Modern Political Philosophy
Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes
(Source: Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/3207)
The Prince by Niccolò Machiavelli
(Source: Machiavelli, Niccolò. The Prince. https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1232)
The Communist Manifesto by Friedrich Engels and Karl Marx
(Source: Engels, Friedrich and Marx, Karl. The Communist Manifesto.
https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/61)
The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte by Karl Marx
(Source: Marx, Karl. The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.
https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1346)
On the Jewish Question by Karl Marx
(Source: Marx, Karl. On the Jewish Question. https://www.marxists.org/index.htm)
Economic & Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 by Karl Marx
(Source: Marx, Karl. Economic & Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Progress Publishers, 1844.
https://www.marxists.org/index.htm)
The German Ideology by Karl Marx
(Source: Marx, Karl. The German Ideology. https://www.marxists.org/index.htm)
Capital by Karl Marx
(Source: Marx, Karl. Capital. Progress Publishers, 1867. https://www.marxists.org/index.htm)
Second Treatise of Government by John Locke
(Source: Locke, John. Second Treatise of Government. https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/7370)
The Social Contract & Discourses by Jean-Jacques Rousseau
(Source: Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Social Contract & Discourses.
https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/46333)
Beyond Good and Evil by Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche
(Source: Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm. Beyond Good and Evil.
https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/4363)
Batsaikhan, O., & Miller, C. (Eds.). (2020).
Ancient and Medieval Political Philosophy.
https://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/all/33
CC BY 4.0

The Project Gutenberg EBook of Leviathan, by Thomas Hobbes
This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or
re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org

Title: Leviathan
Author: Thomas Hobbes
Release Date: October 11, 2009 [EBook #3207]
Last Updated: January 25, 2013
Language: English

*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK LEVIATHAN ***

Produced by Edward White, and David Widger

LEVIATHAN

By Thomas Hobbes
1651

LEVIATHAN OR THE MATTER,
FORME, & POWER OF A COMMON-WEALTH
ECCLESIASTICAL AND CIVILL

Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury
Printed for Andrew Crooke,
at the Green Dragon
in St. Paul's Churchyard,
1651.

TRANSCRIBER'S NOTES ON THE E-TEXT:
This E-text was prepared from the Pelican Classics edition of
Leviathan, which in turn was prepared from the first edition. I have
tried to follow as closely as possible the original, and to give the

flavour of the text that Hobbes himself proof-read, but the
following differences were unavoidable.
Hobbes used capitals and italics very extensively, for emphasis,
for proper names, for quotations, and sometimes, it seems, just
because.
The original has very extensive margin notes, which are used to
show where he introduces the definitions of words and concepts,
to give in short the subject that a paragraph or section is dealing
with, and to give references to his quotations, largely but not
exclusively biblical. To some degree, these margin notes seem to
have been intended to serve in place of an index, the original
having none. They are all in italics.
He also used italics for words in other languages than English,
and there are a number of Greek words, in the Greek alphabet, in
the text.
To deal with these within the limits of plain vanilla ASCII, I have
done the following in this E-text.
I have restricted my use of full capitalization to those places
where Hobbes used it, except in the chapter headings, which I
have fully capitalized, where Hobbes used a mixture of full
capitalization and italics.
Where it is clear that the italics are to indicate the text is
quoting, I have introduced quotation marks. Within quotation
marks I have retained the capitalization that Hobbes used.
Where italics seem to be used for emphasis, or for proper
names, or just because, I have capitalized the initial letter of the
words. This has the disadvantage that they are not then
distinguished from those that Hobbes capitalized in plain text, but
the extent of his italics would make the text very ugly if I was to
use an underscore or slash.
Where the margin notes are either to introduce the paragraph
subject, or to show where he introduces word definitions, I have
included them as headers to the paragraph, again with all words
having initial capitals, and on a shortened line.

For margin references to quotes, I have included them in the
text, in brackets immediately next to the quotation. Where Hobbes
included references in the main text, I have left them as he put
them, except to change his square brackets to round.
For the Greek alphabet, I have simply substituted the nearest
ordinary letters that I can, and I have used initial capitals for
foreign language words.
Neither Thomas Hobbes nor his typesetters seem to have had
many inhibitions about spelling and punctuation. I have tried to
reproduce both exactly, with the exception of the introduction of
quotation marks.
In preparing the text, I have found that it has much more
meaning if I read it with sub-vocalization, or aloud, rather than
trying to read silently. Hobbes' use of emphasis and his eccentric
punctuation and construction seem then to work.

TO MY MOST HONOR'D FRIEND Mr. FRANCIS GODOLPHIN of
GODOLPHIN
HONOR'D SIR.
Your most worthy Brother Mr SIDNEY GODOLPHIN, when he lived,
was pleas'd to think my studies something, and otherwise to oblige me, as
you know, with reall testimonies of his good opinion, great in themselves,
and the greater for the worthinesse of his person. For there is not any
vertue that disposeth a man, either to the service of God, or to the service
of his Country, to Civill Society, or private Friendship, that did not
manifestly appear in his conversation, not as acquired by necessity, or
affected upon occasion, but inhaerent, and shining in a generous
constitution of his nature. Therefore in honour and gratitude to him, and
with devotion to your selfe, I humbly Dedicate unto you this my discourse

of Common-wealth. I know not how the world will receive it, nor how it
may reflect on those that shall seem to favour it. For in a way beset with
those that contend on one side for too great Liberty, and on the other side
for too much Authority, 'tis hard to passe between the points of both
unwounded. But yet, me thinks, the endeavour to advance the Civill
Power, should not be by the Civill Power condemned; nor private men, by
reprehending it, declare they think that Power too great. Besides, I speak
not of the men, but (in the Abstract) of the Seat of Power, (like to those
simple and unpartiall creatures in the Roman Capitol, that with their noyse
defended those within it, not because they were they, but there) offending
none, I think, but those without, or such within (if there be any such) as
favour them. That which perhaps may most offend, are certain Texts of
Holy Scripture, alledged by me to other purpose than ordinarily they use to
be by others. But I have done it with due submission, and also (in order to
my Subject) necessarily; for they are the Outworks of the Enemy, from
whence they impugne the Civill Power. If notwithstanding this, you find
my labour generally decryed, you may be pleased to excuse your selfe, and
say that I am a man that love my own opinions, and think all true I say,
that I honoured your Brother, and honour you, and have presum'd on that,
to assume the Title (without your knowledge) of being, as I am,
Sir,
Your most humble, and most obedient servant, Thomas Hobbes.
Paris APRILL 15/25 1651.
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THE INTRODUCTION
Nature (the art whereby God hath made and governes the world) is by
the art of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it can
make an Artificial Animal. For seeing life is but a motion of Limbs, the
begining whereof is in some principall part within; why may we not say,
that all Automata (Engines that move themselves by springs and wheeles
as doth a watch) have an artificiall life? For what is the Heart, but a
Spring; and the Nerves, but so many Strings; and the Joynts, but so many
Wheeles, giving motion to the whole Body, such as was intended by the
Artificer? Art goes yet further, imitating that Rationall and most excellent
worke of Nature, Man. For by Art is created that great LEVIATHAN called
a COMMON-WEALTH, or STATE, (in latine CIVITAS) which is but an
Artificiall Man; though of greater stature and strength than the Naturall,
for whose protection and defence it was intended; and in which, the
Soveraignty is an Artificiall Soul, as giving life and motion to the whole
body; The Magistrates, and other Officers of Judicature and Execution,
artificiall Joynts; Reward and Punishment (by which fastned to the seat of
the Soveraignty, every joynt and member is moved to performe his duty)
are the Nerves, that do the same in the Body Naturall; The Wealth and
Riches of all the particular members, are the Strength; Salus Populi (the
Peoples Safety) its Businesse; Counsellors, by whom all things needfull
for it to know, are suggested unto it, are the Memory; Equity and Lawes,
an artificiall Reason and Will; Concord, Health; Sedition, Sicknesse; and
Civill War, Death. Lastly, the Pacts and Covenants, by which the parts of
this Body Politique were at first made, set together, and united, resemble
that Fiat, or the Let Us Make Man, pronounced by God in the Creation.
To describe the Nature of this Artificiall man, I will consider
First the Matter thereof, and the Artificer; both which is Man.
Secondly, How, and by what Covenants it is made; what are the Rights
and just Power or Authority of a Soveraigne; and what it is that Preserveth
and Dissolveth it.
Thirdly, what is a Christian Common-Wealth.

Lastly, what is the Kingdome of Darkness.
Concerning the first, there is a saying much usurped of late, That
Wisedome is acquired, not by reading of Books, but of Men. Consequently
whereunto, those persons, that for the most part can give no other proof of
being wise, take great delight to shew what they think they have read in
men, by uncharitable censures of one another behind their backs. But there
is another saying not of late understood, by which they might learn truly to
read one another, if they would take the pains; and that is, Nosce Teipsum,
Read Thy Self: which was not meant, as it is now used, to countenance,
either the barbarous state of men in power, towards their inferiors; or to
encourage men of low degree, to a sawcie behaviour towards their betters;
But to teach us, that for the similitude of the thoughts, and Passions of one
man, to the thoughts, and Passions of another, whosoever looketh into
himselfe, and considereth what he doth, when he does Think, Opine,
Reason, Hope, Feare, &c, and upon what grounds; he shall thereby read
and know, what are the thoughts, and Passions of all other men, upon the
like occasions. I say the similitude of Passions, which are the same in all
men, Desire, Feare, Hope, &c; not the similitude or The Objects of the
Passions, which are the things Desired, Feared, Hoped, &c: for these the
constitution individuall, and particular education do so vary, and they are
so easie to be kept from our knowledge, that the characters of mans heart,
blotted and confounded as they are, with dissembling, lying,
counterfeiting, and erroneous doctrines, are legible onely to him that
searcheth hearts. And though by mens actions wee do discover their
designee sometimes; yet to do it without comparing them with our own,
and distinguishing all circumstances, by which the case may come to be
altered, is to decypher without a key, and be for the most part deceived, by
too much trust, or by too much diffidence; as he that reads, is himselfe a
good or evill man.
But let one man read another by his actions never so perfectly, it serves
him onely with his acquaintance, which are but few. He that is to govern a
whole Nation, must read in himselfe, not this, or that particular man; but
Man-kind; which though it be hard to do, harder than to learn any
Language, or Science; yet, when I shall have set down my own reading
orderly, and perspicuously, the pains left another, will be onely to consider,
if he also find not the same in himselfe. For this kind of Doctrine,
admitteth no other Demonstration.

PART 1 OF MAN

CHAPTER I. OF SENSE
Concerning the Thoughts of man, I will consider them first Singly, and
afterwards in Trayne, or dependance upon one another. Singly, they are
every one a Representation or Apparence, of some quality, or other
Accident of a body without us; which is commonly called an Object.
Which Object worketh on the Eyes, Eares, and other parts of mans body;
and by diversity of working, produceth diversity of Apparences.
The Originall of them all, is that which we call Sense; (For there is no
conception in a mans mind, which hath not at first, totally, or by parts,
been begotten upon the organs of Sense.) The rest are derived from that
originall.
To know the naturall cause of Sense, is not very necessary to the
business now in hand; and I have els-where written of the same at large.
Nevertheless, to fill each part of my present method, I will briefly deliver
the same in this place.
The cause of Sense, is the Externall Body, or Object, which presseth the
organ proper to each Sense, either immediatly, as in the Tast and Touch; or
mediately, as in Seeing, Hearing, and Smelling: which pressure, by the
mediation of Nerves, and other strings, and membranes of the body,
continued inwards to the Brain, and Heart, causeth there a resistance, or
counter-pressure, or endeavour of the heart, to deliver it self: which
endeavour because Outward, seemeth to be some matter without. And this
Seeming, or Fancy, is that which men call sense; and consisteth, as to the
Eye, in a Light, or Colour Figured; To the Eare, in a Sound; To the Nostrill,
in an Odour; To the Tongue and Palat, in a Savour; and to the rest of the
body, in Heat, Cold, Hardnesse, Softnesse, and such other qualities, as we
discern by Feeling. All which qualities called Sensible, are in the object
that causeth them, but so many several motions of the matter, by which it
presseth our organs diversly. Neither in us that are pressed, are they
anything els, but divers motions; (for motion, produceth nothing but
motion.) But their apparence to us is Fancy, the same waking, that
dreaming. And as pressing, rubbing, or striking the Eye, makes us fancy a
light; and pressing the Eare, produceth a dinne; so do the bodies also we

see, or hear, produce the same by their strong, though unobserved action,
For if those Colours, and Sounds, were in the Bodies, or Objects that cause
them, they could not bee severed from them, as by glasses, and in Ecchoes
by reflection, wee see they are; where we know the thing we see, is in one
place; the apparence, in another. And though at some certain distance, the
reall, and very object seem invested with the fancy it begets in us; Yet still
the object is one thing, the image or fancy is another. So that Sense in all
cases, is nothing els but originall fancy, caused (as I have said) by the
pressure, that is, by the motion, of externall things upon our Eyes, Eares,
and other organs thereunto ordained.
But the Philosophy-schooles, through all the Universities of
Christendome, grounded upon certain Texts of Aristotle, teach another
doctrine; and say, For the cause of Vision, that the thing seen, sendeth forth
on every side a Visible Species(in English) a Visible Shew, Apparition, or
Aspect, or a Being Seen; the receiving whereof into the Eye, is Seeing.
And for the cause of Hearing, that the thing heard, sendeth forth an
Audible Species, that is, an Audible Aspect, or Audible Being Seen; which
entring at the Eare, maketh Hearing. Nay for the cause of Understanding
also, they say the thing Understood sendeth forth Intelligible Species, that
is, an Intelligible Being Seen; which comming into the Understanding,
makes us Understand. I say not this, as disapproving the use of
Universities: but because I am to speak hereafter of their office in a
Common-wealth, I must let you see on all occasions by the way, what
things would be amended in them; amongst which the frequency of
insignificant Speech is one.

CHAPTER II. OF IMAGINATION
That when a thing lies still, unlesse somewhat els stirre it, it will lye
still for ever, is a truth that no man doubts of. But that when a thing is in
motion, it will eternally be in motion, unless somewhat els stay it, though
the reason be the same, (namely, that nothing can change it selfe,) is not so
easily assented to. For men measure, not onely other men, but all other
things, by themselves: and because they find themselves subject after
motion to pain, and lassitude, think every thing els growes weary of
motion, and seeks repose of its own accord; little considering, whether it
be not some other motion, wherein that desire of rest they find in
themselves, consisteth. From hence it is, that the Schooles say, Heavy
bodies fall downwards, out of an appetite to rest, and to conserve their
nature in that place which is most proper for them; ascribing appetite, and
Knowledge of what is good for their conservation, (which is more than
man has) to things inanimate absurdly.
When a Body is once in motion, it moveth (unless something els hinder
it) eternally; and whatsoever hindreth it, cannot in an instant, but in time,
and by degrees quite extinguish it: And as wee see in the water, though the
wind cease, the waves give not over rowling for a long time after; so also
it happeneth in that motion, which is made in the internall parts of a man,
then, when he Sees, Dreams, &c. For after the object is removed, or the
eye shut, wee still retain an image of the thing seen, though more obscure
than when we see it. And this is it, that Latines call Imagination, from the
image made in seeing; and apply the same, though improperly, to all the
other senses. But the Greeks call it Fancy; which signifies Apparence, and
is as proper to one sense, as to another. Imagination therefore is nothing
but Decaying Sense; and is found in men, and many other living Creatures,
as well sleeping, as waking.

Memory
The decay of Sense in men waking, is not the decay of the motion made
in sense; but an obscuring of it, in such manner, as the light of the Sun
obscureth the light of the Starres; which starrs do no less exercise their
vertue by which they are visible, in the day, than in the night. But because
amongst many stroaks, which our eyes, eares, and other organs receive
from externall bodies, the predominant onely is sensible; therefore the
light of the Sun being predominant, we are not affected with the action of
the starrs. And any object being removed from our eyes, though the
impression it made in us remain; yet other objects more present
succeeding, and working on us, the Imagination of the past is obscured,
and made weak; as the voyce of a man is in the noyse of the day. From
whence it followeth, that the longer the time is, after the sight, or Sense of
any object, the weaker is the Imagination. For the continuall change of
mans body, destroyes in time the parts which in sense were moved: So that
the distance of time, and of place, hath one and the same effect in us. For
as at a distance of place, that which wee look at, appears dimme, and
without distinction of the smaller parts; and as Voyces grow weak, and
inarticulate: so also after great distance of time, our imagination of the
Past is weak; and wee lose( for example) of Cities wee have seen, many
particular Streets; and of Actions, many particular Circumstances. This
Decaying Sense, when wee would express the thing it self, (I mean Fancy
it selfe,) wee call Imagination, as I said before; But when we would
express the Decay, and signifie that the Sense is fading, old, and past, it is
called Memory. So that Imagination and Memory, are but one thing, which
for divers considerations hath divers names.
Much memory, or memory of many things, is called Experience.
Againe, Imagination being only of those things which have been formerly
perceived by Sense, either all at once, or by parts at severall times; The
former, (which is the imagining the whole object, as it was presented to
the sense) is Simple Imagination; as when one imagineth a man, or horse,
which he hath seen before. The other is Compounded; as when from the
sight of a man at one time, and of a horse at another, we conceive in our

mind a Centaure. So when a man compoundeth the image of his own
person, with the image of the actions of an other man; as when a man
imagins himselfe a Hercules, or an Alexander, (which happeneth often to
them that are much taken with reading of Romants) it is a compound
imagination, and properly but a Fiction of the mind. There be also other
Imaginations that rise in men, (though waking) from the great impression
made in sense; As from gazing upon the Sun, the impression leaves an
image of the Sun before our eyes a long time after; and from being long
and vehemently attent upon Geometricall Figures, a man shall in the dark,
(though awake) have the Images of Lines, and Angles before his eyes:
which kind of Fancy hath no particular name; as being a thing that doth
not commonly fall into mens discourse.

Dreams
The imaginations of them that sleep, are those we call Dreams. And
these also (as all other Imaginations) have been before, either totally, or by
parcells in the Sense. And because in sense, the Brain, and Nerves, which
are the necessary Organs of sense, are so benummed in sleep, as not easily
to be moved by the action of Externall Objects, there can happen in sleep,
no Imagination; and therefore no Dreame, but what proceeds from the
agitation of the inward parts of mans body; which inward parts, for the
connexion they have with the Brayn, and other Organs, when they be
distempered, do keep the same in motion; whereby the Imaginations there
formerly made, appeare as if a man were waking; saving that the Organs
of Sense being now benummed, so as there is no new object, which can
master and obscure them with a more vigorous impression, a Dreame must
needs be more cleare, in this silence of sense, than are our waking
thoughts. And hence it cometh to pass, that it is a hard matter, and by
many thought impossible to distinguish exactly between Sense and
Dreaming. For my part, when I consider, that in Dreames, I do not often,
nor constantly think of the same Persons, Places, Objects, and Actions that
I do waking; nor remember so long a trayne of coherent thoughts,
Dreaming, as at other times; And because waking I often observe the
absurdity of Dreames, but never dream of the absurdities of my waking
Thoughts; I am well satisfied, that being awake, I know I dreame not;
though when I dreame, I think my selfe awake.
And seeing dreames are caused by the distemper of some of the inward
parts of the Body; divers distempers must needs cause different Dreams.
And hence it is, that lying cold breedeth Dreams of Feare, and raiseth the
thought and Image of some fearfull object (the motion from the brain to
the inner parts, and from the inner parts to the Brain being reciprocall:)
and that as Anger causeth heat in some parts of the Body, when we are
awake; so when we sleep, the over heating of the same parts causeth
Anger, and raiseth up in the brain the Imagination of an Enemy. In the
same manner; as naturall kindness, when we are awake causeth desire; and
desire makes heat in certain other parts of the body; so also, too much heat

in those parts, while wee sleep, raiseth in the brain an imagination of some
kindness shewn. In summe, our Dreams are the reverse of our waking
Imaginations; The motion when we are awake, beginning at one end; and
when we Dream, at another.

Apparitions Or Visions
The most difficult discerning of a mans Dream, from his waking
thoughts, is then, when by some accident we observe not that we have
slept: which is easie to happen to a man full of fearfull thoughts; and
whose conscience is much troubled; and that sleepeth, without the
circumstances, of going to bed, or putting off his clothes, as one that
noddeth in a chayre. For he that taketh pains, and industriously layes
himselfe to sleep, in case any uncouth and exorbitant fancy come unto
him, cannot easily think it other than a Dream. We read of Marcus Brutes,
(one that had his life given him by Julius Caesar, and was also his favorite,
and notwithstanding murthered him,) how at Phillipi, the night before he
gave battell to Augustus Caesar, he saw a fearfull apparition, which is
commonly related by Historians as a Vision: but considering the
circumstances, one may easily judge to have been but a short Dream. For
sitting in his tent, pensive and troubled with the horrour of his rash act, it
was not hard for him, slumbering in the cold, to dream of that which most
affrighted him; which feare, as by degrees it made him wake; so also it
must needs make the Apparition by degrees to vanish: And having no
assurance that he slept, he could have no cause to think it a Dream, or any
thing but a Vision. And this is no very rare Accident: for even they that be
perfectly awake, if they be timorous, and supperstitious, possessed with
fearfull tales, and alone in the dark, are subject to the like fancies, and
believe they see spirits and dead mens Ghosts walking in Churchyards;
whereas it is either their Fancy onely, or els the knavery of such persons,
as make use of such superstitious feare, to pass disguised in the night, to
places they would not be known to haunt.
From this ignorance of how to distinguish Dreams, and other strong
Fancies, from vision and Sense, did arise the greatest part of the Religion
of the Gentiles in time past, that worshipped Satyres, Fawnes, nymphs, and
the like; and now adayes the opinion than rude people have of Fayries,
Ghosts, and Goblins; and of the power of Witches. For as for Witches, I
think not that their witch craft is any reall power; but yet that they are
justly punished, for the false beliefe they have, that they can do such

mischiefe, joyned with their purpose to do it if they can; their trade being
neerer to a new Religion, than to a Craft or Science. And for Fayries, and
walking Ghosts, the opinion of them has I think been on purpose, either
taught, or not confuted, to keep in credit the use of Exorcisme, of Crosses,
of holy Water, and other such inventions of Ghostly men. Neverthelesse,
there is no doubt, but God can make unnaturall Apparitions. But that he
does it so often, as men need to feare such things, more than they feare the
stay, or change, of the course of Nature, which he also can stay, and
change, is no point of Christian faith. But evill men under pretext that God
can do any thing, are so bold as to say any thing when it serves their turn,
though they think it untrue; It is the part of a wise man, to believe them no
further, than right reason makes that which they say, appear credible. If
this superstitious fear of Spirits were taken away, and with it,
Prognostiques from Dreams, false Prophecies, and many other things
depending thereon, by which, crafty ambitious persons abuse the simple
people, men would be much more fitted than they are for civill Obedience.
And this ought to be the work of the Schooles; but they rather nourish
such doctrine. For (not knowing what Imagination, or the Senses are),
what they receive, they teach: some saying, that Imaginations rise of
themselves, and have no cause: Others that they rise most commonly from
the Will; and that Good thoughts are blown (inspired) into a man, by God;
and evill thoughts by the Divell: or that Good thoughts are powred
(infused) into a man, by God; and evill ones by the Divell. Some say the
Senses receive the Species of things, and deliver them to the Commonsense; and the Common Sense delivers them over to the Fancy, and the
Fancy to the Memory, and the Memory to the Judgement, like handing of
things from one to another, with many words making nothing understood.

Understanding
The Imagination that is raysed in man (or any other creature indued
with the faculty of imagining) by words, or other voluntary signes, is that
we generally call Understanding; and is common to Man and Beast. For a
dogge by custome will understand the call, or the rating of his Master; and
so will many other Beasts. That Understanding which is peculiar to man, is
the Understanding not onely his will; but his conceptions and thoughts, by
the sequell and contexture of the names of things into Affirmations,
Negations, and other formes of Speech: And of this kinde of
Understanding I shall speak hereafter.

CHAPTER III. OF THE CONSEQUENCE OR
TRAYNE OF IMAGINATIONS
By Consequence, or Trayne of Thoughts, I understand that succession of
one Thought to another, which is called (to distinguish it from Discourse
in words) Mentall Discourse.
When a man thinketh on any thing whatsoever, His next Thought after,
is not altogether so casuall as it seems to be. Not every Thought to every
Thought succeeds indifferently. But as wee have no Imagination, whereof
we have not formerly had Sense, in whole, or in parts; so we have no
Transition from one Imagination to another, whereof we never had the like
before in our Senses. The reason whereof is this. All Fancies are Motions
within us, reliques of those made in the Sense: And those motions that
immediately succeeded one another in the sense, continue also together
after Sense: In so much as the former comming again to take place, and be
praedominant, the later followeth, by coherence of the matter moved, is
such manner, as water upon a plain Table is drawn which way any one part
of it is guided by the finger. But because in sense, to one and the same
thing perceived, sometimes one thing, sometimes another succeedeth, it
comes to passe in time, that in the Imagining of any thing, there is no
certainty what we shall Imagine next; Onely this is certain, it shall be
something that succeeded the same before, at one time or another.

Trayne Of Thoughts Unguided
This Trayne of Thoughts, or Mentall Discourse, is of two sorts. The first
is Unguided, Without Designee, and inconstant; Wherein there is no
Passionate Thought, to govern and direct those that follow, to it self, as the
end and scope of some desire, or other passion: In which case the thoughts
are said to wander, and seem impertinent one to another, as in a Dream.
Such are Commonly the thoughts of men, that are not onely without
company, but also without care of any thing; though even then their
Thoughts are as busie as at other times, but without harmony; as the sound
which a Lute out of tune would yeeld to any man; or in tune, to one that
could not play. And yet in this wild ranging of the mind, a man may ofttimes perceive the way of it, and the dependance of one thought upon
another. For in a Discourse of our present civill warre, what could seem
more impertinent, than to ask (as one did) what was the value of a Roman
Penny? Yet the Cohaerence to me was manifest enough. For the Thought
of the warre, introduced the Thought of the delivering up the King to his
Enemies; The Thought of that, brought in the Thought of the delivering up
of Christ; and that again the Thought of the 30 pence, which was the price
of that treason: and thence easily followed that malicious question; and all
this in a moment of time; for Thought is quick.

Trayne Of Thoughts Regulated
The second is more constant; as being Regulated by some desire, and
designee. For the impression made by such things as wee desire, or feare,
is strong, and permanent, or, (if it cease for a time,) of quick return: so
strong it is sometimes, as to hinder and break our sleep. From Desire,
ariseth the Thought of some means we have seen produce the like of that
which we ayme at; and from the thought of that, the thought of means to
that mean; and so continually, till we come to some beginning within our
own power. And because the End, by the greatnesse of the impression,
comes often to mind, in case our thoughts begin to wander, they are
quickly again reduced into the way: which observed by one of the seven
wise men, made him give men this praecept, which is now worne out,
Respice Finem; that is to say, in all your actions, look often upon what you
would have, as the thing that directs all your thoughts in the way to attain
it.

Remembrance
The Trayn of regulated Thoughts is of two kinds; One, when of an effect
imagined, wee seek the causes, or means that produce it: and this is
common to Man and Beast. The other is, when imagining any thing
whatsoever, wee seek all the possible effects, that can by it be produced;
that is to say, we imagine what we can do with it, when wee have it. Of
which I have not at any time seen any signe, but in man onely; for this is a
curiosity hardly incident to the nature of any living creature that has no
other Passion but sensuall, such as are hunger, thirst, lust, and anger. In
summe, the Discourse of the Mind, when it is governed by designee, is
nothing but Seeking, or the faculty of Invention, which the Latines call
Sagacitas, and Solertia; a hunting out of the causes, of some effect, present
or past; or of the effects, of some present or past cause, sometimes a man
seeks what he hath lost; and from that place, and time, wherein hee misses
it, his mind runs back, from place to place, and time to time, to find where,
and when he had it; that is to say, to find some certain, and limited time
and place, in which to begin a method of seeking. Again, from thence, his
thoughts run over the same places and times, to find what action, or other
occasion might make him lose it. This we call Remembrance, or Calling to
mind: the Latines call it Reminiscentia, as it were a Re-Conning of our
former actions.
Sometimes a man knows a place determinate, within the compasse
whereof his is to seek; and then his thoughts run over all the parts thereof,
in the same manner, as one would sweep a room, to find a jewell; or as a
Spaniel ranges the field, till he find a sent; or as a man should run over the
alphabet, to start a rime.

Prudence
Sometime a man desires to know the event of an action; and then he
thinketh of some like action past, and the events thereof one after another;
supposing like events will follow like actions. As he that foresees what wil
become of a Criminal, re-cons what he has seen follow on the like Crime
before; having this order of thoughts, The Crime, the Officer, the Prison,
the Judge, and the Gallowes. Which kind of thoughts, is called Foresight,
and Prudence, or Providence; and sometimes Wisdome; though such
conjecture, through the difficulty of observing all circumstances, be very
fallacious. But this is certain; by how much one man has more experience
of things past, than another; by so much also he is more Prudent, and his
expectations the seldomer faile him. The Present onely has a being in
Nature; things Past have a being in the Memory onely, but things To Come
have no being at all; the Future being but a fiction of the mind, applying
the sequels of actions Past, to the actions that are Present; which with most
certainty is done by him that has most Experience; but not with certainty
enough. And though it be called Prudence, when the Event answereth our
Expectation; yet in its own nature, it is but Presumption. For the foresight
of things to come, which is Providence, belongs onely to him by whose
will they are to come. From him onely, and supernaturally, proceeds
Prophecy. The best Prophet naturally is the best guesser; and the best
guesser, he that is most versed and studied in the matters he guesses at: for
he hath most Signes to guesse by.

Signes
A Signe, is the Event Antecedent, of the Consequent; and contrarily, the
Consequent of the Antecedent, when the like Consequences have been
observed, before: And the oftner they have been observed, the lesse
uncertain is the Signe. And therefore he that has most experience in any
kind of businesse, has most Signes, whereby to guesse at the Future time,
and consequently is the most prudent: And so much more prudent than he
that is new in that kind of business, as not to be equalled by any advantage
of naturall and extemporary wit: though perhaps many young men think
the contrary.
Neverthelesse it is not Prudence that distinguisheth man from beast.
There be beasts, that at a year old observe more, and pursue that which is
for their good, more prudently, than a child can do at ten.

Conjecture Of The Time Past
As Prudence is a Praesumtion of the Future, contracted from the
Experience of time Past; So there is a Praesumtion of things Past taken
from other things (not future but) past also. For he that hath seen by what
courses and degrees, a flourishing State hath first come into civill warre,
and then to ruine; upon the sights of the ruines of any other State, will
guesse, the like warre, and the like courses have been there also. But his
conjecture, has the same incertainty almost with the conjecture of the
Future; both being grounded onely upon Experience.
There is no other act of mans mind, that I can remember, naturally
planted in him, so, as to need no other thing, to the exercise of it, but to be
born a man, and live with the use of his five Senses. Those other Faculties,
of which I shall speak by and by, and which seem proper to man onely, are
acquired, and encreased by study and industry; and of most men learned
by instruction, and discipline; and proceed all from the invention of
Words, and Speech. For besides Sense, and Thoughts, and the Trayne of
thoughts, the mind of man has no other motion; though by the help of
Speech, and Method, the same Facultyes may be improved to such a
height, as to distinguish men from all other living Creatures.
Whatsoever we imagine, is Finite. Therefore there is no Idea, or
conception of anything we call Infinite. No man can have in his mind an
Image of infinite magnitude; nor conceive the ends, and bounds of the
thing named; having no Conception of the thing, but of our own inability.
And therefore the Name of GOD is used, not to make us conceive him;
(for he is Incomprehensible; and his greatnesse, and power are
unconceivable;) but that we may honour him. Also because whatsoever (as
I said before,) we conceive, has been perceived first by sense, either all at
once, or by parts; a man can have no thought, representing any thing, not
subject to sense. No man therefore can conceive any thing, but he must
conceive it in some place; and indued with some determinate magnitude;
and which may be divided into parts; nor that any thing is all in this place,
and all in another place at the same time; nor that two, or more things can
be in one, and the same place at once: for none of these things ever have,

or can be incident to Sense; but are absurd speeches, taken upon credit
(without any signification at all,) from deceived Philosophers, and
deceived, or deceiving Schoolemen.

CHAPTER IV. OF SPEECH

Originall Of Speech
The Invention of Printing, though ingenious, compared with the
invention of Letters, is no great matter. But who was the first that found
the use of Letters, is not known. He that first brought them into Greece,
men say was Cadmus, the sonne of Agenor, King of Phaenicia. A
profitable Invention for continuing the memory of time past, and the
conjunction of mankind, dispersed into so many, and distant regions of the
Earth; and with all difficult, as proceeding from a watchfull observation of
the divers motions of the Tongue, Palat, Lips, and other organs of Speech;
whereby to make as many differences of characters, to remember them.
But the most noble and profitable invention of all other, was that of
Speech, consisting of Names or Apellations, and their Connexion; whereby
men register their Thoughts; recall them when they are past; and also
declare them one to another for mutuall utility and conversation; without
which, there had been amongst men, neither Common-wealth, nor Society,
nor Contract, nor Peace, no more than amongst Lyons, Bears, and Wolves.
The first author of Speech was GOD himselfe, that instructed Adam how
to name such creatures as he presented to his sight; For the Scripture goeth
no further in this matter. But this was sufficient to direct him to adde more
names, as the experience and use of the creatures should give him
occasion; and to joyn them in such manner by degrees, as to make
himselfe understood; and so by succession of time, so much language
might be gotten, as he had found use for; though not so copious, as an
Orator or Philosopher has need of. For I do not find any thing in the
Scripture, out of which, directly or by consequence can be gathered, that
Adam was taught the names of all Figures, Numbers, Measures, Colours,
Sounds, Fancies, Relations; much less the names of Words and Speech, as
Generall, Speciall, Affirmative, Negative, Interrogative, Optative,
Infinitive, all which are usefull; and least of all, of Entity, Intentionality,
Quiddity, and other significant words of the School.
But all this language gotten, and augmented by Adam and his posterity,
was again lost at the tower of Babel, when by the hand of God, every man
was stricken for his rebellion, with an oblivion of his former language.

And being hereby forced to disperse themselves into severall parts of the
world, it must needs be, that the diversity of Tongues that now is,
proceeded by degrees from them, in such manner, as need (the mother of
all inventions) taught them; and in tract of time grew every where more
copious.

The Use Of Speech
The generall use of Speech, is to transferre our Mentall Discourse, into
Verbal; or the Trayne of our Thoughts, into a Trayne of Words; and that for
two commodities; whereof one is, the Registring of the Consequences of
our Thoughts; which being apt to slip out of our memory, and put us to a
new labour, may again be recalled, by such words as they were marked by.
So that the first use of names, is to serve for Markes, or Notes of
remembrance. Another is, when many use the same words, to signifie (by
their connexion and order,) one to another, what they conceive, or think of
each matter; and also what they desire, feare, or have any other passion
for, and for this use they are called Signes. Speciall uses of Speech are
these; First, to Register, what by cogitation, wee find to be the cause of
any thing, present or past; and what we find things present or past may
produce, or effect: which in summe, is acquiring of Arts. Secondly, to
shew to others that knowledge which we have attained; which is, to
Counsell, and Teach one another. Thirdly, to make known to others our
wills, and purposes, that we may have the mutuall help of one another.
Fourthly, to please and delight our selves, and others, by playing with our
words, for pleasure or ornament, innocently.

Abuses Of Speech
To these Uses, there are also foure correspondent Abuses. First, when
men register their thoughts wrong, by the inconstancy of the signification
of their words; by which they register for their conceptions, that which
they never conceived; and so deceive themselves. Secondly, when they use
words metaphorically; that is, in other sense than that they are ordained
for; and thereby deceive others. Thirdly, when by words they declare that
to be their will, which is not. Fourthly, when they use them to grieve one
another: for seeing nature hath armed living creatures, some with teeth,
some with horns, and some with hands, to grieve an enemy, it is but an
abuse of Speech, to grieve him with the tongue, unlesse it be one whom
wee are obliged to govern; and then it is not to grieve, but to correct and
amend.
The manner how Speech serveth to the remembrance of the consequence
of causes and effects, consisteth in the imposing of Names, and the
Connexion of them.

Names Proper & Common Universall
Of Names, some are Proper, and singular to one onely thing; as Peter,
John, This Man, This Tree: and some are Common to many things; as
Man, Horse, Tree; every of which though but one Name, is nevertheless
the name of divers particular things; in respect of all which together, it is
called an Universall; there being nothing in the world Universall but
Names; for the things named, are every one of them Individual and
Singular.
One Universall name is imposed on many things, for their similitude in
some quality, or other accident: And whereas a Proper Name bringeth to
mind one thing onely; Universals recall any one of those many.
And of Names Universall, some are of more, and some of lesse extent;
the larger comprehending the lesse large: and some again of equall extent,
comprehending each other reciprocally. As for example, the Name Body is
of larger signification than the word Man, and conprehendeth it; and the
names Man and Rationall, are of equall extent, comprehending mutually
one another. But here wee must take notice, that by a Name is not alwayes
understood, as in Grammar, one onely word; but sometimes by
circumlocution many words together. For all these words, Hee That In His
Actions Observeth The Lawes Of His Country, make but one Name,
equivalent to this one word, Just.
By this imposition of Names, some of larger, some of stricter
signification, we turn the reckoning of the consequences of things
imagined in the mind, into a reckoning of the consequences of
Appellations. For example, a man that hath no use of Speech at all, (such,
as is born and remains perfectly deafe and dumb,) if he set before his eyes
a triangle, and by it two right angles, (such as are the corners of a square
figure,) he may by meditation compare and find, that the three angles of
that triangle, are equall to those two right angles that stand by it. But if
another triangle be shewn him different in shape from the former, he
cannot know without a new labour, whether the three angles of that also be
equall to the same. But he that hath the use of words, when he observes,
that such equality was consequent, not to the length of the sides, nor to any

other particular thing in his triangle; but onely to this, that the sides were
straight, and the angles three; and that that was all, for which he named it a
Triangle; will boldly conclude Universally, that such equality of angles is
in all triangles whatsoever; and register his invention in these generall
termes, Every Triangle Hath Its Three Angles Equall To Two Right Angles.
And thus the consequence found in one particular, comes to be registred
and remembred, as a Universall rule; and discharges our mentall
reckoning, of time and place; and delivers us from all labour of the mind,
saving the first; and makes that which was found true Here, and Now, to be
true in All Times and Places.
But the use of words in registring our thoughts, is in nothing so evident
as in Numbering. A naturall foole that could never learn by heart the order
of numerall words, as One, Two, and Three, may observe every stroak of
the Clock, and nod to it, or say one, one, one; but can never know what
houre it strikes. And it seems, there was a time when those names of
number were not in use; and men were fayn to apply their fingers of one or
both hands, to those things they desired to keep account of; and that thence
it proceeded, that now our numerall words are but ten, in any Nation, and
in some but five, and then they begin again. And he that can tell ten, if he
recite them out of order, will lose himselfe, and not know when he has
done: Much lesse will he be able to add, and substract, and performe all
other operations of Arithmetique. So that without words, there is no
possibility of reckoning of Numbers; much lesse of Magnitudes, of
Swiftnesse, of Force, and other things, the reckonings whereof are
necessary to the being, or well-being of man-kind.
When two Names are joyned together into a Consequence, or
Affirmation; as thus, A Man Is A Living Creature; or thus, If He Be A
Man, He Is A Living Creature, If the later name Living Creature, signifie
all that the former name Man signifieth, then the affirmation, or
consequence is True; otherwise False. For True and False are attributes of
Speech, not of things. And where Speech in not, there is neither Truth nor
Falshood. Errour there may be, as when wee expect that which shall not
be; or suspect what has not been: but in neither case can a man be charged
with Untruth.
Seeing then that Truth consisteth in the right ordering of names in our
affirmations, a man that seeketh precise Truth, had need to remember what

every name he uses stands for; and to place it accordingly; or els he will
find himselfe entangled in words, as a bird in lime-twiggs; the more he
struggles, the more belimed. And therefore in Geometry, (which is the
onely Science that it hath pleased God hitherto to bestow on mankind,)
men begin at settling the significations of their words; which settling of
significations, they call Definitions; and place them in the beginning of
their reckoning.
By this it appears how necessary it is for any man that aspires to true
Knowledge, to examine the Definitions of former Authors; and either to
correct them, where they are negligently set down; or to make them
himselfe. For the errours of Definitions multiply themselves, according as
the reckoning proceeds; and lead men into absurdities, which at last they
see, but cannot avoyd, without reckoning anew from the beginning; in
which lyes the foundation of their errours. From whence it happens, that
they which trust to books, do as they that cast up many little summs into a
greater, without considering whether those little summes were rightly cast
up or not; and at last finding the errour visible, and not mistrusting their
first grounds, know not which way to cleere themselves; but spend time in
fluttering over their bookes; as birds that entring by the chimney, and
finding themselves inclosed in a chamber, flitter at the false light of a
glasse window, for want of wit to consider which way they came in. So
that in the right Definition of Names, lyes the first use of Speech; which is
the Acquisition of Science: And in wrong, or no Definitions' lyes the first
abuse; from which proceed all false and senslesse Tenets; which make
those men that take their instruction from the authority of books, and not
from their own meditation, to be as much below the condition of ignorant
men, as men endued with true Science are above it. For between true
Science, and erroneous Doctrines, Ignorance is in the middle. Naturall
sense and imagination, are not subject to absurdity. Nature it selfe cannot
erre: and as men abound in copiousnesse of language; so they become
more wise, or more mad than ordinary. Nor is it possible without Letters
for any man to become either excellently wise, or (unless his memory be
hurt by disease, or ill constitution of organs) excellently foolish. For
words are wise mens counters, they do but reckon by them: but they are
the mony of fooles, that value them by the authority of an Aristotle, a
Cicero, or a Thomas, or any other Doctor whatsoever, if but a man.

Subject To Names
Subject To Names, is whatsoever can enter into, or be considered in an
account; and be added one to another to make a summe; or substracted one
from another, and leave a remainder. The Latines called Accounts of mony
Rationes, and accounting, Ratiocinatio: and that which we in bills or books
of account call Items, they called Nomina; that is, Names: and thence it
seems to proceed, that they extended the word Ratio, to the faculty of
Reckoning in all other things. The Greeks have but one word Logos, for
both Speech and Reason; not that they thought there was no Speech
without Reason; but no Reasoning without Speech: And the act of
reasoning they called syllogisme; which signifieth summing up of the
consequences of one saying to another. And because the same things may
enter into account for divers accidents; their names are (to shew that
diversity) diversly wrested, and diversified. This diversity of names may
be reduced to foure generall heads.
First, a thing may enter into account for Matter, or Body; as Living,
Sensible, Rationall, Hot, Cold, Moved, Quiet; with all which names the
word Matter, or Body is understood; all such, being names of Matter.
Secondly, it may enter into account, or be considered, for some accident
or quality, which we conceive to be in it; as for Being Moved, for Being So
Long, for Being Hot, &c; and then, of the name of the thing it selfe, by a
little change or wresting, wee make a name for that accident, which we
consider; and for Living put into account Life; for Moved, Motion; for
Hot, Heat; for Long, Length, and the like. And all such Names, are the
names of the accidents and properties, by which one Matter, and Body is
distinguished from another. These are called Names Abstract; Because
Severed (not from Matter, but) from the account of Matter.
Thirdly, we bring into account, the Properties of our own bodies,
whereby we make such distinction: as when any thing is Seen by us, we
reckon not the thing it selfe; but the Sight, the Colour, the Idea of it in the
fancy: and when any thing is Heard, wee reckon it not; but the Hearing, or
Sound onely, which is our fancy or conception of it by the Eare: and such
are names of fancies.

Fourthly, we bring into account, consider, and give names, to Names
themselves, and to Speeches: For, Generall, Universall, Speciall,
Oequivocall, are names of Names. And Affirmation, Interrogation,
Commandement, Narration, Syllogisme, Sermon, Oration, and many other
such, are names of Speeches.

Use Of Names Positive
And this is all the variety of Names Positive; which are put to mark
somewhat which is in Nature, or may be feigned by the mind of man, as
Bodies that are, or may be conceived to be; or of bodies, the Properties
that are, or may be feigned to be; or Words and Speech.

Negative Names With Their Uses
There be also other Names, called Negative; which are notes to signifie
that a word is not the name of the thing in question; as these words
Nothing, No Man, Infinite, Indocible, Three Want Foure, and the like;
which are nevertheless of use in reckoning, or in correcting of reckoning;
and call to mind our past cogitations, though they be not names of any
thing; because they make us refuse to admit of Names not rightly used.

Words Insignificant
All other names, are but insignificant sounds; and those of two sorts.
One, when they are new, and yet their meaning not explained by
Definition; whereof there have been aboundance coyned by Schoole-men,
and pusled Philosophers.
Another, when men make a name of two Names, whose significations
are contradictory and inconsistent; as this name, an Incorporeall Body, or
(which is all one) an Incorporeall Substance, and a great number more. For
whensoever any affirmation is false, the two names of which it is
composed, put together and made one, signifie nothing at all. For example
if it be a false affirmation to say A Quadrangle Is Round, the word Round
Quadrangle signifies nothing; but is a meere sound. So likewise if it be
false, to say that vertue can be powred, or blown up and down; the words
In-powred Vertue, In-blown Vertue, are as absurd and insignificant, as a
Round Quadrangle. And therefore you shall hardly meet with a senselesse
and insignificant word, that is not made up of some Latin or Greek names.
A Frenchman seldome hears our Saviour called by the name of Parole, but
by the name of Verbe often; yet Verbe and Parole differ no more, but that
one is Latin, the other French.

Understanding
When a man upon the hearing of any Speech, hath those thoughts which
the words of that Speech, and their connexion, were ordained and
constituted to signifie; Then he is said to understand it; Understanding
being nothing els, but conception caused by Speech. And therefore if
Speech be peculiar to man (as for ought I know it is,) then is
Understanding peculiar to him also. And therefore of absurd and false
affirmations, in case they be universall, there can be no Understanding;
though many think they understand, then, when they do but repeat the
words softly, or con them in their mind.
What kinds of Speeches signifie the Appetites, Aversions, and Passions
of mans mind; and of their use and abuse, I shall speak when I have
spoken of the Passions.

Inconstant Names
The names of such things as affect us, that is, which please, and
displease us, because all men be not alike affected with the same thing,
nor the same man at all times, are in the common discourses of men, of
Inconstant signification. For seeing all names are imposed to signifie our
conceptions; and all our affections are but conceptions; when we conceive
the same things differently, we can hardly avoyd different naming of them.
For though the nature of that we conceive, be the same; yet the diversity of
our reception of it, in respect of different constitutions of body, and
prejudices of opinion, gives everything a tincture of our different passions.
And therefore in reasoning, a man bust take heed of words; which besides
the signification of what we imagine of their nature, disposition, and
interest of the speaker; such as are the names of Vertues, and Vices; For
one man calleth Wisdome, what another calleth Feare; and one Cruelty,
what another Justice; one Prodigality, what another Magnanimity; one
Gravity, what another Stupidity, &c. And therefore such names can never
be true grounds of any ratiocination. No more can Metaphors, and Tropes
of speech: but these are less dangerous, because they profess their
inconstancy; which the other do not.

CHAPTER V. OF REASON, AND SCIENCE.

Reason What It Is
When a man Reasoneth, hee does nothing els but conceive a summe
totall, from Addition of parcels; or conceive a Remainder, from
Substraction of one summe from another: which (if it be done by Words,)
is conceiving of the consequence of the names of all the parts, to the name
of the whole; or from the names of the whole and one part, to the name of
the other part. And though in some things, (as in numbers,) besides Adding
and Substracting, men name other operations, as Multiplying and
Dividing; yet they are the same; for Multiplication, is but Addition
together of things equall; and Division, but Substracting of one thing, as
often as we can. These operations are not incident to Numbers onely, but to
all manner of things that can be added together, and taken one out of
another. For as Arithmeticians teach to adde and substract in Numbers; so
the Geometricians teach the same in Lines, Figures (solid and
superficiall,) Angles, Proportions, Times, degrees of Swiftnesse, Force,
Power, and the like; The Logicians teach the same in Consequences Of
Words; adding together Two Names, to make an Affirmation; and Two
Affirmations, to make a syllogisme; and Many syllogismes to make a
Demonstration; and from the Summe, or Conclusion of a syllogisme, they
substract one Proposition, to finde the other. Writers of Politiques, adde
together Pactions, to find mens Duties; and Lawyers, Lawes and Facts, to
find what is Right and Wrong in the actions of private men. In summe, in
what matter soever there is place for Addition and Substraction, there also
is place for Reason; and where these have no place, there Reason has
nothing at all to do.

Reason Defined
Out of all which we may define, (that is to say determine,) what that is,
which is meant by this word Reason, when wee reckon it amongst the
Faculties of the mind. For Reason, in this sense, is nothing but Reckoning
(that is, Adding and Substracting) of the Consequences of generall names
agreed upon, for the Marking and Signifying of our thoughts; I say
Marking them, when we reckon by our selves; and Signifying, when we
demonstrate, or approve our reckonings to other men.

Right Reason Where
And as in Arithmetique, unpractised men must, and Professors
themselves may often erre, and cast up false; so also in any other subject
of Reasoning, the ablest, most attentive, and most practised men, may
deceive themselves, and inferre false Conclusions; Not but that Reason it
selfe is always Right Reason, as well as Arithmetique is a certain and
infallible art: But no one mans Reason, nor the Reason of any one number
of men, makes the certaintie; no more than an account is therefore well
cast up, because a great many men have unanimously approved it. And
therfore, as when there is a controversy in an account, the parties must by
their own accord, set up for right Reason, the Reason of some Arbitrator,
or Judge, to whose sentence they will both stand, or their controversie
must either come to blowes, or be undecided, for want of a right Reason
constituted by Nature; so is it also in all debates of what kind soever: And
when men that think themselves wiser than all others, clamor and demand
right Reason for judge; yet seek no more, but that things should be
determined, by no other mens reason but their own, it is as intolerable in
the society of men, as it is in play after trump is turned, to use for trump
on every occasion, that suite whereof they have most in their hand. For
they do nothing els, that will have every of their passions, as it comes to
bear sway in them, to be taken for right Reason, and that in their own
controversies: bewraying their want of right Reason, by the claym they lay
to it.

The Use Of Reason
The Use and End of Reason, is not the finding of the summe, and truth
of one, or a few consequences, remote from the first definitions, and
settled significations of names; but to begin at these; and proceed from
one consequence to another. For there can be no certainty of the last
Conclusion, without a certainty of all those Affirmations and Negations,
on which it was grounded, and inferred. As when a master of a family, in
taking an account, casteth up the summs of all the bills of expence, into
one sum; and not regarding how each bill is summed up, by those that give
them in account; nor what it is he payes for; he advantages himselfe no
more, than if he allowed the account in grosse, trusting to every of the
accountants skill and honesty; so also in Reasoning of all other things, he
that takes up conclusions on the trust of Authors, and doth not fetch them
from the first Items in every Reckoning, (which are the significations of
names settled by definitions), loses his labour; and does not know any
thing; but onely beleeveth.

Of Error And Absurdity
When a man reckons without the use of words, which may be done in
particular things, (as when upon the sight of any one thing, wee conjecture
what was likely to have preceded, or is likely to follow upon it;) if that
which he thought likely to follow, followes not; or that which he thought
likely to have preceded it, hath not preceded it, this is called ERROR; to
which even the most prudent men are subject. But when we Reason in
Words of generall signification, and fall upon a generall inference which is
false; though it be commonly called Error, it is indeed an ABSURDITY, or
senseless Speech. For Error is but a deception, in presuming that
somewhat is past, or to come; of which, though it were not past, or not to
come; yet there was no impossibility discoverable. But when we make a
generall assertion, unlesse it be a true one, the possibility of it is
unconceivable. And words whereby we conceive nothing but the sound, are
those we call Absurd, insignificant, and Non-sense. And therefore if a man
should talk to me of a Round Quadrangle; or Accidents Of Bread In
Cheese; or Immaterial Substances; or of A Free Subject; A Free Will; or
any Free, but free from being hindred by opposition, I should not say he
were in an Errour; but that his words were without meaning; that is to say,
Absurd.
I have said before, (in the second chapter,) that a Man did excell all
other Animals in this faculty, that when he conceived any thing
whatsoever, he was apt to enquire the consequences of it, and what effects
he could do with it. And now I adde this other degree of the same
excellence, that he can by words reduce the consequences he findes to
generall Rules, called Theoremes, or Aphorismes; that is, he can Reason,
or reckon, not onely in number; but in all other things, whereof one may
be added unto, or substracted from another.
But this priviledge, is allayed by another; and that is, by the priviledge
of Absurdity; to which no living creature is subject, but man onely. And of
men, those are of all most subject to it, that professe Philosophy. For it is
most true that Cicero sayth of them somewhere; that there can be nothing
so absurd, but may be found in the books of Philosophers. And the reason

is manifest. For there is not one of them that begins his ratiocination from
the Definitions, or Explications of the names they are to use; which is a
method that hath been used onely in Geometry; whose Conclusions have
thereby been made indisputable.

Causes Of Absurditie
The first cause of Absurd conclusions I ascribe to the want of Method;
in that they begin not their Ratiocination from Definitions; that is, from
settled significations of their words: as if they could cast account, without
knowing the value of the numerall words, One, Two, and Three.
And whereas all bodies enter into account upon divers considerations,
(which I have mentioned in the precedent chapter;) these considerations
being diversly named, divers absurdities proceed from the confusion, and
unfit connexion of their names into assertions. And therefore
The second cause of Absurd assertions, I ascribe to the giving of names
of Bodies, to Accidents; or of Accidents, to Bodies; As they do, that say,
Faith Is Infused, or Inspired; when nothing can be Powred, or Breathed
into any thing, but body; and that, Extension is Body; that Phantasmes are
Spirits, &c.
The third I ascribe to the giving of the names of the Accidents of Bodies
Without Us, to the Accidents of our Own Bodies; as they do that say, the
Colour Is In The Body; The Sound Is In The Ayre, &c.
The fourth, to the giving of the names of Bodies, to Names, or
Speeches; as they do that say, that There Be Things Universall; that A
Living Creature Is Genus, or A Generall Thing, &c.
The fifth, to the giving of the names of Accidents, to Names and
Speeches; as they do that say, The Nature Of A Thing Is In Its Definition;
A Mans Command Is His Will; and the like.
The sixth, to the use of Metaphors, Tropes, and other Rhetoricall
figures, in stead of words proper. For though it be lawfull to say, (for
example) in common speech, The Way Goeth, Or Leadeth Hither, Or
Thither, The Proverb Sayes This Or That (whereas wayes cannot go, nor
Proverbs speak;) yet in reckoning, and seeking of truth, such speeches are
not to be admitted.
The seventh, to names that signifie nothing; but are taken up, and
learned by rote from the Schooles, as Hypostatical, Transubstantiate,
Consubstantiate, Eternal-now, and the like canting of Schoole-men.

To him that can avoyd these things, it is not easie to fall into any
absurdity, unlesse it be by the length of an account; wherein he may
perhaps forget what went before. For all men by nature reason alike, and
well, when they have good principles. For who is so stupid, as both to
mistake in Geometry, and also to persist in it, when another detects his
error to him?

Science
By this it appears that Reason is not as Sense, and Memory, borne with
us; nor gotten by Experience onely; as Prudence is; but attayned by
Industry; first in apt imposing of Names; and secondly by getting a good
and orderly Method in proceeding from the Elements, which are Names, to
Assertions made by Connexion of one of them to another; and so to
syllogismes, which are the Connexions of one Assertion to another, till we
come to a knowledge of all the Consequences of names appertaining to the
subject in hand; and that is it, men call SCIENCE. And whereas Sense and
Memory are but knowledge of Fact, which is a thing past, and irrevocable;
Science is the knowledge of Consequences, and dependance of one fact
upon another: by which, out of that we can presently do, we know how to
do something els when we will, or the like, another time; Because when
we see how any thing comes about, upon what causes, and by what
manner; when the like causes come into our power, wee see how to make
it produce the like effects.
Children therefore are not endued with Reason at all, till they have
attained the use of Speech: but are called Reasonable Creatures, for the
possibility apparent of having the use of Reason in time to come. And the
most part of men, though they have the use of Reasoning a little way, as in
numbring to some degree; yet it serves them to little use in common life;
in which they govern themselves, some better, some worse, according to
their differences of experience, quicknesse of memory, and inclinations to
severall ends; but specially according to good or evill fortune, and the
errors of one another. For as for Science, or certain rules of their actions,
they are so farre from it, that they know not what it is. Geometry they have
thought Conjuring: but for other Sciences, they who have not been taught
the beginnings, and some progresse in them, that they may see how they
be acquired and generated, are in this point like children, that having no
thought of generation, are made believe by the women, that their brothers
and sisters are not born, but found in the garden.
But yet they that have no Science, are in better, and nobler condition
with their naturall Prudence; than men, that by mis-reasoning, or by

trusting them that reason wrong, fall upon false and absurd generall rules.
For ignorance of causes, and of rules, does not set men so farre out of their
way, as relying on false rules, and taking for causes of what they aspire to,
those that are not so, but rather causes of the contrary.
To conclude, The Light of humane minds is Perspicuous Words, but by
exact definitions first snuffed, and purged from ambiguity; Reason is the
Pace; Encrease of Science, the Way; and the Benefit of man-kind, the End.
And on the contrary, Metaphors, and senslesse and ambiguous words, are
like Ignes Fatui; and reasoning upon them, is wandering amongst
innumerable absurdities; and their end, contention, and sedition, or
contempt.

Prudence & Sapience, With Their Difference
As, much Experience, is Prudence; so, is much Science, Sapience. For
though wee usually have one name of Wisedome for them both; yet the
Latines did always distinguish between Prudentia and Sapientia, ascribing
the former to Experience, the later to Science. But to make their difference
appeare more cleerly, let us suppose one man endued with an excellent
naturall use, and dexterity in handling his armes; and another to have
added to that dexterity, an acquired Science, of where he can offend, or be
offended by his adversarie, in every possible posture, or guard: The ability
of the former, would be to the ability of the later, as Prudence to Sapience;
both usefull; but the later infallible. But they that trusting onely to the
authority of books, follow the blind blindly, are like him that trusting to
the false rules of the master of fence, ventures praesumptuously upon an
adversary, that either kills, or disgraces him.

Signes Of Science
The signes of Science, are some, certain and infallible; some, uncertain.
Certain, when he that pretendeth the Science of any thing, can teach the
same; that is to say, demonstrate the truth thereof perspicuously to
another: Uncertain, when onely some particular events answer to his
pretence, and upon many occasions prove so as he sayes they must. Signes
of prudence are all uncertain; because to observe by experience, and
remember all circumstances that may alter the successe, is impossible. But
in any businesse, whereof a man has not infallible Science to proceed by;
to forsake his own natural judgement, and be guided by generall sentences
read in Authors, and subject to many exceptions, is a signe of folly, and
generally scorned by the name of Pedantry. And even of those men
themselves, that in Councells of the Common-wealth, love to shew their
reading of Politiques and History, very few do it in their domestique
affaires, where their particular interest is concerned; having Prudence
enough for their private affaires: but in publique they study more the
reputation of their owne wit, than the successe of anothers businesse.

CHAPTER VI. OF THE INTERIOUR
BEGINNINGS OF VOLUNTARY MOTIONS
COMMONLY CALLED THE PASSIONS. AND THE SPEECHES BY
WHICH THEY ARE EXPRESSED.

Motion Vitall And Animal
There be in Animals, two sorts of Motions peculiar to them: One called
Vitall; begun in generation, and continued without interruption through
their whole life; such as are the Course of the Bloud, the Pulse, the
Breathing, the Concoctions, Nutrition, Excretion, &c; to which Motions
there needs no help of Imagination: The other in Animal Motion,
otherwise called Voluntary Motion; as to Go, to Speak, to Move any of our
limbes, in such manner as is first fancied in our minds. That Sense, is
Motion in the organs and interiour parts of mans body, caused by the
action of the things we See, Heare, &c.; And that Fancy is but the Reliques
of the same Motion, remaining after Sense, has been already sayd in the
first and second Chapters. And because Going, Speaking, and the like
Voluntary motions, depend alwayes upon a precedent thought of Whither,
Which Way, and What; it is evident, that the Imagination is the first
internall beginning of all Voluntary Motion. And although unstudied men,
doe not conceive any motion at all to be there, where the thing moved is
invisible; or the space it is moved in, is (for the shortnesse of it)
insensible; yet that doth not hinder, but that such Motions are. For let a
space be never so little, that which is moved over a greater space, whereof
that little one is part, must first be moved over that. These small
beginnings of Motion, within the body of Man, before they appear in
walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions, are commonly called
ENDEAVOUR.

Endeavour; Appetite; Desire; Hunger; Thirst;
Aversion
This Endeavour, when it is toward something which causes it, is called
APPETITE, or DESIRE; the later, being the generall name; and the other,
oftentimes restrayned to signifie the Desire of Food, namely Hunger and
Thirst. And when the Endeavour is fromward something, it is generally
called AVERSION. These words Appetite, and Aversion we have from the
Latines; and they both of them signifie the motions, one of approaching,
the other of retiring. So also do the Greek words for the same, which are
orme and aphorme. For nature it selfe does often presse upon men those
truths, which afterwards, when they look for somewhat beyond Nature,
they stumble at. For the Schooles find in meere Appetite to go, or move,
no actuall Motion at all: but because some Motion they must
acknowledge, they call it Metaphoricall Motion; which is but an absurd
speech; for though Words may be called metaphoricall; Bodies, and
Motions cannot.
That which men Desire, they are also sayd to LOVE; and to HATE those
things, for which they have Aversion. So that Desire, and Love, are the
same thing; save that by Desire, we alwayes signifie the Absence of the
object; by Love, most commonly the Presence of the same. So also by
Aversion, we signifie the Absence; and by Hate, the Presence of the
Object.
Of Appetites, and Aversions, some are born with men; as Appetite of
food, Appetite of excretion, and exoneration, (which may also and more
properly be called Aversions, from somewhat they feele in their Bodies;)
and some other Appetites, not many. The rest, which are Appetites of
particular things, proceed from Experience, and triall of their effects upon
themselves, or other men. For of things wee know not at all, or believe not
to be, we can have no further Desire, than to tast and try. But Aversion wee
have for things, not onely which we know have hurt us; but also that we do
not know whether they will hurt us, or not.

Contempt
Those things which we neither Desire, nor Hate, we are said to
Contemne: CONTEMPT being nothing els but an immobility, or
contumacy of the Heart, in resisting the action of certain things; and
proceeding from that the Heart is already moved otherwise, by either more
potent objects; or from want of experience of them.
And because the constitution of a mans Body, is in continuall mutation;
it is impossible that all the same things should alwayes cause in him the
same Appetites, and aversions: much lesse can all men consent, in the
Desire of almost any one and the same Object.

Good Evill
But whatsoever is the object of any mans Appetite or Desire; that is it,
which he for his part calleth Good: And the object of his Hate, and
Aversion, evill; And of his contempt, Vile, and Inconsiderable. For these
words of Good, evill, and Contemptible, are ever used with relation to the
person that useth them: There being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor
any common Rule of Good and evill, to be taken from the nature of the
objects themselves; but from the Person of the man (where there is no
Common-wealth;) or, (in a Common-wealth,) From the Person that
representeth it; or from an Arbitrator or Judge, whom men disagreeing
shall by consent set up, and make his sentence the Rule thereof.

Pulchrum Turpe; Delightfull Profitable;
Unpleasant Unprofitable
The Latine Tongue has two words, whose significations approach to
those of Good and Evill; but are not precisely the same; And those are
Pulchrum and Turpe. Whereof the former signifies that, which by some
apparent signes promiseth Good; and the later, that, which promiseth evill.
But in our Tongue we have not so generall names to expresse them by. But
for Pulchrum, we say in some things, Fayre; in other Beautifull, or
Handsome, or Gallant, or Honourable, or Comely, or Amiable; and for
Turpe, Foule, Deformed, Ugly, Base, Nauseous, and the like, as the subject
shall require; All which words, in their proper places signifie nothing els,
but the Mine, or Countenance, that promiseth Good and evill. So that of
Good there be three kinds; Good in the Promise, that is Pulchrum; Good in
Effect, as the end desired, which is called Jucundum, Delightfull; and
Good as the Means, which is called Utile, Profitable; and as many of evill:
For evill, in Promise, is that they call Turpe; evill in Effect, and End, is
Molestum, Unpleasant, Troublesome; and evill in the Means, Inutile,
Unprofitable, Hurtfull.

Delight Displeasure
As, in Sense, that which is really within us, is (As I have sayd before)
onely Motion, caused by the action of externall objects, but in apparence;
to the Sight, Light and Colour; to the Eare, Sound; to the Nostrill, Odour,
&c: so, when the action of the same object is continued from the Eyes,
Eares, and other organs to the Heart; the real effect there is nothing but
Motion, or Endeavour; which consisteth in Appetite, or Aversion, to, or
from the object moving. But the apparence, or sense of that motion, is that
wee either call DELIGHT, or TROUBLE OF MIND.

Pleasure Offence
This Motion, which is called Appetite, and for the apparence of it
Delight, and Pleasure, seemeth to be, a corroboration of Vitall motion, and
a help thereunto; and therefore such things as caused Delight, were not
improperly called Jucunda, (A Juvando,) from helping or fortifying; and
the contrary, Molesta, Offensive, from hindering, and troubling the motion
vitall.
Pleasure therefore, (or Delight,) is the apparence, or sense of Good; and
Molestation or Displeasure, the apparence, or sense of evill. And
consequently all Appetite, Desire, and Love, is accompanied with some
Delight more or lesse; and all Hatred, and Aversion, with more or lesse
Displeasure and Offence.

Pleasures Of Sense; Pleasures Of The Mind; Joy
Paine Griefe
Of Pleasures, or Delights, some arise from the sense of an object
Present; And those may be called Pleasures Of Sense, (The word Sensuall,
as it is used by those onely that condemn them, having no place till there
be Lawes.) Of this kind are all Onerations and Exonerations of the body;
as also all that is pleasant, in the Sight, Hearing, Smell, Tast, Or Touch;
Others arise from the Expectation, that proceeds from foresight of the End,
or Consequence of things; whether those things in the Sense Please or
Displease: And these are Pleasures Of The Mind of him that draweth those
consequences; and are generally called JOY. In the like manner,
Displeasures, are some in the Sense, and called PAYNE; others, in the
Expectation of consequences, and are called GRIEFE.
These simple Passions called Appetite, Desire, Love, Aversion, Hate,
Joy, and griefe, have their names for divers considerations diversified. As
first, when they one succeed another, they are diversly called from the
opinion men have of the likelihood of attaining what they desire. Secondly,
from the object loved or hated. Thirdly, from the consideration of many of
them together. Fourthly, from the Alteration or succession it selfe.
Hope— For Appetite with an opinion of attaining, is called HOPE.
Despaire— The same, without such opinion, DESPAIRE.
Feare— Aversion, with opinion of Hurt from the object, FEARE.
Courage— The same, with hope of avoyding that Hurt by resistance,
COURAGE.
Anger— Sudden Courage, ANGER.
Confidence— Constant Hope, CONFIDENCE of our selves.
Diffidence— Constant Despayre, DIFFIDENCE of our selves.
Indignation— Anger for great hurt done to another, when we conceive
the same to be done by Injury, INDIGNATION.
Benevolence— Desire of good to another, BENEVOLENCE, GOOD
WILL, CHARITY. If to man generally, GOOD NATURE.

Covetousnesse— Desire of Riches, COVETOUSNESSE: a name used
alwayes in signification of blame; because men contending for them, are
displeased with one anothers attaining them; though the desire in it selfe,
be to be blamed, or allowed, according to the means by which those Riches
are sought.
Ambition— Desire of Office, or precedence, AMBITION: a name used
also in the worse sense, for the reason before mentioned.
Pusillanimity— Desire of things that conduce but a little to our ends;
And fear of things that are but of little hindrance, PUSILLANIMITY.
Magnanimity— Contempt of little helps, and hindrances,
MAGNANIMITY.
Valour— Magnanimity, in danger of Death, or Wounds, VALOUR,
FORTITUDE.
Liberality— Magnanimity in the use of Riches, LIBERALITY
Miserablenesse— Pusillanimity, in the same WRETCHEDNESSE,
MISERABLENESSE; or PARSIMONY; as it is liked or disliked.
Kindnesse— Love of Persons for society, KINDNESSE.
Naturall Lust— Love of Persons for Pleasing the sense onely,
NATURAL LUST.
Luxury— Love of the same, acquired from Rumination, that is
Imagination of Pleasure past, LUXURY.
The Passion Of Love; Jealousie— Love of one singularly, with desire to
be singularly beloved, THE PASSION OF LOVE. The same, with fear that
the love is not mutuall, JEALOUSIE.
Revengefulnesse— Desire, by doing hurt to another, to make him
condemn some fact of his own, REVENGEFULNESSE.
Curiosity— Desire, to know why, and how, CURIOSITY; such as is in no
living creature but Man; so that Man is distinguished, not onely by his
Reason; but also by this singular Passion from other Animals; in whom the
appetite of food, and other pleasures of Sense, by praedominance, take
away the care of knowing causes; which is a Lust of the mind, that by a
perseverance of delight in the continuall and indefatigable generation of
Knowledge, exceedeth the short vehemence of any carnall Pleasure.

Religion Superstition; True Religion— Feare of power invisible,
feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publiquely allowed,
RELIGION; not allowed, superstition. And when the power imagined is
truly such as we imagine, TRUE RELIGION.
Panique Terrour— Feare, without the apprehension of why, or what,
PANIQUE TERROR; called so from the fables that make Pan the author of
them; whereas in truth there is always in him that so feareth, first, some
apprehension of the cause, though the rest run away by example; every one
supposing his fellow to know why. And therefore this Passion happens to
none but in a throng, or multitude of people.
Admiration— Joy, from apprehension of novelty, ADMIRATION;
proper to man, because it excites the appetite of knowing the cause.
Glory Vaine-glory— Joy, arising from imagination of a man's own
power and ability, is that exultation of the mind which is called
GLORYING: which, if grounded upon the experience of his own former
actions, is the same with Confidence: but if grounded on the flattery of
others, or onely supposed by himselfe, for delight in the consequences of
it, is called VAINE-GLORY: which name is properly given; because a
well-grounded Confidence begetteth attempt; whereas the supposing of
power does not, and is therefore rightly called Vaine.
Dejection— Griefe, from opinion of want of power, is called dejection
of mind.
The Vaine-glory which consisteth in the feigning or supposing of
abilities in ourselves, which we know are not, is most incident to young
men, and nourished by the Histories or Fictions of Gallant Persons; and is
corrected often times by Age, and Employment.
Sudden Glory Laughter— Sudden glory, is the passion which maketh
those Grimaces called LAUGHTER; and is caused either by some sudden
act of their own, that pleaseth them; or by the apprehension of some
deformed thing in another, by comparison whereof they suddenly applaud
themselves. And it is incident most to them, that are conscious of the
fewest abilities in themselves; who are forced to keep themselves in their
own favour, by observing the imperfections of other men. And therefore
much Laughter at the defects of others is a signe of Pusillanimity. For of
great minds, one of the proper workes is, to help and free others from
scorn; and compare themselves onely with the most able.

Sudden Dejection Weeping— On the contrary, Sudden Dejection is the
passion that causeth WEEPING; and is caused by such accidents, as
suddenly take away some vehement hope, or some prop of their power:
and they are most subject to it, that rely principally on helps externall,
such as are Women, and Children. Therefore, some Weep for the loss of
Friends; Others for their unkindnesse; others for the sudden stop made to
their thoughts of revenge, by Reconciliation. But in all cases, both
Laughter and Weeping, are sudden motions; Custome taking them both
away. For no man Laughs at old jests; or Weeps for an old calamity.
Shame Blushing— Griefe, for the discovery of some defect of ability is
SHAME, or the passion that discovereth itself in BLUSHING; and
consisteth in the apprehension of some thing dishonourable; and in young
men, is a signe of the love of good reputation; and commendable: in old
men it is a signe of the same; but because it comes too late, not
commendable.
Impudence— The Contempt of good reputation is called IMPUDENCE.
Pitty— Griefe, for the calamity of another is PITTY; and ariseth from
the imagination that the like calamity may befall himselfe; and therefore
is called also COMPASSION, and in the phrase of this present time a
FELLOW-FEELING: and therefore for Calamity arriving from great
wickedness, the best men have the least Pitty; and for the same Calamity,
those have least Pitty, that think themselves least obnoxious to the same.
Cruelty— Contempt, or little sense of the calamity of others, is that
which men call CRUELTY; proceeding from Security of their own fortune.
For, that any man should take pleasure in other mens' great harmes,
without other end of his own, I do not conceive it possible.
Emulation Envy— Griefe, for the success of a Competitor in wealth,
honour, or other good, if it be joyned with Endeavour to enforce our own
abilities to equal or exceed him, is called EMULATION: but joyned with
Endeavour to supplant or hinder a Competitor, ENVIE.
Deliberation— When in the mind of man, Appetites and Aversions,
Hopes and Feares, concerning one and the same thing, arise alternately;
and divers good and evill consequences of the doing, or omitting the thing
propounded, come successively into our thoughts; so that sometimes we
have an Appetite to it, sometimes an Aversion from it; sometimes Hope to
be able to do it; sometimes Despaire, or Feare to attempt it; the whole sum

of Desires, Aversions, Hopes and Feares, continued till the thing be either
done, or thought impossible, is that we call DELIBERATION.
Therefore of things past, there is no Deliberation; because manifestly
impossible to be changed: nor of things known to be impossible, or
thought so; because men know, or think such Deliberation vaine. But of
things impossible, which we think possible, we may Deliberate; not
knowing it is in vain. And it is called DELIBERATION; because it is a
putting an end to the Liberty we had of doing, or omitting, according to
our own Appetite, or Aversion.
This alternate succession of Appetites, Aversions, Hopes and Feares is
no less in other living Creatures than in Man; and therefore Beasts also
Deliberate.
Every Deliberation is then sayd to End when that whereof they
Deliberate, is either done, or thought impossible; because till then wee
retain the liberty of doing, or omitting, according to our Appetite, or
Aversion.

The Will
In Deliberation, the last Appetite, or Aversion, immediately adhaering
to the action, or to the omission thereof, is that wee call the WILL; the
Act, (not the faculty,) of Willing. And Beasts that have Deliberation must
necessarily also have Will. The Definition of the Will, given commonly by
the Schooles, that it is a Rationall Appetite, is not good. For if it were,
then could there be no Voluntary Act against Reason. For a Voluntary Act
is that, which proceedeth from the Will, and no other. But if in stead of a
Rationall Appetite, we shall say an Appetite resulting from a precedent
Deliberation, then the Definition is the same that I have given here. Will,
therefore, Is The Last Appetite In Deliberating. And though we say in
common Discourse, a man had a Will once to do a thing, that
neverthelesse he forbore to do; yet that is properly but an Inclination,
which makes no Action Voluntary; because the action depends not of it,
but of the last Inclination, or Appetite. For if the intervenient Appetites
make any action Voluntary, then by the same reason all intervenient
Aversions should make the same action Involuntary; and so one and the
same action should be both Voluntary & Involuntary.
By this it is manifest, that not onely actions that have their beginning
from Covetousness, Ambition, Lust, or other Appetites to the thing
propounded; but also those that have their beginning from Aversion, or
Feare of those consequences that follow the omission, are Voluntary
Actions.

Formes Of Speech, In Passion
The formes of Speech by which the Passions are expressed, are partly
the same, and partly different from those, by which we express our
Thoughts. And first generally all Passions may be expressed Indicatively;
as, I Love, I Feare, I Joy, I Deliberate, I Will, I Command: but some of
them have particular expressions by themselves, which nevertheless are
not affirmations, unless it be when they serve to make other inferences,
besides that of the Passion they proceed from. Deliberation is expressed
Subjunctively; which is a speech proper to signifie suppositions, with their
consequences; as, If This Be Done, Then This Will Follow; and differs not
from the language of Reasoning, save that Reasoning is in generall words,
but Deliberation for the most part is of Particulars. The language of
Desire, and Aversion, is Imperative; as, Do This, Forbear That; which
when the party is obliged to do, or forbear, is Command; otherwise Prayer;
or els Counsell. The language of Vaine-Glory, of Indignation, Pitty and
Revengefulness, Optative: but of the Desire to know, there is a peculiar
expression called Interrogative; as, What Is It, When Shall It, How Is It
Done, and Why So? Other language of the Passions I find none: for
Cursing, Swearing, Reviling, and the like, do not signifie as Speech; but as
the actions of a tongue accustomed.
These forms of Speech, I say, are expressions, or voluntary
significations of our Passions: but certain signes they be not; because they
may be used arbitrarily, whether they that use them, have such Passions or
not. The best signes of Passions present, are either in the countenance,
motions of the body, actions, and ends, or aims, which we otherwise know
the man to have.

Good And Evill Apparent
And because in Deliberation the Appetites and Aversions are raised by
foresight of the good and evill consequences, and sequels of the action
whereof we Deliberate; the good or evill effect thereof dependeth on the
foresight of a long chain of consequences, of which very seldome any man
is able to see to the end. But for so far as a man seeth, if the Good in those
consequences be greater than the evill, the whole chain is that which
Writers call Apparent or Seeming Good. And contrarily, when the evill
exceedeth the good, the whole is Apparent or Seeming Evill: so that he
who hath by Experience, or Reason, the greatest and surest prospect of
Consequences, Deliberates best himself; and is able, when he will, to give
the best counsel unto others.

Felicity
Continual Successe in obtaining those things which a man from time to
time desireth, that is to say, continual prospering, is that men call
FELICITY; I mean the Felicity of this life. For there is no such thing as
perpetual Tranquillity of mind, while we live here; because Life itself is
but Motion, and can never be without Desire, nor without Feare, no more
than without Sense. What kind of Felicity God hath ordained to them that
devoutly honour him, a man shall no sooner know, than enjoy; being joys,
that now are as incomprehensible, as the word of School-men, Beatifical
Vision, is unintelligible.

Praise Magnification
The form of speech whereby men signifie their opinion of the
Goodnesse of anything is PRAISE. That whereby they signifie the power
and greatness of anything is MAGNIFYING. And that whereby they
signifie the opinion they have of a man's felicity is by the Greeks called
Makarismos, for which we have no name in our tongue. And thus much is
sufficient for the present purpose to have been said of the passions.

CHAPTER VII. OF THE ENDS OR
RESOLUTIONS OF DISCOURSE
Of all Discourse, governed by desire of Knowledge, there is at last an
End, either by attaining, or by giving over. And in the chain of Discourse,
wheresoever it be interrupted, there is an End for that time.

Judgement, or Sentence Final; Doubt
If the Discourse be meerly Mentall, it consisteth of thoughts that the
thing will be, and will not be; or that it has been, and has not been,
alternately. So that wheresoever you break off the chayn of a mans
Discourse, you leave him in a Praesumption of It Will Be, or, It Will Not
Be; or it Has Been, or, Has Not Been. All which is Opinion. And that
which is alternate Appetite, in Deliberating concerning Good and Evil, the
same is alternate Opinion in the Enquiry of the truth of Past, and Future.
And as the last Appetite in Deliberation is called the Will, so the last
Opinion in search of the truth of Past, and Future, is called the
JUDGEMENT, or Resolute and Final Sentence of him that Discourseth.
And as the whole chain of Appetites alternate, in the question of Good or
Bad is called Deliberation; so the whole chain of Opinions alternate, in the
question of True, or False is called DOUBT.
No Discourse whatsoever, can End in absolute knowledge of Fact, past,
or to come. For, as for the knowledge of Fact, it is originally, Sense; and
ever after, Memory. And for the knowledge of consequence, which I have
said before is called Science, it is not Absolute, but Conditionall. No man
can know by Discourse, that this, or that, is, has been, or will be; which is
to know absolutely: but onely, that if This be, That is; if This has been,
That has been; if This shall be, That shall be: which is to know
conditionally; and that not the consequence of one thing to another; but of
one name of a thing, to another name of the same thing.

Science Opinion Conscience
And therefore, when the Discourse is put into Speech, and begins with
the Definitions of Words, and proceeds by Connexion of the same into
general Affirmations, and of these again into Syllogismes, the end or last
sum is called the Conclusion; and the thought of the mind by it signified is
that conditional Knowledge, or Knowledge of the consequence of words,
which is commonly called Science. But if the first ground of such
Discourse be not Definitions, or if the Definitions be not rightly joyned
together into Syllogismes, then the End or Conclusion is again OPINION,
namely of the truth of somewhat said, though sometimes in absurd and
senslesse words, without possibility of being understood. When two, or
more men, know of one and the same fact, they are said to be
CONSCIOUS of it one to another; which is as much as to know it together.
And because such are fittest witnesses of the facts of one another, or of a
third, it was, and ever will be reputed a very Evill act, for any man to
speak against his Conscience; or to corrupt or force another so to do:
Insomuch that the plea of Conscience, has been always hearkened unto
very diligently in all times. Afterwards, men made use of the same word
metaphorically, for the knowledge of their own secret facts, and secret
thoughts; and therefore it is Rhetorically said that the Conscience is a
thousand witnesses. And last of all, men, vehemently in love with their
own new opinions, (though never so absurd,) and obstinately bent to
maintain them, gave those their opinions also that reverenced name of
Conscience, as if they would have it seem unlawful, to change or speak
against them; and so pretend to know they are true, when they know at
most but that they think so.

Beliefe Faith
When a mans Discourse beginneth not at Definitions, it beginneth either
at some other contemplation of his own, and then it is still called Opinion;
Or it beginneth at some saying of another, of whose ability to know the
truth, and of whose honesty in not deceiving, he doubteth not; and then the
Discourse is not so much concerning the Thing, as the Person; And the
Resolution is called BELEEFE, and FAITH: Faith, In the man; Beleefe,
both Of the man, and Of the truth of what he sayes. So then in Beleefe are
two opinions; one of the saying of the man; the other of his vertue. To
Have Faith In, or Trust To, or Beleeve A Man, signifie the same thing;
namely, an opinion of the veracity of the man: But to Beleeve What Is
Said, signifieth onely an opinion of the truth of the saying. But wee are to
observe that this Phrase, I Beleeve In; as also the Latine, Credo In; and the
Greek, Pisteno Eis, are never used but in the writings of Divines. In stead
of them, in other writings are put, I Beleeve Him; I Have Faith In Him; I
Rely On Him: and in Latin, Credo Illi; Fido Illi: and in Greek, Pisteno
Anto: and that this singularity of the Ecclesiastical use of the word hath
raised many disputes about the right object of the Christian Faith.
But by Beleeving In, as it is in the Creed, is meant, not trust in the
Person; but Confession and acknowledgement of the Doctrine. For not
onely Christians, but all manner of men do so believe in God, as to hold all
for truth they heare him say, whether they understand it, or not; which is
all the Faith and trust can possibly be had in any person whatsoever: But
they do not all believe the Doctrine of the Creed.
From whence we may inferre, that when wee believe any saying
whatsoever it be, to be true, from arguments taken, not from the thing it
selfe, or from the principles of naturall Reason, but from the Authority,
and good opinion wee have, of him that hath sayd it; then is the speaker, or
person we believe in, or trust in, and whose word we take, the object of our
Faith; and the Honour done in Believing, is done to him onely. And
consequently, when wee Believe that the Scriptures are the word of God,
having no immediate revelation from God himselfe, our Beleefe, Faith,
and Trust is in the Church; whose word we take, and acquiesce therein.

And they that believe that which a Prophet relates unto them in the name
of God, take the word of the Prophet, do honour to him, and in him trust,
and believe, touching the truth of what he relateth, whether he be a true, or
a false Prophet. And so it is also with all other History. For if I should not
believe all that is written By Historians, of the glorious acts of Alexander,
or Caesar; I do not think the Ghost of Alexander, or Caesar, had any just
cause to be offended; or any body else, but the Historian. If Livy say the
Gods made once a Cow speak, and we believe it not; wee distrust not God
therein, but Livy. So that it is evident, that whatsoever we believe, upon no
other reason, than what is drawn from authority of men onely, and their
writings; whether they be sent from God or not, is Faith in men onely.

CHAPTER VIII. OF THE VERTUES
COMMONLY CALLED INTELLECTUAL;
AND THEIR CONTRARY DEFECTS

Intellectuall Vertue Defined
Vertue generally, in all sorts of subjects, is somewhat that is valued for
eminence; and consisteth in comparison. For if all things were equally in
all men, nothing would be prized. And by Vertues INTELLECTUALL, are
always understood such abilityes of the mind, as men praise, value, and
desire should be in themselves; and go commonly under the name of a
Good Witte; though the same word Witte, be used also, to distinguish one
certain ability from the rest.

Wit, Naturall, Or Acquired
These Vertues are of two sorts; Naturall, and Acquired. By Naturall, I
mean not, that which a man hath from his Birth: for that is nothing else but
Sense; wherein men differ so little one from another, and from brute
Beasts, as it is not to be reckoned amongst Vertues. But I mean, that Witte,
which is gotten by Use onely, and Experience; without Method, Culture, or
Instruction. This NATURALL WITTE, consisteth principally in two
things; Celerity Of Imagining, (that is, swift succession of one thought to
another;) and Steddy Direction to some approved end. On the Contrary a
slow Imagination, maketh that Defect, or fault of the mind, which is
commonly called DULNESSE, Stupidity, and sometimes by other names
that signifie slownesse of motion, or difficulty to be moved.

Good Wit, Or Fancy; Good Judgement; Discretion
And this difference of quicknesse, is caused by the difference of mens
passions; that love and dislike, some one thing, some another: and
therefore some mens thoughts run one way, some another: and are held to,
and observe differently the things that passe through their imagination.
And whereas in his succession of mens thoughts, there is nothing to
observe in the things they think on, but either in what they be Like One
Another, or in what they be Unlike, or What They Serve For, or How They
Serve To Such A Purpose; Those that observe their similitudes, in case
they be such as are but rarely observed by others, are sayd to have a Good
Wit; by which, in this occasion, is meant a Good Fancy. But they that
observe their differences, and dissimilitudes; which is called
Distinguishing, and Discerning, and Judging between thing and thing; in
case, such discerning be not easie, are said to have a Good Judgement: and
particularly in matter of conversation and businesse; wherein, times,
places, and persons are to be discerned, this Vertue is called
DISCRETION. The former, that is, Fancy, without the help of Judgement,
is not commended as a Vertue: but the later which is Judgement, and
Discretion, is commended for it selfe, without the help of Fancy. Besides
the Discretion of times, places, and persons, necessary to a good Fancy,
there is required also an often application of his thoughts to their End; that
is to say, to some use to be made of them. This done; he that hath this
Vertue, will be easily fitted with similitudes, that will please, not onely by
illustration of his discourse, and adorning it with new and apt metaphors;
but also, by the rarity or their invention. But without Steddinesse, and
Direction to some End, a great Fancy is one kind of Madnesse; such as
they have, that entring into any discourse, are snatched from their purpose,
by every thing that comes in their thought, into so many, and so long
digressions, and parentheses, that they utterly lose themselves: Which
kind of folly, I know no particular name for: but the cause of it is,
sometimes want of experience; whereby that seemeth to a man new and
rare, which doth not so to others: sometimes Pusillanimity; by which that
seems great to him, which other men think a trifle: and whatsoever is new,

or great, and therefore thought fit to be told, withdrawes a man by degrees
from the intended way of his discourse.
In a good Poem, whether it be Epique, or Dramatique; as also in
Sonnets, Epigrams, and other Pieces, both Judgement and Fancy are
required: But the Fancy must be more eminent; because they please for the
Extravagancy; but ought not to displease by Indiscretion.
In a good History, the Judgement must be eminent; because the
goodnesse consisteth, in the Method, in the Truth, and in the Choyse of the
actions that are most profitable to be known. Fancy has no place, but onely
in adorning the stile.
In Orations of Prayse, and in Invectives, the Fancy is praedominant;
because the designe is not truth, but to Honour or Dishonour; which is
done by noble, or by vile comparisons. The Judgement does but suggest
what circumstances make an action laudable, or culpable.
In Hortatives, and Pleadings, as Truth, or Disguise serveth best to the
Designe in hand; so is the Judgement, or the Fancy most required.
In Demonstration, in Councell, and all rigourous search of Truth,
Judgement does all; except sometimes the understanding have need to be
opened by some apt similitude; and then there is so much use of Fancy.
But for Metaphors, they are in this case utterly excluded. For seeing they
openly professe deceipt; to admit them into Councell, or Reasoning, were
manifest folly.
And in any Discourse whatsoever, if the defect of Discretion be
apparent, how extravagant soever the Fancy be, the whole discourse will
be taken for a signe of want of wit; and so will it never when the
Discretion is manifest, though the Fancy be never so ordinary.
The secret thoughts of a man run over all things, holy, prophane, clean,
obscene, grave, and light, without shame, or blame; which verball
discourse cannot do, farther than the Judgement shall approve of the Time,
Place, and Persons. An Anatomist, or a Physitian may speak, or write his
judgement of unclean things; because it is not to please, but profit: but for
another man to write his extravagant, and pleasant fancies of the same, is
as if a man, from being tumbled into the dirt, should come and present
himselfe before good company. And 'tis the want of Discretion that makes
the difference. Again, in profest remissnesse of mind, and familiar
company, a man may play with the sounds, and aequivocal significations

of words; and that many times with encounters of extraordinary Fancy: but
in a Sermon, or in publique, or before persons unknown, or whom we
ought to reverence, there is no Gingling of words that will not be
accounted folly: and the difference is onely in the want of Discretion. So
that where Wit is wanting, it is not Fancy that is wanting, but Discretion.
Judgement therefore without Fancy is Wit, but Fancy without Judgement
not.

Prudence
When the thoughts of a man, that has a designe in hand, running over a
multitude of things, observes how they conduce to that designe; or what
designe they may conduce into; if his observations be such as are not
easie, or usuall, This wit of his is called PRUDENCE; and dependeth on
much Experience, and Memory of the like things, and their consequences
heretofore. In which there is not so much difference of Men, as there is in
their Fancies and Judgements; Because the Experience of men equall in
age, is not much unequall, as to the quantity; but lyes in different
occasions; every one having his private designes. To govern well a family,
and a kingdome, are not different degrees of Prudence; but different sorts
of businesse; no more then to draw a picture in little, or as great, or greater
then the life, are different degrees of Art. A plain husband-man is more
Prudent in affaires of his own house, then a Privy Counseller in the
affaires of another man.

Craft
To Prudence, if you adde the use of unjust, or dishonest means, such as
usually are prompted to men by Feare, or Want; you have that Crooked
Wisdome, which is called CRAFT; which is a signe of Pusillanimity. For
Magnanimity is contempt of unjust, or dishonest helps. And that which the
Latines Call Versutia, (translated into English, Shifting,) and is a putting
off of a present danger or incommodity, by engaging into a greater, as
when a man robbs one to pay another, is but a shorter sighted Craft, called
Versutia, from Versura, which signifies taking mony at usurie, for the
present payment of interest.

Acquired Wit
As for Acquired Wit, (I mean acquired by method and instruction,)
there is none but Reason; which is grounded on the right use of Speech;
and produceth the Sciences. But of Reason and Science, I have already
spoken in the fifth and sixth Chapters.
The causes of this difference of Witts, are in the Passions: and the
difference of Passions, proceedeth partly from the different Constitution
of the body, and partly from different Education. For if the difference
proceeded from the temper of the brain, and the organs of Sense, either
exterior or interior, there would be no lesse difference of men in their
Sight, Hearing, or other Senses, than in their Fancies, and Discretions. It
proceeds therefore from the Passions; which are different, not onely from
the difference of mens complexions; but also from their difference of
customes, and education.
The Passions that most of all cause the differences of Wit, are
principally, the more or lesse Desire of Power, of Riches, of Knowledge,
and of Honour. All which may be reduced to the first, that is Desire of
Power. For Riches, Knowledge and Honour are but severall sorts of Power.

Giddinesse Madnesse
And therefore, a man who has no great Passion for any of these things;
but is as men terme it indifferent; though he may be so farre a good man,
as to be free from giving offence; yet he cannot possibly have either a
great Fancy, or much Judgement. For the Thoughts, are to the Desires, as
Scouts, and Spies, to range abroad, and find the way to the things Desired:
All Stedinesse of the minds motion, and all quicknesse of the same,
proceeding from thence. For as to have no Desire, is to be Dead: so to have
weak Passions, is Dulnesse; and to have Passions indifferently for every
thing, GIDDINESSE, and Distraction; and to have stronger, and more
vehement Passions for any thing, than is ordinarily seen in others, is that
which men call MADNESSE.
Whereof there be almost as many kinds, as of the Passions themselves.
Sometimes the extraordinary and extravagant Passion, proceedeth from
the evill constitution of the organs of the Body, or harme done them; and
sometimes the hurt, and indisposition of the Organs, is caused by the
vehemence, or long continuance of the Passion. But in both cases the
Madnesse is of one and the same nature.
The Passion, whose violence, or continuance maketh Madnesse, is either
great Vaine-Glory; which is commonly called Pride, and Selfe-Conceipt;
or great Dejection of mind.

Rage
Pride, subjecteth a man to Anger, the excesse whereof, is the Madnesse
called RAGE, and FURY. And thus it comes to passe that excessive desire
of Revenge, when it becomes habituall, hurteth the organs, and becomes
Rage: That excessive love, with jealousie, becomes also Rage: Excessive
opinion of a mans own selfe, for divine inspiration, for wisdome, learning,
forme, and the like, becomes Distraction, and Giddinesse: the same,
joyned with Envy, Rage: Vehement opinion of the truth of any thing,
contradicted by others, Rage.

Melancholy
Dejection, subjects a man to causelesse fears; which is a Madnesse
commonly called MELANCHOLY, apparent also in divers manners; as in
haunting of solitudes, and graves; in superstitious behaviour; and in
fearing some one, some another particular thing. In summe, all Passions
that produce strange and unusuall behaviour, are called by the generall
name of Madnesse. But of the severall kinds of Madnesse, he that would
take the paines, might enrowle a legion. And if the Excesses be madnesse,
there is no doubt but the Passions themselves, when they tend to Evill, are
degrees of the same.
(For example,) Though the effect of folly, in them that are possessed of
an opinion of being inspired, be not visible alwayes in one man, by any
very extravagant action, that proceedeth from such Passion; yet when
many of them conspire together, the Rage of the whole multitude is visible
enough. For what argument of Madnesse can there be greater, than to
clamour, strike, and throw stones at our best friends? Yet this is somewhat
lesse than such a multitude will do. For they will clamour, fight against,
and destroy those, by whom all their lifetime before, they have been
protected, and secured from injury. And if this be Madnesse in the
multitude, it is the same in every particular man. For as in the middest of
the sea, though a man perceive no sound of that part of the water next him;
yet he is well assured, that part contributes as much, to the Roaring of the
Sea, as any other part, of the same quantity: so also, thought wee perceive
no great unquietnesse, in one, or two men; yet we may be well assured,
that their singular Passions, are parts of the Seditious roaring of a troubled
Nation. And if there were nothing else that bewrayed their madnesse; yet
that very arrogating such inspiration to themselves, is argument enough. If
some man in Bedlam should entertaine you with sober discourse; and you
desire in taking leave, to know what he were, that you might another time
requite his civility; and he should tell you, he were God the Father; I think
you need expect no extravagant action for argument of his Madnesse.
This opinion of Inspiration, called commonly, Private Spirit, begins
very often, from some lucky finding of an Errour generally held by others;

and not knowing, or not remembring, by what conduct of reason, they
came to so singular a truth, (as they think it, though it be many times an
untruth they light on,) they presently admire themselves; as being in the
speciall grace of God Almighty, who hath revealed the same to them
supernaturally, by his Spirit.
Again, that Madnesse is nothing else, but too much appearing Passion,
may be gathered out of the effects of Wine, which are the same with those
of the evill disposition of the organs. For the variety of behaviour in men
that have drunk too much, is the same with that of Mad-men: some of
them Raging, others Loving, others laughing, all extravagantly, but
according to their severall domineering Passions: For the effect of the
wine, does but remove Dissimulation; and take from them the sight of the
deformity of their Passions. For, (I believe) the most sober men, when
they walk alone without care and employment of the mind, would be
unwilling the vanity and Extravagance of their thoughts at that time should
be publiquely seen: which is a confession, that Passions unguided, are for
the most part meere Madnesse.
The opinions of the world, both in antient and later ages, concerning the
cause of madnesse, have been two. Some, deriving them from the
Passions; some, from Daemons, or Spirits, either good, or bad, which they
thought might enter into a man, possesse him, and move his organs is such
strange, and uncouth manner, as mad-men use to do. The former sort
therefore, called such men, Mad-men: but the Later, called them
sometimes Daemoniacks, (that is, possessed with spirits;) sometimes
Energumeni, (that is agitated, or moved with spirits;) and now in Italy they
are called not onely Pazzi, Mad-men; but also Spiritati, men possest.
There was once a great conflux of people in Abdera, a City of the
Greeks, at the acting of the Tragedy of Andromeda, upon an extream hot
day: whereupon, a great many of the spectators falling into Fevers, had
this accident from the heat, and from The Tragedy together, that they did
nothing but pronounce Iambiques, with the names of Perseus and
Andromeda; which together with the Fever, was cured, by the comming on
of Winter: And this madnesse was thought to proceed from the Passion
imprinted by the Tragedy. Likewise there raigned a fit of madnesse in
another Graecian city, which seized onely the young Maidens; and caused
many of them to hang themselves. This was by most then thought an act of

the Divel. But one that suspected, that contempt of life in them, might
proceed from some Passion of the mind, and supposing they did not
contemne also their honour, gave counsell to the Magistrates, to strip such
as so hang'd themselves, and let them hang out naked. This the story sayes
cured that madnesse. But on the other side, the same Graecians, did often
ascribe madnesse, to the operation of the Eumenides, or Furyes; and
sometimes of Ceres, Phoebus, and other Gods: so much did men attribute
to Phantasmes, as to think them aereal living bodies; and generally to call
them Spirits. And as the Romans in this, held the same opinion with the
Greeks: so also did the Jewes; For they calle mad-men Prophets, or
(according as they thought the spirits good or bad) Daemoniacks; and
some of them called both Prophets, and Daemoniacks, mad-men; and
some called the same man both Daemoniack, and mad-man. But for the
Gentiles, 'tis no wonder; because Diseases, and Health; Vices, and Vertues;
and many naturall accidents, were with them termed, and worshipped as
Daemons. So that a man was to understand by Daemon, as well
(sometimes) an Ague, as a Divell. But for the Jewes to have such opinion,
is somewhat strange. For neither Moses, nor Abraham pretended to
Prophecy by possession of a Spirit; but from the voyce of God; or by a
Vision or Dream: Nor is there any thing in his Law, Morall, or
Ceremoniall, by which they were taught, there was any such Enthusiasme;
or any Possession. When God is sayd, (Numb. 11. 25.) to take from the
Spirit that was in Moses, and give it to the 70. Elders, the Spirit of God
(taking it for the substance of God) is not divided. The Scriptures by the
Spirit of God in man, mean a mans spirit, enclined to Godlinesse. And
where it is said (Exod. 28. 3.) "Whom I have filled with the Spirit of
wisdome to make garments for Aaron," is not meant a spirit put into them,
that can make garments; but the wisdome of their own spirits in that kind
of work. In the like sense, the spirit of man, when it produceth unclean
actions, is ordinarily called an unclean spirit; and so other spirits, though
not alwayes, yet as often as the vertue or vice so stiled, is extraordinary,
and Eminent. Neither did the other Prophets of the old Testament pretend
Enthusiasme; or, that God spake in them; but to them by Voyce, Vision, or
Dream; and the Burthen Of The Lord was not Possession, but Command.
How then could the Jewes fall into this opinion of possession? I can
imagine no reason, but that which is common to all men; namely, the want
of curiosity to search naturall causes; and their placing Felicity, in the

acquisition of the grosse pleasures of the Senses, and the things that most
immediately conduce thereto. For they that see any strange, and unusuall
ability, or defect in a mans mind; unlesse they see withall, from what
cause it may probably proceed, can hardly think it naturall; and if not
naturall, they must needs thinke it supernaturall; and then what can it be,
but that either God, or the Divell is in him? And hence it came to passe,
when our Saviour (Mark 3.21.) was compassed about with the multitude,
those of the house doubted he was mad, and went out to hold him: but the
Scribes said he had Belzebub, and that was it, by which he cast out divels;
as if the greater mad-man had awed the lesser. And that (John 10. 20.)
some said, "He hath a Divell, and is mad;" whereas others holding him for
a Prophet, sayd, "These are not the words of one that hath a Divell." So in
the old Testament he that came to anoynt Jehu, (2 Kings 9.11.) was a
Prophet; but some of the company asked Jehu, "What came that mad-man
for?" So that in summe, it is manifest, that whosoever behaved himselfe in
extraordinary manner, was thought by the Jewes to be possessed either
with a good, or evill spirit; except by the Sadduces, who erred so farre on
the other hand, as not to believe there were at all any spirits, (which is
very neere to direct Atheisme;) and thereby perhaps the more provoked
others, to terme such men Daemoniacks, rather than mad-men.
But why then does our Saviour proceed in the curing of them, as if they
were possest; and not as if they were mad. To which I can give no other
kind of answer, but that which is given to those that urge the Scripture in
like manner against the opinion of the motion of the Earth. The Scripture
was written to shew unto men the kingdome of God; and to prepare their
mindes to become his obedient subjects; leaving the world, and the
Philosophy thereof, to the disputation of men, for the exercising of their
naturall Reason. Whether the Earths, or Suns motion make the day, and
night; or whether the Exorbitant actions of men, proceed from Passion, or
from the Divell, (so we worship him not) it is all one, as to our obedience,
and subjection to God Almighty; which is the thing for which the Scripture
was written. As for that our Saviour speaketh to the disease, as to a person;
it is the usuall phrase of all that cure by words onely, as Christ did, (and
Inchanters pretend to do, whether they speak to a Divel or not.) For is not
Christ also said (Math. 8.26.) to have rebuked the winds? Is not he said
also (Luk. 4. 39.) to rebuke a Fever? Yet this does not argue that a Fever is
a Divel. And whereas many of these Divels are said to confesse Christ; it

is not necessary to interpret those places otherwise, than that those madmen confessed him. And whereas our Saviour (Math. 12. 43.) speaketh of
an unclean Spirit, that having gone out of a man, wandreth through dry
places, seeking rest, and finding none; and returning into the same man,
with seven other spirits worse than himselfe; It is manifestly a Parable,
alluding to a man, that after a little endeavour to quit his lusts, is
vanquished by the strength of them; and becomes seven times worse than
he was. So that I see nothing at all in the Scripture, that requireth a beliefe,
that Daemoniacks were any other thing but Mad-men.

Insignificant Speech
There is yet another fault in the Discourses of some men; which may
also be numbred amongst the sorts of Madnesse; namely, that abuse of
words, whereof I have spoken before in the fifth chapter, by the Name of
Absurdity. And that is, when men speak such words, as put together, have
in them no signification at all; but are fallen upon by some, through
misunderstanding of the words they have received, and repeat by rote; by
others, from intention to deceive by obscurity. And this is incident to none
but those, that converse in questions of matters incomprehensible, as the
Schoole-men; or in questions of abstruse Philosophy. The common sort of
men seldome speak Insignificantly, and are therefore, by those other
Egregious persons counted Idiots. But to be assured their words are
without any thing correspondent to them in the mind, there would need
some Examples; which if any man require, let him take a Schoole-man
into his hands, and see if he can translate any one chapter concerning any
difficult point; as the Trinity; the Deity; the nature of Christ;
Transubstantiation; Free-will. &c. into any of the moderne tongues, so as
to make the same intelligible; or into any tolerable Latine, such as they
were acquainted withall, that lived when the Latine tongue was Vulgar.
What is the meaning of these words. "The first cause does not necessarily
inflow any thing into the second, by force of the Essential subordination of
the second causes, by which it may help it to worke?" They are the
Translation of the Title of the sixth chapter of Suarez first Booke, Of The
Concourse, Motion, And Help Of God. When men write whole volumes of
such stuffe, are they not Mad, or intend to make others so? And
particularly, in the question of Transubstantiation; where after certain
words spoken, they that say, the White-nesse, Round-nesse, Magni-tude,
Quali-ty, Corruptibili-ty, all which are incorporeall, &c. go out of the
Wafer, into the Body of our blessed Saviour, do they not make those
Nesses, Tudes and Ties, to be so many spirits possessing his body? For by
Spirits, they mean alwayes things, that being incorporeall, are
neverthelesse moveable from one place to another. So that this kind of
Absurdity, may rightly be numbred amongst the many sorts of Madnesse;

and all the time that guided by clear Thoughts of their worldly lust, they
forbear disputing, or writing thus, but Lucide Intervals. And thus much of
the Vertues and Defects Intellectuall.

CHAPTER IX. OF THE SEVERALL SUBJECTS
OF KNOWLEDGE
There are of KNOWLEDGE two kinds; whereof one is Knowledge Of
Fact: the other Knowledge Of The Consequence Of One Affirmation To
Another. The former is nothing else, but Sense and Memory, and is
Absolute Knowledge; as when we see a Fact doing, or remember it done:
And this is the Knowledge required in a Witnesse. The later is called
Science; and is Conditionall; as when we know, that, If The Figure Showne
Be A Circle, Then Any Straight Line Through The Centre Shall Divide It
Into Two Equall Parts. And this is the Knowledge required in a
Philosopher; that is to say, of him that pretends to Reasoning.
The Register of Knowledge Of Fact is called History. Whereof there be
two sorts: one called Naturall History; which is the History of such Facts,
or Effects of Nature, as have no Dependance on Mans Will; Such as are
the Histories of Metals, Plants, Animals, Regions, and the like. The other,
is Civill History; which is the History of the Voluntary Actions of men in
Common-wealths.
The Registers of Science, are such Books as contain the Demonstrations
of Consequences of one Affirmation, to another; and are commonly called
Books of Philosophy; whereof the sorts are many, according to the
diversity of the Matter; And may be divided in such manner as I have
divided them in the following Table.
I. Science, that is, Knowledge of Consequences; which is called
also PHILOSOPHY
A.

Consequences from Accidents of Bodies Naturall; which is
called NATURALL PHILOSOPHY
1.

Consequences from the Accidents common to all Bodies Naturall;
which are Quantity, and Motion.
a.

Consequences from Quantity, and Motion Indeterminate;
which, being the Principles or first foundation of
Philosophy, is called Philosophia Prima
PHILOSOPHIA PRIMA

b.

Consequences from Motion, and Quantity Determined

1) Consequences from Quantity, and Motion Determined
a) By Figure, By Number
1] Mathematiques,
GEOMETRY
ARITHMETIQUE
2) Consequences from the Motion, and Quantity of Bodies in
Speciall
a) Consequences from the Motion, and Quantity of the
great parts of the World, as the Earth and Stars,
1] Cosmography
ASTRONOMY
GEOGRAPHY
b) Consequences from the Motion of Speciall kinds, and
Figures of Body,
1] Mechaniques, Doctrine of Weight
Science of
ENGINEERS
ARCHITECTURE
NAVIGATION
2.

PHYSIQUES, or Consequences from Qualities
a.

Consequences from the Qualities of Bodies Transient, such
as sometimes appear, sometimes vanish
METEOROLOGY

b.

Consequences from the Qualities of Bodies Permanent
1) Consequences from the Qualities of the Starres
a) Consequences from the Light of the Starres. Out of
this, and the Motion of the Sunne, is made the
Science of
SCIOGRAPHY
b) Consequences from the Influence of the Starres,
ASTROLOGY
2) Consequences of the Qualities from Liquid Bodies that
fill the space between the Starres; such as are the
Ayre, or substance aetherial.
3) Consequences from Qualities of Bodies Terrestrial

a) Consequences from parts of the Earth that are
without Sense,
1] Consequences from Qualities of Minerals, as
Stones, Metals, &c
2] Consequences from the Qualities of Vegetables

.

b) Consequences from Qualities of Animals
1] Consequences from Qualities of Animals in
Generall
a] Consequences from Vision,
OPTIQUES
b] Consequences from Sounds,
MUSIQUE
c] Consequences from the rest of the senses
2] Consequences from Qualities of Men in Speciall
a] Consequences from Passions of Men,
ETHIQUES
b] Consequences from Speech,
i) In Magnifying, Vilifying, etc.
POETRY
ii) In Persuading,
RHETORIQUE
iii) In Reasoning,
LOGIQUE
iv) In Contracting,
The Science of
JUST and UNJUST
B. Consequences from the Accidents of Politique Bodies; which is
called POLITIQUES, and CIVILL PHILOSOPHY
1.

Of Consequences from the Institution of COMMON-WEALTHS, to
the Rights, and Duties of the Body Politique, or Soveraign.

2.

Of Consequences from the same, to the Duty and Right of
the Subjects.

CHAPTER X. OF POWER, WORTH, DIGNITY,
HONOUR AND WORTHINESS

Power
The POWER of a Man, (to take it Universally,) is his present means, to
obtain some future apparent Good. And is either Originall, or
Instrumentall.
Naturall Power, is the eminence of the Faculties of Body, or Mind: as
extraordinary Strength, Forme, Prudence, Arts, Eloquence, Liberality,
Nobility. Instrumentall are those Powers, which acquired by these, or by
fortune, are means and Instruments to acquire more: as Riches,
Reputation, Friends, and the Secret working of God, which men call Good
Luck. For the nature of Power, is in this point, like to Fame, increasing as
it proceeds; or like the motion of heavy bodies, which the further they go,
make still the more hast.
The Greatest of humane Powers, is that which is compounded of the
Powers of most men, united by consent, in one person, Naturall, or civill,
that has the use of all their Powers depending on his will; such as is the
Power of a Common-wealth: or depending on the wills of each particular;
such as is the Power of a Faction, or of divers factions leagued. Therefore
to have servants, is Power; To have Friends, is Power: for they are
strengths united.
Also Riches joyned with liberality, is Power; because it procureth
friends, and servants: Without liberality, not so; because in this case they
defend not; but expose men to Envy, as a Prey.
Reputation of power, is Power; because it draweth with it the
adhaerance of those that need protection.
So is Reputation of love of a mans Country, (called Popularity,) for the
same Reason.
Also, what quality soever maketh a man beloved, or feared of many; or
the reputation of such quality, is Power; because it is a means to have the
assistance, and service of many.
Good successe is Power; because it maketh reputation of Wisdome, or
good fortune; which makes men either feare him, or rely on him.

Affability of men already in power, is encrease of Power; because it
gaineth love.
Reputation of Prudence in the conduct of Peace or War, is Power;
because to prudent men, we commit the government of our selves, more
willingly than to others.
Nobility is Power, not in all places, but onely in those Commonwealths, where it has Priviledges: for in such priviledges consisteth their
Power.
Eloquence is Power; because it is seeming Prudence.
Forme is Power; because being a promise of Good, it recommendeth
men to the favour of women and strangers.
The Sciences, are small Power; because not eminent; and therefore, not
acknowledged in any man; nor are at all, but in a few; and in them, but of a
few things. For Science is of that nature, as none can understand it to be,
but such as in a good measure have attayned it.
Arts of publique use, as Fortification, making of Engines, and other
Instruments of War; because they conferre to Defence, and Victory, are
Power; And though the true Mother of them, be Science, namely the
Mathematiques; yet, because they are brought into the Light, by the hand
of the Artificer, they be esteemed (the Midwife passing with the vulgar for
the Mother,) as his issue.

Worth
The Value, or WORTH of a man, is as of all other things, his Price; that
is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his Power: and
therefore is not absolute; but a thing dependant on the need and judgement
of another. An able conductor of Souldiers, is of great Price in time of War
present, or imminent; but in Peace not so. A learned and uncorrupt Judge,
is much Worth in time of Peace; but not so much in War. And as in other
things, so in men, not the seller, but the buyer determines the Price. For let
a man (as most men do,) rate themselves as the highest Value they can; yet
their true Value is no more than it is esteemed by others.
The manifestation of the Value we set on one another, is that which is
commonly called Honouring, and Dishonouring. To Value a man at a high
rate, is to Honour him; at a low rate, is to Dishonour him. But high, and
low, in this case, is to be understood by comparison to the rate that each
man setteth on himselfe.

Dignity
The publique worth of a man, which is the Value set on him by the
Common-wealth, is that which men commonly call DIGNITY. And this
Value of him by the Common-wealth, is understood, by offices of
Command, Judicature, publike Employment; or by Names and Titles,
introduced for distinction of such Value.

To Honour and Dishonour
To pray to another, for ayde of any kind, is to HONOUR; because a
signe we have an opinion he has power to help; and the more difficult the
ayde is, the more is the Honour.
To obey, is to Honour; because no man obeyes them, whom they think
have no power to help, or hurt them. And consequently to disobey, is to
Dishonour.
To give great gifts to a man, is to Honour him; because 'tis buying of
Protection, and acknowledging of Power. To give little gifts, is to
Dishonour; because it is but Almes, and signifies an opinion of the need of
small helps. To be sedulous in promoting anothers good; also to flatter, is
to Honour; as a signe we seek his protection or ayde. To neglect, is to
Dishonour.
To give way, or place to another, in any Commodity, is to Honour; being
a confession of greater power. To arrogate, is to Dishonour.
To shew any signe of love, or feare of another, is to Honour; for both to
love, and to feare, is to value. To contemne, or lesse to love or feare then
he expects, is to Dishonour; for 'tis undervaluing.
To praise, magnifie, or call happy, is to Honour; because nothing but
goodnesse, power, and felicity is valued. To revile, mock, or pitty, is to
Dishonour.
To speak to another with consideration, to appear before him with
decency, and humility, is to Honour him; as signes of fear to offend. To
speak to him rashly, to do anything before him obscenely, slovenly,
impudently, is to Dishonour.
To believe, to trust, to rely on another, is to Honour him; signe of
opinion of his vertue and power. To distrust, or not believe, is to
Dishonour.
To hearken to a mans counsell, or discourse of what kind soever, is to
Honour; as a signe we think him wise, or eloquent, or witty. To sleep, or go
forth, or talk the while, is to Dishonour.

To do those things to another, which he takes for signes of Honour, or
which the Law or Custome makes so, is to Honour; because in approving
the Honour done by others, he acknowledgeth the power which others
acknowledge. To refuse to do them, is to Dishonour.
To agree with in opinion, is to Honour; as being a signe of approving his
judgement, and wisdome. To dissent, is Dishonour; and an upbraiding of
errour; and (if the dissent be in many things) of folly.
To imitate, is to Honour; for it is vehemently to approve. To imitate
ones Enemy, is to Dishonour.
To honour those another honours, is to Honour him; as a signe of
approbation of his judgement. To honour his Enemies, is to Dishonour
him.
To employ in counsell, or in actions of difficulty, is to Honour; as a
signe of opinion of his wisdome, or other power. To deny employment in
the same cases, to those that seek it, is to Dishonour.
All these wayes of Honouring, are naturall; and as well within, as
without Common-wealths. But in Common-wealths, where he, or they that
have the supreme Authority, can make whatsoever they please, to stand for
signes of Honour, there be other Honours.
A Soveraigne doth Honour a Subject, with whatsoever Title, or Office,
or Employment, or Action, that he himselfe will have taken for a signe of
his will to Honour him.
The King of Persia, Honoured Mordecay, when he appointed he should
be conducted through the streets in the Kings Garment, upon one of the
Kings Horses, with a Crown on his head, and a Prince before him,
proclayming, "Thus shall it be done to him that the King will honour." And
yet another King of Persia, or the same another time, to one that demanded
for some great service, to weare one of the Kings robes, gave him leave so
to do; but with his addition, that he should weare it as the Kings foole; and
then it was Dishonour. So that of Civill Honour; such as are Magistracy,
Offices, Titles; and in some places Coats, and Scutchions painted: and
men Honour such as have them, as having so many signes of favour in the
Common-wealth; which favour is Power.
Honourable is whatsoever possession, action, or quality, is an argument
and signe of Power.

And therefore To be Honoured, loved, or feared of many, is Honourable;
as arguments of Power. To be Honoured of few or none, Dishonourable.
Good fortune (if lasting,) Honourable; as a signe of the favour of God.
Ill fortune, and losses, Dishonourable. Riches, are Honourable; for they are
Power. Poverty, Dishonourable. Magnanimity, Liberality, Hope, Courage,
Confidence, are Honourable; for they proceed from the conscience of
Power. Pusillanimity, Parsimony, Fear, Diffidence, are Dishonourable.
Timely Resolution, or determination of what a man is to do, is
Honourable; as being the contempt of small difficulties, and dangers. And
Irresolution, Dishonourable; as a signe of too much valuing of little
impediments, and little advantages: For when a man has weighed things as
long as the time permits, and resolves not, the difference of weight is but
little; and therefore if he resolve not, he overvalues little things, which is
Pusillanimity.
All Actions, and Speeches, that proceed, or seem to proceed from much
Experience, Science, Discretion, or Wit, are Honourable; For all these are
Powers. Actions, or Words that proceed from Errour, Ignorance, or Folly,
Dishonourable.
Gravity, as farre forth as it seems to proceed from a mind employed on
some thing else, is Honourable; because employment is a signe of Power.
But if it seem to proceed from a purpose to appear grave, it is
Dishonourable. For the gravity of the Former, is like the steddinesse of a
Ship laden with Merchandise; but of the later, like the steddinesse of a
Ship ballasted with Sand, and other trash.
To be Conspicuous, that is to say, to be known, for Wealth, Office, great
Actions, or any eminent Good, is Honourable; as a signe of the power for
which he is conspicuous. On the contrary, Obscurity, is Dishonourable.
To be descended from conspicuous Parents, is Honourable; because they
the more easily attain the aydes, and friends of their Ancestors. On the
contrary, to be descended from obscure Parentage, is Dishonourable.
Actions proceeding from Equity, joyned with losse, are Honourable; as
signes of Magnanimity: for Magnanimity is a signe of Power. On the
contrary, Craft, Shifting, neglect of Equity, is Dishonourable.
Nor does it alter the case of Honour, whether an action (so it be great
and difficult, and consequently a signe of much power,) be just or unjust:

for Honour consisteth onely in the opinion of Power. Therefore the ancient
Heathen did not thinke they Dishonoured, but greatly Honoured the Gods,
when they introduced them in their Poems, committing Rapes, Thefts, and
other great, but unjust, or unclean acts: In so much as nothing is so much
celebrated in Jupiter, as his Adulteries; nor in Mercury, as his Frauds, and
Thefts: of whose praises, in a hymne of Homer, the greatest is this, that
being born in the morning, he had invented Musique at noon, and before
night, stolen away the Cattell of Appollo, from his Herdsmen.
Also amongst men, till there were constituted great Common-wealths, it
was thought no dishonour to be a Pyrate, or a High-way Theefe; but rather
a lawfull Trade, not onely amongst the Greeks, but also amongst all other
Nations; as is manifest by the Histories of antient time. And at this day, in
this part of the world, private Duels are, and alwayes will be Honourable,
though unlawfull, till such time as there shall be Honour ordained for them
that refuse, and Ignominy for them that make the Challenge. For Duels
also are many times effects of Courage; and the ground of Courage is
alwayes Strength or Skill, which are Power; though for the most part they
be effects of rash speaking, and of the fear of Dishonour, in one, or both
the Combatants; who engaged by rashnesse, are driven into the Lists to
avoyd disgrace.
Scutchions, and coats of Armes haereditary, where they have any
eminent Priviledges, are Honourable; otherwise not: for their Power
consisteth either in such Priviledges, or in Riches, or some such thing as is
equally honoured in other men. This kind of Honour, commonly called
Gentry, has been derived from the Antient Germans. For there never was
any such thing known, where the German Customes were unknown. Nor is
it now any where in use, where the Germans have not inhabited. The
antient Greek Commanders, when they went to war, had their Shields
painted with such Devises as they pleased; insomuch as an unpainted
Buckler was a signe of Poverty, and of a common Souldier: but they
transmitted not the Inheritance of them. The Romans transmitted the
Marks of their Families: but they were the Images, not the Devises of their
Ancestors. Amongst the people of Asia, Afrique, and America, there is
not, nor was ever, any such thing. The Germans onely had that custome;
from whom it has been derived into England, France, Spain, and Italy,
when in great numbers they either ayded the Romans, or made their own
Conquests in these Westerne parts of the world.

For Germany, being antiently, as all other Countries, in their beginnings,
divided amongst an infinite number of little Lords, or Masters of Families,
that continually had wars one with another; those Masters, or Lords,
principally to the end they might, when they were Covered with Arms, be
known by their followers; and partly for ornament, both painted their
Armor, or their Scutchion, or Coat, with the picture of some Beast, or
other thing; and also put some eminent and visible mark upon the Crest of
their Helmets. And his ornament both of the Armes, and Crest, descended
by inheritance to their Children; to the eldest pure, and to the rest with
some note of diversity, such as the Old master, that is to say in Dutch, the
Here-alt thought fit. But when many such Families, joyned together, made
a greater Monarchy, this duty of the Herealt, to distinguish Scutchions,
was made a private Office a part. And the issue of these Lords, is the great
and antient Gentry; which for the most part bear living creatures, noted for
courage, and rapine; or Castles, Battlements, Belts, Weapons, Bars,
Palisadoes, and other notes of War; nothing being then in honour, but
vertue military. Afterwards, not onely Kings, but popular Commonwealths, gave divers manners of Scutchions, to such as went forth to the
War, or returned from it, for encouragement, or recompence to their
service. All which, by an observing Reader, may be found in such ancient
Histories, Greek and Latine, as make mention of the German Nation, and
Manners, in their times.

Titles of Honour
Titles of Honour, such as are Duke, Count, Marquis, and Baron, are
Honourable; as signifying the value set upon them by the Soveraigne
Power of the Common-wealth: Which Titles, were in old time titles of
Office, and Command, derived some from the Romans, some from the
Germans, and French. Dukes, in Latine Duces, being Generalls in War:
Counts, Comites, such as bare the Generall company out of friendship; and
were left to govern and defend places conquered, and pacified: Marquises,
Marchiones, were Counts that governed the Marches, or bounds of the
Empire. Which titles of Duke, Count, and Marquis, came into the Empire,
about the time of Constantine the Great, from the customes of the German
Militia. But Baron, seems to have been a Title of the Gaules, and signifies
a Great man; such as were the Kings, or Princes men, whom they
employed in war about their persons; and seems to be derived from Vir, to
Ber, and Bar, that signified the same in the Language of the Gaules, that
Vir in Latine; and thence to Bero, and Baro: so that such men were called
Berones, and after Barones; and (in Spanish) Varones. But he that would
know more particularly the originall of Titles of Honour, may find it, as I
have done this, in Mr. Seldens most excellent Treatise of that subject. In
processe of time these offices of Honour, by occasion of trouble, and for
reasons of good and peacable government, were turned into meer Titles;
serving for the most part, to distinguish the precedence, place, and order of
subjects in the Common-wealth: and men were made Dukes, Counts,
Marquises, and Barons of Places, wherein they had neither possession, nor
command: and other Titles also, were devised to the same end.

Worthinesse Fitnesse
WORTHINESSE, is a thing different from the worth, or value of a man;
and also from his merit, or desert; and consisteth in a particular power, or
ability for that, whereof he is said to be worthy: which particular ability, is
usually named FITNESSE, or Aptitude.
For he is Worthiest to be a Commander, to be a Judge, or to have any
other charge, that is best fitted, with the qualities required to the well
discharging of it; and Worthiest of Riches, that has the qualities most
requisite for the well using of them: any of which qualities being absent,
one may neverthelesse be a Worthy man, and valuable for some thing else.
Again, a man may be Worthy of Riches, Office, and Employment, that
neverthelesse, can plead no right to have it before another; and therefore
cannot be said to merit or deserve it. For Merit, praesupposeth a right, and
that the thing deserved is due by promise: Of which I shall say more
hereafter, when I shall speak of Contracts.

CHAPTER XI. OF THE DIFFERENCE OF
MANNERS

What Is Here Meant By Manners
By MANNERS, I mean not here, Decency of behaviour; as how one man
should salute another, or how a man should wash his mouth, or pick his
teeth before company, and such other points of the Small Morals; But
those qualities of man-kind, that concern their living together in Peace,
and Unity. To which end we are to consider, that the Felicity of this life,
consisteth not in the repose of a mind satisfied. For there is no such Finis
Ultimus, (utmost ayme,) nor Summum Bonum, (greatest good,) as is
spoken of in the Books of the old Morall Philosophers. Nor can a man any
more live, whose Desires are at an end, than he, whose Senses and
Imaginations are at a stand. Felicity is a continuall progresse of the desire,
from one object to another; the attaining of the former, being still but the
way to the later. The cause whereof is, That the object of mans desire, is
not to enjoy once onely, and for one instant of time; but to assure for ever,
the way of his future desire. And therefore the voluntary actions, and
inclinations of all men, tend, not only to the procuring, but also to the
assuring of a contented life; and differ onely in the way: which ariseth
partly from the diversity of passions, in divers men; and partly from the
difference of the knowledge, or opinion each one has of the causes, which
produce the effect desired.

A Restlesse Desire Of Power, In All Men
So that in the first place, I put for a generall inclination of all mankind,
a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power, that ceaseth onely
in Death. And the cause of this, is not alwayes that a man hopes for a more
intensive delight, than he has already attained to; or that he cannot be
content with a moderate power: but because he cannot assure the power
and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of
more. And from hence it is, that Kings, whose power is greatest, turn their
endeavours to the assuring it a home by Lawes, or abroad by Wars: and
when that is done, there succeedeth a new desire; in some, of Fame from
new Conquest; in others, of ease and sensuall pleasure; in others, of
admiration, or being flattered for excellence in some art, or other ability of
the mind.

Love Of Contention From Competition
Competition of Riches, Honour, command, or other power, enclineth to
Contention, Enmity, and War: because the way of one Competitor, to the
attaining of his desire, is to kill, subdue, supplant, or repell the other.
Particularly, competition of praise, enclineth to a reverence of Antiquity.
For men contend with the living, not with the dead; to these ascribing
more than due, that they may obscure the glory of the other.

Civil Obedience From Love Of Ease
Desire of Ease, and sensuall Delight, disposeth men to obey a common
Power: because by such Desires, a man doth abandon the protection might
be hoped for from his own Industry, and labour.

From Feare Of Death Or Wounds
Fear of Death, and Wounds, disposeth to the same; and for the same
reason. On the contrary, needy men, and hardy, not contented with their
present condition; as also, all men that are ambitious of Military
command, are enclined to continue the causes of warre; and to stirre up
trouble and sedition: for there is no honour Military but by warre; nor any
such hope to mend an ill game, as by causing a new shuffle.

And From Love Of Arts
Desire of Knowledge, and Arts of Peace, enclineth men to obey a
common Power: For such Desire, containeth a desire of leasure; and
consequently protection from some other Power than their own.

Love Of Vertue, From Love Of Praise
Desire of Praise, disposeth to laudable actions, such as please them
whose judgement they value; for of these men whom we contemn, we
contemn also the Praises. Desire of Fame after death does the same. And
though after death, there be no sense of the praise given us on Earth, as
being joyes, that are either swallowed up in the unspeakable joyes of
Heaven, or extinguished in the extreme torments of Hell: yet is not such
Fame vain; because men have a present delight therein, from the foresight
of it, and of the benefit that may rebound thereby to their posterity: which
though they now see not, yet they imagine; and any thing that is pleasure
in the sense, the same also is pleasure in the imagination.

Hate, From Difficulty Of Requiting Great Benefits
To have received from one, to whom we think our selves equall, greater
benefits than there is hope to Requite, disposeth to counterfiet love; but
really secret hatred; and puts a man into the estate of a desperate debtor,
that in declining the sight of his creditor, tacitely wishes him there, where
he might never see him more. For benefits oblige; and obligation is
thraldome; which is to ones equall, hateful. But to have received benefits
from one, whom we acknowledge our superiour, enclines to love; because
the obligation is no new depession: and cheerfull acceptation, (which men
call Gratitude,) is such an honour done to the obliger, as is taken generally
for retribution. Also to receive benefits, though from an equall, or
inferiour, as long as there is hope of requitall, disposeth to love: for in the
intention of the receiver, the obligation is of ayd, and service mutuall;
from whence proceedeth an Emulation of who shall exceed in benefiting;
the most noble and profitable contention possible; wherein the victor is
pleased with his victory, and the other revenged by confessing it.

And From Conscience Of Deserving To Be Hated
To have done more hurt to a man, than he can, or is willing to expiate,
enclineth the doer to hate the sufferer. For he must expect revenge, or
forgivenesse; both which are hatefull.

Promptnesse To Hurt, From Fear
Feare of oppression, disposeth a man to anticipate, or to seek ayd by
society: for there is no other way by which a man can secure his life and
liberty.

And From Distrust Of Their Own Wit
Men that distrust their own subtilty, are in tumult, and sedition, better
disposed for victory, than they that suppose themselves wise, or crafty. For
these love to consult, the other (fearing to be circumvented,) to strike first.
And in sedition, men being alwayes in the procincts of Battell, to hold
together, and use all advantages of force, is a better stratagem, than any
that can proceed from subtilty of Wit.

Vain Undertaking From Vain-glory
Vain-glorious men, such as without being conscious to themselves of
great sufficiency, delight in supposing themselves gallant men, are
enclined onely to ostentation; but not to attempt: Because when danger or
difficulty appears, they look for nothing but to have their insufficiency
discovered.
Vain-glorious men, such as estimate their sufficiency by the flattery of
other men, or the fortune of some precedent action, without assured
ground of hope from the true knowledge of themselves, are enclined to
rash engaging; and in the approach of danger, or difficulty, to retire if they
can: because not seeing the way of safety, they will rather hazard their
honour, which may be salved with an excuse; than their lives, for which no
salve is sufficient.

Ambition, From Opinion Of Sufficiency
Men that have a strong opinion of their own wisdome in matter of
government, are disposed to Ambition. Because without publique
Employment in counsell or magistracy, the honour of their wisdome is
lost. And therefore Eloquent speakers are enclined to Ambition; for
Eloquence seemeth wisdome, both to themselves and others

Irresolution, From Too Great Valuing Of Small
Matters
Pusillanimity disposeth men to Irresolution, and consequently to lose
the occasions, and fittest opportunities of action. For after men have been
in deliberation till the time of action approach, if it be not then manifest
what is best to be done, tis a signe, the difference of Motives, the one way
and the other, are not great: Therefore not to resolve then, is to lose the
occasion by weighing of trifles; which is pusillanimity.
Frugality,(though in poor men a Vertue,) maketh a man unapt to
atchieve such actions, as require the strength of many men at once: For it
weakeneth their Endeavour, which is to be nourished and kept in vigor by
Reward.
Confidence In Others From Ignorance Of The Marks Of Wisdome and
Kindnesse Eloquence, with flattery, disposeth men to confide in them that
have it; because the former is seeming Wisdome, the later seeming
Kindnesse. Adde to them Military reputation, and it disposeth men to
adhaere, and subject themselves to those men that have them. The two
former, having given them caution against danger from him; the later
gives them caution against danger from others.

And From The Ignorance Of Naturall Causes
Want of Science, that is, Ignorance of causes, disposeth, or rather
constraineth a man to rely on the advise, and authority of others. For all
men whom the truth concernes, if they rely not on their own, must rely on
the opinion of some other, whom they think wiser than themselves, and
see not why he should deceive them.

And From Want Of Understanding
Ignorance of the signification of words; which is, want of
understanding, disposeth men to take on trust, not onely the truth they
know not; but also the errors; and which is more, the non-sense of them
they trust: For neither Error, nor non-sense, can without a perfect
understanding of words, be detected.
From the same it proceedeth, that men give different names, to one and
the same thing, from the difference of their own passions: As they that
approve a private opinion, call it Opinion; but they that mislike it,
Haeresie: and yet haeresie signifies no more than private opinion; but has
onely a greater tincture of choler.
From the same also it proceedeth, that men cannot distinguish, without
study and great understanding, between one action of many men, and
many actions of one multitude; as for example, between the one action of
all the Senators of Rome in killing Catiline, and the many actions of a
number of Senators in killing Caesar; and therefore are disposed to take
for the action of the people, that which is a multitude of actions done by a
multitude of men, led perhaps by the perswasion of one.
Adhaerence To Custome, From Ignorance Of The Nature Of Right And
Wrong Ignorance of the causes, and originall constitution of Right, Equity,
Law, and Justice, disposeth a man to make Custome and Example the rule
of his actions; in such manner, as to think that Unjust which it hath been
the custome to punish; and that Just, of the impunity and approbation
whereof they can produce an Example, or (as the Lawyers which onely use
the false measure of Justice barbarously call it) a Precedent; like little
children, that have no other rule of good and evill manners, but the
correction they receive from their Parents, and Masters; save that children
are constant to their rule, whereas men are not so; because grown strong,
and stubborn, they appeale from custome to reason, and from reason to
custome, as it serves their turn; receding from custome when their interest
requires it, and setting themselves against reason, as oft as reason is
against them: Which is the cause, that the doctrine of Right and Wrong, is
perpetually disputed, both by the Pen and the Sword: whereas the doctrine

of Lines, and Figures, is not so; because men care not, in that subject what
be truth, as a thing that crosses no mans ambition, profit, or lust. For I
doubt not, but if it had been a thing contrary to any mans right of
dominion, or to the interest of men that have dominion, That The Three
Angles Of A Triangle Should Be Equall To Two Angles Of A Square; that
doctrine should have been, if not disputed, yet by the burning of all books
of Geometry, suppressed, as farre as he whom it concerned was able.
Adhaerence To Private Men, From Ignorance Of The Causes Of Peace
Ignorance of remote causes, disposeth men to attribute all events, to the
causes immediate, and Instrumentall: For these are all the causes they
perceive. And hence it comes to passe, that in all places, men that are
grieved with payments to the Publique, discharge their anger upon the
Publicans, that is to say, Farmers, Collectors, and other Officers of the
publique Revenue; and adhaere to such as find fault with the publike
Government; and thereby, when they have engaged themselves beyond
hope of justification, fall also upon the Supreme Authority, for feare of
punishment, or shame of receiving pardon.

Credulity From Ignorance Of Nature
Ignorance of naturall causes disposeth a man to Credulity, so as to
believe many times impossibilities: for such know nothing to the contrary,
but that they may be true; being unable to detect the Impossibility. And
Credulity, because men love to be hearkened unto in company, disposeth
them to lying: so that Ignorance it selfe without Malice, is able to make a
man bothe to believe lyes, and tell them; and sometimes also to invent
them.

Curiosity To Know, From Care Of Future Time
Anxiety for the future time, disposeth men to enquire into the causes of
things: because the knowledge of them, maketh men the better able to
order the present to their best advantage.

Naturall Religion, From The Same
Curiosity, or love of the knowledge of causes, draws a man from
consideration of the effect, to seek the cause; and again, the cause of that
cause; till of necessity he must come to this thought at last, that there is
some cause, whereof there is no former cause, but is eternall; which is it
men call God. So that it is impossible to make any profound enquiry into
naturall causes, without being enclined thereby to believe there is one God
Eternall; though they cannot have any Idea of him in their mind,
answerable to his nature. For as a man that is born blind, hearing men talk
of warming themselves by the fire, and being brought to warm himself by
the same, may easily conceive, and assure himselfe, there is somewhat
there, which men call Fire, and is the cause of the heat he feeles; but
cannot imagine what it is like; nor have an Idea of it in his mind, such as
they have that see it: so also, by the visible things of this world, and their
admirable order, a man may conceive there is a cause of them, which men
call God; and yet not have an Idea, or Image of him in his mind.
And they that make little, or no enquiry into the naturall causes of
things, yet from the feare that proceeds from the ignorance it selfe, of
what it is that hath the power to do them much good or harm, are enclined
to suppose, and feign unto themselves, severall kinds of Powers Invisible;
and to stand in awe of their own imaginations; and in time of distresse to
invoke them; as also in the time of an expected good successe, to give
them thanks; making the creatures of their own fancy, their Gods. By
which means it hath come to passe, that from the innumerable variety of
Fancy, men have created in the world innumerable sorts of Gods. And this
Feare of things invisible, is the naturall Seed of that, which every one in
himself calleth Religion; and in them that worship, or feare that Power
otherwise than they do, Superstition.
And this seed of Religion, having been observed by many; some of
those that have observed it, have been enclined thereby to nourish, dresse,
and forme it into Lawes; and to adde to it of their own invention, any
opinion of the causes of future events, by which they thought they should

best be able to govern others, and make unto themselves the greatest use
of their Powers.

CHAPTER XII. OF RELIGION

Religion, In Man Onely
Seeing there are no signes, nor fruit of Religion, but in Man onely; there
is no cause to doubt, but that the seed of Religion, is also onely in Man;
and consisteth in some peculiar quality, or at least in some eminent degree
thereof, not to be found in other Living creatures.

First, From His Desire Of Knowing Causes
And first, it is peculiar to the nature of Man, to be inquisitive into the
Causes of the Events they see, some more, some lesse; but all men so
much, as to be curious in the search of the causes of their own good and
evill fortune.

From The Consideration Of The Beginning Of
Things
Secondly, upon the sight of any thing that hath a Beginning, to think
also it had a cause, which determined the same to begin, then when it did,
rather than sooner or later.

From His Observation Of The Sequell Of Things
Thirdly, whereas there is no other Felicity of Beasts, but the enjoying of
their quotidian Food, Ease, and Lusts; as having little, or no foresight of
the time to come, for want of observation, and memory of the order,
consequence, and dependance of the things they see; Man observeth how
one Event hath been produced by another; and remembreth in them
Antecedence and Consequence; And when he cannot assure himselfe of the
true causes of things, (for the causes of good and evill fortune for the most
part are invisible,) he supposes causes of them, either such as his own
fancy suggesteth; or trusteth to the Authority of other men, such as he
thinks to be his friends, and wiser than himselfe.
The Naturall Cause Of Religion, The Anxiety Of The Time To Come
The two first, make Anxiety. For being assured that there be causes of all
things that have arrived hitherto, or shall arrive hereafter; it is impossible
for a man, who continually endeavoureth to secure himselfe against the
evill he feares, and procure the good he desireth, not to be in a perpetuall
solicitude of the time to come; So that every man, especially those that are
over provident, are in an estate like to that of Prometheus. For as
Prometheus, (which interpreted, is, The Prudent Man,) was bound to the
hill Caucasus, a place of large prospect, where, an Eagle feeding on his
liver, devoured in the day, as much as was repayred in the night: So that
man, which looks too far before him, in the care of future time, hath his
heart all the day long, gnawed on by feare of death, poverty, or other
calamity; and has no repose, nor pause of his anxiety, but in sleep.

Which Makes Them Fear The Power Of Invisible
Things
This perpetuall feare, alwayes accompanying mankind in the ignorance
of causes, as it were in the Dark, must needs have for object something.
And therefore when there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing to accuse,
either of their good, or evill fortune, but some Power, or Agent Invisible:
In which sense perhaps it was, that some of the old Poets said, that the
Gods were at first created by humane Feare: which spoken of the Gods,
(that is to say, of the many Gods of the Gentiles) is very true. But the
acknowledging of one God Eternall, Infinite, and Omnipotent, may more
easily be derived, from the desire men have to know the causes of naturall
bodies, and their severall vertues, and operations; than from the feare of
what was to befall them in time to come. For he that from any effect hee
seeth come to passe, should reason to the next and immediate cause
thereof, and from thence to the cause of that cause, and plonge himselfe
profoundly in the pursuit of causes; shall at last come to this, that there
must be (as even the Heathen Philosophers confessed) one First Mover;
that is, a First, and an Eternall cause of all things; which is that which men
mean by the name of God: And all this without thought of their fortune;
the solicitude whereof, both enclines to fear, and hinders them from the
search of the causes of other things; and thereby gives occasion of
feigning of as many Gods, as there be men that feigne them.

And Suppose Them Incorporeall
And for the matter, or substance of the Invisible Agents, so fancyed;
they could not by naturall cogitation, fall upon any other conceipt, but that
it was the same with that of the Soule of man; and that the Soule of man,
was of the same substance, with that which appeareth in a Dream, to one
that sleepeth; or in a Looking-glasse, to one that is awake; which, men not
knowing that such apparitions are nothing else but creatures of the Fancy,
think to be reall, and externall Substances; and therefore call them Ghosts;
as the Latines called them Imagines, and Umbrae; and thought them
Spirits, that is, thin aereall bodies; and those Invisible Agents, which they
feared, to bee like them; save that they appear, and vanish when they
please. But the opinion that such Spirits were Incorporeall, or Immateriall,
could never enter into the mind of any man by nature; because, though
men may put together words of contradictory signification, as Spirit, and
Incorporeall; yet they can never have the imagination of any thing
answering to them: And therefore, men that by their own meditation,
arrive to the acknowledgement of one Infinite, Omnipotent, and Eternall
God, choose rather to confesse he is Incomprehensible, and above their
understanding; than to define his Nature By Spirit Incorporeall, and then
Confesse their definition to be unintelligible: or if they give him such a
title, it is not Dogmatically, with intention to make the Divine Nature
understood; but Piously, to honour him with attributes, of significations, as
remote as they can from the grossenesse of Bodies Visible.

But Know Not The Way How They Effect
Anything
Then, for the way by which they think these Invisible Agents wrought
their effects; that is to say, what immediate causes they used, in bringing
things to passe, men that know not what it is that we call Causing, (that is,
almost all men) have no other rule to guesse by, but by observing, and
remembring what they have seen to precede the like effect at some other
time, or times before, without seeing between the antecedent and
subsequent Event, any dependance or connexion at all: And therefore from
the like things past, they expect the like things to come; and hope for good
or evill luck, superstitiously, from things that have no part at all in the
causing of it: As the Athenians did for their war at Lepanto, demand
another Phormio; the Pompeian faction for their warre in Afrique, another
Scipio; and others have done in divers other occasions since. In like
manner they attribute their fortune to a stander by, to a lucky or unlucky
place, to words spoken, especially if the name of God be amongst them; as
Charming, and Conjuring (the Leiturgy of Witches;) insomuch as to
believe, they have power to turn a stone into bread, bread into a man, or
any thing, into any thing.

But Honour Them As They Honour Men
Thirdly, for the worship which naturally men exhibite to Powers
invisible, it can be no other, but such expressions of their reverence, as
they would use towards men; Gifts, Petitions, Thanks, Submission of
Body, Considerate Addresses, sober Behaviour, premeditated Words,
Swearing (that is, assuring one another of their promises,) by invoking
them. Beyond that reason suggesteth nothing; but leaves them either to
rest there; or for further ceremonies, to rely on those they believe to be
wiser than themselves.

And Attribute To Them All Extraordinary Events
Lastly, concerning how these Invisible Powers declare to men the things
which shall hereafter come to passe, especially concerning their good or
evill fortune in generall, or good or ill successe in any particular
undertaking, men are naturally at a stand; save that using to conjecture of
the time to come, by the time past, they are very apt, not onely to take
casuall things, after one or two encounters, for Prognostiques of the like
encounter ever after, but also to believe the like Prognostiques from other
men, of whom they have once conceived a good opinion.

Foure Things, Naturall Seeds Of Religion
And in these foure things, Opinion of Ghosts, Ignorance of second
causes, Devotion towards what men fear, and Taking of things Casuall for
Prognostiques, consisteth the Naturall seed of Religion; which by reason
of the different Fancies, Judgements, and Passions of severall men, hath
grown up into ceremonies so different, that those which are used by one
man, are for the most part ridiculous to another.

Made Different By Culture
For these seeds have received culture from two sorts of men. One sort
have been they, that have nourished, and ordered them, according to their
own invention. The other, have done it, by Gods commandement, and
direction: but both sorts have done it, with a purpose to make those men
that relyed on them, the more apt to Obedience, Lawes, Peace, Charity, and
civill Society. So that the Religion of the former sort, is a part of humane
Politiques; and teacheth part of the duty which Earthly Kings require of
their Subjects. And the Religion of the later sort is Divine Politiques; and
containeth Precepts to those that have yeelded themselves subjects in the
Kingdome of God. Of the former sort, were all the Founders of Commonwealths, and the Law-givers of the Gentiles: Of the later sort, were
Abraham, Moses, and our Blessed Saviour; by whom have been derived
unto us the Lawes of the Kingdome of God.

The Absurd Opinion Of Gentilisme
And for that part of Religion, which consisteth in opinions concerning
the nature of Powers Invisible, there is almost nothing that has a name,
that has not been esteemed amongst the Gentiles, in one place or another, a
God, or Divell; or by their Poets feigned to be inanimated, inhabited, or
possessed by some Spirit or other.
The unformed matter of the World, was a God, by the name of Chaos.
The Heaven, the Ocean, the Planets, the Fire, the Earth, the Winds, were
so many Gods.
Men, Women, a Bird, a Crocodile, a Calf, a Dogge, a Snake, an Onion, a
Leeke, Deified. Besides, that they filled almost all places, with spirits
called Daemons; the plains, with Pan, and Panises, or Satyres; the Woods,
with Fawnes, and Nymphs; the Sea, with Tritons, and other Nymphs; every
River, and Fountayn, with a Ghost of his name, and with Nymphs; every
house, with it Lares, or Familiars; every man, with his Genius; Hell, with
Ghosts, and spirituall Officers, as Charon, Cerberus, and the Furies; and in
the night time, all places with Larvae, Lemures, Ghosts of men deceased,
and a whole kingdome of Fayries, and Bugbears. They have also ascribed
Divinity, and built Temples to meer Accidents, and Qualities; such as are
Time, Night, Day, Peace, Concord, Love, Contention, Vertue, Honour,
Health, Rust, Fever, and the like; which when they prayed for, or against,
they prayed to, as if there were Ghosts of those names hanging over their
heads, and letting fall, or withholding that Good, or Evill, for, or against
which they prayed. They invoked also their own Wit, by the name of
Muses; their own Ignorance, by the name of Fortune; their own Lust, by
the name of Cupid; their own Rage, by the name Furies; their own privy
members by the name of Priapus; and attributed their pollutions, to Incubi,
and Succubae: insomuch as there was nothing, which a Poet could
introduce as a person in his Poem, which they did not make either a God,
or a Divel.
The same authors of the Religion of the Gentiles, observing the second
ground for Religion, which is mens Ignorance of causes; and thereby their

aptnesse to attribute their fortune to causes, on which there was no
dependence at all apparent, took occasion to obtrude on their ignorance, in
stead of second causes, a kind of second and ministeriall Gods; ascribing
the cause of Foecundity, to Venus; the cause of Arts, to Apollo; of Subtilty
and Craft, to Mercury; of Tempests and stormes, to Aeolus; and of other
effects, to other Gods: insomuch as there was amongst the Heathen almost
as great variety of Gods, as of businesse.
And to the Worship, which naturally men conceived fit to bee used
towards their Gods, namely Oblations, Prayers, Thanks, and the rest
formerly named; the same Legislators of the Gentiles have added their
Images, both in Picture, and Sculpture; that the more ignorant sort, (that is
to say, the most part, or generality of the people,) thinking the Gods for
whose representation they were made, were really included, and as it were
housed within them, might so much the more stand in feare of them: And
endowed them with lands, and houses, and officers, and revenues, set apart
from all other humane uses; that is, consecrated, and made holy to those
their Idols; as Caverns, Groves, Woods, Mountains, and whole Ilands; and
have attributed to them, not onely the shapes, some of Men, some of
Beasts, some of Monsters; but also the Faculties, and Passions of men and
beasts; as Sense, Speech, Sex, Lust, Generation, (and this not onely by
mixing one with another, to propagate the kind of Gods; but also by
mixing with men, and women, to beget mongrill Gods, and but inmates of
Heaven, as Bacchus, Hercules, and others;) besides, Anger, Revenge, and
other passions of living creatures, and the actions proceeding from them,
as Fraud, Theft, Adultery, Sodomie, and any vice that may be taken for an
effect of Power, or a cause of Pleasure; and all such Vices, as amongst men
are taken to be against Law, rather than against Honour.
Lastly, to the Prognostiques of time to come; which are naturally, but
Conjectures upon the Experience of time past; and supernaturall, divine
Revelation; the same authors of the Religion of the Gentiles, partly upon
pretended Experience, partly upon pretended Revelation, have added
innumerable other superstitious wayes of Divination; and made men
believe they should find their fortunes, sometimes in the ambiguous or
senslesse answers of the priests at Delphi, Delos, Ammon, and other
famous Oracles; which answers, were made ambiguous by designe, to own
the event both wayes; or absurd by the intoxicating vapour of the place,
which is very frequent in sulphurous Cavernes: Sometimes in the leaves of

the Sibills; of whose Prophecyes (like those perhaps of Nostradamus; for
the fragments now extant seem to be the invention of later times) there
were some books in reputation in the time of the Roman Republique:
Sometimes in the insignificant Speeches of Mad-men, supposed to be
possessed with a divine Spirit; which Possession they called Enthusiasme;
and these kinds of foretelling events, were accounted Theomancy, or
Prophecy; Sometimes in the aspect of the Starres at their Nativity; which
was called Horoscopy, and esteemed a part of judiciary Astrology:
Sometimes in their own hopes and feares, called Thumomancy, or Presage:
Sometimes in the Prediction of Witches, that pretended conference with
the dead; which is called Necromancy, Conjuring, and Witchcraft; and is
but juggling and confederate knavery: Sometimes in the Casuall flight, or
feeding of birds; called Augury: Sometimes in the Entrayles of a
sacrificed beast; which was Aruspicina: Sometimes in Dreams: Sometimes
in Croaking of Ravens, or chattering of Birds: Sometimes in the
Lineaments of the face; which was called Metoposcopy; or by Palmistry in
the lines of the hand; in casuall words, called Omina: Sometimes in
Monsters, or unusuall accidents; as Ecclipses, Comets, rare Meteors,
Earthquakes, Inundations, uncouth Births, and the like, which they called
Portenta and Ostenta, because they thought them to portend, or foreshew
some great Calamity to come; Sometimes, in meer Lottery, as Crosse and
Pile; counting holes in a sive; dipping of Verses in Homer, and Virgil; and
innumerable other such vaine conceipts. So easie are men to be drawn to
believe any thing, from such men as have gotten credit with them; and can
with gentlenesse, and dexterity, take hold of their fear, and ignorance.
The Designes Of The Authors Of The Religion Of The Heathen And
therefore the first Founders, and Legislators of Common-wealths amongst
the Gentiles, whose ends were only to keep the people in obedience, and
peace, have in all places taken care; First, to imprint in their minds a
beliefe, that those precepts which they gave concerning Religion, might
not be thought to proceed from their own device, but from the dictates of
some God, or other Spirit; or else that they themselves were of a higher
nature than mere mortalls, that their Lawes might the more easily be
received: So Numa Pompilius pretended to receive the Ceremonies he
instituted amongst the Romans, from the Nymph Egeria: and the first King
and founder of the Kingdome of Peru, pretended himselfe and his wife to
be the children of the Sunne: and Mahomet, to set up his new Religion,

pretended to have conferences with the Holy Ghost, in forme of a Dove.
Secondly, they have had a care, to make it believed, that the same things
were displeasing to the Gods, which were forbidden by the Lawes. Thirdly,
to prescribe Ceremonies, Supplications, Sacrifices, and Festivalls, by
which they were to believe, the anger of the Gods might be appeased; and
that ill success in War, great contagions of Sicknesse, Earthquakes, and
each mans private Misery, came from the Anger of the Gods; and their
Anger from the Neglect of their Worship, or the forgetting, or mistaking
some point of the Ceremonies required. And though amongst the antient
Romans, men were not forbidden to deny, that which in the Poets is written
of the paines, and pleasures after this life; which divers of great authority,
and gravity in that state have in their Harangues openly derided; yet that
beliefe was alwaies more cherished, than the contrary.
And by these, and such other Institutions, they obtayned in order to their
end, (which was the peace of the Commonwealth,) that the common
people in their misfortunes, laying the fault on neglect, or errour in their
Ceremonies, or on their own disobedience to the lawes, were the lesse apt
to mutiny against their Governors. And being entertained with the pomp,
and pastime of Festivalls, and publike Gomes, made in honour of the
Gods, needed nothing else but bread, to keep them from discontent,
murmuring, and commotion against the State. And therefore the Romans,
that had conquered the greatest part of the then known World, made no
scruple of tollerating any Religion whatsoever in the City of Rome it selfe;
unlesse it had somthing in it, that could not consist with their Civill
Government; nor do we read, that any Religion was there forbidden, but
that of the Jewes; who (being the peculiar Kingdome of God) thought it
unlawfull to acknowledge subjection to any mortall King or State
whatsoever. And thus you see how the Religion of the Gentiles was a part
of their Policy.
The True Religion, And The Lawes Of Gods Kingdome The Same But
where God himselfe, by supernaturall Revelation, planted Religion; there
he also made to himselfe a peculiar Kingdome; and gave Lawes, not only
of behaviour towards himselfe; but also towards one another; and thereby
in the Kingdome of God, the Policy, and lawes Civill, are a part of
Religion; and therefore the distinction of Temporall, and Spirituall
Domination, hath there no place. It is true, that God is King of all the
Earth: Yet may he be King of a peculiar, and chosen Nation. For there is no

more incongruity therein, than that he that hath the generall command of
the whole Army, should have withall a peculiar Regiment, or Company of
his own. God is King of all the Earth by his Power: but of his chosen
people, he is King by Covenant. But to speake more largly of the
Kingdome of God, both by Nature, and Covenant, I have in the following
discourse assigned an other place.

The Causes Of Change In Religion
From the propagation of Religion, it is not hard to understand the causes
of the resolution of the same into its first seeds, or principles; which are
only an opinion of a Deity, and Powers invisible, and supernaturall; that
can never be so abolished out of humane nature, but that new Religions
may againe be made to spring out of them, by the culture of such men, as
for such purpose are in reputation.
For seeing all formed Religion, is founded at first, upon the faith which
a multitude hath in some one person, whom they believe not only to be a
wise man, and to labour to procure their happiness, but also to be a holy
man, to whom God himselfe vouchsafeth to declare his will
supernaturally; It followeth necessarily, when they that have the
Goverment of Religion, shall come to have either the wisedome of those
men, their sincerity, or their love suspected; or that they shall be unable to
shew any probable token of divine Revelation; that the Religion which
they desire to uphold, must be suspected likewise; and (without the feare
of the Civill Sword) contradicted and rejected.

Injoyning Beleefe Of Impossibilities
That which taketh away the reputation of Wisedome, in him that
formeth a Religion, or addeth to it when it is allready formed, is the
enjoyning of a beliefe of contradictories: For both parts of a contradiction
cannot possibly be true: and therefore to enjoyne the beliefe of them, is an
argument of ignorance; which detects the Author in that; and discredits
him in all things else he shall propound as from revelation supernaturall:
which revelation a man may indeed have of many things above, but of
nothing against naturall reason.

Doing Contrary To The Religion They Establish
That which taketh away the reputation of Sincerity, is the doing, or
saying of such things, as appeare to be signes, that what they require other
men to believe, is not believed by themselves; all which doings, or sayings
are therefore called Scandalous, because they be stumbling blocks, that
make men to fall in the way of Religion: as Injustice, Cruelty,
Prophanesse, Avarice, and Luxury. For who can believe, that he that doth
ordinarily such actions, as proceed from any of these rootes, believeth
there is any such Invisible Power to be feared, as he affrighteth other men
withall, for lesser faults?
That which taketh away the reputation of Love, is the being detected of
private ends: as when the beliefe they require of others, conduceth or
seemeth to conduce to the acquiring of Dominion, Riches, Dignity, or
secure Pleasure, to themselves onely, or specially. For that which men reap
benefit by to themselves, they are thought to do for their own sakes, and
not for love of others

Want Of The Testimony Of Miracles
Lastly, the testimony that men can render of divine Calling, can be no
other, than the operation of Miracles; or true Prophecy, (which also is a
Miracle;) or extraordinary Felicity. And therefore, to those points of
Religion, which have been received from them that did such Miracles;
those that are added by such, as approve not their Calling by some
Miracle, obtain no greater beliefe, than what the Custome, and Lawes of
the places, in which they be educated, have wrought into them. For as in
naturall things, men of judgement require naturall signes, and arguments;
so in supernaturall things, they require signes supernaturall, (which are
Miracles,) before they consent inwardly, and from their hearts.
All which causes of the weakening of mens faith, do manifestly appear
in the Examples following. First, we have the Example of the children of
Israel; who when Moses, that had approved his Calling to them by
Miracles, and by the happy conduct of them out of Egypt, was absent but
40 dayes, revolted from the worship of the true God, recommended to
them by him; and setting up (Exod.32 1,2) a Golden Calfe for their God,
relapsed into the Idolatry of the Egyptians; from whom they had been so
lately delivered. And again, after Moses, Aaron, Joshua, and that
generation which had seen the great works of God in Israel, (Judges 2 11)
were dead; another generation arose, and served Baal. So that Miracles
fayling, Faith also failed.
Again, when the sons of Samuel, (1 Sam.8.3) being constituted by their
father Judges in Bersabee, received bribes, and judged unjustly, the people
of Israel refused any more to have God to be their King, in other manner
than he was King of other people; and therefore cryed out to Samuel, to
choose them a King after the manner of the Nations. So that Justice
Fayling, Faith also fayled: Insomuch, as they deposed their God, from
reigning over them.
And whereas in the planting of Christian Religion, the Oracles ceased in
all parts of the Roman Empire, and the number of Christians encreased
wonderfully every day, and in every place, by the preaching of the
Apostles, and Evangelists; a great part of that successe, may reasonably be

attributed, to the contempt, into which the Priests of the Gentiles of that
time, had brought themselves, by their uncleannesse, avarice, and jugling
between Princes. Also the Religion of the Church of Rome, was partly, for
the same cause abolished in England, and many other parts of
Christendome; insomuch, as the fayling of Vertue in the Pastors, maketh
Faith faile in the People: and partly from bringing of the Philosophy, and
doctrine of Aristotle into Religion, by the Schoole-men; from whence
there arose so many contradictions, and absurdities, as brought the Clergy
into a reputation both of Ignorance, and of Fraudulent intention; and
enclined people to revolt from them, either against the will of their own
Princes, as in France, and Holland; or with their will, as in England.
Lastly, amongst the points by the Church of Rome declared necessary
for Salvation, there be so many, manifestly to the advantage of the Pope,
and of his spirituall subjects, residing in the territories of other Christian
Princes, that were it not for the mutuall emulation of those Princes, they
might without warre, or trouble, exclude all forraign Authority, as easily as
it has been excluded in England. For who is there that does not see, to
whose benefit it conduceth, to have it believed, that a King hath not his
Authority from Christ, unlesse a Bishop crown him? That a King, if he be
a Priest, cannot Marry? That whether a Prince be born in lawfull Marriage,
or not, must be judged by Authority from Rome? That Subjects may be
freed from their Alleageance, if by the Court of Rome, the King be judged
an Heretique? That a King (as Chilperique of France) may be deposed by a
Pope (as Pope Zachary,) for no cause; and his Kingdome given to one of
his Subjects? That the Clergy, and Regulars, in what Country soever, shall
be exempt from the Jurisdiction of their King, in cases criminall? Or who
does not see, to whose profit redound the Fees of private Masses, and
Vales of Purgatory; with other signes of private interest, enough to
mortifie the most lively Faith, if (as I sayd) the civill Magistrate, and
Custome did not more sustain it, than any opinion they have of the
Sanctity, Wisdome, or Probity of their Teachers? So that I may attribute all
the changes of Religion in the world, to one and the some cause; and that
is, unpleasing Priests; and those not onely amongst Catholiques, but even
in that Church that hath presumed most of Reformation.

CHAPTER XIII. OF THE NATURALL
CONDITION OF MANKIND,
AS CONCERNING THEIR FELICITY, AND MISERY
Nature hath made men so equall, in the faculties of body, and mind; as
that though there bee found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in
body, or of quicker mind then another; yet when all is reckoned together,
the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one
man can thereupon claim to himselfe any benefit, to which another may
not pretend, as well as he. For as to the strength of body, the weakest has
strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by
confederacy with others, that are in the same danger with himselfe.
And as to the faculties of the mind, (setting aside the arts grounded
upon words, and especially that skill of proceeding upon generall, and
infallible rules, called Science; which very few have, and but in few
things; as being not a native faculty, born with us; nor attained, (as
Prudence,) while we look after somewhat els,) I find yet a greater equality
amongst men, than that of strength. For Prudence, is but Experience;
which equall time, equally bestowes on all men, in those things they
equally apply themselves unto. That which may perhaps make such
equality incredible, is but a vain conceipt of ones owne wisdome, which
almost all men think they have in a greater degree, than the Vulgar; that is,
than all men but themselves, and a few others, whom by Fame, or for
concurring with themselves, they approve. For such is the nature of men,
that howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be more witty, or
more eloquent, or more learned; Yet they will hardly believe there be
many so wise as themselves: For they see their own wit at hand, and other
mens at a distance. But this proveth rather that men are in that point
equall, than unequall. For there is not ordinarily a greater signe of the
equall distribution of any thing, than that every man is contented with his
share.

From Equality Proceeds Diffidence
From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of
our Ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which
neverthelesse they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the
way to their End, (which is principally their owne conservation, and
sometimes their delectation only,) endeavour to destroy, or subdue one an
other. And from hence it comes to passe, that where an Invader hath no
more to feare, than an other mans single power; if one plant, sow, build, or
possesse a convenient Seat, others may probably be expected to come
prepared with forces united, to dispossesse, and deprive him, not only of
the fruit of his labour, but also of his life, or liberty. And the Invader again
is in the like danger of another.

From Diffidence Warre
And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to
secure himselfe, so reasonable, as Anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles,
to master the persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no other power
great enough to endanger him: And this is no more than his own
conservation requireth, and is generally allowed. Also because there be
some, that taking pleasure in contemplating their own power in the acts of
conquest, which they pursue farther than their security requires; if others,
that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within modest bounds, should
not by invasion increase their power, they would not be able, long time, by
standing only on their defence, to subsist. And by consequence, such
augmentation of dominion over men, being necessary to a mans
conservation, it ought to be allowed him.
Againe, men have no pleasure, (but on the contrary a great deale of
griefe) in keeping company, where there is no power able to over-awe
them all. For every man looketh that his companion should value him, at
the same rate he sets upon himselfe: And upon all signes of contempt, or
undervaluing, naturally endeavours, as far as he dares (which amongst
them that have no common power, to keep them in quiet, is far enough to
make them destroy each other,) to extort a greater value from his
contemners, by dommage; and from others, by the example.
So that in the nature of man, we find three principall causes of quarrel.
First, Competition; Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory.
The first, maketh men invade for Gain; the second, for Safety; and the
third, for Reputation. The first use Violence, to make themselves Masters
of other mens persons, wives, children, and cattell; the second, to defend
them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any
other signe of undervalue, either direct in their Persons, or by reflexion in
their Kindred, their Friends, their Nation, their Profession, or their Name.

Out Of Civil States,
There Is Alwayes Warre Of Every One Against Every One Hereby it is
manifest, that during the time men live without a common Power to keep
them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such
a warre, as is of every man, against every man. For WARRE, consisteth
not in Battell onely, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein
the Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently known: and therefore the
notion of Time, is to be considered in the nature of Warre; as it is in the
nature of Weather. For as the nature of Foule weather, lyeth not in a
showre or two of rain; but in an inclination thereto of many dayes
together: So the nature of War, consisteth not in actuall fighting; but in the
known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the
contrary. All other time is PEACE.

The Incommodites Of Such A War
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where every
man is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein
men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their
own invention shall furnish them withall. In such condition, there is no
place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently
no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that
may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of
moving, and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge
of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no
Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent
death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.
It may seem strange to some man, that has not well weighed these
things; that Nature should thus dissociate, and render men apt to invade,
and destroy one another: and he may therefore, not trusting to this
Inference, made from the Passions, desire perhaps to have the same
confirmed by Experience. Let him therefore consider with himselfe, when
taking a journey, he armes himselfe, and seeks to go well accompanied;
when going to sleep, he locks his dores; when even in his house he locks
his chests; and this when he knows there bee Lawes, and publike Officers,
armed, to revenge all injuries shall bee done him; what opinion he has of
his fellow subjects, when he rides armed; of his fellow Citizens, when he
locks his dores; and of his children, and servants, when he locks his chests.
Does he not there as much accuse mankind by his actions, as I do by my
words? But neither of us accuse mans nature in it. The Desires, and other
Passions of man, are in themselves no Sin. No more are the Actions, that
proceed from those Passions, till they know a Law that forbids them;
which till Lawes be made they cannot know: nor can any Law be made, till
they have agreed upon the Person that shall make it.
It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time, nor
condition of warre as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over all
the world: but there are many places, where they live so now. For the
savage people in many places of America, except the government of small

Families, the concord whereof dependeth on naturall lust, have no
government at all; and live at this day in that brutish manner, as I said
before. Howsoever, it may be perceived what manner of life there would
be, where there were no common Power to feare; by the manner of life,
which men that have formerly lived under a peacefull government, use to
degenerate into, in a civill Warre.
But though there had never been any time, wherein particular men were
in a condition of warre one against another; yet in all times, Kings, and
persons of Soveraigne authority, because of their Independency, are in
continuall jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators; having
their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their
Forts, Garrisons, and Guns upon the Frontiers of their Kingdomes; and
continuall Spyes upon their neighbours; which is a posture of War. But
because they uphold thereby, the Industry of their Subjects; there does not
follow from it, that misery, which accompanies the Liberty of particular
men.

In Such A Warre, Nothing Is Unjust
To this warre of every man against every man, this also is consequent;
that nothing can be Unjust. The notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and
Injustice have there no place. Where there is no common Power, there is
no Law: where no Law, no Injustice. Force, and Fraud, are in warre the two
Cardinall vertues. Justice, and Injustice are none of the Faculties neither of
the Body, nor Mind. If they were, they might be in a man that were alone
in the world, as well as his Senses, and Passions. They are Qualities, that
relate to men in Society, not in Solitude. It is consequent also to the same
condition, that there be no Propriety, no Dominion, no Mine and Thine
distinct; but onely that to be every mans that he can get; and for so long, as
he can keep it. And thus much for the ill condition, which man by meer
Nature is actually placed in; though with a possibility to come out of it,
consisting partly in the Passions, partly in his Reason.

The Passions That Incline Men To Peace
The Passions that encline men to Peace, are Feare of Death; Desire of
such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a Hope by their
Industry to obtain them. And Reason suggesteth convenient Articles of
Peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These Articles, are
they, which otherwise are called the Lawes of Nature: whereof I shall
speak more particularly, in the two following Chapters.

CHAPTER XIV. OF THE FIRST AND SECOND
NATURALL LAWES, AND OF CONTRACTS

Right Of Nature What
The RIGHT OF NATURE, which Writers commonly call Jus Naturale,
is the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for
the preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own Life; and
consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own Judgement, and
Reason, hee shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.

Liberty What
By LIBERTY, is understood, according to the proper signification of the
word, the absence of externall Impediments: which Impediments, may oft
take away part of a mans power to do what hee would; but cannot hinder
him from using the power left him, according as his judgement, and reason
shall dictate to him.

A Law Of Nature What
A LAW OF NATURE, (Lex Naturalis,) is a Precept, or generall Rule,
found out by Reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is
destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same;
and to omit, that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved. For
though they that speak of this subject, use to confound Jus, and Lex, Right
and Law; yet they ought to be distinguished; because RIGHT, consisteth in
liberty to do, or to forbeare; Whereas LAW, determineth, and bindeth to
one of them: so that Law, and Right, differ as much, as Obligation, and
Liberty; which in one and the same matter are inconsistent.

Naturally Every Man Has Right To Everything
And because the condition of Man, (as hath been declared in the
precedent Chapter) is a condition of Warre of every one against every one;
in which case every one is governed by his own Reason; and there is
nothing he can make use of, that may not be a help unto him, in preserving
his life against his enemyes; It followeth, that in such a condition, every
man has a Right to every thing; even to one anothers body. And therefore,
as long as this naturall Right of every man to every thing endureth, there
can be no security to any man, (how strong or wise soever he be,) of living
out the time, which Nature ordinarily alloweth men to live.

The Fundamental Law Of Nature
And consequently it is a precept, or generall rule of Reason, "That every
man, ought to endeavour Peace, as farre as he has hope of obtaining it; and
when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and
advantages of Warre." The first branch, of which Rule, containeth the first,
and Fundamentall Law of Nature; which is, "To seek Peace, and follow it."
The Second, the summe of the Right of Nature; which is, "By all means we
can, to defend our selves."

The Second Law Of Nature
From this Fundamentall Law of Nature, by which men are commanded
to endeavour Peace, is derived this second Law; "That a man be willing,
when others are so too, as farre-forth, as for Peace, and defence of
himselfe he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things;
and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would
allow other men against himselfe." For as long as every man holdeth this
Right, of doing any thing he liketh; so long are all men in the condition of
Warre. But if other men will not lay down their Right, as well as he; then
there is no Reason for any one, to devest himselfe of his: For that were to
expose himselfe to Prey, (which no man is bound to) rather than to dispose
himselfe to Peace. This is that Law of the Gospell; "Whatsoever you
require that others should do to you, that do ye to them." And that Law of
all men, "Quod tibi feiri non vis, alteri ne feceris."

What it is to lay down a Right
To Lay Downe a mans Right to any thing, is to Devest himselfe of the
Liberty, of hindring another of the benefit of his own Right to the same.
For he that renounceth, or passeth away his Right, giveth not to any other
man a Right which he had not before; because there is nothing to which
every man had not Right by Nature: but onely standeth out of his way, that
he may enjoy his own originall Right, without hindrance from him; not
without hindrance from another. So that the effect which redoundeth to one
man, by another mans defect of Right, is but so much diminution of
impediments to the use of his own Right originall.

Renouncing (or) Transferring Right What;
Obligation Duty Justice
Right is layd aside, either by simply Renouncing it; or by Transferring it
to another. By Simply RENOUNCING; when he cares not to whom the
benefit thereof redoundeth. By TRANSFERRING; when he intendeth the
benefit thereof to some certain person, or persons. And when a man hath in
either manner abandoned, or granted away his Right; then is he said to be
OBLIGED, or BOUND, not to hinder those, to whom such Right is
granted, or abandoned, from the benefit of it: and that he Ought, and it his
DUTY, not to make voyd that voluntary act of his own: and that such
hindrance is INJUSTICE, and INJURY, as being Sine Jure; the Right being
before renounced, or transferred. So that Injury, or Injustice, in the
controversies of the world, is somewhat like to that, which in the
disputations of Scholers is called Absurdity. For as it is there called an
Absurdity, to contradict what one maintained in the Beginning: so in the
world, it is called Injustice, and Injury, voluntarily to undo that, which
from the beginning he had voluntarily done. The way by which a man
either simply Renounceth, or Transferreth his Right, is a Declaration, or
Signification, by some voluntary and sufficient signe, or signes, that he
doth so Renounce, or Transferre; or hath so Renounced, or Transferred the
same, to him that accepteth it. And these Signes are either Words onely, or
Actions onely; or (as it happeneth most often) both Words and Actions.
And the same are the BONDS, by which men are bound, and obliged:
Bonds, that have their strength, not from their own Nature, (for nothing is
more easily broken then a mans word,) but from Feare of some evill
consequence upon the rupture.

Not All Rights Are Alienable
Whensoever a man Transferreth his Right, or Renounceth it; it is either
in consideration of some Right reciprocally transferred to himselfe; or for
some other good he hopeth for thereby. For it is a voluntary act: and of the
voluntary acts of every man, the object is some Good To Himselfe. And
therefore there be some Rights, which no man can be understood by any
words, or other signes, to have abandoned, or transferred. As first a man
cannot lay down the right of resisting them, that assault him by force, to
take away his life; because he cannot be understood to ayme thereby, at
any Good to himselfe. The same may be sayd of Wounds, and Chayns, and
Imprisonment; both because there is no benefit consequent to such
patience; as there is to the patience of suffering another to be wounded, or
imprisoned: as also because a man cannot tell, when he seeth men proceed
against him by violence, whether they intend his death or not. And lastly
the motive, and end for which this renouncing, and transferring or Right is
introduced, is nothing else but the security of a mans person, in his life,
and in the means of so preserving life, as not to be weary of it. And
therefore if a man by words, or other signes, seem to despoyle himselfe of
the End, for which those signes were intended; he is not to be understood
as if he meant it, or that it was his will; but that he was ignorant of how
such words and actions were to be interpreted.

Contract What
The mutuall transferring of Right, is that which men call
CONTRACT.
There is difference, between transferring of Right to the Thing; and
transferring, or tradition, that is, delivery of the Thing it selfe. For the
Thing may be delivered together with the Translation of the Right; as in
buying and selling with ready mony; or exchange of goods, or lands: and it
may be delivered some time after.

Covenant What
Again, one of the Contractors, may deliver the Thing contracted for on
his part, and leave the other to perform his part at some determinate time
after, and in the mean time be trusted; and then the Contract on his part, is
called PACT, or COVENANT: Or both parts may contract now, to
performe hereafter: in which cases, he that is to performe in time to come,
being trusted, his performance is called Keeping Of Promise, or Faith; and
the fayling of performance (if it be voluntary) Violation Of Faith.

Free-gift
When the transferring of Right, is not mutuall; but one of the parties
transferreth, in hope to gain thereby friendship, or service from another, or
from his friends; or in hope to gain the reputation of Charity, or
Magnanimity; or to deliver his mind from the pain of compassion; or in
hope of reward in heaven; This is not Contract, but GIFT, FREEGIFT,
GRACE: which words signifie one and the same thing.

Signes Of Contract Expresse
Signes of Contract, are either Expresse, or By Inference. Expresse, are
words spoken with understanding of what they signifie; And such words
are either of the time Present, or Past; as, I Give, I Grant, I Have Given, I
Have Granted, I Will That This Be Yours: Or of the future; as, I Will Give,
I Will Grant; which words of the future, are called Promise.

Signes Of Contract By Inference
Signes by Inference, are sometimes the consequence of Words;
sometimes the consequence of Silence; sometimes the consequence of
Actions; sometimes the consequence of Forbearing an Action: and
generally a signe by Inference, of any Contract, is whatsoever sufficiently
argues the will of the Contractor.

Free Gift Passeth By Words Of The Present Or
Past
Words alone, if they be of the time to come, and contain a bare promise,
are an insufficient signe of a Free-gift and therefore not obligatory. For if
they be of the time to Come, as, To Morrow I Will Give, they are a signe I
have not given yet, and consequently that my right is not transferred, but
remaineth till I transferre it by some other Act. But if the words be of the
time Present, or Past, as, "I have given, or do give to be delivered to
morrow," then is my to morrows Right given away to day; and that by the
vertue of the words, though there were no other argument of my will. And
there is a great difference in the signification of these words, Volos Hoc
Tuum Esse Cras, and Cros Dabo; that is between "I will that this be thine
to morrow," and, "I will give it to thee to morrow:" For the word I Will, in
the former manner of speech, signifies an act of the will Present; but in the
later, it signifies a promise of an act of the will to Come: and therefore the
former words, being of the Present, transferre a future right; the later, that
be of the Future, transferre nothing. But if there be other signes of the Will
to transferre a Right, besides Words; then, though the gift be Free, yet may
the Right be understood to passe by words of the future: as if a man
propound a Prize to him that comes first to the end of a race, The gift is
Free; and though the words be of the Future, yet the Right passeth: for if
he would not have his words so be understood, he should not have let them
runne.
Signes Of Contract Are Words Both Of The Past, Present, and Future In
Contracts, the right passeth, not onely where the words are of the time
Present, or Past; but also where they are of the Future; because all
Contract is mutuall translation, or change of Right; and therefore he that
promiseth onely, because he hath already received the benefit for which he
promiseth, is to be understood as if he intended the Right should passe: for
unlesse he had been content to have his words so understood, the other
would not have performed his part first. And for that cause, in buying, and
selling, and other acts of Contract, A Promise is equivalent to a Covenant;
and therefore obligatory.

Merit What
He that performeth first in the case of a Contract, is said to MERIT that
which he is to receive by the performance of the other; and he hath it as
Due. Also when a Prize is propounded to many, which is to be given to him
onely that winneth; or mony is thrown amongst many, to be enjoyed by
them that catch it; though this be a Free Gift; yet so to Win, or so to Catch,
is to Merit, and to have it as DUE. For the Right is transferred in the
Propounding of the Prize, and in throwing down the mony; though it be not
determined to whom, but by the Event of the contention. But there is
between these two sorts of Merit, this difference, that In Contract, I Merit
by vertue of my own power, and the Contractors need; but in this case of
Free Gift, I am enabled to Merit onely by the benignity of the Giver; In
Contract, I merit at The Contractors hand that hee should depart with his
right; In this case of gift, I Merit not that the giver should part with his
right; but that when he has parted with it, it should be mine, rather than
anothers. And this I think to be the meaning of that distinction of the
Schooles, between Meritum Congrui, and Meritum Condigni. For God
Almighty, having promised Paradise to those men (hoodwinkt with carnall
desires,) that can walk through this world according to the Precepts, and
Limits prescribed by him; they say, he that shall so walk, shall Merit
Paradise Ex Congruo. But because no man can demand a right to it, by his
own Righteousnesse, or any other power in himselfe, but by the Free Grace
of God onely; they say, no man can Merit Paradise Ex Condigno. This I
say, I think is the meaning of that distinction; but because Disputers do not
agree upon the signification of their own termes of Art, longer than it
serves their turn; I will not affirme any thing of their meaning: onely this I
say; when a gift is given indefinitely, as a prize to be contended for, he that
winneth Meriteth, and may claime the Prize as Due.

Covenants Of Mutuall Trust, When Invalid
If a Covenant be made, wherein neither of the parties performe
presently, but trust one another; in the condition of meer Nature, (which is
a condition of Warre of every man against every man,) upon any
reasonable suspition, it is Voyd; But if there be a common Power set over
them bothe, with right and force sufficient to compell performance; it is
not Voyd. For he that performeth first, has no assurance the other will
performe after; because the bonds of words are too weak to bridle mens
ambition, avarice, anger, and other Passions, without the feare of some
coerceive Power; which in the condition of meer Nature, where all men are
equall, and judges of the justnesse of their own fears cannot possibly be
supposed. And therefore he which performeth first, does but betray
himselfe to his enemy; contrary to the Right (he can never abandon) of
defending his life, and means of living.
But in a civill estate, where there is a Power set up to constrain those
that would otherwise violate their faith, that feare is no more reasonable;
and for that cause, he which by the Covenant is to perform first, is obliged
so to do.
The cause of Feare, which maketh such a Covenant invalid, must be
alwayes something arising after the Covenant made; as some new fact, or
other signe of the Will not to performe; else it cannot make the Covenant
Voyd. For that which could not hinder a man from promising, ought not to
be admitted as a hindrance of performing.

Right To The End, Containeth Right To The
Means
He that transferreth any Right, transferreth the Means of enjoying it, as
farre as lyeth in his power. As he that selleth Land, is understood to
transferre the Herbage, and whatsoever growes upon it; Nor can he that
sells a Mill turn away the Stream that drives it. And they that give to a
man The Right of government in Soveraignty, are understood to give him
the right of levying mony to maintain Souldiers; and of appointing
Magistrates for the administration of Justice.

No Covenant With Beasts
To make Covenant with bruit Beasts, is impossible; because not
understanding our speech, they understand not, nor accept of any
translation of Right; nor can translate any Right to another; and without
mutuall acceptation, there is no Covenant.

Nor With God Without Speciall Revelation
To make Covenant with God, is impossible, but by Mediation of such as
God speaketh to, either by Revelation supernaturall, or by his Lieutenants
that govern under him, and in his Name; For otherwise we know not
whether our Covenants be accepted, or not. And therefore they that Vow
any thing contrary to any law of Nature, Vow in vain; as being a thing
unjust to pay such Vow. And if it be a thing commanded by the Law of
Nature, it is not the Vow, but the Law that binds them.

No Covenant, But Of Possible And Future
The matter, or subject of a Covenant, is alwayes something that falleth
under deliberation; (For to Covenant, is an act of the Will; that is to say an
act, and the last act, of deliberation;) and is therefore alwayes understood
to be something to come; and which is judged Possible for him that
Covenanteth, to performe.
And therefore, to promise that which is known to be Impossible, is no
Covenant. But if that prove impossible afterwards, which before was
thought possible, the Covenant is valid, and bindeth, (though not to the
thing it selfe,) yet to the value; or, if that also be impossible, to the
unfeigned endeavour of performing as much as is possible; for to more no
man can be obliged.

Covenants How Made Voyd
Men are freed of their Covenants two wayes; by Performing; or by
being Forgiven. For Performance, is the naturall end of obligation; and
Forgivenesse, the restitution of liberty; as being a retransferring of that
Right, in which the obligation consisted.

Covenants Extorted By Feare Are Valide
Covenants entred into by fear, in the condition of meer Nature, are
obligatory. For example, if I Covenant to pay a ransome, or service for my
life, to an enemy; I am bound by it. For it is a Contract, wherein one
receiveth the benefit of life; the other is to receive mony, or service for it;
and consequently, where no other Law (as in the condition, of meer
Nature) forbiddeth the performance, the Covenant is valid. Therefore
Prisoners of warre, if trusted with the payment of their Ransome, are
obliged to pay it; And if a weaker Prince, make a disadvantageous peace
with a stronger, for feare; he is bound to keep it; unlesse (as hath been
sayd before) there ariseth some new, and just cause of feare, to renew the
war. And even in Common-wealths, if I be forced to redeem my selfe from
a Theefe by promising him mony, I am bound to pay it, till the Civill Law
discharge me. For whatsoever I may lawfully do without Obligation, the
same I may lawfully Covenant to do through feare: and what I lawfully
Covenant, I cannot lawfully break.

The Former Covenant To One, Makes Voyd The
Later To Another
A former Covenant, makes voyd a later. For a man that hath passed
away his Right to one man to day, hath it not to passe to morrow to
another: and therefore the later promise passeth no Right, but is null.

A Mans Covenant Not To Defend Himselfe, Is
Voyd
A Covenant not to defend my selfe from force, by force, is alwayes
voyd. For (as I have shewed before) no man can transferre, or lay down his
Right to save himselfe from Death, Wounds, and Imprisonment, (the
avoyding whereof is the onely End of laying down any Right,) and
therefore the promise of not resisting force, in no Covenant transferreth
any right; nor is obliging. For though a man may Covenant thus, "Unlesse
I do so, or so, kill me;" he cannot Covenant thus "Unless I do so, or so, I
will not resist you, when you come to kill me." For man by nature
chooseth the lesser evill, which is danger of death in resisting; rather than
the greater, which is certain and present death in not resisting. And this is
granted to be true by all men, in that they lead Criminals to Execution, and
Prison, with armed men, notwithstanding that such Criminals have
consented to the Law, by which they are condemned.

No Man Obliged To Accuse Himselfe
A Covenant to accuse ones Selfe, without assurance of pardon, is
likewise invalide. For in the condition of Nature, where every man is
Judge, there is no place for Accusation: and in the Civill State, the
Accusation is followed with Punishment; which being Force, a man is not
obliged not to resist. The same is also true, of the Accusation of those, by
whose Condemnation a man falls into misery; as of a Father, Wife, or
Benefactor. For the Testimony of such an Accuser, if it be not willingly
given, is praesumed to be corrupted by Nature; and therefore not to be
received: and where a mans Testimony is not to be credited, his not bound
to give it. Also Accusations upon Torture, are not to be reputed as
Testimonies. For Torture is to be used but as means of conjecture, and
light, in the further examination, and search of truth; and what is in that
case confessed, tendeth to the ease of him that is Tortured; not to the
informing of the Torturers: and therefore ought not to have the credit of a
sufficient Testimony: for whether he deliver himselfe by true, or false
Accusation, he does it by the Right of preserving his own life.

The End Of An Oath; The Forme Of As Oath
The force of Words, being (as I have formerly noted) too weak to hold
men to the performance of their Covenants; there are in mans nature, but
two imaginable helps to strengthen it. And those are either a Feare of the
consequence of breaking their word; or a Glory, or Pride in appearing not
to need to breake it. This later is a Generosity too rarely found to be
presumed on, especially in the pursuers of Wealth, Command, or sensuall
Pleasure; which are the greatest part of Mankind. The Passion to be
reckoned upon, is Fear; whereof there be two very generall Objects: one,
the Power of Spirits Invisible; the other, the Power of those men they shall
therein Offend. Of these two, though the former be the greater Power, yet
the feare of the later is commonly the greater Feare. The Feare of the
former is in every man, his own Religion: which hath place in the nature
of man before Civill Society. The later hath not so; at least not place
enough, to keep men to their promises; because in the condition of meer
Nature, the inequality of Power is not discerned, but by the event of
Battell. So that before the time of Civill Society, or in the interruption
thereof by Warre, there is nothing can strengthen a Covenant of Peace
agreed on, against the temptations of Avarice, Ambition, Lust, or other
strong desire, but the feare of that Invisible Power, which they every one
Worship as God; and Feare as a Revenger of their perfidy. All therefore
that can be done between two men not subject to Civill Power, is to put
one another to swear by the God he feareth: Which Swearing or OATH, is
a Forme Of Speech, Added To A Promise; By Which He That Promiseth,
Signifieth, That Unlesse He Performe, He Renounceth The Mercy Of His
God, Or Calleth To Him For Vengeance On Himselfe. Such was the
Heathen Forme, "Let Jupiter kill me else, as I kill this Beast." So is our
Forme, "I shall do thus, and thus, so help me God." And this, with the
Rites and Ceremonies, which every one useth in his own Religion, that the
feare of breaking faith might be the greater.

No Oath, But By God
By this it appears, that an Oath taken according to any other Forme, or
Rite, then his, that sweareth, is in vain; and no Oath: And there is no
Swearing by any thing which the Swearer thinks not God. For though men
have sometimes used to swear by their Kings, for feare, or flattery; yet
they would have it thereby understood, they attributed to them Divine
honour. And that Swearing unnecessarily by God, is but prophaning of his
name: and Swearing by other things, as men do in common discourse, is
not Swearing, but an impious Custome, gotten by too much vehemence of
talking.

An Oath Addes Nothing To The Obligation
It appears also, that the Oath addes nothing to the Obligation. For a
Covenant, if lawfull, binds in the sight of God, without the Oath, as much
as with it; if unlawfull, bindeth not at all; though it be confirmed with an
Oath.

CHAPTER XV. OF OTHER LAWES OF
NATURE

The Third Law Of Nature, Justice
From that law of Nature, by which we are obliged to transferre to
another, such Rights, as being retained, hinder the peace of Mankind, there
followeth a Third; which is this, That Men Performe Their Covenants
Made: without which, Covenants are in vain, and but Empty words; and
the Right of all men to all things remaining, wee are still in the condition
of Warre.

Justice And Injustice What
And in this law of Nature, consisteth the Fountain and Originall of
JUSTICE. For where no Covenant hath preceded, there hath no Right been
transferred, and every man has right to every thing; and consequently, no
action can be Unjust. But when a Covenant is made, then to break it is
Unjust: And the definition of INJUSTICE, is no other than The Not
Performance Of Covenant. And whatsoever is not Unjust, is Just.
Justice And Propriety Begin With The Constitution of Common-wealth
But because Covenants of mutuall trust, where there is a feare of not
performance on either part, (as hath been said in the former Chapter,) are
invalid; though the Originall of Justice be the making of Covenants; yet
Injustice actually there can be none, till the cause of such feare be taken
away; which while men are in the naturall condition of Warre, cannot be
done. Therefore before the names of Just, and Unjust can have place, there
must be some coercive Power, to compell men equally to the performance
of their Covenants, by the terrour of some punishment, greater than the
benefit they expect by the breach of their Covenant; and to make good that
Propriety, which by mutuall Contract men acquire, in recompence of the
universall Right they abandon: and such power there is none before the
erection of a Common-wealth. And this is also to be gathered out of the
ordinary definition of Justice in the Schooles: For they say, that "Justice is
the constant Will of giving to every man his own." And therefore where
there is no Own, that is, no Propriety, there is no Injustice; and where there
is no coerceive Power erected, that is, where there is no Common-wealth,
there is no Propriety; all men having Right to all things: Therefore where
there is no Common-wealth, there nothing is Unjust. So that the nature of
Justice, consisteth in keeping of valid Covenants: but the Validity of
Covenants begins not but with the Constitution of a Civill Power,
sufficient to compell men to keep them: And then it is also that Propriety
begins.

Justice Not Contrary To Reason
The Foole hath sayd in his heart, there is no such thing as Justice; and
sometimes also with his tongue; seriously alleaging, that every mans
conservation, and contentment, being committed to his own care, there
could be no reason, why every man might not do what he thought
conduced thereunto; and therefore also to make, or not make; keep, or not
keep Covenants, was not against Reason, when it conduced to ones benefit.
He does not therein deny, that there be Covenants; and that they are
sometimes broken, sometimes kept; and that such breach of them may be
called Injustice, and the observance of them Justice: but he questioneth,
whether Injustice, taking away the feare of God, (for the same Foole hath
said in his heart there is no God,) may not sometimes stand with that
Reason, which dictateth to every man his own good; and particularly then,
when it conduceth to such a benefit, as shall put a man in a condition, to
neglect not onely the dispraise, and revilings, but also the power of other
men. The Kingdome of God is gotten by violence; but what if it could be
gotten by unjust violence? were it against Reason so to get it, when it is
impossible to receive hurt by it? and if it be not against Reason, it is not
against Justice; or else Justice is not to be approved for good. From such
reasoning as this, Succesfull wickednesse hath obtained the Name of
Vertue; and some that in all other things have disallowed the violation of
Faith; yet have allowed it, when it is for the getting of a Kingdome. And
the Heathen that believed, that Saturn was deposed by his son Jupiter,
believed neverthelesse the same Jupiter to be the avenger of Injustice:
Somewhat like to a piece of Law in Cokes Commentaries on Litleton;
where he sayes, If the right Heire of the Crown be attainted of Treason; yet
the Crown shall descend to him, and Eo Instante the Atteynder be voyd;
From which instances a man will be very prone to inferre; that when the
Heire apparent of a Kingdome, shall kill him that is in possession, though
his father; you may call it Injustice, or by what other name you will; yet it
can never be against Reason, seeing all the voluntary actions of men tend
to the benefit of themselves; and those actions are most Reasonable, that
conduce most to their ends. This specious reasoning is nevertheless false.

For the question is not of promises mutuall, where there is no security
of performance on either side; as when there is no Civill Power erected
over the parties promising; for such promises are no Covenants: But either
where one of the parties has performed already; or where there is a Power
to make him performe; there is the question whether it be against reason,
that is, against the benefit of the other to performe, or not. And I say it is
not against reason. For the manifestation whereof, we are to consider;
First, that when a man doth a thing, which notwithstanding any thing can
be foreseen, and reckoned on, tendeth to his own destruction, howsoever
some accident which he could not expect, arriving may turne it to his
benefit; yet such events do not make it reasonably or wisely done.
Secondly, that in a condition of Warre, wherein every man to every man,
for want of a common Power to keep them all in awe, is an Enemy, there is
no man can hope by his own strength, or wit, to defend himselfe from
destruction, without the help of Confederates; where every one expects the
same defence by the Confederation, that any one else does: and therefore
he which declares he thinks it reason to deceive those that help him, can in
reason expect no other means of safety, than what can be had from his own
single Power. He therefore that breaketh his Covenant, and consequently
declareth that he thinks he may with reason do so, cannot be received into
any Society, that unite themselves for Peace and defence, but by the errour
of them that receive him; nor when he is received, be retayned in it,
without seeing the danger of their errour; which errours a man cannot
reasonably reckon upon as the means of his security; and therefore if he be
left, or cast out of Society, he perisheth; and if he live in Society, it is by
the errours of other men, which he could not foresee, nor reckon upon; and
consequently against the reason of his preservation; and so, as all men that
contribute not to his destruction, forbear him onely out of ignorance of
what is good for themselves.
As for the Instance of gaining the secure and perpetuall felicity of
Heaven, by any way; it is frivolous: there being but one way imaginable;
and that is not breaking, but keeping of Covenant.
And for the other Instance of attaining Soveraignty by Rebellion; it is
manifest, that though the event follow, yet because it cannot reasonably be
expected, but rather the contrary; and because by gaining it so, others are
taught to gain the same in like manner, the attempt thereof is against
reason. Justice therefore, that is to say, Keeping of Covenant, is a Rule of

Reason, by which we are forbidden to do any thing destructive to our life;
and consequently a Law of Nature.
There be some that proceed further; and will not have the Law of
Nature, to be those Rules which conduce to the preservation of mans life
on earth; but to the attaining of an eternall felicity after death; to which
they think the breach of Covenant may conduce; and consequently be just
and reasonable; (such are they that think it a work of merit to kill, or
depose, or rebell against, the Soveraigne Power constituted over them by
their own consent.) But because there is no naturall knowledge of mans
estate after death; much lesse of the reward that is then to be given to
breach of Faith; but onely a beliefe grounded upon other mens saying, that
they know it supernaturally, or that they know those, that knew them, that
knew others, that knew it supernaturally; Breach of Faith cannot be called
a Precept of Reason, or Nature.

Covenants Not Discharged By The Vice Of The
Person To Whom Made
Others, that allow for a Law of Nature, the keeping of Faith, do
neverthelesse make exception of certain persons; as Heretiques, and such
as use not to performe their Covenant to others: And this also is against
reason. For if any fault of a man, be sufficient to discharge our Covenant
made; the same ought in reason to have been sufficient to have hindred the
making of it.

Justice Of Men, And Justice Of Actions What
The names of Just, and Unjust, when they are attributed to Men, signifie
one thing; and when they are attributed to Actions, another. When they are
attributed to Men, they signifie Conformity, or Inconformity of Manners,
to Reason. But when they are attributed to Actions, they signifie the
Conformity, or Inconformity to Reason, not of Manners, or manner of life,
but of particular Actions. A Just man therefore, is he that taketh all the
care he can, that his Actions may be all Just: and an Unjust man, is he that
neglecteth it. And such men are more often in our Language stiled by the
names of Righteous, and Unrighteous; then Just, and Unjust; though the
meaning be the same. Therefore a Righteous man, does not lose that Title,
by one, or a few unjust Actions, that proceed from sudden Passion, or
mistake of Things, or Persons: nor does an Unrighteous man, lose his
character, for such Actions, as he does, of forbeares to do, for feare:
because his Will is not framed by the Justice, but by the apparant benefit
of what he is to do. That which gives to humane Actions the relish of
Justice, is a certain Noblenesse or Gallantnesse of courage, (rarely found,)
by which a man scorns to be beholding for the contentment of his life, to
fraud, or breach of promise. This Justice of the Manners, is that which is
meant, where Justice is called a Vertue; and Injustice a Vice.
But the Justice of Actions denominates men, not Just, but Guiltlesse;
and the Injustice of the same, (which is also called Injury,) gives them but
the name of Guilty.

Justice Of Manners, And Justice Of Actions
Again, the Injustice of Manners, is the disposition, or aptitude to do
Injurie; and is Injustice before it proceed to Act; and without supposing
any individuall person injured. But the Injustice of an Action, (that is to
say Injury,) supposeth an individuall person Injured; namely him, to whom
the Covenant was made: And therefore many times the injury is received
by one man, when the dammage redoundeth to another. As when The
Master commandeth his servant to give mony to a stranger; if it be not
done, the Injury is done to the Master, whom he had before Covenanted to
obey; but the dammage redoundeth to the stranger, to whom he had no
Obligation; and therefore could not Injure him. And so also in Commonwealths, private men may remit to one another their debts; but not
robberies or other violences, whereby they are endammaged; because the
detaining of Debt, is an Injury to themselves; but Robbery and Violence,
are Injuries to the Person of the Common-wealth.

Nothing Done To A Man, By His Own Consent
Can Be Injury
Whatsoever is done to a man, conformable to his own Will signified to
the doer, is no Injury to him. For if he that doeth it, hath not passed away
his originall right to do what he please, by some Antecedent Covenant,
there is no breach of Covenant; and therefore no Injury done him. And if
he have; then his Will to have it done being signified, is a release of that
Covenant; and so again there is no Injury done him.

Justice Commutative, And Distributive
Justice of Actions, is by Writers divided into Commutative, and
Distributive; and the former they say consisteth in proportion
Arithmeticall; the later in proportion Geometricall. Commutative
therefore, they place in the equality of value of the things contracted for;
And Distributive, in the distribution of equall benefit, to men of equall
merit. As if it were Injustice to sell dearer than we buy; or to give more to
a man than he merits. The value of all things contracted for, is measured
by the Appetite of the Contractors: and therefore the just value, is that
which they be contented to give. And Merit (besides that which is by
Covenant, where the performance on one part, meriteth the performance of
the other part, and falls under Justice Commutative, not Distributive,) is
not due by Justice; but is rewarded of Grace onely. And therefore this
distinction, in the sense wherein it useth to be expounded, is not right. To
speak properly, Commutative Justice, is the Justice of a Contractor; that is,
a Performance of Covenant, in Buying, and Selling; Hiring, and Letting to
Hire; Lending, and Borrowing; Exchanging, Bartering, and other acts of
Contract.
And Distributive Justice, the Justice of an Arbitrator; that is to say, the
act of defining what is Just. Wherein, (being trusted by them that make
him Arbitrator,) if he performe his Trust, he is said to distribute to every
man his own: and his is indeed Just Distribution, and may be called
(though improperly) Distributive Justice; but more properly Equity; which
also is a Law of Nature, as shall be shewn in due place.

The Fourth Law Of Nature, Gratitude
As Justice dependeth on Antecedent Covenant; so does Gratitude
depend on Antecedent Grace; that is to say, Antecedent Free-gift: and is
the fourth Law of Nature; which may be conceived in this Forme, "That a
man which receiveth Benefit from another of meer Grace, Endeavour that
he which giveth it, have no reasonable cause to repent him of his good
will." For no man giveth, but with intention of Good to himselfe; because
Gift is Voluntary; and of all Voluntary Acts, the Object is to every man his
own Good; of which if men see they shall be frustrated, there will be no
beginning of benevolence, or trust; nor consequently of mutuall help; nor
of reconciliation of one man to another; and therefore they are to remain
still in the condition of War; which is contrary to the first and
Fundamentall Law of Nature, which commandeth men to Seek Peace. The
breach of this Law, is called Ingratitude; and hath the same relation to
Grace, that Injustice hath to Obligation by Covenant.

The Fifth, Mutuall accommodation, or
Compleasance
A fifth Law of Nature, is COMPLEASANCE; that is to say, "That every
man strive to accommodate himselfe to the rest." For the understanding
whereof, we may consider, that there is in mens aptnesse to Society; a
diversity of Nature, rising from their diversity of Affections; not unlike to
that we see in stones brought together for building of an Aedifice. For as
that stone which by the asperity, and irregularity of Figure, takes more
room from others, than it selfe fills; and for the hardnesse, cannot be
easily made plain, and thereby hindereth the building, is by the builders
cast away as unprofitable, and troublesome: so also, a man that by asperity
of Nature, will strive to retain those things which to himselfe are
superfluous, and to others necessary; and for the stubbornness of his
Passions, cannot be corrected, is to be left, or cast out of Society, as
combersome thereunto. For seeing every man, not onely by Right, but also
by necessity of Nature, is supposed to endeavour all he can, to obtain that
which is necessary for his conservation; He that shall oppose himselfe
against it, for things superfluous, is guilty of the warre that thereupon is to
follow; and therefore doth that, which is contrary to the fundamentall Law
of Nature, which commandeth To Seek Peace. The observers of this Law,
may be called SOCIABLE, (the Latines call them Commodi;) The
contrary, Stubborn, Insociable, Froward, Intractable.

The Sixth, Facility To Pardon
A sixth Law of Nature is this, "That upon caution of the Future time, a
man ought to pardon the offences past of them that repenting, desire it."
For PARDON, is nothing but granting of Peace; which though granted to
them that persevere in their hostility, be not Peace, but Feare; yet not
granted to them that give caution of the Future time, is signe of an
aversion to Peace; and therefore contrary to the Law of Nature.

The Seventh, That In Revenges, Men Respect
Onely The Future Good
A seventh is, " That in Revenges, (that is, retribution of evil for evil,)
Men look not at the greatnesse of the evill past, but the greatnesse of the
good to follow." Whereby we are forbidden to inflict punishment with any
other designe, than for correction of the offender, or direction of others.
For this Law is consequent to the next before it, that commandeth Pardon,
upon security of the Future Time. Besides, Revenge without respect to the
Example, and profit to come, is a triumph, or glorying in the hurt of
another, tending to no end; (for the End is alwayes somewhat to Come;)
and glorying to no end, is vain-glory, and contrary to reason; and to hurt
without reason, tendeth to the introduction of Warre; which is against the
Law of Nature; and is commonly stiled by the name of Cruelty.

The Eighth, Against Contumely
And because all signes of hatred, or contempt, provoke to fight;
insomuch as most men choose rather to hazard their life, than not to be
revenged; we may in the eighth place, for a Law of Nature set down this
Precept, "That no man by deed, word, countenance, or gesture, declare
Hatred, or Contempt of another." The breach of which Law, is commonly
called Contumely.

The Ninth, Against Pride
The question who is the better man, has no place in the condition of
meer Nature; where, (as has been shewn before,) all men are equall. The
inequallity that now is, has been introduced by the Lawes civill. I know
that Aristotle in the first booke of his Politiques, for a foundation of his
doctrine, maketh men by Nature, some more worthy to Command,
meaning the wiser sort (such as he thought himselfe to be for his
Philosophy;) others to Serve, (meaning those that had strong bodies, but
were not Philosophers as he;) as if Master and Servant were not introduced
by consent of men, but by difference of Wit; which is not only against
reason; but also against experience. For there are very few so foolish, that
had not rather governe themselves, than be governed by others: Nor when
the wise in their own conceit, contend by force, with them who distrust
their owne wisdome, do they alwaies, or often, or almost at any time, get
the Victory. If Nature therefore have made men equall, that equalitie is to
be acknowledged; or if Nature have made men unequall; yet because men
that think themselves equall, will not enter into conditions of Peace, but
upon Equall termes, such equalitie must be admitted. And therefore for the
ninth Law of Nature, I put this, "That every man acknowledge other for his
Equall by Nature." The breach of this Precept is Pride.

The Tenth Against Arrogance
On this law, dependeth another, "That at the entrance into conditions of
Peace, no man require to reserve to himselfe any Right, which he is not
content should be reserved to every one of the rest." As it is necessary for
all men that seek peace, to lay down certaine Rights of Nature; that is to
say, not to have libertie to do all they list: so is it necessarie for mans life,
to retaine some; as right to governe their owne bodies; enjoy aire, water,
motion, waies to go from place to place; and all things else without which
a man cannot live, or not live well. If in this case, at the making of Peace,
men require for themselves, that which they would not have to be granted
to others, they do contrary to the precedent law, that commandeth the
acknowledgement of naturall equalitie, and therefore also against the law
of Nature. The observers of this law, are those we call Modest, and the
breakers Arrogant Men. The Greeks call the violation of this law
pleonexia; that is, a desire of more than their share.

The Eleventh Equity
Also "If a man be trusted to judge between man and man," it is a precept
of the Law of Nature, "that he deale Equally between them." For without
that, the Controversies of men cannot be determined but by Warre. He
therefore that is partiall in judgment, doth what in him lies, to deterre men
from the use of Judges, and Arbitrators; and consequently, (against the
fundamentall Lawe of Nature) is the cause of Warre.
The observance of this law, from the equall distribution to each man, of
that which in reason belongeth to him, is called EQUITY, and (as I have
sayd before) distributive justice: the violation, Acception Of Persons,
Prosopolepsia.

The Twelfth, Equall Use Of Things Common
And from this followeth another law, "That such things as cannot be
divided, be enjoyed in Common, if it can be; and if the quantity of the
thing permit, without Stint; otherwise Proportionably to the number of
them that have Right." For otherwise the distribution is Unequall, and
contrary to Equitie.

The Thirteenth, Of Lot
But some things there be, that can neither be divided, nor enjoyed in
common. Then, The Law of Nature, which prescribeth Equity, requireth,
"That the Entire Right; or else, (making the use alternate,) the First
Possession, be determined by Lot." For equall distribution, is of the Law
of Nature; and other means of equall distribution cannot be imagined.

The Fourteenth, Of Primogeniture, And First
Seising
Of Lots there be two sorts, Arbitrary, and Naturall. Arbitrary, is that
which is agreed on by the Competitors; Naturall, is either Primogeniture,
(which the Greek calls Kleronomia, which signifies, Given by Lot;) or
First Seisure.
And therefore those things which cannot be enjoyed in common, nor
divided, ought to be adjudged to the First Possessor; and is some cases to
the First-Borne, as acquired by Lot.

The Fifteenth, Of Mediators
It is also a Law of Nature, "That all men that mediate Peace, be allowed
safe Conduct." For the Law that commandeth Peace, as the End,
commandeth Intercession, as the Means; and to Intercession the Means is
safe Conduct.

The Sixteenth, Of Submission To Arbitrement
And because, though men be never so willing to observe these Lawes,
there may neverthelesse arise questions concerning a mans action; First,
whether it were done, or not done; Secondly (if done) whether against the
Law, or not against the Law; the former whereof, is called a question Of
Fact; the later a question Of Right; therefore unlesse the parties to the
question, Covenant mutually to stand to the sentence of another, they are
as farre from Peace as ever. This other, to whose Sentence they submit, is
called an ARBITRATOR. And therefore it is of the Law of Nature, "That
they that are at controversie, submit their Right to the judgement of an
Arbitrator."

The Seventeenth, No Man Is His Own Judge
And seeing every man is presumed to do all things in order to his own
benefit, no man is a fit Arbitrator in his own cause: and if he were never so
fit; yet Equity allowing to each party equall benefit, if one be admitted to
be Judge, the other is to be admitted also; & so the controversie, that is,
the cause of War, remains, against the Law of Nature.

The Eighteenth, No Man To Be Judge, That Has
In Him Cause Of Partiality
For the same reason no man in any Cause ought to be received for
Arbitrator, to whom greater profit, or honour, or pleasure apparently
ariseth out of the victory of one party, than of the other: for he hath taken
(though an unavoydable bribe, yet) a bribe; and no man can be obliged to
trust him. And thus also the controversie, and the condition of War
remaineth, contrary to the Law of Nature.

The Nineteenth, Of Witnesse
And in a controversie of Fact, the Judge being to give no more credit to
one, than to the other, (if there be no other Arguments) must give credit to
a third; or to a third and fourth; or more: For else the question is
undecided, and left to force, contrary to the Law of Nature.
These are the Lawes of Nature, dictating Peace, for a means of the
conservation of men in multitudes; and which onely concern the doctrine
of Civill Society. There be other things tending to the destruction of
particular men; as Drunkenness, and all other parts of Intemperance;
which may therefore also be reckoned amongst those things which the Law
of Nature hath forbidden; but are not necessary to be mentioned, nor are
pertinent enough to this place.

A Rule, By Which The Laws Of Nature May
Easily Be Examined
And though this may seem too subtile a deduction of the Lawes of
Nature, to be taken notice of by all men; whereof the most part are too
busie in getting food, and the rest too negligent to understand; yet to leave
all men unexcusable, they have been contracted into one easie sum,
intelligible even to the meanest capacity; and that is, "Do not that to
another, which thou wouldest not have done to thy selfe;" which sheweth
him, that he has no more to do in learning the Lawes of Nature, but, when
weighing the actions of other men with his own, they seem too heavy, to
put them into the other part of the ballance, and his own into their place,
that his own passions, and selfe-love, may adde nothing to the weight; and
then there is none of these Lawes of Nature that will not appear unto him
very reasonable.

The Lawes Of Nature Oblige In Conscience
Alwayes,
But In Effect Then Onely When There Is Security The Lawes of Nature
oblige In Foro Interno; that is to say, they bind to a desire they should take
place: but In Foro Externo; that is, to the putting them in act, not alwayes.
For he that should be modest, and tractable, and performe all he promises,
in such time, and place, where no man els should do so, should but make
himselfe a prey to others, and procure his own certain ruine, contrary to
the ground of all Lawes of Nature, which tend to Natures preservation.
And again, he that shall observe the same Lawes towards him, observes
them not himselfe, seeketh not Peace, but War; & consequently the
destruction of his Nature by Violence.
And whatsoever Lawes bind In Foro Interno, may be broken, not onely
by a fact contrary to the Law but also by a fact according to it, in case a
man think it contrary. For though his Action in this case, be according to
the Law; which where the Obligation is In Foro Interno, is a breach.

The Laws Of Nature Are Eternal;
The Lawes of Nature are Immutable and Eternall, For Injustice,
Ingratitude, Arrogance, Pride, Iniquity, Acception of persons, and the rest,
can never be made lawfull. For it can never be that Warre shall preserve
life, and Peace destroy it.

And Yet Easie
The same Lawes, because they oblige onely to a desire, and endeavour, I
mean an unfeigned and constant endeavour, are easie to be observed. For
in that they require nothing but endeavour; he that endeavoureth their
performance, fulfilleth them; and he that fulfilleth the Law, is Just.

The Science Of These Lawes, Is The True Morall
Philosophy
And the Science of them, is the true and onely Moral Philosophy. For
Morall Philosophy is nothing else but the Science of what is Good, and
Evill, in the conversation, and Society of mankind. Good, and Evill, are
names that signifie our Appetites, and Aversions; which in different
tempers, customes, and doctrines of men, are different: And divers men,
differ not onely in their Judgement, on the senses of what is pleasant, and
unpleasant to the tast, smell, hearing, touch, and sight; but also of what is
conformable, or disagreeable to Reason, in the actions of common life.
Nay, the same man, in divers times, differs from himselfe; and one time
praiseth, that is, calleth Good, what another time he dispraiseth, and
calleth Evil: From whence arise Disputes, Controversies, and at last War.
And therefore so long as man is in the condition of meer Nature, (which is
a condition of War,) as private Appetite is the measure of Good, and Evill:
and consequently all men agree on this, that Peace is Good, and therefore
also the way, or means of Peace, which (as I have shewed before) are
Justice, Gratitude, Modesty, Equity, Mercy, & the rest of the Laws of
Nature, are good; that is to say, Morall Vertues; and their contrarie Vices,
Evill. Now the science of Vertue and Vice, is Morall Philosophie; and
therfore the true Doctrine of the Lawes of Nature, is the true Morall
Philosophie. But the Writers of Morall Philosophie, though they
acknowledge the same Vertues and Vices; Yet not seeing wherein consisted
their Goodnesse; nor that they come to be praised, as the meanes of
peaceable, sociable, and comfortable living; place them in a mediocrity of
passions: as if not the Cause, but the Degree of daring, made Fortitude; or
not the Cause, but the Quantity of a gift, made Liberality.
These dictates of Reason, men use to call by the name of Lawes; but
improperly: for they are but Conclusions, or Theoremes concerning what
conduceth to the conservation and defence of themselves; whereas Law,
properly is the word of him, that by right hath command over others. But
yet if we consider the same Theoremes, as delivered in the word of God,
that by right commandeth all things; then are they properly called Lawes.

CHAPTER XVI. OF PERSONS, AUTHORS,
AND THINGS PERSONATED
A Person What
A PERSON, is he "whose words or actions are considered, either as his
own, or as representing the words or actions of an other man, or of any
other thing to whom they are attributed, whether Truly or by Fiction."

Person Naturall, And Artificiall
When they are considered as his owne, then is he called a Naturall
Person: And when they are considered as representing the words and
actions of an other, then is he a Feigned or Artificiall person.

The Word Person, Whence
The word Person is latine: instead whereof the Greeks have Prosopon,
which signifies the Face, as Persona in latine signifies the Disguise, or
Outward Appearance of a man, counterfeited on the Stage; and somtimes
more particularly that part of it, which disguiseth the face, as a Mask or
Visard: And from the Stage, hath been translated to any Representer of
speech and action, as well in Tribunalls, as Theaters. So that a Person, is
the same that an Actor is, both on the Stage and in common Conversation;
and to Personate, is to Act, or Represent himselfe, or an other; and he that
acteth another, is said to beare his Person, or act in his name; (in which
sence Cicero useth it where he saies, "Unus Sustineo Tres Personas; Mei,
Adversarii, & Judicis, I beare three Persons; my own, my Adversaries, and
the Judges;") and is called in diverse occasions, diversly; as a Representer,
or Representative, a Lieutenant, a Vicar, an Attorney, a Deputy, a
Procurator, an Actor, and the like.

Actor, Author; Authority
Of Persons Artificiall, some have their words and actions Owned by
those whom they represent. And then the Person is the Actor; and he that
owneth his words and actions, is the AUTHOR: In which case the Actor
acteth by Authority. For that which in speaking of goods and possessions,
is called an Owner, and in latine Dominus, in Greeke Kurios; speaking of
Actions, is called Author. And as the Right of possession, is called
Dominion; so the Right of doing any Action, is called AUTHORITY. So
that by Authority, is alwayes understood a Right of doing any act: and
Done By Authority, done by Commission, or Licence from him whose
right it is.

Covenants By Authority, Bind The Author
From hence it followeth, that when the Actor maketh a Covenant by
Authority, he bindeth thereby the Author, no lesse than if he had made it
himselfe; and no lesse subjecteth him to all the consequences of the same.
And therfore all that hath been said formerly, (Chap. 14) of the nature of
Covenants between man and man in their naturall capacity, is true also
when they are made by their Actors, Representers, or Procurators, that
have authority from them, so far-forth as is in their Commission, but no
farther.
And therefore he that maketh a Covenant with the Actor, or Representer,
not knowing the Authority he hath, doth it at his own perill. For no man is
obliged by a Covenant, whereof he is not Author; nor consequently by a
Covenant made against, or beside the Authority he gave.

But Not The Actor
When the Actor doth any thing against the Law of Nature by command
of the Author, if he be obliged by former Covenant to obey him, not he,
but the Author breaketh the Law of Nature: for though the Action be
against the Law of Nature; yet it is not his: but contrarily; to refuse to do
it, is against the Law of Nature, that forbiddeth breach of Covenant.

The Authority Is To Be Shewne
And he that maketh a Covenant with the Author, by mediation of the
Actor, not knowing what Authority he hath, but onely takes his word; in
case such Authority be not made manifest unto him upon demand, is no
longer obliged: For the Covenant made with the Author, is not valid,
without his Counter-assurance. But if he that so Covenanteth, knew before
hand he was to expect no other assurance, than the Actors word; then is the
Covenant valid; because the Actor in this case maketh himselfe the
Author. And therefore, as when the Authority is evident, the Covenant
obligeth the Author, not the Actor; so when the Authority is feigned, it
obligeth the Actor onely; there being no Author but himselfe.

Things Personated, Inanimate
There are few things, that are uncapable of being represented by Fiction.
Inanimate things, as a Church, an Hospital, a Bridge, may be Personated
by a Rector, Master, or Overseer. But things Inanimate, cannot be Authors,
nor therefore give Authority to their Actors: Yet the Actors may have
Authority to procure their maintenance, given them by those that are
Owners, or Governours of those things. And therefore, such things cannot
be Personated, before there be some state of Civill Government.

Irrational
Likewise Children, Fooles, and Mad-men that have no use of Reason,
may be Personated by Guardians, or Curators; but can be no Authors
(during that time) of any action done by them, longer then (when they
shall recover the use of Reason) they shall judge the same reasonable. Yet
during the Folly, he that hath right of governing them, may give Authority
to the Guardian. But this again has no place but in a State Civill, because
before such estate, there is no Dominion of Persons.

False Gods
An Idol, or meer Figment of the brain, my be Personated; as were the
Gods of the Heathen; which by such Officers as the State appointed, were
Personated, and held Possessions, and other Goods, and Rights, which men
from time to time dedicated, and consecrated unto them. But idols cannot
be Authors: for a Idol is nothing. The Authority proceeded from the State:
and therefore before introduction of Civill Government, the Gods of the
Heathen could not be Personated.

The True God
The true God may be Personated. As he was; first, by Moses; who
governed the Israelites, (that were not his, but Gods people,) not in his
own name, with Hoc Dicit Moses; but in Gods Name, with Hoc Dicit
Dominus. Secondly, by the son of man, his own Son our Blessed Saviour
Jesus Christ, that came to reduce the Jewes, and induce all Nations into the
Kingdome of his Father; not as of himselfe, but as sent from his Father.
And thirdly, by the Holy Ghost, or Comforter, speaking, and working in
the Apostles: which Holy Ghost, was a Comforter that came not of
himselfe; but was sent, and proceeded from them both.

A Multitude Of Men, How One Person
A Multitude of men, are made One Person, when they are by one man,
or one Person, Represented; so that it be done with the consent of every
one of that Multitude in particular. For it is the Unity of the Representer,
not the Unity of the Represented, that maketh the Person One. And it is the
Representer that beareth the Person, and but one Person: And Unity, cannot
otherwise be understood in Multitude.

Every One Is Author
And because the Multitude naturally is not One, but Many; they cannot
be understood for one; but many Authors, of every thing their
Representative faith, or doth in their name; Every man giving their
common Representer, Authority from himselfe in particular; and owning
all the actions the Representer doth, in case they give him Authority
without stint: Otherwise, when they limit him in what, and how farre he
shall represent them, none of them owneth more, than they gave him
commission to Act.

An Actor May Be Many Men Made One By
Plurality Of Voyces
And if the Representative consist of many men, the voyce of the greater
number, must be considered as the voyce of them all. For if the lesser
number pronounce (for example) in the Affirmative, and the greater in the
Negative, there will be Negatives more than enough to destroy the
Affirmatives; and thereby the excesse of Negatives, standing
uncontradicted, are the onely voyce the Representative hath.

Representatives, When The Number Is Even,
Unprofitable
And a Representative of even number, especially when the number is
not great, whereby the contradictory voyces are oftentimes equall, is
therefore oftentimes mute, and uncapable of Action. Yet in some cases
contradictory voyces equall in number, may determine a question; as in
condemning, or absolving, equality of votes, even in that they condemne
not, do absolve; but not on the contrary condemne, in that they absolve
not. For when a Cause is heard; not to condemne, is to absolve; but on the
contrary, to say that not absolving, is condemning, is not true. The like it is
in a deliberation of executing presently, or deferring till another time; For
when the voyces are equall, the not decreeing Execution, is a decree of
Dilation.

Negative Voyce
Or if the number be odde, as three, or more, (men, or assemblies;)
whereof every one has by a Negative Voice, authority to take away the
effect of all the Affirmative Voices of the rest, This number is no
Representative; because by the diversity of Opinions, and Interests of men,
it becomes oftentimes, and in cases of the greatest consequence, a mute
Person, and unapt, as for may things else, so for the government of a
Multitude, especially in time of Warre.
Of Authors there be two sorts. The first simply so called; which I have
before defined to be him, that owneth the Action of another simply. The
second is he, that owneth an Action, or Covenant of another conditionally;
that is to say, he undertaketh to do it, if the other doth it not, at, or before a
certain time. And these Authors conditionall, are generally called
SURETYES, in Latine Fidejussores, and Sponsores; and particularly for
Debt, Praedes; and for Appearance before a Judge, or Magistrate, Vades.

PART II. OF COMMON-WEALTH

CHAPTER XVII. OF THE CAUSES,
GENERATION, AND DEFINITION OF A
COMMON-WEALTH

The End Of Common-wealth, Particular Security
The finall Cause, End, or Designe of men, (who naturally love Liberty,
and Dominion over others,) in the introduction of that restraint upon
themselves, (in which wee see them live in Common-wealths,) is the
foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby;
that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of
Warre, which is necessarily consequent (as hath been shewn) to the
naturall Passions of men, when there is no visible Power to keep them in
awe, and tye them by feare of punishment to the performance of their
Covenants, and observation of these Lawes of Nature set down in the
fourteenth and fifteenth Chapters.

Which Is Not To Be Had From The Law Of
Nature:
For the Lawes of Nature (as Justice, Equity, Modesty, Mercy, and (in
summe) Doing To Others, As Wee Would Be Done To,) if themselves,
without the terrour of some Power, to cause them to be observed, are
contrary to our naturall Passions, that carry us to Partiality, Pride,
Revenge, and the like. And Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words,
and of no strength to secure a man at all. Therefore notwithstanding the
Lawes of Nature, (which every one hath then kept, when he has the will to
keep them, when he can do it safely,) if there be no Power erected, or not
great enough for our security; every man will and may lawfully rely on his
own strength and art, for caution against all other men. And in all places,
where men have lived by small Families, to robbe and spoyle one another,
has been a Trade, and so farre from being reputed against the Law of
Nature, that the greater spoyles they gained, the greater was their honour;
and men observed no other Lawes therein, but the Lawes of Honour; that
is, to abstain from cruelty, leaving to men their lives, and instruments of
husbandry. And as small Familyes did then; so now do Cities and
Kingdomes which are but greater Families (for their own security) enlarge
their Dominions, upon all pretences of danger, and fear of Invasion, or
assistance that may be given to Invaders, endeavour as much as they can,
to subdue, or weaken their neighbours, by open force, and secret arts, for
want of other Caution, justly; and are rememdbred for it in after ages with
honour.

Nor From The Conjunction Of A Few Men Or
Familyes
Nor is it the joyning together of a small number of men, that gives them
this security; because in small numbers, small additions on the one side or
the other, make the advantage of strength so great, as is sufficient to carry
the Victory; and therefore gives encouragement to an Invasion. The
Multitude sufficient to confide in for our Security, is not determined by
any certain number, but by comparison with the Enemy we feare; and is
then sufficient, when the odds of the Enemy is not of so visible and
conspicuous moment, to determine the event of warre, as to move him to
attempt.

Nor From A Great Multitude, Unlesse Directed By
One Judgement
And be there never so great a Multitude; yet if their actions be directed
according to their particular judgements, and particular appetites, they can
expect thereby no defence, nor protection, neither against a Common
enemy, nor against the injuries of one another. For being distracted in
opinions concerning the best use and application of their strength, they do
not help, but hinder one another; and reduce their strength by mutuall
opposition to nothing: whereby they are easily, not onely subdued by a
very few that agree together; but also when there is no common enemy,
they make warre upon each other, for their particular interests. For if we
could suppose a great Multitude of men to consent in the observation of
Justice, and other Lawes of Nature, without a common Power to keep them
all in awe; we might as well suppose all Man-kind to do the same; and
then there neither would be nor need to be any Civill Government, or
Common-wealth at all; because there would be Peace without subjection.

And That Continually
Nor is it enough for the security, which men desire should last all the
time of their life, that they be governed, and directed by one judgement,
for a limited time; as in one Battell, or one Warre. For though they obtain
a Victory by their unanimous endeavour against a forraign enemy; yet
afterwards, when either they have no common enemy, or he that by one
part is held for an enemy, is by another part held for a friend, they must
needs by the difference of their interests dissolve, and fall again into a
Warre amongst themselves.

Why Certain Creatures Without Reason, Or
Speech,

Do Neverthelesse Live In Society, Without Any
Coercive Power
It is true, that certain living creatures, as Bees, and Ants, live sociably
one with another, (which are therefore by Aristotle numbred amongst
Politicall creatures;) and yet have no other direction, than their particular
judgements and appetites; nor speech, whereby one of them can signifie to
another, what he thinks expedient for the common benefit: and therefore
some man may perhaps desire to know, why Man-kind cannot do the same.
To which I answer,
First, that men are continually in competition for Honour and Dignity,
which these creatures are not; and consequently amongst men there ariseth
on that ground, Envy and Hatred, and finally Warre; but amongst these not
so.
Secondly, that amongst these creatures, the Common good differeth not
from the Private; and being by nature enclined to their private, they
procure thereby the common benefit. But man, whose Joy consisteth in
comparing himselfe with other men, can relish nothing but what is
eminent.
Thirdly, that these creatures, having not (as man) the use of reason, do
not see, nor think they see any fault, in the administration of their common
businesse: whereas amongst men, there are very many, that thinke
themselves wiser, and abler to govern the Publique, better than the rest;
and these strive to reforme and innovate, one this way, another that way;
and thereby bring it into Distraction and Civill warre.
Fourthly, that these creatures, though they have some use of voice, in
making knowne to one another their desires, and other affections; yet they
want that art of words, by which some men can represent to others, that
which is Good, in the likenesse of Evill; and Evill, in the likenesse of
Good; and augment, or diminish the apparent greatnesse of Good and
Evill; discontenting men, and troubling their Peace at their pleasure.
Fiftly, irrationall creatures cannot distinguish betweene Injury, and
Dammage; and therefore as long as they be at ease, they are not offended

with their fellowes: whereas Man is then most troublesome, when he is
most at ease: for then it is that he loves to shew his Wisdome, and
controule the Actions of them that governe the Common-wealth.
Lastly, the agreement of these creatures is Naturall; that of men, is by
Covenant only, which is Artificiall: and therefore it is no wonder if there
be somewhat else required (besides Covenant) to make their Agreement
constant and lasting; which is a Common Power, to keep them in awe, and
to direct their actions to the Common Benefit.

The Generation Of A Common-wealth
The only way to erect such a Common Power, as may be able to defend
them from the invasion of Forraigners, and the injuries of one another, and
thereby to secure them in such sort, as that by their owne industrie, and by
the fruites of the Earth, they may nourish themselves and live contentedly;
is, to conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one
Assembly of men, that may reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices,
unto one Will: which is as much as to say, to appoint one man, or
Assembly of men, to beare their Person; and every one to owne, and
acknowledge himselfe to be Author of whatsoever he that so beareth their
Person, shall Act, or cause to be Acted, in those things which concerne the
Common Peace and Safetie; and therein to submit their Wills, every one to
his Will, and their Judgements, to his Judgment. This is more than
Consent, or Concord; it is a reall Unitie of them all, in one and the same
Person, made by Covenant of every man with every man, in such manner,
as if every man should say to every man, "I Authorise and give up my
Right of Governing my selfe, to this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on
this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorise all his
Actions in like manner." This done, the Multitude so united in one Person,
is called a COMMON-WEALTH, in latine CIVITAS. This is the
Generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speake more
reverently) of that Mortall God, to which wee owe under the Immortall
God, our peace and defence. For by this Authoritie, given him by every
particular man in the Common-Wealth, he hath the use of so much Power
and Strength conferred on him, that by terror thereof, he is inabled to
forme the wills of them all, to Peace at home, and mutuall ayd against
their enemies abroad.

The Definition Of A Common-wealth
And in him consisteth the Essence of the Common-wealth; which (to
define it,) is "One Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude, by mutuall
Covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the Author,
to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think
expedient, for their Peace and Common Defence."

Soveraigne, And Subject, What
And he that carryeth this Person, as called SOVERAIGNE, and said to
have Soveraigne Power; and every one besides, his SUBJECT.
The attaining to this Soveraigne Power, is by two wayes. One, by
Naturall force; as when a man maketh his children, to submit themselves,
and their children to his government, as being able to destroy them if they
refuse, or by Warre subdueth his enemies to his will, giving them their
lives on that condition. The other, is when men agree amongst themselves,
to submit to some Man, or Assembly of men, voluntarily, on confidence to
be protected by him against all others. This later, may be called a
Politicall Common-wealth, or Common-wealth by Institution; and the
former, a Common-wealth by Acquisition. And first, I shall speak of a
Common-wealth by Institution.

CHAPTER XVIII. OF THE RIGHTS OF
SOVERAIGNES BY INSTITUTION

The Act Of Instituting A Common-wealth, What
A Common-wealth is said to be Instituted, when a Multitude of men do
Agree, and Covenant, Every One With Every One, that to whatsoever Man,
or Assembly Of Men, shall be given by the major part, the Right to Present
the Person of them all, (that is to say, to be their Representative;) every
one, as well he that Voted For It, as he that Voted Against It, shall
Authorise all the Actions and Judgements, of that Man, or Assembly of
men, in the same manner, as if they were his own, to the end, to live
peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected against other men.

The Consequences To Such Institution, Are

I. The Subjects Cannot Change The Forme Of
Government

From this Institution of a Common-wealth are
derived all the Rights, and
Facultyes of him, or them, on whom the Soveraigne Power is conferred
by the consent of the People assembled.
First, because they Covenant, it is to be understood, they are not obliged
by former Covenant to any thing repugnant hereunto. And Consequently
they that have already Instituted a Common-wealth, being thereby bound
by Covenant, to own the Actions, and Judgements of one, cannot lawfully
make a new Covenant, amongst themselves, to be obedient to any other, in
any thing whatsoever, without his permission. And therefore, they that are
subjects to a Monarch, cannot without his leave cast off Monarchy, and
return to the confusion of a disunited Multitude; nor transferre their
Person from him that beareth it, to another Man, or other Assembly of
men: for they are bound, every man to every man, to Own, and be reputed
Author of all, that he that already is their Soveraigne, shall do, and judge
fit to be done: so that any one man dissenting, all the rest should break
their Covenant made to that man, which is injustice: and they have also
every man given the Soveraignty to him that beareth their Person; and
therefore if they depose him, they take from him that which is his own,
and so again it is injustice. Besides, if he that attempteth to depose his
Soveraign, be killed, or punished by him for such attempt, he is author of
his own punishment, as being by the Institution, Author of all his
Soveraign shall do: And because it is injustice for a man to do any thing,
for which he may be punished by his own authority, he is also upon that
title, unjust. And whereas some men have pretended for their disobedience
to their Soveraign, a new Covenant, made, not with men, but with God;
this also is unjust: for there is no Covenant with God, but by mediation of
some body that representeth Gods Person; which none doth but Gods
Lieutenant, who hath the Soveraignty under God. But this pretence of
Covenant with God, is so evident a lye, even in the pretenders own
consciences, that it is not onely an act of an unjust, but also of a vile, and
unmanly disposition.

2. Soveraigne Power Cannot Be Forfeited
Secondly, Because the Right of bearing the Person of them all, is given
to him they make Soveraigne, by Covenant onely of one to another, and
not of him to any of them; there can happen no breach of Covenant on the
part of the Soveraigne; and consequently none of his Subjects, by any
pretence of forfeiture, can be freed from his Subjection. That he which is
made Soveraigne maketh no Covenant with his Subjects beforehand, is
manifest; because either he must make it with the whole multitude, as one
party to the Covenant; or he must make a severall Covenant with every
man. With the whole, as one party, it is impossible; because as yet they are
not one Person: and if he make so many severall Covenants as there be
men, those Covenants after he hath the Soveraignty are voyd, because
what act soever can be pretended by any one of them for breach thereof, is
the act both of himselfe, and of all the rest, because done in the Person,
and by the Right of every one of them in particular. Besides, if any one, or
more of them, pretend a breach of the Covenant made by the Soveraigne at
his Institution; and others, or one other of his Subjects, or himselfe alone,
pretend there was no such breach, there is in this case, no Judge to decide
the controversie: it returns therefore to the Sword again; and every man
recovereth the right of Protecting himselfe by his own strength, contrary to
the designe they had in the Institution. It is therefore in vain to grant
Soveraignty by way of precedent Covenant. The opinion that any Monarch
receiveth his Power by Covenant, that is to say on Condition, proceedeth
from want of understanding this easie truth, that Covenants being but
words, and breath, have no force to oblige, contain, constrain, or protect
any man, but what it has from the publique Sword; that is, from the untyed
hands of that Man, or Assembly of men that hath the Soveraignty, and
whose actions are avouched by them all, and performed by the strength of
them all, in him united. But when an Assembly of men is made
Soveraigne; then no man imagineth any such Covenant to have past in the
Institution; for no man is so dull as to say, for example, the People of
Rome, made a Covenant with the Romans, to hold the Soveraignty on such
or such conditions; which not performed, the Romans might lawfully

depose the Roman People. That men see not the reason to be alike in a
Monarchy, and in a Popular Government, proceedeth from the ambition of
some, that are kinder to the government of an Assembly, whereof they may
hope to participate, than of Monarchy, which they despair to enjoy.

3. No Man Can Without Injustice Protest Against
The
Institution Of The Soveraigne Declared By The Major Part. Thirdly,
because the major part hath by consenting voices declared a Soveraigne;
he that dissented must now consent with the rest; that is, be contented to
avow all the actions he shall do, or else justly be destroyed by the rest. For
if he voluntarily entered into the Congregation of them that were
assembled, he sufficiently declared thereby his will (and therefore tacitely
covenanted) to stand to what the major part should ordayne: and therefore
if he refuse to stand thereto, or make Protestation against any of their
Decrees, he does contrary to his Covenant, and therfore unjustly. And
whether he be of the Congregation, or not; and whether his consent be
asked, or not, he must either submit to their decrees, or be left in the
condition of warre he was in before; wherein he might without injustice be
destroyed by any man whatsoever.

4. The Soveraigns Actions Cannot Be Justly
Accused By The Subject
Fourthly, because every Subject is by this Institution Author of all the
Actions, and Judgements of the Soveraigne Instituted; it followes, that
whatsoever he doth, it can be no injury to any of his Subjects; nor ought he
to be by any of them accused of Injustice. For he that doth any thing by
authority from another, doth therein no injury to him by whose authority
he acteth: But by this Institution of a Common-wealth, every particular
man is Author of all the Soveraigne doth; and consequently he that
complaineth of injury from his Soveraigne, complaineth of that whereof
he himselfe is Author; and therefore ought not to accuse any man but
himselfe; no nor himselfe of injury; because to do injury to ones selfe, is
impossible. It is true that they that have Soveraigne power, may commit
Iniquity; but not Injustice, or Injury in the proper signification.

5. What Soever The Soveraigne Doth, Is
Unpunishable By The Subject
Fiftly, and consequently to that which was sayd last, no man that hath
Soveraigne power can justly be put to death, or otherwise in any manner
by his Subjects punished. For seeing every Subject is author of the actions
of his Soveraigne; he punisheth another, for the actions committed by
himselfe.

6. The Soveraigne Is Judge Of What Is Necessary
For The Peace
And Defence Of His Subjects
And because the End of this Institution, is the Peace and Defence of
them all; and whosoever has right to the End, has right to the Means; it
belongeth of Right, to whatsoever Man, or Assembly that hath the
Soveraignty, to be Judge both of the meanes of Peace and Defence; and
also of the hindrances, and disturbances of the same; and to do whatsoever
he shall think necessary to be done, both beforehand, for the preserving of
Peace and Security, by prevention of discord at home and Hostility from
abroad; and, when Peace and Security are lost, for the recovery of the
same. And therefore,

And Judge Of What Doctrines Are Fit To Be
Taught Them
Sixtly, it is annexed to the Soveraignty, to be Judge of what Opinions
and Doctrines are averse, and what conducing to Peace; and consequently,
on what occasions, how farre, and what, men are to be trusted withall, in
speaking to Multitudes of people; and who shall examine the Doctrines of
all bookes before they be published. For the Actions of men proceed from
their Opinions; and in the wel governing of Opinions, consisteth the well
governing of mens Actions, in order to their Peace, and Concord. And
though in matter of Doctrine, nothing ought to be regarded but the Truth;
yet this is not repugnant to regulating of the same by Peace. For Doctrine
Repugnant to Peace, can no more be True, than Peace and Concord can be
against the Law of Nature. It is true, that in a Common-wealth, where by
the negligence, or unskilfullnesse of Governours, and Teachers, false
Doctrines are by time generally received; the contrary Truths may be
generally offensive; Yet the most sudden, and rough busling in of a new
Truth, that can be, does never breake the Peace, but onely somtimes awake
the Warre. For those men that are so remissely governed, that they dare
take up Armes, to defend, or introduce an Opinion, are still in Warre; and
their condition not Peace, but only a Cessation of Armes for feare of one
another; and they live as it were, in the procincts of battaile continually. It
belongeth therefore to him that hath the Soveraign Power, to be Judge, or
constitute all Judges of Opinions and Doctrines, as a thing necessary to
Peace, thereby to prevent Discord and Civill Warre.

7. The Right Of Making Rules, Whereby The
Subject May
Every Man Know What Is So His Owne, As No Other
Subject
Can Without Injustice Take It From Him
Seventhly, is annexed to the Soveraigntie, the whole power of
prescribing the Rules, whereby every man may know, what Goods he may
enjoy and what Actions he may doe, without being molested by any of his
fellow Subjects: And this is it men Call Propriety. For before constitution
of Soveraign Power (as hath already been shewn) all men had right to all
things; which necessarily causeth Warre: and therefore this Proprietie,
being necessary to Peace, and depending on Soveraign Power, is the Act of
the Power, in order to the publique peace. These Rules of Propriety (or
Meum and Tuum) and of Good, Evill, Lawfull and Unlawfull in the
actions of subjects, are the Civill Lawes, that is to say, the lawes of each
Commonwealth in particular; though the name of Civill Law be now
restrained to the antient Civill Lawes of the City of Rome; which being the
head of a great part of the World, her Lawes at that time were in these
parts the Civill Law.

8. To Him Also Belongeth The Right Of All
Judicature
And Decision Of Controversies:
Eightly, is annexed to the Soveraigntie, the Right of Judicature; that is
to say, of hearing and deciding all Controversies, which may arise
concerning Law, either Civill, or naturall, or concerning Fact. For without
the decision of Controversies, there is no protection of one Subject,
against the injuries of another; the Lawes concerning Meum and Tuum are
in vaine; and to every man remaineth, from the naturall and necessary
appetite of his own conservation, the right of protecting himselfe by his
private strength, which is the condition of Warre; and contrary to the end
for which every Common-wealth is instituted.

9. And Of Making War, And Peace, As He Shall
Think Best:
Ninthly, is annexed to the Soveraignty, the Right of making Warre, and
Peace with other Nations, and Common-wealths; that is to say, of Judging
when it is for the publique good, and how great forces are to be assembled,
armed, and payd for that end; and to levy mony upon the Subjects, to
defray the expenses thereof. For the Power by which the people are to be
defended, consisteth in their Armies; and the strength of an Army, in the
union of their strength under one Command; which Command the
Soveraign Instituted, therefore hath; because the command of the Militia,
without other Institution, maketh him that hath it Soveraign. And therefore
whosoever is made Generall of an Army, he that hath the Soveraign Power
is alwayes Generallissimo.

10. And Of Choosing All Counsellours, And
Ministers,
Both Of Peace, And Warre:
Tenthly, is annexed to the Soveraignty, the choosing of all Councellours,
Ministers, Magistrates, and Officers, both in peace, and War. For seeing
the Soveraign is charged with the End, which is the common Peace and
Defence; he is understood to have Power to use such Means, as he shall
think most fit for his discharge.

11. And Of Rewarding, And Punishing, And That
(Where No
Former Law hath Determined The Measure Of It) Arbitrary:
Eleventhly, to the Soveraign is committed the Power of Rewarding with
riches, or honour; and of Punishing with corporall, or pecuniary
punishment, or with ignominy every Subject according to the Lawe he
hath formerly made; or if there be no Law made, according as he shall
judge most to conduce to the encouraging of men to serve the Commonwealth, or deterring of them from doing dis-service to the same.

12. And Of Honour And Order
Lastly, considering what values men are naturally apt to set upon
themselves; what respect they look for from others; and how little they
value other men; from whence continually arise amongst them, Emulation,
Quarrells, Factions, and at last Warre, to the destroying of one another, and
diminution of their strength against a Common Enemy; It is necessary that
there be Lawes of Honour, and a publique rate of the worth of such men as
have deserved, or are able to deserve well of the Common-wealth; and that
there be force in the hands of some or other, to put those Lawes in
execution. But it hath already been shown, that not onely the whole
Militia, or forces of the Common-wealth; but also the Judicature of all
Controversies, is annexed to the Soveraignty. To the Soveraign therefore it
belongeth also to give titles of Honour; and to appoint what Order of
place, and dignity, each man shall hold; and what signes of respect, in
publique or private meetings, they shall give to one another.

These Rights Are Indivisible
These are the Rights, which make the Essence of Soveraignty; and
which are the markes, whereby a man may discern in what Man, or
Assembly of men, the Soveraign Power is placed, and resideth. For these
are incommunicable, and inseparable. The Power to coyn Mony; to
dispose of the estate and persons of Infant heires; to have praeemption in
Markets; and all other Statute Praerogatives, may be transferred by the
Soveraign; and yet the Power to protect his Subject be retained. But if he
transferre the Militia, he retains the Judicature in vain, for want of
execution of the Lawes; Or if he grant away the Power of raising Mony;
the Militia is in vain: or if he give away the government of doctrines, men
will be frighted into rebellion with the feare of Spirits. And so if we
consider any one of the said Rights, we shall presently see, that the
holding of all the rest, will produce no effect, in the conservation of Peace
and Justice, the end for which all Common-wealths are Instituted. And this
division is it, whereof it is said, "A kingdome divided in it selfe cannot
stand:" For unlesse this division precede, division into opposite Armies
can never happen. If there had not first been an opinion received of the
greatest part of England, that these Powers were divided between the King,
and the Lords, and the House of Commons, the people had never been
divided, and fallen into this Civill Warre; first between those that
disagreed in Politiques; and after between the Dissenters about the liberty
of Religion; which have so instructed men in this point of Soveraign
Right, that there be few now (in England,) that do not see, that these
Rights are inseparable, and will be so generally acknowledged, at the next
return of Peace; and so continue, till their miseries are forgotten; and no
longer, except the vulgar be better taught than they have hetherto been.

And Can By No Grant Passe Away Without Direct
Renouncing Of The Soveraign Power
And because they are essentiall and inseparable Rights, it follows
necessarily, that in whatsoever, words any of them seem to be granted
away, yet if the Soveraign Power it selfe be not in direct termes renounced,
and the name of Soveraign no more given by the Grantees to him that
Grants them, the Grant is voyd: for when he has granted all he can, if we
grant back the Soveraignty, all is restored, as inseparably annexed
thereunto.

The Power And Honour Of Subjects Vanisheth In
The Presence
Of The Power Soveraign
This great Authority being indivisible, and inseparably annexed to the
Soveraignty, there is little ground for the opinion of them, that say of
Soveraign Kings, though they be Singulis Majores, of greater Power than
every one of their Subjects, yet they be Universis Minores, of lesse power
than them all together. For if by All Together, they mean not the collective
body as one person, then All Together, and Every One, signifie the same;
and the speech is absurd. But if by All Together, they understand them as
one Person (which person the Soveraign bears,) then the power of all
together, is the same with the Soveraigns power; and so again the speech is
absurd; which absurdity they see well enough, when the Soveraignty is in
an Assembly of the people; but in a Monarch they see it not; and yet the
power of Soveraignty is the same in whomsoever it be placed.
And as the Power, so also the Honour of the Soveraign, ought to be
greater, than that of any, or all the Subjects. For in the Soveraignty is the
fountain of Honour. The dignities of Lord, Earle, Duke, and Prince are his
Creatures. As in the presence of the Master, the Servants are equall, and
without any honour at all; So are the Subjects, in the presence of the
Soveraign. And though they shine some more, some lesse, when they are
out of his sight; yet in his presence, they shine no more than the Starres in
presence of the Sun.

Soveraigne Power Not Hurtfull As The Want Of It,
And The Hurt Proceeds For The Greatest Part From Not
Submitting Readily, To A Lesse
But a man may here object, that the Condition of Subjects is very
miserable; as being obnoxious to the lusts, and other irregular passions of
him, or them that have so unlimited a Power in their hands. And
commonly they that live under a Monarch, think it the fault of Monarchy;
and they that live under the government of Democracy, or other Soveraign
Assembly, attribute all the inconvenience to that forme of Commonwealth; whereas the Power in all formes, if they be perfect enough to
protect them, is the same; not considering that the estate of Man can never
be without some incommodity or other; and that the greatest, that in any
forme of Government can possibly happen to the people in generall, is
scarce sensible, in respect of the miseries, and horrible calamities, that
accompany a Civill Warre; or that dissolute condition of masterlesse men,
without subjection to Lawes, and a coercive Power to tye their hands from
rapine, and revenge: nor considering that the greatest pressure of
Soveraign Governours, proceedeth not from any delight, or profit they can
expect in the dammage, or weakening of their subjects, in whose vigor,
consisteth their own selves, that unwillingly contributing to their own
defence, make it necessary for their Governours to draw from them what
they can in time of Peace, that they may have means on any emergent
occasion, or sudden need, to resist, or take advantage on their Enemies.
For all men are by nature provided of notable multiplying glasses, (that is
their Passions and Self-love,) through which, every little payment
appeareth a great grievance; but are destitute of those prospective glasses,
(namely Morall and Civill Science,) to see a farre off the miseries that
hang over them, and cannot without such payments be avoyded.

CHAPTER XIX. OF THE SEVERALL KINDS
OF COMMON-WEALTH BY INSTITUTION,
AND OF SUCCESSION TO THE SOVERAIGNE POWER

The Different Formes Of Common-wealths But
Three
The difference of Common-wealths, consisteth in the difference of the
Soveraign, or the Person representative of all and every one of the
Multitude. And because the Soveraignty is either in one Man, or in an
Assembly of more than one; and into that Assembly either Every man hath
right to enter, or not every one, but Certain men distinguished from the
rest; it is manifest, there can be but Three kinds of Common-wealth. For
the Representative must needs be One man, or More: and if more, then it
is the Assembly of All, or but of a Part. When the Representative is One
man, then is the Common-wealth a MONARCHY: when an Assembly of
All that will come together, then it is a DEMOCRACY, or Popular
Common-wealth: when an Assembly of a Part onely, then it is called an
ARISTOCRACY. Other kind of Common-wealth there can be none: for
either One, or More, or All must have the Soveraign Power (which I have
shewn to be indivisible) entire.

Tyranny And Oligarchy, But Different Names Of
Monarchy, And Aristocracy
There be other names of Government, in the Histories, and books of
Policy; as Tyranny, and Oligarchy: But they are not the names of other
Formes of Government, but of the same Formes misliked. For they that are
discontented under Monarchy, call it Tyranny; and they that are displeased
with Aristocracy, called it Oligarchy: so also, they which find themselves
grieved under a Democracy, call it Anarchy, (which signifies want of
Government;) and yet I think no man believes, that want of Government,
is any new kind of Government: nor by the same reason ought they to
believe, that the Government is of one kind, when they like it, and another,
when they mislike it, or are oppressed by the Governours.

Subordinate Representatives Dangerous
It is manifest, that men who are in absolute liberty, may, if they please,
give Authority to One Man, to represent them every one; as well as give
such Authority to any Assembly of men whatsoever; and consequently
may subject themselves, if they think good, to a Monarch, as absolutely, as
to any other Representative. Therefore, where there is already erected a
Soveraign Power, there can be no other Representative of the same people,
but onely to certain particular ends, by the Soveraign limited. For that
were to erect two Soveraigns; and every man to have his person
represented by two Actors, that by opposing one another, must needs
divide that Power, which (if men will live in Peace) is indivisible, and
thereby reduce the Multitude into the condition of Warre, contrary to the
end for which all Soveraignty is instituted. And therefore as it is absurd, to
think that a Soveraign Assembly, inviting the People of their Dominion, to
send up their Deputies, with power to make known their Advise, or
Desires, should therefore hold such Deputies, rather than themselves, for
the absolute Representative of the people: so it is absurd also, to think the
same in a Monarchy. And I know not how this so manifest a truth, should
of late be so little observed; that in a Monarchy, he that had the
Soveraignty from a descent of 600 years, was alone called Soveraign, had
the title of Majesty from every one of his Subjects, and was
unquestionably taken by them for their King; was notwithstanding never
considered as their Representative; that name without contradiction
passing for the title of those men, which at his command were sent up by
the people to carry their Petitions, and give him (if he permitted it) their
advise. Which may serve as an admonition, for those that are the true, and
absolute Representative of a People, to instruct men in the nature of that
Office, and to take heed how they admit of any other generall
Representation upon any occasion whatsoever, if they mean to discharge
the truth committed to them.

Comparison Of Monarchy, With Soveraign
Assemblyes
The difference between these three kindes of Common-wealth,
consisteth not in the difference of Power; but in the difference of
Convenience, or Aptitude to produce the Peace, and Security of the people;
for which end they were instituted. And to compare Monarchy with the
other two, we may observe; First, that whosoever beareth the Person of the
people, or is one of that Assembly that bears it, beareth also his own
naturall Person. And though he be carefull in his politique Person to
procure the common interest; yet he is more, or no lesse carefull to
procure the private good of himselfe, his family, kindred and friends; and
for the most part, if the publique interest chance to crosse the private, he
preferrs the private: for the Passions of men, are commonly more potent
than their Reason. From whence it follows, that where the publique and
private interest are most closely united, there is the publique most
advanced. Now in Monarchy, the private interest is the same with the
publique. The riches, power, and honour of a Monarch arise onely from the
riches, strength and reputation of his Subjects. For no King can be rich,
nor glorious, nor secure; whose Subjects are either poore, or contemptible,
or too weak through want, or dissention, to maintain a war against their
enemies: Whereas in a Democracy, or Aristocracy, the publique prosperity
conferres not so much to the private fortune of one that is corrupt, or
ambitious, as doth many times a perfidious advice, a treacherous action, or
a Civill warre.
Secondly, that a Monarch receiveth counsell of whom, when, and where
he pleaseth; and consequently may heare the opinion of men versed in the
matter about which he deliberates, of what rank or quality soever, and as
long before the time of action, and with as much secrecy, as he will. But
when a Soveraigne Assembly has need of Counsell, none are admitted but
such as have a Right thereto from the beginning; which for the most part
are of those who have beene versed more in the acquisition of Wealth than
of Knowledge; and are to give their advice in long discourses, which may,
and do commonly excite men to action, but not governe them in it. For the

Understanding is by the flame of the Passions, never enlightned, but
dazled: Nor is there any place, or time, wherein an Assemblie can receive
Counsell with secrecie, because of their owne Multitude.
Thirdly, that the Resolutions of a Monarch, are subject to no other
Inconstancy, than that of Humane Nature; but in Assemblies, besides that
of Nature, there ariseth an Inconstancy from the Number. For the absence
of a few, that would have the Resolution once taken, continue firme,
(which may happen by security, negligence, or private impediments,) or
the diligent appearance of a few of the contrary opinion, undoes to day, all
that was concluded yesterday.
Fourthly, that a Monarch cannot disagree with himselfe, out of envy, or
interest; but an Assembly may; and that to such a height, as may produce a
Civill Warre.
Fifthly, that in Monarchy there is this inconvenience; that any Subject,
by the power of one man, for the enriching of a favourite or flatterer, may
be deprived of all he possesseth; which I confesse is a great and inevitable
inconvenience. But the same may as well happen, where the Soveraigne
Power is in an Assembly: for their power is the same; and they are as
subject to evill Counsell, and to be seduced by Orators, as a Monarch by
Flatterers; and becoming one an others Flatterers, serve one anothers
Covetousnesse and Ambition by turnes. And whereas the Favorites of an
Assembly, are many; and the Kindred much more numerous, than of any
Monarch. Besides, there is no Favourite of a Monarch, which cannot as
well succour his friends, as hurt his enemies: But Orators, that is to say,
Favourites of Soveraigne Assemblies, though they have great power to
hurt, have little to save. For to accuse, requires lesse Eloquence (such is
mans Nature) than to excuse; and condemnation, than absolution more
resembles Justice.
Sixtly, that it is an inconvenience in Monarchie, that the Soveraigntie
may descend upon an Infant, or one that cannot discerne between Good
and Evill: and consisteth in this, that the use of his Power, must be in the
hand of another Man, or of some Assembly of men, which are to governe
by his right, and in his name; as Curators, and Protectors of his Person,
and Authority. But to say there is inconvenience, in putting the use of the
Soveraign Power, into the hand of a Man, or an Assembly of men; is to say
that all Government is more Inconvenient, than Confusion, and Civill

Warre. And therefore all the danger that can be pretended, must arise from
the Contention of those, that for an office of so great honour, and profit,
may become Competitors. To make it appear, that this inconvenience,
proceedeth not from that forme of Government we call Monarchy, we are
to consider, that the precedent Monarch, hath appointed who shall have the
Tuition of his Infant Successor, either expressely by Testament, or tacitly,
by not controlling the Custome in that case received: And then such
inconvenience (if it happen) is to be attributed, not to the Monarchy, but to
the Ambition, and Injustice of the Subjects; which in all kinds of
Government, where the people are not well instructed in their Duty, and
the Rights of Soveraignty, is the same. Or else the precedent Monarch,
hath not at all taken order for such Tuition; And then the Law of Nature
hath provided this sufficient rule, That the Tuition shall be in him, that
hath by Nature most interest in the preservation of the Authority of the
Infant, and to whom least benefit can accrue by his death, or diminution.
For seeing every man by nature seeketh his own benefit, and promotion; to
put an Infant into the power of those, that can promote themselves by his
destruction, or dammage, is not Tuition, but Trechery. So that sufficient
provision being taken, against all just quarrell, about the Government
under a Child, if any contention arise to the disturbance of the publique
Peace, it is not to be attributed to the forme of Monarchy, but to the
ambition of Subjects, and ignorance of their Duty. On the other side, there
is no great Common-wealth, the Soveraignty whereof is in a great
Assembly, which is not, as to consultations of Peace, and Warre, and
making of Lawes, in the same condition, as if the Government were in a
Child. For as a Child wants the judgement to dissent from counsell given
him, and is thereby necessitated to take the advise of them, or him, to
whom he is committed: So an Assembly wanteth the liberty, to dissent
from the counsell of the major part, be it good, or bad. And as a Child has
need of a Tutor, or Protector, to preserve his Person, and Authority: So
also (in great Common-wealths,) the Soveraign Assembly, in all great
dangers and troubles, have need of Custodes Libertatis; that is of
Dictators, or Protectors of their Authoritie; which are as much as
Temporary Monarchs; to whom for a time, they may commit the entire
exercise of their Power; and have (at the end of that time) been oftner
deprived thereof, than Infant Kings, by their Protectors, Regents, or any
other Tutors.

Though the Kinds of Soveraigntie be, as I have now shewn, but three;
that is to say, Monarchie, where one Man has it; or Democracie, where the
generall Assembly of Subjects hath it; or Aristocracie, where it is in an
Assembly of certain persons nominated, or otherwise distinguished from
the rest: Yet he that shall consider the particular Common-wealthes that
have been, and are in the world, will not perhaps easily reduce them to
three, and may thereby be inclined to think there be other Formes, arising
from these mingled together. As for example, Elective Kingdomes; where
Kings have the Soveraigne Power put into their hands for a time; of
Kingdomes, wherein the King hath a power limited: which Governments,
are nevertheless by most Writers called Monarchie. Likewise if a Popular,
or Aristocraticall Common-wealth, subdue an Enemies Countrie, and
govern the same, by a President, Procurator, or other Magistrate; this may
seeme perhaps at first sight, to be a Democraticall, or Aristocraticall
Government. But it is not so. For Elective Kings, are not Soveraignes, but
Ministers of the Soveraigne; nor limited Kings Soveraignes, but Ministers
of them that have the Soveraigne Power: nor are those Provinces which are
in subjection to a Democracie, or Aristocracie of another Common-wealth,
Democratically, or Aristocratically governed, but Monarchically.
And first, concerning an Elective King, whose power is limited to his
life, as it is in many places of Christendome at this day; or to certaine
Yeares or Moneths, as the Dictators power amongst the Romans; If he
have Right to appoint his Successor, he is no more Elective but Hereditary.
But if he have no Power to elect his Successor, then there is some other
Man, or Assembly known, which after his decease may elect a new, or else
the Common-wealth dieth, and dissolveth with him, and returneth to the
condition of Warre. If it be known who have the power to give the
Soveraigntie after his death, it is known also that the Soveraigntie was in
them before: For none have right to give that which they have not right to
possesse, and keep to themselves, if they think good. But if there be none
that can give the Soveraigntie, after the decease of him that was first
elected; then has he power, nay he is obliged by the Law of Nature, to
provide, by establishing his Successor, to keep those that had trusted him
with the Government, from relapsing into the miserable condition of Civill
warre. And consequently he was, when elected, a Soveraign absolute.
Secondly, that King whose power is limited, is not superiour to him, or
them that have the power to limit it; and he that is not superiour, is not

supreme; that is to say not Soveraign. The Soveraignty therefore was
alwaies in that Assembly which had the Right to Limit him; and by
consequence the government not Monarchy, but either Democracy, or
Aristocracy; as of old time in Sparta; where the Kings had a priviledge to
lead their Armies; but the Soveraignty was in the Ephori.
Thirdly, whereas heretofore the Roman People, governed the land of
Judea (for example) by a President; yet was not Judea therefore a
Democracy; because they were not governed by any Assembly, into which,
any of them, had right to enter; nor by an Aristocracy; because they were
not governed by any Assembly, into which, any man could enter by their
Election: but they were governed by one Person, which though as to the
people of Rome was an Assembly of the people, or Democracy; yet as to
the people of Judea, which had no right at all of participating in the
government, was a Monarch. For though where the people are governed by
an Assembly, chosen by themselves out of their own number, the
government is called a Democracy, or Aristocracy; yet when they are
governed by an Assembly, not of their own choosing, 'tis a Monarchy; not
of One man, over another man; but of one people, over another people.

Of The Right Of Succession
Of all these Formes of Government, the matter being mortall, so that
not onely Monarchs, but also whole Assemblies dy, it is necessary for the
conservation of the peace of men, that as there was order taken for an
Artificiall Man, so there be order also taken, for an Artificiall Eternity of
life; without which, men that are governed by an Assembly, should return
into the condition of Warre in every age; and they that are governed by
One man, as soon as their Governour dyeth. This Artificiall Eternity, is
that which men call the Right of Succession.
There is no perfect forme of Government, where the disposing of the
Succession is not in the present Soveraign. For if it be in any other
particular Man, or private Assembly, it is in a person subject, and may be
assumed by the Soveraign at his pleasure; and consequently the Right is in
himselfe. And if it be in no particular man, but left to a new choyce; then
is the Common-wealth dissolved; and the Right is in him that can get it;
contrary to the intention of them that did institute the Common-wealth, for
their perpetuall, and not temporary security.
In a Democracy, the whole Assembly cannot faile, unlesse the Multitude
that are to be governed faile. And therefore questions of the right of
Succession, have in that forme of Government no place at all.
In an Aristocracy, when any of the Assembly dyeth, the election of
another into his room belongeth to the Assembly, as the Soveraign, to
whom belongeth the choosing of all Counsellours, and Officers. For that
which the Representative doth, as Actor, every one of the Subjects doth, as
Author. And though the Soveraign assembly, may give Power to others, to
elect new men, for supply of their Court; yet it is still by their Authority,
that the Election is made; and by the same it may (when the publique shall
require it) be recalled.
The Present Monarch Hath Right To Dispose Of The Succession The
greatest difficultie about the right of Succession, is in Monarchy: And the
difficulty ariseth from this, that at first sight, it is not manifest who is to
appoint the Successor; nor many times, who it is whom he hath appointed.

For in both these cases, there is required a more exact ratiocination, than
every man is accustomed to use. As to the question, who shall appoint the
Successor, of a Monarch that hath the Soveraign Authority; that is to say,
(for Elective Kings and Princes have not the Soveraign Power in propriety,
but in use only,) we are to consider, that either he that is in possession, has
right to dispose of the Succession, or else that right is again in the
dissolved Multitude. For the death of him that hath the Soveraign power in
propriety, leaves the Multitude without any Soveraign at all; that is,
without any Representative in whom they should be united, and be capable
of doing any one action at all: And therefore they are incapable of Election
of any new Monarch; every man having equall right to submit himselfe to
such as he thinks best able to protect him, or if he can, protect himselfe by
his owne sword; which is a returne to Confusion, and to the condition of a
War of every man against every man, contrary to the end for which
Monarchy had its first Institution. Therfore it is manifest, that by the
Institution of Monarchy, the disposing of the Successor, is alwaies left to
the Judgment and Will of the present Possessor.
And for the question (which may arise sometimes) who it is that the
Monarch in possession, hath designed to the succession and inheritance of
his power; it is determined by his expresse Words, and Testament; or by
other tacite signes sufficient.

Succession Passeth By Expresse Words;
By expresse Words, or Testament, when it is declared by him in his life
time, viva voce, or by Writing; as the first Emperours of Rome declared
who should be their Heires. For the word Heire does not of it selfe imply
the Children, or nearest Kindred of a man; but whomsoever a man shall
any way declare, he would have to succeed him in his Estate. If therefore a
Monarch declare expresly, that such a man shall be his Heire, either by
Word or Writing, then is that man immediately after the decease of his
Predecessor, Invested in the right of being Monarch.

Or, By Not Controlling A Custome;
But where Testament, and expresse Words are wanting, other naturall
signes of the Will are to be followed: whereof the one is Custome. And
therefore where the Custome is, that the next of Kindred absolutely
succeedeth, there also the next of Kindred hath right to the Succession; for
that, if the will of him that was in posession had been otherwise, he might
easily have declared the same in his life time. And likewise where the
Custome is, that the next of the Male Kindred succeedeth, there also the
right of Succession is in the next of the Kindred Male, for the same reason.
And so it is if the Custome were to advance the Female. For whatsoever
Custome a man may by a word controule, and does not, it is a naturall
signe he would have that Custome stand.

Or, By Presumption Of Naturall Affection
But where neither Custome, nor Testament hath preceded, there it is to
be understood, First, that a Monarchs will is, that the government remain
Monarchicall; because he hath approved that government in himselfe.
Secondly, that a Child of his own, Male, or Female, be preferred before
any other; because men are presumed to be more enclined by nature, to
advance their own children, than the children of other men; and of their
own, rather a Male than a Female; because men, are naturally fitter than
women, for actions of labour and danger. Thirdly, where his own Issue
faileth, rather a Brother than a stranger; and so still the neerer in bloud,
rather than the more remote, because it is alwayes presumed that the
neerer of kin, is the neerer in affection; and 'tis evident that a man receives
alwayes, by reflexion, the most honour from the greatnesse of his neerest
kindred.

To Dispose Of The Succession, Though To A King
Of Another Nation,
Not Unlawfull
But if it be lawfull for a Monarch to dispose of the Succession by words
of Contract, or Testament, men may perhaps object a great inconvenience:
for he may sell, or give his Right of governing to a stranger; which,
because strangers (that is, men not used to live under the same
government, not speaking the same language) do commonly undervalue
one another, may turn to the oppression of his Subjects; which is indeed a
great inconvenience; but it proceedeth not necessarily from the subjection
to a strangers government, but from the unskilfulnesse of the Governours,
ignorant of the true rules of Politiques. And therefore the Romans when
they had subdued many Nations, to make their Government digestible,
were wont to take away that grievance, as much as they thought necessary,
by giving sometimes to whole Nations, and sometimes to Principall men
of every Nation they conquered, not onely the Privileges, but also the
Name of Romans; and took many of them into the Senate, and Offices of
charge, even in the Roman City. And this was it our most wise King, King
James, aymed at, in endeavouring the Union of his two Realms of England
and Scotland. Which if he could have obtained, had in all likelihood
prevented the Civill warres, which make both those Kingdomes at this
present, miserable. It is not therefore any injury to the people, for a
Monarch to dispose of the Succession by Will; though by the fault of
many Princes, it hath been sometimes found inconvenient. Of the
lawfulnesse of it, this also is an argument, that whatsoever inconvenience
can arrive by giving a Kingdome to a stranger, may arrive also by so
marrying with strangers, as the Right of Succession may descend upon
them: yet this by all men is accounted lawfull.

CHAPTER XX. OF DOMINION PATERNALL
AND DESPOTICALL
A Common-wealth by Acquisition, is that, where the Soveraign Power
is acquired by Force; And it is acquired by force, when men singly, or
many together by plurality of voyces, for fear of death, or bonds, do
authorise all the actions of that Man, or Assembly, that hath their lives and
liberty in his Power.

Wherein Different From A Common-wealth By
Institution
And this kind of Dominion, or Soveraignty, differeth from Soveraignty
by Institution, onely in this, That men who choose their Soveraign, do it
for fear of one another, and not of him whom they Institute: But in this
case, they subject themselves, to him they are afraid of. In both cases they
do it for fear: which is to be noted by them, that hold all such Covenants,
as proceed from fear of death, or violence, voyd: which if it were true, no
man, in any kind of Common-wealth, could be obliged to Obedience. It is
true, that in a Common-wealth once Instituted, or acquired, Promises
proceeding from fear of death, or violence, are no Covenants, nor obliging,
when the thing promised is contrary to the Lawes; But the reason is not,
because it was made upon fear, but because he that promiseth, hath no
right in the thing promised. Also, when he may lawfully performe, and
doth not, it is not the Invalidity of the Covenant, that absolveth him, but
the Sentence of the Soveraign. Otherwise, whensoever a man lawfully
promiseth, he unlawfully breaketh: But when the Soveraign, who is the
Actor, acquitteth him, then he is acquitted by him that exorted the
promise, as by the Author of such absolution.

The Rights Of Soveraignty The Same In Both
But the Rights, and Consequences of Soveraignty, are the same in both.
His Power cannot, without his consent, be Transferred to another: He
cannot Forfeit it: He cannot be Accused by any of his Subjects, of Injury:
He cannot be Punished by them: He is Judge of what is necessary for
Peace; and Judge of Doctrines: He is Sole Legislator; and Supreme Judge
of Controversies; and of the Times, and Occasions of Warre, and Peace: to
him it belongeth to choose Magistrates, Counsellours, Commanders, and
all other Officers, and Ministers; and to determine of Rewards, and
punishments, Honour, and Order. The reasons whereof, are the same which
are alledged in the precedent Chapter, for the same Rights, and
Consequences of Soveraignty by Institution.

Dominion Paternall How Attained Not By
Generation, But By Contract
Dominion is acquired two wayes; By Generation, and by Conquest. The
right of Dominion by Generation, is that, which the Parent hath over his
Children; and is called PATERNALL. And is not so derived from the
Generation, as if therefore the Parent had Dominion over his Child
because he begat him; but from the Childs Consent, either expresse, or by
other sufficient arguments declared. For as to the Generation, God hath
ordained to man a helper; and there be alwayes two that are equally
Parents: the Dominion therefore over the Child, should belong equally to
both; and he be equally subject to both, which is impossible; for no man
can obey two Masters. And whereas some have attributed the Dominion to
the Man onely, as being of the more excellent Sex; they misreckon in it.
For there is not always that difference of strength or prudence between the
man and the woman, as that the right can be determined without War. In
Common-wealths, this controversie is decided by the Civill Law: and for
the most part, (but not alwayes) the sentence is in favour of the Father;
because for the most part Common-wealths have been erected by the
Fathers, not by the Mothers of families. But the question lyeth now in the
state of meer Nature; where there are supposed no lawes of Matrimony; no
lawes for the Education of Children; but the Law of Nature, and the
naturall inclination of the Sexes, one to another, and to their children. In
this condition of meer Nature, either the Parents between themselves
dispose of the dominion over the Child by Contract; or do not dispose
thereof at all. If they dispose thereof, the right passeth according to the
Contract. We find in History that the Amazons Contracted with the Men of
the neighbouring Countries, to whom they had recourse for issue, that the
issue Male should be sent back, but the Female remain with themselves:
so that the dominion of the Females was in the Mother.

Or Education;
If there be no Contract, the Dominion is in the Mother. For in the
condition of Meer Nature, where there are no Matrimoniall lawes, it
cannot be known who is the Father, unlesse it be declared by the Mother:
and therefore the right of Dominion over the Child dependeth on her will,
and is consequently hers. Again, seeing the Infant is first in the power of
the Mother; so as she may either nourish, or expose it, if she nourish it, it
oweth its life to the Mother; and is therefore obliged to obey her, rather
than any other; and by consequence the Dominion over it is hers. But if
she expose it, and another find, and nourish it, the Dominion is in him that
nourisheth it. For it ought to obey him by whom it is preserved; because
preservation of life being the end, for which one man becomes subject to
another, every man is supposed to promise obedience, to him, in whose
power it is to save, or destroy him.

Or Precedent Subjection Of One Of The Parents
To The Other
If the Mother be the Fathers subject, the Child, is in the Fathers power:
and if the Father be the Mothers subject, (as when a Soveraign Queen
marrieth one of her subjects,) the Child is subject to the Mother; because
the Father also is her subject.
If a man and a woman, Monarches of two severall Kingdomes, have a
Child, and contract concerning who shall have the Dominion of him, the
Right of the Dominion passeth by the Contract. If they contract not, the
Dominion followeth the Dominion of the place of his residence. For the
Soveraign of each Country hath Dominion over all that reside therein.
He that hath the Dominion over the Child, hath Dominion also over
their Childrens Children. For he that hath Dominion over the person of a
man, hath Dominion over all that is his; without which, Dominion were
but a Title, without the effect.

The Right Of Succession Followeth The Rules Of
The Rights Of Possession
The Right of Succession to Paternall dominion, proceedeth in the same
manner, as doth the Right of Succession to Monarchy; of which I have
already sufficiently spoken in the precedent chapter.

Despoticall Dominion, How Attained
Dominion acquired by Conquest, or Victory in war, is that which some
Writers call DESPOTICALL, from Despotes, which signifieth a Lord, or
Master; and is the Dominion of the Master over his Servant. And this
Dominion is then acquired to the Victor, when the Vanquished, to avoyd
the present stroke of death, covenanteth either in expresse words, or by
other sufficient signes of the Will, that so long as his life, and the liberty
of his body is allowed him, the Victor shall have the use thereof, at his
pleasure. And after such Covenant made, the Vanquished is a SERVANT,
and not before: for by the word Servant (whether it be derived from
Servire, to Serve, or from Servare, to Save, which I leave to Grammarians
to dispute) is not meant a Captive, which is kept in prison, or bonds, till
the owner of him that took him, or bought him of one that did, shall
consider what to do with him: (for such men, (commonly called Slaves,)
have no obligation at all; but may break their bonds, or the prison; and
kill, or carry away captive their Master, justly:) but one, that being taken,
hath corporall liberty allowed him; and upon promise not to run away, nor
to do violence to his Master, is trusted by him.

Not By The Victory, But By The Consent Of The
Vanquished
It is not therefore the Victory, that giveth the right of Dominion over the
Vanquished, but his own Covenant. Nor is he obliged because he is
Conquered; that is to say, beaten, and taken, or put to flight; but because he
commeth in, and submitteth to the Victor; Nor is the Victor obliged by an
enemies rendring himselfe, (without promise of life,) to spare him for this
his yeelding to discretion; which obliges not the Victor longer, than in his
own discretion hee shall think fit.
And that men do, when they demand (as it is now called) Quarter,
(which the Greeks called Zogria, taking alive,) is to evade the present fury
of the Victor, by Submission, and to compound for their life, with
Ransome, or Service: and therefore he that hath Quarter, hath not his life
given, but deferred till farther deliberation; For it is not an yeelding on
condition of life, but to discretion. And then onely is his life in security,
and his service due, when the Victor hath trusted him with his corporall
liberty. For Slaves that work in Prisons, or Fetters, do it not of duty, but to
avoyd the cruelty of their task-masters.
The Master of the Servant, is Master also of all he hath; and may exact
the use thereof; that is to say, of his goods, of his labour, of his servants,
and of his children, as often as he shall think fit. For he holdeth his life of
his Master, by the covenant of obedience; that is, of owning, and
authorising whatsoever the Master shall do. And in case the Master, if he
refuse, kill him, or cast him into bonds, or otherwise punish him for his
disobedience, he is himselfe the author of the same; and cannot accuse
him of injury.
In summe the Rights and Consequences of both Paternall and
Despoticall Dominion, are the very same with those of a Soveraign by
Institution; and for the same reasons: which reasons are set down in the
precedent chapter. So that for a man that is Monarch of divers Nations,
whereof he hath, in one the Soveraignty by Institution of the people
assembled, and in another by Conquest, that is by the Submission of each

particular, to avoyd death or bonds; to demand of one Nation more than of
the other, from the title of Conquest, as being a Conquered Nation, is an
act of ignorance of the Rights of Soveraignty. For the Soveraign is
absolute over both alike; or else there is no Soveraignty at all; and so
every man may Lawfully protect himselfe, if he can, with his own sword,
which is the condition of war.

Difference Between A Family And A Kingdom
By this it appears, that a great Family if it be not part of some Commonwealth, is of it self, as to the Rights of Soveraignty, a little Monarchy;
whether that Family consist of a man and his children; or of a man and his
servants; or of a man, and his children, and servants together: wherein the
Father of Master is the Soveraign. But yet a Family is not properly a
Common-wealth; unlesse it be of that power by its own number, or by
other opportunities, as not to be subdued without the hazard of war. For
where a number of men are manifestly too weak to defend themselves
united, every one may use his own reason in time of danger, to save his
own life, either by flight, or by submission to the enemy, as hee shall think
best; in the same manner as a very small company of souldiers, surprised
by an army, may cast down their armes, and demand quarter, or run away,
rather than be put to the sword. And thus much shall suffice; concerning
what I find by speculation, and deduction, of Soveraign Rights, from the
nature, need, and designes of men, in erecting of Commonwealths, and
putting themselves under Monarchs, or Assemblies, entrusted with power
enough for their protection.

The Right Of Monarchy From Scripture
Let us now consider what the Scripture teacheth in the same point. To
Moses, the children of Israel say thus. (Exod. 20. 19) "Speak thou to us,
and we will heare thee; but let not God speak to us, lest we dye." This is
absolute obedience to Moses. Concerning the Right of Kings, God himself
by the mouth of Samuel, saith, (1 Sam. 8. 11, 12, &c.) "This shall be the
Right of the King you will have to reigne over you. He shall take your
sons, and set them to drive his Chariots, and to be his horsemen, and to run
before his chariots; and gather in his harvest; and to make his engines of
War, and Instruments of his chariots; and shall take your daughters to
make perfumes, to be his Cookes, and Bakers. He shall take your fields,
your vine-yards, and your olive-yards, and give them to his servants. He
shall take the tyth of your corne and wine, and give it to the men of his
chamber, and to his other servants. He shall take your man-servants, and
your maid-servants, and the choice of your youth, and employ them in his
businesse. He shall take the tyth of your flocks; and you shall be his
servants." This is absolute power, and summed up in the last words, "you
shall be his servants." Againe, when the people heard what power their
King was to have, yet they consented thereto, and say thus, (Verse. 19 &c.)
"We will be as all other nations, and our King shall judge our causes, and
goe before us, to conduct our wars." Here is confirmed the Right that
Soveraigns have, both to the Militia, and to all Judicature; in which is
conteined as absolute power, as one man can possibly transferre to another.
Again, the prayer of King Salomon to God, was this. (1 Kings 3. 9) "Give
to thy servant understanding, to judge thy people, and to discerne between
Good and Evill." It belongeth therefore to the Soveraigne to bee Judge, and
to praescribe the Rules of Discerning Good and Evill; which Rules are
Lawes; and therefore in him is the Legislative Power. Saul sought the life
of David; yet when it was in his power to slay Saul, and his Servants
would have done it, David forbad them, saying (1 Sam. 24. 9) "God forbid
I should do such an act against my Lord, the anoynted of God." For
obedience of servants St. Paul saith, (Coll. 3. 20) "Servants obey your
masters in All things," and, (Verse. 22) "Children obey your Parents in All

things." There is simple obedience in those that are subject to Paternall, or
Despoticall Dominion. Again, (Math. 23. 2,3) "The Scribes and Pharisees
sit in Moses chayre and therefore All that they shall bid you observe, that
observe and do." There again is simple obedience. And St. Paul, (Tit. 3. 2)
"Warn them that they subject themselves to Princes, and to those that are
in Authority, & obey them." This obedience is also simple. Lastly, our
Saviour himselfe acknowledges, that men ought to pay such taxes as are
by Kings imposed, where he sayes, "Give to Caesar that which is Caesars;"
and payed such taxes himselfe. And that the Kings word, is sufficient to
take any thing from any subject, when there is need; and that the King is
Judge of that need: For he himselfe, as King of the Jewes, commanded his
Disciples to take the Asse, and Asses Colt to carry him into Jerusalem,
saying, (Mat. 21. 2,3) "Go into the Village over against you, and you shall
find a shee Asse tyed, and her Colt with her, unty them, and bring them to
me. And if any man ask you, what you mean by it, Say the Lord hath need
of them: And they will let them go." They will not ask whether his
necessity be a sufficient title; nor whether he be judge of that necessity;
but acquiesce in the will of the Lord.
To these places may be added also that of Genesis, (Gen. 3. 5) "You
shall be as Gods, knowing Good and Evill." and verse 11. "Who told thee
that thou wast naked? hast thou eaten of the tree, of which I commanded
thee thou shouldest not eat?" For the Cognisance of Judicature of Good
and Evill, being forbidden by the name of the fruit of the tree of
Knowledge, as a triall of Adams obedience; The Divell to enflame the
Ambition of the woman, to whom that fruit already seemed beautifull, told
her that by tasting it, they should be as Gods, knowing Good and Evill.
Whereupon having both eaten, they did indeed take upon them Gods
office, which is Judicature of Good and Evill; but acquired no new ability
to distinguish between them aright. And whereas it is sayd, that having
eaten, they saw they were naked; no man hath so interpreted that place, as
if they had formerly blind, as saw not their own skins: the meaning is
plain, that it was then they first judged their nakednesse (wherein it was
Gods will to create them) to be uncomely; and by being ashamed, did
tacitely censure God himselfe. And thereupon God saith, "Hast thou eaten,
&c." as if he should say, doest thou that owest me obedience, take upon
thee to judge of my Commandements? Whereby it is cleerly, (though

Allegorically,) signified, that the Commands of them that have the right to
command, are not by their Subjects to be censured, nor disputed.

Soveraign Power Ought In All Common-wealths
To Be Absolute
So it appeareth plainly, to my understanding, both from Reason, and
Scripture, that the Soveraign Power, whether placed in One Man, as in
Monarchy, or in one Assembly of men, as in Popular, and Aristocraticall
Common-wealths, is as great, as possibly men can be imagined to make it.
And though of so unlimited a Power, men may fancy many evill
consequences, yet the consequences of the want of it, which is perpetuall
warre of every man against his neighbour, are much worse. The condition
of man in this life shall never be without Inconveniences; but there
happeneth in no Common-wealth any great Inconvenience, but what
proceeds from the Subjects disobedience, and breach of those Covenants,
from which the Common-wealth had its being. And whosoever thinking
Soveraign Power too great, will seek to make it lesse; must subject
himselfe, to the Power, that can limit it; that is to say, to a greater.
The greatest objection is, that of the Practise; when men ask, where, and
when, such Power has by Subjects been acknowledged. But one may ask
them again, when, or where has there been a Kingdome long free from
Sedition and Civill Warre. In those Nations, whose Common-wealths have
been long-lived, and not been destroyed, but by forraign warre, the
Subjects never did dispute of the Soveraign Power. But howsoever, an
argument for the Practise of men, that have not sifted to the bottom, and
with exact reason weighed the causes, and nature of Common-wealths, and
suffer daily those miseries, that proceed from the ignorance thereof, is
invalid. For though in all places of the world, men should lay the
foundation of their houses on the sand, it could not thence be inferred, that
so it ought to be. The skill of making, and maintaining Common-wealths,
consisteth in certain Rules, as doth Arithmetique and Geometry; not (as
Tennis-play) on Practise onely: which Rules, neither poor men have the
leisure, nor men that have had the leisure, have hitherto had the curiosity,
or the method to find out.

CHAPTER XXI. OF THE LIBERTY OF
SUBJECTS

Liberty What
Liberty, or FREEDOME, signifieth (properly) the absence of
Opposition; (by Opposition, I mean externall Impediments of motion;) and
may be applyed no lesse to Irrational, and Inanimate creatures, than to
Rationall. For whatsoever is so tyed, or environed, as it cannot move, but
within a certain space, which space is determined by the opposition of
some externall body, we say it hath not Liberty to go further. And so of all
living creatures, whilest they are imprisoned, or restrained, with walls, or
chayns; and of the water whilest it is kept in by banks, or vessels, that
otherwise would spread it selfe into a larger space, we use to say, they are
not at Liberty, to move in such manner, as without those externall
impediments they would. But when the impediment of motion, is in the
constitution of the thing it selfe, we use not to say, it wants the Liberty; but
the Power to move; as when a stone lyeth still, or a man is fastned to his
bed by sicknesse.

What It Is To Be Free
And according to this proper, and generally received meaning of the
word, A FREE-MAN, is "he, that in those things, which by his strength and
wit he is able to do, is not hindred to doe what he has a will to." But when
the words Free, and Liberty, are applyed to any thing but Bodies, they are
abused; for that which is not subject to Motion, is not subject to
Impediment: And therefore, when 'tis said (for example) The way is free,
no liberty of the way is signified, but of those that walk in it without stop.
And when we say a Guift is free, there is not meant any liberty of the
Guift, but of the Giver, that was not bound by any law, or Covenant to give
it. So when we Speak Freely, it is not the liberty of voice, or pronunciation,
but of the man, whom no law hath obliged to speak otherwise then he did.
Lastly, from the use of the word Freewill, no liberty can be inferred to the
will, desire, or inclination, but the liberty of the man; which consisteth in
this, that he finds no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or
inclination to doe.

Feare And Liberty Consistent
Feare and Liberty are consistent; as when a man throweth his goods into
the Sea for Feare the ship should sink, he doth it neverthelesse very
willingly, and may refuse to doe it if he will: It is therefore the action, of
one that was Free; so a man sometimes pays his debt, only for Feare of
Imprisonment, which because no body hindred him from detaining, was
the action of a man at Liberty. And generally all actions which men doe in
Common-wealths, for Feare of the law, or actions, which the doers had
Liberty to omit.

Liberty And Necessity Consistent
Liberty and Necessity are Consistent: As in the water, that hath not only
Liberty, but a Necessity of descending by the Channel: so likewise in the
Actions which men voluntarily doe; which (because they proceed from
their will) proceed from Liberty; and yet because every act of mans will,
and every desire, and inclination proceedeth from some cause, which
causes in a continuall chaine (whose first link in the hand of God the first
of all causes) proceed from Necessity. So that to him that could see the
connexion of those causes, the Necessity of all mens voluntary actions,
would appeare manifest. And therefore God, that seeth, and disposeth all
things, seeth also that the Liberty of man in doing what he will, is
accompanied with the Necessity of doing that which God will, & no more,
nor lesse. For though men may do many things, which God does not
command, nor is therefore Author of them; yet they can have no passion,
nor appetite to any thing, of which appetite Gods will is not the cause. And
did not his will assure the Necessity of mans will, and consequently of all
that on mans will dependeth, the Liberty of men would be a contradiction,
and impediment to the omnipotence and Liberty of God. And this shall
suffice, (as to the matter in hand) of that naturall Liberty, which only is
properly called Liberty.

Artificiall Bonds, Or Covenants
But as men, for the atteyning of peace, and conservation of themselves
thereby, have made an Artificiall Man, which we call a Common-wealth;
so also have they made Artificiall Chains, called Civill Lawes, which they
themselves, by mutuall covenants, have fastned at one end, to the lips of
that Man, or Assembly, to whom they have given the Soveraigne Power;
and at the other end to their own Ears. These Bonds in their own nature but
weak, may neverthelesse be made to hold, by the danger, though not by the
difficulty of breaking them.

Liberty Of Subjects Consisteth In Liberty From
Covenants
In relation to these Bonds only it is, that I am to speak now, of the
Liberty of Subjects. For seeing there is no Common-wealth in the world,
for the regulating of all the actions, and words of men, (as being a thing
impossible:) it followeth necessarily, that in all kinds of actions, by the
laws praetermitted, men have the Liberty, of doing what their own reasons
shall suggest, for the most profitable to themselves. For if wee take
Liberty in the proper sense, for corporall Liberty; that is to say, freedome
from chains, and prison, it were very absurd for men to clamor as they
doe, for the Liberty they so manifestly enjoy. Againe, if we take Liberty,
for an exemption from Lawes, it is no lesse absurd, for men to demand as
they doe, that Liberty, by which all other men may be masters of their
lives. And yet as absurd as it is, this is it they demand; not knowing that
the Lawes are of no power to protect them, without a Sword in the hands
of a man, or men, to cause those laws to be put in execution. The Liberty
of a Subject, lyeth therefore only in those things, which in regulating their
actions, the Soveraign hath praetermitted; such as is the Liberty to buy,
and sell, and otherwise contract with one another; to choose their own
aboad, their own diet, their own trade of life, and institute their children as
they themselves think fit; & the like.

Liberty Of The Subject Consistent With Unlimited
Power Of The Soveraign
Neverthelesse we are not to understand, that by such Liberty, the
Soveraign Power of life, and death, is either abolished, or limited. For it
has been already shewn, that nothing the Soveraign Representative can doe
to a Subject, on what pretence soever, can properly be called Injustice, or
Injury; because every Subject is Author of every act the Soveraign doth; so
that he never wanteth Right to any thing, otherwise, than as he himself is
the Subject of God, and bound thereby to observe the laws of Nature. And
therefore it may, and doth often happen in Common-wealths, that a Subject
may be put to death, by the command of the Soveraign Power; and yet
neither doe the other wrong: as when Jeptha caused his daughter to be
sacrificed: In which, and the like cases, he that so dieth, had Liberty to doe
the action, for which he is neverthelesse, without Injury put to death. And
the same holdeth also in a Soveraign Prince, that putteth to death an
Innocent Subject. For though the action be against the law of Nature, as
being contrary to Equitie, (as was the killing of Uriah, by David;) yet it
was not an Injurie to Uriah; but to God. Not to Uriah, because the right to
doe what he pleased, was given him by Uriah himself; And yet to God,
because David was Gods Subject; and prohibited all Iniquitie by the law of
Nature. Which distinction, David himself, when he repented the fact,
evidently confirmed, saying, "To thee only have I sinned." In the same
manner, the people of Athens, when they banished the most potent of their
Common-wealth for ten years, thought they committed no Injustice; and
yet they never questioned what crime he had done; but what hurt he would
doe: Nay they commanded the banishment of they knew not whom; and
every Citizen bringing his Oystershell into the market place, written with
the name of him he desired should be banished, without actuall accusing
him, sometimes banished an Aristides, for his reputation of Justice; And
sometimes a scurrilous Jester, as Hyperbolus, to make a Jest of it. And yet
a man cannot say, the Soveraign People of Athens wanted right to banish
them; or an Athenian the Libertie to Jest, or to be Just.

The Liberty Which Writers Praise, Is The Liberty
Of Soveraigns;
Not Of Private Men
The Libertie, whereof there is so frequent, and honourable mention, in
the Histories, and Philosophy of the Antient Greeks, and Romans, and in
the writings, and discourse of those that from them have received all their
learning in the Politiques, is not the Libertie of Particular men; but the
Libertie of the Common-wealth: which is the same with that, which every
man then should have, if there were no Civil Laws, nor Common-wealth at
all. And the effects of it also be the same. For as amongst masterlesse
men, there is perpetuall war, of every man against his neighbour; no
inheritance, to transmit to the Son, nor to expect from the Father; no
propriety of Goods, or Lands; no security; but a full and absolute Libertie
in every Particular man: So in States, and Common-wealths not dependent
on one another, every Common-wealth, (not every man) has an absolute
Libertie, to doe what it shall judge (that is to say, what that Man, or
Assemblie that representeth it, shall judge) most conducing to their
benefit. But withall, they live in the condition of a perpetuall war, and
upon the confines of battel, with their frontiers armed, and canons planted
against their neighbours round about. The Athenians, and Romanes, were
free; that is, free Common-wealths: not that any particular men had the
Libertie to resist their own Representative; but that their Representative
had the Libertie to resist, or invade other people. There is written on the
Turrets of the city of Luca in great characters at this day, the word
LIBERTAS; yet no man can thence inferre, that a particular man has more
Libertie, or Immunitie from the service of the Commonwealth there, than
in Constantinople. Whether a Common-wealth be Monarchicall, or
Popular, the Freedome is still the same.
But it is an easy thing, for men to be deceived, by the specious name of
Libertie; and for want of Judgement to distinguish, mistake that for their
Private Inheritance, and Birth right, which is the right of the Publique only.
And when the same errour is confirmed by the authority of men in

reputation for their writings in this subject, it is no wonder if it produce
sedition, and change of Government. In these westerne parts of the world,
we are made to receive our opinions concerning the Institution, and Rights
of Common-wealths, from Aristotle, Cicero, and other men, Greeks and
Romanes, that living under Popular States, derived those Rights, not from
the Principles of Nature, but transcribed them into their books, out of the
Practice of their own Common-wealths, which were Popular; as the
Grammarians describe the Rules of Language, out of the Practise of the
time; or the Rules of Poetry, out of the Poems of Homer and Virgil. And
because the Athenians were taught, (to keep them from desire of changing
their Government,) that they were Freemen, and all that lived under
Monarchy were slaves; therefore Aristotle puts it down in his Politiques,
(lib.6.cap.2) "In democracy, Liberty is to be supposed: for 'tis commonly
held, that no man is Free in any other Government." And as Aristotle; so
Cicero, and other Writers have grounded their Civill doctrine, on the
opinions of the Romans, who were taught to hate Monarchy, at first, by
them that having deposed their Soveraign, shared amongst them the
Soveraignty of Rome; and afterwards by their Successors. And by reading
of these Greek, and Latine Authors, men from their childhood have gotten
a habit (under a false shew of Liberty,) of favouring tumults, and of
licentious controlling the actions of their Soveraigns; and again of
controlling those controllers, with the effusion of so much blood; as I
think I may truly say, there was never any thing so deerly bought, as these
Western parts have bought the learning of the Greek and Latine tongues.

Liberty Of The Subject How To Be Measured
To come now to the particulars of the true Liberty of a Subject; that is to
say, what are the things, which though commanded by the Soveraign, he
may neverthelesse, without Injustice, refuse to do; we are to consider,
what Rights we passe away, when we make a Common-wealth; or (which
is all one,) what Liberty we deny our selves, by owning all the Actions
(without exception) of the Man, or Assembly we make our Soveraign. For
in the act of our Submission, consisteth both our Obligation, and our
Liberty; which must therefore be inferred by arguments taken from
thence; there being no Obligation on any man, which ariseth not from
some Act of his own; for all men equally, are by Nature Free. And because
such arguments, must either be drawn from the expresse words, "I
Authorise all his Actions," or from the Intention of him that submitteth
himselfe to his Power, (which Intention is to be understood by the End for
which he so submitteth;) The Obligation, and Liberty of the Subject, is to
be derived, either from those Words, (or others equivalent;) or else from
the End of the Institution of Soveraignty; namely, the Peace of the
Subjects within themselves, and their Defence against a common Enemy.

Subjects Have Liberty To Defend Their Own
Bodies,
Even Against Them That Lawfully Invade Them
First therefore, seeing Soveraignty by Institution, is by Covenant of
every one to every one; and Soveraignty by Acquisition, by Covenants of
the Vanquished to the Victor, or Child to the Parent; It is manifest, that
every Subject has Liberty in all those things, the right whereof cannot by
Covenant be transferred. I have shewn before in the 14. Chapter, that
Covenants, not to defend a mans own body, are voyd. Therefore,

Are Not Bound To Hurt Themselves;
If the Soveraign command a man (though justly condemned,) to kill,
wound, or mayme himselfe; or not to resist those that assault him; or to
abstain from the use of food, ayre, medicine, or any other thing, without
which he cannot live; yet hath that man the Liberty to disobey.
If a man be interrogated by the Soveraign, or his Authority, concerning a
crime done by himselfe, he is not bound (without assurance of Pardon) to
confesse it; because no man (as I have shewn in the same Chapter) can be
obliged by Covenant to accuse himselfe.
Again, the Consent of a Subject to Soveraign Power, is contained in
these words, "I Authorise, or take upon me, all his actions;" in which there
is no restriction at all, of his own former naturall Liberty: For by allowing
him to Kill Me, I am not bound to Kill my selfe when he commands me.
"'Tis one thing to say 'Kill me, or my fellow, if you please;' another thing
to say, 'I will kill my selfe, or my fellow.'" It followeth therefore, that
No man is bound by the words themselves, either to kill himselfe, or
any other man; And consequently, that the Obligation a man may
sometimes have, upon the Command of the Soveraign to execute any
dangerous, or dishonourable Office, dependeth not on the Words of our
Submission; but on the Intention; which is to be understood by the End
thereof. When therefore our refusall to obey, frustrates the End for which
the Soveraignty was ordained; then there is no Liberty to refuse: otherwise
there is.

Nor To Warfare, Unless They Voluntarily
Undertake It
Upon this ground, a man that is commanded as a Souldier to fight
against the enemy, though his Soveraign have Right enough to punish his
refusall with death, may neverthelesse in many cases refuse, without
Injustice; as when he substituteth a sufficient Souldier in his place: for in
this case he deserteth not the service of the Common-wealth. And there is
allowance to be made for naturall timorousnesse, not onely to women, (of
whom no such dangerous duty is expected,) but also to men of feminine
courage. When Armies fight, there is on one side, or both, a running away;
yet when they do it not out of trechery, but fear, they are not esteemed to
do it unjustly, but dishonourably. For the same reason, to avoyd battell, is
not Injustice, but Cowardise. But he that inrowleth himselfe a Souldier, or
taketh imprest mony, taketh away the excuse of a timorous nature; and is
obliged, not onely to go to the battell, but also not to run from it, without
his Captaines leave. And when the Defence of the Common-wealth,
requireth at once the help of all that are able to bear Arms, every one is
obliged; because otherwise the Institution of the Common-wealth, which
they have not the purpose, or courage to preserve, was in vain.
To resist the Sword of the Common-wealth, in defence of another man,
guilty, or innocent, no man hath Liberty; because such Liberty, takes away
from the Soveraign, the means of Protecting us; and is therefore
destructive of the very essence of Government. But in case a great many
men together, have already resisted the Soveraign Power Unjustly, or
committed some Capitall crime, for which every one of them expecteth
death, whether have they not the Liberty then to joyn together, and assist,
and defend one another? Certainly they have: For they but defend their
lives, which the guilty man may as well do, as the Innocent. There was
indeed injustice in the first breach of their duty; Their bearing of Arms
subsequent to it, though it be to maintain what they have done, is no new
unjust act. And if it be onely to defend their persons, it is not unjust at all.
But the offer of Pardon taketh from them, to whom it is offered, the plea

of self-defence, and maketh their perseverance in assisting, or defending
the rest, unlawfull.

The Greatest Liberty Of Subjects, Dependeth On
The Silence Of The Law
As for other Lyberties, they depend on the silence of the Law. In cases
where the Soveraign has prescribed no rule, there the Subject hath the
liberty to do, or forbeare, according to his own discretion. And therefore
such Liberty is in some places more, and in some lesse; and in some times
more, in other times lesse, according as they that have the Soveraignty
shall think most convenient. As for Example, there was a time, when in
England a man might enter in to his own Land, (and dispossesse such as
wrongfully possessed it) by force. But in after-times, that Liberty of
Forcible entry, was taken away by a Statute made (by the King) in
Parliament. And is some places of the world, men have the Liberty of
many wives: in other places, such Liberty is not allowed.
If a Subject have a controversie with his Soveraigne, of Debt, or of right
of possession of lands or goods, or concerning any service required at his
hands, or concerning any penalty corporall, or pecuniary, grounded on a
precedent Law; He hath the same Liberty to sue for his right, as if it were
against a Subject; and before such Judges, as are appointed by the
Soveraign. For seeing the Soveraign demandeth by force of a former Law,
and not by vertue of his Power; he declareth thereby, that he requireth no
more, than shall appear to be due by that Law. The sute therefore is not
contrary to the will of the Soveraign; and consequently the Subject hath
the Liberty to demand the hearing of his Cause; and sentence, according to
that Law. But if he demand, or take any thing by pretence of his Power;
there lyeth, in that case, no action of Law: for all that is done by him in
Vertue of his Power, is done by the Authority of every subject, and
consequently, he that brings an action against the Soveraign, brings it
against himselfe.
If a Monarch, or Soveraign Assembly, grant a Liberty to all, or any of
his Subjects; which Grant standing, he is disabled to provide for their
safety, the Grant is voyd; unlesse he directly renounce, or transferre the
Soveraignty to another. For in that he might openly, (if it had been his

will,) and in plain termes, have renounced, or transferred it, and did not; it
is to be understood it was not his will; but that the Grant proceeded from
ignorance of the repugnancy between such a Liberty and the Soveraign
Power; and therefore the Soveraignty is still retayned; and consequently
all those Powers, which are necessary to the exercising thereof; such as are
the Power of Warre, and Peace, of Judicature, of appointing Officers, and
Councellours, of levying Mony, and the rest named in the 18th Chapter.

In What Cases Subjects Absolved Of Their
Obedience To Their Soveraign
The Obligation of Subjects to the Soveraign is understood to last as
long, and no longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect
them. For the right men have by Nature to protect themselves, when none
else can protect them, can by no Covenant be relinquished. The
Soveraignty is the Soule of the Common-wealth; which once departed
from the Body, the members doe no more receive their motion from it. The
end of Obedience is Protection; which, wheresoever a man seeth it, either
in his own, or in anothers sword, Nature applyeth his obedience to it, and
his endeavour to maintaine it. And though Soveraignty, in the intention of
them that make it, be immortall; yet is it in its own nature, not only
subject to violent death, by forreign war; but also through the ignorance,
and passions of men, it hath in it, from the very institution, many seeds of
a naturall mortality, by Intestine Discord.

In Case Of Captivity
If a Subject be taken prisoner in war; or his person, or his means of life
be within the Guards of the enemy, and hath his life and corporall Libertie
given him, on condition to be Subject to the Victor, he hath Libertie to
accept the condition; and having accepted it, is the subject of him that took
him; because he had no other way to preserve himselfe. The case is the
same, if he be deteined on the same termes, in a forreign country. But if a
man be held in prison, or bonds, or is not trusted with the libertie of his
bodie; he cannot be understood to be bound by Covenant to subjection; and
therefore may, if he can, make his escape by any means whatsoever.

In Case The Soveraign Cast Off The Government
From Himself And Heyrs
If a Monarch shall relinquish the Soveraignty, both for himself, and his
heires; His Subjects returne to the absolute Libertie of Nature; because,
though Nature may declare who are his Sons, and who are the nerest of his
Kin; yet it dependeth on his own will, (as hath been said in the precedent
chapter,) who shall be his Heyr. If therefore he will have no Heyre, there is
no Soveraignty, nor Subjection. The case is the same, if he dye without
known Kindred, and without declaration of his Heyre. For then there can
no Heire be known, and consequently no Subjection be due.

In Case Of Banishment
If the Soveraign Banish his Subject; during the Banishment, he is not
Subject. But he that is sent on a message, or hath leave to travell, is still
Subject; but it is, by Contract between Soveraigns, not by vertue of the
covenant of Subjection. For whosoever entreth into anothers dominion, is
Subject to all the Lawes thereof; unless he have a privilege by the amity of
the Soveraigns, or by speciall licence.

In Case The Soveraign Render Himself Subject To
Another
If a Monarch subdued by war, render himself Subject to the Victor; his
Subjects are delivered from their former obligation, and become obliged
to the Victor. But if he be held prisoner, or have not the liberty of his own
Body; he is not understood to have given away the Right of Soveraigntie;
and therefore his Subjects are obliged to yield obedience to the
Magistrates formerly placed, governing not in their own name, but in his.
For, his Right remaining, the question is only of the Administration; that
is to say, of the Magistrates and Officers; which, if he have not means to
name, he is supposed to approve those, which he himself had formerly
appointed.

CHAPTER XXII. OF SYSTEMES SUBJECT,
POLITICALL, AND PRIVATE

The Divers Sorts Of Systemes Of People
Having spoken of the Generation, Forme, and Power of a Commonwealth, I am in order to speak next of the parts thereof. And first of
Systemes, which resemble the similar parts, or Muscles of a Body naturall.
By SYSTEMES; I understand any numbers of men joyned in one Interest,
or one Businesse. Of which, some are Regular, and some Irregular. Regular
are those, where one Man, or Assembly of men, is constituted
Representative of the whole number. All other are Irregular.
Of Regular, some are Absolute, and Independent, subject to none but
their own Representative: such are only Common-wealths; Of which I
have spoken already in the 5. last preceding chapters. Others are
Dependent; that is to say, Subordinate to some Soveraign Power, to which
every one, as also their Representative is Subject.
Of Systemes subordinate, some are Politicall, and some Private.
Politicall (otherwise Called Bodies Politique, and Persons In Law,) are
those, which are made by authority from the Soveraign Power of the
Common-wealth. Private, are those, which are constituted by Subjects
amongst themselves, or by authoritie from a stranger. For no authority
derived from forraign power, within the Dominion of another, is Publique
there, but Private.
And of Private Systemes, some are Lawfull; some Unlawfull: Lawfull,
are those which are allowed by the Common-wealth: all other are
Unlawfull. Irregular Systemes, are those which having no Representative,
consist only in concourse of People; which if not forbidden by the
Common-wealth, nor made on evill designe, (such as are conflux of
People to markets, or shews, or any other harmelesse end,) are Lawfull.
But when the Intention is evill, or (if the number be considerable)
unknown, they are Unlawfull.

In All Bodies Politique The Power Of The
Representative Is Limited
In Bodies Politique, the power of the Representative is alwaies Limited:
And that which prescribeth the limits thereof, is the Power Soveraign. For
Power Unlimited, is absolute Soveraignty. And the Soveraign, in every
Commonwealth, is the absolute Representative of all the Subjects; and
therefore no other, can be Representative of any part of them, but so far
forth, as he shall give leave; And to give leave to a Body Politique of
Subjects, to have an absolute Representative to all intents and purposes,
were to abandon the Government of so much of the Commonwealth, and to
divide the Dominion, contrary to their Peace and Defence, which the
Soveraign cannot be understood to doe, by any Grant, that does not plainly,
and directly discharge them of their subjection. For consequences of
words, are not the signes of his will, when other consequences are signes
of the contrary; but rather signes of errour, and misreckoning; to which all
mankind is too prone.
The bounds of that Power, which is given to the Representative of a
Bodie Politique, are to be taken notice of, from two things. One is their
Writt, or Letters from the Soveraign: the other is the Law of the Commonwealth.

By Letters Patents
For though in the Institution or Acquisition of a Common-wealth, which
is independent, there needs no Writing, because the Power of the
Representative has there no other bounds, but such as are set out by the
unwritten Law of Nature; yet in subordinate bodies, there are such
diversities of Limitation necessary, concerning their businesses, times, and
places, as can neither be remembred without Letters, nor taken notice of,
unlesse such Letters be Patent, that they may be read to them, and withall
sealed, or testified, with the Seales, or other permanent signes of the
Authority Soveraign.

And The Lawes
And because such Limitation is not alwaies easie, or perhaps possible to
be described in writing; the ordinary Lawes, common to all Subjects, must
determine, that the Representative may lawfully do, in all Cases, where the
Letters themselves are silent. And therefore

When The Representative Is One Man, His
Unwarranted Acts His Own Onely
In a Body Politique, if the Representative be one man, whatsoever he
does in the Person of the Body, which is not warranted in his Letters, nor
by the Lawes, is his own act, and not the act of the Body, nor of any other
Member thereof besides himselfe: Because further than his Letters, or the
Lawes limit, he representeth no mans person, but his own. But what he
does according to these, is the act of every one: For of the Act of the
Soveraign every one is Author, because he is their Representative
unlimited; and the act of him that recedes not from the Letters of the
Soveraign, is the act of the Soveraign, and therefore every member of the
Body is Author of it.

When It Is An Assembly, It Is The Act Of Them
That Assented Onely
But if the Representative be an Assembly, whatsoever that Assembly
shall Decree, not warranted by their Letters, or the Lawes, is the act of the
Assembly, or Body Politique, and the act of every one by whose Vote the
Decree was made; but not the act of any man that being present Voted to
the contrary; nor of any man absent, unlesse he Voted it by procuration. It
is the act of the Assembly, because Voted by the major part; and if it be a
crime, the Assembly may be punished, as farre-forth as it is capable, as by
dissolution, or forfeiture of their Letters (which is to such artificiall, and
fictitious Bodies, capitall,) or (if the Assembly have a Common stock,
wherein none of the Innocent Members have propriety,) by pecuniary
Mulct. For from corporall penalties Nature hath exempted all Bodies
Politique. But they that gave not their Vote, are therefore Innocent,
because the Assembly cannot Represent any man in things unwarranted by
their Letters, and consequently are not involved in their Votes.
When The Representative Is One Man, If He Borrow Mony, Or Owe It,
By Contract; He Is Lyable Onely, The Members Not If the person of the
Body Politique being in one man, borrow mony of a stranger, that is, of
one that is not of the same Body, (for no Letters need limit borrowing,
seeing it is left to mens own inclinations to limit lending) the debt is the
Representatives. For if he should have Authority from his Letters, to make
the members pay what he borroweth, he should have by consequence the
Soveraignty of them; and therefore the grant were either voyd, as
proceeding from Errour, commonly incident to humane Nature, and an
unsufficient signe of the will of the Granter; or if it be avowed by him,
then is the Representer Soveraign, and falleth not under the present
question, which is onely of Bodies subordinate. No member therefore is
obliged to pay the debt so borrowed, but the Representative himselfe:
because he that lendeth it, being a stranger to the Letters, and to the
qualification of the Body, understandeth those onely for his debtors, that
are engaged; and seeing the Representer can ingage himselfe, and none

else, has him onely for Debtor; who must therefore pay him, out of the
common stock (if there be any), or (if there be none) out of his own estate.
If he come into debt by Contract, or Mulct, the case is the same.

When It Is An Assembly, They Onely Are Liable
That Have Assented
But when the Representative is an Assembly, and the debt to a stranger;
all they, and onely they are responsible for the debt, that gave their votes
to the borrowing of it, or to the Contract that made it due, or to the fact for
which the Mulct was imposed; because every one of those in voting did
engage himselfe for the payment: For he that is author of the borrowing, is
obliged to the payment, even of the whole debt, though when payd by any
one, he be discharged.

If The Debt Be To One Of The Assembly, The
Body Onely Is Obliged
But if the debt be to one of the Assembly, the Assembly onely is obliged
to the payment, out of their common stock (if they have any:) For having
liberty of Vote, if he Vote the Mony, shall be borrowed, he Votes it shall be
payd; If he Vote it shall not be borrowed, or be absent, yet because in
lending, he voteth the borrowing, he contradicteth his former Vote, and is
obliged by the later, and becomes both borrower and lender, and
consequently cannot demand payment from any particular man, but from
the common Treasure onely; which fayling he hath no remedy, nor
complaint, but against himselfe, that being privy to the acts of the
Assembly, and their means to pay, and not being enforced, did
neverthelesse through his own folly lend his mony.

Protestation Against The Decrees Of Bodies
Politique
Sometimes Lawful; But Against Soveraign Power Never It is manifest
by this, that in Bodies Politique subordinate, and subject to a Soveraign
Power, it is sometimes not onely lawfull, but expedient, for a particular
man to make open protestation against the decrees of the Representative
Assembly, and cause their dissent to be Registred, or to take witnesse of it;
because otherwise they may be obliged to pay debts contracted, and be
responsible for crimes committed by other men: But in a Soveraign
Assembly, that liberty is taken away, both because he that protesteth there,
denies their Soveraignty; and also because whatsoever is commanded by
the Soveraign Power, is as to the Subject (though not so alwayes in the
sight of God) justified by the Command; for of such command every
Subject is the Author.

Bodies Politique For Government Of A Province,
Colony, Or Town
The variety of Bodies Politique, is almost infinite; for they are not onely
distinguished by the severall affaires, for which they are constituted,
wherein there is an unspeakable diversitie; but also by the times, places,
and numbers, subject to many limitations. And as to their affaires, some
are ordained for Government; As first, the Government of a Province may
be committed to an Assembly of men, wherein all resolutions shall depend
on the Votes of the major part; and then this Assembly is a Body Politique,
and their power limited by Commission. This word Province signifies a
charge, or care of businesse, which he whose businesse it is, committeth to
another man, to be administred for, and under him; and therefore when in
one Common-wealth there be divers Countries, that have their Lawes
distinct one from another, or are farre distant in place, the Administration
of the Government being committed to divers persons, those Countries
where the Soveraign is not resident, but governs by Commission, are
called Provinces. But of the government of a Province, by an Assembly
residing in the Province it selfe, there be few examples. The Romans who
had the Soveraignty of many Provinces; yet governed them alwaies by
Presidents, and Praetors; and not by Assemblies, as they governed the City
of Rome, and Territories adjacent. In like manner, when there were
Colonies sent from England, to Plant Virginia, and Sommer-Ilands; though
the government of them here, were committed to Assemblies in London,
yet did those Assemblies never commit the Government under them to any
Assembly there; but did to each Plantation send one Governour; For
though every man, where he can be present by Nature, desires to
participate of government; yet where they cannot be present, they are by
Nature also enclined, to commit the Government of their common Interest
rather to a Monarchicall, then a Popular form of Government: which is
also evident in those men that have great private estates; who when they
are unwilling to take the paines of administring the businesse that belongs
to them, choose rather to trust one Servant, than a Assembly either of their
friends or servants. But howsoever it be in fact, yet we may suppose the

Government of a Province, or Colony committed to an Assembly: and
when it is, that which in this place I have to say, is this; that whatsoever
debt is by that Assembly contracted; or whatsoever unlawfull Act is
decreed, is the Act onely of those that assented, and not of any that
dissented, or were absent, for the reasons before alledged. Also that an
Assembly residing out of the bounds of that Colony whereof they have the
government, cannot execute any power over the persons, or goods of any
of the Colonie, to seize on them for debt, or other duty, in any place
without the Colony it selfe, as having no Jurisdiction, nor Authoritie
elsewhere, but are left to the remedie, which the Law of the place alloweth
them. And though the Assembly have right, to impose a Mulct upon any of
their members, that shall break the Lawes they make; yet out of the
Colonie it selfe, they have no right to execute the same. And that which is
said here, of the Rights of an Assembly, for the government of a Province,
or a Colony, is appliable also to an Assembly for the Government of a
Town, or University, or a College, or a Church, or for any other
Government over the persons of men.
And generally, in all Bodies Politique, if any particular member
conceive himself Injured by the Body it self, the Cognisance of his cause
belongeth to the Soveraign, and those the Soveraign hath ordained for
Judges in such causes, or shall ordaine for that particular cause; and not to
the Body it self. For the whole Body is in this case his fellow subject,
which in a Soveraign Assembly, is otherwise: for there, if the Soveraign be
not Judge, though in his own cause, there can be no Judge at all.

Bodies Politique For Ordering Of Trade
In a Bodie Politique, for the well ordering of forraigne Traffique, the
most commodious Representative is an Assembly of all the members; that
is to say, such a one, as every one that adventureth his mony, may be
present at all the Deliberations, and Resolutions of the Body, if they will
themselves. For proof whereof, we are to consider the end, for which men
that are Merchants, and may buy and sell, export, and import their
Merchandise, according to their own discretions, doe neverthelesse bind
themselves up in one Corporation. It is true, there be few Merchants, that
with the Merchandise they buy at home, can fraight a Ship, to export it; or
with that they buy abroad, to bring it home; and have therefore need to
joyn together in one Society; where every man may either participate of
the gaine, according to the proportion of his adventure; or take his own;
and sell what he transports, or imports, at such prices as he thinks fit. But
this is no Body Politique, there being no Common Representative to oblige
them to any other Law, than that which is common to all other subjects.
The End of their Incorporating, is to make their gaine the greater; which is
done two wayes; by sole buying, and sole selling, both at home, and
abroad. So that to grant to a Company of Merchants to be a Corporation, or
Body Politique, is to grant them a double Monopoly, whereof one is to be
sole buyers; another to be sole sellers. For when there is a Company
incorporate for any particular forraign Country, they only export the
Commodities vendible in that Country; which is sole buying at home, and
sole selling abroad. For at home there is but one buyer, and abroad but one
that selleth: both which is gainfull to the Merchant, because thereby they
buy at home at lower, and sell abroad at higher rates: And abroad there is
but one buyer of forraign Merchandise, and but one that sels them at
home; both which againe are gainfull to the adventurers.
Of this double Monopoly one part is disadvantageous to the people at
home, the other to forraigners. For at home by their sole exportation they
set what price they please on the husbandry and handy-works of the
people; and by the sole importation, what price they please on all forraign
commodities the people have need of; both which are ill for the people. On

the contrary, by the sole selling of the native commodities abroad, and sole
buying the forraign commodities upon the place, they raise the price of
those, and abate the price of these, to the disadvantage of the forraigner:
For where but one selleth, the Merchandise is the dearer; and where but
one buyeth the cheaper: Such Corporations therefore are no other then
Monopolies; though they would be very profitable for a Common-wealth,
if being bound up into one body in forraigne Markets they were at liberty
at home, every man to buy, and sell at what price he could.
The end then of these Bodies of Merchants, being not a Common benefit
to the whole Body, (which have in this case no common stock, but what is
deducted out of the particular adventures, for building, buying, victualling
and manning of Ships,) but the particular gaine of every adventurer, it is
reason that every one be acquainted with the employment of his own; that
is, that every one be of the Assembly, that shall have the power to order
the same; and be acquainted with their accounts. And therefore the
Representative of such a Body must be an Assembly, where every member
of the Body may be present at the consultations, if he will.
If a Body Politique of Merchants, contract a debt to a stranger by the act
of their Representative Assembly, every Member is lyable by himself for
the whole. For a stranger can take no notice of their private Lawes, but
considereth them as so many particular men, obliged every one to the
whole payment, till payment made by one dischargeth all the rest: But if
the debt be to one of the Company, the creditor is debter for the whole to
himself, and cannot therefore demand his debt, but only from the common
stock, if there be any.
If the Common-wealth impose a Tax upon the Body, it is understood to
be layd upon every member proportionably to his particular adventure in
the Company. For there is in this case no other common stock, but what is
made of their particular adventures.
If a Mulct be layd upon the Body for some unlawfull act, they only are
lyable by whose votes the act was decreed, or by whose assistance it was
executed; for in none of the rest is there any other crime but being of the
Body; which if a crime, (because the Body was ordeyned by the authority
of the Common-wealth,) is not his.
If one of the Members be indebted to the Body, he may be sued by the
Body; but his goods cannot be taken, nor his person imprisoned by the

authority of the Body; but only by Authority of the Common-wealth: for if
they can doe it by their own Authority, they can by their own Authority
give judgement that the debt is due, which is as much as to be Judge in
their own Cause.

A Bodie Politique For Counsel To Be Give To The
Soveraign
These Bodies made for the government of Men, or of Traffique, be
either perpetuall, or for a time prescribed by writing. But there be Bodies
also whose times are limited, and that only by the nature of their
businesse. For example, if a Soveraign Monarch, or a Soveraign Assembly,
shall think fit to give command to the towns, and other severall parts of
their territory, to send to him their Deputies, to enforme him of the
condition, and necessities of the Subjects, or to advise with him for the
making of good Lawes, or for any other cause, as with one Person
representing the whole Country, such Deputies, having a place and time of
meeting assigned them, are there, and at that time, a Body Politique,
representing every Subject of that Dominion; but it is onely for such
matters as shall be propounded unto them by that Man, or Assembly, that
by the Soveraign Authority sent for them; and when it shall be declared
that nothing more shall be propounded, nor debated by them, the Body is
dissolved. For if they were the absolute Representative of the people, then
were it the Soveraign Assembly; and so there would be two Soveraign
Assemblies, or two Soveraigns, over the same people; which cannot
consist with their Peace. And therefore where there is once a Soveraignty,
there can be no absolute Representation of the people, but by it. And for
the limits of how farre such a Body shall represent the whole People, they
are set forth in the Writing by which they were sent for. For the People
cannot choose their Deputies to other intent, than is in the Writing directed
to them from their Soveraign expressed.

A Regular Private Body, Lawfull, As A Family
Private Bodies Regular, and Lawfull, are those that are constituted
without Letters, or other written Authority, saving the Lawes common to
all other Subjects. And because they be united in one Person
Representative, they are held for Regular; such as are all Families, in
which the Father, or Master ordereth the whole Family. For he obligeth his
Children, and Servants, as farre as the Law permitteth, though not further,
because none of them are bound to obedience in those actions, which the
Law hath forbidden to be done. In all other actions, during the time they
are under domestique government, they are subject to their Fathers, and
Masters, as to their immediate Soveraigns. For the Father, and Master
being before the Institution of Common-wealth, absolute Soveraigns in
their own Families, they lose afterward no more of their Authority, than
the Law of the Common-wealth taketh from them.

Private Bodies Regular, But Unlawfull
Private Bodies Regular, but Unlawfull, are those that unite themselves
into one person Representative, without any publique Authority at all;
such as are the Corporations of Beggars, Theeves and Gipsies, the better to
order their trade of begging, and stealing; and the Corporations of men,
that by Authority from any forraign Person, unite themselves in anothers
Dominion, for easier propagation of Doctrines, and for making a party,
against the Power of the Common-wealth.

Systemes Irregular, Such As Are Private Leagues
Irregular Systemes, in their nature, but Leagues, or sometimes meer
concourse of people, without union to any particular designe, not by
obligation of one to another, but proceeding onely from a similitude of
wills and inclinations, become Lawfull, or Unlawfull, according to the
lawfulnesse, or unlawfulnesse of every particular mans design therein:
And his designe is to be understood by the occasion.
The Leagues of Subjects, (because Leagues are commonly made for
mutuall defence,) are in a Common-wealth (which is no more than a
League of all the Subjects together) for the most part unnecessary, and
savour of unlawfull designe; and are for that cause Unlawfull, and go
commonly by the name of factions, or Conspiracies. For a League being a
connexion of men by Covenants, if there be no power given to any one
Man or Assembly, (as in the condition of meer Nature) to compell them to
performance, is so long onely valid, as there ariseth no just cause of
distrust: and therefore Leagues between Common-wealths, over whom
there is no humane Power established, to keep them all in awe, are not
onely lawfull, but also profitable for the time they last. But Leagues of the
Subjects of one and the same Common-wealth, where every one may
obtain his right by means of the Soveraign Power, are unnecessary to the
maintaining of Peace and Justice, and (in case the designe of them be evill,
or Unknown to the Common-wealth) unlawfull. For all uniting of strength
by private men, is, if for evill intent, unjust; if for intent unknown,
dangerous to the Publique, and unjustly concealed.

Secret Cabals
If the Soveraign Power be in a great Assembly, and a number of men,
part of the Assembly, without authority, consult a part, to contrive the
guidance of the rest; This is a Faction, or Conspiracy unlawfull, as being a
fraudulent seducing of the Assembly for their particular interest. But if he,
whose private interest is to be debated, and judged in the Assembly, make
as many friends as he can; in him it is no Injustice; because in this case he
is no part of the Assembly. And though he hire such friends with mony,
(unlesse there be an expresse Law against it,) yet it is not Injustice. For
sometimes, (as mens manners are,) Justice cannot be had without mony;
and every man may think his own cause just, till it be heard, and judged.

Feuds Of Private Families
In all Common-wealths, if a private man entertain more servants, than
the government of his estate, and lawfull employment he has for them
requires, it is Faction, and unlawfull. For having the protection of the
Common-wealth, he needeth not the defence of private force. And whereas
in Nations not throughly civilized, severall numerous Families have lived
in continuall hostility, and invaded one another with private force; yet it is
evident enough, that they have done unjustly; or else that they had no
Common-wealth.

Factions For Government
And as Factions for Kindred, so also Factions for Government of
Religion, as of Papists, Protestants, &c. or of State, as Patricians, and
Plebeians of old time in Rome, and of Aristocraticalls and Democraticalls
of old time in Greece, are unjust, as being contrary to the peace and safety
of the people, and a taking of the Sword out of the hand of the Soveraign.
Concourse of people, is an Irregular Systeme, the lawfulnesse, or
unlawfulnesse, whereof dependeth on the occasion, and on the number of
them that are assembled. If the occasion be lawfull, and manifest, the
Concourse is lawfull; as the usuall meeting of men at Church, or at a
publique Shew, in usuall numbers: for if the numbers be extraordinarily
great, the occasion is not evident; and consequently he that cannot render a
particular and good account of his being amongst them, is to be judged
conscious of an unlawfull, and tumultuous designe. It may be lawfull for a
thousand men, to joyn in a Petition to be delivered to a Judge, or
Magistrate; yet if a thousand men come to present it, it is a tumultuous
Assembly; because there needs but one or two for that purpose. But in
such cases as these, it is not a set number that makes the Assembly
Unlawfull, but such a number, as the present Officers are not able to
suppresse, and bring to Justice.
When an unusuall number of men, assemble against a man whom they
accuse; the Assembly is an Unlawfull tumult; because they may deliver
their accusation to the Magistrate by a few, or by one man. Such was the
case of St. Paul at Ephesus; where Demetrius, and a great number of other
men, brought two of Pauls companions before the Magistrate, saying with
one Voyce, "Great is Diana of the Ephesians;" which was their way of
demanding Justice against them for teaching the people such doctrine, as
was against their Religion, and Trade. The occasion here, considering the
Lawes of that People, was just; yet was their Assembly Judged Unlawfull,
and the Magistrate reprehended them for it, in these words,(Acts 19. 40)
"If Demetrius and the other work-men can accuse any man, of any thing,
there be Pleas, and Deputies, let them accuse one another. And if you have
any other thing to demand, your case may be judged in an Assembly

Lawfully called. For we are in danger to be accused for this dayes sedition,
because, there is no cause by which any man can render any reason of this
Concourse of People." Where he calleth an Assembly, whereof men can
give no just account, a Sedition, and such as they could not answer for.
And this is all I shall say concerning Systemes, and Assemblyes of People,
which may be compared (as I said,) to the Similar parts of mans Body;
such as be Lawfull, to the Muscles; such as are Unlawfull, to Wens, Biles,
and Apostemes, engendred by the unnaturall conflux of evill humours.

CHAPTER XXIII. OF THE PUBLIQUE
MINISTERS OF SOVERAIGN POWER
In the last Chapter I have spoken of the Similar parts of a Commonwealth; In this I shall speak of the parts Organicall, which are Publique
Ministers.

Publique Minister Who
A PUBLIQUE MINISTER, is he, that by the Soveraign, (whether a
Monarch, or an Assembly,) is employed in any affaires, with Authority to
represent in that employment, the Person of the Common-wealth. And
whereas every man, or assembly that hath Soveraignty, representeth two
Persons, or (as the more common phrase is) has two Capacities, one
Naturall, and another Politique, (as a Monarch, hath the person not onely
of the Common-wealth, but also of a man; and a Soveraign Assembly hath
the Person not onely of the Common-wealth, but also of the Assembly);
they that be servants to them in their naturall Capacity, are not Publique
Ministers; but those onely that serve them in the Administration of the
Publique businesse. And therefore neither Ushers, nor Sergeants, nor other
Officers that waite on the Assembly, for no other purpose, but for the
commodity of the men assembled, in an Aristocracy, or Democracy; nor
Stewards, Chamberlains, Cofferers, or any other Officers of the houshold
of a Monarch, are Publique Ministers in a Monarchy.

Ministers For The Generall Administration
Of Publique Ministers, some have charge committed to them of a
general Administration, either of the whole Dominion, or of a part thereof.
Of the whole, as to a Protector, or Regent, may bee committed by the
Predecessor of an Infant King, during his minority, the whole
Administration of his Kingdome. In which case, every Subject is so far
obliged to obedience, as the Ordinances he shall make, and the commands
he shall give be in the Kings name, and not inconsistent with his
Soveraigne Power. Of a Part, or Province; as when either a Monarch, or a
Soveraign Assembly, shall give the generall charge thereof to a Governour,
Lieutenant, Praefect, or Vice-Roy: And in this case also, every one of that
Province, is obliged to all he shall doe in the name of the Soveraign, and
that not incompatible with the Soveraigns Right. For such Protectors,
Vice-Roys, and Governours, have no other right, but what depends on the
Soveraigns Will; and no Commission that can be given them, can be
interpreted for a Declaration of the will to transferre the Soveraignty,
without expresse and perspicuous words to that purpose. And this kind of
Publique Ministers resembleth the Nerves, and Tendons that move the
severall limbs of a body naturall.

For Speciall Administration, As For Oeconomy
Others have speciall Administration; that is to say, charges of some
speciall businesse, either at home, or abroad: As at home, First, for the
Oeconomy of a Common-wealth, They that have Authority concerning the
Treasure, as Tributes, Impositions, Rents, Fines, or whatsoever publique
revenue, to collect, receive, issue, or take the Accounts thereof, are
Publique Ministers: Ministers, because they serve the Person
Representative, and can doe nothing against his Command, nor without his
Authority: Publique, because they serve him in his Politicall Capacity.
Secondly, they that have Authority concerning the Militia; to have the
custody of Armes, Forts, Ports; to Levy, Pay, or Conduct Souldiers; or to
provide for any necessary thing for the use of war, either by Land or Sea,
are publique Ministers. But a Souldier without Command, though he fight
for the Common-wealth, does not therefore represent the Person of it;
because there is none to represent it to. For every one that hath command,
represents it to them only whom he commandeth.

For Instruction Of The People
They also that have authority to teach, or to enable others to teach the
people their duty to the Soveraign Power, and instruct them in the
knowledge of what is just, and unjust, thereby to render them more apt to
live in godlinesse, and in peace among themselves, and resist the publique
enemy, are Publique Ministers: Ministers, in that they doe it not by their
own Authority, but by anothers; and Publique, because they doe it (or
should doe it) by no Authority, but that of the Soveraign. The Monarch, or
the Soveraign Assembly only hath immediate Authority from God, to
teach and instruct the people; and no man but the Soveraign, receiveth his
power Dei Gratia simply; that is to say, from the favour of none but God:
All other, receive theirs from the favour and providence of God, and their
Soveraigns; as in a Monarchy Dei Gratia & Regis; or Dei Providentia &
Voluntate Regis.

For Judicature
They also to whom Jurisdiction is given, are Publique Ministers. For in
their Seats of Justice they represent the person of the Soveraign; and their
Sentence, is his Sentence; For (as hath been before declared) all Judicature
is essentially annexed to the Soveraignty; and therefore all other Judges
are but Ministers of him, or them that have the Soveraign Power. And as
Controversies are of two sorts, namely of Fact, and of Law; so are
judgements, some of Fact, some of Law: And consequently in the same
controversie, there may be two Judges, one of Fact, another of Law.
And in both these controversies, there may arise a controversie between
the party Judged, and the Judge; which because they be both Subjects to
the Soveraign, ought in Equity to be Judged by men agreed on by consent
of both; for no man can be Judge in his own cause. But the Soveraign is
already agreed on for Judge by them both, and is therefore either to heare
the Cause, and determine it himself, or appoint for Judge such as they
shall both agree on. And this agreement is then understood to be made
between them divers wayes; as first, if the Defendant be allowed to except
against such of his Judges, whose interest maketh him suspect them, (for
as to the Complaynant he hath already chosen his own Judge,) those which
he excepteth not against, are Judges he himself agrees on. Secondly, if he
appeale to any other Judge, he can appeale no further; for his appeale is his
choice. Thirdly, if he appeale to the Soveraign himself, and he by himself,
or by Delegates which the parties shall agree on, give Sentence; that
Sentence is finall: for the Defendant is Judged by his own Judges, that is to
say, by himself.
These properties of just and rationall Judicature considered, I cannot
forbeare to observe the excellent constitution of the Courts of Justice,
established both for Common, and also for Publique Pleas in England. By
Common Pleas, I meane those, where both the Complaynant and
Defendant are Subjects: and by Publique, (which are also called Pleas of
the Crown) those, where the Complaynant is the Soveraign. For whereas
there were two orders of men, whereof one was Lords, the other
Commons; The Lords had this Priviledge, to have for Judges in all Capitall

crimes, none but Lords; and of them, as many as would be present; which
being ever acknowledged as a Priviledge of favour, their Judges were none
but such as they had themselves desired. And in all controversies, every
Subject (as also in civill controversies the Lords) had for Judges, men of
the Country where the matter in controversie lay; against which he might
make his exceptions, till at last Twelve men without exception being
agreed on, they were Judged by those twelve. So that having his own
Judges, there could be nothing alledged by the party, why the sentence
should not be finall, These publique persons, with Authority from the
Soveraign Power, either to Instruct, or Judge the people, are such members
of the Common-wealth, as may fitly be compared to the organs of Voice in
a Body naturall.

For Execution
Publique Ministers are also all those, that have Authority from the
Soveraign, to procure the Execution of Judgements given; to publish the
Soveraigns Commands; to suppresse Tumults; to apprehend, and imprison
Malefactors; and other acts tending to the conservation of the Peace. For
every act they doe by such Authority, is the act of the Common-wealth;
and their service, answerable to that of the Hands, in a Bodie naturall.
Publique Ministers abroad, are those that represent the Person of their
own Soveraign, to forraign States. Such are Ambassadors, Messengers,
Agents, and Heralds, sent by publique Authoritie, and on publique
Businesse.
But such as are sent by Authoritie only of some private partie of a
troubled State, though they be received, are neither Publique, nor Private
Ministers of the Common-wealth; because none of their actions have the
Common-wealth for Author. Likewise, an Ambassador sent from a Prince,
to congratulate, condole, or to assist at a solemnity, though Authority be
Publique; yet because the businesse is Private, and belonging to him in his
naturall capacity; is a Private person. Also if a man be sent into another
Country, secretly to explore their counsels, and strength; though both the
Authority, and the Businesse be Publique; yet because there is none to take
notice of any Person in him, but his own; he is but a Private Minister; but
yet a Minister of the Common-wealth; and may be compared to an Eye in
the Body naturall. And those that are appointed to receive the Petitions or
other informations of the People, and are as it were the publique Eare, are
Publique Ministers, and represent their Soveraign in that office.

Counsellers Without Other Employment Then To
Advise
Are Not Publique Ministers
Neither a Counsellor, nor a Councell of State, if we consider it with no
Authority of Judicature or Command, but only of giving Advice to the
Soveraign when it is required, or of offering it when it is not required, is a
Publique Person. For the Advice is addressed to the Soveraign only, whose
person cannot in his own presence, be represented to him, by another. But
a Body of Counsellors, are never without some other Authority, either of
Judicature, or of immediate Administration: As in a Monarchy, they
represent the Monarch, in delivering his Commands to the Publique
Ministers: In a Democracy, the Councell, or Senate propounds the Result
of their deliberations to the people, as a Councell; but when they appoint
Judges, or heare Causes, or give Audience to Ambassadors, it is in the
quality of a Minister of the People: And in an Aristocracy the Councell of
State is the Soveraign Assembly it self; and gives counsell to none but
themselves.

CHAPTER XXIV. OF THE NUTRITION, AND
PROCREATION OF A COMMON-WEALTH
The Nourishment Of A Common-wealth Consisteth In The
Commodities
Of Sea And Land
The NUTRITION of a Common-wealth consisteth, in the Plenty, and
Distribution of Materials conducing to Life: In Concoction, or
Preparation; and (when concocted) in the Conveyance of it, by convenient
conduits, to the Publique use.
As for the Plenty of Matter, it is a thing limited by Nature, to those
commodities, which from (the two breasts of our common Mother) Land,
and Sea, God usually either freely giveth, or for labour selleth to mankind.
For the Matter of this Nutriment, consisting in Animals, Vegetals, and
Minerals, God hath freely layd them before us, in or neer to the face of the
Earth; so as there needeth no more but the labour, and industry of
receiving them. Insomuch as Plenty dependeth (next to Gods favour)
meerly on the labour and industry of men.
This Matter, commonly called Commodities, is partly Native, and partly
Forraign: Native, that which is to be had within the Territory of the
Common-wealth; Forraign, that which is imported from without. And
because there is no Territory under the Dominion of one Common-wealth,
(except it be of very vast extent,) that produceth all things needfull for the
maintenance, and motion of the whole Body; and few that produce not
something more than necessary; the superfluous commodities to be had
within, become no more superfluous, but supply these wants at home, by
importation of that which may be had abroad, either by Exchange, or by
just Warre, or by Labour: for a mans Labour also, is a commodity
exchangeable for benefit, as well as any other thing: And there have been
Common-wealths that having no more Territory, than hath served them for
habitation, have neverthelesse, not onely maintained, but also encreased
their Power, partly by the labour of trading from one place to another, and

partly by selling the Manifactures, whereof the Materials were brought in
from other places.

And The Right Of Distribution Of Them
The Distribution of the Materials of this Nourishment, is the
constitution of Mine, and Thine, and His, that is to say, in one word
Propriety; and belongeth in all kinds of Common-wealth to the Soveraign
Power. For where there is no Common-wealth, there is, (as hath been
already shewn) a perpetuall warre of every man against his neighbour;
And therefore every thing is his that getteth it, and keepeth it by force;
which is neither Propriety nor Community; but Uncertainty. Which is so
evident, that even Cicero, (a passionate defender of Liberty,) in a publique
pleading, attributeth all Propriety to the Law Civil, "Let the Civill Law,"
saith he, "be once abandoned, or but negligently guarded, (not to say
oppressed,) and there is nothing, that any man can be sure to receive from
his Ancestor, or leave to his Children." And again; "Take away the Civill
Law, and no man knows what is his own, and what another mans." Seeing
therefore the Introduction of Propriety is an effect of Common-wealth;
which can do nothing but by the Person that Represents it, it is the act
onely of the Soveraign; and consisteth in the Lawes, which none can make
that have not the Soveraign Power. And this they well knew of old, who
called that Nomos, (that is to say, Distribution,) which we call Law; and
defined Justice, by distributing to every man his own.

All Private Estates Of Land Proceed Originally
From The Arbitrary Distribution Of The Soveraign
In this Distribution, the First Law, is for Division of the Land it selfe:
wherein the Soveraign assigneth to every man a portion, according as he,
and not according as any Subject, or any number of them, shall judge
agreeable to Equity, and the Common Good. The Children of Israel, were a
Common-wealth in the Wildernesse; but wanted the commodities of the
Earth, till they were masters of the Land of Promise; which afterward was
divided amongst them, not by their own discretion, but by the discretion of
Eleazar the Priest, and Joshua their Generall: who when there were twelve
Tribes, making them thirteen by subdivision of the Tribe of Joseph; made
neverthelesse but twelve portions of the Land; and ordained for the Tribe
of Levi no land; but assigned them the Tenth part of the whole fruits;
which division was therefore Arbitrary. And though a People comming
into possession of a land by warre, do not alwaies exterminate the antient
Inhabitants, (as did the Jewes,) but leave to many, or most, or all of them
their Estates; yet it is manifest they hold them afterwards, as of the Victors
distribution; as the people of England held all theirs of William the
Conquerour.

Propriety Of A Subject Excludes Not The
Dominion Of The Soveraign,
But Onely Of Another Subject
From whence we may collect, that the Propriety which a subject hath in
his lands, consisteth in a right to exclude all other subjects from the use of
them; and not to exclude their Soveraign, be it an Assembly, or a Monarch.
For seeing the Soveraign, that is to say, the Common-wealth (whose
Person he representeth,) is understood to do nothing but in order to the
common Peace and Security, this Distribution of lands, is to be understood
as done in order to the same: And consequently, whatsoever Distribution
he shall make in prejudice thereof, is contrary to the will of every subject,
that committed his Peace, and safety to his discretion, and conscience; and
therefore by the will of every one of them, is to be reputed voyd. It is true,
that a Soveraign Monarch, or the greater part of a Soveraign Assembly,
may ordain the doing of many things in pursuit of their Passions, contrary
to their own consciences, which is a breach of trust, and of the Law of
Nature; but this is not enough to authorise any subject, either to make
warre upon, or so much as to accuse of Injustice, or any way to speak evill
of their Soveraign; because they have authorised all his actions, and in
bestowing the Soveraign Power, made them their own. But in what cases
the Commands of Soveraigns are contrary to Equity, and the Law of
Nature, is to be considered hereafter in another place.

The Publique Is Not To Be Dieted
In the Distribution of land, the Common-wealth it selfe, may be
conceived to have a portion, and possesse, and improve the same by their
Representative; and that such portion may be made sufficient, to susteine
the whole expence to the common Peace, and defence necessarily
required: Which were very true, if there could be any Representative
conceived free from humane passions, and infirmities. But the nature of
men being as it is, the setting forth of Publique Land, or of any certaine
Revenue for the Common-wealth, is in vaine; and tendeth to the
dissolution of Government, and to the condition of meere Nature, and War,
assoon as ever the Soveraign Power falleth into the hands of a Monarch, or
of an Assembly, that are either too negligent of mony, or too hazardous in
engaging the publique stock, into a long, or costly war. Common-wealths
can endure no Diet: For seeing their expence is not limited by their own
appetite, but by externall Accidents, and the appetites of their neighbours,
the Publique Riches cannot be limited by other limits, than those which
the emergent occasions shall require. And whereas in England, there were
by the Conquerour, divers Lands reserved to his own use, (besides
Forrests, and Chases, either for his recreation, or for preservation of
Woods,) and divers services reserved on the Land he gave his Subjects; yet
it seems they were not reserved for his Maintenance in his Publique, but in
his Naturall capacity: For he, and his Successors did for all that, lay
Arbitrary Taxes on all Subjects land, when they judged it necessary. Or if
those publique Lands, and Services, were ordained as a sufficient
maintenance of the Common-wealth, it was contrary to the scope of the
Institution; being (as it appeared by those ensuing Taxes) insufficient, and
(as it appeares by the late Revenue of the Crown) Subject to Alienation,
and Diminution. It is therefore in vaine, to assign a portion to the
Common-wealth; which may sell, or give it away; and does sell, and give
it away when tis done by their Representative.

The Places And Matter Of Traffique Depend, As
Their Distribution,
On The Soveraign
As the Distribution of Lands at home; so also to assigne in what places,
and for what commodities, the Subject shall traffique abroad, belongeth to
the Soveraign. For if it did belong to private persons to use their own
discretion therein, some of them would bee drawn for gaine, both to
furnish the enemy with means to hurt the Common-wealth, and hurt it
themselves, by importing such things, as pleasing mens appetites, be
neverthelesse noxious, or at least unprofitable to them. And therefore it
belongeth to the Common-wealth, (that is, to the Soveraign only,) to
approve, or disapprove both of the places, and matter of forraign
Traffique.

The Laws Of Transferring Property Belong Also
To The Soveraign
Further, seeing it is not enough to the Sustentation of a Commonwealth, that every man have a propriety in a portion of Land, or in some
few commodities, or a naturall property in some usefull art, and there is no
art in the world, but is necessary either for the being, or well being almost
of every particular man; it is necessary, that men distribute that which they
can spare, and transferre their propriety therein, mutually one to another,
by exchange, and mutuall contract. And therefore it belongeth to the
Common-wealth, (that is to say, to the Soveraign,) to appoint in what
manner, all kinds of contract between Subjects, (as buying, selling,
exchanging, borrowing, lending, letting, and taking to hire,) are to bee
made; and by what words, and signes they shall be understood for valid.
And for the Matter, and Distribution of the Nourishment, to the severall
Members of the Common-wealth, thus much (considering the modell of
the whole worke) is sufficient.

Mony The Bloud Of A Common-wealth
By Concoction, I understand the reducing of all commodities, which are
not presently consumed, but reserved for Nourishment in time to come, to
some thing of equal value, and withall so portably, as not to hinder the
motion of men from place to place; to the end a man may have in what
place soever, such Nourishment as the place affordeth. And this is nothing
else but Gold, and Silver, and Mony. For Gold and Silver, being (as it
happens) almost in all Countries of the world highly valued, is a
commodious measure for the value of all things else between Nations; and
Mony (of what matter soever coyned by the Soveraign of a Commonwealth,) is a sufficient measure of the value of all things else, between the
Subjects of that Common-wealth. By the means of which measures, all
commodities, Moveable, and Immoveable, are made to accompany a man,
to all places of his resort, within and without the place of his ordinary
residence; and the same passeth from Man to Man, within the Commonwealth; and goes round about, Nourishing (as it passeth) every part
thereof; In so much as this Concoction, is as it were the Sanguification of
the Common-wealth: For naturall Bloud is in like manner made of the
fruits of the Earth; and circulating, nourisheth by the way, every Member
of the Body of Man.
And because Silver and Gold, have their value from the matter it self;
they have first this priviledge, that the value of them cannot be altered by
the power of one, nor of a few Common-wealths; as being a common
measure of the commodities of all places. But base Mony, may easily be
enhanced, or abased. Secondly, they have the priviledge to make Commonwealths, move, and stretch out their armes, when need is, into forraign
Countries; and supply, not only private Subjects that travell, but also
whole Armies with provision. But that Coyne, which is not considerable
for the Matter, but for the Stamp of the place, being unable to endure
change of ayr, hath its effect at home only; where also it is subject to the
change of Laws, and thereby to have the value diminished, to the prejudice
many times of those that have it.

The Conduits And Way Of Mony To The Publique
Use
The Conduits, and Wayes by which it is conveyed to the Publique use,
are of two sorts; One, that Conveyeth it to the Publique Coffers; The other,
that Issueth the same out againe for publique payments. Of the first sort,
are Collectors, Receivers, and Treasurers; of the second are the Treasurers
againe, and the Officers appointed for payment of severall publique or
private Ministers. And in this also, the Artificiall Man maintains his
resemblance with the Naturall; whose Veins receiving the Bloud from the
severall Parts of the Body, carry it to the Heart; where being made Vitall,
the Heart by the Arteries sends it out again, to enliven, and enable for
motion all the Members of the same.

The Children Of A Common-wealth Colonies
The Procreation, or Children of a Common-wealth, are those we call
Plantations, or Colonies; which are numbers of men sent out from the
Common-wealth, under a Conductor, or Governour, to inhabit a Forraign
Country, either formerly voyd of Inhabitants, or made voyd then, by warre.
And when a Colony is setled, they are either a Common-wealth of
themselves, discharged of their subjection to their Soveraign that sent
them, (as hath been done by many Common-wealths of antient time,) in
which case the Common-wealth from which they went was called their
Metropolis, or Mother, and requires no more of them, then Fathers require
of the Children, whom they emancipate, and make free from their
domestique government, which is Honour, and Friendship; or else they
remain united to their Metropolis, as were the Colonies of the people of
Rome; and then they are no Common-wealths themselves, but Provinces,
and parts of the Common-wealth that sent them. So that the Right of
Colonies (saving Honour, and League with their Metropolis,) dependeth
wholly on their Licence, or Letters, by which their Soveraign authorised
them to Plant.

CHAPTER XXV. OF COUNSELL

Counsell What
How fallacious it is to judge of the nature of things, by the ordinary and
inconstant use of words, appeareth in nothing more, than in the confusion
of Counsels, and Commands, arising from the Imperative manner of
speaking in them both, and in many other occasions besides. For the words
"Doe this," are the words not onely of him that Commandeth; but also of
him that giveth Counsell; and of him that Exhorteth; and yet there are but
few, that see not, that these are very different things; or that cannot
distinguish between them, when they perceive who it is that speaketh, and
to whom the Speech is directed, and upon what occasion. But finding those
phrases in mens writings, and being not able, or not willing to enter into a
consideration of the circumstances, they mistake sometimes the Precepts
of Counsellours, for the Precepts of them that command; and sometimes
the contrary; according as it best agreeth with the conclusions they would
inferre, or the actions they approve. To avoyd which mistakes, and render
to those termes of Commanding, Counselling, and Exhorting, their proper
and distinct significations, I define them thus.

Differences Between Command And Counsell
COMMAND is, where a man saith, "Doe this," or "Doe this not,"
without expecting other reason than the Will of him that sayes it. From
this it followeth manifestly, that he that Commandeth, pretendeth thereby
his own Benefit: For the reason of his Command is his own Will onely,
and the proper object of every mans Will, is some Good to himselfe.
COUNSELL, is where a man saith, "Doe" or "Doe not this," and
deduceth his own reasons from the benefit that arriveth by it to him to
whom he saith it. And from this it is evident, that he that giveth Counsell,
pretendeth onely (whatsoever he intendeth) the good of him, to whom he
giveth it.
Therefore between Counsell and Command, one great difference is, that
Command is directed to a mans own benefit; and Counsell to the benefit of
another man. And from this ariseth another difference, that a man may be
obliged to do what he is Commanded; as when he hath covenanted to obey:
But he cannot be obliged to do as he is Counselled, because the hurt of not
following it, is his own; or if he should covenant to follow it, then is the
Counsell turned into the nature of a Command. A third difference between
them is, that no man can pretend a right to be of another mans Counsell;
because he is not to pretend benefit by it to himselfe; but to demand right
to Counsell another, argues a will to know his designes, or to gain some
other Good to himselfe; which (as I said before) is of every mans will the
proper object.
This also is incident to the nature of Counsell; that whatsoever it be, he
that asketh it, cannot in equity accuse, or punish it: For to ask Counsell of
another, is to permit him to give such Counsell as he shall think best; And
consequently, he that giveth counsell to his Soveraign, (whether a
Monarch, or an Assembly) when he asketh it, cannot in equity be punished
for it, whether the same be conformable to the opinion of the most, or not,
so it be to the Proposition in debate. For if the sense of the Assembly can
be taken notice of, before the Debate be ended, they should neither ask,
nor take any further Counsell; For the Sense of the Assembly, is the
Resolution of the Debate, and End of all Deliberation. And generally he

that demandeth Counsell, is Author of it; and therefore cannot punish it;
and what the Soveraign cannot, no man else can. But if one Subject giveth
Counsell to another, to do any thing contrary to the Lawes, whether that
Counsell proceed from evill intention, or from ignorance onely, it is
punishable by the Common-wealth; because ignorance of the Law, is no
good excuse, where every man is bound to take notice of the Lawes to
which he is subject.

Exhortation And Dehortation What
EXHORTATION, and DEHORTATION, is Counsell, accompanied with
signes in him that giveth it, of vehement desire to have it followed; or to
say it more briefly, Counsell Vehemently Pressed. For he that Exhorteth,
doth not deduce the consequences of what he adviseth to be done, and tye
himselfe therein to the rigour of true reasoning; but encourages him he
Counselleth, to Action: As he that Dehorteth, deterreth him from it. And
therefore they have in their speeches, a regard to the common Passions,
and opinions of men, in deducing their reasons; and make use of
Similitudes, Metaphors, Examples, and other tooles of Oratory, to
perswade their Hearers of the Utility, Honour, or Justice of following their
advise.
From whence may be inferred, First, that Exhortation and Dehortation,
is directed to the Good of him that giveth the Counsell, not of him that
asketh it, which is contrary to the duty of a Counsellour; who (by the
definition of Counsell) ought to regard, not his own benefits, but his whom
he adviseth. And that he directeth his Counsell to his own benefit, is
manifest enough, by the long and vehement urging, or by the artificial
giving thereof; which being not required of him, and consequently
proceeding from his own occasions, is directed principally to his own
benefit, and but accidentarily to the good of him that is Counselled, or not
at all.
Secondly, that the use of Exhortation and Dehortation lyeth onely, where
a man is to speak to a Multitude; because when the Speech is addressed to
one, he may interrupt him, and examine his reasons more rigorously, than
can be done in a Multitude; which are too many to enter into Dispute, and
Dialogue with him that speaketh indifferently to them all at once. Thirdly,
that they that Exhort and Dehort, where they are required to give Counsell,
are corrupt Counsellours, and as it were bribed by their own interest. For
though the Counsell they give be never so good; yet he that gives it, is no
more a good Counsellour, than he that giveth a Just Sentence for a reward,
is a just Judge. But where a man may lawfully Command, as a Father in
his Family, or a Leader in an Army, his Exhortations and Dehortations, are

not onely lawfull, but also necessary, and laudable: But then they are no
more Counsells, but Commands; which when they are for Execution of
soure labour; sometimes necessity, and alwayes humanity requireth to be
sweetned in the delivery, by encouragement, and in the tune and phrase of
Counsell, rather then in harsher language of Command.
Examples of the difference between Command and Counsell, we may
take from the formes of Speech that expresse them in Holy Scripture.
"Have no other Gods but me; Make to thy selfe no graven Image; Take not
Gods name in vain; Sanctifie the Sabbath; Honour thy Parents; Kill not;
Steale not," &c. are Commands; because the reason for which we are to
obey them, is drawn from the will of God our King, whom we are obliged
to obey. But these words, "Sell all thou hast; give it to the poore; and
follow me," are Counsell; because the reason for which we are to do so, is
drawn from our own benefit; which is this, that we shall have "Treasure in
Heaven." These words, "Go into the village over against you, and you shall
find an Asse tyed, and her Colt; loose her, and bring her to me," are a
Command: for the reason of their fact is drawn from the will of their
Master: but these words, "Repent, and be Baptized in the Name of Jesus,"
are Counsell; because the reason why we should so do, tendeth not to any
benefit of God Almighty, who shall still be King in what manner soever we
rebell; but of our selves, who have no other means of avoyding the
punishment hanging over us for our sins.

Differences Of Fit And Unfit Counsellours
As the difference of Counsell from Command, hath been now deduced
from the nature of Counsell, consisting in a deducing of the benefit, or
hurt that may arise to him that is to be Counselled, by the necessary or
probable consequences of the action he propoundeth; so may also the
differences between apt, and inept counsellours be derived from the same.
For Experience, being but Memory of the consequences of like actions
formerly observed, and Counsell but the Speech whereby that experience
is made known to another; the Vertues, and Defects of Counsell, are the
same with the Vertues, and Defects Intellectuall: And to the Person of a
Common-wealth, his Counsellours serve him in the place of Memory, and
Mentall Discourse. But with this resemblance of the Common-wealth, to a
naturall man, there is one dissimilitude joyned, of great importance; which
is, that a naturall man receiveth his experience, from the naturall objects
of sense, which work upon him without passion, or interest of their own;
whereas they that give Counsell to the Representative person of a
Common-wealth, may have, and have often their particular ends, and
passions, that render their Counsells alwayes suspected, and many times
unfaithfull. And therefore we may set down for the first condition of a
good Counsellour, That His Ends, And Interest, Be Not Inconsistent With
The Ends And Interest Of Him He Counselleth.
Secondly, Because the office of a Counsellour, when an action comes
into deliberation, is to make manifest the consequences of it, in such
manner, as he that is Counselled may be truly and evidently informed; he
ought to propound his advise, in such forme of speech, as may make the
truth most evidently appear; that is to say, with as firme ratiocination, as
significant and proper language, and as briefly, as the evidence will
permit. And therefore Rash, And Unevident Inferences; (such as are
fetched onely from Examples, or authority of Books, and are not
arguments of what is good, or evill, but witnesses of fact, or of opinion,)
Obscure, Confused, And Ambiguous Expressions, Also All Metaphoricall
Speeches, Tending To The Stirring Up Of Passion, (because such
reasoning, and such expressions, are usefull onely to deceive, or to lead

him we Counsell towards other ends than his own) Are Repugnant To The
Office Of A Counsellour.
Thirdly, Because the Ability of Counselling proceedeth from
Experience, and long study; and no man is presumed to have experience in
all those things that to the Administration of a great Common-wealth are
necessary to be known, No Man Is Presumed To Be A Good Counsellour,
But In Such Businesse, As He Hath Not Onely Been Much Versed In, But
Hath Also Much Meditated On, And Considered. For seeing the businesse
of a Common-wealth is this, to preserve the people at home, and defend
them against forraign Invasion, we shall find, it requires great knowledge
of the disposition of Man-kind, of the Rights of Government, and of the
nature of Equity, Law, Justice, and Honour, not to be attained without
study; And of the Strength, Commodities, Places, both of their own
Country, and their Neighbours; as also of the inclinations, and designes of
all Nations that may any way annoy them. And this is not attained to,
without much experience. Of which things, not onely the whole summe,
but every one of the particulars requires the age, and observation of a man
in years, and of more than ordinary study. The wit required for Counsel, as
I have said before is Judgement. And the differences of men in that point
come from different education, of some to one kind of study, or businesse,
and of others to another. When for the doing of any thing, there be
Infallible rules, (as in Engines, and Edifices, the rules of Geometry,) all
the experience of the world cannot equall his Counsell, that has learnt, or
found out the Rule. And when there is no such Rule, he that hath most
experience in that particular kind of businesse, has therein the best
Judgement, and is the best Counsellour.
Fourthly, to be able to give Counsell to a Common-wealth, in a
businesse that hath reference to another Common-wealth, It Is Necessary
To Be Acquainted With The Intelligences, And Letters That Come From
Thence, And With All The Records Of Treaties, And Other Transactions
Of State Between Them; which none can doe, but such as the
Representative shall think fit. By which we may see, that they who are not
called to Counsell, can have no good Counsell in such cases to obtrude.
Fifthly, Supposing the number of Counsellors equall, a man is better
Counselled by hearing them apart, then in an Assembly; and that for many
causes. First, in hearing them apart, you have the advice of every man; but

in an Assembly may of them deliver their advise with I, or No, or with
their hands, or feet, not moved by their own sense, but by the eloquence of
another, or for feare of displeasing some that have spoken, or the whole
Assembly, by contradiction; or for feare of appearing duller in
apprehension, than those that have applauded the contrary opinion.
Secondly, in an Assembly of many, there cannot choose but be some whose
interests are contrary to that of the Publique; and these their Interests
make passionate, and Passion eloquent, and Eloquence drawes others into
the same advice. For the Passions of men, which asunder are moderate, as
the heat of one brand; in Assembly are like many brands, that enflame one
another, (especially when they blow one another with Orations) to the
setting of the Common-wealth on fire, under pretence of Counselling it.
Thirdly, in hearing every man apart, one may examine (when there is need)
the truth, or probability of his reasons, and of the grounds of the advise he
gives, by frequent interruptions, and objections; which cannot be done in
an Assembly, where (in every difficult question) a man is rather astonied,
and dazled with the variety of discourse upon it, than informed of the
course he ought to take. Besides, there cannot be an Assembly of many,
called together for advice, wherein there be not some, that have the
ambition to be thought eloquent, and also learned in the Politiques; and
give not their advice with care of the businesse propounded, but of the
applause of their motly orations, made of the divers colored threds, or
shreds of Authors; which is an Impertinence at least, that takes away the
time of serious Consultation, and in the secret way of Counselling apart, is
easily avoided. Fourthly, in Deliberations that ought to be kept secret,
(whereof there be many occasions in Publique Businesse,) the Counsells of
many, and especially in Assemblies, are dangerous; And therefore great
Assemblies are necessitated to commit such affaires to lesser numbers,
and of such persons as are most versed, and in whose fidelity they have
most confidence.
To conclude, who is there that so far approves the taking of Counsell
from a great Assembly of Counsellours, that wisheth for, or would accept
of their pains, when there is a question of marrying his Children, disposing
of his Lands, governing his Household, or managing his private Estate,
especially if there be amongst them such as wish not his prosperity? A
man that doth his businesse by the help of many and prudent Counsellours,
with every one consulting apart in his proper element, does it best, as he

that useth able Seconds at Tennis play, placed in their proper stations. He
does next best, that useth his own Judgement only; as he that has no
Second at all. But he that is carried up and down to his businesse in a
framed Counsell, which cannot move but by the plurality of consenting
opinions, the execution whereof is commonly (out of envy, or interest)
retarded by the part dissenting, does it worst of all, and like one that is
carried to the ball, though by good Players, yet in a Wheele-barrough, or
other frame, heavy of it self, and retarded also by the inconcurrent
judgements, and endeavours of them that drive it; and so much the more,
as they be more that set their hands to it; and most of all, when there is
one, or more amongst them, that desire to have him lose. And though it be
true, that many eys see more then one; yet it is not to be understood of
many Counsellours; but then only, when the finall Resolution is in one
man. Otherwise, because many eyes see the same thing in divers lines, and
are apt to look asquint towards their private benefit; they that desire not to
misse their marke, though they look about with two eyes, yet they never
ayme but with one; And therefore no great Popular Common-wealth was
ever kept up; but either by a forraign Enemy that united them; or by the
reputation of some one eminent Man amongst them; or by the secret
Counsell of a few; or by the mutuall feare of equall factions; and not by
the open Consultations of the Assembly. And as for very little Commonwealths, be they Popular, or Monarchicall, there is no humane wisdome
can uphold them, longer then the Jealousy lasteth of their potent
Neighbours.

CHAPTER XXVI. OF CIVILL LAWES

Civill Law what
By CIVILL LAWES, I understand the Lawes, that men are therefore
bound to observe, because they are Members, not of this, or that Commonwealth in particular, but of a Common-wealth. For the knowledge of
particular Lawes belongeth to them, that professe the study of the Lawes
of their severall Countries; but the knowledge of Civill Law in generall, to
any man. The antient Law of Rome was called their Civil Law, from the
word Civitas, which signifies a Common-wealth; And those Countries,
which having been under the Roman Empire, and governed by that Law,
retaine still such part thereof as they think fit, call that part the Civill Law,
to distinguish it from the rest of their own Civill Lawes. But that is not it I
intend to speak of here; my designe being not to shew what is Law here,
and there; but what is Law; as Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and divers others
have done, without taking upon them the profession of the study of the
Law.
And first it manifest, that Law in generall, is not Counsell, but
Command; nor a Command of any man to any man; but only of him,
whose Command is addressed to one formerly obliged to obey him. And as
for Civill Law, it addeth only the name of the person Commanding, which
is Persona Civitatis, the Person of the Common-wealth.
Which considered, I define Civill Law in this Manner. "CIVILL LAW, Is
to every Subject, those Rules, which the Common-wealth hath
Commanded him, by Word, Writing, or other sufficient Sign of the Will,
to make use of, for the Distinction of Right, and Wrong; that is to say, of
what is contrary, and what is not contrary to the Rule."
In which definition, there is nothing that is not at first sight evident. For
every man seeth, that some Lawes are addressed to all the Subjects in
generall; some to particular Provinces; some to particular Vocations; and
some to particular Men; and are therefore Lawes, to every of those to
whom the Command is directed; and to none else. As also, that Lawes are
the Rules of Just, and Unjust; nothing being reputed Unjust, that is not
contrary to some Law. Likewise, that none can make Lawes but the
Common-wealth; because our Subjection is to the Common-wealth only:

and that Commands, are to be signified by sufficient Signs; because a man
knows not otherwise how to obey them. And therefore, whatsoever can
from this definition by necessary consequence be deduced, ought to be
acknowledged for truth. Now I deduce from it this that followeth.

The Soveraign Is Legislator
1. The Legislator in all Common-wealths, is only the Soveraign, be he
one Man, as in a Monarchy, or one Assembly of men, as in a Democracy,
or Aristocracy. For the Legislator, is he that maketh the Law. And the
Common-wealth only, praescribes, and commandeth the observation of
those rules, which we call Law: Therefore the Common-wealth is the
Legislator. But the Common-wealth is no Person, nor has capacity to doe
any thing, but by the Representative, (that is, the Soveraign;) and therefore
the Soveraign is the sole Legislator. For the same reason, none can
abrogate a Law made, but the Soveraign; because a Law is not abrogated,
but by another Law, that forbiddeth it to be put in execution.

And Not Subject To Civill Law
2. The Soveraign of a Common-wealth, be it an Assembly, or one Man,
is not subject to the Civill Lawes. For having power to make, and repeale
Lawes, he may when he pleaseth, free himselfe from that subjection, by
repealing those Lawes that trouble him, and making of new; and
consequently he was free before. For he is free, that can be free when he
will: Nor is it possible for any person to be bound to himselfe; because he
that can bind, can release; and therefore he that is bound to himselfe onely,
is not bound.

Use, A Law Not By Vertue Of Time, But Of The
Soveraigns Consent
3. When long Use obtaineth the authority of a Law, it is not the Length
of Time that maketh the Authority, but the Will of the Soveraign signified
by his silence, (for Silence is sometimes an argument of Consent;) and it
is no longer Law, then the Soveraign shall be silent therein. And therefore
if the Soveraign shall have a question of Right grounded, not upon his
present Will, but upon the Lawes formerly made; the Length of Time shal
bring no prejudice to his Right; but the question shal be judged by Equity.
For many unjust Actions, and unjust Sentences, go uncontrolled a longer
time, than any man can remember. And our Lawyers account no Customes
Law, but such as are reasonable, and that evill Customes are to be
abolished; But the Judgement of what is reasonable, and of what is to be
abolished, belongeth to him that maketh the Law, which is the Soveraign
Assembly, or Monarch.

The Law Of Nature, And The Civill Law Contain
Each Other
4. The Law of Nature, and the Civill Law, contain each other, and are of
equall extent. For the Lawes of Nature, which consist in Equity, Justice,
Gratitude, and other morall Vertues on these depending, in the condition of
meer Nature (as I have said before in the end of the 15th Chapter,) are not
properly Lawes, but qualities that dispose men to peace, and to obedience.
When a Common-wealth is once settled, then are they actually Lawes, and
not before; as being then the commands of the Common-wealth; and
therefore also Civill Lawes: for it is the Soveraign Power that obliges men
to obey them. For in the differences of private men, to declare, what is
Equity, what is Justice, and what is morall Vertue, and to make them
binding, there is need of the Ordinances of Soveraign Power, and
Punishments to be ordained for such as shall break them; which
Ordinances are therefore part of the Civill Law. The Law of Nature
therefore is a part of the Civill Law in all Common-wealths of the world.
Reciprocally also, the Civill Law is a part of the Dictates of Nature. For
Justice, that is to say, Performance of Covenant, and giving to every man
his own, is a Dictate of the Law of Nature. But every subject in a
Common-wealth, hath covenanted to obey the Civill Law, (either one with
another, as when they assemble to make a common Representative, or with
the Representative it selfe one by one, when subdued by the Sword they
promise obedience, that they may receive life;) And therefore Obedience
to the Civill Law is part also of the Law of Nature. Civill, and Naturall
Law are not different kinds, but different parts of Law; whereof one part
being written, is called Civill, the other unwritten, Naturall. But the Right
of Nature, that is, the naturall Liberty of man, may by the Civill Law be
abridged, and restrained: nay, the end of making Lawes, is no other, but
such Restraint; without the which there cannot possibly be any Peace. And
Law was brought into the world for nothing else, but to limit the naturall
liberty of particular men, in such manner, as they might not hurt, but assist
one another, and joyn together against a common Enemy.

Provinciall Lawes Are Not Made By Custome, But
By The Soveraign Power
5. If the Soveraign of one Common-wealth, subdue a people that have
lived under other written Lawes, and afterwards govern them by the same
Lawes, by which they were governed before; yet those Lawes are the Civill
Lawes of the Victor, and not of the Vanquished Common-wealth, For the
Legislator is he, not by whose authority the Lawes were first made, but by
whose authority they now continue to be Lawes. And therefore where there
be divers Provinces, within the Dominion of a Common-wealth, and in
those Provinces diversity of Lawes, which commonly are called the
Customes of each severall Province, we are not to understand that such
Customes have their Force, onely from Length of Time; but that they were
antiently Lawes written, or otherwise made known, for the Constitutions,
and Statutes of their Soveraigns; and are now Lawes, not by vertue of the
Praescription of time, but by the Constitutions of their present Soveraigns.
But if an unwritten Law, in all the Provinces of a Dominion, shall be
generally observed, and no iniquity appear in the use thereof; that law can
be no other but a Law of Nature, equally obliging all man-kind.

Some Foolish Opinions Of Lawyers Concerning
The Making Of Lawes
6. Seeing then all Lawes, written, and unwritten, have their Authority,
and force, from the Will of the Common-wealth; that is to say, from the
Will of the Representative; which in a Monarchy is the Monarch, and in
other Common-wealths the Soveraign Assembly; a man may wonder from
whence proceed such opinions, as are found in the Books of Lawyers of
eminence in severall Common-wealths, directly, or by consequence
making the Legislative Power depend on private men, or subordinate
Judges. As for example, "That the Common Law, hath no Controuler but
the Parlament;" which is true onely where a Parlament has the Soveraign
Power, and cannot be assembled, nor dissolved, but by their own
discretion. For if there be a right in any else to dissolve them, there is a
right also to controule them, and consequently to controule their
controulings. And if there be no such right, then the Controuler of Lawes
is not Parlamentum, but Rex In Parlamento. And where a Parlament is
Soveraign, if it should assemble never so many, or so wise men, from the
Countries subject to them, for whatsoever cause; yet there is no man will
believe, that such an Assembly hath thereby acquired to themselves a
Legislative Power. Item, that the two arms of a Common-wealth, are
Force, and Justice; The First Whereof Is In The King; The Other Deposited
In The Hands Of The Parlament. As if a Common-wealth could consist,
where the Force were in any hand, which Justice had not the Authority to
command and govern.
7. That Law can never be against Reason, our Lawyers are agreed; and
that not the Letter,(that is, every construction of it,) but that which is
according to the Intention of the Legislator, is the Law. And it is true: but
the doubt is, of whose Reason it is, that shall be received for Law. It is not
meant of any private Reason; for then there would be as much
contradiction in the Lawes, as there is in the Schooles; nor yet (as Sr. Ed,
Coke makes it (Sir Edward Coke, upon Littleton Lib.2. Ch.6 fol 97.b),) an
Artificiall Perfection of Reason, Gotten By Long Study, Observation, And
Experience, (as his was.) For it is possible long study may encrease, and

confirm erroneous Sentences: and where men build on false grounds, the
more they build, the greater is the ruine; and of those that study, and
observe with equall time, and diligence, the reasons and resolutions are,
and must remain discordant: and therefore it is not that Juris Prudentia, or
wisedome of subordinate Judges; but the Reason of this our Artificiall
Man the Common-wealth, and his Command, that maketh Law: And the
Common-wealth being in their Representative but one Person, there
cannot easily arise any contradiction in the Lawes; and when there doth,
the same Reason is able, by interpretation, or alteration, to take it away. In
all Courts of Justice, the Soveraign (which is the Person of the Commonwealth,) is he that Judgeth: The subordinate Judge, ought to have regard to
the reason, which moved his Soveraign to make such Law, that his
Sentence may be according thereunto; which then is his Soveraigns
Sentence; otherwise it is his own, and an unjust one.

Law Made, If Not Also Made Known, Is No Law
8. From this, that the Law is a Command, and a Command consisteth in
declaration, or manifestation of the will of him that commandeth, by
voyce, writing, or some other sufficient argument of the same, we may
understand, that the Command of the Common-wealth, is Law onely to
those, that have means to take notice of it. Over naturall fooles, children,
or mad-men there is no Law, no more than over brute beasts; nor are they
capable of the title of just, or unjust; because they had never power to
make any covenant, or to understand the consequences thereof; and
consequently never took upon them to authorise the actions of any
Soveraign, as they must do that make to themselves a Common-wealth.
And as those from whom Nature, or Accident hath taken away the notice
of all Lawes in generall; so also every man, from whom any accident, not
proceeding from his own default, hath taken away the means to take notice
of any particular Law, is excused, if he observe it not; And to speak
properly, that Law is no Law to him. It is therefore necessary, to consider
in this place, what arguments, and signes be sufficient for the knowledge
of what is the Law; that is to say, what is the will of the Soveraign, as well
in Monarchies, as in other formes of government.

Unwritten Lawes Are All Of Them Lawes Of
Nature
And first, if it be a Law that obliges all the Subjects without exception,
and is not written, nor otherwise published in such places as they may take
notice thereof, it is a Law of Nature. For whatsoever men are to take
knowledge of for Law, not upon other mens words, but every one from his
own reason, must be such as is agreeable to the reason of all men; which
no Law can be, but the Law of Nature. The Lawes of Nature therefore need
not any publishing, nor Proclamation; as being contained in this one
Sentence, approved by all the world, "Do not that to another, which thou
thinkest unreasonable to be done by another to thy selfe."
Secondly, if it be a Law that obliges only some condition of men, or one
particular man and be not written, nor published by word, then also it is a
Law of Nature; and known by the same arguments, and signs, that
distinguish those in such a condition, from other Subjects. For whatsoever
Law is not written, or some way published by him that makes it Law, can
be known no way, but by the reason of him that is to obey it; and is
therefore also a Law not only Civill, but Naturall. For example, if the
Soveraign employ a Publique Minister, without written Instructions what
to doe; he is obliged to take for Instructions the Dictates of Reason; As if
he make a Judge, The Judge is to take notice, that his Sentence ought to be
according to the reason of his Soveraign, which being alwaies understood
to be Equity, he is bound to it by the Law of Nature: Or if an Ambassador,
he is (in al things not conteined in his written Instructions) to take for
Instruction that which Reason dictates to be most conducing to his
Soveraigns interest; and so of all other Ministers of the Soveraignty,
publique and private. All which Instructions of naturall Reason may be
comprehended under one name of Fidelity; which is a branch of naturall
Justice.
The Law of Nature excepted, it belongeth to the essence of all other
Lawes, to be made known, to every man that shall be obliged to obey
them, either by word, or writing, or some other act, known to proceed from

the Soveraign Authority. For the will of another, cannot be understood, but
by his own word, or act, or by conjecture taken from his scope and
purpose; which in the person of the Common-wealth, is to be supposed
alwaies consonant to Equity and Reason. And in antient time, before
letters were in common use, the Lawes were many times put into verse;
that the rude people taking pleasure in singing, or reciting them, might the
more easily reteine them in memory. And for the same reason Solomon
adviseth a man, to bind the ten Commandements (Prov. 7. 3) upon his ten
fingers. And for the Law which Moses gave to the people of Israel at the
renewing of the Covenant, (Deut. 11. 19) he biddeth them to teach it their
Children, by discoursing of it both at home, and upon the way; at going to
bed, and at rising from bed; and to write it upon the posts, and dores of
their houses; and (Deut. 31. 12) to assemble the people, man, woman, and
child, to heare it read.

Nothing Is Law Where The Legislator Cannot Be
Known
Nor is it enough the Law be written, and published; but also that there
be manifest signs, that it proceedeth from the will of the Soveraign. For
private men, when they have, or think they have force enough to secure
their unjust designes, and convoy them safely to their ambitious ends, may
publish for Lawes what they please, without, or against the Legislative
Authority. There is therefore requisite, not only a Declaration of the Law,
but also sufficient signes of the Author, and Authority. The Author, or
Legislator is supposed in every Common-wealth to be evident, because he
is the Soveraign, who having been Constituted by the consent of every one,
is supposed by every one to be sufficiently known. And though the
ignorance, and security of men be such, for the most part, as that when the
memory of the first Constitution of their Common-wealth is worn out,
they doe not consider, by whose power they use to be defended against
their enemies, and to have their industry protected, and to be righted when
injury is done them; yet because no man that considers, can make question
of it, no excuse can be derived from the ignorance of where the
Soveraignty is placed. And it is a Dictate of Naturall Reason, and
consequently an evident Law of Nature, that no man ought to weaken that
power, the protection whereof he hath himself demanded, or wittingly
received against others. Therefore of who is Soveraign, no man, but by his
own fault, (whatsoever evill men suggest,) can make any doubt. The
difficulty consisteth in the evidence of the Authority derived from him;
The removing whereof, dependeth on the knowledge of the publique
Registers, publique Counsels, publique Ministers, and publique Seales; by
which all Lawes are sufficiently verified.

Difference Between Verifying And Authorising
Verifyed, I say, not Authorised: for the Verification, is but the Testimony
and Record; not the Authority of the law; which consisteth in the
Command of the Soveraign only.

The Law Verifyed By The Subordinate Judge
If therefore a man have a question of Injury, depending on the Law of
Nature; that is to say, on common Equity; the Sentence of the Judge, that
by Commission hath Authority to take cognisance of such causes, is a
sufficient Verification of the Law of Nature in that individuall case. For
though the advice of one that professeth the study of the Law, be usefull
for the avoyding of contention; yet it is but advice; tis the Judge must tell
men what is Law, upon the hearing of the Controversy.

By The Publique Registers
But when the question is of injury, or crime, upon a written Law; every
man by recourse to the Registers, by himself, or others, may (if he will) be
sufficiently enformed, before he doe such injury, or commit the crime,
whither it be an injury, or not: Nay he ought to doe so: for when a man
doubts whether the act he goeth about, be just, or injust; and may informe
himself, if he will; the doing is unlawfull. In like manner, he that
supposeth himself injured, in a case determined by the written Law, which
he may by himself, or others see and consider; if he complaine before he
consults with the Law, he does unjustly, and bewrayeth a disposition rather
to vex other men, than to demand his own right.

By Letters Patent, And Publique Seale
If the question be of Obedience to a publique Officer; To have seen his
Commission, with the Publique Seale, and heard it read; or to have had the
means to be informed of it, if a man would, is a sufficient Verification of
his Authority. For every man is obliged to doe his best endeavour, to
informe himself of all written Lawes, that may concerne his own future
actions.

The Interpretation Of The Law Dependeth On
The Soveraign Power
The Legislator known; and the Lawes, either by writing, or by the light
of Nature, sufficiently published; there wanteth yet another very materiall
circumstance to make them obligatory. For it is not the Letter, but the
Intendment, or Meaning; that is to say, the authentique Interpretation of
the Law (which is the sense of the Legislator,) in which the nature of the
Law consisteth; And therefore the Interpretation of all Lawes dependeth
on the Authority Soveraign; and the Interpreters can be none but those,
which the Soveraign, (to whom only the Subject oweth obedience) shall
appoint. For else, by the craft of an Interpreter, the Law my be made to
beare a sense, contrary to that of the Soveraign; by which means the
Interpreter becomes the Legislator.

All Lawes Need Interpretation
All Laws, written, and unwritten, have need of Interpretation. The
unwritten Law of Nature, though it be easy to such, as without partiality,
and passion, make use of their naturall reason, and therefore leaves the
violators thereof without excuse; yet considering there be very few,
perhaps none, that in some cases are not blinded by self love, or some
other passion, it is now become of all Laws the most obscure; and has
consequently the greatest need of able Interpreters. The written Laws, if
they be short, are easily mis-interpreted, from the divers significations of
a word, or two; if long, they be more obscure by the diverse significations
of many words: in so much as no written Law, delivered in few, or many
words, can be well understood, without a perfect understanding of the
finall causes, for which the Law was made; the knowledge of which finall
causes is in the Legislator. To him therefore there can not be any knot in
the Law, insoluble; either by finding out the ends, to undoe it by; or else by
making what ends he will, (as Alexander did with his sword in the Gordian
knot,) by the Legislative power; which no other Interpreter can doe.

The Authenticall Interpretation Of Law Is Not
That Of Writers
The Interpretation of the Lawes of Nature, in a Common-wealth,
dependeth not on the books of Morall Philosophy. The Authority of
writers, without the Authority of the Common-wealth, maketh not their
opinions Law, be they never so true. That which I have written in this
Treatise, concerning the Morall Vertues, and of their necessity, for the
procuring, and maintaining peace, though it bee evident Truth, is not
therefore presently Law; but because in all Common-wealths in the world,
it is part of the Civill Law: For though it be naturally reasonable; yet it is
by the Soveraigne Power that it is Law: Otherwise, it were a great errour,
to call the Lawes of Nature unwritten Law; whereof wee see so many
volumes published, and in them so many contradictions of one another,
and of themselves.

The Interpreter Of The Law Is The Judge Giving
Sentence Viva Voce
In Every Particular Case
The Interpretation of the Law of Nature, is the Sentence of the Judge
constituted by the Soveraign Authority, to heare and determine such
controversies, as depend thereon; and consisteth in the application of the
Law to the present case. For in the act of Judicature, the Judge doth no
more but consider, whither the demand of the party, be consonant to
naturall reason, and Equity; and the Sentence he giveth, is therefore the
Interpretation of the Law of Nature; which Interpretation is Authentique;
not because it is his private Sentence; but because he giveth it by
Authority of the Soveraign, whereby it becomes the Soveraigns Sentence;
which is Law for that time, to the parties pleading.

The Sentence Of A Judge, Does Not Bind Him, Or
Another Judge
To Give Like Sentence In Like Cases Ever After
But because there is no Judge Subordinate, nor Soveraign, but may erre
in a Judgement of Equity; if afterward in another like case he find it more
consonant to Equity to give a contrary Sentence, he is obliged to doe it. No
mans error becomes his own Law; nor obliges him to persist in it. Neither
(for the same reason) becomes it a Law to other Judges, though sworn to
follow it. For though a wrong Sentence given by authority of the
Soveraign, if he know and allow it, in such Lawes as are mutable, be a
constitution of a new Law, in cases, in which every little circumstance is
the same; yet in Lawes immutable, such as are the Lawes of Nature, they
are no Lawes to the same, or other Judges, in the like cases for ever after.
Princes succeed one another; and one Judge passeth, another commeth;
nay, Heaven and Earth shall passe; but not one title of the Law of Nature
shall passe; for it is the Eternall Law of God. Therefore all the Sentences
of precedent Judges that have ever been, cannot all together make a Law
contrary to naturall Equity: Nor any Examples of former Judges, can
warrant an unreasonable Sentence, or discharge the present Judge of the
trouble of studying what is Equity (in the case he is to Judge,) from the
principles of his own naturall reason. For example sake, 'Tis against the
Law of Nature, To Punish The Innocent; and Innocent is he that acquitteth
himselfe Judicially, and is acknowledged for Innocent by the Judge. Put
the case now, that a man is accused of a capitall crime, and seeing the
powers and malice of some enemy, and the frequent corruption and
partiality of Judges, runneth away for feare of the event, and afterwards is
taken, and brought to a legall triall, and maketh it sufficiently appear, he
was not guilty of the crime, and being thereof acquitted, is neverthelesse
condemned to lose his goods; this is a manifest condemnation of the
Innocent. I say therefore, that there is no place in the world, where this can
be an interpretation of a Law of Nature, or be made a Law by the
Sentences of precedent Judges, that had done the same. For he that judged

it first, judged unjustly; and no Injustice can be a pattern of Judgement to
succeeding Judges. A written Law may forbid innocent men to fly, and
they may be punished for flying: But that flying for feare of injury, should
be taken for presumption of guilt, after a man is already absolved of the
crime Judicially, is contrary to the nature of a Presumption, which hath no
place after Judgement given. Yet this is set down by a great Lawyer for the
common Law of England. "If a man," saith he, "that is Innocent, be
accused of Felony, and for feare flyeth for the same; albeit he judicially
acquitteth himselfe of the Felony; yet if it be found that he fled for the
Felony, he shall notwithstanding his Innocency, Forfeit all his goods,
chattels, debts, and duties. For as to the Forfeiture of them, the Law will
admit no proofe against the Presumption in Law, grounded upon his
flight." Here you see, An Innocent Man, Judicially Acquitted,
Notwithstanding His Innocency, (when no written Law forbad him to fly)
after his acquitall, Upon A Presumption In Law, condemned to lose all the
goods he hath. If the Law ground upon his flight a Presumption of the fact,
(which was Capitall,) the Sentence ought to have been Capitall: if the
presumption were not of the Fact, for what then ought he to lose his
goods? This therefore is no Law of England; nor is the condemnation
grounded upon a Presumption of Law, but upon the Presumption of the
Judges. It is also against Law, to say that no Proofe shall be admitted
against a Presumption of Law. For all Judges, Soveraign and subordinate,
if they refuse to heare Proofe, refuse to do Justice: for though the Sentence
be Just, yet the Judges that condemn without hearing the Proofes offered,
are Unjust Judges; and their Presumption is but Prejudice; which no man
ought to bring with him to the Seat of Justice, whatsoever precedent
judgements, or examples he shall pretend to follow. There be other things
of this nature, wherein mens Judgements have been perverted, by trusting
to Precedents: but this is enough to shew, that though the Sentence of the
Judge, be a Law to the party pleading, yet it is no Law to any Judge, that
shall succeed him in that Office.
In like manner, when question is of the Meaning of written Lawes, he is
not the Interpreter of them, that writeth a Commentary upon them. For
Commentaries are commonly more subject to cavill, than the Text; and
therefore need other Commentaries; and so there will be no end of such
Interpretation. And therefore unlesse there be an Interpreter authorised by
the Soveraign, from which the subordinate Judges are not to recede, the

Interpreter can be no other than the ordinary Judges, in the some manner,
as they are in cases of the unwritten Law; and their Sentences are to be
taken by them that plead, for Lawes in that particular case; but not to bind
other Judges, in like cases to give like judgements. For a Judge may erre in
the Interpretation even of written Lawes; but no errour of a subordinate
Judge, can change the Law, which is the generall Sentence of the
Soveraigne.

The Difference Between The Letter And Sentence
Of The Law
In written Lawes, men use to make a difference between the Letter, and
the Sentence of the Law: And when by the Letter, is meant whatsoever can
be gathered from the bare words, 'tis well distinguished. For the
significations of almost all words, are either in themselves, or in the
metaphoricall use of them, ambiguous; and may be drawn in argument, to
make many senses; but there is onely one sense of the Law. But if by the
Letter, be meant the Literall sense, then the Letter, and the Sentence or
intention of the Law, is all one. For the literall sense is that, which the
Legislator is alwayes supposed to be Equity: For it were a great contumely
for a Judge to think otherwise of the Soveraigne. He ought therefore, if the
Word of the Law doe not fully authorise a reasonable Sentence, to supply
it with the Law of Nature; or if the case be difficult, to respit Judgement
till he have received more ample authority. For Example, a written Law
ordaineth, that he which is thrust out of his house by force, shall be
restored by force: It happens that a man by negligence leaves his house
empty, and returning is kept out by force, in which case there is no speciall
Law ordained. It is evident, that this case is contained in the same Law: for
else there is no remedy for him at all; which is to be supposed against the
Intention of the Legislator. Again, the word of the Law, commandeth to
Judge according to the Evidence: A man is accused falsly of a fact, which
the Judge saw himself done by another; and not by him that is accused. In
this case neither shall the Letter of the Law be followed to the
condemnation of the Innocent, nor shall the Judge give Sentence against
the evidence of the Witnesses; because the Letter of the Law is to the
contrary: but procure of the Soveraign that another be made Judge, and
himselfe Witnesse. So that the incommodity that follows the bare words of
a written Law, may lead him to the Intention of the Law, whereby to
interpret the same the better; though no Incommodity can warrant a
Sentence against the Law. For every Judge of Right, and Wrong, is not
Judge of what is Commodious, or Incommodious to the Common-wealth.

The Abilities Required In A Judge
The abilities required in a good Interpreter of the Law, that is to say, in a
good Judge, are not the same with those of an Advocate; namely the study
of the Lawes. For a Judge, as he ought to take notice of the Fact, from
none but the Witnesses; so also he ought to take notice of the Law, from
nothing but the Statutes, and Constitutions of the Soveraign, alledged in
the pleading, or declared to him by some that have authority from the
Soveraign Power to declare them; and need not take care before-hand,
what hee shall Judge; for it shall bee given him what hee shall say
concerning the Fact, by Witnesses; and what hee shall say in point of Law,
from those that shall in their pleadings shew it, and by authority interpret
it upon the place. The Lords of Parlament in England were Judges, and
most difficult causes have been heard and determined by them; yet few of
them were much versed in the study of the Lawes, and fewer had made
profession of them: and though they consulted with Lawyers, that were
appointed to be present there for that purpose; yet they alone had the
authority of giving Sentence. In like manner, in the ordinary trialls of
Right, Twelve men of the common People, are the Judges, and give
Sentence, not onely of the Fact, but of the Right; and pronounce simply for
the Complaynant, or for the Defendant; that is to say, are Judges not onely
of the Fact, but also of the Right: and in a question of crime, not onely
determine whether done, or not done; but also whether it be Murder,
Homicide, Felony, Assault, and the like, which are determinations of Law:
but because they are not supposed to know the Law of themselves, there is
one that hath Authority to enforme them of it, in the particular case they
are to Judge of. But yet if they judge not according to that he tells them,
they are not subject thereby to any penalty; unlesse it be made appear, they
did it against their consciences, or had been corrupted by reward. The
things that make a good Judge, or good Interpreter of the Lawes, are, first
A Right Understanding of that principall Law of Nature called Equity;
which depending not on the reading of other mens Writings, but on the
goodnesse of a mans own naturall Reason, and Meditation, is presumed to
be in those most, that have had most leisure, and had the most inclination

to meditate thereon. Secondly, Contempt Of Unnecessary Riches, and
Preferments. Thirdly, To Be Able In Judgement To Devest Himselfe Of All
Feare, Anger, Hatred, Love, And Compassion. Fourthly, and lastly,
Patience To Heare; Diligent Attention In Hearing; And Memory To Retain,
Digest And Apply What He Hath Heard.

Divisions Of Law
The difference and division of the Lawes, has been made in divers
manners, according to the different methods, of those men that have
written of them. For it is a thing that dependeth not on Nature, but on the
scope of the Writer; and is subservient to every mans proper method. In
the Institutions of Justinian, we find seven sorts of Civill Lawes.
1. The Edicts, Constitutions, and Epistles Of The Prince, that is, of the
Emperour; because the whole power of the people was in him. Like these,
are the Proclamations of the Kings of England.
2. The Decrees Of The Whole People Of Rome (comprehending the
Senate,) when they were put to the Question by the Senate. These were
Lawes, at first, by the vertue of the Soveraign Power residing in the
people; and such of them as by the Emperours were not abrogated,
remained Lawes by the Authority Imperiall. For all Lawes that bind, are
understood to be Lawes by his authority that has power to repeale them.
Somewhat like to these Lawes, are the Acts of Parliament in England.
3. The Decrees Of The Common People (excluding the Senate,) when
they were put to the question by the Tribune of the people. For such of
them as were not abrogated by the Emperours, remained Lawes by the
Authority Imperiall. Like to these, were the Orders of the House of
Commons in England.
4. Senatus Consulta, the Orders Of The Senate; because when the people
of Rome grew so numerous, as it was inconvenient to assemble them; it
was thought fit by the Emperour, that men should Consult the Senate in
stead of the people: And these have some resemblance with the Acts of
Counsell.
5. The Edicts Of Praetors, and (in some Cases) of the Aediles: such as
are the Chiefe Justices in the Courts of England.
6. Responsa Prudentum; which were the Sentences, and Opinions of
those Lawyers, to whom the Emperour gave Authority to interpret the Law,
and to give answer to such as in matter of Law demanded their advice;
which Answers, the Judges in giving Judgement were obliged by the

Constitutions of the Emperour to observe; And should be like the Reports
of Cases Judged, if other Judges be by the Law of England bound to
observe them. For the Judges of the Common Law of England, are not
properly Judges, but Juris Consulti; of whom the Judges, who are either
the Lords, or Twelve men of the Country, are in point of Law to ask advice.
7. Also, Unwritten Customes, (which in their own nature are an
imitation of Law,) by the tacite consent of the Emperour, in case they be
not contrary to the Law of Nature, are very Lawes.
Another division of Lawes, is into Naturall and Positive. Naturall are
those which have been Lawes from all Eternity; and are called not onely
Naturall, but also Morall Lawes; consisting in the Morall Vertues, as
Justice, Equity, and all habits of the mind that conduce to Peace, and
Charity; of which I have already spoken in the fourteenth and fifteenth
Chapters.
Positive, are those which have not been for Eternity; but have been
made Lawes by the Will of those that have had the Soveraign Power over
others; and are either written, or made known to men, by some other
argument of the Will of their Legislator.

Another Division Of Law
Again, of Positive Lawes some are Humane, some Divine; And of
Humane positive lawes, some are Distributive, some Penal. Distributive
are those that determine the Rights of the Subjects, declaring to every man
what it is, by which he acquireth and holdeth a propriety in lands, or
goods, and a right or liberty of action; and these speak to all the Subjects.
Penal are those, which declare, what Penalty shall be inflicted on those
that violate the Law; and speak to the Ministers and Officers ordained for
execution. For though every one ought to be informed of the Punishments
ordained beforehand for their transgression; neverthelesse the Command
is not addressed to the Delinquent, (who cannot be supposed will faithfully
punish himselfe,) but to publique Ministers appointed to see the Penalty
executed. And these Penal Lawes are for the most part written together
with the Lawes Distributive; and are sometimes called Judgements. For all
Lawes are generall judgements, or Sentences of the Legislator; as also
every particular Judgement, is a Law to him, whose case is Judged.

Divine Positive Law How Made Known To Be Law
Divine Positive Lawes (for Naturall Lawes being Eternall, and
Universall, are all Divine,) are those, which being the Commandements of
God, (not from all Eternity, nor universally addressed to all men, but onely
to a certain people, or to certain persons,) are declared for such, by those
whom God hath authorised to declare them. But this Authority of man to
declare what be these Positive Lawes of God, how can it be known? God
may command a man by a supernaturall way, to deliver Lawes to other
men. But because it is of the essence of Law, that he who is to be obliged,
be assured of the Authority of him that declareth it, which we cannot
naturally take notice to be from God, How Can A Man Without
Supernaturall Revelation Be Assured Of The Revelation Received By The
Declarer? and How Can He Be Bound To Obey Them? For the first
question, how a man can be assured of the Revelation of another, without a
Revelation particularly to himselfe, it is evidently impossible: for though
a man may be induced to believe such Revelation, from the Miracles they
see him doe, or from seeing the Extraordinary sanctity of his life, or from
seeing the Extraordinary wisedome, or Extraordinary felicity of his
Actions, all which are marks of Gods extraordinary favour; yet they are
not assured evidence of speciall Revelation. Miracles are Marvellous
workes: but that which is marvellous to one, may not be so to another.
Sanctity may be feigned; and the visible felicities of this world, are most
often the work of God by Naturall, and ordinary causes. And therefore no
man can infallibly know by naturall reason, that another has had a
supernaturall revelation of Gods will; but only a beliefe; every one (as the
signs thereof shall appear greater, or lesser) a firmer, or a weaker belief.
But for the second, how he can be bound to obey them; it is not so hard.
For if the Law declared, be not against the Law of Nature (which is
undoubtedly Gods Law) and he undertake to obey it, he is bound by his
own act; bound I say to obey it, but not bound to believe it: for mens
beliefe, and interiour cogitations, are not subject to the commands, but
only to the operation of God, ordinary, or extraordinary. Faith of
Supernaturall Law, is not a fulfilling, but only an assenting to the same;

and not a duty that we exhibite to God, but a gift which God freely giveth
to whom he pleaseth; as also Unbelief is not a breach of any of his Lawes;
but a rejection of them all, except the Lawes Naturall. But this that I say,
will be made yet cleerer, by the Examples, and Testimonies concerning
this point in holy Scripture. The Covenant God made with Abraham (in a
Supernaturall Manner) was thus, (Gen. 17. 10) "This is the Covenant
which thou shalt observe between Me and Thee and thy Seed after thee."
Abrahams Seed had not this revelation, nor were yet in being; yet they are
a party to the Covenant, and bound to obey what Abraham should declare
to them for Gods Law; which they could not be, but in vertue of the
obedience they owed to their Parents; who (if they be Subject to no other
earthly power, as here in the case of Abraham) have Soveraign power over
their children, and servants. Againe, where God saith to Abraham, "In thee
shall all Nations of the earth be blessed: For I know thou wilt command
thy children, and thy house after thee to keep the way of the Lord, and to
observe Righteousnesse and Judgement," it is manifest, the obedience of
his Family, who had no Revelation, depended on their former obligation to
obey their Soveraign. At Mount Sinai Moses only went up to God; the
people were forbidden to approach on paine of death; yet were they bound
to obey all that Moses declared to them for Gods Law. Upon what ground,
but on this submission of their own, "Speak thou to us, and we will heare
thee; but let not God speak to us, lest we dye?" By which two places it
sufficiently appeareth, that in a Common-wealth, a subject that has no
certain and assured Revelation particularly to himself concerning the Will
of God, is to obey for such, the Command of the Common-wealth: for if
men were at liberty, to take for Gods Commandements, their own dreams,
and fancies, or the dreams and fancies of private men; scarce two men
would agree upon what is Gods Commandement; and yet in respect of
them, every man would despise the Commandements of the Commonwealth. I conclude therefore, that in all things not contrary to the Morall
Law, (that is to say, to the Law of Nature,) all Subjects are bound to obey
that for divine Law, which is declared to be so, by the Lawes of the
Common-wealth. Which also is evident to any mans reason; for
whatsoever is not against the Law of Nature, may be made Law in the
name of them that have the Soveraign power; and there is no reason men
should be the lesse obliged by it, when tis propounded in the name of God.
Besides, there is no place in the world where men are permitted to pretend

other Commandements of God, than are declared for such by the
Common-wealth. Christian States punish those that revolt from Christian
Religion, and all other States, those that set up any Religion by them
forbidden. For in whatsoever is not regulated by the Common-wealth, tis
Equity (which is the Law of Nature, and therefore an eternall Law of God)
that every man equally enjoy his liberty.

Another Division Of Lawes
There is also another distinction of Laws, into Fundamentall, and Not
Fundamentall: but I could never see in any Author, what a Fundamentall
Law signifieth. Neverthelesse one may very reasonably distinguish Laws
in that manner.

A Fundamentall Law What
For a Fundamentall Law in every Common-wealth is that, which being
taken away, the Common-wealth faileth, and is utterly dissolved; as a
building whose Foundation is destroyed. And therefore a Fundamentall
Law is that, by which Subjects are bound to uphold whatsoever power is
given to the Soveraign, whether a Monarch, or a Soveraign Assembly,
without which the Common-wealth cannot stand, such as is the power of
War and Peace, of Judicature, of Election of Officers, and of doing
whatsoever he shall think necessary for the Publique good. Not
Fundamentall is that the abrogating whereof, draweth not with it the
dissolution of the Common-Wealth; such as are the Lawes Concerning
Controversies between subject and subject. Thus much of the Division of
Lawes.

Difference Between Law And Right
I find the words Lex Civilis, and Jus Civile, that is to say, Law and Right
Civil, promiscuously used for the same thing, even in the most learned
Authors; which neverthelesse ought not to be so. For Right is Liberty,
namely that Liberty which the Civil Law leaves us: But Civill Law is an
Obligation; and takes from us the Liberty which the Law of Nature gave
us. Nature gave a Right to every man to secure himselfe by his own
strength, and to invade a suspected neighbour, by way of prevention; but
the Civill Law takes away that Liberty, in all cases where the protection of
the Lawe may be safely stayd for. Insomuch as Lex and Jus, are as
different as Obligation and Liberty.

And Between A Law And A Charter
Likewise Lawes and Charters are taken promiscuously for the same
thing. Yet Charters are Donations of the Soveraign; and not Lawes, but
exemptions from Law. The phrase of a Law is Jubeo, Injungo, I Command,
and Enjoyn: the phrase of a Charter is Dedi, Concessi, I Have Given, I
Have Granted: but what is given or granted, to a man, is not forced upon
him, by a Law. A Law may be made to bind All the Subjects of a
Common-wealth: a Liberty, or Charter is only to One man, or some One
part of the people. For to say all the people of a Common-wealth, have
Liberty in any case whatsoever; is to say, that in such case, there hath been
no Law made; or else having been made, is now abrogated.

CHAPTER XXVII. OF CRIMES, EXCUSES,
AND EXTENUATIONS
Sinne What
A Sinne, is not onely a Transgression of a Law, but also any Contempt
of the Legislator. For such Contempt, is a breach of all his Lawes at once.
And therefore may consist, not onely in the Commission of a Fact, or in
the Speaking of Words by the Lawes forbidden, or in the Omission of what
the Law commandeth, but also in the Intention, or purpose to transgresse.
For the purpose to breake the Law, is some degree of Contempt of him, to
whom it belongeth to see it executed. To be delighted in the Imagination
onely, of being possessed of another mans goods, servants, or wife,
without any intention to take them from him by force, or fraud, is no
breach of the Law, that sayth, "Thou shalt not covet:" nor is the pleasure a
man my have in imagining, or dreaming of the death of him, from whose
life he expecteth nothing but dammage, and displeasure, a Sinne; but the
resolving to put some Act in execution, that tendeth thereto. For to be
pleased in the fiction of that, which would please a man if it were reall, is
a Passion so adhaerent to the Nature both of a man, and every other living
creature, as to make it a Sinne, were to make Sinne of being a man. The
consideration of this, has made me think them too severe, both to
themselves, and others, that maintain, that the First motions of the mind,
(though checked with the fear of God) be Sinnes. But I confesse it is safer
to erre on that hand, than on the other.

A Crime What
A Crime, is a sinne, consisting in the Committing (by Deed, or Word) of
that which the Law forbiddeth, or the Omission of what it hath
commanded. So that every Crime is a sinne; but not every sinne a Crime.
To intend to steale, or kill, is a sinne, though it never appeare in Word, or
Fact: for God that seeth the thoughts of man, can lay it to his charge: but
till it appear by some thing done, or said, by which the intention may be
Crime; which distinction the Greeks observed in the word amartema, and
egklema, or aitia; wherof the former, (which is translated Sinne,)
signifieth any swarving from the Law whatsoever; but the two later,
(which are translated Crime,) signifie that sinne onely, whereof one man
may accuse another. But of Intentions, which never appear by any outward
act, there is no place for humane accusation. In like manner the Latines by
Peccatum, which is Sinne, signifie all manner of deviation from the Law;
but by crimen, (which word they derive from Cerno, which signifies to
perceive,) they mean onely such sinnes, as my be made appear before a
Judge; and therfore are not meer Intentions.

Where No Civill Law Is, There Is No Crime
From this relation of Sinne to the Law, and of Crime to the Civill Law,
may be inferred, First, that where Law ceaseth, Sinne ceaseth. But because
the Law of Nature is eternall, Violation of Covenants, Ingratitude,
Arrogance, and all Facts contrary to any Morall vertue, can never cease to
be Sinne. Secondly, that the Civill Law ceasing, Crimes cease: for there
being no other Law remaining, but that of Nature, there is no place for
Accusation; every man being his own Judge, and accused onely by his own
Conscience, and cleared by the Uprightnesse of his own Intention. When
therefore his Intention is Right, his fact is no Sinne: if otherwise, his fact
is Sinne; but not Crime. Thirdly, That when the Soveraign Power ceaseth,
Crime also ceaseth: for where there is no such Power, there is no
protection to be had from the Law; and therefore every one may protect
himself by his own power: for no man in the Institution of Soveraign
Power can be supposed to give away the Right of preserving his own body;
for the safety whereof all Soveraignty was ordained. But this is to be
understood onely of those, that have not themselves contributed to the
taking away of the Power that protected them: for that was a Crime from
the beginning.

Ignorance Of The Law Of Nature Excuseth No
Man
The source of every Crime, is some defect of the Understanding; or
some errour in Reasoning, or some sudden force of the Passions. Defect in
the Understanding, is Ignorance; in Reasoning, Erroneous Opinion. Again,
ignorance is of three sort; of the Law, and of the Soveraign, and of the
Penalty. Ignorance of the Law of Nature Excuseth no man; because every
man that hath attained to the use of Reason, is supposed to know, he ought
not to do to another, what he would not have done to himselfe. Therefore
into what place soever a man shall come, if he do any thing contrary to
that Law, it is a Crime. If a man come from the Indies hither, and perswade
men here to receive a new Religion, or teach them any thing that tendeth
to disobedience of the Lawes of this Country, though he be never so well
perswaded of the truth of what he teacheth, he commits a Crime, and may
be justly punished for the same, not onely because his doctrine is false, but
also because he does that which he would not approve in another, namely,
that comming from hence, he should endeavour to alter the Religion there.
But ignorance of the Civill Law, shall Excuse a man in a strange Country,
till it be declared to him; because, till then no Civill Law is binding.

Ignorance Of The Civill Law Excuseth Sometimes
In the like manner, if the Civill Law of a mans own Country, be not so
sufficiently declared, as he may know it if he will; nor the Action against
the Law of Nature; the Ignorance is a good Excuse: In other cases
ignorance of the Civill Law, Excuseth not.

Ignorance Of The Soveraign Excuseth Not
Ignorance of the Soveraign Power, in the place of a mans ordinary
residence, Excuseth him not; because he ought to take notice of the Power,
by which he hath been protected there.

Ignorance Of The Penalty Excuseth Not
Ignorance of the Penalty, where the Law is declared, Excuseth no man:
For in breaking the Law, which without a fear of penalty to follow, were
not a Law, but vain words, he undergoeth the penalty, though he know not
what it is; because, whosoever voluntarily doth any action, accepteth all
the known consequences of it; but Punishment is a known consequence of
the violation of the Lawes, in every Common-wealth; which punishment,
if it be determined already by the Law, he is subject to that; if not, then is
he subject to Arbitrary punishment. For it is reason, that he which does
Injury, without other limitation than that of his own Will, should suffer
punishment without other limitation, than that of his Will whose Law is
thereby violated.

Punishments Declared Before The Fact, Excuse
From Greater Punishments
After It
But when a penalty, is either annexed to the Crime in the Law it selfe, or
hath been usually inflicted in the like cases; there the Delinquent is
Excused from a greater penalty. For the punishment foreknown, if not
great enough to deterre men from the action, is an invitement to it:
because when men compare the benefit of their Injustice, with the harm of
their punishment, by necessity of Nature they choose that which appeareth
best for themselves; and therefore when they are punished more than the
Law had formerly determined, or more than others were punished for the
same Crime; it the Law that tempted, and deceiveth them.

Nothing Can Be Made A Crime By A Law Made
After The Fact
No Law, made after a Fact done, can make it a Crime: because if the
Fact be against the Law of Nature, the Law was before the Fact; and a
Positive Law cannot be taken notice of, before it be made; and therefore
cannot be Obligatory. But when the Law that forbiddeth a Fact, is made
before the Fact be done; yet he that doth the Fact, is lyable to the Penalty
ordained after, in case no lesser Penalty were made known before, neither
by Writing, nor by Example, for the reason immediatly before alledged.

False Principles Of Right And Wrong Causes Of
Crime
From defect in Reasoning, (that is to say, from Errour,) men are prone to
violate the Lawes, three wayes. First, by Presumption of false Principles;
as when men from having observed how in all places, and in all ages,
unjust Actions have been authorised, by the force, and victories of those
who have committed them; and that potent men, breaking through the
Cob-web Lawes of their Country, the weaker sort, and those that have
failed in their Enterprises, have been esteemed the onely Criminals; have
thereupon taken for Principles, and grounds of their Reasoning, "That
Justice is but a vain word: That whatsoever a man can get by his own
Industry, and hazard, is his own: That the Practice of all Nations cannot be
unjust: That examples of former times are good Arguments of doing the
like again;" and many more of that kind: Which being granted, no Act in it
selfe can be a Crime, but must be made so (not by the Law, but) by the
successe of them that commit it; and the same Fact be vertuous, or
vicious, as Fortune pleaseth; so that what Marius makes a Crime, Sylla
shall make meritorious, and Caesar (the same Lawes standing) turn again
into a Crime, to the perpetuall disturbance of the Peace of the Commonwealth.

False Teachers Mis-interpreting The Law Of
Nature Secondly, by false
Teachers, that either mis-interpret the Law of Nature, making it thereby
repugnant to the Law Civill; or by teaching for Lawes, such Doctrines of
their own, or Traditions of former times, as are inconsistent with the duty
of a Subject.

And False Inferences From True Principles, By
Teachers
Thirdly, by Erroneous Inferences from True Principles; which happens
commonly to men that are hasty, and praecipitate in concluding, and
resolving what to do; such as are they, that have both a great opinion of
their own understanding, and believe that things of this nature require not
time and study, but onely common experience, and a good naturall wit;
whereof no man thinks himselfe unprovided: whereas the knowledge, of
Right and Wrong, which is no lesse difficult, there is no man will pretend
to, without great and long study. And of those defects in Reasoning, there
is none that can Excuse (though some of them may Extenuate) a Crime, in
any man, that pretendeth to the administration of his own private
businesse; much lesse in them that undertake a publique charge; because
they pretend to the Reason, upon the want whereof they would ground
their Excuse.

By Their Passions;
Of the Passions that most frequently are the causes of Crime, one, is
Vain-glory, or a foolish over-rating of their own worth; as if difference of
worth, were an effect of their wit, or riches, or bloud, or some other
naturall quality, not depending on the Will of those that have the
Soveraign Authority. From whence proceedeth a Presumption that the
punishments ordained by the Lawes, and extended generally to all
Subjects, ought not to be inflicted on them, with the same rigour they are
inflicted on poore, obscure, and simple men, comprehended under the
name of the Vulgar.

Presumption Of Riches
Therefore it happeneth commonly, that such as value themselves by the
greatnesse of their wealth, adventure on Crimes, upon hope of escaping
punishment, by corrupting publique Justice, or obtaining Pardon by Mony,
or other rewards.

And Friends
And that such as have multitude of Potent Kindred; and popular men,
that have gained reputation amongst the Multitude, take courage to violate
the Lawes, from a hope of oppressing the Power, to whom it belongeth to
put them in execution.

Wisedome
And that such as have a great, and false opinion of their own Wisedome,
take upon them to reprehend the actions, and call in question the Authority
of them that govern, and so to unsettle the Lawes with their publique
discourse, as that nothing shall be a Crime, but what their own designes
require should be so. It happeneth also to the same men, to be prone to all
such Crimes, as consist in Craft, and in deceiving of their Neighbours;
because they think their designes are too subtile to be perceived. These I
say are effects of a false presumption of their own Wisdome. For of them
that are the first movers in the disturbance of Common-wealth, (which can
never happen without a Civill Warre,) very few are left alive long enough,
to see their new Designes established: so that the benefit of their Crimes,
redoundeth to Posterity, and such as would least have wished it: which
argues they were not as wise, as they thought they were. And those that
deceive upon hope of not being observed, do commonly deceive
themselves, (the darknesse in which they believe they lye hidden, being
nothing else but their own blindnesse;) and are no wiser than Children,
that think all hid, by hiding their own eyes.
And generally all vain-glorious men, (unlesse they be withall timorous,)
are subject to Anger; as being more prone than others to interpret for
contempt, the ordinary liberty of conversation: And there are few Crimes
that may not be produced by Anger.

Hatred, Lust, Ambition, Covetousnesse, Causes Of
Crime
As for the Passions, of Hate, Lust, Ambition, and Covetousnesse, what
Crimes they are apt to produce, is so obvious to every mans experience
and understanding, as there needeth nothing to be said of them, saving that
they are infirmities, so annexed to the nature, both of man, and all other
living creatures, as that their effects cannot be hindred, but by
extraordinary use of Reason, or a constant severity in punishing them. For
in those things men hate, they find a continuall, and unavoydable
molestation; whereby either a mans patience must be everlasting, or he
must be eased by removing the power of that which molesteth him; The
former is difficult; the later is many times impossible, without some
violation of the Law. Ambition, and Covetousnesse are Passions also that
are perpetually incumbent, and pressing; whereas Reason is not
perpetually present, to resist them: and therefore whensoever the hope of
impunity appears, their effects proceed. And for Lust, what it wants in the
lasting, it hath in the vehemence, which sufficeth to weigh down the
apprehension of all easie, or uncertain punishments.

Fear Sometimes Cause Of Crime, As When The
Danger Is Neither Present,
Nor Corporeall
Of all Passions, that which enclineth men least to break the Lawes, is
Fear. Nay, (excepting some generous natures,) it is the onely thing, (when
there is apparence of profit, or pleasure by breaking the Lawes,) that
makes men keep them. And yet in many cases a Crime may be committed
through Feare.
For not every Fear justifies the Action it produceth, but the fear onely of
corporeall hurt, which we call Bodily Fear, and from which a man cannot
see how to be delivered, but by the action. A man is assaulted, fears
present death, from which he sees not how to escape, but by wounding him
that assaulteth him; If he wound him to death, this is no Crime; because no
man is supposed at the making of a Common-wealth, to have abandoned
the defence of his life, or limbes, where the Law cannot arrive time
enough to his assistance. But to kill a man, because from his actions, or his
threatnings, I may argue he will kill me when he can, (seeing I have time,
and means to demand protection, from the Soveraign Power,) is a Crime.
Again, a man receives words of disgrace, or some little injuries (for which
they that made the Lawes, had assigned no punishment, nor thought it
worthy of a man that hath the use of Reason, to take notice of,) and is
afraid, unlesse he revenge it, he shall fall into contempt, and consequently
be obnoxious to the like injuries from others; and to avoyd this, breaks the
Law, and protects himselfe for the future, by the terrour of his private
revenge. This is a Crime; For the hurt is not Corporeall, but Phantasticall,
and (though in this corner of the world, made sensible by a custome not
many years since begun, amongst young and vain men,) so light, as a
gallant man, and one that is assured of his own courage, cannot take notice
of. Also a man may stand in fear of Spirits, either through his own
superstition, or through too much credit given to other men, that tell him
of strange Dreams and visions; and thereby be made believe they will hurt
him, for doing, or omitting divers things, which neverthelesse, to do, or

omit, is contrary to the Lawes; And that which is so done, or omitted, is
not to be Excused by this fear; but is a Crime. For (as I have shewn before
in the second Chapter) Dreams be naturally but the fancies remaining in
sleep, after the impressions our Senses had formerly received waking; and
when men are by any accident unassured they have slept, seem to be reall
Visions; and therefore he that presumes to break the Law upon his own, or
anothers Dream, or pretended Vision, or upon other Fancy of the power of
Invisible Spirits, than is permitted by the Common-wealth, leaveth the
Law of Nature, which is a certain offence, and followeth the imagery of
his own, or another private mans brain, which he can never know whether
it signifieth any thing, or nothing, nor whether he that tells his Dream, say
true, or lye; which if every private man should have leave to do, (as they
must by the Law of Nature, if any one have it) there could no Law be made
to hold, and so all Common-wealth would be dissolved.

Crimes Not Equall
From these different sources of Crimes, it appeares already, that all
Crimes are not (as the Stoicks of old time maintained) of the same allay.
There is place, not only for EXCUSE, by which that which seemed a
Crime, is proved to be none at all; but also for EXTENUATION, by which
the Crime, that seemed great, is made lesse. For though all Crimes doe
equally deserve the name of Injustice, as all deviation from a strait line is
equally crookednesse, which the Stoicks rightly observed; yet it does not
follow that all Crimes are equally unjust, no more than that all crooked
lines are equally crooked; which the Stoicks not observing, held it as great
a Crime, to kill a Hen, against the Law, as to kill ones Father.

Totall Excuses
That which totally Excuseth a Fact, and takes away from it the nature of
a Crime, can be none but that, which at the same time, taketh away the
obligation of the Law. For the fact committed once against the Law, if he
that committed it be obliged to the Law, can be no other than a Crime.
The want of means to know the Law, totally Excuseth: For the Law
whereof a man has no means to enforme himself, is not obligatory. But the
want of diligence to enquire, shall not be considered as a want of means;
Nor shall any man, that pretendeth to reason enough for the Government
of his own affairs, be supposed to want means to know the Lawes of
Nature; because they are known by the reason he pretends to: only
Children, and Madmen are Excused from offences against the Law
Naturall.
Where a man is captive, or in the power of the enemy, (and he is then in
the power of the enemy, when his person, or his means of living, is so,) if
it be without his own fault, the Obligation of the Law ceaseth; because he
must obey the enemy, or dye; and consequently such obedience is no
Crime: for no man is obliged (when the protection of the Law faileth,) not
to protect himself, by the best means he can.
If a man by the terrour of present death, be compelled to doe a fact
against the Law, he is totally Excused; because no Law can oblige a man to
abandon his own preservation. And supposing such a Law were obligatory;
yet a man would reason thus, "If I doe it not, I die presently; if I doe it, I
die afterwards; therefore by doing it, there is time of life gained;" Nature
therefore compells him to the fact.
When a man is destitute of food, or other thing necessary for his life,
and cannot preserve himselfe any other way, but by some fact against the
Law; as if in a great famine he take the food by force, or stealth, which he
cannot obtaine for mony nor charity; or in defence of his life, snatch away
another mans Sword, he is totally Excused, for the reason next before
alledged.

Excuses Against The Author
Again, Facts done against the Law, by the authority of another, are by
that authority Excused against the Author; because no man ought to accuse
his own fact in another, that is but his instrument: but it is not Excused
against a third person thereby injured; because in the violation of the law,
bothe the Author, and Actor are Criminalls. From hence it followeth that
when that Man, or Assembly, that hath the Soveraign Power, commandeth
a man to do that which is contrary to a former Law, the doing of it is
totally Excused: For he ought not to condemn it himselfe, because he is
the Author; and what cannot justly be condemned by the Soveraign, cannot
justly be punished by any other. Besides, when the Soveraign commandeth
any thing to be done against his own former Law, the Command, as to that
particular fact, is an abrogation of the Law.
If that Man, or Assembly, that hath the Soveraign Power, disclaime any
Right essentiall to the Soveraignty, whereby there accrueth to the Subject,
any liberty inconsistent with the Soveraign Power, that is to say, with the
very being of a Common-wealth, if the Subject shall refuse to obey the
Command in any thing, contrary to the liberty granted, this is
neverthelesse a Sinne, and contrary to the duty of the Subject: for he ought
to take notice of what is inconsistent with the Soveraignty, because it was
erected by his own consent, and for his own defence; and that such liberty
as is inconsistent with it, was granted through ignorance of the evill
consequence thereof. But if he not onely disobey, but also resist a publique
Minister in the execution of it, then it is a Crime; because he might have
been righted, (without any breach of the Peace,) upon complaint.
The Degrees of Crime are taken on divers Scales, and measured, First,
by the malignity of the Source, or Cause: Secondly, by the contagion of the
Example: Thirdly, by the mischiefe of the Effect; and Fourthly, by the
concurrence of Times, Places, and Persons.

Presumption Of Power, Aggravateth
The same Fact done against the Law, if it proceed from Presumption of
strength, riches, or friends to resist those that are to execute the Law, is a
greater Crime, than if it proceed from hope of not being discovered, or of
escape by flight: For Presumption of impunity by force, is a Root, from
whence springeth, at all times, and upon all temptations, a contempt of all
Lawes; whereas in the later case, the apprehension of danger, that makes a
man fly, renders him more obedient for the future. A Crime which we
know to be so, is greater than the same Crime proceeding from a false
perswasion that it is lawfull: For he that committeth it against his own
conscience, presumeth on his force, or other power, which encourages him
to commit the same again: but he that doth it by errour, after the errour
shewn him, is conformable to the Law.

Evill Teachers, Extenuate
Hee, whose errour proceeds from the authority of a Teacher, or an
Interpreter of the Law publiquely authorised, is not so faulty, as he whose
errour proceedeth from a peremptory pursute of his own principles, and
reasoning: For what is taught by one that teacheth by publique Authority,
the Common-wealth teacheth, and hath a resemblance of Law, till the same
Authority controuleth it; and in all Crimes that contain not in them a
denyall of the Soveraign Power, nor are against an evident Law, Excuseth
totally: whereas he that groundeth his actions, on his private Judgement,
ought according to the rectitude, or errour thereof, to stand, or fall.

Examples Of Impunity, Extenuate
The same Fact, if it have been constantly punished in other men, as a
greater Crime, than if there have been may precedent Examples of
impunity. For those Examples, are so many hopes of Impunity given by the
Soveraign himselfe: And because he which furnishes a man with such a
hope, and presumption of mercy, as encourageth him to offend, hath his
part in the offence; he cannot reasonably charge the offender with the
whole.

Praemeditation, Aggravateth
A Crime arising from a sudden Passion, is not so great, as when the
same ariseth from long meditation: For in the former case there is a place
for Extenuation, in the common infirmity of humane nature: but he that
doth it with praemeditation, has used circumspection, and cast his eye, on
the Law, on the punishment, and on the consequence thereof to humane
society; all which in committing the Crime, hee hath contemned, and
postposed to his own appetite. But there is no suddennesse of Passion
sufficient for a totall Excuse: For all the time between the first knowing of
the Law, and the Commission of the Fact, shall be taken for a time of
deliberation; because he ought by meditation of the Law, to rectifie the
irregularity of his Passions.
Where the Law is publiquely, and with assiduity, before all the people
read, and interpreted; a fact done against it, is a greater Crime, than where
men are left without such instruction, to enquire of it with difficulty,
uncertainty, and interruption of their Callings, and be informed by private
men: for in this case, part of the fault is discharged upon common
infirmity; but in the former there is apparent negligence, which is not
without some contempt of the Soveraign Power.

Tacite Approbation Of The Soveraign, Extenuates
Those facts which the Law expresly condemneth, but the Law-maker by
other manifest signes of his will tacitly approveth, are lesse Crimes, than
the same facts, condemned both by the Law, and Lawmaker. For seeing the
will of the Law-maker is a Law, there appear in this case two contradictory
Lawes; which would totally Excuse, if men were bound to take notice of
the Soveraigns approbation, by other arguments, than are expressed by his
command. But because there are punishments consequent, not onely to the
transgression of his Law, but also to the observing of it, he is in part a
cause of the transgression, and therefore cannot reasonably impute the
whole Crime to the Delinquent. For example, the Law condemneth Duells;
the punishment is made capitall: On the contrary part, he that refuseth
Duell, is subject to contempt and scorne, without remedy; and sometimes
by the Soveraign himselfe thought unworthy to have any charge, or
preferment in Warre: If thereupon he accept Duell, considering all men
lawfully endeavour to obtain the good opinion of them that have the
Soveraign Power, he ought not in reason to be rigorously punished; seeing
part of the fault may be discharged on the punisher; which I say, not as
wishing liberty of private revenges, or any other kind of disobedience; but
a care in Governours, not to countenance any thing obliquely, which
directly they forbid. The examples of Princes, to those that see them, are,
and ever have been, more potent to govern their actions, than the Lawes
themselves. And though it be our duty to do, not what they do, but what
they say; yet will that duty never be performed, till it please God to give
men an extraordinary, and supernaturall grace to follow that Precept.

Comparison Of Crimes From Their Effects
Again, if we compare Crimes by the mischiefe of their Effects, First, the
same fact, when it redounds to the dammage of many, is greater, than
when it redounds to the hurt of few. And therefore, when a fact hurteth, not
onely in the present, but also, (by example) in the future, it is a greater
Crime, than if it hurt onely in the present: for the former, is a fertile
Crime, and multiplyes to the hurt of many; the later is barren. To maintain
doctrines contrary to the Religion established in the Common-wealth, is a
greater fault, in an authorised Preacher, than in a private person: So also is
it, to live prophanely, incontinently, or do any irreligious act whatsoever.
Likewise in a Professor of the Law, to maintain any point, on do any act,
that tendeth to the weakning of the Soveraign Power, as a greater Crime,
than in another man: Also in a man that hath such reputation for
wisedome, as that his counsells are followed, or his actions imitated by
many, his fact against the Law, is a greater Crime, than the same fact in
another: For such men not onely commit Crime, but teach it for Law to all
other men. And generally all Crimes are the greater, by the scandall they
give; that is to say, by becoming stumbling-blocks to the weak, that look
not so much upon the way they go in, as upon the light that other men
carry before them.

Laesae Majestas
Also Facts of Hostility against the present state of the Common-wealth,
are greater Crimes, than the same acts done to private men; For the
dammage extends it selfe to all: Such are the betraying of the strengths, or
revealing of the secrets of the Common-wealth to an Enemy; also all
attempts upon the Representative of the Common-wealth, be it a monarch,
or an Assembly; and all endeavours by word, or deed to diminish the
Authority of the same, either in the present time, or in succession: which
Crimes the Latines understand by Crimina Laesae Majestatis, and consist
in designe, or act, contrary to a Fundamentall Law.

Bribery And False Testimony
Likewise those Crimes, which render Judgements of no effect, are
greater Crimes, than Injuries done to one, or a few persons; as to receive
mony to give False judgement, or testimony, is a greater Crime, than
otherwise to deceive a man of the like, or a greater summe; because not
onely he has wrong, that falls by such judgements; but all Judgements are
rendered uselesse, and occasion ministred to force, and private revenges.

Depeculation
Also Robbery, and Depeculation of the Publique treasure, or Revenues,
is a greater Crime, than the robbing, or defrauding of a Private man;
because to robbe the publique, is to robbe many at once.

Counterfeiting Authority
Also the Counterfeit usurpation of publique Ministery, the
Counterfeiting of publique Seales, or publique Coine, than counterfeiting
of a private mans person, or his seale; because the fraud thereof, extendeth
to the dammage of many.

Crimes Against Private Men Compared
Of facts against the Law, done to private men, the greater Crime, is that,
where the dammage in the common opinion of men, is most sensible. And
therefore
To kill against the Law, is a greater Crime, that any other injury, life
preserved.
And to kill with Torment, greater, than simply to kill.
And Mutilation of a limbe, greater, than the spoyling a man of his
goods.
And the spoyling a man of his goods, by Terrour of death, or wounds,
than by clandestine surreption.
And by clandestine Surreption, than by consent fraudulently obtained.
And the violation of chastity by Force, greater, than by flattery.
And of a woman Married, than of a woman not married.
For all these things are commonly so valued; though some men are
more, and some lesse sensible of the same offence. But the Law regardeth
not the particular, but the generall inclination of mankind.
And therefore the offence men take, from contumely, in words, or
gesture, when they produce no other harme, than the present griefe of him
that is reproached, hath been neglected in the Lawes of the Greeks,
Romans, and other both antient, and moderne Common-wealths;
supposing the true cause of such griefe to consist, not in the contumely,
(which takes no hold upon men conscious of their own Vertue,) but in the
Pusillanimity of him that is offended by it.
Also a Crime against a private man, is much aggravated by the person,
time, and place. For to kill ones Parent, is a greater Crime, than to kill
another: for the Parent ought to have the honour of a Soveraign, (though he
have surrendred his Power to the Civill Law,) because he had it originally
by Nature. And to Robbe a poore man, is a greater Crime, than to robbe a
rich man; because 'tis to the poore a more sensible dammage.

And a Crime committed in the Time, or Place appointed for Devotion, is
greater, than if committed at another time or place: for it proceeds from a
greater contempt of the Law.
Many other cases of Aggravation, and Extenuation might be added: but
by these I have set down, it is obvious to every man, to take the altitude of
any other Crime proposed.

Publique Crimes What
Lastly, because in almost all Crimes there is an Injury done, not onely to
some Private man, but also to the Common-wealth; the same Crime, when
the accusation is in the name of the Common-wealth, is called Publique
Crime; and when in the name of a Private man, a Private Crime; And the
Pleas according thereunto called Publique, Judicia Publica, Pleas of the
Crown; or Private Pleas. As in an Accusation of Murder, if the accuser be
a Private man, the plea is a Private plea; if the accuser be the Soveraign,
the plea is a Publique plea.

CHAPTER XXVIII. OF PUNISHMENTS, AND
REWARDS

The Definition Of Punishment
"A PUNISHMENT, is an Evill inflicted by publique Authority, on him
that hath done, or omitted that which is Judged by the same Authority to
be a Transgression of the Law; to the end that the will of men may thereby
the better be disposed to obedience."

Right To Punish Whence Derived
Before I inferre any thing from this definition, there is a question to be
answered, of much importance; which is, by what door the Right, or
Authority of Punishing in any case, came in. For by that which has been
said before, no man is supposed bound by Covenant, not to resist violence;
and consequently it cannot be intended, that he gave any right to another to
lay violent hands upon his person. In the making of a Common-wealth,
every man giveth away the right of defending another; but not of
defending himselfe. Also he obligeth himselfe, to assist him that hath the
Soveraignty, in the Punishing of another; but of himselfe not. But to
covenant to assist the Soveraign, in doing hurt to another, unlesse he that
so covenanteth have a right to doe it himselfe, is not to give him a Right to
Punish. It is manifest therefore that the Right which the Common-wealth
(that is, he, or they that represent it) hath to Punish, is not grounded on any
concession, or gift of the Subjects. But I have also shewed formerly, that
before the Institution of Common-wealth, every man had a right to every
thing, and to do whatsoever he thought necessary to his own preservation;
subduing, hurting, or killing any man in order thereunto. And this is the
foundation of that right of Punishing, which is exercised in every
Common-wealth. For the Subjects did not give the Soveraign that right;
but onely in laying down theirs, strengthned him to use his own, as he
should think fit, for the preservation of them all: so that it was not given,
but left to him, and to him onely; and (excepting the limits set him by
naturall Law) as entire, as in the condition of meer Nature, and of warre of
every one against his neighbour.

Private Injuries, And Revenges No Punishments
From the definition of Punishment, I inferre, First, that neither private
revenges, nor injuries of private men, can properly be stiled Punishment;
because they proceed not from publique Authority.

Nor Denyall Of Preferment
Secondly, that to be neglected, and unpreferred by the publique favour,
is not a Punishment; because no new evill is thereby on any man Inflicted;
he is onely left in the estate he was in before.

Nor Pain Inflicted Without Publique Hearing
Thirdly, that the evill inflicted by publique Authority, without precedent
publique condemnation, is not to be stiled by the name of Punishment; but
of an hostile act; because the fact for which a man is Punished, ought first
to be Judged by publique Authority, to be a transgression of the Law.

Nor Pain Inflicted By Usurped Power
Fourthly, that the evill inflicted by usurped power, and Judges without
Authority from the Soveraign, is not Punishment; but an act of hostility;
because the acts of power usurped, have not for Author, the person
condemned; and therefore are not acts of publique Authority.

Nor Pain Inflicted Without Respect To The Future
Good
Fifthly, that all evill which is inflicted without intention, or possibility
of disposing the Delinquent, or (by his example) other men, to obey the
Lawes, is not Punishment; but an act of hostility; because without such an
end, no hurt done is contained under that name.

Naturall Evill Consequences, No Punishments
Sixthly, whereas to certain actions, there be annexed by Nature, divers
hurtfull consequences; as when a man in assaulting another, is himselfe
slain, or wounded; or when he falleth into sicknesse by the doing of some
unlawfull act; such hurt, though in respect of God, who is the author of
Nature, it may be said to be inflicted, and therefore a Punishment divine;
yet it is not contaned in the name of Punishment in respect of men,
because it is not inflicted by the Authority of man.

Hurt Inflicted, If Lesse Than The Benefit Of
Transgressing,
Is Not Punishment
Seventhly, If the harm inflicted be lesse than the benefit, or contentment
that naturally followeth the crime committed, that harm is not within the
definition; and is rather the Price, or Redemption, than the Punishment of
a Crime: Because it is of the nature of Punishment, to have for end, the
disposing of men to obey the Law; which end (if it be lesse that the benefit
of the transgression) it attaineth not, but worketh a contrary effect.

Where The Punishment Is Annexed To The Law,
A Greater Hurt Is Not
Punishment, But Hostility
Eighthly, If a Punishment be determined and prescribed in the Law it
selfe, and after the crime committed, there be a greater Punishment
inflicted, the excesse is not Punishment, but an act of hostility. For seeing
the aym of Punishment is not a revenge, but terrour; and the terrour of a
great Punishment unknown, is taken away by the declaration of a lesse, the
unexpected addition is no part of the Punishment. But where there is no
Punishment at all determined by the Law, there whatsoever is inflicted,
hath the nature of Punishment. For he that goes about the violation of a
Law, wherein no penalty is determined, expecteth an indeterminate, that is
to say, an arbitrary Punishment.

Hurt Inflicted For A Fact Done Before The Law,
No Punishment
Ninthly, Harme inflicted for a Fact done before there was a Law that
forbad it, is not Punishment, but an act of Hostility: For before the Law,
there is no transgression of the Law: But Punishment supposeth a fact
judged, to have been a transgression of the Law; Therefore Harme
inflicted before the Law made, is not Punishment, but an act of Hostility.

The Representative Of The Common-wealth
Unpunishable
Tenthly, Hurt inflicted on the Representative of the Common-wealth, is
not Punishment, but an act of Hostility: Because it is of the nature of
Punishment, to be inflicted by publique Authority, which is the Authority
only of the Representative it self.

Hurt To Revolted Subjects Is Done By Right Of
War, Not
By Way Of Punishment
Lastly, Harme inflicted upon one that is a declared enemy, fals not under
the name of Punishment: Because seeing they were either never subject to
the Law, and therefore cannot transgresse it; or having been subject to it,
and professing to be no longer so, by consequence deny they can
transgresse it, all the Harmes that can be done them, must be taken as acts
of Hostility. But in declared Hostility, all infliction of evill is lawfull.
From whence it followeth, that if a subject shall by fact, or word,
wittingly, and deliberatly deny the authority of the Representative of the
Common-wealth, (whatsoever penalty hath been formerly ordained for
Treason,) he may lawfully be made to suffer whatsoever the
Representative will: For in denying subjection, he denyes such Punishment
as by the Law hath been ordained; and therefore suffers as an enemy of the
Common-wealth; that is, according to the will of the Representative. For
the Punishments set down in the Law, are to Subjects, not to Enemies; such
as are they, that having been by their own act Subjects, deliberately
revolting, deny the Soveraign Power.
The first, and most generall distribution of Punishments, is into Divine,
and Humane. Of the former I shall have occasion, to speak, in a more
convenient place hereafter.
Humane, are those Punishments that be inflicted by the Commandement
of Man; and are either Corporall, or Pecuniary, or Ignominy, or
Imprisonment, or Exile, or mixt of these.

Punishments Corporall
Corporall Punishment is that, which is inflicted on the body directly,
and according to the intention of him that inflicteth it: such as are stripes,
or wounds, or deprivation of such pleasures of the body, as were before
lawfully enjoyed.

Capitall
And of these, some be Capitall, some Lesse than Capitall. Capitall, is
the Infliction of Death; and that either simply, or with torment. Lesse than
Capitall, are Stripes, Wounds, Chains, and any other corporall Paine, not in
its own nature mortall. For if upon the Infliction of a Punishment death
follow not in the Intention of the Inflicter, the Punishment is not be bee
esteemed Capitall, though the harme prove mortall by an accident not to
be foreseen; in which case death is not inflicted, but hastened.
Pecuniary Punishment, is that which consisteth not only in the
deprivation of a Summe of Mony, but also of Lands, or any other goods
which are usually bought and sold for mony. And in case the Law, that
ordaineth such a punishment, be made with design to gather mony, from
such as shall transgresse the same, it is not properly a Punishment, but the
Price of priviledge, and exemption from the Law, which doth not
absolutely forbid the fact, but only to those that are not able to pay the
mony: except where the Law is Naturall, or part of Religion; for in that
case it is not an exemption from the Law, but a transgression of it. As
where a Law exacteth a Pecuniary mulct, of them that take the name of
God in vaine, the payment of the mulct, is not the price of a dispensation
to sweare, but the Punishment of the transgression of a Law undispensable.
In like manner if the Law impose a Summe of Mony to be payd, to him
that has been Injured; this is but a satisfaction for the hurt done him; and
extinguisheth the accusation of the party injured, not the crime of the
offender.

Ignominy
Ignominy, is the infliction of such Evill, as is made Dishonorable; or the
deprivation of such Good, as is made Honourable by the Common-wealth.
For there be some things Honorable by Nature; as the effects of Courage,
Magnanimity, Strength, Wisdome, and other abilities of body and mind:
Others made Honorable by the Common-wealth; as Badges, Titles,
Offices, or any other singular marke of the Soveraigns favour. The former,
(though they may faile by nature, or accident,) cannot be taken away by a
Law; and therefore the losse of them is not Punishment. But the later, may
be taken away by the publique authority that made them Honorable, and
are properly Punishments: Such are degrading men condemned, of their
Badges, Titles, and Offices; or declaring them uncapable of the like in
time to come.

Imprisonment
Imprisonment, is when a man is by publique Authority deprived of
liberty; and may happen from two divers ends; whereof one is the safe
custody of a man accused; the other is the inflicting of paine on a man
condemned. The former is not Punishment; because no man is supposed to
be Punisht, before he be Judicially heard, and declared guilty. And
therefore whatsoever hurt a man is made to suffer by bonds, or restraint,
before his cause be heard, over and above that which is necessary to assure
his custody, is against the Law of Nature. But the Later is Punishment,
because Evill, and inflicted by publique Authority, for somewhat that has
by the same Authority been Judged a Transgression of the Law. Under this
word Imprisonment, I comprehend all restraint of motion, caused by an
externall obstacle, be it a House, which is called by the generall name of a
Prison; or an Iland, as when men are said to be confined to it; or a place
where men are set to worke, as in old time men have been condemned to
Quarries, and in these times to Gallies; or be it a Chaine, or any other such
impediment.

Exile
Exile, (Banishment) is when a man is for a crime, condemned to depart
out of the dominion of the Common-wealth, or out of a certaine part
thereof; and during a prefixed time, or for ever, not to return into it: and
seemeth not in its own nature, without other circumstances, to be a
Punishment; but rather an escape, or a publique commandement to avoid
Punishment by flight. And Cicero sayes, there was never any such
Punishment ordained in the City of Rome; but cals it a refuge of men in
danger. For if a man banished, be neverthelesse permitted to enjoy his
Goods, and the Revenue of his Lands, the meer change of ayr is no
punishment; nor does it tend to that benefit of the Common-wealth, for
which all Punishments are ordained, (that is to say, to the forming of mens
wils to the observation of the Law;) but many times to the dammage of the
Common-wealth. For a Banished man, is a lawfull enemy of the Commonwealth that banished him; as being no more a Member of the same. But if
he be withall deprived of his Lands, or Goods, then the Punishment lyeth
not in the Exile, but is to be reckoned amongst Punishments Pecuniary.

The Punishment Of Innocent Subjects Is Contrary
To The Law Of Nature
All Punishments of Innocent subjects, be they great or little, are against
the Law of Nature; For Punishment is only of Transgression of the Law,
and therefore there can be no Punishment of the Innocent. It is therefore a
violation, First, of that Law of Nature, which forbiddeth all men, in their
Revenges, to look at any thing but some future good: For there can arrive
no good to the Common-wealth, by Punishing the Innocent. Secondly, of
that, which forbiddeth Ingratitude: For seeing all Soveraign Power, is
originally given by the consent of every one of the Subjects, to the end
they should as long as they are obedient, be protected thereby; the
Punishment of the Innocent, is a rendring of Evill for Good. And thirdly, of
the Law that commandeth Equity; that is to say, an equall distribution of
Justice; which in Punishing the Innocent is not observed.

But The Harme Done To Innocents In War, Not So
But the Infliction of what evill soever, on an Innocent man, that is not a
Subject, if it be for the benefit of the Common-wealth, and without
violation of any former Covenant, is no breach of the Law of Nature. For
all men that are not Subjects, are either Enemies, or else they have ceased
from being so, by some precedent covenants. But against Enemies, whom
the Common-wealth judgeth capable to do them hurt, it is lawfull by the
originall Right of Nature to make warre; wherein the Sword Judgeth not,
nor doth the Victor make distinction of Nocent and Innocent, as to the time
past; nor has other respect of mercy, than as it conduceth to the good of his
own People. And upon this ground it is, that also in Subjects, who
deliberatly deny the Authority of the Common-wealth established, the
vengeance is lawfully extended, not onely to the Fathers, but also to the
third and fourth generation not yet in being, and consequently innocent of
the fact, for which they are afflicted: because the nature of this offence,
consisteth in the renouncing of subjection; which is a relapse into the
condition of warre, commonly called Rebellion; and they that so offend,
suffer not as Subjects, but as Enemies. For Rebellion, is but warre
renewed.

Reward, Is Either Salary, Or Grace
REWARD, is either of Gift, or by Contract. When by Contract, it is
called Salary, and Wages; which is benefit due for service performed, or
promised. When of Gift, it is benefit proceeding from the Grace of them
that bestow it, to encourage, or enable men to do them service. And
therefore when the Soveraign of a Common-wealth appointeth a Salary to
any publique Office, he that receiveth it, is bound in Justice to performe
his office; otherwise, he is bound onely in honour, to acknowledgement,
and an endeavour of requitall. For though men have no lawfull remedy,
when they be commanded to quit their private businesse, to serve the
publique, without Reward, or Salary; yet they are not bound thereto, by the
Law of Nature, nor by the institution of the Common-wealth, unlesse the
service cannot otherwise be done; because it is supposed the Soveraign
may make use of all their means, insomuch as the most common Souldier,
may demand the wages of his warrefare, as a debt.

Benefits Bestowed For Fear, Are Not Rewards
The benefits which a Soveraign bestoweth on a Subject, for fear of some
power, and ability he hath to do hurt to the Common-wealth, are not
properly Rewards; for they are not Salaryes; because there is in this case
no contract supposed, every man being obliged already not to do the
Common-wealth disservice: nor are they Graces; because they be extorted
by feare, which ought not to be incident to the Soveraign Power: but are
rather Sacrifices, which the Soveraign (considered in his naturall person,
and not in the person of the Common-wealth) makes, for the appeasing the
discontent of him he thinks more potent than himselfe; and encourage not
to obedience, but on the contrary, to the continuance, and increasing of
further extortion.

Salaries Certain And Casuall
And whereas some Salaries are certain, and proceed from the publique
Treasure; and others uncertain, and casuall, proceeding from the execution
of the Office for which the Salary is ordained; the later is in some cases
hurtfull to the Common-wealth; as in the case of Judicature. For where the
benefit of the Judges, and Ministers of a Court of Justice, ariseth for the
multitude of Causes that are brought to their cognisance, there must needs
follow two Inconveniences: One, is the nourishing of sutes; for the more
sutes, the greater benefit: and another that depends on that, which is
contention about Jurisdiction; each Court drawing to it selfe, as many
Causes as it can. But in offices of Execution there are not those
Inconveniences; because their employment cannot be encreased by any
endeavour of their own. And thus much shall suffice for the nature of
Punishment, and Reward; which are, as it were, the Nerves and Tendons,
that move the limbes and joynts of a Common-wealth.
Hitherto I have set forth the nature of Man, (whose Pride and other
Passions have compelled him to submit himselfe to Government;) together
with the great power of his Governour, whom I compared to Leviathan,
taking that comparison out of the two last verses of the one and fortieth of
Job; where God having set forth the great power of Leviathan, called him
King of the Proud. "There is nothing," saith he, "on earth, to be compared
with him. He is made so as not be afraid. Hee seeth every high thing below
him; and is King of all the children of pride." But because he is mortall,
and subject to decay, as all other Earthly creatures are; and because there
is that in heaven, (though not on earth) that he should stand in fear of, and
whose Lawes he ought to obey; I shall in the next following Chapters
speak of his Diseases, and the causes of his Mortality; and of what Lawes
of Nature he is bound to obey.

CHAPTER XXIX. OF THOSE THINGS THAT
WEAKEN, OR TEND TO THE DISSOLUTION
OF
A COMMON-WEALTH
Dissolution Of Common-wealths Proceedeth From Imperfect Institution
Though nothing can be immortall, which mortals make; yet, if men had
the use of reason they pretend to, their Common-wealths might be secured,
at least, from perishing by internall diseases. For by the nature of their
Institution, they are designed to live, as long as Man-kind, or as the Lawes
of Nature, or as Justice it selfe, which gives them life. Therefore when
they come to be dissolved, not by externall violence, but intestine
disorder, the fault is not in men, as they are the Matter; but as they are the
Makers, and orderers of them. For men, as they become at last weary of
irregular justling, and hewing one another, and desire with all their hearts,
to conforme themselves into one firme and lasting edifice; so for want,
both of the art of making fit Laws, to square their actions by, and also of
humility, and patience, to suffer the rude and combersome points of their
present greatnesse to be taken off, they cannot without the help of a very
able Architect, be compiled, into any other than a crasie building, such as
hardly lasting out their own time, must assuredly fall upon the heads of
their posterity.
Amongst the Infirmities therefore of a Common-wealth, I will reckon in
the first place, those that arise from an Imperfect Institution, and resemble
the diseases of a naturall body, which proceed from a Defectuous
Procreation.

Want Of Absolute Power
Of which, this is one, "That a man to obtain a Kingdome, is sometimes
content with lesse Power, than to the Peace, and defence of the Commonwealth is necessarily required." From whence it commeth to passe, that
when the exercise of the Power layd by, is for the publique safety to be
resumed, it hath the resemblance of as unjust act; which disposeth great
numbers of men (when occasion is presented) to rebell; In the same
manner as the bodies of children, gotten by diseased parents, are subject
either to untimely death, or to purge the ill quality, derived from their
vicious conception, by breaking out into biles and scabbs. And when Kings
deny themselves some such necessary Power, it is not alwayes (though
sometimes) out of ignorance of what is necessary to the office they
undertake; but many times out of a hope to recover the same again at their
pleasure: Wherein they reason not well; because such as will hold them to
their promises, shall be maintained against them by forraign Commonwealths; who in order to the good of their own Subjects let slip few
occasions to Weaken the estate of their Neighbours. So was Thomas
Beckett Archbishop of Canterbury, supported against Henry the Second, by
the Pope; the subjection of Ecclesiastiques to the Common-wealth, having
been dispensed with by William the Conqueror at his reception, when he
took an Oath, not to infringe the liberty of the Church. And so were the
Barons, whose power was by William Rufus (to have their help in
transferring the Succession from his Elder brother, to himselfe,) encreased
to a degree, inconsistent with the Soveraign Power, maintained in their
Rebellion against King John, by the French. Nor does this happen in
Monarchy onely. For whereas the stile of the antient Roman Commonwealth, was, The Senate, and People of Rome; neither Senate, nor People
pretended to the whole Power; which first caused the seditions, of Tiberius
Gracchus, Caius Gracchus, Lucius Saturnius, and others; and afterwards
the warres between the Senate and the People, under Marius and Sylla; and
again under Pompey and Caesar, to the Extinction of their Democraty, and
the setting up of Monarchy.

The people of Athens bound themselves but from one onely Action;
which was, that no man on pain of death should propound the renewing of
the warre for the Island of Salamis; And yet thereby, if Solon had not
caused to be given out he was mad, and afterwards in gesture and habit of
a mad-man, and in verse, propounded it to the People that flocked about
him, they had had an enemy perpetually in readinesse, even at the gates of
their Citie; such dammage, or shifts, are all Common-wealths forced to,
that have their Power never so little limited.

Private Judgement Of Good and Evill
In the second place, I observe the Diseases of a Common-wealth, that
proceed from the poyson of seditious doctrines; whereof one is, "That
every private man is Judge of Good and Evill actions." This is true in the
condition of meer Nature, where there are no Civill Lawes; and also under
Civill Government, in such cases as are not determined by the Law. But
otherwise, it is manifest, that the measure of Good and Evill actions, is the
Civill Law; and the Judge the Legislator, who is alwayes Representative of
the Common-wealth. From this false doctrine, men are disposed to debate
with themselves, and dispute the commands of the Common-wealth; and
afterwards to obey, or disobey them, as in their private judgements they
shall think fit. Whereby the Common-wealth is distracted and Weakened.

Erroneous Conscience
Another doctrine repugnant to Civill Society, is, that "Whatsoever a man
does against his Conscience, is Sinne;" and it dependeth on the
presumption of making himself judge of Good and Evill. For a mans
Conscience, and his Judgement is the same thing; and as the Judgement, so
also the Conscience may be erroneous. Therefore, though he that is subject
to no Civill Law, sinneth in all he does against his Conscience, because he
has no other rule to follow but his own reason; yet it is not so with him
that lives in a Common-wealth; because the Law is the publique
Conscience, by which he hath already undertaken to be guided. Otherwise
in such diversity, as there is of private Consciences, which are but private
opinions, the Common-wealth must needs be distracted, and no man dare
to obey the Soveraign Power, farther than it shall seem good in his own
eyes.

Pretence Of Inspiration
It hath been also commonly taught, "That Faith and Sanctity, are not to
be attained by Study and Reason, but by supernaturall Inspiration, or
Infusion," which granted, I see not why any man should render a reason of
his Faith; or why every Christian should not be also a Prophet; or why any
man should take the Law of his Country, rather than his own Inspiration,
for the rule of his action. And thus wee fall again into the fault of taking
upon us to Judge of Good and Evill; or to make Judges of it, such private
men as pretend to be supernaturally Inspired, to the Dissolution of all
Civill Government. Faith comes by hearing, and hearing by those
accidents, which guide us into the presence of them that speak to us; which
accidents are all contrived by God Almighty; and yet are not supernaturall,
but onely, for the great number of them that concurre to every effect,
unobservable. Faith, and Sanctity, are indeed not very frequent; but yet
they are not Miracles, but brought to passe by education, discipline,
correction, and other naturall wayes, by which God worketh them in his
elect, as such time as he thinketh fit. And these three opinions, pernicious
to Peace and Government, have in this part of the world, proceeded chiefly
from the tongues, and pens of unlearned Divines; who joyning the words
of Holy Scripture together, otherwise than is agreeable to reason, do what
they can, to make men think, that Sanctity and Naturall Reason, cannot
stand together.

Subjecting The Soveraign Power To Civill Lawes
A fourth opinion, repugnant to the nature of a Common-wealth, is this,
"That he that hath the Soveraign Power, is subject to the Civill Lawes." It
is true, that Soveraigns are all subjects to the Lawes of Nature; because
such lawes be Divine, and cannot by any man, or Common-wealth be
abrogated. But to those Lawes which the Soveraign himselfe, that is,
which the Common-wealth maketh, he is not subject. For to be subject to
Lawes, is to be subject to the Common-wealth, that is to the Soveraign
Representative, that is to himselfe; which is not subjection, but freedome
from the Lawes. Which errour, because it setteth the Lawes above the
Soveraign, setteth also a Judge above him, and a Power to punish him;
which is to make a new Soveraign; and again for the same reason a third,
to punish the second; and so continually without end, to the Confusion,
and Dissolution of the Common-wealth.

Attributing Of Absolute Propriety To The Subjects
A Fifth doctrine, that tendeth to the Dissolution of a Common-wealth,
is, "That every private man has an absolute Propriety in his Goods; such,
as excludeth the Right of the Soveraign." Every man has indeed a
Propriety that excludes the Right of every other Subject: And he has it
onely from the Soveraign Power; without the protection whereof, every
other man should have equall Right to the same. But if the Right of the
Soveraign also be excluded, he cannot performe the office they have put
him into; which is, to defend them both from forraign enemies, and from
the injuries of one another; and consequently there is no longer a
Common-wealth.
And if the Propriety of Subjects, exclude not the Right of the Soveraign
Representative to their Goods; much lesse to their offices of Judicature, or
Execution, in which they Represent the Soveraign himselfe.

Dividing Of The Soveraign Power
There is a Sixth doctrine, plainly, and directly against the essence of a
Common-wealth; and 'tis this, "That the Soveraign Power may be
divided." For what is it to divide the Power of a Common-wealth, but to
Dissolve it; for Powers divided mutually destroy each other. And for these
doctrines, men are chiefly beholding to some of those, that making
profession of the Lawes, endeavour to make them depend upon their own
learning, and not upon the Legislative Power.

Imitation Of Neighbour Nations
And as False Doctrine, so also often-times the Example of different
Government in a neighbouring Nation, disposeth men to alteration of the
forme already setled. So the people of the Jewes were stirred up to reject
God, and to call upon the Prophet Samuel, for a King after the manner of
the Nations; So also the lesser Cities of Greece, were continually
disturbed, with seditions of the Aristocraticall, and Democraticall
factions; one part of almost every Common-wealth, desiring to imitate the
Lacedaemonians; the other, the Athenians. And I doubt not, but many men,
have been contented to see the late troubles in England, out of an imitation
of the Low Countries; supposing there needed no more to grow rich, than
to change, as they had done, the forme of their Government. For the
constitution of mans nature, is of it selfe subject to desire novelty: When
therefore they are provoked to the same, by the neighbourhood also of
those that have been enriched by it, it is almost impossible for them, not to
be content with those that solicite them to change; and love the first
beginnings, though they be grieved with the continuance of disorder; like
hot blouds, that having gotten the itch, tear themselves with their own
nayles, till they can endure the smart no longer.

Imitation Of The Greeks, And Romans
And as to Rebellion in particular against Monarchy; one of the most
frequent causes of it, is the Reading of the books of Policy, and Histories
of the antient Greeks, and Romans; from which, young men, and all others
that are unprovided of the Antidote of solid Reason, receiving a strong,
and delightfull impression, of the great exploits of warre, atchieved by the
Conductors of their Armies, receive withall a pleasing Idea, of all they
have done besides; and imagine their great prosperity, not to have
proceeded from the aemulation of particular men, but from the vertue of
their popular form of government: Not considering the frequent Seditions,
and Civill Warres, produced by the imperfection of their Policy. From the
reading, I say, of such books, men have undertaken to kill their Kings,
because the Greek and Latine writers, in their books, and discourses of
Policy, make it lawfull, and laudable, for any man so to do; provided
before he do it, he call him Tyrant. For they say not Regicide, that is,
killing of a King, but Tyrannicide, that is, killing of a Tyrant is lawfull.
From the same books, they that live under a Monarch conceive an opinion,
that the Subjects in a Popular Common-wealth enjoy Liberty; but that in a
Monarchy they are all Slaves. I say, they that live under a Monarchy
conceive such an opinion; not they that live under a Popular Government;
for they find no such matter. In summe, I cannot imagine, how anything
can be more prejudiciall to a Monarchy, than the allowing of such books to
be publikely read, without present applying such correctives of discreet
Masters, as are fit to take away their Venime; Which Venime I will not
doubt to compare to the biting of a mad Dogge, which is a disease the
Physicians call Hydrophobia, or Fear Of Water. For as he that is so bitten,
has a continuall torment of thirst, and yet abhorreth water; and is in such
an estate, as if the poyson endeavoured to convert him into a Dogge: So
when a Monarchy is once bitten to the quick, by those Democraticall
writers, that continually snarle at that estate; it wanteth nothing more than
a strong Monarch, which neverthelesse out of a certain Tyrannophobia, or
feare of being strongly governed, when they have him, they abhorre.

As here have been Doctors, that hold there be three Soules in a man; so
there be also that think there may be more Soules, (that is, more
Soveraigns,) than one, in a Common-wealth; and set up a Supremacy
against the Soveraignty; Canons against Lawes; and a Ghostly Authority
against the Civill; working on mens minds, with words and distinctions,
that of themselves signifie nothing, but bewray (by their obscurity) that
there walketh (as some think invisibly) another Kingdome, as it were a
Kingdome of Fayries, in the dark. Now seeing it is manifest, that the Civill
Power, and the Power of the Common-wealth is the same thing; and that
Supremacy, and the Power of making Canons, and granting Faculties,
implyeth a Common-wealth; it followeth, that where one is Soveraign,
another Supreme; where one can make Lawes, and another make Canons;
there must needs be two Common-wealths, of one & the same Subjects;
which is a Kingdome divided in it selfe, and cannot stand. For
notwithstanding the insignificant distinction of Temporall, and Ghostly,
they are still two Kingdomes, and every Subject is subject to two Masters.
For seeing the Ghostly Power challengeth the Right to declare what is
Sinne it challengeth by consequence to declare what is Law, (Sinne being
nothing but the transgression of the Law;) and again, the Civill Power
challenging to declare what is Law, every Subject must obey two Masters,
who bothe will have their Commands be observed as Law; which is
impossible. Or, if it be but one Kingdome, either the Civill, which is the
Power of the Common-wealth, must be subordinate to the Ghostly; or the
Ghostly must be subordinate to the Temporall and then there is no
Supremacy but the Temporall. When therefore these two Powers oppose
one another, the Common-wealth cannot but be in great danger of Civill
warre, and Dissolution. For the Civill Authority being more visible, and
standing in the cleerer light of naturall reason cannot choose but draw to it
in all times a very considerable part of the people: And the Spirituall,
though it stand in the darknesse of Schoole distinctions, and hard words;
yet because the fear of Darknesse, and Ghosts, is greater than other fears,
cannot want a party sufficient to Trouble, and sometimes to Destroy a
Common-wealth. And this is a Disease which not unfitly may be compared
to the Epilepsie, or Falling-sicknesse (which the Jewes took to be one kind
of possession by Spirits) in the Body Naturall. For as in this Disease, there
is an unnaturall spirit, or wind in the head that obstructeth the roots of the
Nerves, and moving them violently, taketh away the motion which

naturally they should have from the power of the Soule in the Brain, and
thereby causeth violent, and irregular motions (which men call
Convulsions) in the parts; insomuch as he that is seized therewith, falleth
down sometimes into the water, and sometimes into the fire, as a man
deprived of his senses; so also in the Body Politique, when the Spirituall
power, moveth the Members of a Common-wealth, by the terrour of
punishments, and hope of rewards (which are the Nerves of it,) otherwise
than by the Civill Power (which is the Soule of the Common-wealth) they
ought to be moved; and by strange, and hard words suffocates the people,
and either Overwhelm the Common-wealth with Oppression, or cast it into
the Fire of a Civill warre.

Mixt Government
Sometimes also in the meerly Civill government, there be more than
one Soule: As when the Power of levying mony, (which is the Nutritive
faculty,) has depended on a generall Assembly; the Power of conduct and
command, (which is the Motive Faculty,) on one man; and the Power of
making Lawes, (which is the Rationall faculty,) on the accidentall consent,
not onely of those two, but also of a third; This endangereth the Commonwealth, somtimes for want of consent to good Lawes; but most often for
want of such Nourishment, as is necessary to Life, and Motion. For
although few perceive, that such government, is not government, but
division of the Common-wealth into three Factions, and call it mixt
Monarchy; yet the truth is, that it is not one independent Common-wealth,
but three independent Factions; nor one Representative Person, but three.
In the Kingdome of God, there may be three Persons independent, without
breach of unity in God that Reigneth; but where men Reigne, that be
subject to diversity of opinions, it cannot be so. And therefore if the King
bear the person of the People, and the generall Assembly bear also the
person of the People, and another assembly bear the person of a Part of the
people, they are not one Person, nor one Soveraign, but three Persons, and
three Soveraigns.
To what Disease in the Naturall Body of man, I may exactly compare
this irregularity of a Common-wealth, I know not. But I have seen a man,
that had another man growing out of his side, with an head, armes, breast,
and stomach, of his own: If he had had another man growing out of his
other side, the comparison might then have been exact.

Want Of Mony
Hitherto I have named such Diseases of a Common-wealth, as are of the
greatest, and most present danger. There be other, not so great; which
neverthelesse are not unfit to be observed. As first, the difficulty of raising
Mony, for the necessary uses of the Common-wealth; especially in the
approach of warre. This difficulty ariseth from the opinion, that every
Subject hath of a Propriety in his lands and goods, exclusive of the
Soveraigns Right to the use of the same. From whence it commeth to
passe, that the Soveraign Power, which foreseeth the necessities and
dangers of the Common-wealth, (finding the passage of mony to the
publique Treasure obstructed, by the tenacity of the people,) whereas it
ought to extend it selfe, to encounter, and prevent such dangers in their
beginnings, contracteth it selfe as long as it can, and when it cannot
longer, struggles with the people by strategems of Law, to obtain little
summes, which not sufficing, he is fain at last violently to open the way
for present supply, or Perish; and being put often to these extremities, at
last reduceth the people to their due temper; or else the Common-wealth
must perish. Insomuch as we may compare this Distemper very aptly to an
Ague; wherein, the fleshy parts being congealed, or by venomous matter
obstructed; the Veins which by their naturall course empty themselves into
the Heart, are not (as they ought to be) supplyed from the Arteries,
whereby there succeedeth at first a cold contraction, and trembling of the
limbes; and afterwards a hot, and strong endeavour of the Heart, to force a
passage for the Bloud; and before it can do that, contenteth it selfe with
the small refreshments of such things as coole of a time, till (if Nature be
strong enough) it break at last the contumacy of the parts obstructed, and
dissipateth the venome into sweat; or (if Nature be too weak) the Patient
dyeth.

Monopolies And Abuses Of Publicans
Again, there is sometimes in a Common-wealth, a Disease, which
resembleth the Pleurisie; and that is, when the Treasure of the Commonwealth, flowing out of its due course, is gathered together in too much
abundance, in one, or a few private men, by Monopolies, or by Farmes of
the Publique Revenues; in the same manner as the Blood in a Pleurisie,
getting into the Membrane of the breast, breedeth there an Inflammation,
accompanied with a Fever, and painfull stitches.

Popular Men
Also, the Popularity of a potent Subject, (unlesse the Common-wealth
have very good caution of his fidelity,) is a dangerous Disease; because the
people (which should receive their motion from the Authority of the
Soveraign,) by the flattery, and by the reputation of an ambitious man, are
drawn away from their obedience to the Lawes, to follow a man, of whose
vertues, and designes they have no knowledge. And this is commonly of
more danger in a Popular Government, than in a Monarchy; as it may
easily be made believe, they are the People. By this means it was, that
Julius Caesar, who was set up by the People against the Senate, having
won to himselfe the affections of his Army, made himselfe Master, both of
Senate and People. And this proceeding of popular, and ambitious men, is
plain Rebellion; and may be resembled to the effects of Witchcraft.

Excessive Greatnesse Of A Town, Multitude Of
Corporations
Another infirmity of a Common-wealth, is the immoderate greatnesse
of a Town, when it is able to furnish out of its own Circuit, the number,
and expence of a great Army: As also the great number of Corporations;
which are as it were many lesser Common-wealths in the bowels of a
greater, like wormes in the entrayles of a naturall man.

Liberty Of Disputing Against Soveraign Power
To which may be added, the Liberty of Disputing against absolute
Power, by pretenders to Politicall Prudence; which though bred for the
most part in the Lees of the people; yet animated by False Doctrines, are
perpetually medling with the Fundamentall Lawes, to the molestation of
the Common-wealth; like the little Wormes, which Physicians call
Ascarides.
We may further adde, the insatiable appetite, or Bulimia, of enlarging
Dominion; with the incurable Wounds thereby many times received from
the enemy; And the Wens, of ununited conquests, which are many times a
burthen, and with lesse danger lost, than kept; As also the Lethargy of
Ease, and Consumption of Riot and Vain Expence.

Dissolution Of The Common-wealth
Lastly, when in a warre (forraign, or intestine,) the enemies got a final
Victory; so as (the forces of the Common-wealth keeping the field no
longer) there is no farther protection of Subjects in their loyalty; then is
the Common-wealth DISSOLVED, and every man at liberty to protect
himselfe by such courses as his own discretion shall suggest unto him. For
the Soveraign, is the publique Soule, giving Life and Motion to the
Common-wealth; which expiring, the Members are governed by it no
more, than the Carcasse of a man, by his departed (though Immortal)
Soule. For though the Right of a Soveraign Monarch cannot be
extinguished by the act of another; yet the Obligation of the members may.
For he that wants protection, may seek it anywhere; and when he hath it, is
obliged (without fraudulent pretence of having submitted himselfe out of
fear,) to protect his Protection as long as he is able. But when the Power of
an Assembly is once suppressed, the Right of the same perisheth utterly;
because the Assembly it selfe is extinct; and consequently, there is no
possibility for the Soveraignty to re-enter.

CHAPTER XXX. OF THE OFFICE OF THE
SOVERAIGN REPRESENTATIVE

The Procuration Of The Good Of The People
The OFFICE of the Soveraign, (be it a Monarch, or an Assembly,)
consisteth in the end, for which he was trusted with the Soveraign Power,
namely the procuration of the Safety Of The People; to which he is obliged
by the Law of Nature, and to render an account thereof to God, the Author
of that Law, and to none but him. But by Safety here, is not meant a bare
Preservation, but also all other Contentments of life, which every man by
lawfull Industry, without danger, or hurt to the Common-wealth, shall
acquire to himselfe.

By Instruction & Lawes
And this is intended should be done, not by care applyed to Individualls,
further than their protection from injuries, when they shall complain; but
by a generall Providence, contained in publique Instruction, both of
Doctrine, and Example; and in the making, and executing of good Lawes,
to which individuall persons may apply their own cases.

Against The Duty Of A Soveraign To Relinquish
Any Essentiall Right
of Soveraignty Or Not To See The People Taught The
Grounds Of Them
And because, if the essentiall Rights of Soveraignty (specified before in
the eighteenth Chapter) be taken away, the Common-wealth is thereby
dissolved, and every man returneth into the condition, and calamity of a
warre with every other man, (which is the greatest evill that can happen in
this life;) it is the Office of the Soveraign, to maintain those Rights entire;
and consequently against his duty, First, to transferre to another, or to lay
from himselfe any of them. For he that deserteth the Means, deserteth the
Ends; and he deserteth the Means, that being the Soveraign,
acknowledgeth himselfe subject to the Civill Lawes; and renounceth the
Power of Supreme Judicature; or of making Warre, or Peace by his own
Authority; or of Judging of the Necessities of the Common-wealth; or of
levying Mony, and Souldiers, when, and as much as in his own conscience
he shall judge necessary; or of making Officers, and Ministers both of
Warre, and Peace; or of appointing Teachers, and examining what
Doctrines are conformable, or contrary to the Defence, Peace, and Good of
the people. Secondly, it is against his duty, to let the people be ignorant, or
mis-in-formed of the grounds, and reasons of those his essentiall Rights;
because thereby men are easie to be seduced, and drawn to resist him,
when the Common-wealth shall require their use and exercise.
And the grounds of these Rights, have the rather need to be diligently,
and truly taught; because they cannot be maintained by any Civill Law, or
terrour of legal punishment. For a Civill Law, that shall forbid Rebellion,
(and such is all resistance to the essentiall Rights of Soveraignty,) is not
(as a Civill Law) any obligation, but by vertue onely of the Law of Nature,
that forbiddeth the violation of Faith; which naturall obligation if men
know not, they cannot know the Right of any Law the Soveraign maketh.
And for the Punishment, they take it but for an act of Hostility; which

when they think they have strength enough, they will endeavour by acts of
Hostility, to avoyd.

Objection Of Those That Say There Are No
Principles Of Reason For
Absolute Soveraignty
As I have heard some say, that Justice is but a word, without substance;
and that whatsoever a man can by force, or art, acquire to himselfe, (not
onely in the condition of warre, but also in a Common-wealth,) is his own,
which I have already shewed to be false: So there be also that maintain,
that there are no grounds, nor Principles of Reason, to sustain those
essentiall Rights, which make Soveraignty absolute. For if there were, they
would have been found out in some place, or other; whereas we see, there
has not hitherto been any Common-wealth, where those Rights have been
acknowledged, or challenged. Wherein they argue as ill, as if the Savage
people of America, should deny there were any grounds, or Principles of
Reason, so to build a house, as to last as long as the materials, because
they never yet saw any so well built. Time, and Industry, produce every
day new knowledge. And as the art of well building, is derived from
Principles of Reason, observed by industrious men, that had long studied
the nature of materials, and the divers effects of figure, and proportion,
long after mankind began (though poorly) to build: So, long time after
men have begun to constitute Common-wealths, imperfect, and apt to
relapse into disorder, there may, Principles of Reason be found out, by
industrious meditation, to make use of them, or be neglected by them, or
not, concerneth my particular interest, at this day, very little. But
supposing that these of mine are not such Principles of Reason; yet I am
sure they are Principles from Authority of Scripture; as I shall make it
appear, when I shall come to speak of the Kingdome of God, (administred
by Moses,) over the Jewes, his peculiar people by Covenant.

Objection From The Incapacity Of The Vulgar
But they say again, that though the Principles be right, yet Common
people are not of capacity enough to be made to understand them. I should
be glad, that the Rich, and Potent Subjects of a Kingdome, or those that are
accounted the most Learned, were no lesse incapable than they. But all
men know, that the obstructions to this kind of doctrine, proceed not so
much from the difficulty of the matter, as from the interest of them that
are to learn. Potent men, digest hardly any thing that setteth up a Power to
bridle their affections; and Learned men, any thing that discovereth their
errours, and thereby lesseneth their Authority: whereas the Commonpeoples minds, unlesse they be tainted with dependance on the Potent, or
scribbled over with the opinions of their Doctors, are like clean paper, fit
to receive whatsoever by Publique Authority shall be imprinted in them.
Shall whole Nations be brought to Acquiesce in the great Mysteries of
Christian Religion, which are above Reason; and millions of men be made
believe, that the same Body may be in innumerable places, at one and the
same time, which is against Reason; and shall not men be able, by their
teaching, and preaching, protected by the Law, to make that received,
which is so consonant to Reason, that any unprejudicated man, needs no
more to learn it, than to hear it? I conclude therefore, that in the
instruction of the people in the Essentiall Rights (which are the Naturall,
and Fundamentall Lawes) of Soveraignty, there is no difficulty, (whilest a
Soveraign has his Power entire,) but what proceeds from his own fault, or
the fault of those whom he trusteth in the administration of the Commonwealth; and consequently, it is his Duty, to cause them so to be instructed;
and not onely his Duty, but his Benefit also, and Security, against the
danger that may arrive to himselfe in his naturall Person, from Rebellion.

Subjects Are To Be Taught, Not To Affect Change
Of Government
And (to descend to particulars) the People are to be taught, First, that
they ought not to be in love with any forme of Government they see in
their neighbour Nations, more than with their own, nor (whatsoever
present prosperity they behold in Nations that are otherwise governed than
they,) to desire change. For the prosperity of a People ruled by an
Aristocraticall, or Democraticall assembly, commeth not from Aristocracy,
nor from Democracy, but from the Obedience, and Concord of the
Subjects; nor do the people flourish in a Monarchy, because one man has
the right to rule them, but because they obey him. Take away in any kind
of State, the Obedience, (and consequently the Concord of the People,) and
they shall not onely not flourish, but in short time be dissolved. And they
that go about by disobedience, to doe no more than reforme the Commonwealth, shall find they do thereby destroy it; like the foolish daughters of
Peleus (in the fable;) which desiring to renew the youth of their decrepit
Father, did by the Counsell of Medea, cut him in pieces, and boyle him,
together with strange herbs, but made not of him a new man. This desire of
change, is like the breach of the first of Gods Commandements: For there
God says, Non Habebis Deos Alienos; Thou shalt not have the Gods of
other Nations; and in another place concerning Kings, that they are Gods.

Nor Adhere (Against The Soveraign) To Popular
Men
Secondly, they are to be taught, that they ought not to be led with
admiration of the vertue of any of their fellow Subjects, how high soever
he stand, nor how conspicuously soever he shine in the Common-wealth;
nor of any Assembly, (except the Soveraign Assembly,) so as to deferre to
them any obedience, or honour, appropriate to the Soveraign onely, whom
(in their particular stations) they represent; nor to receive any influence
from them, but such as is conveighed by them from the Soveraign
Authority. For that Soveraign, cannot be imagined to love his People as he
ought, that is not Jealous of them, but suffers them by the flattery of
Popular men, to be seduced from their loyalty, as they have often been, not
onely secretly, but openly, so as to proclaime Marriage with them In Facie
Ecclesiae by Preachers; and by publishing the same in the open streets:
which may fitly be compared to the violation of the second of the ten
Commandements.
Nor To Dispute The Soveraign Power
Thirdly, in consequence to this, they ought to be informed, how great
fault it is, to speak evill of the Soveraign Representative, (whether One
man, or an Assembly of men;) or to argue and dispute his Power, or any
way to use his Name irreverently, whereby he may be brought into
Contempt with his People, and their Obedience (in which the safety of the
Common-wealth consisteth) slackened. Which doctrine the third
Commandement by resemblance pointeth to.

And To Have Dayes Set Apart To Learn Their
Duty
Fourthly, seeing people cannot be taught this, nor when 'tis taught,
remember it, nor after one generation past, so much as know in whom the
Soveraign Power is placed, without setting a part from their ordinary
labour, some certain times, in which they may attend those that are
appointed to instruct them; It is necessary that some such times be
determined, wherein they may assemble together, and (after prayers and
praises given to God, the Soveraign of Soveraigns) hear those their Duties
told them, and the Positive Lawes, such as generally concern them all,
read and expounded, and be put in mind of the Authority that maketh them
Lawes. To this end had the Jewes every seventh day, a Sabbath, in which
the Law was read and expounded; and in the solemnity whereof they were
put in mind, that their King was God; that having created the world in six
days, he rested the seventh day; and by their resting on it from their
labour, that that God was their King, which redeemed them from their
servile, and painfull labour in Egypt, and gave them a time, after they had
rejoyced in God, to take joy also in themselves, by lawfull recreation. So
that the first Table of the Commandements, is spent all, in setting down
the summe of Gods absolute Power; not onely as God, but as King by pact,
(in peculiar) of the Jewes; and may therefore give light, to those that have
the Soveraign Power conferred on them by the consent of men, to see what
doctrine they Ought to teach their Subjects.

And To Honour Their Parents
And because the first instruction of Children, dependeth on the care of
their Parents; it is necessary that they should be obedient to them, whilest
they are under their tuition; and not onely so, but that also afterwards (as
gratitude requireth,) they acknowledge the benefit of their education, by
externall signes of honour. To which end they are to be taught, that
originally the Father of every man was also his Soveraign Lord, with
power over him of life and death; and that the Fathers of families, when by
instituting a Common-wealth, they resigned that absolute Power, yet it
was never intended, they should lose the honour due unto them for their
education. For to relinquish such right, was not necessary to the Institution
of Soveraign Power; nor would there be any reason, why any man should
desire to have children, or take the care to nourish, and instruct them, if
they were afterwards to have no other benefit from them, than from other
men. And this accordeth with the fifth Commandement.

And To Avoyd Doing Of Injury:
Again, every Soveraign Ought to cause Justice to be taught, which
(consisting in taking from no man what is his) is as much as to say, to
cause men to be taught not to deprive their Neighbour, by violence, or
fraud, of any thing which by the Soveraign Authority is theirs. Of things
held in propriety, those that are dearest to a man are his own life, & limbs;
and in the next degree, (in most men,) those that concern conjugall
affection; and after them riches and means of living. Therefore the People
are to be taught, to abstain from violence to one anothers person, by
private revenges; from violation of conjugall honour; and from forcibly
rapine, and fraudulent surreption of one anothers goods. For which
purpose also it is necessary they be shewed the evill consequences of false
Judgement, by corruption either of Judges or Witnesses, whereby the
distinction of propriety is taken away, and Justice becomes of no effect: all
which things are intimated in the sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth
Commandements.

And To Do All This Sincerely From The Heart
Lastly, they are to be taught, that not onely the unjust facts, but the
designes and intentions to do them, (though by accident hindred,) are
Injustice; which consisteth in the pravity of the will, as well as in the
irregularity of the act. And this is the intention of the tenth
Commandement, and the summe of the Second Table; which is reduced all
to this one Commandement of mutuall Charity, "Thou shalt love thy
neighbour as thy selfe:" as the summe of the first Table is reduced to "the
love of God;" whom they had then newly received as their King.

The Use Of Universities
As for the Means, and Conduits, by which the people may receive this
Instruction, wee are to search, by what means so may Opinions, contrary
to the peace of Man-kind, upon weak and false Principles, have
neverthelesse been so deeply rooted in them. I mean those, which I have in
the precedent Chapter specified: as That men shall Judge of what is
lawfull and unlawfull, not by the Law it selfe, but by their own private
Judgements; That Subjects sinne in obeying the Commands of the
Common-wealth, unlesse they themselves have first judged them to be
lawfull: That their Propriety in their riches is such, as to exclude the
Dominion, which the Common-wealth hath over the same: That it is
lawfull for Subjects to kill such, as they call Tyrants: That the Soveraign
Power may be divided, and the like; which come to be instilled into the
People by this means. They whom necessity, or covetousnesse keepeth
attent on their trades, and labour; and they, on the other side, whom
superfluity, or sloth carrieth after their sensuall pleasures, (which two sorts
of men take up the greatest part of Man-kind,) being diverted from the
deep meditation, which the learning of truth, not onely in the matter of
Naturall Justice, but also of all other Sciences necessarily requireth,
receive the Notions of their duty, chiefly from Divines in the Pulpit, and
partly from such of their Neighbours, or familiar acquaintance, as having
the Faculty of discoursing readily, and plausibly, seem wiser and better
learned in cases of Law, and Conscience, than themselves. And the
Divines, and such others as make shew of Learning, derive their
knowledge from the Universities, and from the Schooles of Law, or from
the Books, which by men eminent in those Schooles, and Universities have
been published. It is therefore manifest, that the Instruction of the people,
dependeth wholly, on the right teaching of Youth in the Universities. But
are not (may some men say) the Universities of England learned enough
already to do that? or is it you will undertake to teach the Universities?
Hard questions. Yet to the first, I doubt not to answer; that till towards the
later end of Henry the Eighth, the Power of the Pope, was alwayes upheld
against the Power of the Common-wealth, principally by the Universities;

and that the doctrines maintained by so many Preachers, against the
Soveraign Power of the King, and by so many Lawyers, and others, that
had their education there, is a sufficient argument, that though the
Universities were not authors of those false doctrines, yet they knew not
how to plant the true. For in such a contradiction of Opinions, it is most
certain, that they have not been sufficiently instructed; and 'tis no wonder,
if they yet retain a relish of that subtile liquor, wherewith they were first
seasoned, against the Civill Authority. But to the later question, it is not
fit, nor needfull for me to say either I, or No: for any man that sees what I
am doing, may easily perceive what I think.
The safety of the People, requireth further, from him, or them that have
the Soveraign Power, that Justice be equally administred to all degrees of
People; that is, that as well the rich, and mighty, as poor and obscure
persons, may be righted of the injuries done them; so as the great, may
have no greater hope of impunity, when they doe violence, dishonour, or
any Injury to the meaner sort, than when one of these, does the like to one
of them: For in this consisteth Equity; to which, as being a Precept of the
Law of Nature, a Soveraign is as much subject, as any of the meanest of
his People. All breaches of the Law, are offences against the Commonwealth: but there be some, that are also against private Persons. Those that
concern the Common-wealth onely, may without breach of Equity be
pardoned; for every man may pardon what is done against himselfe,
according to his own discretion. But an offence against a private man,
cannot in Equity be pardoned, without the consent of him that is injured;
or reasonable satisfaction.
The Inequality of Subjects, proceedeth from the Acts of Soveraign
Power; and therefore has no more place in the presence of the Soveraign;
that is to say, in a Court of Justice, then the Inequality between Kings, and
their Subjects, in the presence of the King of Kings. The honour of great
Persons, is to be valued for their beneficence, and the aydes they give to
men of inferiour rank, or not at all. And the violences, oppressions, and
injuries they do, are not extenuated, but aggravated by the greatnesse of
their persons; because they have least need to commit them. The
consequences of this partiality towards the great, proceed in this manner.
Impunity maketh Insolence; Insolence Hatred; and Hatred, an Endeavour
to pull down all oppressing and contumelious greatnesse, though with the
ruine of the Common-wealth.

Equall Taxes
To Equall Justice, appertaineth also the Equall imposition of Taxes; the
equality whereof dependeth not on the Equality of riches, but on the
Equality of the debt, that every man oweth to the Common-wealth for his
defence. It is not enough, for a man to labour for the maintenance of his
life; but also to fight, (if need be,) for the securing of his labour. They
must either do as the Jewes did after their return from captivity, in reedifying the Temple, build with one hand, and hold the Sword in the other;
or else they must hire others to fight for them. For the Impositions that are
layd on the People by the Soveraign Power, are nothing else but the
Wages, due to them that hold the publique Sword, to defend private men in
the exercise of severall Trades, and Callings. Seeing then the benefit that
every one receiveth thereby, is the enjoyment of life, which is equally dear
to poor, and rich; the debt which a poor man oweth them that defend his
life, is the same which a rich man oweth for the defence of his; saving that
the rich, who have the service of the poor, may be debtors not onely for
their own persons, but for many more. Which considered, the Equality of
Imposition, consisteth rather in the Equality of that which is consumed,
than of the riches of the persons that consume the same. For what reason is
there, that he which laboureth much, and sparing the fruits of his labour,
consumeth little, should be more charged, then he that living idlely, getteth
little, and spendeth all he gets; seeing the one hath no more protection
from the Common-wealth, then the other? But when the Impositions, are
layd upon those things which men consume, every man payeth Equally for
what he useth: Nor is the Common-wealth defrauded, by the luxurious
waste of private men.

Publique Charity
And whereas many men, by accident unevitable, become unable to
maintain themselves by their labour; they ought not to be left to the
Charity of private persons; but to be provided for, (as far-forth as the
necessities of Nature require,) by the Lawes of the Common-wealth. For as
it is Uncharitablenesse in any man, to neglect the impotent; so it is in the
Soveraign of a Common-wealth, to expose them to the hazard of such
uncertain Charity.

Prevention Of Idlenesse
But for such as have strong bodies, the case is otherwise: they are to be
forced to work; and to avoyd the excuse of not finding employment, there
ought to be such Lawes, as may encourage all manner of Arts; as
Navigation, Agriculture, Fishing, and all manner of Manifacture that
requires labour. The multitude of poor, and yet strong people still
encreasing, they are to be transplanted into Countries not sufficiently
inhabited: where neverthelesse, they are not to exterminate those they find
there; but constrain them to inhabit closer together, and not range a great
deal of ground, to snatch what they find; but to court each little Plot with
art and labour, to give them their sustenance in due season. And when all
the world is overchargd with Inhabitants, then the last remedy of all is
Warre; which provideth for every man, by Victory, or Death.

Good Lawes What
To the care of the Soveraign, belongeth the making of Good Lawes. But
what is a good Law? By a Good Law, I mean not a Just Law: for no Law
can be Unjust. The Law is made by the Soveraign Power, and all that is
done by such Power, is warranted, and owned by every one of the people;
and that which every man will have so, no man can say is unjust. It is in
the Lawes of a Common-wealth, as in the Lawes of Gaming: whatsoever
the Gamesters all agree on, is Injustice to none of them. A good Law is
that, which is Needfull, for the Good Of The People, and withall
Perspicuous.

Such As Are Necessary
For the use of Lawes, (which are but Rules Authorised) is not to bind
the People from all Voluntary actions; but to direct and keep them in such
a motion, as not to hurt themselves by their own impetuous desires,
rashnesse, or indiscretion, as Hedges are set, not to stop Travellers, but to
keep them in the way. And therefore a Law that is not Needfull, having not
the true End of a Law, is not Good. A Law may be conceived to be Good,
when it is for the benefit of the Soveraign; though it be not Necessary for
the People; but it is not so. For the good of the Soveraign and People,
cannot be separated. It is a weak Soveraign, that has weak Subjects; and a
weak People, whose Soveraign wanteth Power to rule them at his will.
Unnecessary Lawes are not good Lawes; but trapps for Mony: which
where the right of Soveraign Power is acknowledged, are superfluous; and
where it is not acknowledged, unsufficient to defend the People.

Such As Are Perspicuous
The Perspicuity, consisteth not so much in the words of the Law it selfe,
as in a Declaration of the Causes, and Motives, for which it was made.
That is it, that shewes us the meaning of the Legislator, and the meaning
of the Legislator known, the Law is more easily understood by few, than
many words. For all words, are subject to ambiguity; and therefore
multiplication of words in the body of the Law, is multiplication of
ambiguity: Besides it seems to imply, (by too much diligence,) that
whosoever can evade the words, is without the compasse of the Law. And
this is a cause of many unnecessary Processes. For when I consider how
short were the Lawes of antient times; and how they grew by degrees still
longer; me thinks I see a contention between the Penners, and Pleaders of
the Law; the former seeking to circumscribe the later; and the later to
evade their circumscriptions; and that the Pleaders have got the Victory. It
belongeth therefore to the Office of a Legislator, (such as is in all
Common-wealths the Supreme Representative, be it one Man, or an
Assembly,) to make the reason Perspicuous, why the Law was made; and
the Body of the Law it selfe, as short, but in as proper, and significant
termes, as may be.

Punishments
It belongeth also to the Office of the Soveraign, to make a right
application of Punishments, and Rewards. And seeing the end of punishing
is not revenge, and discharge of choler; but correction, either of the
offender, or of others by his example; the severest Punishments are to be
inflicted for those Crimes, that are of most Danger to the Publique; such as
are those which proceed from malice to the Government established; those
that spring from contempt of Justice; those that provoke Indignation in the
Multitude; and those, which unpunished, seem Authorised, as when they
are committed by Sonnes, Servants, or Favorites of men in Authority: For
Indignation carrieth men, not onely against the Actors, and Authors of
Injustice; but against all Power that is likely to protect them; as in the case
of Tarquin; when for the Insolent act of one of his Sonnes, he was driven
out of Rome, and the Monarchy it selfe dissolved. But Crimes of
Infirmity; such as are those which proceed from great provocation, from
great fear, great need, or from ignorance whether the Fact be a great
Crime, or not, there is place many times for Lenity, without prejudice to
the Common-wealth; and Lenity when there is such place for it, is required
by the Law of Nature. The Punishment of the Leaders, and teachers in a
Commotion; not the poore seduced People, when they are punished, can
profit the Common-wealth by their example. To be severe to the People, is
to punish that ignorance, which may in great part be imputed to the
Soveraign, whose fault it was, they were no better instructed.

Rewards
In like manner it belongeth to the Office, and Duty of the Soveraign, to
apply his Rewards alwayes so, as there may arise from them benefit to the
Common-wealth: wherein consisteth their Use, and End; and is then done,
when they that have well served the Common-wealth, are with as little
expence of the Common Treasure, as is possible, so well recompenced, as
others thereby may be encouraged, both to serve the same as faithfully as
they can, and to study the arts by which they may be enabled to do it
better. To buy with Mony, or Preferment, from a Popular ambitious
Subject, to be quiet, and desist from making ill impressions in the mindes
of the People, has nothing of the nature of Reward; (which is ordained not
for disservice, but for service past;) nor a signe of Gratitude, but of Fear:
nor does it tend to the Benefit, but to the Dammage of the Publique. It is a
contention with Ambition, like that of Hercules with the Monster Hydra,
which having many heads, for every one that was vanquished, there grew
up three. For in like manner, when the stubbornnesse of one Popular man,
is overcome with Reward, there arise many more (by the Example) that do
the same Mischiefe, in hope of like Benefit: and as all sorts of
Manifacture, so also Malice encreaseth by being vendible. And though
sometimes a Civill warre, may be differred, by such wayes as that, yet the
danger growes still the greater, and the Publique ruine more assured. It is
therefore against the Duty of the Soveraign, to whom the Publique Safety
is committed, to Reward those that aspire to greatnesse by disturbing the
Peace of their Country, and not rather to oppose the beginnings of such
men, with a little danger, than after a longer time with greater.

Counsellours
Another Businesse of the Soveraign, is to choose good Counsellours; I
mean such, whose advice he is to take in the Government of the Commonwealth. For this word Counsell, Consilium, corrupted from Considium, is a
large signification, and comprehendeth all Assemblies of men that sit
together, not onely to deliberate what is to be done hereafter, but also to
judge of Facts past, and of Law for the present. I take it here in the first
sense onely: And in this sense, there is no choyce of Counsell, neither in a
Democracy, nor Aristocracy; because the persons Counselling are
members of the person Counselled. The choyce of Counsellours therefore
is to Monarchy; In which, the Soveraign that endeavoureth not to make
choyce of those, that in every kind are the most able, dischargeth not his
Office as he ought to do. The most able Counsellours, are they that have
least hope of benefit by giving evill Counsell, and most knowledge of
those things that conduce to the Peace, and Defence of the Commonwealth. It is a hard matter to know who expecteth benefit from publique
troubles; but the signes that guide to a just suspicion, is the soothing of the
people in their unreasonable, or irremediable grievances, by men whose
estates are not sufficient to discharge their accustomed expences, and may
easily be observed by any one whom it concerns to know it. But to know,
who has most knowledge of the Publique affaires, is yet harder; and they
that know them, need them a great deale the lesse. For to know, who
knowes the Rules almost of any Art, is a great degree of the knowledge of
the same Art; because no man can be assured of the truth of anothers
Rules, but he that is first taught to understand them. But the best signes of
Knowledge of any Art, are, much conversing in it, and constant good
effects of it. Good Counsell comes not by Lot, nor by Inheritance; and
therefore there is no more reason to expect good Advice from the rich, or
noble, in matter of State, than in delineating the dimensions of a fortresse;
unlesse we shall think there needs no method in the study of the
Politiques, (as there does in the study of Geometry,) but onely to be
lookers on; which is not so. For the Politiques is the harder study of the
two. Whereas in these parts of Europe, it hath been taken for a Right of

certain persons, to have place in the highest Councell of State by
Inheritance; it is derived from the Conquests of the antient Germans;
wherein many absolute Lords joyning together to conquer other Nations,
would not enter in to the Confederacy, without such Priviledges, as might
be marks of difference in time following, between their Posterity, and the
posterity of their Subjects; which Priviledges being inconsistent with the
Soveraign Power, by the favour of the Soveraign, they may seem to keep;
but contending for them as their Right, they must needs by degrees let
them go, and have at last no further honour, than adhaereth naturally to
their abilities.
And how able soever be the Counsellours in any affaire, the benefit of
their Counsell is greater, when they give every one his Advice, and reasons
of it apart, than when they do it in an Assembly, by way of Orations; and
when they have praemeditated, than when they speak on the sudden; both
because they have more time, to survey the consequences of action; and
are lesse subject to be carried away to contradiction, through Envy,
Emulation, or other Passions arising from the difference of opinion.
The best Counsell, in those things that concern not other Nations, but
onely the ease, and benefit the Subjects may enjoy, by Lawes that look
onely inward, is to be taken from the generall informations, and
complaints of the people of each Province, who are best acquainted with
their own wants, and ought therefore, when they demand nothing in
derogation of the essentiall Rights of Soveraignty, to be diligently taken
notice of. For without those Essentiall Rights, (as I have often before
said,) the Common-wealth cannot at all subsist.

Commanders
A Commander of an Army in chiefe, if he be not Popular, shall not be
beloved, nor feared as he ought to be by his Army; and consequently
cannot performe that office with good successe. He must therefore be
Industrious, Valiant, Affable, Liberall and Fortunate, that he may gain an
opinion both of sufficiency, and of loving his Souldiers. This is Popularity,
and breeds in the Souldiers both desire, and courage, to recommend
themselves to his favour; and protects the severity of the Generall, in
punishing (when need is) the Mutinous, or negligent Souldiers. But this
love of Souldiers, (if caution be not given of the Commanders fidelity,) is
a dangerous thing to Soveraign Power; especially when it is in the hands of
an Assembly not popular. It belongeth therefore to the safety of the People,
both that they be good Conductors, and faithfull subjects, to whom the
Soveraign Commits his Armies.
But when the Soveraign himselfe is Popular, that is, reverenced and
beloved of his People, there is no danger at all from the Popularity of a
Subject. For Souldiers are never so generally unjust, as to side with their
Captain; though they love him, against their Soveraign, when they love not
onely his Person, but also his Cause. And therefore those, who by violence
have at any time suppressed the Power of their Lawfull Soveraign, before
they could settle themselves in his place, have been alwayes put to the
trouble of contriving their Titles, to save the People from the shame of
receiving them. To have a known Right to Soveraign Power, is so popular a
quality, as he that has it needs no more, for his own part, to turn the hearts
of his Subjects to him, but that they see him able absolutely to govern his
own Family: Nor, on the part of his enemies, but a disbanding of their
Armies. For the greatest and most active part of Mankind, has never
hetherto been well contented with the present.
Concerning the Offices of one Soveraign to another, which are
comprehended in that Law, which is commonly called the Law of Nations,
I need not say any thing in this place; because the Law of Nations, and the
Law of Nature, is the same thing. And every Soveraign hath the same
Right, in procuring the safety of his People, that any particular man can

have, in procuring the safety of his own Body. And the same Law, that
dictateth to men that have no Civil Government, what they ought to do,
and what to avoyd in regard of one another, dictateth the same to
Common-wealths, that is, to the Consciences of Soveraign Princes, and
Soveraign Assemblies; there being no Court of Naturall Justice, but in the
Conscience onely; where not Man, but God raigneth; whose Lawes, (such
of them as oblige all Mankind,) in respect of God, as he is the Author of
Nature, are Naturall; and in respect of the same God, as he is King of
Kings, are Lawes. But of the Kingdome of God, as King of Kings, and as
King also of a peculiar People, I shall speak in the rest of this discourse.

CHAPTER XXXI. OF THE KINGDOME OF
GOD BY NATURE

The Scope Of The Following Chapters
That the condition of meer Nature, that is to say, of absolute Liberty,
such as is theirs, that neither are Soveraigns, nor Subjects, is Anarchy, and
the condition of Warre: That the Praecepts, by which men are guided to
avoyd that condition, are the Lawes of Nature: That a Common-wealth,
without Soveraign Power, is but a word, without substance, and cannot
stand: That Subjects owe to Soveraigns, simple Obedience, in all things,
wherein their obedience is not repugnant to the Lawes of God, I have
sufficiently proved, in that which I have already written. There wants
onely, for the entire knowledge of Civill duty, to know what are those
Lawes of God. For without that, a man knows not, when he is commanded
any thing by the Civill Power, whether it be contrary to the Law of God, or
not: and so, either by too much civill obedience, offends the Divine
Majesty, or through feare of offending God, transgresses the
commandements of the Common-wealth. To avoyd both these Rocks, it is
necessary to know what are the Lawes Divine. And seeing the knowledge
of all Law, dependeth on the knowledge of the Soveraign Power; I shall
say something in that which followeth, of the KINGDOME OF GOD.

Who Are Subjects In The Kingdome Of God
"God is King, let the Earth rejoice," saith the Psalmist. (Psal. 96. 1).
And again, "God is King though the Nations be angry; and he that sitteth
on the Cherubins, though the earth be moved." (Psal. 98. 1). Whether men
will or not, they must be subject alwayes to the Divine Power. By denying
the Existence, or Providence of God, men may shake off their Ease, but
not their Yoke. But to call this Power of God, which extendeth it selfe not
onely to Man, but also to Beasts, and Plants, and Bodies inanimate, by the
name of Kingdome, is but a metaphoricall use of the word. For he onely is
properly said to Raigne, that governs his Subjects, by his Word, and by
promise of Rewards to those that obey it, and by threatning them with
Punishment that obey it not. Subjects therefore in the Kingdome of God,
are not Bodies Inanimate, nor creatures Irrationall; because they
understand no Precepts as his: Nor Atheists; nor they that believe not that
God has any care of the actions of mankind; because they acknowledge no
Word for his, nor have hope of his rewards, or fear of his threatnings. They
therefore that believe there is a God that governeth the world, and hath
given Praecepts, and propounded Rewards, and Punishments to Mankind,
are Gods Subjects; all the rest, are to be understood as Enemies.

A Threefold Word Of God, Reason, Revelation,
Prophecy
To rule by Words, requires that such Words be manifestly made known;
for else they are no Lawes: For to the nature of Lawes belongeth a
sufficient, and clear Promulgation, such as may take away the excuse of
Ignorance; which in the Lawes of men is but of one onely kind, and that is,
Proclamation, or Promulgation by the voyce of man. But God declareth his
Lawes three wayes; by the Dictates of Naturall Reason, By Revelation, and
by the Voyce of some Man, to whom by the operation of Miracles, he
procureth credit with the rest. From hence there ariseth a triple Word of
God, Rational, Sensible, and Prophetique: to which Correspondeth a triple
Hearing; Right Reason, Sense Supernaturall, and Faith. As for Sense
Supernaturall, which consisteth in Revelation, or Inspiration, there have
not been any Universall Lawes so given, because God speaketh not in that
manner, but to particular persons, and to divers men divers things.
A Twofold Kingdome Of God, Naturall And Prophetique From the
difference between the other two kinds of Gods Word, Rationall, and
Prophetique, there may be attributed to God, a two-fold Kingdome,
Naturall, and Prophetique: Naturall, wherein he governeth as many of
Mankind as acknowledge his Providence, by the naturall Dictates of Right
Reason; And Prophetique, wherein having chosen out one peculiar Nation
(the Jewes) for his Subjects, he governed them, and none but them, not
onely by naturall Reason, but by Positive Lawes, which he gave them by
the mouths of his holy Prophets. Of the Naturall Kingdome of God I intend
to speak in this Chapter.
The Right Of Gods Soveraignty Is Derived From His Omnipotence The
Right of Nature, whereby God reigneth over men, and punisheth those that
break his Lawes, is to be derived, not from his Creating them, as if he
required obedience, as of Gratitude for his benefits; but from his
Irresistible Power. I have formerly shewn, how the Soveraign Right ariseth
from Pact: To shew how the same Right may arise from Nature, requires
no more, but to shew in what case it is never taken away. Seeing all men

by Nature had Right to All things, they had Right every one to reigne over
all the rest. But because this Right could not be obtained by force, it
concerned the safety of every one, laying by that Right, to set up men
(with Soveraign Authority) by common consent, to rule and defend them:
whereas if there had been any man of Power Irresistible; there had been no
reason, why he should not by that Power have ruled, and defended both
himselfe, and them, according to his own discretion. To those therefore
whose Power is irresistible, the dominion of all men adhaereth naturally
by their excellence of Power; and consequently it is from that Power, that
the Kingdome over men, and the Right of afflicting men at his pleasure,
belongeth Naturally to God Almighty; not as Creator, and Gracious; but as
Omnipotent. And though Punishment be due for Sinne onely, because by
that word is understood Affliction for Sinne; yet the Right of Afflicting, is
not alwayes derived from mens Sinne, but from Gods Power.

Sinne Not The Cause Of All Affliction
This question, "Why Evill men often Prosper, and Good men suffer
Adversity," has been much disputed by the Antient, and is the same with
this of ours, "By what Right God dispenseth the Prosperities and
Adversities of this life;" and is of that difficulty, as it hath shaken the
faith, not onely of the Vulgar, but of Philosophers, and which is more, of
the Saints, concerning the Divine Providence. "How Good," saith David,
"is the God of Israel to those that are Upright in Heart; and yet my feet
were almost gone, my treadings had well-nigh slipt; for I was grieved at
the Wicked, when I saw the Ungodly in such Prosperity." And Job, how
earnestly does he expostulate with God, for the many Afflictions he
suffered, notwithstanding his Righteousnesse? This question in the case of
Job, is decided by God himselfe, not by arguments derived from Job's
Sinne, but his own Power. For whereas the friends of Job drew their
arguments from his Affliction to his Sinne, and he defended himselfe by
the conscience of his Innocence, God himselfe taketh up the matter, and
having justified the Affliction by arguments drawn from his Power, such
as this "Where was thou when I layd the foundations of the earth," and the
like, both approved Job's Innocence, and reproved the Erroneous doctrine
of his friends. Conformable to this doctrine is the sentence of our Saviour,
concerning the man that was born Blind, in these words, "Neither hath this
man sinned, nor his fathers; but that the works of God might be made
manifest in him." And though it be said "That Death entred into the world
by sinne," (by which is meant that if Adam had never sinned, he had never
dyed, that is, never suffered any separation of his soule from his body,) it
follows not thence, that God could not justly have Afflicted him, though
he had not Sinned, as well as he afflicteth other living creatures, that
cannot sinne.

Divine Lawes
Having spoken of the Right of Gods Soveraignty, as grounded onely on
Nature; we are to consider next, what are the Divine Lawes, or Dictates of
Naturall Reason; which Lawes concern either the naturall Duties of one
man to another, or the Honour naturally due to our Divine Soveraign. The
first are the same Lawes of Nature, of which I have spoken already in the
14. and 15. Chapters of this Treatise; namely, Equity, Justice, Mercy,
Humility, and the rest of the Morall Vertues. It remaineth therefore that we
consider, what Praecepts are dictated to men, by their Naturall Reason
onely, without other word of God, touching the Honour and Worship of the
Divine Majesty.

Honour And Worship What
Honour consisteth in the inward thought, and opinion of the Power, and
Goodnesse of another: and therefore to Honour God, is to think as Highly
of his Power and Goodnesse, as is possible. And of that opinion, the
externall signes appearing in the Words, and Actions of men, are called
Worship; which is one part of that which the Latines understand by the
word Cultus: For Cultus signifieth properly, and constantly, that labour
which a man bestowes on any thing, with a purpose to make benefit by it.
Now those things whereof we make benefit, are either subject to us, and
the profit they yeeld, followeth the labour we bestow upon them, as a
naturall effect; or they are not subject to us, but answer our labour,
according to their own Wills. In the first sense the labour bestowed on the
Earth, is called Culture; and the education of Children a Culture of their
mindes. In the second sense, where mens wills are to be wrought to our
purpose, not by Force, but by Compleasance, it signifieth as much as
Courting, that is, a winning of favour by good offices; as by praises, by
acknowledging their Power, and by whatsoever is pleasing to them from
whom we look for any benefit. And this is properly Worship: in which
sense Publicola, is understood for a Worshipper of the People, and Cultus
Dei, for the Worship of God.

Severall Signes Of Honour
From internall Honour, consisting in the opinion of Power and
Goodnesse, arise three Passions; Love, which hath reference to Goodnesse;
and Hope, and Fear, that relate to Power: And three parts of externall
worship; Praise, Magnifying, and Blessing: The subject of Praise, being
Goodnesse; the subject of Magnifying, and Blessing, being Power, and the
effect thereof Felicity. Praise, and Magnifying are significant both by
Words, and Actions: By Words, when we say a man is Good, or Great: By
Actions, when we thank him for his Bounty, and obey his Power. The
opinion of the Happinesse of another, can onely be expressed by words.

Worship Naturall And Arbitrary
There be some signes of Honour, (both in Attributes and Actions,) that
be Naturally so; as amongst Attributes, Good, Just, Liberall, and the like;
and amongst Actions, Prayers, Thanks, and Obedience. Others are so by
Institution, or Custome of men; and in some times and places are
Honourable; in others Dishonourable; in others Indifferent: such as are the
Gestures in Salutation, Prayer, and Thanksgiving, in different times and
places, differently used. The former is Naturall; the later Arbitrary
Worship.

Worship Commanded And Free
And of Arbitrary Worship, there bee two differences: For sometimes it
is a Commanded, sometimes Voluntary Worship: Commanded, when it is
such as hee requireth, who is Worshipped: Free, when it is such as the
Worshipper thinks fit. When it is Commanded, not the words, or gestures,
but the obedience is the Worship. But when Free, the Worship consists in
the opinion of the beholders: for if to them the words, or actions by which
we intend honour, seem ridiculous, and tending to contumely; they are not
Worship; because a signe is not a signe to him that giveth it, but to him to
whom it is made; that is, to the spectator.

Worship Publique And Private
Again, there is a Publique, and a Private Worship. Publique, is the
Worship that a Common-wealth performeth, as one Person. Private, is that
which a Private person exhibiteth. Publique, in respect of the whole
Common-wealth, is Free; but in respect of Particular men it is not so.
Private, is in secret Free; but in the sight of the multitude, it is never
without some Restraint, either from the Lawes, or from the Opinion of
men; which is contrary to the nature of Liberty.

The End Of Worship
The End of Worship amongst men, is Power. For where a man seeth
another worshipped he supposeth him powerfull, and is the readier to obey
him; which makes his Power greater. But God has no Ends: the worship we
do him, proceeds from our duty, and is directed according to our capacity,
by those rules of Honour, that Reason dictateth to be done by the weak to
the more potent men, in hope of benefit, for fear of dammage, or in
thankfulnesse for good already received from them.

Attributes Of Divine Honour
That we may know what worship of God is taught us by the light of
Nature, I will begin with his Attributes. Where, First, it is manifest, we
ought to attribute to him Existence: For no man can have the will to
honour that, which he thinks not to have any Beeing.
Secondly, that those Philosophers, who sayd the World, or the Soule of
the World was God, spake unworthily of him; and denyed his Existence:
For by God, is understood the cause of the World; and to say the World is
God, is to say there is no cause of it, that is, no God.
Thirdly, to say the World was not Created, but Eternall, (seeing that
which is Eternall has no cause,) is to deny there is a God.
Fourthly, that they who attributing (as they think) Ease to God, take
from him the care of Mankind; take from him his Honour: for it takes
away mens love, and fear of him; which is the root of Honour.
Fifthly, in those things that signifie Greatnesse, and Power; to say he is
Finite, is not to Honour him: For it is not a signe of the Will to Honour
God, to attribute to him lesse than we can; and Finite, is lesse than we can;
because to Finite, it is easie to adde more.
Therefore to attribute Figure to him, is not Honour; for all Figure is
Finite:
Nor to say we conceive, and imagine, or have an Idea of him, in our
mind: for whatsoever we conceive is Finite:
Not to attribute to him Parts, or Totality; which are the Attributes onely
of things Finite:
Nor to say he is this, or that Place: for whatsoever is in Place, is
bounded, and Finite:
Nor that he is Moved, or Resteth: for both these Attributes ascribe to
him Place:
Nor that there be more Gods than one; because it implies them all
Finite: for there cannot be more than one Infinite: Nor to ascribe to him
(unlesse Metaphorically, meaning not the Passion, but the Effect) Passions

that partake of Griefe; as Repentance, Anger, Mercy: or of Want; as
Appetite, Hope, Desire; or of any Passive faculty: For Passion, is Power
limited by somewhat else.
And therefore when we ascribe to God a Will, it is not to be understood,
as that of Man, for a Rationall Appetite; but as the Power, by which he
effecteth every thing.
Likewise when we attribute to him Sight, and other acts of Sense; as
also Knowledge, and Understanding; which in us is nothing else, but a
tumult of the mind, raised by externall things that presse the organicall
parts of mans body: For there is no such thing in God; and being things
that depend on naturall causes, cannot be attributed to him.
Hee that will attribute to God, nothing but what is warranted by naturall
Reason, must either use such Negative Attributes, as Infinite, Eternall,
Incomprehensible; or Superlatives, as Most High, Most Great, and the
like; or Indefinite, as Good, Just, Holy, Creator; and in such sense, as if he
meant not to declare what he is, (for that were to circumscribe him within
the limits of our Fancy,) but how much wee admire him, and how ready we
would be to obey him; which is a signe of Humility, and of a Will to
honour him as much as we can: For there is but one Name to signifie our
Conception of his Nature, and that is, I AM: and but one Name of his
Relation to us, and that is God; in which is contained Father, King, and
Lord.

Actions That Are Signes Of Divine Honour
Concerning the actions of Divine Worship, it is a most generall Precept
of Reason, that they be signes of the Intention to Honour God; such as are,
First, Prayers: For not the Carvers, when they made Images, were thought
to make them Gods; but the People that Prayed to them.
Secondly, Thanksgiving; which differeth from Prayer in Divine
Worship, no otherwise, than that Prayers precede, and Thanks succeed the
benefit; the end both of the one, and the other, being to acknowledge God,
for Author of all benefits, as well past, as future.
Thirdly, Gifts; that is to say, Sacrifices, and Oblations, (if they be of the
best,) are signes of Honour: for they are Thanksgivings.
Fourthly, Not to swear by any but God, is naturally a signe of Honour:
for it is a confession that God onely knoweth the heart; and that no mans
wit, or strength can protect a man against Gods vengence on the perjured.
Fifthly, it is a part of Rationall Worship, to speak Considerately of God;
for it argues a Fear of him, and Fear, is a confession of his Power. Hence
followeth, That the name of God is not to be used rashly, and to no
purpose; for that is as much, as in Vain: And it is to no purpose; unlesse it
be by way of Oath, and by order of the Common-wealth, to make
Judgements certain; or between Common-wealths, to avoyd Warre. And
that disputing of Gods nature is contrary to his Honour: For it is supposed,
that in this naturall Kingdome of God, there is no other way to know any
thing, but by naturall Reason; that is, from the Principles of naturall
Science; which are so farre from teaching us any thing of Gods nature, as
they cannot teach us our own nature, nor the nature of the smallest
creature living. And therefore, when men out of the Principles of naturall
Reason, dispute of the Attributes of God, they but dishonour him: For in
the Attributes which we give to God, we are not to consider the
signification of Philosophicall Truth; but the signification of Pious
Intention, to do him the greatest Honour we are able. From the want of
which consideration, have proceeded the volumes of disputation about the
Nature of God, that tend not to his Honour, but to the honour of our own

wits, and learning; and are nothing else but inconsiderate, and vain abuses
of his Sacred Name.
Sixthly, in Prayers, Thanksgivings, Offerings and Sacrifices, it is a
Dictate of naturall Reason, that they be every one in his kind the best, and
most significant of Honour. As for example, that Prayers, and
Thanksgiving, be made in Words and Phrases, not sudden, nor light, nor
Plebeian; but beautifull and well composed; For else we do not God as
much honour as we can. And therefore the Heathens did absurdly, to
worship Images for Gods: But their doing it in Verse, and with Musick,
both of Voyce, and Instruments, was reasonable. Also that the Beasts they
offered in sacrifice, and the Gifts they offered, and their actions in
Worshipping, were full of submission, and commemorative of benefits
received, was according to reason, as proceeding from an intention to
honour him.
Seventhly, Reason directeth not onely to worship God in Secret; but
also, and especially, in Publique, and in the sight of men: For without that,
(that which in honour is most acceptable) the procuring others to honour
him, is lost.
Lastly, Obedience to his Lawes (that is, in this case to the Lawes of
Nature,) is the greatest worship of all. For as Obedience is more
acceptable to God than sacrifice; so also to set light by his
Commandements, is the greatest of all contumelies. And these are the
Lawes of that Divine Worship, which naturall Reason dictateth to private
men.

Publique Worship Consisteth In Uniformity
But seeing a Common-wealth is but one Person, it ought also to exhibite
to God but one Worship; which then it doth, when it commandeth it to be
exhibited by Private men, Publiquely. And this is Publique Worship; the
property whereof, is to be Uniforme: For those actions that are done
differently, by different men, cannot be said to be a Publique Worship. And
therefore, where many sorts of Worship be allowed, proceeding from the
different Religions of Private men, it cannot be said there is any Publique
Worship, nor that the Common-wealth is of any Religion at all.

All Attributes Depend On The Lawes Civill
And because words (and consequently the Attributes of God) have their
signification by agreement, and constitution of men; those Attributes are
to be held significative of Honour, that men intend shall so be; and
whatsoever may be done by the wills of particular men, where there is no
Law but Reason, may be done by the will of the Common-wealth, by
Lawes Civill. And because a Common-wealth hath no Will, nor makes no
Lawes, but those that are made by the Will of him, or them that have the
Soveraign Power; it followeth, that those Attributes which the Soveraign
ordaineth, in the Worship of God, for signes of Honour, ought to be taken
and used for such, by private men in their publique Worship.

Not All Actions
But because not all Actions are signes by Constitution; but some are
Naturally signes of Honour, others of Contumely, these later (which are
those that men are ashamed to do in the sight of them they reverence)
cannot be made by humane power a part of Divine worship; nor the former
(such as are decent, modest, humble Behaviour) ever be separated from it.
But whereas there be an infinite number of Actions, and Gestures, of an
indifferent nature; such of them as the Common-wealth shall ordain to be
Publiquely and Universally in use, as signes of Honour, and part of Gods
Worship, are to be taken and used for such by the Subjects. And that which
is said in the Scripture, "It is better to obey God than men," hath place in
the kingdome of God by Pact, and not by Nature.

Naturall Punishments
Having thus briefly spoken of the Naturall Kingdome of God, and his
Naturall Lawes, I will adde onely to this Chapter a short declaration of his
Naturall Punishments. There is no action of man in this life, that is not the
beginning of so long a chayn of Consequences, as no humane Providence,
is high enough, to give a man a prospect to the end. And in this Chayn,
there are linked together both pleasing and unpleasing events; in such
manner, as he that will do any thing for his pleasure, must engage himselfe
to suffer all the pains annexed to it; and these pains, are the Naturall
Punishments of those actions, which are the beginning of more Harme that
Good. And hereby it comes to passe, that Intemperance, is naturally
punished with Diseases; Rashnesse, with Mischances; Injustice, with the
Violence of Enemies; Pride, with Ruine; Cowardise, with Oppression;
Negligent government of Princes, with Rebellion; and Rebellion, with
Slaughter. For seeing Punishments are consequent to the breach of Lawes;
Naturall Punishments must be naturally consequent to the breach of the
Lawes of Nature; and therfore follow them as their naturall, not arbitrary
effects.

The Conclusion Of The Second Part
And thus farre concerning the Constitution, Nature, and Right of
Soveraigns; and concerning the Duty of Subjects, derived from the
Principles of Naturall Reason. And now, considering how different this
Doctrine is, from the Practise of the greatest part of the world, especially
of these Western parts, that have received their Morall learning from
Rome, and Athens; and how much depth of Morall Philosophy is required,
in them that have the Administration of the Soveraign Power; I am at the
point of believing this my labour, as uselesse, and the Common-wealth of
Plato; For he also is of opinion that it is impossible for the disorders of
State, and change of Governments by Civill Warre, ever to be taken away,
till Soveraigns be Philosophers. But when I consider again, that the
Science of Naturall Justice, is the onely Science necessary for Soveraigns,
and their principall Ministers; and that they need not be charged with the
Sciences Mathematicall, (as by Plato they are,) further, than by good
Lawes to encourage men to the study of them; and that neither Plato, nor
any other Philosopher hitherto, hath put into order, and sufficiently, or
probably proved all the Theoremes of Morall doctrine, that men may learn
thereby, both how to govern, and how to obey; I recover some hope, that
one time or other, this writing of mine, may fall into the hands of a
Soveraign, who will consider it himselfe, (for it is short, and I think clear,)
without the help of any interested, or envious Interpreter; and by the
exercise of entire Soveraignty, in protecting the Publique teaching of it,
convert this Truth of Speculation, into the Utility of Practice.

PART III. OF A CHRISTIAN COMMONWEALTH

CHAPTER XXXII. OF THE PRINCIPLES OF
CHRISTIAN POLITIQUES
The Word Of God Delivered By Prophets Is The Main Principle
Of Christian Politiques
I have derived the Rights of Soveraigne Power, and the duty of Subjects
hitherto, from the Principles of Nature onely; such as Experience has
found true, or Consent (concerning the use of words) has made so; that is
to say, from the nature of Men, known to us by Experience, and from
Definitions (of such words as are Essentiall to all Politicall reasoning)
universally agreed on. But in that I am next to handle, which is the Nature
and Rights of a CHRISTIAN COMMON-WEALTH, whereof there
dependeth much upon Supernaturall Revelations of the Will of God; the
ground of my Discourse must be, not only the Naturall Word of God, but
also the Propheticall.
Neverthelesse, we are not to renounce our Senses, and Experience; nor
(that which is the undoubted Word of God) our naturall Reason. For they
are the talents which he hath put into our hands to negotiate, till the
coming again of our blessed Saviour; and therefore not to be folded up in
the Napkin of an Implicate Faith, but employed in the purchase of Justice,
Peace, and true Religion, For though there be many things in Gods Word
above Reason; that is to say, which cannot by naturall reason be either
demonstrated, or confuted; yet there is nothing contrary to it; but when it
seemeth so, the fault is either in our unskilfull Interpretation, or erroneous
Ratiocination.
Therefore, when any thing therein written is too hard for our
examination, wee are bidden to captivate our understanding to the Words;
and not to labour in sifting out a Philosophicall truth by Logick, of such
mysteries as are not comprehensible, nor fall under any rule of naturall
science. For it is with the mysteries of our Religion, as with wholsome
pills for the sick, which swallowed whole, have the vertue to cure; but
chewed, are for the most part cast up again without effect.

What It Is To Captivate The Understanding
But by the Captivity of our Understanding, is not meant a Submission of
the Intellectual faculty, to the Opinion of any other man; but of the Will to
Obedience, where obedience is due. For Sense, Memory, Understanding,
Reason, and Opinion are not in our power to change; but alwaies, and
necessarily such, as the things we see, hear, and consider suggest unto us;
and therefore are not effects of our Will, but our Will of them. We then
Captivate our Understanding and Reason, when we forbear contradiction;
when we so speak, as (by lawfull Authority) we are commanded; and when
we live accordingly; which in sum, is Trust, and Faith reposed in him that
speaketh, though the mind be incapable of any Notion at all from the
words spoken.

How God Speaketh To Men
When God speaketh to man, it must be either immediately; or by
mediation of another man, to whom he had formerly spoken by himself
immediately. How God speaketh to a man immediately, may be understood
by those well enough, to whom he hath so spoken; but how the same
should be understood by another, is hard, if not impossible to know. For if
a man pretend to me, that God hath spoken to him supernaturally, and
immediately, and I make doubt of it, I cannot easily perceive what
argument he can produce, to oblige me to beleeve it. It is true, that if he be
my Soveraign, he may oblige me to obedience, so, as not by act or word to
declare I beleeve him not; but not to think any otherwise then my reason
perswades me. But if one that hath not such authority over me, shall
pretend the same, there is nothing that exacteth either beleefe, or
obedience.
For to say that God hath spoken to him in the Holy Scripture, is not to
say God hath spoken to him immediately, but by mediation of the
Prophets, or of the Apostles, or of the Church, in such manner as he speaks
to all other Christian men. To say he hath spoken to him in a Dream, is no
more than to say he dreamed that God spake to him; which is not of force
to win beleef from any man, that knows dreams are for the most part
naturall, and may proceed from former thoughts; and such dreams as that,
from selfe conceit, and foolish arrogance, and false opinion of a mans own
godlinesse, or other vertue, by which he thinks he hath merited the favour
of extraordinary Revelation. To say he hath seen a Vision, or heard a Voice,
is to say, that he hath dreamed between sleeping and waking: for in such
manner a man doth many times naturally take his dream for a vision, as
not having well observed his own slumbering. To say he speaks by
supernaturall Inspiration, is to say he finds an ardent desire to speak, or
some strong opinion of himself, for which he can alledge no naturall and
sufficient reason. So that though God Almighty can speak to a man, by
Dreams, Visions, Voice, and Inspiration; yet he obliges no man to beleeve
he hath so done to him that pretends it; who (being a man), may erre, and
(which is more) may lie.

By What Marks Prophets Are Known
How then can he, to whom God hath never revealed his Wil
immediately (saving by the way of natural reason) know when he is to
obey, or not to obey his Word, delivered by him, that sayes he is a Prophet?
(1 Kings 22) Of 400 Prophets, of whom the K. of Israel asked counsel,
concerning the warre he made against Ramoth Gilead, only Micaiah was a
true one.(1 Kings 13) The Prophet that was sent to prophecy against the
Altar set up by Jeroboam, though a true Prophet, and that by two miracles
done in his presence appears to be a Prophet sent from God, was yet
deceived by another old Prophet, that perswaded him as from the mouth of
God, to eat and drink with him. If one Prophet deceive another, what
certainty is there of knowing the will of God, by other way than that of
Reason? To which I answer out of the Holy Scripture, that there be two
marks, by which together, not asunder, a true Prophet is to be known. One
is the doing of miracles; the other is the not teaching any other Religion
than that which is already established. Asunder (I say) neither of these is
sufficient. (Deut. 13 v. 1,2,3,4,5 ) "If a Prophet rise amongst you, or a
Dreamer of dreams, and shall pretend the doing of a miracle, and the
miracle come to passe; if he say, Let us follow strange Gods, which thou
hast not known, thou shalt not hearken to him, &c. But that Prophet and
Dreamer of dreams shall be put to death, because he hath spoken to you to
Revolt from the Lord your God." In which words two things are to be
observed, First, that God wil not have miracles alone serve for arguments,
to approve the Prophets calling; but (as it is in the third verse) for an
experiment of the constancy of our adherence to himself. For the works of
the Egyptian Sorcerers, though not so great as those of Moses, yet were
great miracles. Secondly, that how great soever the miracle be, yet if it
tend to stir up revolt against the King, or him that governeth by the Kings
authority, he that doth such miracle, is not to be considered otherwise than
as sent to make triall of their allegiance. For these words, "revolt from the
Lord your God," are in this place equivalent to "revolt from your King."
For they had made God their King by pact at the foot of Mount Sinai; who
ruled them by Moses only; for he only spake with God, and from time to

time declared Gods Commandements to the people. In like manner, after
our Saviour Christ had made his Disciples acknowledge him for the
Messiah, (that is to say, for Gods anointed, whom the nation of the Jews
daily expected for their King, but refused when he came,) he omitted not
to advertise them of the danger of miracles. "There shall arise," (saith he)
"false Christs, and false Prophets, and shall doe great wonders and
miracles, even to the seducing (if it were possible) of the very Elect."
(Mat. 24. 24) By which it appears, that false Prophets may have the power
of miracles; yet are wee not to take their doctrin for Gods Word. St. Paul
says further to the Galatians, that "if himself, or an Angell from heaven
preach another Gospel to them, than he had preached, let him be
accursed." (Gal. 1. 8) That Gospel was, that Christ was King; so that all
preaching against the power of the King received, in consequence to these
words, is by St. Paul accursed. For his speech is addressed to those, who
by his preaching had already received Jesus for the Christ, that is to say,
for King of the Jews.

The Marks Of A Prophet In The Old Law,
Miracles, And Doctrine
Conformable To The Law
And as Miracles, without preaching that Doctrine which God hath
established; so preaching the true Doctrine, without the doing of Miracles,
is an unsufficient argument of immediate Revelation. For if a man that
teacheth not false Doctrine, should pretend to bee a Prophet without
shewing any Miracle, he is never the more to bee regarded for his
pretence, as is evident by Deut. 18. v. 21, 22. "If thou say in thy heart, How
shall we know that the Word (of the Prophet) is not that which the Lord
hath spoken. When the Prophet shall have spoken in the name of the Lord,
that which shall not come to passe, that's the word which the Lord hath not
spoken, but the Prophet has spoken it out of the pride of his own heart, fear
him not." But a man may here again ask, When the Prophet hath foretold a
thing, how shal we know whether it will come to passe or not? For he may
foretel it as a thing to arrive after a certain long time, longer then the time
of mans life; or indefinitely, that it will come to passe one time or other: in
which case this mark of a Prophet is unusefull; and therefore the miracles
that oblige us to beleeve a Prophet, ought to be confirmed by an
immediate, or a not long deferr'd event. So that it is manifest, that the
teaching of the Religion which God hath established, and the showing of a
present Miracle, joined together, were the only marks whereby the
Scripture would have a true Prophet, that is to say immediate Revelation
to be acknowledged; neither of them being singly sufficient to oblige any
other man to regard what he saith.

Miracles Ceasing, Prophets Cease, The Scripture
Supplies Their Place
Seeing therefore Miracles now cease, we have no sign left, whereby to
acknowledge the pretended Revelations, or Inspirations of any private
man; nor obligation to give ear to any Doctrine, farther than it is
conformable to the Holy Scriptures, which since the time of our Saviour,
supply the want of all other Prophecy; and from which, by wise and
careful ratiocination, all rules and precepts necessary to the knowledge of
our duty both to God and man, without Enthusiasme, or supernaturall
Inspiration, may easily be deduced. And this Scripture is it, out of which I
am to take the Principles of my Discourse, concerning the Rights of those
that are the Supream Govenors on earth, of Christian Common-wealths;
and of the duty of Christian Subjects towards their Soveraigns. And to that
end, I shall speak in the next Chapter, or the Books, Writers, Scope and
Authority of the Bible.

CHAPTER XXXIII. OF THE NUMBER,
ANTIQUITY, SCOPE, AUTHORITY,
AND INTERPRETERS OF THE BOOKS OF HOLY
SCRIPTURES

Of The Books Of Holy Scripture
By the Books of Holy SCRIPTURE, are understood those, which ought
to be the Canon, that is to say, the Rules of Christian life. And because all
Rules of life, which men are in conscience bound to observe, are Laws; the
question of the Scripture, is the question of what is Law throughout all
Christendome, both Naturall, and Civill. For though it be not determined
in Scripture, what Laws every Christian King shall constitute in his own
Dominions; yet it is determined what laws he shall not constitute. Seeing
therefore I have already proved, that Soveraigns in their own Dominions
are the sole Legislators; those Books only are Canonicall, that is, Law, in
every nation, which are established for such by the Soveraign Authority. It
is true, that God is the Soveraign of all Soveraigns; and therefore, when he
speaks to any Subject, he ought to be obeyed, whatsoever any earthly
Potentate command to the contrary. But the question is not of obedience to
God, but of When, and What God hath said; which to Subjects that have no
supernaturall revelation, cannot be known, but by that naturall reason,
which guided them, for the obtaining of Peace and Justice, to obey the
authority of their severall Common-wealths; that is to say, of their lawfull
Soveraigns. According to this obligation, I can acknowledge no other
Books of the Old Testament, to be Holy Scripture, but those which have
been commanded to be acknowledged for such, by the Authority of the
Church of England. What Books these are, is sufficiently known, without a
Catalogue of them here; and they are the same that are acknowledged by
St. Jerome, who holdeth the rest, namely, the Wisdome of Solomon,
Ecclesiasticus, Judith, Tobias, the first and second of Maccabees, (though
he had seen the first in Hebrew) and the third and fourth of Esdras, for
Apocrypha. Of the Canonicall, Josephus a learned Jew, that wrote in the
time of the Emperor Domitian, reckoneth Twenty Two, making the number
agree with the Hebrew Alphabet. St. Jerome does the same, though they
reckon them in different manner. For Josephus numbers Five Books of
Moses, Thirteen of Prophets, that writ the History of their own times
(which how it agrees with the Prophets writings contained in the Bible wee
shall see hereafter), and Four of Hymnes and Morall Precepts. But St.

Jerome reckons Five Books of Moses, Eight of Prophets, and Nine of other
Holy writ, which he calls of Hagiographa. The Septuagint, who were 70.
learned men of the Jews, sent for by Ptolemy King of Egypt, to translate
the Jewish Law, out of the Hebrew into the Greek, have left us no other for
holy Scripture in the Greek tongue, but the same that are received in the
Church of England.
As for the Books of the New Testament, they are equally acknowledged
for Canon by all Christian Churches, and by all sects of Christians, that
admit any Books at all for Canonicall.

Their Antiquity
Who were the originall writers of the severall Books of Holy Scripture,
has not been made evident by any sufficient testimony of other History,
(which is the only proof of matter of fact); nor can be by any arguments of
naturall Reason; for Reason serves only to convince the truth (not of fact,
but) of consequence. The light therefore that must guide us in this
question, must be that which is held out unto us from the Bookes
themselves: And this light, though it show us not the writer of every book,
yet it is not unusefull to give us knowledge of the time, wherein they were
written.

The Pentateuch Not Written By Moses
And first, for the Pentateuch, it is not argument enough that they were
written by Moses, because they are called the five Books of Moses; no
more than these titles, The Book of Joshua, the Book of Judges, The Book
of Ruth, and the Books of the Kings, are arguments sufficient to prove,
that they were written by Joshua, by the Judges, by Ruth, and by the Kings.
For in titles of Books, the subject is marked, as often as the writer. The
History Of Livy, denotes the Writer; but the History Of Scanderbeg, is
denominated from the subject. We read in the last Chapter of
Deuteronomie, Ver. 6. concerning the sepulcher of Moses, "that no man
knoweth of his sepulcher to this day," that is, to the day wherein those
words were written. It is therefore manifest, that those words were written
after his interrement. For it were a strange interpretation, to say Moses
spake of his own sepulcher (though by Prophecy), that it was not found to
that day, wherein he was yet living. But it may perhaps be alledged, that
the last Chapter only, not the whole Pentateuch, was written by some other
man, but the rest not: Let us therefore consider that which we find in the
Book of Genesis, Chap. 12. Ver. 6 "And Abraham passed through the land
to the place of Sichem, unto the plain of Moreh, and the Canaanite was
then in the land;" which must needs bee the words of one that wrote when
the Canaanite was not in the land; and consequently, not of Moses, who
dyed before he came into it. Likewise Numbers 21. Ver. 14. the Writer
citeth another more ancient Book, Entituled, The Book of the Warres of
the Lord, wherein were registred the Acts of Moses, at the Red-sea, and at
the brook of Arnon. It is therefore sufficiently evident, that the five Books
of Moses were written after his time, though how long after it be not so
manifest.
But though Moses did not compile those Books entirely, and in the form
we have them; yet he wrote all that which hee is there said to have written:
as for example, the Volume of the Law, which is contained, as it seemeth
in the 11 of Deuteronomie, and the following Chapters to the 27. which
was also commanded to be written on stones, in their entry into the land of
Canaan. (Deut. 31. 9) And this did Moses himself write, and deliver to the

Priests and Elders of Israel, to be read every seventh year to all Israel, at
their assembling in the feast of Tabernacles. And this is that Law which
God commanded, that their Kings (when they should have established that
form of Government) should take a copy of from the Priests and Levites to
lay in the side of the Arke; (Deut. 31. 26) and the same which having been
lost, was long time after found again by Hilkiah, and sent to King Josias,
who causing it to be read to the People, renewed the Covenant between
God and them. (2 King. 22. 8 & 23. 1,2,3)

The Book of Joshua Written After His Time
That the Book of Joshua was also written long after the time of Joshua,
may be gathered out of many places of the Book it self. Joshua had set up
twelve stones in the middest of Jordan, for a monument of their passage;
(Josh 4. 9) of which the Writer saith thus, "They are there unto this day;"
(Josh 5. 9) for "unto this day", is a phrase that signifieth a time past,
beyond the memory of man. In like manner, upon the saying of the Lord,
that he had rolled off from the people the Reproach of Egypt, the Writer
saith, "The place is called Gilgal unto this day;" which to have said in the
time of Joshua had been improper. So also the name of the Valley of
Achor, from the trouble that Achan raised in the Camp, (Josh. 7. 26) the
Writer saith, "remaineth unto this day;" which must needs bee therefore
long after the time of Joshua. Arguments of this kind there be many other;
as Josh. 8. 29. 13. 13. 14. 14. 15. 63.

The Booke Of Judges And Ruth Written Long
After The Captivity
The same is manifest by like arguments of the Book of Judges, chap. 1.
21,26 6.24 10.4 15.19 17.6 and Ruth 1. 1. but especially Judg. 18. 30.
where it is said, that Jonathan "and his sonnes were Priests to the Tribe of
Dan, untill the day of the captivity of the land."

The Like Of The Bookes Of Samuel
That the Books of Samuel were also written after his own time, there are
the like arguments, 1 Sam. 5.5. 7.13,15. 27.6. & 30.25. where, after David
had adjudged equall part of the spoiles, to them that guarded the
Ammunition, with them that fought, the Writer saith, "He made it a
Statute and an Ordinance to Israel to this day." (2. Sam. 6.4.) Again, when
David (displeased, that the Lord had slain Uzzah, for putting out his hand
to sustain the Ark,) called the place Perez-Uzzah, the Writer saith, it is
called so "to this day": the time therefore of the writing of that Book, must
be long after the time of the fact; that is, long after the time of David.

The Books Of The Kings, And The Chronicles
As for the two Books of the Kings, and the two books of the Chronicles,
besides the places which mention such monuments, as the Writer saith,
remained till his own days; such as are 1 Kings 9.13. 9.21. 10. 12. 12.19. 2
Kings 2.22. 8.22. 10.27. 14.7. 16.6. 17.23. 17.34. 17.41. 1 Chron. 4.41.
5.26. It is argument sufficient they were written after the captivity in
Babylon, that the History of them is continued till that time. For the Facts
Registred are alwaies more ancient than such Books as make mention of,
and quote the Register; as these Books doe in divers places, referring the
Reader to the Chronicles of the Kings of Juda, to the Chronicles of the
Kings of Israel, to the Books of the Prophet Samuel, or the Prophet
Nathan, of the Prophet Ahijah; to the Vision of Jehdo, to the Books of the
Prophet Serveiah, and of the Prophet Addo.

Ezra And Nehemiah
The Books of Esdras and Nehemiah were written certainly after their
return from captivity; because their return, the re-edification of the walls
and houses of Jerusalem, the renovation of the Covenant, and ordination of
their policy are therein contained.

Esther
The History of Queen Esther is of the time of the Captivity; and
therefore the Writer must have been of the same time, or after it.

Job
The Book of Job hath no mark in it of the time wherein it was written:
and though it appear sufficiently (Exekiel 14.14, and James 5.11.) that he
was no fained person; yet the Book it self seemeth not to be a History, but
a Treatise concerning a question in ancient time much disputed, "why
wicked men have often prospered in this world, and good men have been
afflicted;" and it is the most probably, because from the beginning, to the
third verse of the third chapter, where the complaint of Job beginneth, the
Hebrew is (as St. Jerome testifies) in prose; and from thence to the sixt
verse of the last chapter in Hexameter Verses; and the rest of that chapter
again in prose. So that the dispute is all in verse; and the prose is added,
but as a Preface in the beginning, and an Epilogue in the end. But Verse is
no usuall stile of such, as either are themselves in great pain, as Job; or of
such as come to comfort them, as his friends; but in Philosophy, especially
morall Philosophy, in ancient time frequent.

The Psalter
The Psalmes were written the most part by David, for the use of the
Quire. To these are added some songs of Moses, and other holy men; and
some of them after the return from the Captivity; as the 137. and the 126.
whereby it is manifest that the Psalter was compiled, and put into the form
it now hath, after the return of the Jews from Babylon.

The Proverbs
The Proverbs, being a Collection of wise and godly Sayings, partly of
Solomon, partly of Agur the son of Jakeh; and partly of the Mother of
King Lemuel, cannot probably be thought to have been collected by
Solomon, rather then by Agur, or the Mother of Lemues; and that, though
the sentences be theirs, yet the collection or compiling them into this one
Book, was the work of some other godly man, that lived after them all.

Ecclesiastes And The Canticles
The Books of Ecclesiastes and the Canticles have nothing that was not
Solomons, except it be the Titles, or Inscriptions. For "The Words of the
Preacher, the Son of David, King in Jerusalem;" and, "the Song of Songs,
which is Solomon's," seem to have been made for distinctions sake, then,
when the Books of Scripture were gathered into one body of the Law; to
the end, that not the Doctrine only, but the Authors also might be extant.

The Prophets
Of the Prophets, the most ancient, are Sophoniah, Jonas, Amos, Hosea,
Isaiah and Michaiah, who lived in the time of Amaziah, and Azariah,
otherwise Ozias, Kings of Judah. But the Book of Jonas is not properly a
Register of his Prophecy, (for that is contained in these few words, "Fourty
dayes and Ninivy shall be destroyed,") but a History or Narration of his
frowardenesse and disputing Gods commandements; so that there is small
probability he should be the Author, seeing he is the subject of it. But the
Book of Amos is his Prophecy.
Jeremiah, Abdias, Nahum, and Habakkuk prophecyed in the time of
Josiah.
Ezekiel, Daniel, Aggeus, and Zacharias, in the Captivity.
When Joel and Malachi prophecyed, is not evident by their Writings.
But considering the Inscriptions, or Titles of their Books, it is manifest
enough, that the whole Scripture of the Old Testament, was set forth in the
form we have it, after the return of the Jews from their Captivity in
Babylon, and before the time of Ptolemaeus Philadelphus, that caused it to
bee translated into Greek by seventy men, which were sent him out of
Judea for that purpose. And if the Books of Apocrypha (which are
recommended to us by the Church, though not for Canonicall, yet for
profitable Books for our instruction) may in this point be credited, the
Scripture was set forth in the form wee have it in, by Esdras; as may
appear by that which he himself saith, in the second book, chapt. 14. verse
21, 22, &c. where speaking to God, he saith thus, "Thy law is burnt;
therefore no man knoweth the things which thou has done, or the works
that are to begin. But if I have found Grace before thee, send down the
holy Spirit into me, and I shall write all that hath been done in the world,
since the beginning, which were written in thy Law, that men may find thy
path, and that they which will live in the later days, may live." And verse
45. "And it came to passe when the forty dayes were fulfilled, that the
Highest spake, saying, 'The first that thou hast written, publish openly, that
the worthy and unworthy may read it; but keep the seventy last, that thou
mayst deliver them onely to such as be wise among the people.'" And thus

much concerning the time of the writing of the Bookes of the Old
Testament.

The New Testament
The Writers of the New Testament lived all in lesse then an age after
Christs Ascension, and had all of them seen our Saviour, or been his
Disciples, except St. Paul, and St. Luke; and consequently whatsoever was
written by them, is as ancient as the time of the Apostles. But the time
wherein the Books of the New Testament were received, and
acknowledged by the Church to be of their writing, is not altogether so
ancient. For, as the Bookes of the Old Testament are derived to us, from no
higher time then that of Esdras, who by the direction of Gods Spirit
retrived them, when they were lost: Those of the New Testament, of which
the copies were not many, nor could easily be all in any one private mans
hand, cannot bee derived from a higher time, that that wherein the
Governours of the Church collected, approved, and recommended them to
us, as the writings of those Apostles and Disciples; under whose names
they go. The first enumeration of all the Bookes, both of the Old, and New
Testament, is in the Canons of the Apostles, supposed to be collected by
Clement the first (after St. Peter) Bishop of Rome. But because that is but
supposed, and by many questioned, the Councell of Laodicea is the first
we know, that recommended the Bible to the then Christian Churches, for
the Writings of the Prophets and Apostles: and this Councell was held in
the 364. yeer after Christ. At which time, though ambition had so far
prevailed on the great Doctors of the Church, as no more to esteem
Emperours, though Christian, for the Shepherds of the people, but for
Sheep; and Emperours not Christian, for Wolves; and endeavoured to
passe their Doctrine, not for Counsell, and Information, as Preachers; but
for Laws, as absolute Governours; and thought such frauds as tended to
make the people the more obedient to Christian Doctrine, to be pious; yet I
am perswaded they did not therefore falsifie the Scriptures, though the
copies of the Books of the New Testament, were in the hands only of the
Ecclesiasticks; because if they had had an intention so to doe, they would
surely have made them more favorable to their power over Christian
Princes, and Civill Soveraignty, than they are. I see not therefore any
reason to doubt, but that the Old, and New Testament, as we have them

now, are the true Registers of those things, which were done and said by
the Prophets, and Apostles. And so perhaps are some of those Books which
are called Apocrypha, if left out of the Canon, not for inconformity of
Doctrine with the rest, but only because they are not found in the Hebrew.
For after the conquest of Asia by Alexander the Great, there were few
learned Jews, that were not perfect in the Greek tongue. For the seventy
Interpreters that converted the Bible into Greek, were all of them
Hebrews; and we have extant the works of Philo and Josephus both Jews,
written by them eloquently in Greek. But it is not the Writer, but the
authority of the Church, that maketh a Book Canonicall.

Their Scope
And although these Books were written by divers men, yet it is manifest
the Writers were all indued with one and the same Spirit, in that they
conspire to one and the same end, which is the setting forth of the Rights
of the Kingdome of God, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. For the Book of
Genesis, deriveth the Genealogy of Gods people, from the creation of the
World, to the going into Egypt: the other four Books of Moses, contain the
Election of God for their King, and the Laws which hee prescribed for
their Government: The Books of Joshua, Judges, Ruth, and Samuel, to the
time of Saul, describe the acts of Gods people, till the time they cast off
Gods yoke, and called for a King, after the manner of their neighbour
nations; The rest of the History of the Old Testament, derives the
succession of the line of David, to the Captivity, out of which line was to
spring the restorer of the Kingdome of God, even our blessed Saviour God
the Son, whose coming was foretold in the Bookes of the Prophets, after
whom the Evangelists writt his life, and actions, and his claim to the
Kingdome, whilst he lived one earth: and lastly, the Acts, and Epistles of
the Apostles, declare the coming of God, the Holy Ghost, and the
Authority he left with them, and their successors, for the direction of the
Jews, and for the invitation of the Gentiles. In summe, the Histories and
the Prophecies of the old Testament, and the Gospels, and Epistles of the
New Testament, have had one and the same scope, to convert men to the
obedience of God; 1. in Moses, and the Priests; 2. in the man Christ; and 3.
in the Apostles and the successors to Apostolicall power. For these three at
several times did represent the person of God: Moses, and his successors
the High Priests, and Kings of Judah, in the Old Testament: Christ himself,
in the time he lived on earth: and the Apostles, and their successors, from
the day of Pentecost (when the Holy Ghost descended on them) to this day.

The Question Of The Authority Of The Scriptures
Stated.
It is a question much disputed between the divers sects of Christian
Religion, From Whence The Scriptures Derive Their Authority; which
question is also propounded sometimes in other terms, as, How Wee Know
Them To Be The Word Of God, or, Why We Beleeve Them To Be So: and
the difficulty of resolving it, ariseth chiefly from the impropernesse of the
words wherein the question it self is couched. For it is beleeved on all
hands, that the first and originall Author of them is God; and consequently
the question disputed, is not that. Again, it is manifest, that none can know
they are Gods Word, (though all true Christians beleeve it,) but those to
whom God himself hath revealed it supernaturally; and therefore the
question is not rightly moved, of our Knowledge of it. Lastly, when the
question is propounded of our Beleefe; because some are moved to
beleeve for one, and others for other reasons, there can be rendred no one
generall answer for them all. The question truly stated is, By What
Authority They Are Made Law.

Their Authority And Interpretation
As far as they differ not from the Laws of Nature, there is no doubt, but
they are the Law of God, and carry their Authority with them, legible to all
men that have the use of naturall reason: but this is no other Authority,
then that of all other Morall Doctrine consonant to Reason; the Dictates
whereof are Laws, not Made, but Eternall.
If they be made Law by God himselfe, they are of the nature of written
Law, which are Laws to them only to whom God hath so sufficiently
published them, as no man can excuse himself, by saying, he know not
they were his.
He therefore, to whom God hath not supernaturally revealed, that they
are his, nor that those that published them, were sent by him, is not
obliged to obey them, by any Authority, but his, whose Commands have
already the force of Laws; that is to say, by any other Authority, then that
of the Common-wealth, residing in the Soveraign, who only has the
Legislative power. Again, if it be not the Legislative Authority of the
Common-wealth, that giveth them the force of Laws, it must bee some
other Authority derived from God, either private, or publique: if private, it
obliges onely him, to whom in particular God hath been pleased to reveale
it. For if every man should be obliged, to take for Gods Law, what
particular men, on pretence of private Inspiration, or Revelation, should
obtrude upon him, (in such a number of men, that out of pride, and
ignorance, take their own Dreams, and extravagant Fancies, and Madnesse,
for testimonies of Gods Spirit; or out of ambition, pretend to such Divine
testimonies, falsely, and contrary to their own consciences,) it were
impossible that any Divine Law should be acknowledged. If publique, it is
the Authority of the Common-wealth, or of the Church. But the Church, if
it be one person, is the same thing with a Common-wealth of Christians;
called a Common-wealth, because it consisteth of men united in one
person, their Soveraign; and a Church, because it consisteth in Christian
men, united in one Christian Soveraign. But if the Church be not one
person, then it hath no authority at all; it can neither command, nor doe
any action at all; nor is capable of having any power, or right to any thing;

nor has any Will, Reason, nor Voice; for all these qualities are personall.
Now if the whole number of Christians be not contained in one Commonwealth, they are not one person; nor is there an Universall Church that hath
any authority over them; and therefore the Scriptures are not made Laws,
by the Universall Church: or if it bee one Common-wealth, then all
Christian Monarchs, and States are private persons, and subject to bee
judged, deposed, and punished by an Universall Soveraigne of all
Christendome. So that the question of the Authority of the Scriptures is
reduced to this, "Whether Christian Kings, and the Soveraigne Assemblies
in Christian Common-wealths, be absolute in their own Territories,
immediately under God; or subject to one Vicar of Christ, constituted over
the Universall Church; to bee judged, condemned, deposed, and put to
death, as hee shall think expedient, or necessary for the common good."
Which question cannot bee resolved, without a more particular
consideration of the Kingdome of God; from whence also, wee are to
judge of the Authority of Interpreting the Scripture. For, whosoever hath a
lawfull power over any Writing, to make it Law, hath the power also to
approve, or disapprove the interpretation of the same.

CHAPTER XXXIV. OF THE SIGNIFICATION
OF SPIRIT, ANGEL, AND INSPIRATION IN
THE BOOKS OF HOLY SCRIPTURE

Body And Spirit How Taken In The Scripture
Seeing the foundation of all true Ratiocination, is the constant
Signification of words; which in the Doctrine following, dependeth not (as
in naturall science) on the Will of the Writer, nor (as in common
conversation) on vulgar use, but on the sense they carry in the Scripture; It
is necessary, before I proceed any further, to determine, out of the Bible,
the meaning of such words, as by their ambiguity, may render what I am to
inferre upon them, obscure, or disputable. I will begin with the words
BODY, and SPIRIT, which in the language of the Schools are termed,
Substances, Corporeall, and Incorporeall.
The Word Body, in the most generall acceptation, signifieth that which
filleth, or occupyeth some certain room, or imagined place; and dependeth
not on the imagination, but is a reall part of that we call the Universe. For
the Universe, being the Aggregate of all Bodies, there is no reall part
thereof that is not also Body; nor any thing properly a Body, that is not
also part of (that Aggregate of all Bodies) the Universe. The same also,
because Bodies are subject to change, that is to say, to variety of apparence
to the sense of living creatures, is called Substance, that is to say, Subject,
to various accidents, as sometimes to be Moved, sometimes to stand Still;
and to seem to our senses sometimes Hot, sometimes Cold, sometimes of
one Colour, Smel, Tast, or Sound, somtimes of another. And this diversity
of Seeming, (produced by the diversity of the operation of bodies, on the
organs of our sense) we attribute to alterations of the Bodies that operate,
& call them Accidents of those Bodies. And according to this acceptation
of the word, Substance and Body, signifie the same thing; and therefore
Substance Incorporeall are words, which when they are joined together,
destroy one another, as if a man should say, an Incorporeall Body.
But in the sense of common people, not all the Universe is called Body,
but only such parts thereof as they can discern by the sense of Feeling, to
resist their force, or by the sense of their Eyes, to hinder them from a
farther prospect. Therefore in the common language of men, Aire, and
Aeriall Substances, use not to be taken for Bodies, but (as often as men are
sensible of their effects) are called Wind, or Breath, or (because the some

are called in the Latine Spiritus) Spirits; as when they call that aeriall
substance, which in the body of any living creature, gives it life and
motion, Vitall and Animall Spirits. But for those Idols of the brain, which
represent Bodies to us, where they are not, as in a Looking-glasse, in a
Dream, or to a Distempered brain waking, they are (as the Apostle saith
generally of all Idols) nothing; Nothing at all, I say, there where they seem
to bee; and in the brain it self, nothing but tumult, proceeding either from
the action of the objects, or from the disorderly agitation of the Organs of
our Sense. And men, that are otherwise imployed, then to search into their
causes, know not of themselves, what to call them; and may therefore
easily be perswaded, by those whose knowledge they much reverence,
some to call them Bodies, and think them made of aire compacted by a
power supernaturall, because the sight judges them corporeall; and some
to call them Spirits, because the sense of Touch discerneth nothing in the
place where they appear, to resist their fingers: So that the proper
signification of Spirit in common speech, is either a subtile, fluid, and
invisible Body, or a Ghost, or other Idol or Phantasme of the Imagination.
But for metaphoricall significations, there be many: for sometimes it is
taken for Disposition or Inclination of the mind; as when for the
disposition to controwl the sayings of other men, we say, A Spirit
Contradiction; For A Disposition to Uncleannesse, An Unclean Spirit; for
Perversenesse, A Froward Spirit; for Sullennesse, A Dumb Spirit, and for
Inclination To Godlinesse, And Gods Service, the Spirit of God:
sometimes for any eminent ability, or extraordinary passion, or disease of
the mind, as when Great Wisdome is called the Spirit Of Wisdome; and
Mad Men are said to be Possessed With A Spirit.
Other signification of Spirit I find no where any; and where none of
these can satisfie the sense of that word in Scripture, the place falleth not
under humane Understanding; and our Faith therein consisteth not in our
Opinion, but in our Submission; as in all places where God is said to be a
Spirit; or where by the Spirit of God, is meant God himselfe. For the
nature of God is incomprehensible; that is to say, we understand nothing of
What He Is, but only That He Is; and therefore the Attributes we give him,
are not to tell one another, What He Is, Nor to signifie our opinion of his
Nature, but our desire to honor him with such names as we conceive most
honorable amongst our selves.

Spirit Of God Taken In The Scripture Sometimes
For A Wind, Or Breath
Gen. 1. 2. "The Spirit of God moved upon the face of the Waters." Here
if by the Spirit of God be meant God himself, then is Motion attributed to
God, and consequently Place, which are intelligible only of Bodies, and
not of substances incorporeall; and so the place is above our
understanding, that can conceive nothing moved that changes not place, or
that has not dimension; and whatsoever has dimension, is Body. But the
meaning of those words is best understood by the like place, Gen. 8. 1.
Where when the earth was covered with Waters, as in the beginning, God
intending to abate them, and again to discover the dry land, useth like
words, "I will bring my Spirit upon the Earth, and the waters shall be
diminished:" in which place by Spirit is understood a Wind, (that is an
Aire or Spirit Moved,) which might be called (as in the former place) the
Spirit of God, because it was Gods Work.

Secondly, For Extraordinary Gifts Of The
Understanding
Gen. 41. 38. Pharaoh calleth the Wisdome of Joseph, the Spirit of God.
For Joseph having advised him to look out a wise and discreet man, and to
set him over the land of Egypt, he saith thus, "Can we find such a man as
this is, in whom is the Spirit of God?" and Exod. 28.3. "Thou shalt speak
(saith God) to all that are wise hearted, whom I have filled with the Spirit
of Wisdome, to make Aaron Garments, to consecrate him." Where
extraordinary Understanding, though but in making Garments, as being the
Gift of God, is called the Spirit of God. The same is found again, Exod.
31.3,4,5,6. and 35.31. And Isaiah 11.2,3. where the Prophet speaking of the
Messiah, saith, "The Spirit of the Lord shall abide upon him, the Spirit of
wisdome and understanding, the Spirit of counsell, and fortitude; and the
Spirit of the fear of the Lord." Where manifestly is meant, not so many
Ghosts, but so many eminent Graces that God would give him.

Thirdly, For Extraordinary Affections
In the Book of Judges, an extraordinary Zeal, and Courage in the
defence of Gods people, is called the Spirit of God; as when it excited
Othoniel, Gideon, Jeptha, and Samson to deliver them from servitude,
Judg. 3.10. 6.34. 11.29. 13.25. 14.6,19. And of Saul, upon the newes of the
insolence of the Ammonites towards the men of Jabeth Gilead, it is said (1
Sam.11.6.) that "The Spirit of God came upon Saul, and his Anger (or, as it
is in the Latine, His Fury) was kindled greatly." Where it is not probable
was meant a Ghost, but an extraordinary Zeal to punish the cruelty of the
Ammonites. In like manner by the Spirit of God, that came upon Saul,
when hee was amongst the Prophets that praised God in Songs, and
Musick (1 Sam.19.20.) is to be understood, not a Ghost, but an unexpected
and sudden Zeal to join with them in their devotions.

Fourthly, For The Gift Of Prediction By Dreams
And Visions
The false Prophet Zedekiah, saith to Micaiah (1 Kings 22.24.) "Which
way went the Spirit of the Lord from me to speak to thee?" Which cannot
be understood of a Ghost; for Micaiah declared before the Kings of Israel
and Judah, the event of the battle, as from a Vision, and not as from a
Spirit, speaking in him.
In the same manner it appeareth, in the Books of the Prophets, that
though they spake by the Spirit of God, that is to say, by a speciall grace of
Prediction; yet their knowledge of the future, was not by a Ghost within
them, but by some supernaturall Dream or Vision.

Fiftly, For Life
Gen. 2.7. It is said, "God made man of the dust of the Earth, and
breathed into his nostrills (spiraculum vitae) the breath of life, and man
was made a living soul." There the Breath of Life inspired by God,
signifies no more, but that God gave him life; And (Job 27.3.) "as long as
the Spirit of God is in my nostrils;" is no more then to say, "as long as I
live." So in Ezek. 1.20. "the Spirit of life was in the wheels," is equivalent
to, "the wheels were alive." And (Ezek. 2.30.) "the spirit entred into me,
and set me on my feet," that is, "I recovered my vitall strength;" not that
any Ghost, or incorporeal substance entred into, and possessed his body.

Sixtly, For A Subordination To Authority
In the 11 chap. of Numbers. verse 17. "I will take (saith God) of the
Spirit, which is upon thee, and will put it upon them, and they shall bear
the burthen of the people with thee;" that is, upon the seventy Elders:
whereupon two of the seventy are said to prophecy in the campe; of whom
some complained, and Joshua desired Moses to forbid them; which Moses
would not doe. Whereby it appears; that Joshua knew not they had
received authority so to do, and prophecyed according to the mind of
Moses, that is to say, by a Spirit, or Authority subordinate to his own.
In the like sense we read (Deut. 34.9.) that "Joshua was full of the Spirit
of wisdome," because Moses had laid his hands upon him: that is, because
he was Ordained by Moses, to prosecute the work hee had himselfe begun,
(namely, the bringing of Gods people into the promised land), but
prevented by death, could not finish.
In the like sense it is said, (Rom. 8.9.) "If any man have not the Spirit of
Christ, he is none of his:" not meaning thereby the Ghost of Christ, but a
Submission to his Doctrine. As also (1 John 4.2.) "Hereby you shall know
the Spirit of God; Every Spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in
the flesh, is of God;" by which is meant the Spirit of unfained Christianity,
or Submission to that main Article of Christian faith, that Jesus is the
Christ; which cannot be interpreted of a Ghost.
Likewise these words (Luke 4.1.) "And Jesus full of the Holy Ghost"
(that is, as it is exprest, Mat. 4.1. and Mar. 1.12. "of the Holy Spirit",) may
be understood, for Zeal to doe the work for which hee was sent by God the
Father: but to interpret it of a Ghost, is to say, that God himselfe (for so
our Saviour was,) was filled with God; which is very unproper, and
unsignificant. How we came to translate Spirits, by the word Ghosts,
which signifieth nothing, neither in heaven, nor earth, but the Imaginary
inhabitants of mans brain, I examine not: but this I say, the word Spirit in
the text signifieth no such thing; but either properly a reall Substance, or
Metaphorically, some extraordinary Ability of Affection of the Mind, or of
the Body.

Seventhly, For Aeriall Bodies
The Disciples of Christ, seeing him walking upon the sea, (Mat. 14.26.
and Marke 6.49.) supposed him to be a Spirit, meaning thereby an Aeriall
Body, and not a Phantasme: for it is said, they all saw him; which cannot
be understood of the delusions of the brain, (which are not common to
many at once, as visible Bodies are; but singular, because of the
differences of Fancies), but of Bodies only. In like manner, where he was
taken for a Spirit, by the same Apostles (Luke 24.3,7.): So also (Acts
12.15) when St. Peter was delivered out of Prison, it would not be
beleeved; but when the Maid said he was at the dore, they said it was his
Angel; by which must be meant a corporeall substance, or we must say, the
Disciples themselves did follow the common opinion of both Jews and
Gentiles, that some such apparitions were not Imaginary, but Reall; and
such as needed not the fancy of man for their Existence: These the Jews
called Spirits, and Angels, Good or Bad; as the Greeks called the same by
the name of Daemons. And some such apparitions may be reall, and
substantiall; that is to say, subtile Bodies, which God can form by the same
power, by which he formed all things, and make use of, as of Ministers,
and Messengers (that is to say, Angels) to declare his will, and execute the
same when he pleaseth, in extraordinary and supernaturall manner. But
when hee hath so formed them they are Substances, endued with
dimensions, and take up roome, and can be moved from place to place,
which is peculiar to Bodies; and therefore are not Ghosts Incorporeall, that
is to say, Ghosts that are in No Place; that is to say, that are No Where; that
is to say, that seeming to be Somewhat, are Nothing. But if corporeall be
taken in the most vulgar manner, for such Substances as are perceptible by
our externall Senses; then is Substance Incorporeall, a thing not Imaginary,
but Reall; namely, a thin Substance Invisible, but that hath the same
dimensions that are in grosser Bodies.

Angel What
By the name of ANGEL, is signified generally, a Messenger; and most
often, a Messenger of God: And by a Messenger of God, is signified, any
thing that makes known his extraordinary Presence; that is to say, the
extraordinary manifestation of his power, especially by a Dream, or
Vision.
Concerning the creation of Angels, there is nothing delivered in the
Scriptures. That they are Spirits, is often repeated: but by the name of
Spirit, is signified both in Scripture, and vulgarly, both amongst Jews, and
Gentiles, sometimes thin Bodies; as the Aire, the Wind, the Spirits Vitall,
and Animall, of living creatures; and sometimes the Images that rise in the
fancy in Dreams, and Visions; which are not reall Substances, but
accidents of the brain; yet when God raiseth them supernaturally, to
signifie his Will, they are not unproperly termed Gods Messengers, that is
to say, his Angels.
And as the Gentiles did vulgarly conceive the Imagery of the brain, for
things really subsistent without them, and not dependent on the fancy; and
out of them framed their opinions of Daemons, Good and Evill; which
because they seemed to subsist really, they called Substances; and because
they could not feel them with their hands, Incorporeall: so also the Jews
upon the same ground, without any thing in the Old Testament that
constrained them thereunto, had generally an opinion, (except the sect of
the Sadduces,) that those apparitions (which it pleased God sometimes to
produce in the fancie of men, for his own service, and therefore called
them his Angels) were substances, not dependent on the fancy, but
permanent creatures of God; whereof those which they thought were good
to them, they esteemed the Angels of God, and those they thought would
hurt them, they called Evill Angels, or Evill Spirits; such as was the Spirit
of Python, and the Spirits of Mad-men, of Lunatiques, and Epileptiques:
For they esteemed such as were troubled with such diseases,
Daemoniaques.
But if we consider the places of the Old Testament where Angels are
mentioned, we shall find, that in most of them, there can nothing else be

understood by the word Angel, but some image raised (supernaturally) in
the fancy, to signifie the presence of God in the execution of some
supernaturall work; and therefore in the rest, where their nature is not
exprest, it may be understood in the same manner.
For we read Gen. 16. that the same apparition is called, not onely an
Angel, but God; where that which (verse 7.) is called the Angel of the
Lord, in the tenth verse, saith to Agar, "I will multiply thy seed
exceedingly;" that is, speaketh in the person of God. Neither was this
apparition a Fancy figured, but a Voice. By which it is manifest, that Angel
signifieth there, nothing but God himself, that caused Agar supernaturally
to apprehend a voice supernaturall, testifying Gods speciall presence there.
Why therefore may not the Angels that appeared to Lot, and are called
Gen. 19.13. Men; and to whom, though they were but two, Lot speaketh
(ver. 18.) as but one, and that one, as God, (for the words are, "Lot said
unto them, Oh not so my Lord") be understood of images of men,
supernaturally formed in the Fancy; as well as before by Angel was
understood a fancyed Voice? When the Angel called to Abraham out of
heaven, to stay his hand (Gen. 22.11.) from slaying Isaac, there was no
Apparition, but a Voice; which neverthelesse was called properly enough a
Messenger, or Angel of God, because it declared Gods will supernaturally,
and saves the labour of supposing any permanent Ghosts. The Angels
which Jacob saw on the Ladder of Heaven (Gen. 28.12.) were a Vision of
his sleep; therefore onely Fancy, and a Dream; yet being supernaturall, and
signs of Gods Speciall presence, those apparitions are not improperly
called Angels. The same is to be understood (Gen.31.11.) where Jacob
saith thus, "The Angel of the Lord appeared to mee in my sleep." For an
apparition made to a man in his sleep, is that which all men call a Dreame,
whether such Dreame be naturall, or supernaturall: and that which there
Jacob calleth an Angel, was God himselfe; for the same Angel saith (verse
13.) "I am the God of Bethel."
Also (Exod.14.9.) the Angel that went before the Army of Israel to the
Red Sea, and then came behind it, is (verse 19.) the Lord himself; and he
appeared not in the form of a beautifull man, but in form (by day) of a
Pillar Of Cloud and (by night) in form of a Pillar Of Fire; and yet this
Pillar was all the apparition, and Angel promised to Moses (Exod. 14.9.)
for the Armies guide: For this cloudy pillar, is said, to have descended,
and stood at the dore of the Tabernacle, and to have talked with Moses.

There you see Motion, and Speech, which are commonly attributed to
Angels, attributed to a Cloud, because the Cloud served as a sign of Gods
presence; and was no lesse an Angel, then if it had had the form of a Man,
or Child of never so great beauty; or Wings, as usually they are painted,
for the false instruction of common people. For it is not the shape; but
their use, that makes them Angels. But their use is to be significations of
Gods presence in supernaturall operations; As when Moses (Exod. 33.14.)
had desired God to goe along with the Campe, (as he had done alwaies
before the making of the Golden Calfe,) God did not answer, "I will goe,"
nor "I will send an Angel in my stead;" but thus, "my presence shall goe
with thee."
To mention all the places of the Old Testament where the name of Angel
is found, would be too long. Therefore to comprehend them all at once, I
say, there is no text in that part of the Old Testament, which the Church of
England holdeth for Canonicall, from which we can conclude, there is, or
hath been created, any permanent thing (understood by the name of Spirit
or Angel,) that hath not quantity; and that may not be, by the
understanding divided; that is to say, considered by parts; so as one part
may bee in one place, and the next part in the next place to it; and, in
summe, which is not (taking Body for that, which is some what, or some
where) Corporeall; but in every place, the sense will bear the
interpretation of Angel, for Messenger; as John Baptist is called an Angel,
and Christ the Angel of the Covenant; and as (according to the same
Analogy) the Dove, and the Fiery Tongues, in that they were signes of
Gods speciall presence, might also be called Angels. Though we find in
Daniel two names of Angels, Gabriel, and Michael; yet is cleer out of the
text it selfe, (Dan. 12.1) that by Michael is meant Christ, not as an Angel,
but as a Prince: and that Gabriel (as the like apparitions made to other holy
men in their sleep) was nothing but a supernaturall phantasme, by which it
seemed to Daniel, in his dream, that two Saints being in talke, one of them
said to the other, "Gabriel, let us make this man understand his Vision:"
For God needeth not, to distinguish his Celestiall servants by names,
which are usefull onely to the short memories of Mortalls. Nor in the New
Testament is there any place, out of which it can be proved, that Angels
(except when they are put for such men, as God hath made the
Messengers, and Ministers of his word, or works) are things permanent,
and withall incorporeall. That they are permanent, may bee gathered from

the words of our Saviour himselfe, (Mat. 25.41.) where he saith, it shall be
said to the wicked in the last day, "Go ye cursed into everlasting fire
prepared for the Devil and his Angels:" which place is manifest for the
permanence of Evill Angels, (unlesse wee might think the name of Devill
and his Angels may be understood of the Churches Adversaries and their
Ministers;) but then it is repugnant to their Immateriality; because
Everlasting fire is no punishment to impatible substances, such as are all
things Incorporeall. Angels therefore are not thence proved to be
Incorporeall. In like manner where St. Paul sayes (1 Cor. 6.3.) "Knew ye
not that wee shall judge the Angels?" And (2 Pet. 2.4.) "For if God spared
not the Angels that sinned, but cast them down into Hell." And (Jude 1,6.)
"And the Angels that kept not their first estate, but left their owne
habitation, hee hath reserved in everlasting chaines under darknesse unto
the Judgement of the last day;" though it prove the Permanence of
Angelicall nature, it confirmeth also their Materiality. And (Mat. 22.30.)
In the resurrection men doe neither marry, nor give in marriage, but are as
the Angels of God in heaven:" but in the resurrection men shall be
Permanent, and not Incorporeall; so therefore also are the Angels.
There be divers other places out of which may be drawn the like
conclusion. To men that understand the signification of these words,
Substance, and Incorporeall; as Incorporeall is taken not for subtile body,
but for Not Body, they imply a contradiction: insomuch as to say, an
Angel, or Spirit is (in that sense) an Incorporeall Substance, is to say in
effect, there is no Angel nor Spirit at all. Considering therefore the
signification of the word Angel in the Old Testament, and the nature of
Dreams and Visions that happen to men by the ordinary way of Nature; I
was enclined to this opinion, that Angels were nothing but supernaturall
apparitions of the Fancy, raised by the speciall and extraordinary operation
of God, thereby to make his presence and commandements known to
mankind, and chiefly to his own people. But the many places of the New
Testament, and our Saviours own words, and in such texts, wherein is no
suspicion of corruption of the Scripture, have extorted from my feeble
Reason, an acknowledgement, and beleef, that there be also Angels
substantiall, and permanent. But to beleeve they be in no place, that is to
say, no where, that is to say, nothing, as they (though indirectly) say, that
will have them Incorporeall, cannot by Scripture bee evinced.

Inspiration What
On the signification of the word Spirit, dependeth that of the word
INSPIRATION; which must either be taken properly; and then it is nothing
but the blowing into a man some thin and subtile aire, or wind, in such
manner as a man filleth a bladder with his breath; or if Spirits be not
corporeal, but have their existence only in the fancy, it is nothing but the
blowing in of a Phantasme; which is improper to say, and impossible; for
Phantasmes are not, but only seem to be somewhat. That word therefore is
used in the Scripture metaphorically onely: As (Gen. 2.7.) where it is said,
that God Inspired into man the breath of life, no more is meant, then that
God gave unto him vitall motion. For we are not to think that God made
first a living breath, and then blew it into Adam after he was made,
whether that breath were reall, or seeming; but only as it is (Acts 17.25.)
"that he gave him life and breath;" that is, made him a living creature. And
where it is said (2 Tim. 3.16.) "all Scripture is given by Inspiration from
God," speaking there of the Scripture of the Old Testament, it is an easie
metaphor, to signifie, that God enclined the spirit or mind of those
Writers, to write that which should be usefull, in teaching, reproving,
correcting, and instructing men in the way of righteous living. But where
St. Peter (2 Pet. 1.21.) saith, that "Prophecy came not in old time by the
will of man, but the holy men of God spake as they were moved by the
Holy Spirit," by the Holy Spirit, is meant the voice of God in a Dream, or
Vision supernaturall, which is not Inspiration; Nor when our Saviour
breathing on his Disciples, said, "Receive the Holy Spirit," was that Breath
the Spirit, but a sign of the spirituall graces he gave unto them. And
though it be said of many, and of our Saviour himself, that he was full of
the Holy Spirit; yet that Fulnesse is not to be understood for Infusion of
the substance of God, but for accumulation of his gifts, such as are the gift
of sanctity of life, of tongues, and the like, whether attained
supernaturally, or by study and industry; for in all cases they are the gifts
of God. So likewise where God sayes (Joel 2.28.) "I will powre out my
Spirit upon all flesh, and your Sons and your Daughters shall prophecy,
your Old men shall dream Dreams, and your Young men shall see

Visions," wee are not to understand it in the proper sense, as if his Spirit
were like water, subject to effusion, or infusion; but as if God had
promised to give them Propheticall Dreams, and Visions. For the proper
use of the word Infused, in speaking of the graces of God, is an abuse of it;
for those graces are Vertues, not Bodies to be carryed hither and thither,
and to be powred into men, as into barrels.
In the same manner, to take Inspiration in the proper sense, or to say
that Good Spirits entred into men to make them prophecy, or Evill Spirits
into those that became Phrenetique, Lunatique, or Epileptique, is not to
take the word in the sense of the Scripture; for the Spirit there is taken for
the power of God, working by causes to us unknown. As also (Acts 2.2.)
the wind, that is there said to fill the house wherein the Apostles were
assembled on the day of Pentecost, is not to be understood for the Holy
Spirit, which is the Deity it self; but for an Externall sign of Gods speciall
working on their hearts, to effect in them the internall graces, and holy
vertues hee thought requisite for the performance of their Apostleship.

CHAPTER XXXV. OF THE SIGNIFICATION IN
SCRIPTURE OF KINGDOME OF GOD, OF
HOLY, SACRED, AND SACRAMENT

Kingdom Of God Taken By Divines
Metaphorically But In The Scriptures
Properly
The Kingdome of God in the Writings of Divines, and specially in
Sermons, and Treatises of Devotion, is taken most commonly for Eternall
Felicity, after this life, in the Highest Heaven, which they also call the
Kingdome of Glory; and sometimes for (the earnest of that felicity)
Sanctification, which they terme the Kingdome of Grace, but never for the
Monarchy, that is to say, the Soveraign Power of God over any Subjects
acquired by their own consent, which is the proper signification of
Kingdome.
To the contrary, I find the KINGDOME OF GOD, to signifie in most
places of Scripture, a Kingdome Properly So Named, constituted by the
Votes of the People of Israel in peculiar manner; wherein they chose God
for their King by Covenant made with him, upon Gods promising them the
possession of the land of Canaan; and but seldom metaphorically; and then
it is taken for Dominion Over Sinne; (and only in the New Testament;)
because such a Dominion as that, every Subject shall have in the
Kingdome of God, and without prejudice to the Soveraign.
From the very Creation, God not only reigned over all men Naturally by
his might; but also had Peculiar Subjects, whom he commanded by a
Voice, as one man speaketh to another. In which manner he Reigned over
Adam, and gave him commandement to abstaine from the tree of
cognizance of Good and Evill; which when he obeyed not, but tasting
thereof, took upon him to be as God, judging between Good and Evill, not
by his Creators commandement, but by his own sense, his punishment was
a privation of the estate of Eternall life, wherein God had at first created
him: And afterwards God punished his posterity, for their vices, all but
eight persons, with an universall deluge; And in these eight did consist the
then Kingdome Of God.

The Originall Of The Kingdome Of God
After this, it pleased God to speak to Abraham, and (Gen. 17.7,8.) to
make a Covenant with him in these words, "I will establish my Covenant
between me, and thee, and thy seed after thee in their generations, for an
everlasting Covenant, to be a God to thee, and to thy seed after thee; And I
will give unto thee, and to thy seed after thee, the land wherein thou art a
stranger, all the land of Canaan for an everlasting possession." And for a
memoriall, and a token of this Covenant, he ordaineth (verse 11.) the
Sacrament of Circumcision. This is it which is called the Old Covenant, or
Testament; and containeth a Contract between God and Abraham; by
which Abraham obligeth himself, and his posterity, in a peculiar manner to
be subject to Gods positive Law; for to the Law Morall he was obliged
before, as by an Oath of Allegiance. And though the name of King be not
yet given to God, nor of Kingdome to Abraham and his seed; yet the thing
is the same; namely, an Institution by pact, of Gods peculiar Soveraignty
over the seed of Abraham; which in the renewing of the same Covenant by
Moses, at Mount Sinai, is expressely called a peculiar Kingdome of God
over the Jews: and it is of Abraham (not of Moses) St. Paul saith (Rom.
4.11.) that he is the "Father of the Faithfull," that is, of those that are
loyall, and doe not violate their Allegiance sworn to God, then by
Circumcision, and afterwards in the New Covenant by Baptisme.

That The Kingdome Of God Is Properly His Civill
Soveraignty Over
A Peculiar People By Pact
This Covenant, at the Foot of Mount Sinai, was renewed by Moses
(Exod. 19.5.) where the Lord commandeth Moses to speak to the people in
this manner, "If you will obey my voice indeed, and keep my Covenant,
then yee shall be a peculiar people to me, for all the Earth is mine; and yee
shall be unto me a Sacerdotall Kingdome, and an holy Nation." For a
"Peculiar people" the vulgar Latine hath, Peculium De Cunctis Populis: the
English translation made in the beginning of the Reign of King James,
hath, a "Peculiar treasure unto me above all Nations;" and the Geneva
French, "the most precious Jewel of all Nations." But the truest
Translation is the first, because it is confirmed by St. Paul himself (Tit.
2.14.) where he saith, alluding to that place, that our blessed Saviour "gave
himself for us, that he might purifie us to himself, a peculiar (that is, an
extraordinary) people:" for the word is in the Greek periousios, which is
opposed commonly to the word epiousios: and as this signifieth Ordinary,
Quotidian, or (as in the Lords Prayer) Of Daily Use; so the other signifieth
that which is Overplus, and Stored Up, and Enjoyed In A Speciall Manner;
which the Latines call Peculium; and this meaning of the place is
confirmed by the reason God rendereth of it, which followeth immediately,
in that he addeth, "For all the Earth is mine," as if he should say, "All the
Nations of the world are mine;" but it is not so that you are mine, but in a
Speciall Manner: For they are all mine, by reason of my Power; but you
shall be mine, by your own Consent, and Covenant; which is an addition to
his ordinary title, to all nations.
The same is again confirmed in expresse words in the same Text, "Yee
shall be to me a Sacerdotall Kingdome, and an holy Nation." The Vulgar
Latine hath it, Regnum Sacerdotale, to which agreeth the Translation of
that place (1 Pet. 2.9.) Sacerdotium Regale, A Regal Priesthood; as also
the Institution it self, by which no man might enter into the Sanctum
Sanctorum, that is to say, no man might enquire Gods will immediately of

God himselfe, but onely the High Priest. The English Translation before
mentioned, following that of Geneva, has, "a Kingdome of Priests;" which
is either meant of the succession of one High Priest after another, or else it
accordeth not with St. Peter, nor with the exercise of the High Priesthood;
For there was never any but the High Priest onely, that was to informe the
People of Gods Will; nor any Convocation of Priests ever allowed to enter
into the Sanctum Sanctorum.
Again, the title of a Holy Nation confirmes the same: For Holy
signifies, that which is Gods by speciall, not by generall Right. All the
Earth (as is said in the text) is Gods; but all the Earth is not called Holy,
but that onely which is set apart for his especiall service, as was the Nation
of the Jews. It is therefore manifest enough by this one place, that by the
Kingdome of God, is properly meant a Common-wealth, instituted (by the
consent of those which were to be subject thereto) for their Civill
Government, and the regulating of their behaviour, not onely towards God
their King, but also towards one another in point of justice, and towards
other Nations both in peace and warre; which properly was a Kingdome,
wherein God was King, and the High priest was to be (after the death of
Moses) his sole Viceroy, or Lieutenant.
But there be many other places that clearly prove the same. As first (1
Sam. 8.7.) when the Elders of Israel (grieved with the corruption of the
Sons of Samuel) demanded a King, Samuel displeased therewith, prayed
unto the Lord; and the Lord answering said unto him, "Hearken unto the
voice of the People, for they have not rejected thee, but they have rejected
me, that I should not reign over them." Out of which it is evident, that God
himself was then their King; and Samuel did not command the people, but
only delivered to them that which God from time to time appointed him.
Again, (1 Sam. 12.12.) where Samuel saith to the People, "When yee
saw that Nahash King of the Children of Ammon came against you, ye
said unto me, Nay, but a King shall reign over us, when the Lord your God
was your King:" It is manifest that God was their King, and governed the
Civill State of their Common-wealth.
And after the Israelites had rejected God, the Prophets did foretell his
restitution; as (Isaiah 24.23.) "Then the Moon shall be confounded, and the
Sun ashamed when the Lord of Hosts shall reign in Mount Zion, and in
Jerusalem;" where he speaketh expressely of his Reign in Zion, and

Jerusalem; that is, on Earth. And (Micah 4.7.) "And the Lord shall reign
over them in Mount Zion:" This Mount Zion is in Jerusalem upon the
Earth. And (Ezek. 20.33.) "As I live, saith the Lord God, surely with a
mighty hand, and a stretched out arme, and with fury powred out, I wil
rule over you; and (verse 37.) I will cause you to passe under the rod, and I
will bring you into the bond of the Covenant;" that is, I will reign over
you, and make you to stand to that Covenant which you made with me by
Moses, and brake in your rebellion against me in the days of Samuel, and
in your election of another King.
And in the New testament, the Angel Gabriel saith of our Saviour (Luke
1.32,33) "He shall be great, and be called the Son of the Most High, and
the Lord shall give him the throne of his Father David; and he shall reign
over the house of Jacob for ever; and of his Kingdome there shall be no
end." This is also a Kingdome upon Earth; for the claim whereof, as an
enemy to Caesar, he was put to death; the title of his crosse, was, Jesus of
Nazareth, King of the Jews; hee was crowned in scorn with a crown of
Thornes; and for the proclaiming of him, it is said of the Disciples (Acts
17.7.) "That they did all of them contrary to the decrees of Caesar, saying
there was another King, one Jesus. The Kingdome therefore of God, is a
reall, not a metaphoricall Kingdome; and so taken, not onely in the Old
Testament, but the New; when we say, "For thine is the Kingdome, the
Power, and Glory," it is to be understood of Gods Kingdome, by force of
our Covenant, not by the Right of Gods Power; for such a Kingdome God
alwaies hath; so that it were superfluous to say in our prayer, "Thy
Kingdome come," unlesse it be meant of the Restauration of that
Kingdome of God by Christ, which by revolt of the Israelites had been
interrupted in the election of Saul. Nor had it been proper to say, "The
Kingdome of Heaven is at hand," or to pray, "Thy Kingdome come," if it
had still continued.
There be so many other places that confirm this interpretation, that it
were a wonder there is no greater notice taken of it, but that it gives too
much light to Christian Kings to see their right of Ecclesiastical
Government. This they have observed, that in stead of a Sacerdotall
Kingdome, translate, a Kingdome of Priests: for they may as well translate
a Royall Priesthood, (as it is in St. Peter) into a Priesthood of Kings. And
whereas, for a Peculiar People, they put a Pretious Jewel, or Treasure, a

man might as well call the speciall Regiment, or Company of a Generall,
the Generalls pretious Jewel, or his Treasure.
In short, the Kingdome of God is a Civill Kingdome; which consisted,
first in the obligation of the people of Israel to those Laws, which Moses
should bring unto them from Mount Sinai; and which afterwards the High
Priest of the time being, should deliver to them from before the Cherubins
in the Sanctum Sanctorum; and which kingdome having been cast off, in
the election of Saul, the Prophets foretold, should be restored by Christ;
and the Restauration whereof we daily pray for, when we say in the Lords
Prayer, "Thy Kingdome come;" and the Right whereof we acknowledge,
when we adde, "For thine is the Kingdome, the Power, and Glory, for ever
and ever, Amen;" and the Proclaiming whereof, was the Preaching of the
Apostles; and to which men are prepared, by the Teachers of the Gospel; to
embrace which Gospel, (that is to say, to promise obedience to Gods
government) is, to bee in the Kingdome of Grace, because God hath gratis
given to such the power to bee the subjects (that is, Children) of God
hereafter, when Christ shall come in Majesty to judge the world, and
actually to govern his owne people, which is called the Kingdome of
Glory. If the Kingdome of God (called also the Kingdome of Heaven, from
the gloriousnesse, and admirable height of that throne) were not a
Kingdome which God by his Lieutenant, or Vicars, who deliver his
Commandements to the people, did exercise on Earth; there would not
have been so much contention, and warre, about who it is, by whom God
speaketh to us; neither would many Priests have troubled themselves with
Spirituall Jurisdiction, nor any King have denied it them.
Out of this literall interpretation of the Kingdome of God, ariseth also
the true interpretation of the word HOLY. For it is a word, which in Gods
Kingdome answereth to that, which men in their Kingdomes use to call
Publique, or the Kings.
The King of any Countrey is the Publique Person, or Representative of
all his own Subjects. And God the King of Israel was the Holy One of
Israel. The Nation which is subject to one earthly Soveraign, is the Nation
of that Soveraign, that is, of the Publique Person. So the Jews, who were
Gods Nation, were called (Exod. 19.6.) "a Holy Nation." For by Holy, is
alwaies understood, either God himselfe, or that which is Gods in
propriety; as by Publique is alwaies meant, either the Person of the

Common-wealth it self, or something that is so the Common-wealths, as
no private person can claim any propriety therein.
Therefore the Sabbath (Gods day) is a Holy Day; the Temple, (Gods
house) a Holy House; Sacrifices, Tithes, and Offerings (Gods tribute) Holy
Duties; Priests, Prophets, and anointed Kings, under Christ (Gods
ministers) Holy Men; The Coelestiall ministring Spirits (Gods
Messengers) Holy Angels; and the like: and wheresoever the word Holy is
taken properly, there is still something signified of Propriety, gotten by
consent. In saying "Hallowed be thy name," we do but pray to God for
grace to keep the first Commandement, of "having no other Gods but
Him." Mankind is Gods Nation in propriety: but the Jews only were a Holy
Nation. Why, but because they became his Propriety by covenant.

Sacred What
And the word Profane, is usually taken in the Scripture for the same
with Common; and consequently their contraries, Holy, and Proper, in the
Kingdome of God must be the same also. But figuratively, those men also
are called Holy, that led such godly lives, as if they had forsaken all
worldly designes, and wholly devoted, and given themselves to God. In the
proper sense, that which is made Holy by Gods appropriating or separating
it to his own use, is said to be Sanctified by God, as the Seventh day in the
fourth Commandement; and as the Elect in the New Testament were said
to bee Sanctified, when they were endued with the Spirit of godlinesse.
And that which is made Holy by the dedication of men, and given to God,
so as to be used onely in his publique service, is called also SACRED, and
said to be consecrated, as Temples, and other Houses of Publique Prayer,
and their Utensils, Priests, and Ministers, Victimes, Offerings, and the
externall matter of Sacraments.

Degrees of Sanctity
Of Holinesse there be degrees: for of those things that are set apart for
the service of God, there may bee some set apart again, for a neerer and
more especial service. The whole Nation of the Israelites were a people
Holy to God; yet the tribe of Levi was amongst the Israelites a Holy tribe;
and amongst the Levites, the Priests were yet more Holy; and amongst the
Priests, the High Priest was the most Holy. So the Land of Judea was the
Holy Land; but the Holy City wherein God was to be worshipped, was
more Holy; and again, the Temples more Holy than the City; and the
Sanctum Sanctorum more Holy than the rest of the Temple.

Sacrament
A SACRAMENT, is a separation of some visible thing from common
use; and a consecration of it to Gods service, for a sign, either of our
admission into the Kingdome of God, to be of the number of his peculiar
people, or for a Commemoration of the same. In the Old Testament, the
sign of Admission was Circumcision; in the New Testament, Baptisme.
The Commemoration of it in the Old Testament, was the Eating (at a
certain time, which was Anniversary) of the Paschall Lamb; by which they
were put in mind of the night wherein they were delivered out of their
bondage in Egypt; and in the New Testament, the celebrating of the Lords
Supper; by which, we are put in mind, of our deliverance from the bondage
of sin, by our Blessed Saviours death upon the crosse. The Sacraments of
Admission, are but once to be used, because there needs but one
Admission; but because we have need of being often put in mind of our
deliverance, and of our Allegeance, The Sacraments of Commemoration
have need to be reiterated. And these are the principall Sacraments, and as
it were the solemne oathes we make of our Alleageance. There be also
other Consecrations, that may be called Sacraments, as the word implyeth
onely Consecration to Gods service; but as it implies an oath, or promise
of Alleageance to God, there were no other in the Old Testament, but
Circumcision, and the Passover; nor are there any other in the New
Testament, but Baptisme, and the Lords Supper.

CHAPTER XXXVI. OF THE WORD OF GOD,
AND OF PROPHETS

Word What
When there is mention of the Word of God, or of Man, it doth not
signifie a part of Speech, such as Grammarians call a Nown, or a Verb, or
any simple voice, without a contexture with other words to make it
significative; but a perfect Speech or Discourse, whereby the speaker
Affirmeth, Denieth, Commandeth, Promiseth, Threateneth, Wisheth, or
Interrogateth. In which sense it is not Vocabulum, that signifies a Word;
but Sermo, (in Greek Logos) that is some Speech, Discourse, or Saying.

The Words Spoken By God And Concerning God,
Both Are Called Gods Word
In Scripture
Again, if we say the Word of God, or of Man, it may bee understood
sometimes of the Speaker, (as the words that God hath spoken, or that a
Man hath spoken): In which sense, when we say, the Gospel of St.
Matthew, we understand St. Matthew to be the Writer of it: and sometimes
of the Subject: In which sense, when we read in the Bible, "The words of
the days of the Kings of Israel, or Judah," 'tis meant, that the acts that were
done in those days, were the Subject of those Words; And in the Greek,
which (in the Scripture) retaineth many Hebraismes, by the Word of God
is oftentimes meant, not that which is spoken by God, but concerning God,
and his government; that is to say, the Doctrine of Religion: Insomuch, as
it is all one, to say Logos Theou, and Theologia; which is, that Doctrine
which wee usually call Divinity, as is manifest by the places following
(Acts 13.46.) "Then Paul and Barnabas waxed bold, and said, It was
necessary that the Word of God should first have been spoken to you, but
seeing you put it from you, and judge your selves unworthy of everlasting
life, loe, we turn to the Gentiles." That which is here called the Word of
god, was the Doctrine of Christian Religion; as it appears evidently by that
which goes before. And (Acts 5.20.) where it is said to the Apostles by an
Angel, "Go stand and speak in the Temple, all the Words of this life;" by
the Words of this life, is meant, the Doctrine of the Gospel; as is evident
by what they did in the Temple, and is expressed in the last verse of the
same Chap. "Daily in the Temple, and in every house they ceased not to
teach and preach Christ Jesus:" In which place it is manifest, that Jesus
Christ was the subject of this Word of Life; or (which is all one) the
subject of the Words of this Life Eternall, that our saviour offered them.
So (Acts 15.7.) the Word of God, is called the Word of the Gospel, because
it containeth the Doctrine of the Kingdome of Christ; and the same Word
(Rom. 10.8,9.) is called the Word of Faith; that is, as is there expressed,
the Doctrine of Christ come, and raised from the dead. Also (Mat. 13. 19.)

"When any one heareth the Word of the Kingdome;" that is, the Doctrine
of the Kingdome taught by Christ. Again, the same Word, is said (Acts 12.
24.) "to grow and to be multiplied;" which to understand of the
Evangelicall Doctrine is easie, but of the Voice, or Speech of God, hard
and strange. In the same sense the Doctrine of Devils, signifieth not the
Words of any Devill, but the Doctrine of Heathen men concerning
Daemons, and those Phantasms which they worshipped as Gods. (1 Tim.
4.1.)
Considering these two significations of the WORD OF GOD, as it is
taken in Scripture, it is manifest in this later sense (where it is taken for
the Doctrine of the Christian Religion,) that the whole scripture is the
Word of God: but in the former sense not so. For example, though these
words, "I am the Lord thy God, &c." to the end of the Ten
Commandements, were spoken by God to Moses; yet the Preface, "God
spake these words and said," is to be understood for the Words of him that
wrote the holy History. The Word of God, as it is taken for that which he
hath spoken, is understood sometimes Properly, sometimes
Metaphorically. Properly, as the words, he hath spoken to his Prophets;
Metaphorically, for his Wisdome, Power, and eternall Decree, in making
the world; in which sense, those Fiats, "Let there be light," "Let there be a
firmament," "Let us make man," &c. (Gen. 1.) are the Word of God. And
in the same sense it is said (John 1.3.) "All things were made by it, and
without it was nothing made that was made; And (Heb. 1.3.) "He
upholdeth all things by the word of his Power;" that is, by the Power of his
Word; that is, by his Power; and (Heb. 11.3.) "The worlds were framed by
the Word of God;" and many other places to the same sense: As also
amongst the Latines, the name of Fate, which signifieth properly The
Word Spoken, is taken in the same sense.

Secondly, For The Effect Of His Word
Secondly, for the effect of his Word; that is to say, for the thing it self,
which by his Word is Affirmed, Commanded, Threatned, or Promised; as
(Psalm 105.19.) where Joseph is said to have been kept in prison, "till his
Word was come;" that is, till that was come to passe which he had (Gen.
40.13.) foretold to Pharaohs Butler, concerning his being restored to his
office: for there by His Word Was Come, is meant, the thing it self was
come to passe. So also (1 King. 18.36.) Elijah saith to God, "I have done
all these thy Words," in stead of "I have done all these things at thy Word,"
or commandement: and (Jer. 17.15.) "Where is the Word of the Lord," is
put for, "Where is the Evill he threatened:" And (Ezek. 12.28.) "There
shall none of my Words be prolonged any more:" by "Words" are
understood those Things, which God promised to his people. And in the
New Testament (Mat. 24.35.) "heaven and earth shal pass away, but my
Words shall not pass away;" that is, there is nothing that I have promised
or foretold, that shall not come to passe. And in this sense it is, that St.
John the Evangelist, and, I think, St. John onely calleth our Saviour
himself as in the flesh "the Word of God (as Joh. 1.14.) the Word was
made Flesh;" that is to say, the Word, or Promise that Christ should come
into the world, "who in the beginning was with God;" that is to say, it was
in the purpose of God the Father, to send God the Son into the world, to
enlighten men in the way of Eternall life, but it was not till then put in
execution, and actually incarnate; So that our Saviour is there called "the
Word," not because he was the promise, but the thing promised. They that
taking occasion from this place, doe commonly call him the Verbe of God,
do but render the text more obscure. They might as well term him the
Nown of God: for as by Nown, so also by Verbe, men understand nothing
but a part of speech, a voice, a sound, that neither affirms, nor denies, nor
commands, nor promiseth, nor is any substance corporeall, or spirituall;
and therefore it cannot be said to bee either God, or Man; whereas our
Saviour is both. And this Word which St. John in his Gospel saith was with
God, is (in his 1 Epistle, verse 1.) called "the Word of Life;" and (verse 2.)
"The eternall life, which was with the Father:" so that he can be in no other

sense called the Word, then in that, wherein he is called Eternall life; that
is, "he that hath procured us Eternall life," by his comming in the flesh. So
also (Apocalypse 19.13.) the Apostle speaking of Christ, clothed in a
garment dipt in bloud, saith; his name is "the Word of God;" which is to be
understood, as if he had said his name had been, "He that was come
according to the purpose of God from the beginning, and according to his
Word and promises delivered by the Prophets." So that there is nothing
here of the Incarnation of a Word, but of the Incarnation of God the Son,
therefore called the Word, because his Incarnation was the Performance of
the Promise; In like manner as the Holy Ghost is called The Promise.
(Acts 1.4. Luke 24.49.)

Thirdly, For The Words Of Reason And Equity
There are also places of the Scripture, where, by the Word of God, is
signified such Words as are consonant to reason, and equity, though spoken
sometimes neither by prophet, nor by a holy man. For Pharaoh Necho was
an Idolator; yet his Words to the good King Josiah, in which he advised
him by Messengers, not to oppose him in his march against Carchemish,
are said to have proceeded from the mouth of God; and that Josiah not
hearkning to them, was slain in the battle; as is to be read 2 Chron. 35.
vers. 21,22,23. It is true, that as the same History is related in the first
book of Esdras, not Pharaoh, but Jeremiah spake these words to Josiah,
from the mouth of the Lord. But wee are to give credit to the Canonicall
Scripture, whatsoever be written in the Apocrypha.
The Word of God, is then also to be taken for the Dictates of reason, and
equity, when the same is said in the Scriptures to bee written in mans
heart; as Psalm 36.31. Jerem. 31.33. Deut.30.11, 14. and many other like
places.

Divers Acceptions Of The Word Prophet
The name of PROPHET, signifieth in Scripture sometimes Prolocutor;
that is, he that speaketh from God to Man, or from man to God: And
sometimes Praedictor, or a foreteller of things to come; And sometimes
one that speaketh incoherently, as men that are distracted. It is most
frequently used in the sense of speaking from God to the People. So
Moses, Samuel, Elijah, Isaiah, Jeremiah, and others were Prophets. And in
this sense the High Priest was a Prophet, for he only went into the Sanctum
Sanctorum, to enquire of God; and was to declare his answer to the people.
And therefore when Caiphas said, it was expedient that one man should die
for the people, St. John saith (chap. 11.51.) that "He spake not this of
himselfe, but being High Priest that year, he prophesied that one man
should dye for the nation." Also they that in Christian Congregations
taught the people, (1 Cor. 14.3.) are said to Prophecy. In the like sense it is,
that God saith to Moses (Exod. 4.16.) concerning Aaron, "He shall be thy
Spokes-man to the People; and he shall be to thee a mouth, and thou shalt
be to him in stead of God;" that which here is Spokesman, is (chap.7.1.)
interpreted Prophet; "See (saith God) I have made thee a God to Pharaoh,
and Aaron thy Brother shall be thy Prophet." In the sense of speaking from
man to God, Abraham is called a Prophet (Genes. 20.7.) where God in a
Dream speaketh to Abimelech in this manner, "Now therefore restore the
man his wife, for he is a Prophet, and shall pray for thee;" whereby may be
also gathered, that the name of Prophet may be given, not unproperly to
them that in Christian Churches, have a Calling to say publique prayers for
the Congregation. In the same sense, the Prophets that came down from
the High place (or Hill of God) with a Psaltery, and a Tabret, and a Pipe,
and a Harp (1 Sam. 10.5,6.) and (vers. 10.) Saul amongst them, are said to
Prophecy, in that they praised God, in that manner publiquely. In the like
sense, is Miriam (Exod. 15.20.) called a Prophetesse. So is it also to be
taken (1 Cor. 11.4,5.) where St. Paul saith, "Every man that prayeth or
prophecyeth with his head covered, &c. and every woman that prayeth or
prophecyeth with her head uncovered: For Prophecy in that place,
signifieth no more, but praising God in Psalmes, and Holy Songs; which

women might doe in the Church, though it were not lawfull for them to
speak to the Congregation. And in this signification it is, that the Poets of
the Heathen, that composed Hymnes and other sorts of Poems in the honor
of their Gods, were called Vates (Prophets) as is well enough known by all
that are versed in the Books of the Gentiles, and as is evident (Tit. 1.12.)
where St. Paul saith of the Cretians, that a Prophet of their owne said, they
were Liars; not that St. Paul held their Poets for Prophets, but
acknowledgeth that the word Prophet was commonly used to signifie them
that celebrated the honour of God in Verse

Praediction Of Future Contingents, Not Alwaies
Prophecy
When by Prophecy is meant Praediction, or foretelling of future
Contingents; not only they were Prophets, who were Gods Spokesmen, and
foretold those things to others, which God had foretold to them; but also
all those Imposters, that pretend by the helpe of familiar spirits, or by
superstitious divination of events past, from false causes, to foretell the
like events in time to come: of which (as I have declared already in the 12.
chapter of this Discourse) there be many kinds, who gain in the opinion of
the common sort of men, a greater reputation of Prophecy, by one casuall
event that may bee but wrested to their purpose, than can be lost again by
never so many failings. Prophecy is not an art, nor (when it is taken for
Praediction) a constant Vocation; but an extraordinary, and temporary
Employment from God, most often of Good men, but sometimes also of
the Wicked. The woman of Endor, who is said to have had a familiar
spirit, and thereby to have raised a Phantasme of Samuel, and foretold
Saul his death, was not therefore a Prophetesse; for neither had she any
science, whereby she could raise such a Phantasme; nor does it appear that
God commanded the raising of it; but onely guided that Imposture to be a
means of Sauls terror and discouragement; and by consequent, of the
discomfiture, by which he fell. And for Incoherent Speech, it was amongst
the Gentiles taken for one sort of Prophecy, because the Prophets of their
Oracles, intoxicated with a spirit, or vapour from the cave of the Pythian
Oracle at Delphi, were for the time really mad, and spake like mad-men;
of whose loose words a sense might be made to fit any event, in such sort,
as all bodies are said to be made of Materia prima. In the Scripture I find
it also so taken (1 Sam. 18. 10.) in these words, "And the Evill spirit came
upon Saul, and he Prophecyed in the midst of the house."

The Manner How God Hath Spoken To The
Prophets
And although there be so many significations in Scripture of the word
Prophet; yet is that the most frequent, in which it is taken for him, to
whom God speaketh immediately, that which the Prophet is to say from
him, to some other man, or to the people. And hereupon a question may be
asked, in what manner God speaketh to such a Prophet. Can it (may some
say) be properly said, that God hath voice and language, when it cannot be
properly said, he hath a tongue, or other organs, as a man? The Prophet
David argueth thus, "Shall he that made the eye, not see? or he that made
the ear, not hear?" But this may be spoken, not (as usually) to signifie
Gods nature, but to signifie our intention to honor him. For to See, and
Hear, are Honorable Attributes, and may be given to God, to declare (as
far as our capacity can conceive) his Almighty power. But if it were to be
taken in the strict, and proper sense, one might argue from his making of
all parts of mans body, that he had also the same use of them which we
have; which would be many of them so uncomely, as it would be the
greatest contumely in the world to ascribe them to him. Therefore we are
to interpret Gods speaking to men immediately, for that way (whatsoever
it be), by which God makes them understand his will: And the wayes
whereby he doth this, are many; and to be sought onely in the Holy
Scripture: where though many times it be said, that God spake to this, and
that person, without declaring in what manner; yet there be again many
places, that deliver also the signes by which they were to acknowledge his
presence, and commandement; and by these may be understood, how he
spake to many of the rest.

To The Extraordinary Prophets Of The Old
Testament He Spake
By Dreams, Or Visions
In what manner God spake to Adam, and Eve, and Cain, and Noah, is
not expressed; nor how he spake to Abraham, till such time as he came out
of his own countrey to Sichem in the land of Canaan; and then (Gen. 12.7.)
God is said to have Appeared to him. So there is one way, whereby God
made his presence manifest; that is, by an Apparition, or Vision. And
again, (Gen. 15.1.) The Word of the Lord came to Abraham in a Vision;
that is to say, somewhat, as a sign of Gods presence, appeared as Gods
Messenger, to speak to him. Again, the Lord appeared to Abraham (Gen.
18. 1.) by an apparition of three Angels; and to Abimelech (Gen. 20. 3.) in
a dream: To Lot (Gen. 19. 1.) by an apparition of Two Angels: And to
Hagar (Gen. 21. 17.) by the apparition of one Angel: And to Abraham
again (Gen. 22. 11.) by the apparition of a voice from heaven: And (Gen.
26. 24.) to Isaac in the night; (that is, in his sleep, or by dream): And to
Jacob (Gen. 18. 12.) in a dream; that is to say (as are the words of the text)
"Jacob dreamed that he saw a ladder, &c." And (Gen. 32. 1.) in a Vision of
Angels: And to Moses (Exod. 3.2.) in the apparition of a flame of fire out
of the midst of a bush: And after the time of Moses, (where the manner
how God spake immediately to man in the Old Testament, is expressed)
hee spake alwaies by a Vision, or by a Dream; as to Gideon, Samuel, Eliah,
Elisha, Isaiah, Ezekiel, and the rest of the Prophets; and often in the New
Testament, as to Joseph, to St. Peter, to St. Paul, and to St. John the
Evangelist in the Apocalypse.
Onely to Moses hee spake in a more extraordinary manner in Mount
Sinai, and in the Tabernacle; and to the High Priest in the Tabernacle, and
in the Sanctum Sanctorum of the Temple. But Moses, and after him the
High Priests were Prophets of a more eminent place, and degree in Gods
favour; And God himself in express words declareth, that to other Prophets
hee spake in Dreams and Visions, but to his servant Moses, in such manner
as a man speaketh to his friend. The words are these (Numb. 12. 6,7,8.) "If

there be a Prophet among you, I the Lord will make my self known to him
in a Vision, and will speak unto him in a Dream. My servant Moses is not
so, who is faithfull in all my house; with him I will speak mouth to mouth,
even apparently, not in dark speeches; and the similitude of the Lord shall
he behold." And (Exod. 33. 11.) "The Lord spake to Moses face to face, as
a man speaketh to his friend." And yet this speaking of God to Moses, was
by mediation of an Angel, or Angels, as appears expressely, Acts 7. ver. 35.
and 53. and Gal. 3. 19. and was therefore a Vision, though a more cleer
Vision than was given to other Prophets. And conformable hereunto, where
God saith (Deut. 13. 1.) "If there arise amongst you a Prophet, or Dreamer
of Dreams," the later word is but the interpretation of the former. And
(Joel 2. 28.) "Your sons and your daughters shall Prophecy; your old men
shall dream Dreams, and your young men shall see Visions:" where again,
the word Prophecy is expounded by Dream, and Vision. And in the same
manner it was, that God spake to Solomon, promising him Wisdome,
Riches, and Honor; for the text saith, (1 Kings 3. 15.) "And Solomon
awoak, and behold it was a Dream:" So that generally the Prophets
extraordinary in the old Testament took notice of the Word of God no
otherwise, than from their Dreams, or Visions, that is to say, from the
imaginations which they had in their sleep, or in an Extasie; which
imaginations in every true Prophet were supernaturall; but in false
Prophets were either naturall, or feigned.
The same Prophets were neverthelesse said to speak by the Spirit; as
(Zach. 7. 12.) where the Prophet speaking of the Jewes, saith, "They made
their hearths hard as Adamant, lest they should hear the law, and the words
which the Lord of Hosts hath sent in his Spirit by the former Prophets." By
which it is manifest, that speaking by the Spirit, or Inspiration, was not a
particular manner of Gods speaking, different from Vision, when they that
were said to speak by the Spirit, were extraordinary Prophets, such as for
every new message, were to have a particular Commission, or (which is all
one) a new Dream, or Vision.
To Prophets Of Perpetuall Calling, And Supreme, God Spake In The Old
Testament From The Mercy Seat, In A Manner Not Expressed In The
Scripture. Of Prophets, that were so by a perpetuall Calling in the Old
Testament, some were Supreme, and some Subordinate: Supreme were
first Moses; and after him the High Priest, every one for his time, as long
as the Priesthood was Royall; and after the people of the Jews, had

rejected God, that he should no more reign over them, those Kings which
submitted themselves to Gods government, were also his chief Prophets;
and the High Priests office became Ministeriall. And when God was to be
consulted, they put on the holy vestments, and enquired of the Lord, as the
King commanded them, and were deprived of their office, when the King
thought fit. For King Saul (1 Sam. 13. 9.) commanded the burnt offering to
be brought, and (1 Sam. 14. 18.) he commands the Priest to bring the Ark
neer him; and (ver. 19.) again to let it alone, because he saw an advantage
upon his enemies. And in the same chapter Saul asketh counsell of God. In
like manner King David, after his being anointed, though before he had
possession of the Kingdome, is said to "enquire of the Lord" (1 Sam. 23.
2.) whether he should fight against the Philistines at Keilah; and (verse
10.) David commandeth the Priest to bring him the Ephod, to enquire
whether he should stay in Keilah, or not. And King Solomon (1 Kings 2.
27.) took the Priesthood from Abiathar, and gave it (verse 35.) to Zadoc.
Therefore Moses, and the High Priests, and the pious Kings, who enquired
of God on all extraordinary occasions, how they were to carry themselves,
or what event they were to have, were all Soveraign Prophets. But in what
manner God spake unto them, is not manifest. To say that when Moses
went up to God in Mount Sinai, it was a Dream, or Vision, such as other
Prophets had, is contrary to that distinction which God made between
Moses, and other Prophets, Numb. 12. 6,7,8. To say God spake or appeared
as he is in his own nature, is to deny his Infinitenesse, Invisibility,
Incomprehensibility. To say he spake by Inspiration, or Infusion of the
Holy Spirit, as the Holy Spirit signifieth the Deity, is to make Moses
equall with Christ, in whom onely the Godhead (as St. Paul speaketh Col.
2.9.) dwelleth bodily. And lastly, to say he spake by the Holy Spirit, as it
signifieth the graces, or gifts of the Holy Spirit, is to attribute nothing to
him supernaturall. For God disposeth men to Piety, Justice, Mercy, Truth,
Faith, and all manner of Vertue, both Morall, and Intellectuall, by doctrine,
example, and by severall occasions, naturall, and ordinary.
And as these ways cannot be applyed to God, in his speaking to Moses,
at Mount Sinai; so also, they cannot be applyed to him, in his speaking to
the High Priests, from the Mercy-Seat. Therefore in what manner God
spake to those Soveraign Prophets of the Old Testament, whose office it
was to enquire of him, is not intelligible. In the time of the New

Testament, there was no Soveraign Prophet, but our Saviour; who was both
God that spake, and the Prophet to whom he spake.
To Prophets Of Perpetuall Calling, But Subordinate, God Spake By The
Spirit. To subordinate Prophets of perpetuall Calling, I find not any place
that proveth God spake to them supernaturally; but onely in such manner,
as naturally he inclineth men to Piety, to Beleef, to Righteousnesse, and to
other vertues all other Christian Men. Which way, though it consist in
Constitution, Instruction, Education, and the occasions and invitements
men have to Christian vertues; yet it is truly attributed to the operation of
the Spirit of God, or Holy Spirit (which we in our language call the Holy
Ghost): For there is no good inclination, that is not of the operation of
God. But these operations are not alwaies supernaturall. When therefore a
Prophet is said to speak in the Spirit, or by the Spirit of God, we are to
understand no more, but that he speaks according to Gods will, declared by
the supreme Prophet. For the most common acceptation of the word Spirit,
is in the signification of a mans intention, mind, or disposition.
In the time of Moses, there were seventy men besides himself, that
Prophecyed in the Campe of the Israelites. In what manner God spake to
them, is declared in the 11 of Numbers, verse 25. "The Lord came down in
a cloud, and spake unto Moses, and took of the Spirit that was upon him,
and gave it to the seventy Elders. And it came to passe, when the Spirit
rested upon them, they Prophecyed, and did not cease," By which it is
manifest, first, that their Prophecying to the people, was subservient, and
subordinate to the Prophecying of Moses; for that God took of the Spirit of
Moses, to put upon them; so that they Prophecyed as Moses would have
them: otherwise they had not been suffered to Prophecy at all. For there
was (verse 27.) a complaint made against them to Moses; and Joshua
would have Moses to have forbidden them; which he did not, but said to
Joshua, Bee not jealous in my behalf. Secondly, that the Spirit of God in
that place, signifieth nothing but the Mind and Disposition to obey, and
assist Moses in the administration of the Government. For if it were meant
they had the substantial Spirit of God; that is, the Divine nature, inspired
into them, then they had it in no lesse manner than Christ himself, in
whom onely the Spirit of God dwelt bodily. It is meant therefore of the
Gift and Grace of God, that guided them to co-operate with Moses; from
whom their Spirit was derived. And it appeareth (verse 16.) that, they were
such as Moses himself should appoint for Elders and Officers of the

People: For the words are, "Gather unto me seventy men, whom thou
knowest to be Elders and Officers of the people:" where, "thou knowest,"
is the same with "thou appointest," or "hast appointed to be such." For we
are told before (Exod. 18.) that Moses following the counsell of Jethro his
Father-in-law, did appoint Judges, and Officers over the people, such as
feared God; and of these, were those Seventy, whom God by putting upon
them Moses spirit, inclined to aid Moses in the Administration of the
Kingdome: and in this sense the Spirit of God is said (1 Sam. 16. 13, 14.)
presently upon the anointing of David, to have come upon David, and left
Saul; God giving his graces to him he chose to govern his people, and
taking them away from him, he rejected. So that by the Spirit is meant
Inclination to Gods service; and not any supernaturall Revelation.

God Sometimes Also Spake By Lots
God spake also many times by the event of Lots; which were ordered by
such as he had put in Authority over his people. So wee read that God
manifested by the Lots which Saul caused to be drawn (1 Sam. 14. 43.) the
fault that Jonathan had committed, in eating a honey-comb, contrary to the
oath taken by the people. And (Josh. 18. 10.) God divided the land of
Canaan amongst the Israelite, by the "lots that Joshua did cast before the
Lord in Shiloh." In the same manner it seemeth to be, that God discovered
(Joshua 7.16., &c.) the crime of Achan. And these are the wayes whereby
God declared his Will in the Old Testament.
All which ways he used also in the New Testament. To the Virgin Mary,
by a Vision of an Angel: To Joseph in a Dream: again to Paul in the way to
Damascus in a Vision of our Saviour: and to Peter in the Vision of a sheet
let down from heaven, with divers sorts of flesh, of clean and unclean,
beasts; and in prison, by Vision of an Angel: And to all the Apostles, and
Writers of the New Testament, by the graces of his Spirit; and to the
Apostles again (at the choosing of Matthias in the place of Judas Iscariot)
by lot.

Every Man Ought To Examine The Probability Of
A Pretended Prophets
Calling
Seeing then all Prophecy supposeth Vision, or Dream, (which two, when
they be naturall, are the same,) or some especiall gift of God, so rarely
observed in mankind, as to be admired where observed; and seeing as well
such gifts, as the most extraordinary Dreams, and Visions, may proceed
from God, not onely by his supernaturall, and immediate, but also by his
naturall operation, and by mediation of second causes; there is need of
Reason and Judgement to discern between naturall, and supernaturall
Gifts, and between naturall, and supernaturall Visions, or Dreams. And
consequently men had need to be very circumspect, and wary, in obeying
the voice of man, that pretending himself to be a Prophet, requires us to
obey God in that way, which he in Gods name telleth us to be the way to
happinesse. For he that pretends to teach men the way of so great felicity,
pretends to govern them; that is to say, to rule, and reign over them; which
is a thing, that all men naturally desire, and is therefore worthy to be
suspected of Ambition and Imposture; and consequently, ought to be
examined, and tryed by every man, before hee yeeld them obedience;
unlesse he have yeelded it them already, in the institution of a Commonwealth; as when the Prophet is the Civill Soveraign, or by the Civil
Soveraign Authorized. And if this examination of Prophets, and Spirits,
were not allowed to every one of the people, it had been to no purpose, to
set out the marks, by which every man might be able, to distinguish
between those, whom they ought, and those whom they ought not to
follow. Seeing therefore such marks are set out (Deut. 13. 1,&c.) to know a
Prophet by; and (1 John 4.1.&C) to know a Spirit by: and seeing there is so
much Prophecying in the Old Testament; and so much Preaching in the
New Testament against Prophets; and so much greater a number ordinarily
of false Prophets, then of true; every one is to beware of obeying their
directions, at their own perill. And first, that there were many more false
than true Prophets, appears by this, that when Ahab (1 Kings 12.)

consulted four hundred Prophets, they were all false Imposters, but onely
one Michaiah. And a little before the time of the Captivity, the Prophets
were generally lyars. "The Prophets" (saith the Lord by Jerem. cha. 14.
verse 14.) "prophecy Lies in my name. I sent them not, neither have I
commanded them, nor spake unto them, they prophecy to you a false
Vision, a thing of naught; and the deceit of their heart." In so much as God
commanded the People by the mouth of the Prophet Jeremiah (chap. 23.
16.) not to obey them. "Thus saith the Lord of Hosts, hearken not unto the
words of the Prophets, that prophecy to you. They make you vain, they
speak a Vision of their own heart, and not out of the mouth of the Lord."

All Prophecy But Of The Soveraign Prophet Is To
Be Examined
By Every Subject
Seeing then there was in the time of the Old Testament, such quarrells
amongst the Visionary Prophets, one contesting with another, and asking
When departed the Spirit from me, to go to thee? as between Michaiah,
and the rest of the four hundred; and such giving of the Lye to one another,
(as in Jerem. 14.14.) and such controversies in the New Testament at this
day, amongst the Spirituall Prophets: Every man then was, and now is
bound to make use of his Naturall Reason, to apply to all Prophecy those
Rules which God hath given us, to discern the true from the false. Of
which rules, in the Old Testament, one was, conformable doctrine to that
which Moses the Soveraign Prophet had taught them; and the other the
miraculous power of foretelling what God would bring to passe, as I have
already shown out of Deut. 13. 1. &c. and in the New Testament there was
but one onely mark; and that was the preaching of this Doctrine, That
Jesus Is The Christ, that is, the King of the Jews, promised in the Old
Testament. Whosoever denyed that Article, he was a false Prophet,
whatsoever miracles he might seem to work; and he that taught it was a
true Prophet. For St. John (1 Epist, 4. 2, &c) speaking expressely of the
means to examine Spirits, whether they be of God, or not; after he hath
told them that there would arise false Prophets, saith thus, "Hereby know
ye the Spirit of God. Every Spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come
in the flesh, is of God;" that is, is approved and allowed as a Prophet of
God: not that he is a godly man, or one of the Elect, for this, that he
confesseth, professeth, or preacheth Jesus to be the Christ; but for that he
is a Prophet avowed. For God sometimes speaketh by Prophets, whose
persons he hath not accepted; as he did by Baalam; and as he foretold Saul
of his death, by the Witch of Endor. Again in the next verse, "Every Spirit
that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the Flesh, is not of Christ.
And this is the Spirit of Antichrist." So that the rule is perfect on both
sides; that he is a true Prophet, which preacheth the Messiah already come,

in the person of Jesus; and he a false one that denyeth him come, and
looketh for him in some future Imposter, that shall take upon him that
honour falsely, whom the Apostle there properly calleth Antichrist. Every
man therefore ought to consider who is the Soveraign Prophet; that is to
say, who it is, that is Gods Viceregent on earth; and hath next under God,
the Authority of Governing Christian men; and to observe for a Rule, that
Doctrine, which in the name of God, hee commanded to bee taught; and
thereby to examine and try out the truth of those Doctrines, which
pretended Prophets with miracles, or without, shall at any time advance:
and if they find it contrary to that Rule, to doe as they did, that came to
Moses, and complained that there were some that Prophecyed in the
Campe, whose Authority so to doe they doubted of; and leave to the
Soveraign, as they did to Moses to uphold, or to forbid them, as hee should
see cause; and if hee disavow them, then no more to obey their voice; or if
he approve them, then to obey them, as men to whom God hath given a
part of the Spirit of their Soveraigne. For when Christian men, take not
their Christian Soveraign, for Gods Prophet; they must either take their
owne Dreams, for the prophecy they mean to bee governed by, and the
tumour of their own hearts for the Spirit of God; or they must suffer
themselves to bee lead by some strange Prince; or by some of their fellow
subjects, that can bewitch them, by slander of the government, into
rebellion, without other miracle to confirm their calling, then sometimes
an extraordinary successe, and Impunity; and by this means destroying all
laws, both divine, and humane, reduce all Order, Government, and Society,
to the first Chaos of Violence, and Civill warre.

CHAPTER XXXVII. OF MIRACLES, AND
THEIR USE

A Miracle Is A Work That Causeth Admiration
By Miracles are signified the Admirable works of God: & therefore they
are also called Wonders. And because they are for the most part, done, for
a signification of his commandement, in such occasions, as without them,
men are apt to doubt, (following their private naturall reasoning,) what he
hath commanded, and what not, they are commonly in Holy Scripture,
called Signes, in the same sense, as they are called by the Latines, Ostenta,
and Portenta, from shewing, and fore-signifying that, which the Almighty
is about to bring to passe.

And Must Therefore Be Rare, Whereof There Is
No Naturall Cause Known
To understand therefore what is a Miracle, we must first understand
what works they are, which men wonder at, and call Admirable. And there
be but two things which make men wonder at any event: The one is, if it be
strange, that is to say, such, as the like of it hath never, or very rarely been
produced: The other is, if when it is produced, we cannot imagine it to
have been done by naturall means, but onely by the immediate hand of
God. But when wee see some possible, naturall cause of it, how rarely
soever the like has been done; or if the like have been often done, how
impossible soever it be to imagine a naturall means thereof, we no more
wonder, nor esteem it for a Miracle.
Therefore, if a Horse, or Cow should speak, it were a Miracle; because
both the thing is strange, & the Naturall cause difficult to imagin: So also
were it, to see a strange deviation of nature, in the production of some new
shape of a living creature. But when a man, or other Animal, engenders his
like, though we know no more how this is done, than the other; yet because
'tis usuall, it is no Miracle. In like manner, if a man be metamorphosed
into a stone, or into a pillar, it is a Miracle; because strange: but if a peece
of wood be so changed; because we see it often, it is no Miracle: and yet
we know no more, by what operation of God, the one is brought to passe,
than the other.
The first Rainbow that was seen in the world, was a Miracle, because
the first; and consequently strange; and served for a sign from God, placed
in heaven, to assure his people, there should be no more an universall
destruction of the world by Water. But at this day, because they are
frequent, they are not Miracles, neither to them that know their naturall
causes, nor to them who know them not. Again, there be many rare works
produced by the Art of man: yet when we know they are done; because
thereby wee know also the means how they are done, we count them not
for Miracles, because not wrought by the immediate hand of God, but by
mediation of humane Industry.

That Which Seemeth A Miracle To One Man, May
Seem Otherwise To Another
Furthermore, seeing Admiration and Wonder, is consequent to the
knowledge and experience, wherewith men are endued, some more, some
lesse; it followeth, that the same thing, may be a Miracle to one, and not to
another. And thence it is, that ignorant, and superstitious men make great
Wonders of those works, which other men, knowing to proceed from
Nature, (which is not the immediate, but the ordinary work of God,)
admire not at all: As when Ecclipses of the Sun and Moon have been taken
for supernaturall works, by the common people; when neverthelesse, there
were others, could from their naturall causes, have foretold the very hour
they should arrive: Or, as when a man, by confederacy, and secret
intelligence, getting knowledge of the private actions of an ignorant,
unwary man, thereby tells him, what he has done in former time; it seems
to him a Miraculous thing; but amongst wise, and cautelous men, such
Miracles as those, cannot easily be done.

The End Of Miracles
Again, it belongeth to the nature of a Miracle, that it be wrought for the
procuring of credit to Gods Messengers, Ministers, and Prophets, that
thereby men may know, they are called, sent, and employed by God, and
thereby be the better inclined to obey them. And therefore, though the
creation of the world, and after that the destruction of all living creatures
in the universall deluge, were admirable works; yet because they were not
done to procure credit to any Prophet, or other Minister of God, they use
not to be called Miracles. For how admirable soever any work be, the
Admiration consisteth not in that it could be done, because men naturally
beleeve the Almighty can doe all things, but because he does it at the
Prayer, or Word of a man. But the works of God in Egypt, by the hand of
Moses, were properly Miracles; because they were done with intention to
make the people of Israel beleeve, that Moses came unto them, not out of
any design of his owne interest, but as sent from God. Therefore after God
had commanded him to deliver the Israelites from the Egyptian bondage,
when he said (Exod 4.1. &c.) "They will not beleeve me, but will say, the
Lord hath not appeared unto me," God gave him power, to turn the Rod he
had in his hand into a Serpent, and again to return it into a Rod; and by
putting his hand into his bosome, to make it leprous; and again by pulling
it out to make it whole, to make the Children of Israel beleeve (as it is
verse 5.) that the God of their Fathers had appeared unto him; And if that
were not enough, he gave him power to turn their waters into bloud. And
when hee had done these Miracles before the people, it is said (verse 41.)
that "they beleeved him." Neverthelesse, for fear of Pharaoh, they durst
not yet obey him. Therefore the other works which were done to plague
Pharaoh and the Egyptians, tended all to make the Israelites beleeve in
Moses, and were properly Miracles. In like manner if we consider all the
Miracles done by the hand of Moses, and all the rest of the Prophets, till
the Captivity; and those of our Saviour, and his Apostles afterward; we
shall find, their end was alwaies to beget, or confirm beleefe, that they
came not of their own motion, but were sent by God. Wee may further
observe in Scripture, that the end of Miracles, was to beget beleef, not

universally in all men, elect, and reprobate; but in the elect only; that is to
say, is such as God had determined should become his Subjects. For those
miraculous plagues of Egypt, had not for end, the conversion of Pharaoh;
For God had told Moses before, that he would harden the heart of Pharaoh,
that he should not let the people goe: And when he let them goe at last, not
the Miracles perswaded him, but the plagues forced him to it. So also of
our Saviour, it is written, (Mat. 13. 58.) that he wrought not many
Miracles in his own countrey, because of their unbeleef; and (in Marke
6.5.) in stead of, "he wrought not many," it is, "he could work none." It was
not because he wanted power; which to say, were blasphemy against God;
nor that the end of Miracles was not to convert incredulous men to Christ;
for the end of all the Miracles of Moses, of Prophets, of our Saviour, and
of his Apostles was to adde men to the Church; but it was, because the end
of their Miracles, was to adde to the Church (not all men, but) such as
should be saved; that is to say, such as God had elected. Seeing therefore
our Saviour sent from his Father, hee could not use his power in the
conversion of those, whom his Father had rejected. They that expounding
this place of St. Marke, say, that his word, "Hee could not," is put for, "He
would not," do it without example in the Greek tongue, (where Would Not,
is put sometimes for Could Not, in things inanimate, that have no will; but
Could Not, for Would Not, never,) and thereby lay a stumbling block
before weak Christians; as if Christ could doe no Miracles, but amongst
the credulous.

The Definition Of A Miracle
From that which I have here set down, of the nature, and use of a
Miracle, we may define it thus, "A MIRACLE, is a work of God, (besides
his operation by the way of Nature, ordained in the Creation,) done for the
making manifest to his elect, the mission of an extraordinary Minister for
their salvation."
And from this definition, we may inferre; First, that in all Miracles, the
work done, is not the effect of any vertue in the Prophet; because it is the
effect of the immediate hand of God; that is to say God hath done it,
without using the Prophet therein, as a subordinate cause.
Secondly, that no Devil, Angel, or other created Spirit, can do a Miracle.
For it must either be by vertue of some naturall science, or by Incantation,
that is, vertue of words. For if the Inchanters do it by their own power
independent, there is some power that proceedeth not from God; which all
men deny: and if they doe it by power given them, then is the work not
from the immediate hand of God, but naturall, and consequently no
Miracle.
There be some texts of Scripture, that seem to attribute the power of
working wonders (equall to some of those immediate Miracles, wrought
by God himself,) to certain Arts of Magick, and Incantation. As for
example, when we read that after the Rod of Moses being cast on the
ground became a Serpent, (Exod. 7. 11.) "the Magicians of Egypt did the
like by their Enchantments;" and that after Moses had turned the waters of
the Egyptian Streams, Rivers, Ponds, and Pooles of water into blood,
(Exod. 7. 22.) "the Magicians of Egypt did so likewise, with their
Enchantments;" and that after Moses had by the power of God brought
frogs upon the land, (Exod. 8. 7.) "the Magicians also did so with their
Enchantments, and brought up frogs upon the land of Egypt;" will not a
man be apt to attribute Miracles to Enchantments; that is to say, to the
efficacy of the sound of Words; and think the same very well proved out of
this, and other such places? and yet there is no place of Scripture, that
telleth us what on Enchantment is. If therefore Enchantment be not, as
many think it, a working of strange effects by spells, and words; but

Imposture, and delusion, wrought by ordinary means; and so far from
supernaturall, as the Impostors need not the study so much as of naturall
causes, but the ordinary ignorance, stupidity, and superstition of mankind,
to doe them; those texts that seem to countenance the power of Magick,
Witchcraft, and Enchantment, must needs have another sense, than at first
sight they seem to bear.

That Men Are Apt To Be Deceived By False
Miracles
For it is evident enough, that Words have no effect, but on those that
understand them; and then they have no other, but to signifie the
intentions, or passions of them that speak; and thereby produce, hope, fear,
or other passions, or conceptions in the hearer. Therefore when a Rod
seemeth a Serpent, or the Water Bloud, or any other Miracle seemeth done
by Enchantment; if it be not to the edification of Gods people, not the Rod,
nor the Water, nor any other thing is enchanted; that is to say, wrought
upon by the Words, but the Spectator. So that all the Miracle consisteth in
this, that the Enchanter has deceived a man; which is no Miracle, but a
very easie matter to doe.
For such is the ignorance, and aptitude to error generally of all men, but
especially of them that have not much knowledge of naturall causes, and
of the nature, and interests of men; as by innumerable and easie tricks to
be abused. What opinion of miraculous power, before it was known there
was a Science of the course of the Stars, might a man have gained, that
should have told the people, This hour, or day the Sun should be darkned?
A juggler by the handling of his goblets, and other trinkets, if it were not
now ordinarily practised, would be thought to do his wonders by the power
at least of the Devil. A man that hath practised to speak by drawing in of
his breath, (which kind of men in antient time were called Ventriloqui,)
and so make the weaknesse of his voice seem to proceed, not from the
weak impulsion of the organs of Speech, but from distance of place, is
able to make very many men beleeve it is a voice from Heaven,
whatsoever he please to tell them. And for a crafty man, that hath enquired
into the secrets, and familiar confessions that one man ordinarily maketh
to another of his actions and adventures past, to tell them him again is no
hard matter; and yet there be many, that by such means as that, obtain the
reputation of being Conjurers. But it is too long a businesse, to reckon up
the severall sorts of those men, which the Greeks called Thaumaturgi, that
is to say, workers of things wonderfull; and yet these do all they do, by
their own single dexterity. But if we looke upon the Impostures wrought by

Confederacy, there is nothing how impossible soever to be done, that is
impossible to bee beleeved. For two men conspiring, one to seem lame,
the other to cure him with a charme, will deceive many: but many
conspiring, one to seem lame, another so to cure him, and all the rest to
bear witnesse; will deceive many more.

Cautions Against The Imposture Of Miracles
In this aptitude of mankind, to give too hasty beleefe to pretended
Miracles, there can be no better, nor I think any other caution, than that
which God hath prescribed, first by Moses, (as I have said before in the
precedent chapter,) in the beginning of the 13. and end of the 18. of
Deuteronomy; That wee take not any for Prophets, that teach any other
Religion, then that which Gods Lieutenant, (which at that time was
Moses,) hath established; nor any, (though he teach the same Religion,)
whose Praediction we doe not see come to passe. Moses therefore in his
time, and Aaron, and his successors in their times, and the Soveraign
Governour of Gods people, next under God himself, that is to say, the Head
of the Church in all times, are to be consulted, what doctrine he hath
established, before wee give credit to a pretended Miracle, or Prophet. And
when that is done, the thing they pretend to be a Miracle, we must both see
it done, and use all means possible to consider, whether it be really done;
and not onely so, but whether it be such, as no man can do the like by his
naturall power, but that it requires the immediate hand of God. And in this
also we must have recourse to Gods Lieutenant; to whom in all doubtfull
cases, wee have submitted our private judgments. For Example; if a man
pretend, that after certain words spoken over a peece of bread, that
presently God hath made it not bread, but a God, or a man, or both, and
neverthelesse it looketh still as like bread as ever it did; there is no reason
for any man to think it really done; nor consequently to fear him, till he
enquire of God, by his Vicar, or Lieutenant, whether it be done, or not. If
he say not, then followeth that which Moses saith, (Deut. 18. 22.) "he hath
spoken it presumptuously, thou shalt not fear him." If he say 'tis done, then
he is not to contradict it. So also if wee see not, but onely hear tell of a
Miracle, we are to consult the Lawful Church; that is to say, the lawful
Head thereof, how far we are to give credit to the relators of it. And this is
chiefly the case of men, that in these days live under Christian Soveraigns.
For in these times, I do not know one man, that ever saw any such
wondrous work, done by the charm, or at the word, or prayer of a man, that
a man endued but with a mediocrity of reason, would think supernaturall:

and the question is no more, whether what wee see done, be a Miracle;
whether the Miracle we hear, or read of, were a reall work, and not the Act
of a tongue, or pen; but in plain terms, whether the report be true, or a lye.
In which question we are not every one, to make our own private Reason,
or Conscience, but the Publique Reason, that is, the reason of Gods
Supreme Lieutenant, Judge; and indeed we have made him Judge already,
if wee have given him a Soveraign power, to doe all that is necessary for
our peace and defence. A private man has alwaies the liberty, (because
thought is free,) to beleeve, or not beleeve in his heart, those acts that have
been given out for Miracles, according as he shall see, what benefit can
accrew by mens belief, to those that pretend, or countenance them, and
thereby conjecture, whether they be Miracles, or Lies. But when it comes
to confession of that faith, the Private Reason must submit to the
Publique; that is to say, to Gods Lieutenant. But who is this Lieutenant of
God, and Head of the Church, shall be considered in its proper place
thereafter.

CHAPTER XXXVIII. OF THE SIGNIFICATION
IN SCRIPTURE OF ETERNALL LIFE,
HELL, SALVATION, THE WORLD TO COME, AND
REDEMPTION
The maintenance of Civill Society, depending on Justice; and Justice on
the power of Life and Death, and other lesse Rewards and Punishments,
residing in them that have the Soveraignty of the Common-wealth; It is
impossible a Common-wealth should stand, where any other than the
Soveraign, hath a power of giving greater rewards than Life; and of
inflicting greater punishments than Death. Now seeing Eternall Life is a
greater reward, than the Life Present; and Eternall Torment a greater
punishment than the Death of Nature; It is a thing worthy to be well
considered, of all men that desire (by obeying Authority) to avoid the
calamities of Confusion, and Civill war, what is meant in Holy Scripture,
by Life Eternall, and Torment Eternall; and for what offences, against
whom committed, men are to be Eternally Tormented; and for what
actions, they are to obtain Eternall Life.

Place Of Adams Eternity If He Had Not Sinned,
The Terrestrial Paradise
And first we find, that Adam was created in such a condition of life, as
had he not broken the commandement of God, he had enjoyed it in the
Paradise of Eden Everlastingly. For there was the Tree of Life; whereof he
was so long allowed to eat, as he should forbear to eat of the tree of
Knowledge of Good an Evill; which was not allowed him. And therefore as
soon as he had eaten of it, God thrust him out of Paradise, "lest he should
put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and live for ever." (Gen.
3. 22.) By which it seemeth to me, (with submission neverthelesse both in
this, and in all questions, whereof the determination dependeth on the
Scriptures, to the interpretation of the Bible authorized by the Commonwealth, whose Subject I am,) that Adam if he had not sinned, had had an
Eternall Life on Earth: and that Mortality entred upon himself, and his
posterity, by his first Sin. Not that actuall Death then entred; for Adam
then could never have had children; whereas he lived long after, and saw a
numerous posterity ere he dyed. But where it is said, "In the day that thou
eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die," it must needs bee meant of his
Mortality, and certitude of death. Seeing then Eternall life was lost by
Adams forfeiture, in committing sin, he that should cancell that forfeiture
was to recover thereby, that Life again. Now Jesus Christ hath satisfied for
the sins of all that beleeve in him; and therefore recovered to all beleevers,
that ETERNALL LIFE, which was lost by the sin of Adam. And in this
sense it is, that the comparison of St. Paul holdeth (Rom. 5.18, 19.) "As by
the offence of one, Judgment came upon all men to condemnation, even so
by the righteousnesse of one, the free gift came upon all men to
Justification of Life." Which is again (1 Cor. 15.21,22) more perspicuously
delivered in these words, "For since by man came death, by man came also
the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall
all be made alive."

Texts Concerning The Place Of Life Eternall For
Beleevers
Concerning the place wherein men shall enjoy that Eternall Life, which
Christ hath obtained for them, the texts next before alledged seem to make
it on Earth. For if as in Adam, all die, that is, have forfeited Paradise, and
Eternall Life on Earth; even so in Christ all shall be made alive; then all
men shall be made to live on Earth; for else the comparison were not
proper. Hereunto seemeth to agree that of the Psalmist, (Psal. 133.3.)
"Upon Zion God commanded the blessing, even Life for evermore;" for
Zion, is in Jerusalem, upon Earth: as also that of S. Joh. (Rev. 2.7.) "To
him that overcommeth I will give to eat of the tree of life, which is in the
midst of the Paradise of God." This was the tree of Adams Eternall life;
but his life was to have been on Earth. The same seemeth to be confirmed
again by St. Joh. (Rev. 21.2.) where he saith, "I John saw the Holy City,
New Jerusalem, coming down from God out of heaven, prepared as a Bride
adorned for her husband:" and again v. 10. to the same effect: As if he
should say, the new Jerusalem, the Paradise of God, at the coming again of
Christ, should come down to Gods people from Heaven, and not they goe
up to it from Earth. And this differs nothing from that, which the two men
in white clothing (that is, the two Angels) said to the Apostles, that were
looking upon Christ ascending (Acts 1.11.) "This same Jesus, who is taken
up from you into Heaven, shall so come, as you have seen him go up into
Heaven." Which soundeth as if they had said, he should come down to
govern them under his Father, Eternally here; and not take them up to
govern them in Heaven; and is conformable to the Restauration of the
Kingdom of God, instituted under Moses; which was a Political
government of the Jews on Earth. Again, that saying of our Saviour (Mat.
22.30.) "that in the Resurrection they neither marry, nor are given in
marriage, but are as the Angels of God in heaven," is a description of an
Eternall Life, resembling that which we lost in Adam in the point of
Marriage. For seeing Adam, and Eve, if they had not sinned, had lived on
Earth Eternally, in their individuall persons; it is manifest, they should not
continually have procreated their kind. For if Immortals should have

generated, as Mankind doth now; the Earth in a small time, would not have
been able to afford them a place to stand on. The Jews that asked our
Saviour the question, whose wife the woman that had married many
brothers, should be, in the resurrection, knew not what were the
consequences of Immortality; that there shal be no Generation, and
consequently no marriage, no more than there is Marriage, or generation
among the Angels. The comparison between that Eternall life which Adam
lost, and our Saviour by his Victory over death hath recovered; holdeth
also in this, that as Adam lost Eternall Life by his sin, and yet lived after it
for a time; so the faithful Christian hath recovered Eternal Life by Christs
passion, though he die a natural death, and remaine dead for a time;
namely, till the Resurrection. For as Death is reckoned from the
Condemnation of Adam, not from the Execution; so life is reckoned from
the Absolution, not from the Resurrection of them that are elected in
Christ.

Ascension Into Heaven
That the place wherein men are to live Eternally, after the Resurrection,
is the Heavens, meaning by Heaven, those parts of the world, which are the
most remote from Earth, as where the stars are, or above the stars, in
another Higher Heaven, called Caelum Empyreum, (whereof there is no
mention in Scripture, nor ground in Reason) is not easily to be drawn from
any text that I can find. By the Kingdome of Heaven, is meant the
Kingdome of the King that dwelleth in Heaven; and his Kingdome was the
people of Israel, whom he ruled by the Prophets his Lieutenants, first
Moses, and after him Eleazar, and the Soveraign Priests, till in the days of
Samuel they rebelled, and would have a mortall man for their King, after
the manner of other Nations. And when our Saviour Christ, by the
preaching of his Ministers, shall have perswaded the Jews to return, and
called the Gentiles to his obedience, then shall there be a new Kingdome
of Heaven, because our King shall then be God, whose Throne is Heaven;
without any necessity evident in the Scripture, that man shall ascend to his
happinesse any higher than Gods Footstool the Earth. On the contrary, we
find written (Joh. 3.13.) that "no man hath ascended into Heaven, but he
that came down from Heaven, even the Son of man, that is in Heaven."
Where I observe by the way, that these words are not, as those which go
immediately before, the words of our Saviour, but of St. John himself; for
Christ was then not in Heaven, but upon the Earth. The like is said of
David (Acts 2.34.) where St. Peter, to prove the Ascension of Christ, using
the words of the Psalmist, (Psal. 16.10.) "Thou wilt not leave my soule in
Hell, nor suffer thine Holy one to see corruption," saith, they were spoken
(not of David, but) of Christ; and to prove it, addeth this Reason, "For
David is not ascended into Heaven." But to this a man may easily answer,
and say, that though their bodies were not to ascend till the generall day of
Judgment, yet their souls were in Heaven as soon as they were departed
from their bodies; which also seemeth to be confirmed by the words of our
Saviour (Luke 20.37,38.) who proving the Resurrection out of the word of
Moses, saith thus, "That the dead are raised, even Moses shewed, at the
bush, when he calleth the Lord, the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac,

and the God of Jacob. For he is not a God of the Dead, but of the Living;
for they all live to him." But if these words be to be understood only of the
Immortality of the Soul, they prove not at all that which our Saviour
intended to prove, which was the Resurrection of the Body, that is to say,
the Immortality of the Man. Therefore our Saviour meaneth, that those
Patriarchs were Immortall; not by a property consequent to the essence,
and nature of mankind, but by the will of God, that was pleased of his
mere grace, to bestow Eternall Life upon the faithfull. And though at that
time the Patriarchs and many other faithfull men were Dead, yet as it is in
the text, they Lived To God; that is, they were written in the Book of Life
with them that were absolved of their sinnes, and ordained to Life eternall
at the Resurrection. That the Soul of man is in its own nature Eternall, and
a living Creature independent on the Body; or that any meer man is
Immortall, otherwise than by the Resurrection in the last day, (except Enos
and Elias,) is a doctrine not apparent in Scripture. The whole 14. Chapter
of Job, which is the speech not of his friends, but of himselfe, is a
complaint of this Mortality of Nature; and yet no contradiction of the
Immortality at the Resurrection. "There is hope of a tree," (saith hee verse
7.) "if it be cast down, Though the root thereof wax old, and the stock
thereof die in the ground, yet when it scenteth the water it will bud, and
bring forth boughes like a Plant. But man dyeth, and wasteth away, yea,
man giveth up the Ghost, and where is he?" and (verse 12.) "man lyeth
down, and riseth not, till the heavens be no more." But when is it, that the
heavens shall be no more? St. Peter tells us, that it is at the generall
Resurrection. For in his 2. Epistle, 3. Chapter, and 7. verse, he saith, that
"the Heavens and the Earth that are now, are reserved unto fire against the
day of Judgment, and perdition of ungodly men," and (verse 12.) "looking
for, and hasting to the comming of God, wherein the Heavens shall be on
fire, and shall be dissolved, and the Elements shall melt with fervent heat.
Neverthelesse, we according to the promise look for new Heavens, and a
new Earth, wherein dwelleth righteousnesse." Therefore where Job saith,
man riseth not till the Heavens be no more; it is all one, as if he had said,
the Immortall Life (and Soule and Life in the Scripture, do usually signifie
the same thing) beginneth not in man, till the Resurrection, and day of
Judgment; and hath for cause, not his specificall nature, and generation;
but the Promise. For St. Peter saies not, "Wee look for new heavens, and a
new earth, (from Nature) but from Promise."

Lastly, seeing it hath been already proved out of divers evident places of
Scripture, in the 35. chapter of this book, that the Kingdom of God is a
Civil Common-wealth, where God himself is Soveraign, by vertue first of
the Old, and since of the New Covenant, wherein he reigneth by his Vicar,
or Lieutenant; the same places do therefore also prove, that after the
comming again of our Saviour in his Majesty, and glory, to reign actually,
and Eternally; the Kingdom of God is to be on Earth. But because this
doctrine (though proved out of places of Scripture not few, nor obscure)
will appear to most men a novelty; I doe but propound it; maintaining
nothing in this, or any other paradox of Religion; but attending the end of
that dispute of the sword, concerning the Authority, (not yet amongst my
Countrey-men decided,) by which all sorts of doctrine are to bee approved,
or rejected; and whose commands, both in speech, and writing,
(whatsoever be the opinions of private men) must by all men, that mean to
be protected by their Laws, be obeyed. For the points of doctrine
concerning the Kingdome (of) God, have so great influence on the
Kingdome of Man, as not to be determined, but by them, that under God
have the Soveraign Power.

The Place After Judgment, Of Those Who Were
Never In The Kingdome
Of God, Or Having Been In, Are Cast Out
As the Kingdome of God, and Eternall Life, so also Gods Enemies, and
their Torments after Judgment, appear by the Scripture, to have their place
on Earth. The name of the place, where all men remain till the
Resurrection, that were either buryed, or swallowed up of the Earth, is
usually called in Scripture, by words that signifie Under Ground; which
the Latines read generally Infernus, and Inferni, and the Greeks Hades;
that is to say, a place where men cannot see; and containeth as well the
Grave, as any other deeper place. But for the place of the damned after the
Resurrection, it is not determined, neither in the Old, nor New Testament,
by any note of situation; but onely by the company: as that it shall bee,
where such wicked men were, as God in former times in extraordinary, and
miraculous manner, had destroyed from off the face of the Earth: As for
Example, that they are in Inferno, in Tartarus, or in the bottomelesse pit;
because Corah, Dathan, and Abirom, were swallowed up alive into the
earth. Not that the Writers of the Scripture would have us beleeve, there
could be in the globe of the Earth, which is not only finite, but also
(compared to the height of the Stars) of no considerable magnitude, a pit
without a bottome; that is, a hole of infinite depth, such as the Greeks in
their Daemonologie (that is to say, in their doctrine concerning Daemons,)
and after them, the Romans called Tartarus; of which Virgill sayes,
Bis patet in praeceps, tantem tenditque sub umbras,
Quantus ad aethereum coeli suspectus Olympum:

for that is a thing the proportion of Earth to Heaven cannot bear: but
that wee should beleeve them there, indefinitely, where those men are, on
whom God inflicted that Exemplary punnishment.

The Congregation Of Giants
Again, because those mighty men of the Earth, that lived in the time of
Noah, before the floud, (which the Greeks called Heroes, and the Scripture
Giants, and both say, were begotten, by copulation of the children of God,
with the children of men,) were for their wicked life destroyed by the
generall deluge; the place of the Damned, is therefore also sometimes
marked out, by the company of those deceased Giants; as Proverbs 21.16.
"The man that wandreth out of the way of understanding, shall remain in
the congregation of the Giants," and Job 26.5. "Behold the Giants groan
under water, and they that dwell with them." Here the place of the
Damned, is under the water. And Isaiah 14.9. "Hell is troubled how to meet
thee," (that is, the King of Babylon) "and will displace the Giants for
thee:" and here again the place of the Damned, (if the sense be literall,) is
to be under water.

Lake Of Fire
Thirdly, because the Cities of Sodom, and Gomorrah, by the
extraordinary wrath of God, were consumed for their wickednesse with
Fire and Brimstone, and together with them the countrey about made a
stinking bituminous Lake; the place of the Damned is sometimes
expressed by Fire, and a Fiery Lake: as in the Apocalypse ch.21.8. "But the
timorous, incredulous, and abominable, and Murderers, and
Whoremongers, and Sorcerers, and Idolators, and all Lyars, shall have
their part in the Lake that burneth with Fire, and Brimstone; which is the
second Death." So that it is manifest, that Hell Fire, which is here
expressed by Metaphor, from the reall Fire of Sodome, signifieth not any
certain kind, or place of Torment; but is to be taken indefinitely, for
Destruction, as it is in the 20. Chapter, at the 14. verse; where it is said,
that "Death and Hell were cast into the Lake of Fire;" that is to say, were
abolished, and destroyed; as if after the day of Judgment, there shall be no
more Dying, nor no more going into Hell; that is, no more going to Hades
(from which word perhaps our word Hell is derived,) which is the same
with no more Dying.

Utter Darknesse
Fourthly, from the Plague of Darknesse inflicted on the Egyptians, of
which it is written (Exod. 10.23.) "They saw not one another, neither rose
any man from his place for three days; but all the Children of Israel had
light in their dwellings;" the place of the wicked after Judgment, is called
Utter Darknesse, or (as it is in the originall) Darknesse Without. And so it
is expressed (Mat. 22.13.) where the King commandeth his Servants, "to
bind hand and foot the man that had not on his Wedding garment, and to
cast him out," Eis To Skotos To Exoteron, Externall Darknesse, or
Darknesse Without: which though translated Utter Darknesse, does not
signifie How Great, but Where that darknesse is to be; namely, Without
The Habitation of Gods Elect.

Gehenna, And Tophet
Lastly, whereas there was a place neer Jerusalem, called the Valley of
the Children of Hinnon; in a part whereof, called Tophet, the Jews had
committed most grievous Idolatry, sacrificing their children to the Idol
Moloch; and wherein also God had afflicted his enemies with most
grievous punishments; and wherein Josias had burnt the Priests of Moloch
upon their own Altars, as appeareth at large in the 2 of Kings chap. 23. the
place served afterwards, to receive the filth, and garbage which was
carried thither, out of the City; and there used to be fires made, from time
to time, to purifie the aire, and take away the stench of Carrion. From this
abominable place, the Jews used ever after to call the place of the
Damned, by the name of Gehenna, or Valley of Hinnon. And this Gehenna,
is that word, which is usually now translated HELL; and from the fires
from time to time there burning, we have the notion of Everlasting, and
Unquenchable Fire.

Of The Literall Sense Of The Scripture
Concerning Hell
Seeing now there is none, that so interprets the Scripture, as that after
the day of Judgment, the wicked are all Eternally to be punished in the
Valley of Hinnon; or that they shall so rise again, as to be ever after under
ground, or under water; or that after the Resurrection, they shall no more
see one another; nor stir from one place to another; it followeth, me
thinks, very necessarily, that that which is thus said concerning Hell Fire,
is spoken metaphorically; and that therefore there is a proper sense to bee
enquired after, (for of all Metaphors there is some reall ground, that may
be expressed in proper words) both of the Place of Hell, and the nature of
Hellish Torment, and Tormenters.

Satan, Devill, Not Proper Names, But Appellatives
And first for the Tormenters, wee have their nature, and properties,
exactly and properly delivered by the names of, The Enemy, or Satan; The
Accuser, or Diabolus; The Destroyer, or Abbadon. Which significant
names, Satan, Devill, Abbadon, set not forth to us any Individuall person,
as proper names use to doe; but onely an office, or quality; and are
therefore Appellatives; which ought not to have been left untranslated, as
they are, in the Latine, and Modern Bibles; because thereby they seem to
be the proper names of Daemons; and men are the more easily seduced to
beleeve the doctrine of Devills; which at that time was the Religion of the
Gentiles, and contrary to that of Moses, and of Christ.
And because by the Enemy, the Accuser, and Destroyer, is meant, the
Enemy of them that shall be in the Kingdome of God; therefore if the
Kingdome of God after the Resurrection, bee upon the Earth, (as in the
former Chapter I have shewn by Scripture it seems to be,) The Enemy, and
his Kingdome must be on Earth also. For so also was it, in the time before
the Jews had deposed God. For Gods Kingdome was in Palestine; and the
Nations round about, were the Kingdomes of the Enemy; and consequently
by Satan, is meant any Earthly Enemy of the Church.

Torments Of Hell
The Torments of Hell, are expressed sometimes, by "weeping, and
gnashing of teeth," as Mat. 8.12. Sometimes, by "the worm of
Conscience;" as Isa.66.24. and Mark 9.44, 46, 48; sometimes, by Fire, as
in the place now quoted, "where the worm dyeth not, and the fire is not
quenched," and many places beside: sometimes by "Shame, and
contempt," as Dan. 12.2. "And many of them that sleep in the dust of the
Earth, shall awake; some to Everlasting life; and some to shame, and
everlasting contempt." All which places design metaphorically a grief, and
discontent of mind, from the sight of that Eternall felicity in others, which
they themselves through their own incredulity, and disobedience have lost.
And because such felicity in others, is not sensible but by comparison with
their own actuall miseries; it followeth that they are to suffer such bodily
paines, and calamities, as are incident to those, who not onely live under
evill and cruell Governours, but have also for Enemy, the Eternall King of
the Saints, God Almighty. And amongst these bodily paines, is to be
reckoned also to every one of the wicked a second Death. For though the
Scripture bee clear for an universall Resurrection; yet wee do not read,
that to any of the Reprobate is promised an Eternall life. For whereas St.
Paul (1 Cor. 15.42, 43.) to the question concerning what bodies men shall
rise with again, saith, that "the body is sown in corruption, and is raised in
incorruption; It is sown in dishonour, it is raised in glory; it is sown in
weaknesse, it is raised in power;" Glory and Power cannot be applyed to
the bodies of the wicked: Nor can the name of Second Death, bee applyed
to those that can never die but once: And although in Metaphoricall
speech, a Calamitous life Everlasting, may bee called an Everlasting Death
yet it cannot well be understood of a Second Death. The fire prepared for
the wicked, is an Everlasting Fire: that is to say, the estate wherein no man
can be without torture, both of body and mind, after the Resurrection, shall
endure for ever; and in that sense the Fire shall be unquenchable, and the
torments Everlasting: but it cannot thence be inferred, that hee who shall
be cast into that fire, or be tormented with those torments, shall endure,
and resist them so, as to be eternally burnt, and tortured, and yet never be

destroyed, nor die. And though there be many places that affirm
Everlasting Fire, and Torments (into which men may be cast successively
one after another for ever;) yet I find none that affirm there shall bee an
Eternall Life therein of any individuall person; but on the contrary, an
Everlasting Death, which is the Second Death: (Apoc. 20. 13,14.) "For
after Death, and the Grave shall have delivered up the dead which were in
them, and every man be judged according to his works; Death and the
Grave shall also be cast into the Lake of Fire. This is the Second Death."
Whereby it is evident, that there is to bee a Second Death of every one that
shall bee condemned at the day of Judgement, after which hee shall die no
more.

The Joyes Of Life Eternall, And Salvation The
Same Thing,
Salvation From Sin, And From Misery, All One
The joyes of Life Eternall, are in Scripture comprehended all under the
name of SALVATION, or Being Saved. To be saved, is to be secured, either
respectively, against speciall Evills, or absolutely against all Evill,
comprehending Want, Sicknesse, and Death it self. And because man was
created in a condition Immortall, not subject to corruption, and
consequently to nothing that tendeth to the dissolution of his nature; and
fell from that happinesse by the sin of Adam; it followeth, that to be Saved
From Sin, is to be saved from all the Evill, and Calamities that Sinne hath
brought upon us. And therefore in the Holy Scripture, Remission of Sinne,
and Salvation from Death and Misery, is the same thing, as it appears by
the words of our Saviour, who having cured a man sick of the Palsey, by
saying, (Mat. 9.2.) "Son be of good cheer, thy Sins be forgiven thee;" and
knowing that the Scribes took for blasphemy, that a man should pretend to
forgive Sins, asked them (v.5.) "whether it were easier to say, Thy Sinnes
be forgiven thee, or, Arise and walk;" signifying thereby, that it was all
one, as to the saving of the sick, to say, "Thy Sins are forgiven," and "Arise
and walk;" and that he used that form of speech, onely to shew he had
power to forgive Sins. And it is besides evident in reason, that since Death
and Misery, were the punishments of Sin, the discharge of Sinne, must also
be a discharge of Death and Misery; that is to say, Salvation absolute, such
as the faithfull are to enjoy after the day of Judgment, by the power, and
favour of Jesus Christ, who for that cause is called our SAVIOUR.
Concerning Particular Salvations, such as are understood, 1 Sam. 14.39.
"as the Lord liveth that saveth Israel," that is, from their temporary
enemies, and 2 Sam. 22.4. "Thou art my Saviour, thou savest me from
violence;" and 2 Kings 13.5. "God gave the Israelites a Saviour, and so
they were delivered from the hand of the Assyrians," and the like, I need
say nothing; there being neither difficulty, nor interest, to corrupt the
interpretation of texts of that kind.

The Place Of Eternall Salvation
But concerning the Generall Salvation, because it must be in the
Kingdome of Heaven, there is great difficulty concerning the Place. On
one side, by Kingdome (which is an estate ordained by men for their
perpetuall security against enemies, and want) it seemeth that this
Salvation should be on Earth. For by Salvation is set forth unto us, a
glorious Reign of our King, by Conquest; not a safety by Escape: and
therefore there where we look for Salvation, we must look also for
Triumph; and before Triumph, for Victory; and before Victory, for Battell;
which cannot well be supposed, shall be in Heaven. But how good soever
this reason may be, I will not trust to it, without very evident places of
Scripture. The state of Salvation is described at large, Isaiah, 33. ver.
20,21,22,23,24.
"Look upon Zion, the City of our solemnities, thine eyes shall see
Jerusalem a quiet habitation, a tabernacle that shall not be taken down; not
one of the stakes thereof shall ever be removed, neither shall any of the
cords thereof be broken.
But there the glorious Lord will be unto us a place of broad rivers, and
streams; wherein shall goe no Gally with oares; neither shall gallant ship
passe thereby.
For the Lord is our Judge, the Lord is our Lawgiver, the Lord is our
King, he will save us.
Thy tacklings are loosed; they could not well strengthen their mast; they
could not spread the sail: then is the prey of a great spoil divided; the lame
take the prey.
And the Inhabitant shall not say, I am sicke; the people that shall dwell
therein shall be forgiven their Iniquity."
In which words wee have the place from whence Salvation is to proceed,
"Jerusalem, a quiet habitation;" the Eternity of it, "a tabernacle that shall
not be taken down," &c. The Saviour of it, "the Lord, their Judge, their
Lawgiver, their King, he will save us;" the Salvation, "the Lord shall be to
them as a broad mote of swift waters," &c. the condition of their Enemies,

"their tacklings are loose, their masts weake, the lame shal take the spoil
of them." The condition of the Saved, "The Inhabitants shall not say, I am
sick:" And lastly, all this is comprehended in Forgivenesse of sin, "The
people that dwell therein shall be forgiven their iniquity." By which it is
evident, that Salvation shall be on Earth, then, when God shall reign, (at
the coming again of Christ) in Jerusalem; and from Jerusalem shall
proceed the Salvation of the Gentiles that shall be received into Gods
Kingdome; as is also more expressely declared by the same Prophet, Chap.
66.20, 21. "And they," (that is, the Gentiles who had any Jew in bondage)
"shall bring all your brethren, for an offering to the Lord, out of all
nations, upon horses, and in charets, and in litters, and upon mules, and
upon swift beasts, to my holy mountain, Jerusalem, saith the Lord, as the
Children of Israel bring an offering in a clean vessell into the House of the
Lord. And I will also take of them for Priests and for Levites, saith the
Lord:" Whereby it is manifest, that the chief seat of Gods Kingdome
(which is the Place, from whence the Salvation of us that were Gentiles,
shall proceed) shall be Jerusalem; And the same is also confirmed by our
Saviour, in his discourse with the woman of Samaria, concerning the place
of Gods worship; to whom he saith, John 4.22. that the Samaritans
worshipped they know not what, but the Jews worship what they knew,
"For Salvation is of the Jews (Ex Judais, that is, begins at the Jews): as if
he should say, you worship God, but know not by whom he wil save you,
as we doe, that know it shall be one of the tribe of Judah, a Jew, not a
Samaritan. And therefore also the woman not impertinently answered him
again, "We know the Messias shall come." So that which our saviour saith,
"Salvation is from the Jews," is the same that Paul sayes (Rom. 1.16,17.)
"The Gospel is the power of God to Salvation to every one that beleeveth;
To the Jew first, and also to the Greek. For therein is the righteousnesse of
God revealed from faith to faith;" from the faith of the Jew, to the faith of
the Gentile. In the like sense the Prophet Joel describing the day of
Judgment, (chap. 2.30,31.) that God would "shew wonders in heaven, and
in earth, bloud, and fire, and pillars of smoak. The Sun should be turned to
darknesse, and the Moon into bloud, before the great and terrible day of
the Lord come," he addeth verse 32. "and it shall come to passe, that
whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord, shall be saved. For in
Mount Zion, and in Jerusalem shall be Salvation." And Obadiah verse 17
saith the same, "Upon Mount Zion shall be Deliverance; and there shall be

holinesse, and the house of Jacob shall possesse their possessions," that is,
the possessions of the Heathen, which possessions he expresseth more
particularly in the following verses, by the Mount of Esau, the Land of the
Philistines, the Fields of Ephraim, of Samaria, Gilead, and the Cities of the
South, and concludes with these words, "the Kingdom shall be the Lords."
All these places are for Salvation, and the Kingdome of God (after the day
of Judgement) upon Earth. On the other side, I have not found any text that
can probably be drawn, to prove any Ascension of the Saints into Heaven;
that is to say, into any Coelum Empyreum, or other aetheriall Region;
saving that it is called the Kingdome of Heaven; which name it may have,
because God, that was King of the Jews, governed them by his commands,
sent to Moses by Angels from Heaven, to reduce them to their obedience;
and shall send him thence again, to rule both them, and all other faithfull
men, from the day of Judgment, Everlastingly: or from that, that the
Throne of this our Great King is in Heaven; whereas the Earth is but his
Footstoole. But that the Subjects of God should have any place as high as
his throne, or higher than his Footstoole, it seemeth not sutable to the
dignity of a King, nor can I find any evident text for it in holy Scripture.
From this that hath been said of the Kingdom of God, and of Salvation,
it is not hard to interpret, what is meant by the WORLD TO COME. There
are three worlds mentioned in Scripture, the Old World, the Present World,
and the World to Come. Of the first, St. Peter speaks, (2 Pet. 2.5.) "If God
spared not the Old World, but saved Noah the eighth person, a Preacher of
righteousnesse, bringing the flood upon the world of the ungodly," &c. So
the First World, was from Adam to the generall Flood. Of the present
World, our Saviour speaks (John 18.36.) "My Kingdome is not of this
World." For he came onely to teach men the way of Salvation, and to
renew the Kingdome of his Father, by his doctrine. Of the World to come,
St. Peter speaks, (2 Pet. 3. 13.) "Neverthelesse we according to his promise
look for new Heavens, and a new Earth." This is that WORLD, wherein
Christ coming down from Heaven, in the clouds, with great power, and
glory, shall send his Angels, and shall gather together his elect, from the
four winds, and from the uttermost parts of the Earth, and thence forth
reign over them, (under his Father) Everlastingly.

Redemption
Salvation of a sinner, supposeth a precedent REDEMPTION; for he that
is once guilty of Sin, is obnoxious to the Penalty of the same; and must
pay (or some other for him) such Ransome, as he that is offended, and has
him in his power, shall require. And seeing the person offended, is
Almighty God, in whose power are all things; such Ransome is to be paid
before Salvation can be acquired, as God hath been pleased to require. By
this Ransome, is not intended a satisfaction for Sin, equivalent to the
Offence, which no sinner for himselfe, nor righteous man can ever be able
to make for another; The dammage a man does to another, he may make
amends for by restitution, or recompence, but sin cannot be taken away by
recompence; for that were to make the liberty to sin, a thing vendible. But
sins may bee pardoned to the repentant, either Gratis, or upon such
penalty, as God is pleased to accept. That which God usually accepted in
the Old Testament, was some Sacrifice, or Oblation. To forgive sin is not
an act of Injustice, though the punishment have been threatned. Even
amongst men, though the promise of Good, bind the promiser; yet threats,
that is to say, promises, of Evill, bind them not; much lesse shall they bind
God, who is infinitely more mercifull then men. Our Saviour Christ
therefore to Redeem us, did not in that sense satisfie for the Sins of men,
as that his Death, of its own vertue, could make it unjust in God to punish
sinners with Eternall death; but did make that Sacrifice, and Oblation of
himself, at his first coming, which God was pleased to require, for the
Salvation at his second coming, of such as in the mean time should repent,
and beleeve in him. And though this act of our Redemption, be not alwaies
in Scripture called a Sacrifice, and Oblation, but sometimes a Price, yet by
Price we are not to understand any thing, by the value whereof, he could
claim right to a pardon for us, from his offended Father, but that Price
which God the Father was pleased in mercy to demand.

CHAPTER XXXIX. OF THE SIGNIFICATION
IN SCRIPTURE OF THE WORD CHURCH

Church The Lords House
The word Church, (Ecclesia) signifieth in the Books of Holy Scripture
divers things. Sometimes (though not often) it is taken for Gods House,
that is to say, for a Temple, wherein Christians assemble to perform holy
duties publiquely; as, 1 Cor. 14. ver. 34. "Let your women keep silence in
the Churches:" but this is Metaphorically put, for the Congregation there
assembled; and hath been since used for the Edifice it self, to distinguish
between the Temples of Christians, and Idolaters. The Temple of
Jerusalem was Gods House, and the House of Prayer; and so is any Edifice
dedicated by Christians to the worship of Christ, Christs House: and
therefore the Greek Fathers call it Kuriake, The Lords House; and thence,
in our language it came to be called Kyrke, and Church.

Ecclesia Properly What
Church (when not taken for a House) signifieth the same that Ecclesia
signified in the Grecian Common-wealths; that is to say, a Congregation,
or an Assembly of Citizens, called forth, to hear the Magistrate speak unto
them; and which in the Common-wealth of Rome was called Concio, as he
that spake was called Ecclesiastes, and Concionator. And when they were
called forth by lawfull Authority, (Acts 19.39.) it was Ecclesia Legitima, a
Lawfull Church, Ennomos Ecclesia. But when they were excited by
tumultuous, and seditious clamor, then it was a confused Church, Ecclesia
Sugkechumene.
It is taken also sometimes for the men that have right to be of the
Congregation, though not actually assembled; that is to say, for the whole
multitude of Christian men, how far soever they be dispersed: as (Act.
8.3.) where it is said, that "Saul made havock of the Church:" And in this
sense is Christ said to be Head of the Church. And sometimes for a certain
part of Christians, as (Col. 4.15.) "Salute the Church that is in his house."
Sometimes also for the Elect onely; as (Ephes. 5.27.) "A Glorious Church,
without spot, or wrinkle, holy, and without blemish;" which is meant of the
Church Triumphant, or, Church To Come. Sometimes, for a Congregation
assembled, of professors of Christianity, whether their profession be true,
or counterfeit, as it is understood, Mat. 18.17. where it is said, "Tell it to
the Church, and if hee neglect to hear the Church, let him be to thee as a
Gentile, or Publican."

In What Sense The Church Is One Person Church
Defined
And in this last sense only it is that the Church can be taken for one
Person; that is to say, that it can be said to have power to will, to
pronounce, to command, to be obeyed, to make laws, or to doe any other
action whatsoever; For without authority from a lawfull Congregation,
whatsoever act be done in a concourse of people, it is the particular act of
every one of those that were present, and gave their aid to the performance
of it; and not the act of them all in grosse, as of one body; much lesse that
act of them that were absent, or that being present, were not willing it
should be done. According to this sense, I define a CHURCH to be, "A
company of men professing Christian Religion, united in the person of one
Soveraign; at whose command they ought to assemble, and without whose
authority they ought not to assemble." And because in all Commonwealths, that Assembly, which is without warrant from the Civil
Soveraign, is unlawful; that Church also, which is assembled in any
Common-wealth, that hath forbidden them to assemble, is an unlawfull
Assembly.

A Christian Common-wealth, And A Church All
One
It followeth also, that there is on Earth, no such universall Church as all
Christians are bound to obey; because there is no power on Earth, to which
all other Common-wealths are subject: There are Christians, in the
Dominions of severall Princes and States; but every one of them is subject
to that Common-wealth, whereof he is himself a member; and
consequently, cannot be subject to the commands of any other Person. And
therefore a Church, such as one as is capable to Command, to Judge,
Absolve, Condemn, or do any other act, is the same thing with a Civil
Common-wealth, consisting of Christian men; and is called a Civill State,
for that the subjects of it are Men; and a Church, for that the subjects
thereof are Christians. Temporall and Spirituall Government, are but two
words brought into the world, to make men see double, and mistake their
Lawfull Soveraign. It is true, that the bodies of the faithfull, after the
Resurrection shall be not onely Spirituall, but Eternall; but in this life they
are grosse, and corruptible. There is therefore no other Government in this
life, neither of State, nor Religion, but Temporall; nor teaching of any
doctrine, lawfull to any Subject, which the Governour both of the State,
and of the Religion, forbiddeth to be taught: And that Governor must be
one; or else there must needs follow Faction, and Civil war in the
Common-wealth, between the Church and State; between Spiritualists, and
Temporalists; between the Sword Of Justice, and the Shield Of Faith; and
(which is more) in every Christian mans own brest, between the Christian,
and the Man. The Doctors of the Church, are called Pastors; so also are
Civill Soveraignes: But if Pastors be not subordinate one to another, so as
that there may bee one chief Pastor, men will be taught contrary Doctrines,
whereof both may be, and one must be false. Who that one chief Pastor is,
according to the law of Nature, hath been already shewn; namely, that it is
the Civill Soveraign; And to whom the Scripture hath assigned that Office,
we shall see in the Chapters following.

CHAPTER XL
OF THE RIGHTS OF THE KINGDOME OF GOD, IN
ABRAHAM, MOSES, HIGH PRIESTS,
AND THE KINGS OF JUDAH

The Soveraign Rights Of Abraham
The Father of the Faithfull, and first in the Kingdome of God by
Covenant, was Abraham. For with him was the Covenant first made;
wherein he obliged himself, and his seed after him, to acknowledge and
obey the commands of God; not onely such, as he could take notice of, (as
Morall Laws,) by the light of Nature; but also such, as God should in
speciall manner deliver to him by Dreams and Visions. For as to the
Morall law, they were already obliged, and needed not have been
contracted withall, by promise of the Land of Canaan. Nor was there any
Contract, that could adde to, or strengthen the Obligation, by which both
they, and all men else were bound naturally to obey God Almighty: And
therefore the Covenant which Abraham made with God, was to take for the
Commandement of God, that which in the name of God was commanded
him, in a Dream, or Vision, and to deliver it to his family, and cause them
to observe the same.

Abraham Had The Sole Power Of Ordering The
Religion Of His Own People
In this Contract of God with Abraham, wee may observe three points of
important consequence in the government of Gods people. First, that at the
making of this Covenant, God spake onely to Abraham; and therefore
contracted not with any of his family, or seed, otherwise then as their wills
(which make the essence of all Covenants) were before the Contract
involved in the will of Abraham; who was therefore supposed to have had
a lawfull power, to make them perform all that he covenanted for them.
According whereunto (Gen 18.18, 19.) God saith, "All the Nations of the
Earth shall be blessed in him, For I know him that he will command his
children and his houshold after him, and they shall keep the way of the
Lord." From whence may be concluded this first point, that they to whom
God hath not spoken immediately, are to receive the positive
commandements of God, from their Soveraign; as the family and seed of
Abraham did from Abraham their Father, and Lord, and Civill Soveraign.
And Consequently in every Common-wealth, they who have no
supernaturall Revelation to the contrary, ought to obey the laws of their
own Soveraign, in the externall acts and profession of Religion. As for the
inward Thought, and beleef of men, which humane Governours can take no
notice of, (for God onely knoweth the heart) they are not voluntary, nor the
effect of the laws, but of the unrevealed will, and of the power of God; and
consequently fall not under obligation.

No Pretence Of Private Spirit Against The Religion
Of Abraham
From whence proceedeth another point, that it was not unlawfull for
Abraham, when any of his Subjects should pretend Private Vision, or
Spirit, or other Revelation from God, for the countenancing of any
doctrine which Abraham should forbid, or when they followed, or adhered
to any such pretender, to punish them; and consequently that it is lawfull
now for the Soveraign to punish any man that shall oppose his Private
Spirit against the Laws: For hee hath the same place in the Commonwealth, that Abraham had in his own Family.

Abraham Sole Judge, And Interpreter Of What
God Spake
There ariseth also from the same, a third point; that as none but
Abraham in his family, so none but the Soveraign in a Christian Commonwealth, can take notice what is, or what is not the Word of God. For God
spake onely to Abraham; and it was he onely, that was able to know what
God said, and to interpret the same to his family: And therefore also, they
that have the place of Abraham in a Common-wealth, are the onely
Interpreters of what God hath spoken.

The Authority Of Moses Whereon Grounded
The same Covenant was renewed with Isaac; and afterwards with Jacob;
but afterwards no more, till the Israelites were freed from the Egyptians,
and arrived at the Foot of Mount Sinai: and then it was renewed by Moses
(as I have said before, chap. 35.) in such manner, as they became from that
time forward the Peculiar Kingdome of God; whose Lieutenant was
Moses, for his owne time; and the succession to that office was setled
upon Aaron, and his heirs after him, to bee to God a Sacerdotall Kingdome
for ever.
By this constitution, a Kingdome is acquired to God. But seeing Moses
had no authority to govern the Israelites, as a successor to the right of
Abraham, because he could not claim it by inheritance; it appeareth not as
yet, that the people were obliged to take him for Gods Lieutenant, longer
than they beleeved that God spake unto him. And therefore his authority
(notwithstanding the Covenant they made with God) depended yet merely
upon the opinion they had of his Sanctity, and of the reality of his
Conferences with God, and the verity of his Miracles; which opinion
coming to change, they were no more obliged to take any thing for the law
of God, which he propounded to them in Gods name. We are therefore to
consider, what other ground there was, of their obligation to obey him. For
it could not be the commandement of God that could oblige them; because
God spake not to them immediately, but by the mediation of Moses
Himself; And our Saviour saith of himself, (John 5. 31.) "If I bear witnesse
of my self, my witnesse is not true," much lesse if Moses bear witnesse of
himselfe, (especially in a claim of Kingly power over Gods people) ought
his testimony to be received. His authority therefore, as the authority of all
other Princes, must be grounded on the Consent of the People, and their
Promise to obey him. And so it was: for "the people" (Exod. 20.18.) "when
they saw the Thunderings, and the Lightnings, and the noyse of the
Trumpet, and the mountaine smoaking, removed, and stood a far off. And
they said unto Moses, speak thou with us, and we will hear, but let not God
speak with us lest we die." Here was their promise of obedience; and by

this it was they obliged themselves to obey whatsoever he should deliver
unto them for the Commandement of God.

Moses Was (Under God) Soveraign Of The Jews,
All His Own Time,
Though Aaron Had The Priesthood
And notwithstanding the Covenant constituted a Sacerdotall Kingdome,
that is to say, a Kingdome hereditary to Aaron; yet that is to be understood
of the succession, after Moses should bee dead. For whosoever ordereth,
and establisheth the Policy, as first founder of a Common-wealth (be it
Monarchy, Aristocracy, or Democracy) must needs have Soveraign Power
over the people all the while he is doing of it. And that Moses had that
power all his own time, is evidently affirmed in the Scripture. First, in the
text last before cited, because the people promised obedience, not to Aaron
but to him. Secondly, (Exod. 24.1, 2.) "And God said unto Moses, Come up
unto the Lord, thou, and Aaron, Nadab and Abihu, and seventy of the
Elders of Israel. And Moses alone shall come neer the Lord, but they shall
not come nigh, neither shall the people goe up with him." By which it is
plain, that Moses who was alone called up to God, (and not Aaron, nor the
other Priests, nor the Seventy Elders, nor the People who were forbidden
to come up) was alone he, that represented to the Israelites the Person of
God; that is to say, was their sole Soveraign under God. And though
afterwards it be said (verse 9.) "Then went up Moses, and Aaron, Nadab,
and Abihu, and seventy of the Elders of Israel, and they saw the God of
Israel, and there was under his feet, as it were a paved work of a saphire
stone," &c. yet this was not till after Moses had been with God before, and
had brought to the people the words which God had said to him. He onely
went for the businesse of the people; the others, as the Nobles of his
retinue, were admitted for honour to that speciall grace, which was not
allowed to the people; which was, (as in the verse after appeareth) to see
God and live. "God laid not his hand upon them, they saw God and did eat
and drink" (that is, did live), but did not carry any commandement from
him to the people. Again, it is every where said, "The Lord spake unto
Moses," as in all other occasions of Government; so also in the ordering of
the Ceremonies of Religion, contained in the 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, and 31

Chapters of Exodus, and throughout Leviticus: to Aaron seldome. The
Calfe that Aaron made, Moses threw into the fire. Lastly, the question of
the Authority of Aaron, by occasion of his and Miriams mutiny against
Moses, was (Numbers 12.) judged by God himself for Moses. So also in
the question between Moses, and the People, when Corah, Dathan, and
Abiram, and two hundred and fifty Princes of the Assembly "gathered
themselves together" (Numbers 16. 3) "against Moses, and against Aaron,
and said unto them, 'Ye take too much upon you, seeing all the
congregation are Holy, every one of them, and the Lord is amongst them,
why lift you up your selves above the congregation of the Lord?'" God
caused the Earth to swallow Corah, Dathan, and Abiram with their wives
and children alive, and consumed those two hundred and fifty Princes with
fire. Therefore neither Aaron, nor the People, nor any Aristocracy of the
chief Princes of the People, but Moses alone had next under God the
Soveraignty over the Israelites: And that not onely in causes of Civill
Policy, but also of Religion; For Moses onely spake with God, and
therefore onely could tell the People, what it was that God required at their
hands. No man upon pain of death might be so presumptuous as to
approach the Mountain where God talked with Moses. "Thou shalt set
bounds" (saith the Lord, Exod 19. 12.) "to the people round about, and say,
Take heed to your selves that you goe not up into the Mount, or touch the
border of it; whosoever toucheth the Mount shall surely be put to death."
and again (verse 21.) "Get down, charge the people, lest they break
through unto the Lord to gaze." Out of which we may conclude, that
whosoever in a Christian Common-wealth holdeth the place of Moses, is
the sole Messenger of God, and Interpreter of his Commandements. And
according hereunto, no man ought in the interpretation of the Scripture to
proceed further then the bounds which are set by their severall Soveraigns.
For the Scriptures since God now speaketh in them, are the Mount Sinai;
the bounds whereof are the Laws of them that represent Gods Person on
Earth. To look upon them and therein to behold the wondrous works of
God, and learn to fear him is allowed; but to interpret them; that is, to pry
into what God saith to him whom he appointeth to govern under him, and
make themselves Judges whether he govern as God commandeth him, or
not, is to transgresse the bounds God hath set us, and to gaze upon God
irreverently.

All Spirits Were Subordinate To The Spirit Of
Moses
There was no Prophet in the time of Moses, nor pretender to the Spirit
of God, but such as Moses had approved, and Authorized. For there were
in his time but Seventy men, that are said to Prophecy by the Spirit of
God, and these were of all Moses his election; concerning whom God saith
to Moses (Numb. 11.16.) "Gather to mee Seventy of the Elders of Israel,
whom thou knowest to be the Elders of the People." To these God imparted
his Spirit; but it was not a different Spirit from that of Moses; for it is said
(verse 25.) "God came down in a cloud, and took of the Spirit that was
upon Moses, and gave it to the Seventy Elders." But as I have shewn
before (chap. 36.) by Spirit, is understood the Mind; so that the sense of
the place is no other than this, that God endued them with a mind
conformable, and subordinate to that of Moses, that they might Prophecy,
that is to say, speak to the people in Gods name, in such manner, as to set
forward (as Ministers of Moses, and by his authority) such doctrine as was
agreeable to Moses his doctrine. For they were but Ministers; and when
two of them Prophecyed in the Camp, it was thought a new and unlawfull
thing; and as it is in the 27. and 28. verses of the same Chapter, they were
accused of it, and Joshua advised Moses to forbid them, as not knowing
that it was by Moses his Spirit that they Prophecyed. By which it is
manifest, that no Subject ought to pretend to Prophecy, or to the Spirit, in
opposition to the doctrine established by him, whom God hath set in the
place of Moses.

After Moses The Soveraignty Was In The High
Priest
Aaron being dead, and after him also Moses, the Kingdome, as being a
Sacerdotall Kingdome, descended by vertue of the Covenant, to Aarons
Son, Eleazar the High Priest: And God declared him (next under himself)
for Soveraign, at the same time that he appointed Joshua for the Generall
of their Army. For thus God saith expressely (Numb. 27.21.) concerning
Joshua; "He shall stand before Eleazar the Priest, who shall ask counsell
for him, before the Lord, at his word shall they goe out, and at his word
they shall come in, both he, and all the Children of Israel with him:"
Therefore the Supreme Power of making War and Peace, was in the Priest.
The Supreme Power of Judicature belonged also to the High Priest: For the
Book of the Law was in their keeping; and the Priests and Levites onely
were the subordinate Judges in causes Civill, as appears in Deut. 17.8, 9,
10. And for the manner of Gods worship, there was never doubt made, but
that the High Priest till the time of Saul, had the Supreme Authority.
Therefore the Civill and Ecclesiasticall Power were both joined together in
one and the same person, the High Priest; and ought to bee so, in
whosoever governeth by Divine Right; that is, by Authority immediate
from God.

Of The Soveraign Power Between The Time Of
Joshua And Of Saul
After the death of Joshua, till the time of Saul, the time between is
noted frequently in the Book of Judges, "that there was in those dayes no
King in Israel;" and sometimes with this addition, that "every man did that
which was right in his own eyes." By which is to bee understood, that
where it is said, "there was no King," is meant, "there was no Soveraign
Power" in Israel. And so it was, if we consider the Act, and Exercise of
such power. For after the death of Joshua, & Eleazar, "there arose another
generation" (Judges 2.10.) "that knew not the Lord, nor the works which he
had done for Israel, but did evill in the sight of the Lord, and served
Baalim." And the Jews had that quality which St. Paul noteth, "to look for
a sign," not onely before they would submit themselves to the government
of Moses, but also after they had obliged themselves by their submission.
Whereas Signs, and Miracles had for End to procure Faith, not to keep
men from violating it, when they have once given it; for to that men are
obliged by the law of Nature. But if we consider not the Exercise, but the
Right of governing, the Soveraign power was still in the High Priest.
Therefore whatsoever obedience was yeelded to any of the Judges, (who
were men chosen by God extraordinarily, to save his rebellious subjects
out of the hands of the enemy,) it cannot bee drawn into argument against
the Right the High Priest had to the Soveraign Power, in all matters, both
of Policy and Religion. And neither the Judges, nor Samuel himselfe had
an ordinary, but extraordinary calling to the Government; and were obeyed
by the Israelites, not out of duty, but out of reverence to their favour with
God, appearing in their wisdome, courage, or felicity. Hitherto therefore
the Right of Regulating both the Policy, and the Religion, were
inseparable.

Of The Rights Of The Kings Of Israel
To the Judges, succeeded Kings; And whereas before, all authority, both
in Religion, and Policy, was in the High Priest; so now it was all in the
King. For the Soveraignty over the people, which was before, not onely by
vertue of the Divine Power, but also by a particular pact of the Israelites in
God, and next under him, in the High Priest, as his Viceregent on earth,
was cast off by the People, with the consent of God himselfe. For when
they said to Samuel (1 Sam. 8.5.) "make us a King to judge us, like all the
Nations," they signified that they would no more bee governed by the
commands that should bee laid upon them by the Priest, in the name of
God; but by one that should command them in the same manner that all
other nations were commanded; and consequently in deposing the High
Priest of Royall authority, they deposed that peculiar Government of God.
And yet God consented to it, saying to Samuel (verse 7.) "Hearken unto
the voice of the People, in all that they shall say unto thee; for they have
not rejected thee, but they have rejected mee, that I should not reign over
them." Having therefore rejected God, in whose Right the Priests
governed, there was no authority left to the Priests, but such as the King
was pleased to allow them; which was more, or lesse, according as the
Kings were good, or evill. And for the Government of Civill affaires, it is
manifest, it was all in the hands of the King. For in the same Chapter,
verse 20. They say they will be like all the Nations; that their King shall be
their Judge, and goe before them, and fight their battells; that is, he shall
have the whole authority, both in Peace and War. In which is contained also
the ordering of Religion; for there was no other Word of God in that time,
by which to regulate Religion, but the Law of Moses, which was their
Civill Law. Besides, we read (1 Kings 2.27.) that Solomon "thrust out
Abiathar from being Priest before the Lord:" He had therefore authority
over the High Priest, as over any other Subject; which is a great mark of
Supremacy in Religion. And we read also (1 Kings 8.) that hee dedicated
the Temple; that he blessed the People; and that he himselfe in person
made that excellent prayer, used in the Consecrations of all Churches, and
houses of Prayer; which is another great mark of Supremacy in Religion.

Again, we read (2 Kings 22.) that when there was question concerning the
Book of the Law found in the Temple, the same was not decided by the
High Priest, but Josiah sent both him, and others to enquire concerning it,
of Hulda, the Prophetesse; which is another mark of the Supremacy in
Religion. Lastly, wee read (1 Chro. 26.30.) that David made Hashabiah and
his brethren, Hebronites, Officers of Israel among them Westward, "in all
businesse of the Lord, and in the service of the King." Likewise (verse 32.)
that hee made other Hebronites, "rulers over the Reubenites, the Gadites,
and the halfe tribe of Manasseh" (these were the rest of Israel that dwelt
beyond Jordan) "for every matter pertaining to God, and affairs of the
King." Is not this full Power, both Temporall and Spirituall, as they call it,
that would divide it? To conclude; from the first institution of Gods
Kingdome, to the Captivity, the Supremacy of Religion, was in the same
hand with that of the Civill Soveraignty; and the Priests office after the
election of Saul, was not Magisteriall, but Ministeriall.

The Practice Of Supremacy In Religion, Was Not
In The Time Of The Kings,
According To The Right Thereof
Notwithstanding the government both in Policy and Religion, were
joined, first in the High Priests, and afterwards in the Kings, so far forth as
concerned the Right; yet it appeareth by the same Holy History, that the
people understood it not; but there being amongst them a great part, and
probably the greatest part, that no longer than they saw great miracles, or
(which is equivalent to a miracle) great abilities, or great felicity in the
enterprises of their Governours, gave sufficient credit, either to the fame
of Moses, or to the Colloquies between God and the Priests; they took
occasion as oft as their Governours displeased them, by blaming
sometimes the Policy, sometimes the Religion, to change the Government,
or revolt from their Obedience at their pleasure: And from thence
proceeded from time to time the civill troubles, divisions, and calamities
of the Nation. As for example, after the death of Eleazar and Joshua, the
next generation which had not seen the wonders of God, but were left to
their own weak reason, not knowing themselves obliged by the Covenant
of a Sacerdotall Kingdome, regarded no more the Commandement of the
Priest, nor any law of Moses, but did every man that which was right in his
own eyes; and obeyed in Civill affairs, such men, as from time to time
they thought able to deliver them from the neighbour Nations that
oppressed them; and consulted not with God (as they ought to doe,) but
with such men, or women, as they guessed to bee Prophets by their
Praedictions of things to come; and thought they had an Idol in their
Chappel, yet if they had a Levite for their Chaplain, they made account
they worshipped the God of Israel.
And afterwards when they demanded a King, after the manner of the
nations; yet it was not with a design to depart from the worship of God
their King; but despairing of the justice of the sons of Samuel, they would
have a King to judg them in Civill actions; but not that they would allow
their King to change the Religion which they thought was recommended to

them by Moses. So that they alwaies kept in store a pretext, either of
Justice, or Religion, to discharge themselves of their obedience,
whensoever they had hope to prevaile. Samuel was displeased with the
people, for that they desired a King, (for God was their King already, and
Samuel had but an authority under him); yet did Samuel, when Saul
observed not his counsell, in destroying Agag as God had commanded,
anoint another King, namely David, to take the succession from his heirs.
Rehoboam was no Idolater; but when the people thought him an
Oppressor; that Civil pretence carried from him ten Tribes to Jeroboam an
Idolater. And generally through the whole History of the Kings, as well of
Judah, as of Israel, there were Prophets that alwaies controlled the Kings,
for transgressing the Religion; and sometimes also for Errours of State; (2
Chro. 19. 2.) as Jehosaphat was reproved by the Prophet Jehu, for aiding
the King of Israel against the Syrians; and Hezekiah, by Isaiah, for
shewing his treasures to the Ambassadors of Babylon. By all which it
appeareth, that though the power both of State and Religion were in the
Kings; yet none of them were uncontrolled in the use of it, but such as
were gracious for their own naturall abilities, or felicities. So that from the
practise of those times, there can no argument be drawn, that the right of
Supremacy in Religion was not in the Kings, unlesse we place it in the
Prophets; and conclude, that because Hezekiah praying to the Lord before
the Cherubins, was not answered from thence, nor then, but afterwards by
the Prophet Isaiah, therefore Isaiah was supreme Head of the Church; or
because Josiah consulted Hulda the Prophetesse, concerning the Book of
the Law, that therefore neither he, nor the High Priest, but Hulda the
Prophetesse had the Supreme authority in matter of Religion; which I
thinke is not the opinion of any Doctor.

After The Captivity The Jews Had No Setled
Common-wealth
During the Captivity, the Jews had no Common-wealth at all
And after their return, though they renewed their Covenant with God,
yet there was no promise made of obedience, neither to Esdras, nor to any
other; And presently after they became subjects to the Greeks (from whose
Customes, and Daemonology, and from the doctrine of the Cabalists, their
Religion became much corrupted): In such sort as nothing can be gathered
from their confusion, both in State and Religion, concerning the
Supremacy in either. And therefore so far forth as concerneth the Old
Testament, we may conclude, that whosoever had the Soveraignty of the
Common-wealth amongst the Jews, the same had also the Supreme
Authority in matter of Gods externall worship; and represented Gods
Person; that is the person of God the Father; though he were not called by
the name of Father, till such time as he sent into the world his Son Jesus
Christ, to redeem mankind from their sins, and bring them into his
Everlasting Kingdome, to be saved for evermore. Of which we are to speak
in the Chapter following.

CHAPTER XLI. OF THE OFFICE OF OUR
BLESSED SAVIOUR

Three Parts Of The Office Of Christ
We find in Holy Scripture three parts of the Office of the Messiah: the
first of a Redeemer, or Saviour: The second of a Pastor, Counsellour, or
Teacher, that is, of a Prophet sent from God, to convert such as God hath
elected to Salvation; The third of a King, and Eternall King, but under his
Father, as Moses and the High Priests were in their severall times. And to
these three parts are corespondent three times. For our Redemption he
wrought at his first coming, by the Sacrifice, wherein he offered up
himself for our sinnes upon the Crosse: our conversion he wrought partly
then in his own Person; and partly worketh now by his Ministers; and will
continue to work till his coming again. And after his coming again, shall
begin that his glorious Reign over his elect, which is to last eternally.

His Office As A Redeemer
To the Office of a Redeemer, that is, of one that payeth the Ransome of
Sin, (which Ransome is Death,) it appertaineth, that he was Sacrificed, and
thereby bare upon his own head, and carryed away from us our iniquities,
in such sort as God had required. Not that the death of one man, though
without sinne, can satisfie for the offences of all men, in the rigour of
Justice, but in the Mercy of God, that ordained such Sacrifices for sin, as
he was pleased in his mercy to accept. In the old Law (as we may read,
Leviticus the 16.) the Lord required, that there should every year once, bee
made an Atonement for the Sins of all Israel, both Priests, and others; for
the doing whereof, Aaron alone was to sacrifice for himself and the Priests
a young Bullock; and for the rest of the people, he was to receive from
them two young Goates, of which he was to Sacrifice one; but as for the
other, which was the Scape Goat, he was to lay his hands on the head
thereof, and by a confession of the iniquities of the people, to lay them all
on that head, and then by some opportune man, to cause the Goat to be led
into the wildernesse, and there to Escape, and carry away with him the
iniquities of the people. As the Sacrifice of the one Goat was a sufficient
(because an acceptable) price for the Ransome of all Israel; so the death of
the Messiah, is a sufficient price, for the Sins of all mankind, because
there was no more required. Our Saviour Christs sufferings seem to be
here figured, as cleerly, as in the oblation of Isaac, or in any other type of
him in the Old Testament: He was both the sacrificed Goat, and the Scape
Goat; "Hee was oppressed, and he was afflicted (Isa. 53.7.); he opened not
his mouth; he brought as a lamb to the slaughter, and as a sheep is dumbe
before the shearer, so opened he not his mouth:" Here he is the Sacrificed
Goat. "He hath born our Griefs, (ver.4.) and carried our sorrows;" And
again, (ver. 6.) "the Lord hath laid upon him the iniquities of us all:" And
so he is the Scape Goat. "He was cut off from the land of the living (ver.
8.) for the transgression of my People:" There again he is the Sacrificed
Goat. And again (ver. 11.) "he shall bear their sins:" Hee is the Scape Goat.
Thus is the Lamb of God equivalent to both those Goates; sacrificed, in

that he dyed; and escaping, in his Resurrection; being raised opportunely
by his Father, and removed from the habitation of men in his Ascension.

Christs Kingdome Not Of This World
For as much therefore, as he that Redeemeth, hath no title to the Thing
Redeemed, before the Redemption, and Ransome paid; and this Ransome
was the Death of the Redeemer; it is manifest, that our Saviour (as man)
was not King of those that he Redeemed, before hee suffered death; that is,
during that time hee conversed bodily on the Earth. I say, he was not then
King in present, by vertue of the Pact, which the faithfull make with him
in Baptisme; Neverthelesse, by the renewing of their Pact with God in
Baptisme, they were obliged to obey him for King, (under his Father)
whensoever he should be pleased to take the Kingdome upon him.
According whereunto, our Saviour himself expressely saith, (John 18.36.)
"My Kingdome is not of this world." Now seeing the Scripture maketh
mention but of two worlds; this that is now, and shall remain to the day of
Judgment, (which is therefore also called, The Last Day;) and that which
shall bee a new Heaven, and a new Earth; the Kingdome of Christ is not to
begin till the general Resurrection. And that is it which our Saviour saith,
(Mat. 16.27.) "The Son of man shall come in the glory of his Father, with
his Angels; and then he shall reward every man according to his works."
To reward every man according to his works, is to execute the Office of a
King; and this is not to be till he come in the glory of his Father, with his
Angells. When our Saviour saith, (Mat. 23.2.) "The Scribes and Pharisees
sit in Moses seat; All therefore whatsoever they bid you doe, that observe
and doe;" hee declareth plainly, that hee ascribeth Kingly Power, for that
time, not to himselfe, but to them. And so hee hath also, where he saith,
(Luke 12.14.) "Who made mee a Judge, or Divider over you?" And (John
12.47.) "I came not to judge the world, but to save the world." And yet our
Saviour came into this world that hee might bee a King, and a Judge in the
world to come: For hee was the Messiah, that is, the Christ, that is, the
Anointed Priest, and the Soveraign Prophet of God; that is to say, he was to
have all the power that was in Moses the Prophet, in the High Priests that
succeeded Moses, and in the Kings that succeeded the Priests. And St.
John saies expressely (chap. 5. ver. 22.) "The Father judgeth no man, but
hath committed all judgment to the Son." And this is not repugnant to that

other place, "I came not to judge the world:" for this is spoken of the world
present, the other of the world to come; as also where it is said, that at the
second coming of Christ, (Mat. 19. 28.) "Yee that have followed me in the
Regeneration, when the Son of man shall sit in the throne of his Glory, yee
shall also sit on twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel."

The End Of Christs Comming Was To Renew The
Covenant Of The Kingdome
Of God, And To Perswade The Elect To Imbrace It, Which
Was The Second

Part Of His Office
If then Christ while hee was on Earth, had no Kingdome in this World,
to what end was his first coming? It was to restore unto God, by a new
Covenant, the Kingdome, which being his by the Old Covenant, had been
cut off by the rebellion of the Israelites in the election of Saul. Which to
doe, he was to preach unto them, that he was the Messiah, that is, the King
promised to them by the Prophets; and to offer himselfe in sacrifice for
the sinnes of them that should by faith submit themselves thereto; and in
case the nation generally should refuse him, to call to his obedience such
as should beleeve in him amongst the Gentiles. So that there are two parts
of our Saviours Office during his aboad upon the Earth; One to Proclaim
himself the Christ; and another by Teaching, and by working of Miracles,
to perswade, and prepare men to live so, as to be worthy of the
Immortality Beleevers were to enjoy, at such time as he should come in
majesty, to take possession of his Fathers Kingdome. And therefore it is,
that the time of his preaching, is often by himself called the Regeneration;
which is not properly a Kingdome, and thereby a warrant to deny
obedience to the Magistrates that then were, (for hee commanded to obey
those that sate then in Moses chaire, and to pay tribute to Caesar;) but
onely an earnest of the Kingdome of God that was to come, to those to
whom God had given the grace to be his disciples, and to beleeve in him;
For which cause the Godly are said to bee already in the Kingdome of
Grace, as naturalized in that heavenly Kingdome.

The Preaching Of Christ Not Contrary To The
Then Law Of The Jews,
Nor Of Caesar
Hitherto therefore there is nothing done, or taught by Christ, that
tendeth to the diminution of the Civill Right of the Jewes, or of Caesar. For
as touching the Common-wealth which then was amongst the Jews, both
they that bare rule amongst them, that they that were governed, did all
expect the Messiah, and Kingdome of God; which they could not have
done if their Laws had forbidden him (when he came) to manifest, and
declare himself. Seeing therefore he did nothing, but by Preaching, and
Miracles go about to prove himselfe to be that Messiah, hee did therein
nothing against their laws. The Kingdome hee claimed was to bee in
another world; He taught all men to obey in the mean time them that sate
in Moses seat: he allowed them to give Caesar his tribute, and refused to
take upon himselfe to be a Judg. How then could his words, or actions bee
seditious, or tend to the overthrow of their then Civill Government? But
God having determined his sacrifice, for the reduction of his elect to their
former covenanted obedience, for the means, whereby he would bring the
same to effect, made use of their malice, and ingratitude. Nor was it
contrary to the laws of Caesar. For though Pilate himself (to gratifie the
Jews) delivered him to be crucified; yet before he did so, he pronounced
openly, that he found no fault in him: And put for title of his
condemnation, not as the Jews required, "that he pretended to be King;"
but simply, "That hee was King of the Jews;" and notwithstanding their
clamour, refused to alter it; saying, "What I have written, I have written."

The Third Part Of His Office Was To Be King
(Under His Father)
Of The Elect
As for the third part of his Office, which was to be King, I have already
shewn that his Kingdome was not to begin till the Resurrection. But then
he shall be King, not onely as God, in which sense he is King already, and
ever shall be, of all the Earth, in vertue of his omnipotence; but also
peculiarly of his own Elect, by vertue of the pact they make with him in
their Baptisme. And therefore it is, that our Saviour saith (Mat. 19.28.)
that his Apostles should sit upon twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes
of Israel, "When the Son of man shall sit in the throne of his glory;"
whereby he signified that he should reign then in his humane nature; and
(Mat. 16.27.) "The Son of man shall come in the glory of his Father, with
his Angels, and then he shall reward every man according to his works."
The same we may read, Marke 13..26. and 14.26. and more expressely for
the time, Luke 22.29, 30. "I appoint unto you a Kingdome, as my Father
hath appointed to mee, that you may eat and drink at my table in my
Kingdome, and sit on thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel." By
which it is manifest that the Kingdome of Christ appointed to him by his
Father, is not to be before the Son of Man shall come in Glory, and make
his Apostles Judges of the twelve tribes of Israel. But a man may here ask,
seeing there is no marriage in the Kingdome of Heaven, whether men shall
then eat, and drink; what eating therefore is meant in this place? This is
expounded by our Saviour (John 6.27.) where he saith, "Labour not for the
meat which perisheth, but for that meat which endureth unto everlasting
life, which the Son of man shall give you." So that by eating at Christs
table, is meant the eating of the Tree of Life; that is to say, the enjoying of
Immortality, in the Kingdome of the Son of Man. By which places, and
many more, it is evident, that our Saviours Kingdome is to bee exercised
by him in his humane nature.

Christs Authority In The Kingdome Of God
Subordinate To His Father
Again, he is to be King then, no otherwise than as subordinate, or
Viceregent of God the Father, as Moses was in the wildernesse; and as the
High Priests were before the reign of Saul; and as the Kings were after it.
For it is one of the Prophecies concerning Christ, that he should be like (in
Office) to Moses; "I will raise them up a Prophet (saith the Lord, Deut.
18.18.) from amongst their Brethren like unto thee, and will put my words
into his mouth," and this similitude with Moses, is also apparent in the
actions of our Saviour himself, whilest he was conversant on Earth. For as
Moses chose twelve Princes of the tribes, to govern under him; so did our
Saviour choose twelve Apostles, who shall sit on twelve thrones, and judge
the twelve tribes of Israel; And as Moses authorized Seventy Elders, to
receive the Spirit of God, and to Prophecy to the people, that is, (as I have
said before,) to speak unto them in the name of God; so our Saviour also
ordained seventy Disciples, to preach his Kingdome, and Salvation to all
Nations. And as when a complaint was made to Moses, against those of the
Seventy that prophecyed in the camp of Israel, he justified them in it, as
being subservient therein to his government; so also our Saviour, when St.
John complained to him of a certain man that cast out Devills in his name,
justified him therein, saying, (Luke 9.50.) "Forbid him not, for hee that is
not against us, is on our part."
Again, our Saviour resembled Moses in the institution of Sacraments,
both of Admission into the Kingdome of God, and of Commemoration of
his deliverance of his Elect from their miserable condition. As the
Children of Israel had for Sacrament of their Reception into the Kingdome
of God, before the time of Moses, the rite of Circumcision, which rite
having been omitted in the Wildernesse, was again restored as soon as
they came into the land of Promise; so also the Jews, before the coming of
our Saviour, had a rite of Baptizing, that is, of washing with water all
those that being Gentiles, embraced the God of Israel. This rite St. John
the Baptist used in the reception of all them that gave their names to the
Christ, whom hee preached to bee already come into the world; and our

Saviour instituted the same for a Sacrament to be taken by all that
beleeved in him. From what cause the rite of Baptisme first proceeded, is
not expressed formally in the Scripture; but it may be probably thought to
be an imitation of the law of Moses, concerning Leprousie; wherein the
Leprous man was commanded to be kept out of the campe of Israel for a
certain time; after which time being judged by the Priest to be clean, hee
was admitted into the campe after a solemne Washing. And this may
therefore bee a type of the Washing in Baptisme; wherein such men as are
cleansed of the Leprousie of Sin by Faith, are received into the Church
with the solemnity of Baptisme. There is another conjecture drawn from
the Ceremonies of the Gentiles, in a certain case that rarely happens; and
that is, when a man that was thought dead, chanced to recover, other men
made scruple to converse with him, as they would doe to converse with a
Ghost, unlesse hee were received again into the number of men, by
Washing, as Children new born were washed from the uncleannesse of
their nativity, which was a kind of new birth. This ceremony of the Greeks,
in the time that Judaea was under the Dominion of Alexander, and the
Greeks his successors, may probably enough have crept into the Religion
of the Jews. But seeing it is not likely our Saviour would countenance a
Heathen rite, it is most likely it proceeded from the Legall Ceremony of
Washing after Leprosie. And for the other Sacraments, of eating the
Paschall Lambe, it is manifestly imitated in the Sacrament of the Lords
Supper; in which the Breaking of the Bread, and the pouring out of the
Wine, do keep in memory our deliverance from the Misery of Sin, by
Christs Passion, as the eating of the Paschall Lambe, kept in memory the
deliverance of the Jewes out of the Bondage of Egypt. Seeing therefore the
authority of Moses was but subordinate, and hee but a Lieutenant to God;
it followeth, that Christ, whose authority, as man, was to bee like that of
Moses, was no more but subordinate to the authority of his Father. The
same is more expressely signified, by that that hee teacheth us to pray,
"Our Father, Let thy Kingdome come;" and, "For thine is the Kingdome,
the power and the Glory;" and by that it is said, that "Hee shall come in the
Glory of his Father;" and by that which St. Paul saith, (1 Cor. 15.24.) "then
commeth the end, when hee shall have delivered up the Kingdome to God,
even the Father;" and by many other most expresse places.

One And The Same God Is The Person
Represented By Moses, And By Christ
Our Saviour therefore, both in Teaching, and Reigning, representeth (as
Moses Did) the Person of God; which God from that time forward, but not
before, is called the Father; and being still one and the same substance, is
one Person as represented by Moses, and another Person as represented by
his Sonne the Christ. For Person being a relative to a Representer, it is
consequent to plurality of Representers, that there bee a plurality of
Persons, though of one and the same Substance.

CHAPTER XLII. OF POWER
ECCLESIASTICALL
For the understanding of POWER ECCLESIASTICALL, what, and in
whom it is, we are to distinguish the time from the Ascension of our
Saviour, into two parts; one before the Conversion of Kings, and men
endued with Soveraign Civill Power; the other after their Conversion. For
it was long after the Ascension, before any King, or Civill Soveraign
embraced, and publiquely allowed the teaching of Christian Religion.

Of The Holy Spirit That Fel On The Apostles
And for the time between, it is manifest, that the Power Ecclesiasticall,
was in the Apostles; and after them in such as were by them ordained to
Preach the Gospell, and to convert men to Christianity, and to direct them
that were converted in the way of Salvation; and after these the Power was
delivered again to others by these ordained, and this was done by
Imposition of hands upon such as were ordained; by which was signified
the giving of the Holy Spirit, or Spirit of God, to those whom they
ordained Ministers of God, to advance his Kingdome. So that Imposition
of hands, was nothing else but the Seal of their Commission to Preach
Christ, and teach his Doctrine; and the giving of the Holy Ghost by that
ceremony of Imposition of hands, was an imitation of that which Moses
did. For Moses used the same ceremony to his Minister Joshua, as wee
read Deuteronomy 34. ver. 9. "And Joshua the son of Nun was full of the
Spirit of Wisdome; for Moses had laid his hands upon him." Our Saviour
therefore between his Resurrection, and Ascension, gave his Spirit to the
Apostles; first, by "Breathing on them, and saying," (John 20.22.) "Receive
yee the Holy Spirit;" and after his Ascension (Acts 2.2, 3.) by sending
down upon them, a "mighty wind, and Cloven tongues of fire;" and not by
Imposition of hands; as neither did God lay his hands on Moses; and his
Apostles afterward, transmitted the same Spirit by Imposition of hands, as
Moses did to Joshua. So that it is manifest hereby, in whom the Power
Ecclesiasticall continually remained, in those first times, where there was
not any Christian Common-wealth; namely, in them that received the same
from the Apostles, by successive laying on of hands.

Of The Trinity
Here wee have the Person of God born now the third time. For as Moses,
and the High Priests, were Gods Representative in the Old Testament; and
our Saviour himselfe as Man, during his abode on earth: So the Holy
Ghost, that is to say, the Apostles, and their successors, in the Office of
Preaching, and Teaching, that had received the Holy Spirit, have
Represented him ever since. But a Person, (as I have shewn before, [chapt.
16.].) is he that is Represented, as often as hee is Represented; and
therefore God, who has been Represented (that is, Personated) thrice, may
properly enough be said to be three Persons; though neither the word
Person, nor Trinity be ascribed to him in the Bible. St. John indeed (1
Epist. 5.7.) saith, "There be three that bear witnesse in heaven, the Father,
the Word, and the Holy Spirit; and these Three are One:" But this
disagreeth not, but accordeth fitly with three Persons in the proper
signification of Persons; which is, that which is Represented by another.
For so God the Father, as Represented by Moses, is one Person; and as
Represented by his Sonne, another Person, and as Represented by the
Apostles, and by the Doctors that taught by authority from them derived,
is a third Person; and yet every Person here, is the Person of one and the
same God. But a man may here ask, what it was whereof these three bare
witnesse. St. John therefore tells us (verse 11.) that they bear witnesse,
that "God hath given us eternall life in his Son." Again, if it should be
asked, wherein that testimony appeareth, the Answer is easie; for he hath
testified the same by the miracles he wrought, first by Moses; secondly, by
his Son himself; and lastly by his Apostles, that had received the Holy
Spirit; all which in their times Represented the Person of God; and either
prophecyed, or preached Jesus Christ. And as for the Apostles, it was the
character of the Apostleship, in the twelve first and great Apostles, to bear
Witnesse of his Resurrection; as appeareth expressely (Acts 1. ver. 21,22.)
where St Peter, when a new Apostle was to be chosen in the place of Judas
Iscariot, useth these words, "Of these men which have companied with us
all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and out amongst us, beginning at
the Baptisme of John, unto that same day that hee was taken up from us,

must one bee ordained to be a Witnesse with us of his Resurrection:"
which words interpret the Bearing of Witnesse, mentioned by St. John.
There is in the same place mentioned another Trinity of Witnesses in
Earth. For (ver. 8.) he saith, "there are three that bear Witnesse in Earth,
the Spirit, and the Water, and the Bloud; and these three agree in one:" that
is to say, the graces of Gods Spirit, and the two Sacraments, Baptisme, and
the Lords Supper, which all agree in one Testimony, to assure the
consciences of beleevers, of eternall life; of which Testimony he saith
(verse 10.) "He that beleeveth on the Son of man hath the Witnesse in
himselfe." In this Trinity on Earth the Unity is not of the thing; for the
Spirit, the Water, and the Bloud, are not the same substance, though they
give the same testimony: But in the Trinity of Heaven, the Persons are the
persons of one and the same God, though Represented in three different
times and occasions. To conclude, the doctrine of the Trinity, as far as can
be gathered directly from the Scripture, is in substance this; that God who
is alwaies One and the same, was the Person Represented by Moses; the
Person Represented by his Son Incarnate; and the Person Represented by
the Apostles. As Represented by the Apostles, the Holy Spirit by which
they spake, is God; As Represented by his Son (that was God and Man),
the Son is that God; As represented by Moses, and the High Priests, the
Father, that is to say, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, is that God: From
whence we may gather the reason why those names Father, Son, and Holy
Spirit in the signification of the Godhead, are never used in the Old
Testament: For they are Persons, that is, they have their names from
Representing; which could not be, till divers men had Represented Gods
Person in ruling, or in directing under him.
Thus wee see how the Power Ecclesiasticall was left by our Saviour to
the Apostles; and how they were (to the end they might the better exercise
that Power,) endued with the Holy Spirit, which is therefore called
sometime in the New Testament Paracletus which signifieth an Assister, or
one called to for helpe, though it bee commonly translated a Comforter.
Let us now consider the Power it selfe, what it was, and over whom.

The Power Ecclesiasticall Is But The Power To
Teach
Cardinall Bellarmine in his third generall Controversie, hath handled a
great many questions concerning the Ecclesiasticall Power of the Pope of
Rome; and begins with this, Whether it ought to be Monarchicall,
Aristocraticall, or Democraticall. All which sorts of Power, are Soveraign,
and Coercive. If now it should appear, that there is no Coercive Power left
them by our Saviour; but onely a Power to proclaim the Kingdom of
Christ, and to perswade men to submit themselves thereunto; and by
precepts and good counsell, to teach them that have submitted, what they
are to do, that they may be received into the Kingdom of God when it
comes; and that the Apostles, and other Ministers of the Gospel, are our
Schoolemasters, and not our Commanders, and their Precepts not Laws,
but wholesome Counsells then were all that dispute in vain.

An Argument Thereof, The Power Of Christ
Himself
I have shewn already (in the last Chapter,) that the Kingdome of Christ
is not of this world: therefore neither can his Ministers (unlesse they be
Kings,) require obedience in his name. For if the Supreme King, have not
his Regall Power in this world; by what authority can obedience be
required to his Officers? As my Father sent me, (so saith our Saviour) I
send you. But our Saviour was sent to perswade the Jews to return to, and
to invite the Gentiles, to receive the Kingdome of his Father, and not to
reign in Majesty, no not, as his Fathers Lieutenant, till the day of
Judgment.

From The Name Of Regeneration
The time between the Ascension, and the generall Resurrection, is
called, not a Reigning, but a Regeneration; that is, a Preparation of men
for the second and glorious coming of Christ, at the day of Judgment; as
appeareth by the words of our Saviour, Mat. 19.28. "You that have
followed me in the Regeneration, when the Son of man shall sit in the
throne of his glory, you shall also sit upon twelve Thrones;" And of St.
Paul (Ephes. 6.15.) "Having your feet shod with the Preparation of the
Gospell of Peace."

From The Comparison Of It, With Fishing,
Leaven, Seed
And is compared by our Saviour, to Fishing; that is, to winning men to
obedience, not by Coercion, and Punishing; but by Perswasion: and
therefore he said not to his Apostles, hee would make them so many
Nimrods, Hunters Of Men; But Fishers Of Men. It is compared also to
Leaven; to Sowing of Seed, and to the Multiplication of a grain of
Mustard-seed; by all which Compulsion is excluded; and consequently
there can in that time be no actual Reigning. The work of Christs
Ministers, is Evangelization; that is, a Proclamation of Christ, and a
preparation for his second comming; as the Evangelization of John
Baptist, was a preparation to his first coming.

From The Nature Of Faith:
Again, the Office of Christs Ministers in this world, is to make men
Beleeve, and have Faith in Christ: But Faith hath no relation to, nor
dependence at all upon Compulsion, or Commandement; but onely upon
certainty, or probability of Arguments drawn from Reason, or from
something men beleeve already. Therefore the Ministers of Christ in this
world, have no Power by that title, to Punish any man for not Beleeving, or
for Contradicting what they say; they have I say no Power by that title of
Christs Ministers, to Punish such: but if they have Soveraign Civill Power,
by politick institution, then they may indeed lawfully Punish any
Contradiction to their laws whatsoever: And St. Paul, of himselfe and
other then Preachers of the Gospell saith in expresse words, (2 Cor. 1.24.)
"Wee have no Dominion over your Faith, but are Helpers of your Joy."

From The Authority Christ Hath Left To Civill
Princes
Another Argument, that the Ministers of Christ in this present world
have no right of Commanding, may be drawn from the lawfull Authority
which Christ hath left to all Princes, as well Christians, as Infidels. St.
Paul saith (Col. 3.20.) "Children obey your Parents in all things; for this is
well pleasing to the Lord." And ver. 22. "Servants obey in all things your
Masters according to the flesh, not with eye-service, as men-pleasers, but
in singlenesse of heart, as fearing the Lord;" This is spoken to them whose
Masters were Infidells; and yet they are bidden to obey them In All
Things. And again, concerning obedience to Princes. (Rom. 13. the first 6.
verses) exhorting to "be subject to the Higher Powers," he saith, "that all
Power is ordained of God;" and "that we ought to be subject to them, not
onely for" fear of incurring their "wrath, but also for conscience sake."
And St. Peter, (1 Epist. chap. 2e ver. 13, 14, 15.) "Submit your selves to
every Ordinance of Man, for the Lords sake, whether it bee to the King, as
Supreme, or unto Governours, as to them that be sent by him for the
punishment of evill doers, and for the praise of them that doe well; for so
is the will of God." And again St. Paul (Tit. 3.1.) "Put men in mind to be
subject to Principalities, and Powers, and to obey Magistrates." These
Princes, and Powers, whereof St. Peter, and St. Paul here speak, were all
Infidels; much more therefore we are to obey those Christians, whom God
hath ordained to have Soveraign Power over us. How then can wee be
obliged to doe any thing contrary to the Command of the King, or other
Soveraign Representant of the Common-wealth, whereof we are members,
and by whom we look to be protected? It is therefore manifest, that Christ
hath not left to his Ministers in this world, unlesse they be also endued
with Civill Authority, any authority to Command other men.

What Christians May Do To Avoid Persecution
But what (may some object) if a King, or a Senate, or other Soveraign
Person forbid us to beleeve in Christ? To this I answer, that such
forbidding is of no effect, because Beleef, and Unbeleef never follow mens
Commands. Faith is a gift of God, which Man can neither give, nor take
away by promise of rewards, or menaces of torture. And if it be further
asked, What if wee bee commanded by our lawfull Prince, to say with our
tongue, wee beleeve not; must we obey such command? Profession with
the tongue is but an externall thing, and no more then any other gesture
whereby we signifie our obedience; and wherein a Christian, holding
firmely in his heart the Faith of Christ, hath the same liberty which the
Prophet Elisha allowed to Naaman the Syrian. Naaman was converted in
his heart to the God of Israel; For hee saith (2 Kings 5.17.) "Thy servant
will henceforth offer neither burnt offering, nor sacrifice unto other Gods
but unto the Lord. In this thing the Lord pardon thy servant, that when my
Master goeth into the house of Rimmon to worship there, and he leaneth
on my hand, and I bow my selfe in the house of Rimmon; when I bow my
selfe in the house of Rimmon, the Lord pardon thy servant in this thing."
This the Prophet approved, and bid him "Goe in peace." Here Naaman
beleeved in his heart; but by bowing before the Idol Rimmon, he denyed
the true God in effect, as much as if he had done it with his lips. But then
what shall we answer to our Saviours saying, "Whosoever denyeth me
before men, I will deny him before my Father which is in Heaven?" This
we may say, that whatsoever a Subject, as Naaman was, is compelled to in
obedience to his Soveraign, and doth it not in order to his own mind, but in
order to the laws of his country, that action is not his, but his Soveraigns;
nor is it he that in this case denyeth Christ before men, but his Governour,
and the law of his countrey. If any man shall accuse this doctrine, as
repugnant to true, and unfeigned Christianity; I ask him, in case there
should be a subject in any Christian Common-wealth, that should be
inwardly in his heart of the Mahometan Religion, whether if his Soveraign
Command him to bee present at the divine service of the Christian Church,
and that on pain of death, he think that Mamometan obliged in conscience

to suffer death for that cause, rather than to obey that command of his
lawful Prince. If he say, he ought rather to suffer death, then he authorizeth
all private men, to disobey their Princes, in maintenance of their Religion,
true, or false; if he say, he ought to bee obedient, then he alloweth to
himself, that which hee denyeth to another, contrary to the words of our
Saviour, "Whatsoever you would that men should doe unto you, that doe
yee unto them;" and contrary to the Law of Nature, (which is the
indubitable everlasting Law of God) "Do not to another, that which thou
wouldest not he should doe unto thee."

Of Martyrs
But what then shall we say of all those Martyrs we read of in the History
of the Church, that they have needlessely cast away their lives? For answer
hereunto, we are to distinguish the persons that have been for that cause
put to death; whereof some have received a Calling to preach, and professe
the Kingdome of Christ openly; others have had no such Calling, nor more
has been required of them than their owne faith. The former sort, if they
have been put to death, for bearing witnesse to this point, that Jesus Christ
is risen from the dead, were true Martyrs; For a Martyr is, (to give the true
definition of the word) a Witnesse of the Resurrection of Jesus the
Messiah; which none can be but those that conversed with him on earth,
and saw him after he was risen: For a Witnesse must have seen what he
testifieth, or else his testimony is not good. And that none but such, can
properly be called Martyrs of Christ, is manifest out of the words of St.
Peter, Act. 1.21, 22. "Wherefore of these men which have companyed with
us all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and out amongst us, beginning
from the Baptisme of John unto that same day hee was taken up from us,
must one be ordained to be a Martyr (that is a Witnesse) with us of his
Resurrection:" Where we may observe, that he which is to bee a Witnesse
of the truth of the Resurrection of Christ, that is to say, of the truth of this
fundamentall article of Christian Religion, that Jesus was the Christ, must
be some Disciple that conversed with him, and saw him before, and after
his Resurrection; and consequently must be one of his originall Disciples:
whereas they which were not so, can Witnesse no more, but that their
antecessors said it, and are therefore but Witnesses of other mens
testimony; and are but second Martyrs, or Martyrs of Christs Witnesses.
He, that to maintain every doctrine which he himself draweth out of the
History of our Saviours life, and of the Acts, or Epistles of the Apostles; or
which he beleeveth upon the authority of a private man, wil oppose the
Laws and Authority of the Civill State, is very far from being a Martyr of
Christ, or a Martyr of his Martyrs. 'Tis one Article onely, which to die for,
meriteth so honorable a name; and that Article is this, that Jesus Is The
Christ; that is to say, He that hath redeemed us, and shall come again to

give us salvation, and eternall life in his glorious Kingdome. To die for
every tenet that serveth the ambition, or profit of the Clergy, is not
required; nor is it the Death of the Witnesse, but the Testimony it self that
makes the Martyr: for the word signifieth nothing else, but the man that
beareth Witnesse, whether he be put to death for his testimony, or not.
Also he that is not sent to preach this fundamentall article, but taketh it
upon him of his private authority, though he be a Witnesse, and
consequently a Martyr, either primary of Christ, or secondary of his
Apostles, Disciples, or their Successors; yet is he not obliged to suffer
death for that cause; because being not called thereto, tis not required at
his hands; nor ought hee to complain, if he loseth the reward he expecteth
from those that never set him on work. None therefore can be a Martyr,
neither of the first, nor second degree, that have not a warrant to preach
Christ come in the flesh; that is to say, none, but such as are sent to the
conversion of Infidels. For no man is a Witnesse to him that already
beleeveth, and therefore needs no Witnesse; but to them that deny, or
doubt, or have not heard it. Christ sent his Apostles, and his Seventy
Disciples, with authority to preach; he sent not all that beleeved: And he
sent them to unbeleevers; "I send you (saith he) as sheep amongst wolves;"
not as sheep to other sheep.

Argument From The Points Of Their Commission
Lastly the points of their Commission, as they are expressely set down
in the Gospel, contain none of them any authority over the Congregation.

To Preach
We have first (Mat. 10.) that the twelve Apostles were sent "to the lost
sheep of the house of Israel," and commanded to Preach, "that the
Kingdome of God was at hand." Now Preaching in the originall, is that act,
which a Crier, Herald, or other Officer useth to doe publiquely in
Proclaiming of a King. But a Crier hath not right to Command any man.
And (Luke 10.2.) the seventy Disciples are sent out, "as Labourers, not as
Lords of the Harvest;" and are bidden (verse 9.) to say, "The Kingdome of
God is come nigh unto you;" and by Kingdome here is meant, not the
Kingdome of Grace, but the Kingdome of Glory; for they are bidden to
denounce it (ver. 11.) to those Cities which shall not receive them, as a
threatning, that it shall be more tolerable in that day for Sodome, than for
such a City. And (Mat. 20.28.) our Saviour telleth his Disciples, that
sought Priority of place, their Office was to minister, even as the Son of
man came, not to be ministred unto, but to minister. Preachers therefore
have not Magisteriall, but Ministeriall power: "Bee not called Masters,
(saith our Saviour, Mat. 23.10) for one is your Master, even Christ."

And Teach
Another point of their Commission, is, to Teach All Nations; as it is in
Mat. 28.19. or as in St. Mark 16.15 "Goe into all the world, and Preach the
Gospel to every creature." Teaching therefore, and Preaching is the same
thing. For they that Proclaim the comming of a King, must withall make
known by what right he commeth, if they mean men shall submit
themselves unto him: As St. Paul did to the Jews of Thessalonica, when
"three Sabbath days he reasoned with them out of the Scriptures, opening,
and alledging that Christ must needs have suffered, and risen again from
the dead, and that this Jesus is Christ." But to teach out of the Old
Testament that Jesus was Christ, (that is to say, King,) and risen from the
dead, is not to say, that men are bound after they beleeve it, to obey those
that tell them so, against the laws, and commands of their Soveraigns; but
that they shall doe wisely, to expect the coming of Christ hereafter, in
Patience, and Faith, with Obedience to their present Magistrates.

To Baptize;
Another point of their Commission, is to Baptize, "in the name of the
Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." What is Baptisme?
Dipping into water. But what is it to Dip a man into the water in the name
of any thing? The meaning of these words of Baptisme is this. He that is
Baptized, is Dipped or Washed, as a sign of becomming a new man, and a
loyall subject to that God, whose Person was represented in old time by
Moses, and the High Priests, when he reigned over the Jews; and to Jesus
Christ, his Sonne, God, and Man, that hath redeemed us, and shall in his
humane nature Represent his Fathers Person in his eternall Kingdome after
the Resurrection; and to acknowledge the Doctrine of the Apostles, who
assisted by the Spirit of the Father, and of the Son, were left for guides to
bring us into that Kingdome, to be the onely, and assured way thereunto.
This, being our promise in Baptisme; and the Authority of Earthly
Soveraigns being not to be put down till the day of Judgment; (for that is
expressely affirmed by S. Paul 1 Cor. 15. 22, 23, 24. where he saith, "As in
Adam all die, so in Christ all shall be made alive. But every man in his
owne order, Christ the first fruits, afterward they that are Christs, at his
comming; Then Commeth the end, when he shall have delivered up the
Kingdome of God, even the Father, when he shall have put down all Rule,
and all Authority and Power") it is manifest, that we do not in Baptisme
constitute over us another authority, by which our externall actions are to
be governed in this life; but promise to take the doctrine of the Apostles
for our direction in the way to life eternall.

And To Forgive, And Retain Sinnes
The Power of Remission, And Retention Of Sinnes, called also the
Power of Loosing, and Binding, and sometimes the Keyes Of The
Kingdome Of Heaven, is a consequence of the Authority to Baptize, or
refuse to Baptize. For Baptisme is the Sacrament of Allegeance, of them
that are to be received into the Kingdome of God; that is to say, into
Eternall life; that is to say, to Remission of Sin: For as Eternall life was
lost by the Committing, so it is recovered by the Remitting of mens Sins.
The end of Baptisme is Remission of Sins: and therefore St. Peter, when
they that were converted by his Sermon on the day of Pentecost, asked
what they were to doe, advised them to "repent, and be Baptized in the
name of Jesus, for the Remission of Sins." And therefore seeing to Baptize
is to declare the Reception of men into Gods Kingdome; and to refuse to
Baptize is to declare their Exclusion; it followeth, that the Power to
declare them Cast out, or Retained in it, was given to the same Apostles,
and their Substitutes, and Successors. And therefore after our Saviour had
breathed upon them, saying, (John 20.22.) "Receive the Holy Ghost," hee
addeth in the next verse, "Whose soever Sins ye Remit, they are Remitted
unto them; and whose soever Sins ye Retain, they are Retained." By which
words, is not granted an Authority to Forgive, or Retain Sins, simply and
absolutely, as God Forgiveth or Retaineth them, who knoweth the Heart of
man, and truth of his Penitence and Conversion; but conditionally, to the
Penitent: And this Forgivenesse, or Absolution, in case the absolved have
but a feigned Repentance, is thereby without other act, or sentence of the
Absolvent, made void, and hath no effect at all to Salvation, but on the
contrary, to the Aggravation of his Sin. Therefore the Apostles, and their
Successors, are to follow but the outward marks of Repentance; which
appearing, they have no Authority to deny Absolution; and if they appeare
not, they have no authority to Absolve. The same also is to be observed in
Baptisme: for to a converted Jew, or Gentile, the Apostles had not the
Power to deny Baptisme; nor to grant it to the Un-penitent. But seeing no
man is able to discern the truth of another mans Repentance, further than
by externall marks, taken from his words, and actions, which are subject to

hypocrisie; another question will arise, Who it is that is constituted Judge
of those marks. And this question is decided by our Saviour himself; (Mat.
18. 15, 16, 17.) "If thy Brother (saith he) shall trespasse against thee, go
and tell him his fault between thee, and him alone; if he shall hear thee,
thou hast gained thy Brother. But if he will not hear thee, then take with
thee one, or two more. And if he shall neglect to hear them, tell it unto the
Church, let him be unto thee as an Heathen man, and a Publican." By
which it is manifest, that the Judgment concerning the truth of
Repentance, belonged not to any one Man, but to the Church, that is, to the
Assembly of the Faithfull, or to them that have authority to bee their
Representant. But besides the Judgment, there is necessary also the
pronouncing of Sentence: And this belonged alwaies to the Apostle, or
some Pastor of the Church, as Prolocutor; and of this our Saviour speaketh
in the 18 verse, "Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth, shall be bound in
heaven; and whatsoever ye shall loose on earth, shall be loosed in heaven."
And comformable hereunto was the practise of St. Paul (1 Cor. 5.3, 4, &
5.) where he saith, "For I verily, as absent in body, but present in spirit,
have determined already, as though I were present, concerning him that
hath so done this deed; In the name of our Lord Jesus Christ when ye are
gathered together, and my spirit, with the power of our Lord Jesus Christ,
To deliver such a one to Satan;" that is to say, to cast him out of the
Church, as a man whose Sins are not Forgiven. Paul here pronounceth the
Sentence; but the Assembly was first to hear the Cause, (for St. Paul was
absent;) and by consequence to condemn him. But in the same chapter
(ver. 11, 12.) the Judgment in such a case is more expressely attributed to
the Assembly: "But now I have written unto you, not to keep company, if
any man that is called a Brother be a Fornicator, &c. with such a one no
not to eat. For what have I to do to judg them that are without? Do not ye
judg them that are within?" The Sentence therefore by which a man was
put out of the Church, was pronounced by the Apostle, or Pastor; but the
Judgment concerning the merit of the cause, was in the Church; that is to
say, (as the times were before the conversion of Kings, and men that had
Soveraign Authority in the Common-wealth,) the Assembly of the
Christians dwelling in the same City; as in Corinth, in the Assembly of the
Christians of Corinth.

Of Excommunication
This part of the Power of the Keyes, by which men were thrust out from
the Kingdome of God, is that which is called Excommunication; and to
excommunicate, is in the Originall, Aposunagogon Poiein, To Cast Out Of
The Synagogue; that is, out of the place of Divine service; a word drawn
from the custom of the Jews, to cast out of their Synagogues, such as they
thought in manners, or doctrine, contagious, as Lepers were by the Law of
Moses separated from the congregation of Israel, till such time as they
should be by the Priest pronounced clean.

The Use Of Excommunication Without Civill
Power.
The Use and Effect of Excommunication, whilest it was not yet
strengthened with the Civill Power, was no more, than that they, who were
not Excommunicate, were to avoid the company of them that were. It was
not enough to repute them as Heathen, that never had been Christians; for
with such they might eate, and drink; which with Excommunicate persons
they might not do; as appeareth by the words of St. Paul, (1 Cor. 5. ver. 9,
10, &c.) where he telleth them, he had formerly forbidden them to
"company with Fornicators;" but (because that could not bee without going
out of the world,) he restraineth it to such Fornicators, and otherwise
vicious persons, as were of the brethren; "with such a one" (he saith) they
ought not to keep company, "no, not to eat." And this is no more than our
Saviour saith (Mat. 18.17.) "Let him be to thee as a Heathen, and as a
Publican." For Publicans (which signifieth Farmers, and Receivers of the
revenue of the Common-wealth) were so hated, and detested by the Jews
that were to pay for it, as that Publican and Sinner were taken amongst
them for the same thing: Insomuch, as when our Saviour accepted the
invitation of Zacchaeus a Publican; though it were to Convert him, yet it
was objected to him as a Crime. And therefore, when our Saviour, to
Heathen, added Publican, he did forbid them to eat with a man
Excommunicate.
As for keeping them out of their Synagogues, or places of Assembly,
they had no Power to do it, but that of the owner of the place, whether he
were Christian, or Heathen. And because all places are by right, in the
Dominion of the Common-wealth; as well hee that was Excommunicated,
as hee that never was Baptized, might enter into them by Commission
from the Civill Magistrate; as Paul before his conversion entred into their
Synagogues at Damascus, (Acts 9.2.) to apprehend Christians, men and
women, and to carry them bound to Jerusalem, by Commission from the
High Priest.

Of No Effect Upon An Apostate
By which it appears, that upon a Christian, that should become an
Apostate, in a place where the Civill Power did persecute, or not assist the
Church, the effect of Excommunication had nothing in it, neither of
dammage in this world, nor of terrour: Not of terrour, because of their
unbeleef; nor of dammage, because they returned thereby into the favour
of the world; and in the world to come, were to be in no worse estate, then
they which never had beleeved. The dammage redounded rather to the
Church, by provocation of them they cast out, to a freer execution of their
malice.

But Upon The Faithfull Only
Excommunication therefore had its effect onely upon those, that
beleeved that Jesus Christ was to come again in Glory, to reign over, and
to judge both the quick, and the dead, and should therefore refuse entrance
into his Kingdom, to those whose Sins were Retained; that is, to those that
were Excommunicated by the Church. And thence it is that St. Paul calleth
Excommunication, a delivery of the Excommunicate person to Satan. For
without the Kingdom of Christ, all other Kingdomes after Judgment, are
comprehended in the Kingdome of Satan. This is it that the faithfull stood
in fear of, as long as they stood Excommunicate, that is to say, in an estate
wherein their sins were not Forgiven. Whereby wee may understand, that
Excommunication in the time that Christian Religion was not authorized
by the Civill Power, was used onely for a correction of manners, not of
errours in opinion: for it is a punishment, whereof none could be sensible
but such as beleeved, and expected the coming again of our Saviour to
judge the world; and they who so beleeved, needed no other opinion, but
onely uprightnesse of life, to be saved.

For What Fault Lyeth Excommunication
There Lyeth Excommunication for Injustice; as (Mat. 18.) If thy Brother
offend thee, tell it him privately; then with Witnesses; lastly, tell the
Church; and then if he obey not, "Let him be to thee as an Heathen man,
and a Publican." And there lyeth Excommunication for a Scandalous Life,
as (1 Cor. 5. 11.) "If any man that is called a Brother, be a Fornicator, or
Covetous, or an Idolater, or a Drunkard, or an Extortioner, with such a one
yee are not to eat." But to Excommunicate a man that held this foundation,
that Jesus Was The Christ, for difference of opinion in other points, by
which that Foundation was not destroyed, there appeareth no authority in
the Scripture, nor example in the Apostles. There is indeed in St. Paul
(Titus 3.10.) a text that seemeth to be to the contrary. "A man that is an
Haeretique, after the first and second admonition, reject." For an
Haeretique, is he, that being a member of the Church, teacheth
neverthelesse some private opinion, which the Church has forbidden: and
such a one, S. Paul adviseth Titus, after the first, and second admonition,
to Reject. But to Reject (in this place) is not to Excommunicate the Man;
But to Give Over Admonishing Him, To Let Him Alone, To Set By
Disputing With Him, as one that is to be convinced onely by himselfe. The
same Apostle saith (2 Tim. 2.23.) "Foolish and unlearned questions
avoid;" The word Avoid in this place, and Reject in the former, is the same
in the Originall, paraitou: but Foolish questions may bee set by without
Excommunication. And again, (Tit. 3.93) "Avoid Foolish questions,"
where the Originall, periistaso, (set them by) is equivalent to the former
word Reject. There is no other place that can so much as colourably be
drawn, to countenance the Casting out of the Church faithfull men, such as
beleeved the foundation, onely for a singular superstructure of their own,
proceeding perhaps from a good & pious conscience. But on the contrary,
all such places as command avoiding such disputes, are written for a
Lesson to Pastors, (such as Timothy and Titus were) not to make new
Articles of Faith, by determining every small controversie, which oblige
men to a needlesse burthen of Conscience, or provoke them to break the
union of the Church. Which Lesson the Apostles themselves observed

well. S. Peter and S. Paul, though their controversie were great, (as we
may read in Gal. 2.11.) yet they did not cast one another out of the Church.
Neverthelesse, during the Apostles time, there were other Pastors that
observed it not; As Diotrephes (3 John 9. &c.) who cast out of the Church,
such as S. John himself thought fit to be received into it, out of a pride he
took in Praeeminence; so early it was, that Vainglory, and Ambition had
found entrance into the Church of Christ.

Of Persons Liable To Excommunication
That a man be liable to Excommunication, there be many conditions
requisite; as First, that he be a member of some Commonalty, that is to
say, of some lawfull Assembly, that is to say, of some Christian Church,
that hath power to judge of the cause for which hee is to bee
Excommunicated. For where there is no community, there can bee no
Excommunication; nor where there is no power to Judge, can there bee any
power to give Sentence. From hence it followeth, that one Church cannot
be Excommunicated by another: For either they have equall power to
Excommunicate each other, in which case Excommunication is not
Discipline, nor an act of Authority, but Schisme, and Dissolution of
charity; or one is so subordinate to the other, as that they both have but
one voice, and then they be but one Church; and the part Excommunicated,
is no more a Church, but a dissolute number of individuall persons.
And because the sentence of Excommunication, importeth an advice,
not to keep company, nor so much as to eat with him that is
Excommunicate, if a Soveraign Prince, or Assembly bee Excommunicate,
the sentence is of no effect. For all Subjects are bound to be in the
company and presence of their own Soveraign (when he requireth it) by
the law of Nature; nor can they lawfully either expell him from any place
of his own Dominion, whether profane or holy; nor go out of his
Dominion, without his leave; much lesse (if he call them to that honour,)
refuse to eat with him. And as to other Princes and States, because they are
not parts of one and the same congregation, they need not any other
sentence to keep them from keeping company with the State
Excommunicate: for the very Institution, as it uniteth many men into one
Community; so it dissociateth one Community from another: so that
Excommunication is not needfull for keeping Kings and States asunder;
nor has any further effect then is in the nature of Policy it selfe; unlesse it
be to instigate Princes to warre upon one another.
Nor is the Excommunication of a Christian Subject, that obeyeth the
laws of his own Soveraign, whether Christian, or Heathen, of any effect.
For if he beleeve that "Jesus is the Christ, he hath the Spirit of God" (1

Joh. 4.1.) "and God dwelleth in him, and he in God," (1 Joh. 4.15.) But hee
that hath the Spirit of God; hee that dwelleth in God; hee in whom God
dwelleth, can receive no harm by the Excommunication of men. Therefore,
he that beleeveth Jesus to be the Christ, is free from all the dangers
threatned to persons Excommunicate. He that beleeveth it not, is no
Christian. Therefore a true and unfeigned Christian is not liable to
Excommunication; Nor he also that is a professed Christian, till his
Hypocrisy appear in his Manners, that is, till his behaviour bee contrary to
the law of his Soveraign, which is the rule of Manners, and which Christ
and his Apostles have commanded us to be subject to. For the Church
cannot judge of Manners but by externall Actions, which Actions can
never bee unlawfull, but when they are against the Law of the Commonwealth.
If a mans Father, or Mother, or Master bee Excommunicate, yet are not
the Children forbidden to keep them Company, nor to Eat with them; for
that were (for the most part) to oblige them not to eat at all, for want of
means to get food; and to authorise them to disobey their Parents, and
Masters, contrary to the Precept of the Apostles.
In summe, the Power of Excommunication cannot be extended further
than to the end for which the Apostles and Pastors of the Church have their
Commission from our Saviour; which is not to rule by Command and
Coaction, but by Teaching and Direction of men in the way of Salvation in
the world to come. And as a Master in any Science, may abandon his
Scholar, when hee obstinately neglecteth the practise of his rules; but not
accuse him of Injustice, because he was never bound to obey him: so a
Teacher of Christian doctrine may abandon his Disciples that obstinately
continue in an unchristian life; but he cannot say, they doe him wrong,
because they are not obliged to obey him: For to a Teacher that shall so
complain, may be applyed the Answer of God to Samuel in the like place,
(1 Sam. 8.) "They have not rejected thee, but mee." Excommunication
therefore when it wanteth the assistance of the Civill Power, as it doth,
when a Christian State, or Prince is Excommunicate by a forain Authority,
is without effect; and consequently ought to be without terrour. The name
of Fulmen Excommunicationis (that is, the Thunderbolt Of
Excommunication) proceeded from an imagination of the Bishop of Rome,
which first used it, that he was King of Kings, as the Heathen made Jupiter
King of the Gods; and assigned him in their Poems, and Pictures, a

Thunderbolt, wherewith to subdue, and punish the Giants, that should dare
to deny his power: Which imagination was grounded on two errours; one,
that the Kingdome of Christ is of this world, contrary to our Saviours
owne words, "My Kingdome is not of this world;" the other, that hee is
Christs Vicar, not onely over his owne Subjects, but over all the Christians
of the World; whereof there is no ground in Scripture, and the contrary
shall bee proved in its due place.

Of The Interpreter Of The Scriptures Before Civill
Soveraigns
Became Christians
St. Paul coming to Thessalonica, where was a Synagogue of the Jews,
(Acts 17.2, 3.) "As his manner was, went in unto them, and three Sabbath
dayes reasoned with them out of the Scriptures, Opening and alledging,
that Christ must needs have suffered and risen again from the dead; and
that this Jesus whom he preached was the Christ." The Scriptures here
mentioned were the Scriptures of the Jews, that is, the Old Testament. The
men, to whom he was to prove that Jesus was the Christ, and risen again
from the dead, were also Jews, and did beleeve already, that they were the
Word of God. Hereupon (as it is verse 4.) some of them beleeved, and (as
it is in the 5. ver.) some beleeved not. What was the reason, when they all
beleeved the Scripture, that they did not all beleeve alike; but that some
approved, others disapproved the Interpretation of St. Paul that cited them;
and every one Interpreted them to himself? It was this; S. Paul came to
them without any Legall Commission, and in the manner of one that would
not Command, but Perswade; which he must needs do, either by Miracles,
as Moses did to the Israelites in Egypt, that they might see his Authority in
Gods works; or by Reasoning from the already received Scripture, that
they might see the truth of his doctrine in Gods Word. But whosoever
perswadeth by reasoning from principles written, maketh him to whom
hee speaketh Judge, both of the meaning of those principles, and also of
the force of his inferences upon them. If these Jews of Thessalonica were
not, who else was the Judge of what S. Paul alledged out of Scripture? If S.
Paul, what needed he to quote any places to prove his doctrine? It had been
enough to have said, I find it so in Scripture, that is to say, in your Laws,
of which I am Interpreter, as sent by Christ. The Interpreter therefore of
the Scripture, to whose Interpretation the Jews of Thessalonica were bound
to stand, could be none: every one might beleeve, or not beleeve,
according as the Allegations seemed to himselfe to be agreeable, or not
agreeable to the meaning of the places alledged. And generally in all cases

of the world, hee that pretendeth any proofe, maketh Judge of his proofe
him to whom he addresseth his speech. And as to the case of the Jews in
particular, they were bound by expresse words (Deut. 17.) to receive the
determination of all hard questions, from the Priests and Judges of Israel
for the time being. But this is to bee understood of the Jews that were yet
unconverted.
For the Conversion of the Gentiles, there was no use of alledging the
Scriptures, which they beleeved not. The Apostles therefore laboured by
Reason to confute their Idolatry; and that done, to perswade them to the
faith of Christ, by their testimony of his Life, and Resurrection. So that
there could not yet bee any controversie concerning the authority to
Interpret Scripture; seeing no man was obliged during his infidelity, to
follow any mans Interpretation of any Scripture, except his Soveraigns
Interpretation of the Laws of his countrey.
Let us now consider the Conversion it self, and see what there was
therein, that could be cause of such an obligation. Men were converted to
no other thing then to the Beleef of that which the Apostles preached: And
the Apostles preached nothing, but that Jesus was the Christ, that is to say,
the King that was to save them, and reign over them eternally in the world
to come; and consequently that hee was not dead, but risen again from the
dead, and gone up into Heaven, and should come again one day to judg the
world, (which also should rise again to be judged,) and reward every man
according to his works. None of them preached that himselfe, or any other
Apostle was such an Interpreter of the Scripture, as all that became
Christians, ought to take their Interpretation for Law. For to Interpret the
Laws, is part of the Administration of a present Kingdome; which the
Apostles had not. They prayed then, and all other Pastors ever since, "Let
thy Kingdome come;" and exhorted their Converts to obey their then
Ethnique Princes. The New Testament was not yet published in one Body.
Every of the Evangelists was Interpreter of his own Gospel; and every
Apostle of his own Epistle; And of the Old Testament, our Saviour
himselfe saith to the Jews (John 5. 39.) "Search the Scriptures; for in them
yee thinke to have eternall life, and they are they that testifie of me." If
hee had not meant they should Interpret them, hee would not have bidden
them take thence the proof of his being the Christ; he would either have
Interpreted them himselfe, or referred them to the Interpretation of the
Priests.

When a difficulty arose, the Apostles and Elders of the Church
assembled themselves together, and determined what should bee preached,
and taught, and how they should Interpret the Scriptures to the People; but
took not from the People the liberty to read, and Interpret them to
themselves. The Apostles sent divers Letters to the Churches, and other
Writings for their instruction; which had been in vain, if they had not
allowed them to Interpret, that is, to consider the meaning of them. And as
it was in the Apostles time, it must be till such time as there should be
Pastors, that could authorise an Interpreter, whose Interpretation should
generally be stood to: But that could not be till Kings were Pastors, or
Pastors Kings.

Of The Power To Make Scripture Law
There be two senses, wherein a Writing may be said to be Canonicall;
for Canon, signifieth a Rule; and a Rule is a Precept, by which a man is
guided, and directed in any action whatsoever. Such Precepts, though given
by a Teacher to his Disciple, or a Counsellor to his friend, without power
to Compell him to observe them, are neverthelesse Canons; because they
are Rules: But when they are given by one, whom he that receiveth them is
bound to obey, then are those Canons, not onely Rules, but Laws: The
question therefore here, is of the Power to make the Scriptures (which are
the Rules of Christian Faith) Laws.

Of The Ten Commandements
That part of the Scripture, which was first Law, was the Ten
Commandements, written in two Tables of Stone, and delivered by God
himselfe to Moses; and by Moses made known to the people. Before that
time there was no written Law of God, who as yet having not chosen any
people to bee his peculiar Kingdome, had given no Law to men, but the
Law of Nature, that is to say, the Precepts of Naturall Reason, written in
every mans own heart. Of these two Tables, the first containeth the law of
Soveraignty; 1. That they should not obey, nor honour the Gods of other
Nations, in these words, "Non habebis Deos alienos coram me," that is,
"Thou shalt not have for Gods, the Gods that other Nations worship; but
onely me:" whereby they were forbidden to obey, or honor, as their King
and Governour, any other God, than him that spake unto them then by
Moses, and afterwards by the High Priest. 2. That they "should not make
any Image to represent him;" that is to say, they were not to choose to
themselves, neither in heaven, nor in earth, any Representative of their
own fancying, but obey Moses and Aaron, whom he had appointed to that
office. 3. That "they should not take the Name of God in vain;" that is,
they should not speak rashly of their King, nor dispute his Right, nor the
commissions of Moses and Aaron, his Lieutenants. 4. That "they should
every Seventh day abstain from their ordinary labour," and employ that
time in doing him Publique Honor. The second Table containeth the Duty
of one man towards another, as "To honor Parents; Not to kill; Not to
Commit Adultery; Not to steale; Not to corrupt Judgment by false
witnesse;" and finally, "Not so much as to designe in their heart the doing
of any injury one to another." The question now is, Who it was that gave to
these written Tables the obligatory force of Lawes. There is no doubt but
that they were made Laws by God himselfe: But because a Law obliges
not, nor is Law to any, but to them that acknowledge it to be the act of the
Soveraign, how could the people of Israel that were forbidden to approach
the Mountain to hear what God said to Moses, be obliged to obedience to
all those laws which Moses propounded to them? Some of them were
indeed the Laws of Nature, as all the Second Table; and therefore to be

acknowledged for Gods Laws; not to the Israelites alone, but to all people:
But of those that were peculiar to the Israelites, as those of the first Table,
the question remains; saving that they had obliged themselves, presently
after the propounding of them, to obey Moses, in these words (Exod.
20.19.) "Speak them thou to us, and we will hear thee; but let not God
speak to us, lest we die." It was therefore onely Moses then, and after him
the High Priest, whom (by Moses) God declared should administer this his
peculiar Kingdome, that had on Earth, the power to make this short
Scripture of the Decalogue to bee Law in the Common-wealth of Israel.
But Moses, and Aaron, and the succeeding High Priests were the Civill
Soveraigns. Therefore hitherto, the Canonizing, or making of the Scripture
Law, belonged to the Civill Soveraigne.

Of The Judicial, And Leviticall Law
The Judiciall Law, that is to say, the Laws that God prescribed to the
Magistrates of Israel, for the rule of their administration of Justice, and of
the Sentences, or Judgments they should pronounce, in Pleas between man
and man; and the Leviticall Law, that is to say, the rule that God prescribed
touching the Rites and Ceremonies of the Priests and Levites, were all
delivered to them by Moses onely; and therefore also became Lawes, by
vertue of the same promise of obedience to Moses. Whether these laws
were then written, or not written, but dictated to the People by Moses
(after his forty dayes being with God in the Mount) by word of mouth, is
not expressed in the Text; but they were all positive Laws, and equivalent
to holy Scripture, and made Canonicall by Moses the Civill Soveraign.

The Second Law
After the Israelites were come into the Plains of Moab over against
Jericho, and ready to enter into the land of Promise, Moses to the former
Laws added divers others; which therefore are called Deuteronomy: that
is, Second Laws. And are (as it is written, Deut. 29.1.) "The words of a
Covenant which the Lord commanded Moses to make with the Children of
Israel, besides the Covenant which he made with them in Horeb." For
having explained those former Laws, in the beginning of the Book of
Deuteronomy, he addeth others, that begin at the 12. Cha. and continue to
the end of the 26. of the same Book. This Law (Deut. 27.1.) they were
commanded to write upon great stones playstered over, at their passing
over Jordan: This Law also was written by Moses himself in a Book; and
delivered into the hands of the "Priests, and to the Elders of Israel," (Deut.
31.9.) and commanded (ve. 26.) "to be put in the side of the Arke;" for in
the Ark it selfe was nothing but the Ten Commandements. This was the
Law, which Moses (Deuteronomy 17.18.) commanded the Kings of Israel
should keep a copie of: And this is the Law, which having been long time
lost, was found again in the Temple in the time of Josiah, and by his
authority received for the Law of God. But both Moses at the writing, and
Josiah at the recovery thereof, had both of them the Civill Soveraignty.
Hitherto therefore the Power of making Scripture Canonicall, was in the
Civill Soveraign.
Besides this Book of the Law, there was no other Book, from the time of
Moses, till after the Captivity, received amongst the Jews for the Law of
God. For the Prophets (except a few) lived in the time of the Captivity it
selfe; and the rest lived but a little before it; and were so far from having
their Prophecies generally received for Laws, as that their persons were
persecuted, partly by false Prophets, and partly by the Kings which were
seduced by them. And this Book it self, which was confirmed by Josiah for
the Law of God, and with it all the History of the Works of God, was lost
in the Captivity, and sack of the City of Jerusalem, as appears by that of 2
Esdras 14.21. "Thy Law is burnt; therefor no man knoweth the things that
are done of thee, of the works that shall begin." And before the Captivity,

between the time when the Law was lost, (which is not mentioned in the
Scripture, but may probably be thought to be the time of Rehoboam, when
Shishak King of Egypt took the spoils of the Temple,(1 Kings 14.26.)) and
the time of Josiah, when it was found againe, they had no written Word of
God, but ruled according to their own discretion, or by the direction of
such, as each of them esteemed Prophets.

The Old Testament, When Made Canonicall
From whence we may inferre, that the Scriptures of the Old Testament,
which we have at this day, were not Canonicall, nor a Law unto the Jews,
till the renovation of their Covenant with God at their return from the
Captivity, and restauration of their Common-wealth under Esdras. But
from that time forward they were accounted the Law of the Jews, and for
such translated into Greek by Seventy Elders of Judaea, and put into the
Library of Ptolemy at Alexandria, and approved for the Word of God. Now
seeing Esdras was the High Priest, and the High Priest was their Civill
Soveraigne, it is manifest, that the Scriptures were never made Laws, but
by the Soveraign Civill Power.
The New Testament Began To Be Canonicall Under Christian
Soveraigns By the Writings of the Fathers that lived in the time before that
Christian Religion was received, and authorised by Constantine the
Emperour, we may find, that the Books wee now have of the New
Testament, were held by the Christians of that time (except a few, in
respect of whose paucity the rest were called the Catholique Church, and
others Haeretiques) for the dictates of the Holy Ghost; and consequently
for the Canon, or Rule of Faith: such was the reverence and opinion they
had of their Teachers; as generally the reverence that the Disciples bear to
their first Masters, in all manner of doctrine they receive from them, is not
small. Therefore there is no doubt, but when S. Paul wrote to the Churches
he had converted; or any other Apostle, or Disciple of Christ, to those
which had then embraced Christ, they received those their Writings for the
true Christian Doctrine. But in that time, when not the Power and
Authority of the Teacher, but the Faith of the Hearer caused them to
receive it, it was not the Apostles that made their own Writings
Canonicall, but every Convert made them so to himself.
But the question here, is not what any Christian made a Law, or Canon
to himself, (which he might again reject, by the same right he received it;)
but what was so made a Canon to them, as without injustice they could not
doe any thing contrary thereunto. That the New Testament should in this
sense be Canonicall, that is to say, a Law in any place where the Law of the

Common-wealth had not made it so, is contrary to the nature of a Law. For
a Law, (as hath been already shewn) is the Commandement of that Man, or
Assembly, to whom we have given Soveraign Authority, to make such
Rules for the direction of our actions, as hee shall think fit; and to punish
us, when we doe any thing contrary to the same. When therefore any other
man shall offer unto us any other Rules, which the Soveraign Ruler hath
not prescribed, they are but Counsell, and Advice; which, whether good, or
bad, hee that is counselled, may without injustice refuse to observe, and
when contrary to the Laws already established, without injustice cannot
observe, how good soever he conceiveth it to be. I say, he cannot in this
case observe the same in his actions, nor in his discourse with other men;
though he may without blame beleeve the his private Teachers, and wish
he had the liberty to practise their advice; and that it were publiquely
received for Law. For internall faith is in its own nature invisible, and
consequently exempted from all humane jurisdiction; whereas the words,
and actions that proceed from it, as breaches of our Civil obedience, are
injustice both before God and Man. Seeing then our Saviour hath denyed
his Kingdome to be in this world, seeing he hath said, he came not to
judge, but to save the world, he hath not subjected us to other Laws than
those of the Common-wealth; that is, the Jews to the Law of Moses,
(which he saith (Mat. 5.) he came not to destroy, but to fulfill,) and other
Nations to the Laws of their severall Soveraigns, and all men to the Laws
of Nature; the observing whereof, both he himselfe, and his Apostles have
in their teaching recommended to us, as a necessary condition of being
admitted by him in the last day into his eternall Kingdome, wherein shall
be Protection, and Life everlasting. Seeing then our Saviour, and his
Apostles, left not new Laws to oblige us in this world, but new Doctrine to
prepare us for the next; the Books of the New Testament, which containe
that Doctrine, untill obedience to them was commanded, by them that God
hath given power to on earth to be Legislators, were not obligatory
Canons, that is, Laws, but onely good, and safe advice, for the direction of
sinners in the way to salvation, which every man might take, and refuse at
his owne perill, without injustice.
Again, our Saviour Christs Commission to his Apostles, and Disciples,
was to Proclaim his Kingdome (not present, but) to come; and to Teach all
Nations; and to Baptize them that should beleeve; and to enter into the
houses of them that should receive them; and where they were not

received, to shake off the dust of their feet against them; but not to call for
fire from heaven to destroy them, nor to compell them to obedience by the
Sword. In all which there is nothing of Power, but of Perswasion. He sent
them out as Sheep unto Wolves, not as Kings to their Subjects. They had
not in Commission to make Laws; but to obey, and teach obedience to
Laws made; and consequently they could not make their Writings
obligatory Canons, without the help of the Soveraign Civill Power. And
therefore the Scripture of the New Testament is there only Law, where the
lawfull Civill Power hath made it so. And there also the King, or
Soveraign, maketh it a Law to himself; by which he subjecteth himselfe,
not to the Doctor, or Apostle, that converted him, but to God himself, and
his Son Jesus Christ, as immediately as did the Apostles themselves.

Of The Power Of Councells To Make The
Scripture Law
That which may seem to give the New Testament, in respect of those
that have embraced Christian Doctrine, the force of Laws, in the times,
and places of persecution, is the decrees they made amongst themselves in
their Synods. For we read (Acts 15.28.) the stile of the Councell of the
Apostles, the Elders, and the whole Church, in this manner, "It seemed
good to the Holy Ghost, and to us, to lay upon you no greater burthen than
these necessary things, &C." which is a stile that signifieth a Power to lay
a burthen on them that had received their Doctrine. Now "to lay a burthen
on another," seemeth the same that "to oblige;" and therefore the Acts of
that Councell were Laws to the then Christians. Neverthelesse, they were
no more Laws than are these other Precepts, "Repent, Be Baptized; Keep
the Commandements; Beleeve the Gospel; Come unto me; Sell all that
thou hast; Give it to the poor;" and "Follow me;" which are not
Commands, but Invitations, and Callings of men to Christianity, like that
of Esay 55.1. "Ho, every man that thirsteth, come yee to the waters, come,
and buy wine and milke without money." For first, the Apostles power was
no other than that of our Saviour, to invite men to embrace the Kingdome
of God; which they themselves acknowledged for a Kingdome (not
present, but) to come; and they that have no Kingdome, can make no
Laws. And secondly, if their Acts of Councell, were Laws, they could not
without sin be disobeyed. But we read not any where, that they who
received not the Doctrine of Christ, did therein sin; but that they died in
their sins; that is, that their sins against the Laws to which they owed
obedience, were not pardoned. And those Laws were the Laws of Nature,
and the Civill Laws of the State, whereto every Christian man had by pact
submitted himself. And therefore by the Burthen, which the Apostles
might lay on such as they had converted, are not to be understood Laws,
but Conditions, proposed to those that sought Salvation; which they might
accept, or refuse at their own perill, without a new sin, though not without
the hazard of being condemned, and excluded out of the Kingdome of God
for their sins past. And therefore of Infidels, S. John saith not, the wrath of

God shall "come" upon them, but "the wrath of God remaineth upon
them;" and not that they shall be condemned; but that "they are
condemned already."(John 3.36, 3.18) Nor can it be conceived, that the
benefit of Faith, "is Remission of sins" unlesse we conceive withall, that
the dammage of Infidelity, is "the Retention of the same sins."
But to what end is it (may some man aske), that the Apostles, and other
Pastors of the Church, after their time, should meet together, to agree upon
what Doctrine should be taught, both for Faith and Manners, if no man
were obliged to observe their Decrees? To this may be answered, that the
Apostles, and Elders of that Councell, were obliged even by their entrance
into it, to teach the Doctrine therein concluded, and decreed to be taught,
so far forth, as no precedent Law, to which they were obliged to yeeld
obedience, was to the contrary; but not that all other Christians should be
obliged to observe, what they taught. For though they might deliberate
what each of them should teach; yet they could not deliberate what others
should do, unless their Assembly had had a Legislative Power; which none
could have but Civill Soveraigns. For though God be the Soveraign of all
the world, we are not bound to take for his Law, whatsoever is propounded
by every man in his name; nor any thing contrary to the Civill Law, which
God hath expressely commanded us to obey.
Seeing then the Acts of Councell of the Apostles, were then no Laws,
but Councells; much lesse are Laws the Acts of any other Doctors, or
Councells since, if assembled without the Authority of the Civill
Soveraign. And consequently, the Books of the New Testament, though
most perfect Rules of Christian Doctrine, could not be made Laws by any
other authority then that of Kings, or Soveraign Assemblies.
The first Councell, that made the Scriptures we now have, Canon, is not
extant: For that Collection the first Bishop of Rome after S. Peter, is
subject to question: For though the Canonicall books bee there reckoned
up; yet these words, "Sint vobis omnibus Clericis & Laicis Libris
venerandi, &c." containe a distinction of Clergy, and Laity, that was not in
use so neer St. Peters time. The first Councell for setling the Canonicall
Scripture, that is extant, is that of Laodicea, Can. 59. which forbids the
reading of other Books then those in the Churches; which is a Mandate
that is not addressed to every Christian, but to those onely that had

authority to read any publiquely in the Church; that is, to Ecclesiastiques
onely.

Of The Right Of Constituting Ecclesiasticall
Officers In The Time
Of The Apostles
Of Ecclesiastical Officers in the time of the Apostles, some were
Magisteriall, some Ministeriall. Magisteriall were the Offices of
preaching of the Gospel of the Kingdom of God to Infidels; of
administring the Sacraments, and Divine Service; and of teaching the
Rules of Faith and Manners to those that were converted. Ministeriall was
the Office of Deacons, that is, of them that were appointed to the
administration of the secular necessities of the Church, at such time as
they lived upon a common stock of mony, raised out of the voluntary
contributions of the faithfull.
Amongst the Officers Magisteriall, the first, and principall were the
Apostles; whereof there were at first but twelve; and these were chosen
and constituted by our Saviour himselfe; and their Office was not onely to
Preach, Teach, and Baptize, but also to be Martyrs, (Witnesses of our
Saviours Resurrection.) This Testimony, was the specificall, and essentiall
mark; whereby the Apostleship was distinguished from other Magistracy
Ecclesiasticall; as being necessary for an Apostle, either to have seen our
Saviour after his Resurrection, or to have conversed with him before, and
seen his works, and other arguments of his Divinity, whereby they might
be taken for sufficient Witnesses. And therefore at the election of a new
Apostle in the place of Judas Iscariot, S. Peter saith (Acts 1.21,22.) "Of
these men that have companyed with us, all the time that the Lord Jesus
went in and out among us, beginning from the Baptisme of John unto that
same day that he was taken up from us, must one be ordained to be a
Witnesse with us of his Resurrection:" where, by this word Must, is
implyed a necessary property of an Apostle, to have companyed with the
first and prime Apostles in the time that our Saviour manifested himself in
the flesh.

Matthias Made Apostle By The Congregation.
The first Apostle, of those which were not constituted by Christ in the
time he was upon the Earth, was Matthias, chosen in this manner: There
were assembled together in Jerusalem about 120 Christians (Acts 1.15.)
These appointed two, Joseph the Just, and Matthias (ver. 23.) and caused
lots to be drawn; "and (ver. 26.) the Lot fell on Matthias and he was
numbred with the Apostles." So that here we see the ordination of this
Apostle, was the act of the Congregation, and not of St. Peter, nor of the
eleven, otherwise then as Members of the Assembly.

Paul And Barnabas Made Apostles By The
Church Of Antioch
After him there was never any other Apostle ordained, but Paul and
Barnabas, which was done (as we read Acts 13.1,2,3.) in this manner.
"There were in the Church that was at Antioch, certaine Prophets, and
Teachers; as Barnabas, and Simeon that was called Niger, and Lucius of
Cyrene, and Manaen; which had been brought up with Herod the Tetrarch,
and Saul. As they ministred unto the Lord, and fasted, the Holy Ghost said,
'Separate mee Barnabas, and Saul for the worke whereunto I have called
them.' And when they had fasted, and prayed, and laid their hands on them,
they sent them away."
By which it is manifest, that though they were called by the Holy Ghost,
their Calling was declared unto them, and their Mission authorized by the
particular Church of Antioch. And that this their calling was to the
Apostleship, is apparent by that, that they are both called (Acts 14.14.)
Apostles: And that it was by vertue of this act of the Church of Antioch,
that they were Apostles, S. Paul declareth plainly (Rom. 1.1.) in that hee
useth the word, which the Holy Ghost used at his calling: For he stileth
himself, "An Apostle separated unto the Gospel of God;" alluding to the
words of the Holy Ghost, "Separate me Barnabas and Saul, &c." But
seeing the work of an Apostle, was to be a Witnesse of the Resurrection of
Christ, and man may here aske, how S. Paul that conversed not with our
Saviour before his passion, could know he was risen. To which it is easily
answered, that our Saviour himself appeared to him in the way to
Damascus, from Heaven, after his Ascension; "and chose him for a vessell
to bear his name before the Gentiles, and Kings, and Children of Israel;"
and consequently (having seen the Lord after his passion) was a competent
Witnesse of his Resurrection: And as for Barnabas, he was a Disciple
before the Passion. It is therefore evident that Paul, and Barnabas were
Apostles; and yet chosen, and authorized (not by the first Apostles alone,
but) by the Church of Antioch; as Matthias was chosen, and authorized by
the Church of Jerusalem.

What Offices In The Church Are Magisteriall
Bishop, a word formed in our language, out of the Greek Episcopus,
signifieth an overseer, or Superintendent of any businesse, and particularly
a Pastor or Shepherd; and thence by metaphor was taken, not only amongst
the Jews that were originally Shepherds, but also amongst the Heathen, to
signifie the Office of a King, or any other Ruler, or Guide of People,
whether he ruled by Laws, or Doctrine. And so the Apostles were the first
Christian Bishops, instituted by Christ himselfe: in which sense the
Apostleship of Judas is called (Acts 1.20.) his Bishoprick. And afterwards,
when there were constituted Elders in the Christian Churches, with charge
to guide Christs flock by their doctrine, and advice; these Elders were also
called Bishops. Timothy was an Elder (which word Elder, in the New
Testament is a name of Office, as well as of Age;) yet he was also a
Bishop. And Bishops were then content with the Title of Elders. Nay S.
John himselfe, the Apostle beloved of our Lord, beginneth his Second
Epistle with these words, "The Elder to the Elect Lady." By which it is
evident, that Bishop, Pastor, Elder, Doctor, that is to say, Teacher, were but
so many divers names of the same Office in the time of the Apostles. For
there was then no government by Coercion, but only by Doctrine, and
Perswading. The Kingdome of God was yet to come, in a new world; so
that there could be no authority to compell in any Church, till the
Common-wealth had embraced the Christian Faith; and consequently no
diversity of Authority, though there were diversity of Employments.
Besides these Magisteriall employments in the Church, namely
Apostles, Bishops, Elders, Pastors, and Doctors, whose calling was to
proclaim Christ to the Jews, and Infidels, and to direct, and teach those
that beleeved we read in the New Testament of no other. For by the names
of Evangelists and Prophets, is not signified any Office, but severall Gifts,
by which severall men were profitable to the Church: as Evangelists, by
writing the life and acts of our Saviour; such as were S. Matthew and S.
John Apostles, and S. Marke and S. Luke Disciples, and whosoever else
wrote of that subject, (as S. Thomas, and S. Barnabas are said to have
done, though the Church have not received the Books that have gone under

their names:) and as Prophets, by the gift of interpreting the Old
Testament; and sometimes by declaring their speciall Revelations to the
Church. For neither these gifts, nor the gifts of Languages, nor the gift of
Casting out Devils, or of Curing other diseases, nor any thing else did
make an Officer in the Church, save onely the due calling and election to
the charge of Teaching.

Ordination Of Teachers
As the Apostles, Matthias, Paul, and Barnabas, were not made by our
Saviour himself, but were elected by the Church, that is, by the Assembly
of Christians; namely, Matthias by the Church of Jerusalem, and Paul, and
Barnabas by the Church of Antioch; so were also the Presbyters, and
Pastors in other Cities, elected by the Churches of those Cities. For proof
whereof, let us consider, first, how S. Paul proceeded in the Ordination of
Presbyters, in the Cities where he had converted men to the Christian
Faith, immediately after he and Barnabas had received their Apostleship.
We read (Acts 14.23.) that "they ordained Elders in every Church;" which
at first sight may be taken for an Argument, that they themselves chose,
and gave them their authority: But if we consider the Originall text, it will
be manifest, that they were authorized, and chosen by the Assembly of the
Christians of each City. For the words there are, "cheirotonesantes
autoispresbuterous kat ekklesian," that is, "When they had Ordained them
Elders by the Holding up of Hands in every Congregation." Now it is well
enough known, that in all those Cities, the manner of choosing
Magistrates, and Officers, was by plurality of suffrages; and (because the
ordinary way of distinguishing the Affirmative Votes from the Negatives,
was by Holding up of Hands) to ordain an Officer in any of the Cities, was
no more but to bring the people together, to elect them by plurality of
Votes, whether it were by plurality of elevated hands, or by plurality of
voices, or plurality of balls, or beans, or small stones, of which every man
cast in one, into a vessell marked for the Affirmative, or Negative; for
divers Cities had divers customes in that point. It was therefore the
Assembly that elected their own Elders: the Apostles were onely
Presidents of the Assembly to call them together for such Election, and to
pronounce them Elected, and to give them the benediction, which now is
called Consecration. And for this cause they that were Presidents of the
Assemblies, as (in the absence of the Apostles) the Elders were, were
called proestotes, and in Latin Antistities; which words signifie the
Principall Person of the Assembly, whose office was to number the Votes,
and to declare thereby who was chosen; and where the Votes were equall,

to decide the matter in question, by adding his own; which is the Office of
a President in Councell. And (because all the Churches had their
Presbyters ordained in the same manner,) where the word is Constitute, (as
Titus 1.5.) "ina katasteses kata polin presbuterous," "For this cause left I
thee in Crete, that thou shouldest constitute Elders in every City," we are
to understand the same thing; namely, that hee should call the faithfull
together, and ordain them Presbyters by plurality of suffrages. It had been
a strange thing, if in a Town, where men perhaps had never seen any
Magistrate otherwise chosen then by an Assembly, those of the Town
becomming Christians, should so much as have thought on any other way
of Election of their Teachers, and Guides, that is to say, of their Presbyters,
(otherwise called Bishops,) then this of plurality of suffrages, intimated by
S. Paul (Acts 14.23.) in the word Cheirotonesantes: Nor was there ever any
choosing of Bishops, (before the Emperors found it necessary to regulate
them in order to the keeping of the peace amongst them,) but by the
Assemblies of the Christians in every severall Town.
The same is also confirmed by the continuall practise even to this day,
in the Election of the Bishops of Rome. For if the Bishop of any place, had
the right of choosing another, to the succession of the Pastorall Office, in
any City, at such time as he went from thence, to plant the same in another
place; much more had he had the Right, to appoint his successour in that
place, in which he last resided and dyed: And we find not, that ever any
Bishop of Rome appointed his successor. For they were a long time chosen
by the People, as we may see by the sedition raised about the Election,
between Damascus, and Ursinicus; which Ammianus Marcellinus saith
was so great, that Juventius the Praefect, unable to keep the peace between
them, was forced to goe out of the City; and that there were above an
hundred men found dead upon that occasion in the Church it self. And
though they afterwards were chosen, first, by the whole Clergy of Rome,
and afterwards by the Cardinalls; yet never any was appointed to the
succession by his predecessor. If therefore they pretended no right to
appoint their successors, I think I may reasonably conclude, they had no
right to appoint the new power; which none could take from the Church to
bestow on them, but such as had a lawfull authority, not onely to Teach,
but to Command the Church; which none could doe, but the Civill
Soveraign.

Ministers Of The Church What
The word Minister in the Originall Diakonos signifieth one that
voluntarily doth the businesse of another man; and differeth from a
Servant onely in this, that Servants are obliged by their condition, to what
is commanded them; whereas Ministers are obliged onely by their
undertaking, and bound therefore to no more than that they have
undertaken: So that both they that teach the Word of God, and they that
administer the secular affairs of the Church, are both Ministers, but they
are Ministers of different Persons. For the Pastors of the Church, called
(Acts 6.4.) "The Ministers of the Word," are Ministers of Christ, whose
Word it is: But the Ministery of a Deacon, which is called (verse 2. of the
same Chapter) "Serving of Tables," is a service done to the Church, or
Congregation: So that neither any one man, nor the whole Church, could
ever of their Pastor say, he was their Minister; but of a Deacon, whether
the charge he undertook were to serve tables, or distribute maintenance to
the Christians, when they lived in each City on a common stock, or upon
collections, as in the first times, or to take a care of the House of Prayer,
or of the Revenue, or other worldly businesse of the Church, the whole
Congregation might properly call him their Minister.
For their employment, as Deacons, was to serve the Congregation;
though upon occasion they omitted not to preach the Gospel, and maintain
the Doctrine of Christ, every one according to his gifts, as S. Steven did;
and both to Preach, and Baptize, as Philip did: For that Philip, which (Act.
8. 5.) Preached the Gospel at Samaria, and (verse 38.) Baptized the
Eunuch, was Philip the Deacon, not Philip the Apostle. For it is manifest
(verse 1.) that when Philip preached in Samaria, the Apostles were at
Jerusalem, and (verse 14.) "When they heard that Samaria had received the
Word of God, sent Peter and John to them;" by imposition of whose hands,
they that were Baptized (verse 15.) received (which before by the
Baptisme of Philip they had not received) the Holy Ghost. For it was
necessary for the conferring of the Holy Ghost, that their Baptisme should
be administred, or confirmed by a Minister of the Word, not by a Minister
of the Church. And therefore to confirm the Baptisme of those that Philip

the Deacon had Baptized, the Apostles sent out of their own number from
Jerusalem to Samaria, Peter, and John; who conferred on them that before
were but Baptized, those graces that were signs of the Holy Spirit, which
at that time did accompany all true Beleevers; which what they were may
be understood by that which S. Marke saith (chap. 16.17.) "These signs
follow them that beleeve in my Name; they shall cast out Devills; they
shall speak with new tongues; They shall take up Serpents, and if they
drink any deadly thing, it shall not hurt them; They shall lay hands on the
sick, and they shall recover." This to doe, was it that Philip could not give;
but the Apostles could, and (as appears by this place) effectually did to
every man that truly beleeved, and was by a Minister of Christ himself
Baptized: which power either Christs Ministers in this age cannot
conferre, or else there are very few true Beleevers, or Christ hath very few
Ministers.

And How Chosen What
That the first Deacons were chosen, not by the Apostles, but by a
Congregation of the Disciples; that is, of Christian men of all sorts, is
manifest out of Acts 6. where we read that the Twelve, after the number of
Disciples was multiplyed, called them together, and having told them, that
it was not fit that the Apostles should leave the Word of God, and serve
tables, said unto them (verse 3.) "Brethren looke you out among you seven
men of honest report, full of the Holy Ghost, and of Wisdome, whom we
may appoint over this businesse." Here it is manifest, that though the
Apostles declared them elected; yet the Congregation chose them; which
also, (verse the fift) is more expressely said, where it is written, that "the
saying pleased the multitude, and they chose seven, &c."

Of Ecclesiasticall Revenue, Under The Law Of
Moses
Under the Old Testament, the Tribe of Levi were onely capable of the
Priesthood, and other inferiour Offices of the Church. The land was
divided amongst the other Tribes (Levi excepted,) which by the
subdivision of the Tribe of Joseph, into Ephraim and Manasses, were still
twelve. To the Tribe of Levi were assigned certain Cities for their
habitation, with the suburbs for their cattell: but for their portion, they
were to have the tenth of the fruits of the land of their Brethren. Again, the
Priests for their maintenance had the tenth of that tenth, together with part
of the oblations, and sacrifices. For God had said to Aaron (Numb. 18. 20.)
"Thou shalt have no inheritance in their land, neither shalt thou have any
part amongst them, I am thy part, and thine inheritance amongst the
Children of Israel." For God being then King, and having constituted the
Tribe of Levi to be his Publique Ministers, he allowed them for their
maintenance, the Publique revenue, that is to say, the part that God had
reserved to himself; which were Tythes, and Offerings: and that it is which
is meant, where God saith, I am thine inheritance. And therefore to the
Levites might not unfitly be attributed the name of Clergy from Kleros,
which signifieth Lot, or Inheritance; not that they were heirs of the
Kingdome of God, more than other; but that Gods inheritance, was their
maintenance. Now seeing in this time God himself was their King, and
Moses, Aaron, and the succeeding High Priests were his Lieutenants; it is
manifest, that the Right of Tythes, and Offerings was constituted by the
Civill Power.
After their rejection of God in the demand of a King, they enjoyed still
the same revenue; but the Right thereof was derived from that, that the
Kings did never take it from them: for the Publique Revenue was at the
disposing of him that was the Publique Person; and that (till the Captivity)
was the King. And again, after the return from the Captivity, they paid
their Tythes as before to the Priest. Hitherto therefore Church Livings were
determined by the Civill Soveraign.

In Our Saviours Time, And After
Of the maintenance of our Saviour, and his Apostles, we read onely they
had a Purse, (which was carried by Judas Iscariot;) and, that of the
Apostles, such as were Fisher-men, did sometimes use their trade; and that
when our Saviour sent the Twelve Apostles to Preach, he forbad them "to
carry Gold, and Silver, and Brasse in their purses, for that the workman is
worthy of his hire:" (Mat. 10. 9,10.) By which it is probable, their ordinary
maintenance was not unsuitable to their employment; for their
employment was (ver. 8.) "freely to give, because they had freely
received;" and their maintenance was the Free Gift of those that beleeved
the good tyding they carryed about of the coming of the Messiah their
Saviour. To which we may adde, that which was contributed out of
gratitude, by such as our Saviour had healed of diseases; of which are
mentioned "Certain women (Luke 8. 2,3.) which had been healed of evill
spirits and infirmities; Mary Magdalen, out of whom went seven Devills;
and Joanna the wife of Chuza, Herods Steward; and Susanna, and many
others, which ministred unto him of their substance.
After our Saviours Ascension, the Christians of every City lived in
Common, (Acts 4. 34.) upon the mony which was made of the sale of their
lands and possessions, and laid down at the feet of the Apostles, of good
will, not of duty; for "whilest the Land remained (saith S. Peter to Ananias
Acts 5.4.) was it not thine? and after it was sold, was it not in thy power?"
which sheweth he needed not to have saved his land, nor his money by
lying, as not being bound to contribute any thing at all, unlesse he had
pleased. And as in the time of the Apostles, so also all the time downward,
till after Constantine the Great, we shall find, that the maintenance of the
Bishops, and Pastors of the Christian Church, was nothing but the
voluntary contribution of them that had embraced their Doctrine. There
was yet no mention of Tythes: but such was in the time of Constantine, and
his Sons, the affection of Christians to their Pastors, as Ammianus
Marcellinus saith (describing the sedition of Damasus and Ursinicus about
the Bishopricke,) that it was worth their contention, in that the Bishops of
those times by the liberality of their flock, and especially of Matrons,

lived splendidly, were carryed in Coaches, and sumptuous in their fare and
apparell.
The Ministers Of The Gospel Lived On The Benevolence Of Their
Flocks But here may some ask, whether the Pastor were then bound to live
upon voluntary contribution, as upon almes, "For who (saith S. Paul 1 Cor.
9. 7.) goeth to war at his own charges? or who feedeth a flock, and eatheth
not of the milke of the flock?" And again, (1 Cor. 9. 13.) "Doe ye not know
that they which minister about holy things, live of the things of the
Temple; and they which wait at the Altar, partake with the Altar;" that is to
say, have part of that which is offered at the Altar for their maintenance?
And then he concludeth, "Even so hath the Lord appointed, that they which
preach the Gospel should live of the Gospel. From which place may be
inferred indeed, that the Pastors of the Church ought to be maintained by
their flocks; but not that the Pastors were to determine, either the quantity,
or the kind of their own allowance, and be (as it were) their own Carvers.
Their allowance must needs therefore be determined, either by the
gratitude, and liberality of every particular man of their flock, or by the
whole Congregation. By the whole Congregation it could not be, because
their Acts were then no Laws: Therefore the maintenance of Pastors,
before Emperours and Civill Soveraigns had made Laws to settle it, was
nothing but Benevolence. They that served at the Altar lived on what was
offered. In what court should they sue for it, who had no Tribunalls? Or if
they had Arbitrators amongst themselves, who should execute their
Judgments, when they had no power to arme their Officers? It remaineth
therefore, that there could be no certaine maintenance assigned to any
Pastors of the Church, but by the whole Congregation; and then onely,
when their Decrees should have the force (not onely of Canons, but also)
of Laws; which Laws could not be made, but by Emperours, Kings, or
other Civill Soveraignes. The Right of Tythes in Moses Law, could not be
applyed to the then Ministers of the Gospell; because Moses and the High
Priests were the Civill Soveraigns of the people under God, whose
Kingdom amongst the Jews was present; whereas the Kingdome of God by
Christ is yet to come.
Hitherto hath been shewn what the Pastors of the Church are; what are
the points of their Commission (as that they were to Preach, to Teach, to
Baptize, to be Presidents in their severall Congregations;) what is
Ecclesiasticall Censure, viz. Excommunication, that is to say, in those

places where Christianity was forbidden by the Civill Laws, a putting of
themselves out of the company of the Excommunicate, and where
Christianity was by the Civill Law commanded, a putting the
Excommunicate out of the Congregations of Christians; who elected the
Pastors and Ministers of the Church, (that it was, the Congregation); who
consecrated and blessed them, (that it was the Pastor); what was their due
revenue, (that it was none but their own possessions, and their own labour,
and the voluntary contributions of devout and gratefull Christians). We are
to consider now, what Office those persons have, who being Civill
Soveraignes, have embraced also the Christian Faith.

The Civill Soveraign Being A Christian Hath The
Right Of Appointing
Pastors
And first, we are to remember, that the Right of Judging what Doctrines
are fit for Peace, and to be taught the Subjects, is in all Common-wealths
inseparably annexed (as hath been already proved cha. 18.) to the
Soveraign Power Civill, whether it be in one Man, or in one Assembly of
men. For it is evident to the meanest capacity, that mens actions are
derived from the opinions they have of the Good, or Evill, which from
those actions redound unto themselves; and consequently, men that are
once possessed of an opinion, that their obedience to the Soveraign Power,
will bee more hurtfull to them, than their disobedience, will disobey the
Laws, and thereby overthrow the Common-wealth, and introduce
confusion, and Civill war; for the avoiding whereof, all Civill Government
was ordained. And therefore in all Common-wealths of the Heathen, the
Soveraigns have had the name of Pastors of the People, because there was
no Subject that could lawfully Teach the people, but by their permission
and authority.
This Right of the Heathen Kings, cannot bee thought taken from them
by their conversion to the Faith of Christ; who never ordained, that Kings
for beleeving in him, should be deposed, that is, subjected to any but
himself, or (which is all one) be deprived of the power necessary for the
conservation of Peace amongst their Subjects, and for their defence
against foraign Enemies. And therefore Christian Kings are still the
Supreme Pastors of their people, and have power to ordain what Pastors
they please, to teach the Church, that is, to teach the People committed to
their charge.
Again, let the right of choosing them be (as before the conversion of
Kings) in the Church, for so it was in the time of the Apostles themselves
(as hath been shewn already in this chapter); even so also the Right will be
in the Civill Soveraign, Christian. For in that he is a Christian, he allowes

the Teaching; and in that he is the Soveraign (which is as much as to say,
the Church by Representation,) the Teachers hee elects, are elected by the
Church. And when an Assembly of Christians choose their Pastor in a
Christian Common-wealth, it is the Soveraign that electeth him, because
tis done by his Authority; In the same manner, as when a Town choose
their Maior, it is the act of him that hath the Soveraign Power: For every
act done, is the act of him, without whose consent it is invalid. And
therefore whatsoever examples may be drawn out of History, concerning
the Election of Pastors, by the People, or by the Clergy, they are no
arguments against the Right of any Civill Soveraign, because they that
elected them did it by his Authority.
Seeing then in every Christian Common-wealth, the Civill Soveraign is
the Supreme Pastor, to whose charge the whole flock of his Subjects is
committed, and consequently that it is by his authority, that all other
Pastors are made, and have power to teach, and performe all other
Pastorall offices; it followeth also, that it is from the Civill Soveraign, that
all other Pastors derive their right of Teaching, Preaching, and other
functions pertaining to that Office; and that they are but his Ministers; in
the same manner as the Magistrates of Towns, Judges in Courts of Justice,
and Commanders of Armies, are all but Ministers of him that is the
Magistrate of the whole Common-wealth, Judge of all Causes, and
Commander of the whole Militia, which is alwayes the Civill Soveraign.
And the reason hereof, is not because they that Teach, but because they
that are to Learn, are his Subjects. For let it be supposed, that a Christian
King commit the Authority of Ordaining Pastors in his Dominions to
another King, (as divers Christian Kings allow that power to the Pope;) he
doth not thereby constitute a Pastor over himself, nor a Soveraign Pastor
over his People; for that were to deprive himself of the Civill Power;
which depending on the opinion men have of their Duty to him, and the
fear they have of Punishment in another world, would depend also on the
skill, and loyalty of Doctors, who are no lesse subject, not only to
Ambition, but also to Ignorance, than any other sort of men. So that where
a stranger hath authority to appoint Teachers, it is given him by the
Soveraign in whose Dominions he teacheth. Christian Doctors are our
Schoolmasters to Christianity; But Kings are Fathers of Families, and may
receive Schoolmasters for their Subjects from the recommendation of a
stranger, but not from the command; especially when the ill teaching them

shall redound to the great and manifest profit of him that recommends
them: nor can they be obliged to retain them, longer than it is for the
Publique good; the care of which they stand so long charged withall, as
they retain any other essentiall Right of the Soveraignty.

The Pastorall Authority Of Soveraigns Only Is De
Jure Divino,
That Of Other Pastors Is Jure Civili
If a man therefore should ask a Pastor, in the execution of his Office, as
the chief Priests and Elders of the people (Mat. 21.23.) asked our Saviour,
"By what authority dost thou these things, and who gave thee this
authority:" he can make no other just Answer, but that he doth it by the
Authority of the Common-wealth, given him by the King, or Assembly
that representeth it. All Pastors, except the Supreme, execute their charges
in the Right, that is by the Authority of the Civill Soveraign, that is, Jure
Civili. But the King, and every other Soveraign executeth his Office of
Supreme Pastor, by immediate Authority from God, that is to say, In Gods
Right, or Jure Divino. And therefore none but Kings can put into their
Titles (a mark of their submission to God onely ) Dei Gratia Rex, &c.
Bishops ought to say in the beginning of their Mandates, "By the favour of
the Kings Majesty, Bishop of such a Diocesse;" or as Civill Ministers, "In
his Majesties Name." For in saying, Divina Providentia, which is the same
with Dei Gratia, though disguised, they deny to have received their
authority from the Civill State; and sliely slip off the Collar of their Civill
Subjection, contrary to the unity and defence of the Common-wealth.

Christian Kings Have Power To Execute All
Manner Of Pastoral Function
But if every Christian Soveraign be the Supreme Pastor of his own
Subjects, it seemeth that he hath also the Authority, not only to Preach
(which perhaps no man will deny;) but also to Baptize, and to Administer
the Sacrament of the Lords Supper; and to Consecrate both Temples, and
Pastors to Gods service; which most men deny; partly because they use not
to do it; and partly because the Administration of Sacraments, and
Consecration of Persons, and Places to holy uses, requireth the Imposition
of such mens hands, as by the like Imposition successively from the time
of the Apostles have been ordained to the like Ministery. For proof
therefore that Christian Kings have power to Baptize, and to Consecrate, I
am to render a reason, both why they use not to doe it, and how, without
the ordinary ceremony of Imposition of hands, they are made capable of
doing it, when they will.
There is no doubt but any King, in case he were skilfull in the Sciences,
might by the same Right of his Office, read Lectures of them himself, by
which he authorizeth others to read them in the Universities.
Neverthelesse, because the care of the summe of the businesse of the
Common-wealth taketh up his whole time, it were not convenient for him
to apply himself in Person to that particular. A King may also if he please,
sit in Judgment, to hear and determine all manner of Causes, as well as
give others authority to doe it in his name; but that the charge that lyeth
upon him of Command and Government, constrain him to bee continually
at the Helm, and to commit the Ministeriall Offices to others under him.
In the like manner our Saviour (who surely had power to Baptize)
Baptized none himselfe, but sent his Apostles and Disciples to Baptize.
(John 4.2.) So also S. Paul, by the necessity of Preaching in divers and far
distant places, Baptized few: Amongst all the Corinthians he Baptized
only Crispus, Cajus, and Stephanus; (1 Cor.1.14,16.) and the reason was,
because his principall Charge was to Preach. (1 Cor. 1.17.) Whereby it is
manifest, that the greater Charge, (such as is the Government of the
Church,) is a dispensation for the lesse. The reason therefore why

Christian Kings use not to Baptize, is evident, and the same, for which at
this day there are few Baptized by Bishops, and by the Pope fewer.
And as concerning Imposition of Hands, whether it be needfull, for the
authorizing of a King to Baptize, and Consecrate, we may consider thus.
Imposition of Hands, was a most ancient publique ceremony amongst
the Jews, by which was designed, and made certain, the person, or other
thing intended in a mans prayer, blessing, sacrifice, consecration,
condemnation, or other speech. So Jacob in blessing the children of Joseph
(Gen. 48.14.) "Laid his right Hand on Ephraim the younger, and his left
Hand on Manasseh the first born;" and this he did Wittingly (though they
were so presented to him by Joseph, as he was forced in doing it to stretch
out his arms acrosse) to design to whom he intended the greater blessing.
So also in the sacrificing of the Burnt offering, Aaron is commanded
(Exod. 29.10.) "to Lay his Hands on the head of the bullock;" and (ver. 15.)
"to Lay his Hand on the head of the ramme." The same is also said again,
Levit. 1.4. & 8.14. Likewise Moses when he ordained Joshua to be Captain
of the Israelites, that is, consecrated him to Gods service, (Numb. 27.23.)
"Laid his hands upon him, and gave him his Charge," designing and
rendring certain, who it was they were to obey in war. And in the
consecration of the Levites (Numb. 8.10.) God commanded that "the
Children of Israel should Put their Hands upon the Levites." And in the
condemnation of him that had blasphemed the Lord (Levit. 24.14.) God
commanded that "all that heard him should Lay their Hands on his head,
and that all the Congregation should stone him." And why should they
only that heard him, Lay their Hands upon him, and not rather a Priest,
Levite, or other Minister of Justice, but that none else were able to design,
and demonstrate to the eyes of the Congregation, who it was that had
blasphemed, and ought to die? And to design a man, or any other thing, by
the Hand to the Eye is lesse subject to mistake, than when it is done to the
Eare by a Name.
And so much was this ceremony observed, that in blessing the whole
Congregation at once, which cannot be done by Laying on of Hands, yet
"Aaron (Levit. 9.22.) did lift up his Hand towards the people when he
blessed them." And we read also of the like ceremony of Consecration of
Temples amongst the Heathen, as that the Priest laid his Hands on some
post of the Temple, all the while he was uttering the words of

Consecration. So naturall it is to design any individuall thing, rather by the
Hand, to assure the Eyes, than by Words to inform the Eare in matters of
Gods Publique service.
This ceremony was not therefore new in our Saviours time. For Jairus
(Mark 5.23.) whose daughter was sick, besought our Saviour (not to heal
her, but) "to Lay his Hands upon her, that shee might bee healed." And
(Matth. 19.13.) "they brought unto him little children, that hee should Put
his Hands on them, and Pray."
According to this ancient Rite, the Apostles, and Presbyters, and the
Presbytery it self, Laid Hands on them whom they ordained Pastors, and
withall prayed for them that they might receive the Holy Ghost; and that
not only once, but sometimes oftner, when a new occasion was presented:
but the end was still the same, namely a punctuall, and religious
designation of the person, ordained either to the Pastorall Charge in
general, or to a particular Mission: so (Act. 6.6.) "The Apostles Prayed,
and Laid their Hands" on the seven Deacons; which was done, not to give
them the Holy Ghost, (for they were full of the Holy Ghost before thy were
chosen, as appeareth immediately before, verse 3.) but to design them to
that Office. And after Philip the Deacon had converted certain persons in
Samaria, Peter and John went down (Act. 8.17.)" and laid their Hands on
them, and they received the Holy Ghost." And not only an Apostle, but a
Presbyter had this power: For S. Paul adviseth Timothy (1 Tim. 5.22.)
"Lay Hands suddenly on no man;" that is, designe no man rashly to the
Office of a Pastor. The whole Presbytery Laid their Hands on Timothy, as
we read 1 Tim. 4.14. but this is to be understood, as that some did it by the
appointment of the Presbytery, and most likely their Proestos, or
Prolocutor, which it may be was St. Paul himself. For in his 2 Epist. to
Tim. ver. 6. he saith to him, "Stirre up the gift of God which is in thee, by
the Laying on of my Hands:" where note by the way, that by the Holy
ghost, is not meant the third Person in the Trinity, but the Gifts necessary
to the Pastorall Office. We read also, that St. Paul had Imposition of Hands
twice; once from Ananias at Damascus (Acts 9.17,18.) at the time of his
Baptisme; and again (Acts 13.3.) at Antioch, when he was first sent out to
Preach. The use then of this ceremony considered in the Ordination of
Pastors, was to design the Person to whom they gave such Power. But if
there had been then any Christian, that had had the Power of Teaching
before; the Baptizing of him, that is the making of him a Christian, had

given him no new Power, but had onely caused him to preach true
Doctrine, that is, to use his Power aright; and therefore the Imposition of
Hands had been unnecessary; Baptisme it selfe had been sufficient. But
every Soveraign, before Christianity, had the power of Teaching, and
Ordaining Teachers; and therefore Christianity gave them no new Right,
but only directed them in the way of teaching truth; and consequently they
needed no Imposition of Hands (besides that which is done in Baptisme) to
authorize them to exercise any part of the Pastorall Function, as namely, to
Baptize, and Consecrate. And in the Old Testament, though the Priest only
had right to Consecrate, during the time that the Soveraignty was in the
High Priest; yet it was not so when the Soveraignty was in the King: For
we read (1 Kings 8.) That Solomon Blessed the People, Consecrated the
Temple, and pronounced that Publique Prayer, which is the pattern now for
Consecration of all Christian Churches, and Chappels: whereby it appears,
he had not only the right of Ecclesiasticall Government; but also of
exercising Ecclesiasticall Functions.

The Civill Soveraigne If A Christian, Is Head Of
The Church
In His Own Dominions
From this consolidation of the Right Politique, and Ecclesiastique in
Christian Soveraigns, it is evident, they have all manner of Power over
their Subjects, that can be given to man, for the government of mens
externall actions, both in Policy, and Religion; and may make such Laws,
as themselves shall judge fittest, for the government of their own Subjects,
both as they are the Common-wealth, and as they are the Church: for both
State, and Church are the same men.
If they please therefore, they may (as many Christian Kings now doe)
commit the government of their Subjects in matters of Religion to the
Pope; but then the Pope is in that point Subordinate to them, and
exerciseth that Charge in anothers Dominion Jure Civili, in the Right of
the Civill Soveraign; not Jure Divino, in Gods Right; and may therefore be
discharged of that Office, when the Soveraign for the good of his Subjects
shall think it necessary. They may also if they please, commit the care of
Religion to one Supreme Pastor, or to an Assembly of Pastors; and give
them what power over the Church, or one over another, they think most
convenient; and what titles of honor, as of Bishops, Archbishops, Priests,
or Presbyters, they will; and make such Laws for their maintenance, either
by Tithes, or otherwise, as they please, so they doe it out of a sincere
conscience, of which God onely is the Judge. It is the Civill Soveraign,
that is to appoint Judges, and Interpreters of the Canonicall Scriptures; for
it is he that maketh them Laws. It is he also that giveth strength to
Excommunications; which but for such Laws and Punishments, as may
humble obstinate Libertines, and reduce them to union with the rest of the
Church, would bee contemned. In summe, he hath the Supreme Power in
all causes, as well Ecclesiasticall, as Civill, as far as concerneth actions,
and words, for these onely are known, and may be accused; and of that
which cannot be accused, there is no Judg at all, but God, that knoweth the
heart. And these Rights are incident to all Soveraigns, whether Monarchs,

or Assemblies: for they that are the Representants of a Christian People,
are Representants of the Church: for a Church, and a Common-wealth of
Christian People, are the same thing.

Cardinal Bellarmines Books De Summo Pontifice
Considered
Though this that I have here said, and in other places of this Book, seem
cleer enough for the asserting of the Supreme Ecclesiasticall Power to
Christian Soveraigns; yet because the Pope of Romes challenge to that
Power universally, hath been maintained chiefly, and I think as strongly as
is possible, by Cardinall Bellarmine, in his Controversie De Summo
Pontifice; I have thought it necessary, as briefly as I can, to examine the
grounds, and strength of his Discourse.

The First Book
Of five Books he hath written of this subject, the first containeth three
Questions: One, Which is simply the best government, Monarchy,
Aristocracy, or Democracy; and concludeth for neither, but for a
government mixt of all there: Another, which of these is the best
Government of the Church; and concludeth for the mixt, but which should
most participate of Monarchy: the third, whether in this mixt Monarchy,
St. Peter had the place of Monarch. Concerning his first Conclusion, I have
already sufficiently proved (chapt. 18.) that all Governments which men
are bound to obey, are Simple, and Absolute. In Monarchy there is but One
Man Supreme; and all other men that have any kind of Power in the State,
have it by his Commission, during his pleasure; and execute it in his
name: And in Aristocracy, and Democracy, but One Supreme Assembly,
with the same Power that in Monarchy belongeth to the Monarch, which is
not a Mixt, but an Absolute Soveraignty. And of the three sorts, which is
the best, is not to be disputed, where any one of them is already
established; but the present ought alwaies to be preferred, maintained, and
accounted best; because it is against both the Law of Nature, and the
Divine positive Law, to doe any thing tending to the subversion thereof.
Besides, it maketh nothing to the Power of any Pastor, (unlesse he have the
Civill Soveraignty,) what kind of Government is the best; because their
Calling is not to govern men by Commandement, but to teach them, and
perswade them by Arguments, and leave it to them to consider, whether
they shall embrace, or reject the Doctrine taught. For Monarchy,
Aristocracy, and Democracy, do mark out unto us three sorts of
Soveraigns, not of Pastors; or, as we may say, three sorts of Masters of
Families, not three sorts of Schoolmasters for their children.
And therefore the second Conclusion, concerning the best form of
Government of the Church, is nothing to the question of the Popes Power
without his own Dominions: For in all other Common-wealths his Power
(if hee have any at all) is that of the Schoolmaster onely, and not of the
Master of the Family.

For the third Conclusion, which is, that St. Peter was Monarch of the
Church, he bringeth for his chiefe argument the place of S. Matth. (chap.
16.18, 19.) "Thou art Peter, And upon this rock I will build my Church,
&c. And I will give thee the keyes of Heaven; whatsoever thou shalt bind
on Earth, shall be bound in Heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt loose on
Earth, shall be loosed in Heaven." Which place well considered, proveth
no more, but that the Church of Christ hath for foundation one onely
Article; namely, that which Peter in the name of all the Apostles
professing, gave occasion to our Saviour to speak the words here cited;
which that wee may cleerly understand, we are to consider, that our
Saviour preached by himself, by John Baptist, and by his Apostles, nothing
but this Article of Faith, "that he was the Christ;" all other Articles
requiring faith no otherwise, than as founded on that. John began first,
(Mat. 3.2.) preaching only this, "The Kingdome of God is at hand." Then
our Saviour himself (Mat. 4.17.) preached the same: And to his Twelve
Apostles, when he gave them their Commission (Mat. 10.7.) there is no
mention of preaching any other Article but that. This was the fundamentall
Article, that is the Foundation of the Churches Faith. Afterwards the
Apostles being returned to him, he asketh them all, (Mat. 16.13) not Peter
onely, "Who men said he was;" and they answered, that "some said he was
John the Baptist, some Elias, and others Jeremias, or one of the Prophets:"
Then (ver. 15.) he asked them all again, (not Peter onely) "Whom say yee
that I am?" Therefore Peter answered (for them all) "Thou art Christ, the
Son of the Living God;" which I said is the Foundation of the Faith of the
whole Church; from which our Saviour takes the occasion of saying,
"Upon this stone I will build my Church;" By which it is manifest, that by
the Foundation-Stone of the Church, was meant the Fundamentall Article
of the Churches Faith. But why then (will some object) doth our Saviour
interpose these words, "Thou art Peter"? If the originall of this text had
been rigidly translated, the reason would easily have appeared: We are
therefore to consider, that the Apostle Simon, was surnamed Stone, (which
is the signification of the Syriacke word Cephas, and of the Greek word
Petrus). Our Saviour therefore after the confession of that Fundamentall
Article, alluding to his name, said (as if it were in English) thus, Thou art
"Stone," and upon this Stone I will build my Church: which is as much as
to say, this Article, that "I am the Christ," is the Foundation of all the Faith
I require in those that are to bee members of my Church: Neither is this

allusion to a name, an unusuall thing in common speech: But it had been a
strange, and obscure speech, if our Saviour intending to build his Church
on the Person of St. Peter, had said, "thou art a Stone, and upon this Stone
I will build my Church," when it was so obvious without ambiguity to
have said, "I will build my Church on thee; and yet there had been still the
same allusion to his name.
And for the following words, "I will give thee the Keyes of Heaven,
&c." it is no more than what our Saviour gave also to all the rest of his
Disciples (Matth. 18.18.) "Whatsoever yee shall bind on Earth, shall be
bound in Heaven. And whatsoever ye shall loose on Earth, shall be loosed
in Heaven." But howsoever this be interpreted, there is no doubt but the
Power here granted belongs to all Supreme Pastors; such as are all
Christian Civill Soveraignes in their own Dominions. In so much, as if St.
Peter, or our Saviour himself had converted any of them to beleeve him,
and to acknowledge his Kingdome; yet because his Kingdome is not of
this world, he had left the supreme care of converting his subjects to none
but him; or else hee must have deprived him of the Soveraignty, to which
the Right of Teaching is inseparably annexed. And thus much in refutation
of his first Book, wherein hee would prove St. Peter to have been the
Monarch Universall of the Church, that is to say, of all the Christians in
the world.

The Second Book
The second Book hath two Conclusions: One, that S. Peter was Bishop
of Rome, and there dyed: The other, that the Popes of Rome are his
Successors. Both which have been disputed by others. But supposing them
to be true; yet if by Bishop of Rome bee understood either the Monarch of
the Church, or the Supreme Pastor of it; not Silvester, but Constantine
(who was the first Christian Emperour) was that Bishop; and as
Constantine, so all other Christian Emperors were of Right supreme
Bishops of the Roman Empire; I say of the Roman Empire, not of all
Christendome: For other Christian Soveraigns had the same Right in their
severall Territories, as to an Office essentially adhaerent to their
Soveraignty. Which shall serve for answer to his second Book.

The Third Book
In the third Book, he handleth the question whether the Pope be
Antichrist. For my part, I see no argument that proves he is so, in that
sense that Scripture useth the name: nor will I take any argument from the
quality of Antichrist, to contradict the Authority he exerciseth, or hath
heretofore exercised in the Dominions of any other Prince, or State.
It is evident that the Prophets of the Old Testament foretold, and the
Jews expected a Messiah, that is, a Christ, that should re-establish
amongst them the kingdom of God, which had been rejected by them in
the time of Samuel, when they required a King after the manner of other
Nations. This expectation of theirs, made them obnoxious to the Imposture
of all such, as had both the ambition to attempt the attaining of the
Kingdome, and the art to deceive the People by counterfeit miracles, by
hypocriticall life, or by orations and doctrine plausible. Our Saviour
therefore, and his Apostles forewarned men of False Prophets, and of False
Christs. False Christs, are such as pretend to be the Christ, but are not, and
are called properly Antichrists, in such sense, as when there happeneth a
Schisme in the Church by the election of two Popes, the one calleth the
other Antipapa, or the false Pope. And therefore Antichrist in the proper
signification hath two essentiall marks; One, that he denyeth Jesus to be
Christ; and another that he professeth himselfe to bee Christ. The first
Mark is set down by S. John in his 1 Epist. 4. ch. 3. ver. "Every Spirit that
confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is not of God; And
this is the Spirit of Antichrist." The other Mark is expressed in the words
of our Saviour, (Mat. 24.5.) "Many shall come in my name, saying, I am
Christ;" and again, "If any man shall say unto you, Loe, here is Christ,
there is Christ beleeve it not." And therefore Antichrist must be a False
Christ, that is, some one of them that shall pretend themselves to be
Christ. And out of these two Marks, "to deny Jesus to be the Christ," and to
"affirm himselfe to be the Christ," it followeth, that he must also be an
"Adversary of the true Christ," which is another usuall signification of the
word Antichrist. But of these many Antichrists, there is one speciall one,
O Antichristos, The Antichrist, or Antichrist definitely, as one certaine

person; not indefinitely An Antichrist. Now seeing the Pope of Rome,
neither pretendeth himself, nor denyeth Jesus to be the Christ, I perceive
not how he can be called Antichrist; by which word is not meant, one that
falsely pretendeth to be His Lieutenant, or Vicar Generall, but to be Hee.
There is also some Mark of the time of this speciall Antichrist, as (Mat.
24.15.) when that abominable Destroyer, spoken of by Daniel, (Dan. 9.
27.) shall stand in the Holy place, and such tribulation as was not since the
beginning of the world, nor ever shall be again, insomuch as if it were to
last long, (ver. 22.) "no flesh could be saved; but for the elects sake those
days shall be shortened" (made fewer). But that tribulation is not yet
come; for it is to be followed immediately (ver. 29.) by a darkening of the
Sun and Moon, a falling of the Stars, a concussion of the Heavens, and the
glorious coming again of our Saviour, in the cloudes. And therefore The
Antichrist is not yet come; whereas, many Popes are both come and gone.
It is true, the Pope in taking upon him to give Laws to all Christian Kings,
and Nations, usurpeth a Kingdome in this world, which Christ took not on
him: but he doth it not As Christ, but as For Christ, wherein there is
nothing of the Antichrist.

The Fourth Book
In the fourth Book, to prove the Pope to be the supreme Judg in all
questions of Faith and Manners, (which is as much as to be the absolute
Monarch of all Christians in the world,) be bringeth three Propositions:
The first, that his Judgments are Infallible: The second, that he can make
very Laws, and punish those that observe them not: The third, that our
Saviour conferred all Jurisdiction Ecclesiasticall on the Pope of Rome.

Texts For The Infallibility Of The Popes
Judgement In Points Of Faith
For the Infallibility of his Judgments, he alledgeth the Scriptures: and
first, that of Luke 22.31. "Simon, Simon, Satan hath desired you that hee
may sift you as wheat; but I have prayed for thee, that thy faith faile not;
and when thou art converted, strengthen thy Brethren." This, according to
Bellarmines exposition, is, that Christ gave here to Simon Peter two
priviledges: one, that neither his Faith should fail, neither he, nor any of
his successors should ever define any point concerning Faith, or Manners
erroneously, or contrary to the definition of a former Pope: Which is a
strange, and very much strained interpretation. But he that with attention
readeth that chapter, shall find there is no place in the whole Scripture,
that maketh more against the Popes Authority, than this very place. The
Priests and Scribes seeking to kill our Saviour at the Passeover, and Judas
possessed with a resolution to betray him, and the day of killing the
Passeover being come, our Saviour celebrated the same with his Apostles,
which he said, till the Kingdome of God was come hee would doe no
more; and withall told them, that one of them was to betray him: Hereupon
they questioned, which of them it should be; and withall (seeing the next
Passeover their Master would celebrate should be when he was King)
entred into a contention, who should then be the greater man. Our Saviour
therefore told them, that the Kings of the Nations had Dominion over their
Subjects, and are called by a name (in Hebrew) that signifies Bountifull;
but I cannot be so to you, you must endeavour to serve one another; I
ordain you a Kingdome, but it is such as my Father hath ordained mee; a
Kingdome that I am now to purchase with my blood, and not to possesse
till my second coming; then yee shall eat and drink at my Table, and sit on
Thrones, judging the twelve Tribes of Israel: And then addressing himself
to St. Peter, he saith, Simon, Simon, Satan seeks by suggesting a present
domination, to weaken your faith of the future; but I have prayed for thee,
that thy faith shall not fail; Thou therefore (Note this,) being converted,
and understanding my Kingdome as of another world, confirm the same
faith in thy Brethren: To which S. Peter answered (as one that no more

expected any authority in this world) "Lord I am ready to goe with thee,
not onely to Prison, but to Death." Whereby it is manifest, S. Peter had not
onely no jurisdiction given him in this world, but a charge to teach all the
other Apostles, that they also should have none. And for the Infallibility of
St. Peters sentence definitive in matter of Faith, there is no more to be
attributed to it out of this Text, than that Peter should continue in the
beleef of this point, namely, that Christ should come again, and possesse
the Kingdome at the day of Judgement; which was not given by the Text to
all his Successors; for wee see they claim it in the World that now is.
The second place is that of Matth. 16. "Thou art Peter, and upon this
rocke I will build my Church, and the gates of Hell shall not prevail
against it." By which (as I have already shewn in this chapter) is proved no
more, than that the gates of Hell shall not prevail against the confession of
Peter, which gave occasion to that speech; namely this, That Jesus Is
Christ The Sonne Of God.
The third text is John 21. ver. 16,17. "Feed my sheep;" which contains
no more but a Commission of Teaching: And if we grant the rest of the
Apostles to be contained in that name of Sheep; then it is the supreme
Power of Teaching: but it was onely for the time that there were no
Christian Soveraigns already possessed of that Supremacy. But I have
already proved, that Christian Soveraignes are in their owne Dominions
the supreme Pastors, and instituted thereto, by vertue of their being
Baptized, though without other Imposition of Hands. For such imposition
being a Ceremony of designing the person, is needlesse, when hee is
already designed to the Power of Teaching what Doctrine he will, by his
institution to an Absolute Power over his Subjects. For as I have proved
before, Soveraigns are supreme Teachers (in generall) by their Office and
therefore oblige themselves (by their Baptisme) to teach the Doctrine of
Christ: And when they suffer others to teach their people, they doe it at the
perill of their own souls; for it is at the hands of the Heads of Families that
God will require the account of the instruction of his Children and
Servants. It is of Abraham himself, not of a hireling, that God saith (Gen.
18.19) "I know him that he will command his Children, and his houshold
after him, that they keep the way of the Lord, and do justice and
judgement.

The fourth place is that of Exod. 28.30. "Thou shalt put in the
Breastplate of Judgment, the Urim and the Thummin:" which hee saith is
interpreted by the Septuagint, delosin kai aletheian, that is, Evidence and
Truth: And thence concludeth, God had given Evidence, and Truth, (which
is almost infallibility,) to the High Priest. But be it Evidence and Truth it
selfe that was given; or be it but Admonition to the Priest to endeavour to
inform himself cleerly, and give judgment uprightly; yet in that it was
given to the High Priest, it was given to the Civill Soveraign: For next
under God was the High Priest in the Common-wealth of Israel; and is an
argument for Evidence and Truth, that is, for the Ecclesiasticall
Supremacy of Civill Soveraigns over their own Subjects, against the
pretended Power of the Pope. These are all the Texts hee bringeth for the
Infallibility of the Judgement of the Pope, in point of Faith.

Texts For The Same In Point Of Manners
For the Infallibility of his Judgment concerning Manners, hee bringeth
one Text, which is that of John 16.13. "When the Spirit of truth is come,
hee will lead you into all truth" where (saith he) by All Truth, is meant, at
least, All Truth Necessary To Salvation. But with this mitigation, he
attributeth no more Infallibility to the Pope, than to any man that
professeth Christianity, and is not to be damned: For if any man erre in any
point, wherein not to erre is necessary to Salvation, it is impossible he
should be saved; for that onely is necessary to Salvation, without which to
be saved is impossible. What points these are, I shall declare out of the
Scripture in the Chapter following. In this place I say no more, but that
though it were granted, the Pope could not possibly teach any error at all,
yet doth not this entitle him to any Jurisdiction in the Dominions of
another Prince, unlesse we shall also say, a man is obliged in conscience to
set on work upon all occasions the best workman, even then also when he
hath formerly promised his work to another.
Besides the Text, he argueth from Reason, thus, If the Pope could erre in
necessaries, then Christ hath not sufficiently provided for the Churches
Salvation; because he hath commanded her to follow the Popes directions.
But this Reason is invalid, unlesse he shew when, and where Christ
commanded that, or took at all any notice of a Pope: Nay granting
whatsoever was given to S. Peter was given to the Pope; yet seeing there is
in the Scripture no command to any man to obey St. Peter, no man can bee
just, that obeyeth him, when his commands are contrary to those of his
lawfull Soveraign.
Lastly, it hath not been declared by the Church, nor by the Pope
himselfe, that he is the Civill Soveraign of all the Christians in the world;
and therefore all Christians are not bound to acknowledge his Jurisdiction
in point of Manners. For the Civill Soveraignty, and supreme Judicature in
controversies of Manners, are the same thing: And the Makers of Civill
Laws, are not onely Declarers, but also Makers of the justice, and injustice
of actions; there being nothing in mens Manners that makes them
righteous, or unrighteous, but their conformity with the Law of the

Soveraign. And therefore when the Pope challengeth Supremacy in
controversies of Manners, hee teacheth men to disobey the Civill
Soveraign; which is an erroneous Doctrine, contrary to the many precepts
of our Saviour and his Apostles, delivered to us in the Scripture.
To prove the Pope has Power to make Laws, he alledgeth many places;
as first, Deut. 17.12. "The man that will doe presumptuously, and will not
hearken unto the Priest, (that standeth to Minister there before the Lord
thy God, or unto the Judge,) even that man shall die, and thou shalt put
away the evill from Israel." For answer whereunto, we are to remember
that the High Priest (next and immediately under God) was the Civill
Soveraign; and all Judges were to be constituted by him. The words
alledged sound therefore thus. "The man that will presume to disobey the
Civill Soveraign for the time being, or any of his Officers in the execution
of their places, that man shall die, &c." which is cleerly for the Civill
Soveraignty, against the Universall power of the Pope.
Secondly, he alledgeth that of Matth. 16. "Whatsoever yee shall bind,
&c." and interpreteth it for such Binding as is attributed (Matth. 23.4.) to
the Scribes and Pharisees, "They bind heavy burthens, and grievous to be
born, and lay them on mens shoulders;" by which is meant (he sayes)
Making of Laws; and concludes thence, the Pope can make Laws. But this
also maketh onely for the Legislative power of Civill Soveraigns: For the
Scribes, and Pharisees sat in Moses Chaire, but Moses next under God was
Soveraign of the People of Israel: and therefore our Saviour commanded
them to doe all that they should say, but not all that they should do. That
is, to obey their Laws, but not follow their Example.
The third place, is John 21.16. "Feed my sheep;" which is not a Power to
make Laws, but a command to Teach. Making Laws belongs to the Lord of
the Family; who by his owne discretion chooseth his Chaplain, as also a
Schoolmaster to Teach his children.
The fourth place John 20.21. is against him. The words are, "As my
Father sent me, so send I you." But our Saviour was sent to Redeem (by
his Death) such as should Beleeve; and by his own, and his Apostles
preaching to prepare them for their entrance into his Kingdome; which he
himself saith, is not of this world, and hath taught us to pray for the
coming of it hereafter, though hee refused (Acts 1.6,7.) to tell his Apostles
when it should come; and in which, when it comes, the twelve Apostles

shall sit on twelve Thrones (every one perhaps as high as that of St. Peter)
to judge the twelve tribes of Israel. Seeing then God the Father sent not
our Saviour to make Laws in this present world, wee may conclude from
the Text, that neither did our Saviour send S. Peter to make Laws here, but
to perswade men to expect his second comming with a stedfast faith; and
in the mean time, if Subjects, to obey their Princes; and if Princes, both to
beleeve it themselves, and to do their best to make their Subjects doe the
same; which is the Office of a Bishop. Therefore this place maketh most
strongly for the joining of the Ecclesiasticall Supremacy to the Civill
Soveraignty, contrary to that which Cardinall Bellarmine alledgeth it for.
The fift place is Acts 15.28. "It hath seemed good to the Holy Spirit, and
to us, to lay upon you no greater burden, than these necessary things, that
yee abstaine from meats offered to Idols, and from bloud, and from things
strangled, and from fornication." Here hee notes the word Laying Of
Burdens for the Legislative Power. But who is there, that reading this Text,
can say, this stile of the Apostles may not as properly be used in giving
Counsell, as in making Laws? The stile of a Law is, We Command: But,
We Think Good, is the ordinary stile of them, that but give Advice; and
they lay a Burthen that give Advice, though it bee conditionall, that is, if
they to whom they give it, will attain their ends: And such is the Burthen,
of abstaining from things strangled, and from bloud; not absolute, but in
case they will not erre. I have shewn before (chap. 25.) that Law, is
distinguished from Counsell, in this, that the reason of a Law, is taken
from the designe, and benefit of him that prescribeth it; but the reason of a
Counsell, from the designe, and benefit of him, to whom the Counsell is
given. But here, the Apostles aime onely at the benefit of the converted
Gentiles, namely their Salvation; not at their own benefit; for having done
their endeavour, they shall have their reward, whether they be obeyed, or
not. And therefore the Acts of this Councell, were not Laws, but Counsells.
The sixt place is that of Rom. 13. "Let every Soul be subject to the
Higher Powers, for there is no Power but of God;" which is meant, he saith
not onely of Secular, but also of Ecclesiasticall Princes. To which I
answer, first, that there are no Ecclesiasticall Princes but those that are
also Civill Soveraignes; and their Principalities exceed not the compasse
of their Civill Soveraignty; without those bounds though they may be
received for Doctors, they cannot be acknowledged for Princes. For if the
Apostle had meant, we should be subject both to our own Princes, and also

to the Pope, he had taught us a doctrine, which Christ himself hath told us
is impossible, namely, "to serve two Masters." And though the Apostle say
in another place, "I write these things being absent, lest being present I
should use sharpnesse, according to the Power which the Lord hath given
me;" it is not, that he challenged a Power either to put to death, imprison,
banish, whip, or fine any of them, which are Punishments; but onely to
Excommunicate, which (without the Civill Power) is no more but a
leaving of their company, and having no more to doe with them, than with
a Heathen man, or a Publican; which in many occasions might be a greater
pain to the Excommunicant, than to the Excommunicate.
The seventh place is 1 Cor. 4.21. "Shall I come unto you with a Rod, or
in love, and the spirit of lenity?" But here again, it is not the Power of a
Magistrate to punish offenders, that is meant by a Rod; but onely the
Power of Excommunication, which is not in its owne nature a Punishment,
but onely a Denouncing of punishment, that Christ shall inflict, when he
shall be in possession of his Kingdome, at the day of Judgment. Nor then
also shall it bee properly a Punishment, as upon a Subject that hath broken
the Law; but a Revenge, as upon an Enemy, or Revolter, that denyeth the
Right of our Saviour to the Kingdome: And therefore this proveth not the
Legislative Power of any Bishop, that has not also the Civill Power.
The eighth place is, Timothy 3.2. "A Bishop must be the husband but of
one wife, vigilant, sober, &c." which he saith was a Law. I thought that
none could make a Law in the Church, but the Monarch of the Church, St.
Peter. But suppose this Precept made by the authority of St. Peter; yet I see
no reason why to call it a Law, rather than an Advice, seeing Timothy was
not a Subject, but a Disciple of St. Paul; nor the flock under the charge of
Timothy, his Subjects in the Kingdome, but his Scholars in the Schoole of
Christ: If all the Precepts he giveth Timothy, be Laws, why is not this also
a Law, "Drink no longer water, but use a little wine for thy healths sake"?
And why are not also the Precepts of good Physitians, so many Laws? but
that it is not the Imperative manner of speaking, but an absolute
Subjection to a Person, that maketh his Precept Laws.
In like manner, the ninth place, 1 Tim. 5. 19. "Against an Elder receive
not an accusation, but before two or three Witnesses," is a wise Precept,
but not a Law.

The tenth place is, Luke 10.16. "He that heareth you, heareth mee; and
he that despiseth you, despiseth me." And there is no doubt, but he that
despiseth the Counsell of those that are sent by Christ, despiseth the
Counsell of Christ himself. But who are those now that are sent by Christ,
but such as are ordained Pastors by lawfull Authority? and who are
lawfully ordained, that are not ordained by the Soveraign Pastor? and who
is ordained by the Soveraign Pastor in a Christian Common-wealth, that is
not ordained by the authority of the Soveraign thereof? Out of this place
therefore it followeth, that he which heareth his Soveraign being a
Christian, heareth Christ; and hee that despiseth the Doctrine which his
King being a Christian, authorizeth, despiseth the Doctrine of Christ
(which is not that which Bellarmine intendeth here to prove, but the
contrary). But all this is nothing to a Law. Nay more, a Christian King, as a
Pastor, and Teacher of his Subjects, makes not thereby his Doctrines Laws.
He cannot oblige men to beleeve; though as a Civill Soveraign he may
make Laws suitable to his Doctrine, which may oblige men to certain
actions, and sometimes to such as they would not otherwise do, and which
he ought not to command; and yet when they are commanded, they are
Laws; and the externall actions done in obedience to them, without the
inward approbation, are the actions of the Soveraign, and not of the
Subject, which is in that case but as an instrument, without any motion of
his owne at all; because God hath commanded to obey them.
The eleventh, is every place, where the Apostle for Counsell, putteth
some word, by which men use to signifie Command; or calleth the
following of his Counsell, by the name of Obedience. And therefore they
are alledged out of 1 Cor. 11.2. "I commend you for keeping my Precepts
as I delivered them to you." The Greek is, "I commend you for keeping
those things I delivered to you, as I delivered them." Which is far from
signifying that they were Laws, or any thing else, but good Counsell. And
that of 1 Thess. 4.2. "You know what commandements we gave you:"
where the Greek word is paraggelias edokamen, equivalent to
paredokamen, what wee delivered to you, as in the place next before
alledged, which does not prove the Traditions of the Apostles, to be any
more than Counsells; though as is said in the 8th verse, "he that despiseth
them, despiseth not man, but God": For our Saviour himself came not to
Judge, that is, to be King in this world; but to Sacrifice himself for
Sinners, and leave Doctors in his Church, to lead, not to drive men to

Christ, who never accepteth forced actions, (which is all the Law
produceth,) but the inward conversion of the heart; which is not the work
of Laws, but of Counsell, and Doctrine.
And that of 2 Thess. 3.14. "If any man Obey not our word by this
Epistle, note that man, and have no company with him, that he may bee
ashamed": where from the word Obey, he would inferre, that this Epistle
was a Law to the Thessalonians. The Epistles of the Emperours were
indeed Laws. If therefore the Epistle of S. Paul were also a Law, they were
to obey two Masters. But the word Obey, as it is in the Greek upakouei,
signifieth Hearkening To, or Putting In Practice, not onely that which is
Commanded by him that has right to punish, but also that which is
delivered in a way of Counsell for our good; and therefore St. Paul does
not bid kill him that disobeys, nor beat, nor imprison, nor amerce him,
which Legislators may all do; but avoid his company, that he may bee
ashamed: whereby it is evident, it was not the Empire of an Apostle, but
his Reputation amongst the Faithfull, which the Christians stood in awe of.
The last place is that of Heb. 13.17. "Obey your Leaders, and submit
your selves to them, for they watch for your souls, as they that must give
account:" And here also is intended by Obedience, a following of their
Counsell: For the reason of our Obedience, is not drawn from the will and
command of our Pastors, but from our own benefit, as being the Salvation
of our Souls they watch for, and not for the Exaltation of their own Power,
and Authority. If it were meant here, that all they teach were Laws, then
not onely the Pope, but every Pastor in his Parish should have Legislative
Power. Again, they that are bound to obey, their Pastors, have no power to
examine their commands. What then shall wee say to St. John who bids us
(1 Epist. chap. 4. ver. 1.) "Not to beleeve every Spirit, but to try the Spirits
whether they are of God, because many false Prophets are gone out into
the world"? It is therefore manifest, that wee may dispute the Doctrine of
our Pastors; but no man can dispute a Law. The Commands of Civill
Soveraigns are on all sides granted to be Laws: if any else can make a Law
besides himselfe, all Common-wealth, and consequently all Peace, and
Justice must cease; which is contrary to all Laws, both Divine and
Humane. Nothing therefore can be drawn from these, or any other places
of Scripture, to prove the Decrees of the Pope, where he has not also the
Civill Soveraignty, to be Laws.

The Question Of Superiority Between The Pope And Other Bishops The
last point hee would prove, is this, "That our Saviour Christ has committed
Ecclesiasticall Jurisdiction immediately to none but the Pope." Wherein he
handleth not the Question of Supremacy between the Pope and Christian
Kings, but between the Pope and other Bishops. And first, he sayes it is
agreed, that the Jurisdiction of Bishops, is at least in the generall De Jure
Divino, that is, in the Right of God; for which he alledges S. Paul, Ephes.
4.11. where hee sayes, that Christ after his Ascension into heaven, "gave
gifts to men, some Apostles, some Prophets, and some Evangelists, and
some Pastors, and some Teachers:" And thence inferres, they have indeed
their Jurisdiction in Gods Right; but will not grant they have it
immediately from God, but derived through the Pope. But if a man may be
said to have his Jurisdiction De Jure Divino, and yet not immediately;
what lawfull Jurisdiction, though but Civill, is there in a Christian
Common-wealth, that is not also De Jure Divino? For Christian Kings
have their Civill Power from God immediately; and the Magistrates under
him exercise their severall charges in vertue of his Commission; wherein
that which they doe, is no lesse De Jure Divino Mediato, than that which
the Bishops doe, in vertue of the Popes Ordination. All lawfull Power is of
God, immediately in the Supreme Governour, and mediately in those that
have Authority under him: So that either hee must grant every Constable
in the State, to hold his Office in the Right of God; or he must not hold
that any Bishop holds his so, besides the Pope himselfe.
But this whole Dispute, whether Christ left the Jurisdiction to the Pope
onely, or to other Bishops also, if considered out of these places where the
Pope has the Civill Soveraignty, is a contention De Lana Caprina: For none
of them (where they are not Soveraigns) has any Jurisdiction at all. For
Jurisdiction is the Power of hearing and determining Causes between man
and man; and can belong to none, but him that hath the Power to prescribe
the Rules of Right and Wrong; that is, to make Laws; and with the Sword
of Justice to compell men to obey his Decisions, pronounced either by
himself, or by the Judges he ordaineth thereunto; which none can lawfully
do, but the Civill Soveraign.
Therefore when he alledgeth out of the 6 of Luke, that our Saviour
called his Disciples together, and chose twelve of them which he named
Apostles, he proveth that he Elected them (all, except Matthias, Paul and
Barnabas,) and gave them Power and Command to Preach, but not to Judge

of Causes between man and man: for that is a Power which he refused to
take upon himselfe, saying, "Who made me a Judge, or a Divider, amongst
you?" and in another place, "My Kingdome is not of this world." But hee
that hath not the Power to hear, and determine Causes between man and
man, cannot be said to have any Jurisdiction at all. And yet this hinders
not, but that our Saviour gave them Power to Preach and Baptize in all
parts of the world, supposing they were not by their own lawfull Soveraign
forbidden: For to our own Soveraigns Christ himself, and his Apostles
have in sundry places expressely commanded us in all things to be
obedient.
The arguments by which he would prove, that Bishops receive their
Jurisdiction from the Pope (seeing the Pope in the Dominions of other
Princes hath no Jurisdiction himself,) are all in vain. Yet because they
prove, on the contrary, that all Bishops receive Jurisdiction when they have
it from their Civill Soveraigns, I will not omit the recitall of them.
The first, is from Numbers 11. where Moses not being able alone to
undergoe the whole burthen of administring the affairs of the People of
Israel, God commanded him to choose Seventy Elders, and took part of the
spirit of Moses, to put it upon those Seventy Elders: by which it is
understood, not that God weakened the spirit of Moses, for that had not
eased him at all; but that they had all of them their authority from him;
wherein he doth truly, and ingenuously interpret that place. But seeing
Moses had the entire Soveraignty in the Common-wealth of the Jews, it is
manifest, that it is thereby signified, that they had their Authority from the
Civill Soveraign: and therefore that place proveth, that Bishops in every
Christian Common-wealth have their Authority from the Civill Soveraign;
and from the Pope in his own Territories only, and not in the Territories of
any other State.
The second argument, is from the nature of Monarchy; wherein all
Authority is in one Man, and in others by derivation from him: But the
Government of the Church, he says, is Monarchicall. This also makes for
Christian Monarchs. For they are really Monarchs of their own people;
that is, of their own Church (for the Church is the same thing with a
Christian people;) whereas the Power of the Pope, though hee were S.
Peter, is neither Monarchy, nor hath any thing of Archicall, nor Craticall,

but onely of Didacticall; For God accepteth not a forced, but a willing
obedience.
The third, is, from that the Sea of S. Peter is called by S. Cyprian, the
Head, the Source, the Roote, the Sun, from whence the Authority of
Bishops is derived. But by the Law of Nature (which is a better Principle
of Right and Wrong, than the word of any Doctor that is but a man) the
Civill Soveraign in every Common-wealth, is the Head, the Source, the
Root, and the Sun, from which all Jurisdiction is derived. And therefore,
the Jurisdiction of Bishops, is derived from the Civill Soveraign.
The fourth, is taken from the Inequality of their Jurisdictions: For if
God (saith he) had given it them immediately, he had given aswell
Equality of Jurisdiction, as of Order: But wee see, some are Bishops but of
own Town, some of a hundred Towns, and some of many whole Provinces;
which differences were not determined by the command of God; their
Jurisdiction therefore is not of God, but of Man; and one has a greater,
another a lesse, as it pleaseth the Prince of the Church. Which argument, if
he had proved before, that the Pope had had an Universall Jurisdiction
over all Christians, had been for his purpose. But seeing that hath not been
proved, and that it is notoriously known, the large Jurisdiction of the Pope
was given him by those that had it, that is, by the Emperours of Rome, (for
the Patriarch of Constantinople, upon the same title, namely, of being
Bishop of the Capitall City of the Empire, and Seat of the Emperour,
claimed to be equal to him,) it followeth, that all other Bishops have their
Jurisdiction from the Soveraigns of the place wherein they exercise the
same: And as for that cause they have not their Authority De Jure Divino;
so neither hath the Pope his De Jure Divino, except onely where hee is also
the Civill Soveraign.
His fift argument is this, "If Bishops have their Jurisdiction
immediately from God, the Pope could not take it from them, for he can
doe nothing contrary to Gods ordination;" And this consequence is good,
and well proved. "But, (saith he) the Pope can do this, and has done it."
This also is granted, so he doe it in his own Dominions, or in the
Dominions of any other Prince that hath given him that Power; but not
universally, in Right of the Popedome: For that power belongeth to every
Christian Soveraign, within the bounds of his owne Empire, and is
inseparable from the Soveraignty. Before the People of Israel had (by the

commandment of God to Samuel) set over themselves a King, after the
manner of other Nations, the High Priest had the Civill Government; and
none but he could make, nor depose an inferiour Priest: But that Power
was afterwards in the King, as may be proved by this same argument of
Bellarmine; For if the Priest (be he the High Priest or any other) had his
Jurisdiction immediately from God, then the King could not take it from
him; "for he could do nothing contrary to Gods ordinance: But it is certain,
that King Solomon (1 Kings 2.26.) deprived Abiathar the High Priest of
his office, and placed Zadok (verse 35.) in his room. Kings therefore may
in the like manner Ordaine, and Deprive Bishops, as they shall thinke fit,
for the well governing of their Subjects.
His sixth argument is this, If Bishops have their Jurisdiction De Jure
Divino (that is, immediately from God,) they that maintaine it, should
bring some Word of God to prove it: But they can bring none. The
argument is good; I have therefore nothing to say against it. But it is an
argument no lesse good, to prove the Pope himself to have no Jurisdiction
in the Dominion of any other Prince.
Lastly, hee bringeth for argument, the testimony of two Popes, Innocent,
and Leo; and I doubt not but hee might have alledged, with as good reason,
the testimonies of all the Popes almost since S. Peter: For considering the
love of Power naturally implanted in mankind, whosoever were made
Pope, he would be tempted to uphold the same opinion. Neverthelesse,
they should therein but doe, as Innocent, and Leo did, bear witnesse of
themselves, and therefore their witness should not be good.

Of The Popes Temporall Power
In the fift Book he hath four Conclusions. The first is, "That the Pope in
not Lord of all the world:" the second, "that the Pope is not Lord of all the
Christian world:" The third, "That the Pope (without his owne Territory)
has not any Temporall Jurisdiction DIRECTLY:" These three Conclusions
are easily granted. The fourth is, "That the Pope has (in the Dominions of
other Princes) the Supreme Temporall Power INDIRECTLY:" which is
denyed; unlesse he mean by Indirectly, that he has gotten it by Indirect
means; then is that also granted. But I understand, that when he saith he
hath it Indirectly, he means, that such Temporall Jurisdiction belongeth to
him of Right, but that this Right is but a Consequence of his Pastorall
Authority, the which he could not exercise, unlesse he have the other with
it: And therefore to the Pastorall Power (which he calls Spirituall) the
Supreme Power Civill is necessarily annexed; and that thereby hee hath a
Right to change Kingdomes, giving them to one, and taking them from
another, when he shall think it conduces to the Salvation of Souls.
Before I come to consider the Arguments by which hee would prove this
doctrine, it will not bee amisse to lay open the Consequences of it; that
Princes, and States, that have the Civill Soveraignty in their severall
Common-wealths, may bethink themselves, whether it bee convenient for
them, and conducing to the good of their Subjects, of whom they are to
give an account at the day of Judgment, to admit the same.
When it is said, the Pope hath not (in the Territories of other States) the
Supreme Civill Power Directly; we are to understand, he doth not
challenge it, as other Civill Soveraigns doe, from the originall submission
thereto of those that are to be governed. For it is evident, and has already
been sufficiently in this Treatise demonstrated, that the Right of all
Soveraigns, is derived originally from the consent of every one of those
that are to bee governed; whether they that choose him, doe it for their
common defence against an Enemy, as when they agree amongst
themselves to appoint a Man, or an Assembly of men to protect them; or
whether they doe it, to save their lives, by submission to a conquering
Enemy. The Pope therefore, when he disclaimeth the Supreme Civill

Power over other States Directly, denyeth no more, but that his Right
cometh to him by that way; He ceaseth not for all that, to claime it another
way; and that is, (without the consent of them that are to be governed) by a
Right given him by God, (which hee calleth Indirectly,) in his Assumption
to the Papacy. But by what way soever he pretend, the Power is the same;
and he may (if it bee granted to be his Right) depose Princes and States, as
often as it is for the Salvation of Soules, that is, as often as he will; for he
claimeth also the Sole Power to Judge, whether it be to the salvation of
mens Souls, or not. And this is the Doctrine, not onely that Bellarmine
here, and many other Doctors teach in their Sermons and Books, but also
that some Councells have decreed, and the Popes have decreed, and the
Popes have accordingly, when the occasion hath served them, put in
practise. For the fourth Councell of Lateran held under Pope Innocent the
third, (in the third Chap. De Haereticis,) hath this Canon. "If a King at the
Popes admonition, doe not purge his Kingdome of Haeretiques, and being
Excommunicate for the same, make not satisfaction within a year, his
subjects are absolved of their Obedience." And the practise hereof hath
been seen on divers occasions; as in the Deposing of Chilperique, King of
France; in the Translation of the Roman Empire to Charlemaine; in the
Oppression of John King of England; in Transferring the Kingdome of
Navarre; and of late years, in the League against Henry the third of France,
and in many more occurrences. I think there be few Princes that consider
not this as Injust, and Inconvenient; but I wish they would all resolve to be
Kings, or Subjects. Men cannot serve two Masters: They ought therefore
to ease them, either by holding the Reins of Government wholly in their
own hands; or by wholly delivering them into the hands of the Pope; that
such men as are willing to be obedient, may be protected in their
obedience. For this distinction of Temporall, and Spirituall Power is but
words. Power is as really divided, and as dangerously to all purposes, by
sharing with another Indirect Power, as with a Direct one. But to come
now to his Arguments.
The first is this, "The Civill Power is subject to the Spirituall: Therefore
he that hath the Supreme Power Spirituall, hath right to command
Temporall Princes, and dispose of their Temporalls in order to the
Spirituall. As for the distinction of Temporall, and Spirituall, let us
consider in what sense it may be said intelligibly, that the Temporall, or
Civill Power is subject to the Spirituall. There be but two ways that those

words can be made sense. For when wee say, one Power is subject to
another Power, the meaning either is, that he which hath the one, is subject
to him that hath the other; or that the one Power is to the other, as the
means to the end. For wee cannot understand, that one Power hath Power
over another Power; and that one Power can have Right or Command over
another: For Subjection, Command, Right, and Power are accidents, not of
Powers, but of Persons: One Power may be subordinate to another, as the
art of a Sadler, to the art of a Rider. If then it be granted, that the Civill
Government be ordained as a means to bring us to a Spirituall felicity; yet
it does not follow, that if a King have the Civill Power, and the Pope the
Spirituall, that therefore the King is bound to obey the Pope, more then
every Sadler is bound to obey every Rider. Therefore as from
Subordination of an Art, cannot be inferred the Subjection of the
Professor; so from the Subordination of a Government, cannot be inferred
the Subjection of the Governor. When therefore he saith, the Civill Power
is Subject to the Spirituall, his meaning is, that the Civill Soveraign, is
Subject to the Spirituall Soveraign. And the Argument stands thus, "The
Civil Soveraign, is subject to the Spirituall; Therefore the Spirituall Prince
may command Temporall Princes." Where the conclusion is the same, with
the Antecedent he should have proved. But to prove it, he alledgeth first,
this reason, "Kings and Popes, Clergy and Laity make but one Commonwealth; that is to say, but one Church: And in all Bodies the Members
depend one upon another: But things Spirituall depend not of things
Temporall: Therefore, Temporall depend on Spirituall. And therefore are
Subject to them." In which Argumentation there be two grosse errours: one
is, that all Christian Kings, Popes, Clergy, and all other Christian men,
make but one Common-wealth: For it is evident that France is one
Common-wealth, Spain another, and Venice a third, &c. And these consist
of Christians; and therefore also are severall Bodies of Christians; that is
to say, severall Churches: And their severall Soveraigns Represent them,
whereby they are capable of commanding and obeying, of doing and
suffering, as a natural man; which no Generall or Universall Church is, till
it have a Representant; which it hath not on Earth: for if it had, there is no
doubt but that all Christendome were one Common-wealth, whose
Soveraign were that Representant, both in things Spirituall and Temporall:
And the Pope, to make himself this Representant, wanteth three things that
our Saviour hath not given him, to Command, and to Judge, and to Punish,

otherwise than (by Excommunication) to run from those that will not
Learn of him: For though the Pope were Christs onely Vicar, yet he cannot
exercise his government, till our Saviours second coming: And then also it
is not the Pope, but St. Peter himselfe, with the other Apostles, that are to
be Judges of the world.
The other errour in this his first Argument is, that he sayes, the
Members of every Common-wealth, as of a naturall Body, depend one of
another: It is true, they cohaere together; but they depend onely on the
Soveraign, which is the Soul of the Common-wealth; which failing, the
Common-wealth is dissolved into a Civill war, no one man so much as
cohaering to another, for want of a common Dependance on a known
Soveraign; Just as the Members of the naturall Body dissolve into Earth,
for want of a Soul to hold them together. Therefore there is nothing in this
similitude, from whence to inferre a dependance of the Laity on the
Clergy, or of the Temporall Officers on the Spirituall; but of both on the
Civill Soveraign; which ought indeed to direct his Civill commands to the
Salvation of Souls; but is not therefore subject to any but God himselfe.
And thus you see the laboured fallacy of the first Argument, to deceive
such men as distinguish not between the Subordination of Actions in the
way to the End; and the Subjection of Persons one to another in the
administration of the Means. For to every End, the Means are determined
by Nature, or by God himselfe supernaturally: but the Power to make men
use the Means, is in every nation resigned (by the Law of Nature, which
forbiddeth men to violate their Faith given) to the Civill Soveraign.
His second Argument is this, "Every Common-wealth, (because it is
supposed to be perfect and sufficient in it self,) may command any other
Common-wealth, not subject to it, and force it to change the
administration of the Government, nay depose the Prince, and set another
in his room, if it cannot otherwise defend it selfe against the injuries he
goes about to doe them: much more may a Spirituall Common-wealth
command a Temporall one to change the administration of their
Government, and may depose Princes, and institute others, when they
cannot otherwise defend the Spirituall Good."
That a Common-wealth, to defend it selfe against injuries, may lawfully
doe all that he hath here said, is very true; and hath already in that which
hath gone before been sufficiently demonstrated. And if it were also true,

that there is now in this world a Spirituall Common-wealth, distinct from a
Civill Common-wealth, then might the Prince thereof, upon injury done
him, or upon want of caution that injury be not done him in time to come,
repaire, and secure himself by Warre; which is in summe, deposing,
killing, or subduing, or doing any act of Hostility. But by the same reason,
it would be no lesse lawfull for a Civill Soveraign, upon the like injuries
done, or feared, to make warre upon the Spirituall Soveraign; which I
beleeve is more than Cardinall Bellarmine would have inferred from his
own proposition.
But Spirituall Common-wealth there is none in this world: for it is the
same thing with the Kingdome of Christ; which he himselfe saith, is not of
this world; but shall be in the next world, at the Resurrection, when they
that have lived justly, and beleeved that he was the Christ, shall (though
they died Naturall bodies) rise Spirituall bodies; and then it is, that our
Saviour shall judge the world, and conquer his Adversaries, and make a
Spirituall Common-wealth. In the mean time, seeing there are no men on
earth, whose bodies are Spirituall; there can be no Spirituall Commonwealth amongst men that are yet in the flesh; unlesse wee call Preachers,
that have Commission to Teach, and prepare men for their reception into
the Kingdome of Christ at the Resurrection, a Common-wealth; which I
have proved to bee none.
The third Argument is this; "It is not lawfull for Christians to tolerate an
Infidel, or Haereticall King, in case he endeavour to draw them to his
Haeresie, or Infidelity. But to judge whether a King draw his subjects to
Haeresie, or not, belongeth to the Pope. Therefore hath the Pope Right, to
determine whether the Prince be to be deposed, or not deposed."
To this I answer, that both these assertions are false. For Christians, (or
men of what Religion soever,) if they tolerate not their King, whatsoever
law hee maketh, though it bee concerning Religion, doe violate their faith,
contrary to the Divine Law, both Naturall and Positive: Nor is there any
Judge of Haeresie amongst Subjects, but their own Civill Soveraign; for
"Haeresie is nothing else, but a private opinion, obstinately maintained,
contrary to the opinion which the Publique Person (that is to say, the
Representant of the Common-wealth) hath commanded to bee taught." By
which it is manifest, that an opinion publiquely appointed to bee taught,
cannot be Haeresie; nor the Soveraign Princes that authorize them,

Haeretiques. For Haeretiques are none but private men, that stubbornly
defend some Doctrine, prohibited by their lawful Soveraigns.
But to prove that Christians are not to tolerate Infidell, or Haereticall
Kings, he alledgeth a place in Deut. 17. where God forbiddeth the Jews,
when they shall set a King over themselves, to choose a stranger; And
from thence inferreth, that it is unlawfull for a Christian, to choose a King,
that is not a Christian. And 'tis true, that he that is a Christian, that is, hee
that hath already obliged himself to receive our Saviour when he shall
come, for his King, shal tempt God too much in choosing for King in this
world, one that hee knoweth will endeavour, both by terrour, and
perswasion to make him violate his faith. But, it is (saith hee) the same
danger, to choose one that is not a Christian, for King, and not to depose
him, when hee is chosen. To this I say, the question is not of the danger of
not deposing; but of the Justice of deposing him. To choose him, may in
some cases bee unjust; but to depose him, when he is chosen, is in no case
Just. For it is alwaies violation of faith, and consequently against the Law
of Nature, which is the eternal Law of God. Nor doe wee read, that any
such Doctrine was accounted Christian in the time of the Apostles; nor in
the time of the Romane Emperours, till the Popes had the Civill
Soveraignty of Rome. But to this he hath replyed, that the Christians of
old, deposed not Nero, nor Diocletian, nor Julian, nor Valens an Arrian, for
this cause onely, that they wanted Temporall forces. Perhaps so. But did
our Saviour, who for calling for, might have had twelve Legions of
immortall, invulnerable Angels to assist him, want forces to depose
Caesar, or at least Pilate, that unjustly, without finding fault in him,
delivered him to the Jews to bee crucified? Or if the Apostles wanted
Temporall forces to depose Nero, was it therefore necessary for them in
their Epistles to the new made Christians, to teach them, (as they did) to
obey the Powers constituted over them, (whereof Nero in that time was
one,) and that they ought to obey them, not for fear of their wrath, but for
conscience sake? Shall we say they did not onely obey, but also teach what
they meant not, for want of strength? It is not therefore for want of
strength, but for conscience sake, that Christians are to tolerate their
Heathen Princes, or Princes (for I cannot call any one whose Doctrine is
the Publique Doctrine, an Haeretique) that authorize the teaching of an
Errour. And whereas for the Temporall Power of the Pope, he alledgeth
further, that St. Paul (1 Cor. 6.) appointed Judges under the Heathen

Princes of those times, such as were not ordained by those Princes; it is
not true. For St. Paul does but advise them, to take some of their Brethren
to compound their differences, as Arbitrators, rather than to goe to law one
with another before the Heathen Judges; which is a wholsome Precept, and
full of Charity, fit to bee practised also in the Best Christian Commonwealths. And for the danger that may arise to Religion, by the Subjects
tolerating of an Heathen, or an Erring Prince, it is a point, of which a
Subject is no competent Judge; or if hee bee, the Popes Temporall Subjects
may judge also of the Popes Doctrine. For every Christian Prince, as I
have formerly proved, is no lesse Supreme Pastor of his own Subjects,
than the Pope of his.
The fourth Argument, is taken from the Baptisme of Kings; wherein,
that they may be made Christians they submit their Scepters to Christ; and
promise to keep, and defend the Christian Faith. This is true; for Christian
Kings are no more but Christs Subjects: but they may, for all that, bee the
Popes Fellowes; for they are Supreme Pastors of their own Subjects; and
the Pope is no more but King, and Pastor, even in Rome it selfe.
The fifth Argument, is drawn from the words spoken by our Saviour,
Feed My Sheep; by which was give all Power necessary for a Pastor; as the
Power to chase away Wolves, such as are Haeretiques; the Power to shut
up Rammes, if they be mad, or push at the other Sheep with their Hornes,
such as are Evill (though Christian) Kings; and Power to give the Flock
convenient food: From whence hee inferreth, that St. Peter had these three
Powers given him by Christ. To which I answer, that the last of these
Powers, is no more than the Power, or rather Command to Teach. For the
first, which is to chase away Wolves, that is, Haeretiques, the place hee
quoteth is (Matth. 7.15.) "Beware of false Prophets which come to you in
Sheeps clothing, but inwardly are ravening Wolves." But neither are
Haeretiques false Prophets, or at all Prophets: nor (admitting Haeretiques
for the Wolves there meant,) were the Apostles commanded to kill them,
or if they were Kings, to depose them; but to beware of, fly, and avoid
them: nor was it to St. Peter, nor to any of the Apostles, but to the
multitude of the Jews that followed him into the mountain, men for the
most part not yet converted, that hee gave this Counsell, to Beware of false
Prophets: which therefore if it conferre a Power of chasing away Kings,
was given, not onely to private men; but to men that were not at all
Christians. And as to the Power of Separating, and Shutting up of furious

Rammes, (by which hee meaneth Christian Kings that refuse to submit
themselves to the Roman Pastor,) our Saviour refused to take upon him
that Power in this world himself, but advised to let the Corn and Tares
grow up together till the day of Judgment: much lesse did hee give it to St.
Peter, or can S. Peter give it to the Popes. St. Peter, and all other Pastors,
are bidden to esteem those Christians that disobey the Church, that is, (that
disobey the Christian Soveraigne) as Heathen men, and as Publicans.
Seeing then men challenge to the Pope no authority over Heathen Princes,
they ought to challenge none over those that are to bee esteemed as
Heathen.
But from the Power to Teach onely, hee inferreth also a Coercive Power
in the Pope, over Kings. The Pastor (saith he) must give his flock
convenient food: Therefore the Pope may, and ought to compell Kings to
doe their duty. Out of which it followeth, that the Pope, as Pastor of
Christian men, is King of Kings: which all Christian Kings ought indeed
either to Confesse, or else they ought to take upon themselves the Supreme
Pastorall Charge, every one in his own Dominion.
His sixth, and last Argument, is from Examples. To which I answer,
first, that Examples prove nothing; Secondly, that the Examples he
alledgeth make not so much as a probability of Right. The fact of
Jehoiada, in Killing Athaliah (2 Kings 11.) was either by the Authority of
King Joash, or it was a horrible Crime in the High Priest, which (ever after
the election of King Saul) was a mere Subject. The fact of St. Ambrose, in
Excommunicating Theodosius the Emperour, (if it were true hee did so,)
was a Capitall Crime. And for the Popes, Gregory 1. Greg. 2. Zachary, and
Leo 3. their Judgments are void, as given in their own Cause; and the Acts
done by them conformably to this Doctrine, are the greatest Crimes
(especially that of Zachary) that are incident to Humane Nature. And thus
much of Power Ecclesiasticall; wherein I had been more briefe, forbearing
to examine these Arguments of Bellarmine, if they had been his, as a
Private man, and not as the Champion of the Papacy, against all other
Christian Princes, and States.

CHAPTER XLIII. OF WHAT IS NECESSARY
FOR A MANS RECEPTION INTO THE
KINGDOME OF HEAVEN.

The Difficulty Of Obeying God And Man Both At
Once
The most frequent praetext of Sedition, and Civill Warre, in Christian
Common-wealths hath a long time proceeded from a difficulty, not yet
sufficiently resolved, of obeying at once, both God, and Man, then when
their Commandements are one contrary to the other. It is manifest enough,
that when a man receiveth two contrary Commands, and knows that one of
them is Gods, he ought to obey that, and not the other, though it be the
command even of his lawfull Soveraign (whether a Monarch, or a
Soveraign Assembly,) or the command of his Father. The difficulty
therefore consisteth in this, that men when they are commanded in the
name of God, know not in divers Cases, whether the command be from
God, or whether he that commandeth, doe but abuse Gods name for some
private ends of his own. For as there ware in the Church of the Jews, many
false Prophets, that sought reputation with the people, by feigned Dreams,
and Visions; so there have been in all times in the Church of Christ, false
Teachers, that seek reputation with the people, by phantasticall and false
Doctrines; and by such reputation (as is the nature of Ambition,) to govern
them for their private benefit.

Is None To Them That Distinguish Between What
Is, And What Is Not
Necessary To Salvation
But this difficulty of obeying both God, and the Civill Soveraign on
earth, to those that can distinguish between what is Necessary, and what is
not Necessary for their Reception into the Kingdome of God, is of no
moment. For if the command of the Civill Soveraign bee such, as that it
may be obeyed, without the forfeiture of life Eternall; not to obey it is
unjust; and the precept of the Apostle takes place; "Servants obey your
Masters in all things;" and, "Children obey your Parents in all things;" and
the precept of our Saviour, "The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses Chaire,
All therefore they shall say, that observe, and doe." But if the command be
such, as cannot be obeyed, without being damned to Eternall Death, then it
were madnesse to obey it, and the Counsell of our Saviour takes place,
(Mat. 10. 28.) "Fear not those that kill the body, but cannot kill the soule."
All men therefore that would avoid, both the punishments that are to be in
this world inflicted, for disobedience to their earthly Soveraign, and those
that shall be inflicted in the world to come for disobedience to God, have
need be taught to distinguish well between what is, and what is not
Necessary to Eternall Salvation.

All That Is Necessary To Salvation Is Contained In
Faith And Obedience
All that is NECESSARY to Salvation, is contained in two Vertues, Faith
in Christ, and Obedience to Laws. The latter of these, if it were perfect,
were enough to us. But because wee are all guilty of disobedience to Gods
Law, not onely originally in Adam, but also actually by our own
transgressions, there is required at our hands now, not onely Obedience for
the rest of our time, but also a Remission of sins for the time past; which
Remission is the reward of our Faith in Christ. That nothing else is
Necessarily required to Salvation, is manifest from this, that the
Kingdome of Heaven, is shut to none but to Sinners; that is to say, to the
disobedient, or transgressors of the Law; nor to them, in case they Repent,
and Beleeve all the Articles of Christian Faith, Necessary to Salvation.

What Obedience Is Necessary;
The Obedience required at our hands by God, that accepteth in all our
actions the Will for the Deed, is a serious Endeavour to Obey him; and is
called also by all such names as signifie that Endeavour. And therefore
Obedience, is sometimes called by the names of Charity, and Love,
because they imply a Will to Obey; and our Saviour himself maketh our
Love to God, and to one another, a Fulfilling of the whole Law: and
sometimes by the name of Righteousnesse; for Righteousnesse is but the
will to give to every one his owne, that is to say, the will to obey the Laws:
and sometimes by the name of Repentance; because to Repent, implyeth a
turning away from sinne, which is the same, with the return of the will to
Obedience. Whosoever therefore unfeignedly desireth to fulfill the
Commandements of God, or repenteth him truely of his transgressions, or
that loveth God with all his heart, and his neighbor as himself, hath all the
Obedience Necessary to his Reception into the Kingdome of God: For if
God should require perfect Innocence, there could no flesh be saved.

And To What Laws
But what Commandements are those that God hath given us? Are all
those Laws which were given to the Jews by the hand of Moses, the
Commandements of God? If they bee, why are not Christians taught to
obey them? If they be not, what others are so, besides the Law of Nature?
For our Saviour Christ hath not given us new Laws, but Counsell to
observe those wee are subject to; that is to say, the Laws of Nature, and the
Laws of our severall Soveraigns: Nor did he make any new Law to the
Jews in his Sermon on the Mount, but onely expounded the Laws of
Moses, to which they were subject before. The Laws of God therefore are
none but the Laws of Nature, whereof the principall is, that we should not
violate our Faith, that is, a commandement to obey our Civill Soveraigns,
which wee constituted over us, by mutuall pact one with another. And this
Law of God, that commandeth Obedience to the Law Civill, commandeth
by consequence Obedience to all the Precepts of the Bible, which (as I
have proved in the precedent Chapter) is there onely Law, where the Civill
Soveraign hath made it so; and in other places but Counsell; which a man
at his own perill, may without injustice refuse to obey.

In The Faith Of A Christian, Who Is The Person
Beleeved
Knowing now what is the Obedience Necessary to Salvation, and to
whom it is due; we are to consider next concerning Faith, whom, and why
we beleeve; and what are the Articles, or Points necessarily to be beleeved
by them that shall be saved. And first, for the Person whom we beleeve,
because it is impossible to beleeve any Person, before we know what he
saith, it is necessary he be one that wee have heard speak. The Person
therefore, whom Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses and the Prophets beleeved,
was God himself, that spake unto them supernaturally: And the Person,
whom the Apostles and Disciples that conversed with Christ beleeved, was
our Saviour himself. But of them, to whom neither God the Father, nor our
Saviour ever spake, it cannot be said, that the Person whom they beleeved,
was God. They beleeved the Apostles, and after them the Pastors and
Doctors of the Church, that recommended to their faith the History of the
Old and New Testament: so that the Faith of Christians ever since our
Saviours time, hath had for foundation, first, the reputation of their
Pastors, and afterward, the authority of those that made the Old and New
Testament to be received for the Rule of Faith; which none could do but
Christian Soveraignes; who are therefore the Supreme Pastors, and the
onely Persons, whom Christians now hear speak from God; except such as
God speaketh to, in these days supernaturally. But because there be many
false Prophets "gone out into the world," other men are to examine such
Spirits (as St. John advised us, 1 Epistle, Chap. 4. ver.1.) "whether they be
of God, or not." And therefore, seeing the Examination of Doctrines
belongeth to the Supreme Pastor, the Person which all they that have no
speciall revelation are to beleeve, is (in every Common-wealth) the
Supreme Pastor, that is to say, the Civill Soveraigne.

The Causes Of Christian Faith
The causes why men beleeve any Christian Doctrine, are various; For
Faith is the gift of God; and he worketh it in each severall man, by such
wayes, as it seemeth good unto himself. The most ordinary immediate
cause of our beleef, concerning any point of Christian Faith, is, that wee
beleeve the Bible to be the Word of God. But why wee beleeve the Bible to
be the Word of God, is much disputed, as all questions must needs bee,
that are not well stated. For they make not the question to be, "Why we
Beleeve it," but "How wee Know it;" as if Beleeving and Knowing were all
one. And thence while one side ground their Knowledge upon the
Infallibility of the Church, and the other side, on the Testimony of the
Private Spirit, neither side concludeth what it pretends. For how shall a
man know the Infallibility of the Church, but by knowing first the
Infallibility of the Scripture? Or how shall a man know his own Private
spirit to be other than a beleef, grounded upon the Authority, and
Arguments of his Teachers; or upon a Presumption of his own Gifts?
Besides, there is nothing in the Scripture, from which can be inferred the
Infallibility of the Church; much lesse, of any particular Church; and least
of all, the Infallibility of any particular man.

Faith Comes By Hearing
It is manifest, therefore, that Christian men doe not know, but onely
beleeve the Scripture to be the Word of God; and that the means of making
them beleeve which God is pleased to afford men ordinarily, is according
to the way of Nature, that is to say, from their Teachers. It is the Doctrine
of St. Paul concerning Christian Faith in generall, (Rom. 10.17.) "Faith
cometh by Hearing," that is, by Hearing our lawfull Pastors. He saith also
(ver. 14,15. of the same Chapter) "How shall they beleeve in him of whom
they have not heard? and how shall they hear without a Preacher? and how
shall they Preach, except they be sent?" Whereby it is evident, that the
ordinary cause of beleeving that the Scriptures are the Word of God, is the
same with the cause of the beleeving of all other Articles of our Faith,
namely, the Hearing of those that are by the Law allowed and appointed to
Teach us, as our Parents in their Houses, and our Pastors in the Churches:
Which also is made more manifest by experience. For what other cause
can there bee assigned, why in Christian Common-wealths all men either
beleeve, or at least professe the Scripture to bee the Word of God, and in
other Common-wealths scarce any; but that in Christian Common-wealths
they are taught it from their infancy; and in other places they are taught
otherwise?
But if Teaching be the cause of Faith, why doe not all beleeve? It is
certain therefore that Faith is the gift of God, and hee giveth it to whom he
will. Neverthelesse, because of them to whom he giveth it, he giveth it by
the means of Teachers, the immediate cause of Faith is Hearing. In a
School where many are taught, and some profit, others profit not, the
cause of learning in them that profit, is the Master; yet it cannot be thence
inferred, that learning is not the gift of God. All good things proceed from
God; yet cannot all that have them, say they are Inspired; for that implies a
gift supernaturall, and the immediate hand of God; which he that pretends
to, pretends to be a Prophet, and is subject to the examination of the
Church.
But whether men Know, or Beleeve, or Grant the Scriptures to be the
Word of God; if out of such places of them, as are without obscurity, I

shall shew what Articles of Faith are necessary, and onely necessary for
Salvation, those men must needs Know, Beleeve, or Grant the same.
The Onely Necessary Article Of Christian Faith, The (Unum
Necessarium) Onely Article of Faith, which the Scripture maketh simply
Necessary to Salvation, is this, that JESUS IS THE CHRIST. By the name
of Christ, is understood the King, which God had before promised by the
Prophets of the Old Testament, to send into the world, to reign (over the
Jews, and over such of other nations as should beleeve in him) under
himself eternally; and to give them that eternall life, which was lost by the
sin of Adam. Which when I have proved out of Scripture, I will further
shew when, and in what sense some other Articles may bee also called
Necessary.

Proved From The Scope Of The Evangelists
For Proof that the Beleef of this Article, Jesus Is The Christ, is all the
Faith required to Salvation, my first Argument shall bee from the Scope of
the Evangelists; which was by the description of the life of our Saviour, to
establish that one Article, Jesus Is The Christ. The summe of St. Matthews
Gospell is this, That Jesus was of the stock of David; Born of a Virgin;
which are the Marks of the true Christ: That the Magi came to worship
him as King of the Jews: That Herod for the same cause sought to kill him:
That John Baptist proclaimed him: That he preached by himselfe, and his
Apostles that he was that King; That he taught the Law, not as a Scribe, but
as a man of Authority: That he cured diseases by his Word onely, and did
many other Miracles, which were foretold the Christ should doe: That he
was saluted King when he entered into Jerusalem: That he fore-warned
them to beware of all others that should pretend to be Christ: That he was
taken, accused, and put to death, for saying, hee was King: That the cause
of his condemnation written on the Crosse, was JESUS OF NAZARETH,
THE KING OF THE JEWES. All which tend to no other end than this, that
men should beleeve, that Jesus Is The Christ. Such therefore was the Scope
of St. Matthews Gospel. But the Scope of all the Evangelists (as may
appear by reading them) was the same. Therefore the Scope of the whole
Gospell, was the establishing of that onely Article. And St. John
expressely makes it his conclusion, John 20. 31. "These things are written,
that you may know that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of the living God."

From The Sermons Of The Apostles:
My second Argument is taken from the Subject of the Sermons of the
Apostles, both whilest our Saviour lived on earth, and after his Ascension.
The Apostles in our Saviours time were sent, Luke 9.2. to Preach the
Kingdome of God: For neither there, nor Mat. 10.7. giveth he any
Commission to them, other than this, "As ye go, Preach, saying, the
Kingdome of Heaven is at hand;" that is, that Jesus is the Messiah, the
Christ, the King which was to come. That their Preaching also after his
ascension was the same, is manifest out of Acts 17.6. "They drew (saith St.
Luke) Jason and certain Brethren unto the Rulers of the City, crying, These
that have turned the world upside down are come hither also, whom Jason
hath received. And these all do contrary to the Decrees of Caesar, saying,
that there is another King, one Jesus:" And out of the 2.&3. verses of the
same Chapter, where it is said, that St. Paul "as his manner was, went in
unto them; and three Sabbath dayes reasoned with them out of the
Scriptures; opening and alledging, that Christ must needs have suffered,
and risen againe from the dead, and that this Jesus (whom he preached) is
Christ."

From The Easinesse Of The Doctrine:
The third Argument is, from those places of Scripture, by which all the
Faith required to Salvation is declared to be Easie. For if an inward assent
of the mind to all the Doctrines concerning Christian Faith now taught,
(whereof the greatest part are disputed,) were necessary to Salvation, there
would be nothing in the world so hard, as to be a Christian. The Thief upon
the Crosse though repenting, could not have been saved for saying, "Lord
remember me when thou commest into thy Kingdome;" by which he
testified no beleefe of any other Article, but this, That Jesus Was The
King. Nor could it bee said (as it is Mat. 11. 30.) that "Christs yoke is
Easy, and his burthen Light:" Nor that "Little Children beleeve in him," as
it is Matth. 18.6. Nor could St. Paul have said (1 Cor. 1. 21.) "It pleased
God by the Foolishnesse of preaching, to save them that beleeve:" Nor
could St. Paul himself have been saved, much lesse have been so great a
Doctor of the Church so suddenly, that never perhaps thought of
Transsubstantiation, nor Purgatory, nor many other Articles now obtruded.

From Formall And Cleer Texts
The fourth Argument is taken from places expresse, and such as receive
no controversie of Interpretation; as first, John 5. 39. "Search the
Scriptures, for in them yee thinke yee have eternall life; and they are they
that testifie of mee." Our Saviour here speaketh of the Scriptures onely of
the Old Testament; for the Jews at that time could not search the
Scriptures of the New Testament, which were not written. But the Old
Testament hath nothing of Christ, but the Markes by which men might
know him when hee came; as that he should descend from David, be born
at Bethlehem, and of a Virgin; doe great Miracles, and the like. Therefore
to beleeve that this Jesus was He, was sufficient to eternall life: but more
than sufficient is not Necessary; and consequently no other Article is
required. Again, (John 11. 26.) "Whosoever liveth and beleeveth in mee,
shall not die eternally," Therefore to beleeve in Christ, is faith sufficient to
eternall life; and consequently no more faith than that is Necessary, But to
beleeve in Jesus, and to beleeve that Jesus is the Christ, is all one, as
appeareth in the verses immediately following. For when our Saviour
(verse 26.) had said to Martha, "Beleevest thou this?" she answereth (verse
27.) "Yea Lord, I beleeve that thou art the Christ, the Son of God, which
should come into the world;" Therefore this Article alone is faith
sufficient to life eternall; and more than sufficient is not Necessary.
Thirdly, John 20. 31. "These things are written that yee might beleeve, that
Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that beleeving yee might have life
through his name." There, to beleeve that Jesus Is The Christ, is faith
sufficient to the obtaining of life; and therefore no other Article is
Necessary. Fourthly, 1 John 4. 2. "Every Spirit that confesseth that Jesus
Christ is come in the flesh, is of God." And 1 Joh. 5. 1. "whosoever
beleeveth that Jesus is the Christ, is born of God." And verse 5. "Who is
hee that overcommeth the world, but he that beleeveth that Jesus is the
Son of God?" Fiftly, Act. 8. ver. 36, 37. "See (saith the Eunuch) here is
water, what doth hinder me to be baptized? And Philip said, If thou
beleevest with all thy heart thou mayst. And hee answered and said, I
beleeve that Jesus Christ is the Son of God." Therefore this Article

beleeved, Jesus Is The Christ, is sufficient to Baptisme, that is to say, to
our Reception into the Kingdome of God, and by consequence, onely
Necessary. And generally in all places where our Saviour saith to any man,
"Thy faith hath saved thee," the cause he saith it, is some Confession,
which directly, or by consequence, implyeth a beleef, that Jesus Is The
Christ.

From That It Is The Foundation Of All Other
Articles
The last Argument is from the places, where this Article is made the
Foundation of Faith: For he that holdeth the Foundation shall bee saved.
Which places are first, Mat. 24.23. "If any man shall say unto you, Loe,
here is Christ, or there, beleeve it not, for there shall arise false Christs,
and false Prophets, and shall shew great signes and wonders, &c." Here
wee see, this Article Jesus Is The Christ, must bee held, though hee that
shall teach the contrary should doe great miracles. The second place is
Gal. 1. 8. "Though we, or an Angell from Heaven preach any other Gospell
unto you, than that wee have preached unto you, let him bee accursed." But
the Gospell which Paul, and the other Apostles, preached, was onely this
Article, that Jesus Is The Christ; Therefore for the Beleef of this Article,
we are to reject the Authority of an Angell from heaven; much more of
any mortall man, if he teach the contrary. This is therefore the
Fundamentall Article of Christian Faith. A third place is, 1 Joh. 4.1.
"Beloved, beleeve not every spirit. Hereby yee shall know the Spirit of
God; every spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is
of God." By which it is evident, that this Article, is the measure, and rule,
by which to estimate, and examine all other Articles; and is therefore
onely Fundamentall. A fourth is, Matt. 16.18. where after St. Peter had
professed this Article, saying to our Saviour, "Thou art Christ the Son of
the living God," Our Saviour answered, "Thou art Peter, and upon this
Rock I will build my Church:" from whence I inferre, that this Article is
that, on which all other Doctrines of the Church are built, as on their
Foundation. A fift is (1 Cor. 3. ver. 11, 12, &c.) "Other Foundation can no
man lay, than that which is laid, Jesus is the Christ. Now if any man build
upon this Foundation, Gold, Silver, pretious Stones, Wood, Hay, Stubble;
Every mans work shall be made manifest; For the Day shall declare it,
because it shall be revealed by fire, and the fire shall try every mans work,
of what sort it is. If any mans work abide, which he hath built thereupon,
he shall receive a reward: If any mans work shall bee burnt, he shall suffer
losse; but he himself shall be saved, yet so as by fire." Which words, being

partly plain and easie to understand, and partly allegoricall and difficult;
out of that which is plain, may be inferred, that Pastors that teach this
Foundation, that Jesus Is The Christ, though they draw from it false
consequences, (which all men are sometimes subject to,) they may
neverthelesse bee saved; much more that they may bee saved, who being
no Pastors, but Hearers, beleeve that which is by their lawfull Pastors
taught them. Therefore the beleef of this Article is sufficient; and by
consequence there is no other Article of Faith Necessarily required to
Salvation.
Now for the part which is Allegoricall, as "That the fire shall try every
mans work," and that "They shall be saved, but so as by fire," or "through
fire," (for the originall is dia puros,) it maketh nothing against this
conclusion which I have drawn from the other words, that are plain.
Neverthelesse, because upon this place there hath been an argument taken,
to prove the fire of Purgatory, I will also here offer you my conjecture
concerning the meaning of this triall of Doctrines, and saving of men as by
Fire. The Apostle here seemeth to allude to the words of the Prophet
Zachary, Ch. 13. 8,9. who speaking of the Restauration of the Kingdome of
God, saith thus, "Two parts therein shall be cut off, and die, but the third
shall be left therein; and I will bring the third part through the Fire, and
will refine them as Silver is refined, and will try them as Gold is tryed;
they shall call on the name of the Lord, and I will hear them." The day of
Judgment, is the day of the Restauration of the Kingdome of God; and at
that day it is, that St. Peter tells us (2 Pet. 3. v.7, 10, 12.) shall be the
Conflagration of the world, wherein the wicked shall perish; but the
remnant which God will save, shall passe through that Fire, unhurt, and be
therein (as Silver and Gold are refined by the fire from their drosse) tryed,
and refined from their Idolatry, and be made to call upon the name of the
true God. Alluding whereto St. Paul here saith, that The Day (that is, the
Day of Judgment, the Great Day of our Saviours comming to restore the
Kingdome of God in Israel) shall try every mans doctrine, by Judging,
which are Gold, Silver, Pretious Stones, Wood, Hay, Stubble; And then
they that have built false Consequences on the true Foundation, shall see
their Doctrines condemned; neverthelesse they themselves shall be saved,
and passe unhurt through this universall Fire, and live eternally, to call
upon the name of the true and onely God. In which sense there is nothing

that accordeth not with the rest of Holy Scripture, or any glimpse of the
fire of Purgatory.

In What Sense Other Articles May Be Called
Necessary
But a man may here aske, whether it bee not as necessary to Salvation,
to beleeve, that God is Omnipotent; Creator of the world; that Jesus Christ
is risen; and that all men else shall rise again from the dead at the last day;
as to beleeve, that Jesus Is The Christ. To which I answer, they are; and so
are many more Articles: but they are such, as are contained in this one,
and may be deduced from it, with more, or lesse difficulty. For who is
there that does not see, that they who beleeve Jesus to be the Son of the
God of Israel, and that the Israelites had for God the Omnipotent Creator
of all things, doe therein also beleeve, that God is the Omnipotent Creator
of all things? Or how can a man beleeve, that Jesus is the King that shall
reign eternally, unlesse hee beleeve him also risen again from the dead?
For a dead man cannot exercise the Office of a King. In summe, he that
holdeth this Foundation, Jesus Is The Christ, holdeth Expressely all that
hee seeth rightly deduced from it, and Implicitely all that is consequent
thereunto, though he have not skill enough to discern the consequence.
And therefore it holdeth still good, that the beleef of this one Article is
sufficient faith to obtaine remission of sinnes to the Penitent, and
consequently to bring them into the Kingdome of Heaven.

That Faith, And Obedience Are Both Of Them
Necessary To Salvation
Now that I have shewn, that all the Obedience required to Salvation,
consisteth in the will to obey the Law of God, that is to say, in Repentance;
and all the Faith required to the same, is comprehended in the beleef of
this Article, Jesus Is The Christ; I will further alledge those places of the
Gospell, that prove, that all that is Necessary to Salvation is contained in
both these joined together. The men to whom St. Peter preached on the day
of Pentecost, next after the Ascension of our Saviour, asked him, and the
rest of the Apostles, saying, (Act. 2.37.) "Men and Brethren what shall we
doe?" to whom St. Peter answered (in the next verse) "Repent, and be
Baptized every one of you, for the remission of sins, and ye shall receive
the gift of the Holy Ghost." Therefore Repentance, and Baptisme, that is,
beleeving that Jesus Is The Christ, is all that is Necessary to Salvation.
Again, our Saviour being asked by a certain Ruler, (Luke 18.18.) "What
shall I doe to inherit eternall life?" Answered (verse 20) "Thou knowest
the Commandements, Doe not commit Adultery, Doe not Kill, Doe not
Steal, Doe not bear false witnesse, Honor thy Father, and thy Mother;"
which when he said he had observed, our Saviour added, "Sell all thou
hast, give it to the Poor, and come and follow me:" which was as much as
to say, Relye on me that am the King: Therefore to fulfill the Law, and to
beleeve that Jesus is the King, is all that is required to bring a man to
eternall life. Thirdly, St. Paul saith (Rom. 1.17.) "The Just shall live by
Faith;" not every one, but the Just; therefore Faith and Justice (that is, the
Will To Be Just, or Repentance) are all that is Necessary to life eternall.
And (Mark 1.15.) our Saviour preached, saying, "The time is fulfilled, and
the Kingdom of God is at hand, Repent and Beleeve the Evangile," that is,
the Good news that the Christ was come. Therefore to Repent, and to
Beleeve that Jesus is the Christ, is all that is required to Salvation.

What Each Of Them Contributes Thereunto
Seeing then it is Necessary that Faith, and Obedience (implyed in the
word Repentance) do both concurre to our Salvation; the question by
which of the two we are Justified, is impertinently disputed.
Neverthelesse, it will not be impertinent, to make manifest in what manner
each of them contributes thereunto; and in what sense it is said, that we are
to be Justified by the one, and by the other. And first, if by Righteousnesse
be understood the Justice of the Works themselves, there is no man that
can be saved; for there is none that hath not transgressed the Law of God.
And therefore when wee are said to be Justified by Works, it is to be
understood of the Will, which God doth alwaies accept for the Work it
selfe, as well in good, as in evill men. And in this sense onely it is, that a
man is called Just, or Unjust; and that his Justice Justifies him, that is,
gives him the title, in Gods acceptation, of Just; and renders him capable
of Living By His Faith, which before he was not. So that Justice Justifies
in that that sense, in which to Justifie, is the same that to Denominate A
Man Just; and not in the signification of discharging the Law; whereby the
punishment of his sins should be unjust.
But a man is then also said to be Justified, when his Plea, though in it
selfe unsufficient, is accepted; as when we Plead our Will, our Endeavour
to fulfill the Law, and Repent us of our failings, and God accepteth it for
the Performance it selfe: And because God accepteth not the Will for the
Deed, but onely in the Faithfull; it is therefore Faith that makes good our
Plea; and in this sense it is, that Faith onely Justifies: So that Faith and
Obedience are both Necessary to Salvation; yet in severall senses each of
them is said to Justifie.

Obedience To God And To The Civill Soveraign
Not Inconsistent
Whether Christian, Having thus shewn what is Necessary to Salvation;
it is not hard to reconcile our Obedience to the Civill Soveraign; who is
either Christian, or Infidel. If he bee a Christian, he alloweth the beleefe of
this Article, that Jesus Is The Christ; and of all the Articles that are
contained in, or are evident consequence deduced from it: which is all the
Faith Necessary to Salvation. And because he is a Soveraign, he requireth
Obedience to all his owne, that is, to all the Civill Laws; in which also are
contained all the Laws of Nature, that is, all the Laws of God: for besides
the Laws of Nature, and the Laws of the Church, which are part of the
Civill Law, (for the Church that can make Laws is the Common-wealth,)
there bee no other Laws Divine. Whosoever therefore obeyeth his
Christian Soveraign, is not thereby hindred, neither from beleeving, nor
from obeying God. But suppose that a Christian King should from this
Foundation, Jesus Is The Christ, draw some false consequences, that is to
say, make some superstructions of Hay, or Stubble, and command the
teaching of the same; yet seeing St. Paul says, he shal be saved; much
more shall he be saved, that teacheth them by his command; and much
more yet, he that teaches not, but onely beleeves his lawfull Teacher. And
in case a Subject be forbidden by the Civill Soveraign to professe some of
those his opinions, upon what grounds can he disobey? Christian Kings
may erre in deducing a Consequence, but who shall Judge? Shall a private
man Judge, when the question is of his own obedience? or shall any man
Judg but he that is appointed thereto by the Church, that is, by the Civill
Soveraign that representeth it? or if the Pope, or an Apostle Judge, may he
not erre in deducing of a consequence? did not one of the two, St. Peter, or
St. Paul erre in a superstructure, when St. Paul withstood St. Peter to his
face? There can therefore be no contradiction between the Laws of God,
and the Laws of a Christian Common-wealth.

Or Infidel
And when the Civill Soveraign is an Infidel, every one of his own
Subjects that resisteth him, sinneth against the Laws of God (for such as
are the Laws of Nature,) and rejecteth the counsell of the Apostles, that
admonisheth all Christians to obey their Princes, and all Children and
Servants to obey they Parents, and Masters, in all things. And for their
Faith, it is internall, and invisible; They have the licence that Naaman had,
and need not put themselves into danger for it. But if they do, they ought
to expect their reward in Heaven, and not complain of their Lawfull
Soveraign; much lesse make warre upon him. For he that is not glad of any
just occasion of Martyrdome, has not the faith be professeth, but pretends
it onely, to set some colour upon his own contumacy. But what Infidel
King is so unreasonable, as knowing he has a Subject, that waiteth for the
second comming of Christ, after the present world shall be burnt, and
intendeth then to obey him (which is the intent of beleeving that Jesus is
the Christ,) and in the mean time thinketh himself bound to obey the Laws
of that Infidel King, (which all Christians are obliged in conscience to
doe,) to put to death, or to persecute such a Subject?
And thus much shall suffice, concerning the Kingdome of God, and
Policy Ecclesiasticall. Wherein I pretend not to advance any Position of
my own, but onely to shew what are the Consequences that seem to me
deducible from the Principles of Christian Politiques, (which are the holy
Scriptures,) in confirmation of the Power of Civill Soveraigns, and the
Duty of their Subjects. And in the allegation of Scripture, I have
endeavoured to avoid such Texts as are of obscure, or controverted
Interpretation; and to alledge none, but is such sense as is most plain, and
agreeable to the harmony and scope of the whole Bible; which was written
for the re-establishment of the Kingdome of God in Christ. For it is not the
bare Words, but the Scope of the writer that giveth the true light, by which
any writing is to bee interpreted; and they that insist upon single Texts,
without considering the main Designe, can derive no thing from them
cleerly; but rather by casting atomes of Scripture, as dust before mens

eyes, make every thing more obscure than it is; an ordinary artifice of
those that seek not the truth, but their own advantage.

CHAPTER XLIV. OF SPIRITUALL
DARKNESSE FROM MISINTERPRETATION
OF SCRIPTURE

The Kingdome Of Darknesse What
Besides these Soveraign Powers, Divine, and Humane, of which I have
hitherto discoursed, there is mention in Scripture of another Power,
namely, (Eph. 6. 12.), that of "the Rulers of the Darknesse of this world,"
(Mat. 12. 26.), "the Kingdome of Satan," and, (Mat. 9. 34.), "the
Principality of Beelzebub over Daemons," that is to say, over Phantasmes
that appear in the Air: For which cause Satan is also called (Eph. 2. 2.)
"the Prince of the Power of the Air;" and (because he ruleth in the
darknesse of this world) (Joh. 16. 11.) "The Prince of this world;" And in
consequence hereunto, they who are under his Dominion, in opposition to
the faithfull (who are the Children Of The Light) are called the Children
Of Darknesse. For seeing Beelzebub is Prince of Phantasmes, Inhabitants
of his Dominion of Air and Darknesse, the Children of Darknesse, and
these Daemons, Phantasmes, or Spirits of Illusion, signifie allegorically
the same thing. This considered, the Kingdome of Darknesse, as it is set
forth in these, and other places of the Scripture, is nothing else but a
"Confederacy of Deceivers, that to obtain dominion over men in this
present world, endeavour by dark, and erroneous Doctrines, to extinguish
in them the Light, both of Nature, and of the Gospell; and so to dis-prepare
them for the Kingdome of God to come."

The Church Not Yet Fully Freed Of Darknesse
As men that are utterly deprived from their Nativity, of the light of the
bodily Eye, have no Idea at all, of any such light; and no man conceives in
his imagination any greater light, than he hath at some time, or other
perceived by his outward Senses: so also is it of the light of the Gospel,
and of the light of the Understanding, that no man can conceive there is
any greater degree of it, than that which he hath already attained unto. And
from hence it comes to passe, that men have no other means to
acknowledge their owne Darknesse, but onely by reasoning from the unforseen mischances, that befall them in their ways; The Darkest part of the
Kingdome of Satan, is that which is without the Church of God; that is to
say, amongst them that beleeve not in Jesus Christ. But we cannot say, that
therefore the Church enjoyeth (as the land of Goshen) all the light, which
to the performance of the work enjoined us by God, is necessary. Whence
comes it, that in Christendome there has been, almost from the time of the
Apostles, such justling of one another out of their places, both by forraign,
and Civill war? such stumbling at every little asperity of their own
fortune, and every little eminence of that of other men? and such diversity
of ways in running to the same mark, Felicity, if it be not Night amongst
us, or at least a Mist? wee are therefore yet in the Dark.

Four Causes Of Spirituall Darknesse
The Enemy has been here in the Night of our naturall Ignorance, and
sown the tares of Spirituall Errors; and that, First, by abusing, and putting
out the light of the Scriptures: For we erre, not knowing the Scriptures.
Secondly, by introducing the Daemonology of the Heathen Poets, that is to
say, their fabulous Doctrine concerning Daemons, which are but Idols, or
Phantasms of the braine, without any reall nature of their own, distinct
from humane fancy; such as are dead mens Ghosts, and Fairies, and other
matter of old Wives tales. Thirdly, by mixing with the Scripture divers
reliques of the Religion, and much of the vain and erroneous Philosophy of
the Greeks, especially of Aristotle. Fourthly, by mingling with both these,
false, or uncertain Traditions, and fained, or uncertain History. And so we
come to erre, by "giving heed to seducing Spirits," and the Daemonology
of such "as speak lies in Hypocrisie," (or as it is in the Originall, 1 Tim.
4.1,2. "of those that play the part of lyars") "with a seared conscience,"
that is, contrary to their own knowledge. Concerning the first of these,
which is the Seducing of men by abuse of Scripture, I intend to speak
briefly in this Chapter.

Errors From Misinterpreting The Scriptures,
Concerning The Kingdome
Of God
The greatest, and main abuse of Scripture, and to which almost all the
rest are either consequent, or subservient, is the wresting of it, to prove
that the Kingdome of God, mentioned so often in the Scripture, is the
present Church, or multitude of Christian men now living, or that being
dead, are to rise again at the last day: whereas the Kingdome of God was
first instituted by the Ministery of Moses, over the Jews onely; who were
therefore called his Peculiar People; and ceased afterward, in the election
of Saul, when they refused to be governed by God any more, and
demanded a King after the manner of the nations; which God himself
consented unto, as I have more at large proved before, in the 35. Chapter.
After that time, there was no other Kingdome of God in the world, by any
Pact, or otherwise, than he ever was, is, and shall be King, of all men, and
of all creatures, as governing according to his Will, by his infinite Power.
Neverthelesse, he promised by his Prophets to restore this his Government
to them again, when the time he hath in his secret counsell appointed for it
shall bee fully come, and when they shall turn unto him by repentance, and
amendment of life; and not onely so, but he invited also the Gentiles to
come in, and enjoy the happinesse of his Reign, on the same conditions of
conversion and repentance; and hee promised also to send his Son into the
world, to expiate the sins of them all by his death, and to prepare them by
his Doctrine, to receive him at his second coming: Which second coming
not yet being, the Kingdome of God is not yet come, and wee are not now
under any other Kings by Pact, but our Civill Soveraigns; saving onely,
that Christian men are already in the Kingdome of Grace, in as much as
they have already the Promise of being received at his comming againe.

As That The Kingdome Of God Is The Present
Church
Consequent to this Errour, that the present Church is Christs Kingdome,
there ought to be some one Man, or Assembly, by whose mouth our
Saviour (now in heaven) speaketh, giveth law, and which representeth his
person to all Christians, or divers Men, or divers Assemblies that doe the
same to divers parts of Christendome. This power Regal under Christ,
being challenged, universally by that Pope, and in particular Commonwealths by Assemblies of the Pastors of the place, (when the Scripture
gives it to none but to Civill Soveraigns,) comes to be so passionately
disputed, that it putteth out the Light of Nature, and causeth so great a
Darknesse in mens understanding, that they see not who it is to whom they
have engaged their obedience.

And That The Pope Is His Vicar Generall
Consequent to this claim of the Pope to Vicar Generall of Christ in the
present Church, (supposed to be that Kingdom of his, to which we are
addressed in the Gospel,) is the Doctrine, that it is necessary for a
Christian King, to receive his Crown by a Bishop; as if it were from that
Ceremony, that he derives the clause of Dei Gratia in his title; and that
then onely he is made King by the favour of God, when he is crowned by
the authority of Gods universall Viceregent on earth; and that every Bishop
whosoever be his Soveraign, taketh at his Consecration an oath of absolute
Obedience to the Pope, Consequent to the same, is the Doctrine of the
fourth Councell of Lateran, held under Pope Innocent the third, (Chap. 3.
De Haereticis.) "That if a King at the Popes admonition, doe not purge his
Kingdome of Haeresies, and being excommunicate for the same, doe not
give satisfaction within a year, his Subjects are absolved of the bond of
their obedience." Where, by Haeresies are understood all opinions which
the Church of Rome hath forbidden to be maintained. And by this means,
as often as there is any repugnancy between the Politicall designes of the
Pope, and other Christian Princes, as there is very often, there ariseth such
a Mist amongst their Subjects, that they know not a stranger that thrusteth
himself into the throne of their lawfull Prince, from him whom they had
themselves placed there; and in this Darknesse of mind, are made to fight
one against another, without discerning their enemies from their friends,
under the conduct of another mans ambition.

And That The Pastors Are The Clergy
From the same opinion, that the present Church is the Kingdome of
God, it proceeds that Pastours, Deacons, and all other Ministers of the
Church, take the name to themselves of the Clergy, giving to other
Christians the name of Laity, that is, simply People. For Clergy signifies
those, whose maintenance is that Revenue, which God having reserved to
himselfe during his Reigne over the Israelites, assigned to the tribe of Levi
(who were to be his publique Ministers, and had no portion of land set
them out to live on, as their brethren) to be their inheritance. The Pope
therefore, (pretending the present Church to be, as the Realme of Israel,
the Kingdome of God) challenging to himselfe and his subordinate
Ministers, the like revenue, as the Inheritance of God, the name of Clergy
was sutable to that claime. And thence it is, that Tithes, or other tributes
paid to the Levites, as Gods Right, amongst the Israelites, have a long time
been demanded, and taken of Christians, by Ecclesiastiques, Jure Divino,
that is, in Gods Right. By which meanes, the people every where were
obliged to a double tribute; one to the State, another to the Clergy;
whereof, that to the Clergy, being the tenth of their revenue, is double to
that which a King of Athens (and esteemed a Tyrant) exacted of his
subjects for the defraying of all publique charges: For he demanded no
more but the twentieth part; and yet abundantly maintained therewith the
Commonwealth. And in the Kingdome of the Jewes, during the Sacerdotall
Reigne of God, the Tithes and Offerings were the whole Publique
Revenue.
From the same mistaking of the present Church for the Kingdom of
God, came in the distinction betweene the Civill and the Canon Laws: The
civil Law being the acts of Soveraigns in their own Dominions, and the
Canon Law being the Acts of the Pope in the same Dominions. Which
Canons, though they were but Canons, that is, Rules Propounded, and but
voluntarily received by Christian Princes, till the translation of the Empire
to Charlemain; yet afterwards, as the power of the Pope encreased, became
Rules Commanded, and the Emperours themselves (to avoyd greater

mischiefes, which the people blinded might be led into) were forced to let
them passe for Laws.
From hence it is, that in all Dominions, where the Popes Ecclesiasticall
power is entirely received, Jewes, Turkes, and Gentiles, are in the Roman
Church tolerated in their Religion, as farre forth, as in the exercise and
profession thereof they offend not against the civill power: whereas in a
Christian, though a stranger, not to be of the Roman Religion, is Capitall;
because the Pope pretendeth that all Christians are his Subjects. For
otherwise it were as much against the law of Nations, to persecute a
Christian stranger, for professing the Religion of his owne country, as an
Infidell; or rather more, in as much as they that are not against Christ, are
with him.
From the same it is, that in every Christian State there are certaine men,
that are exempt, by Ecclesiasticall liberty, from the tributes, and from the
tribunals of the Civil State; for so are the secular Clergy, besides Monks
and Friars, which in many places, bear so great a proportion to the
common people, as if need were, there might be raised out of them alone,
an Army, sufficient for any warre the Church militant should imploy them
in, against their owne, or other Princes.

Error From Mistaking Consecration For
Conjuration
A second generall abuse of Scripture, is the turning of Consecration into
Conjuration, or Enchantment. To Consecrate, is in Scripture, to Offer,
Give, or Dedicate, in pious and decent language and gesture, a man, or any
other thing to God, by separating of it from common use; that is to say, to
Sanctifie, or make it Gods, and to be used only by those, whom God hath
appointed to be his Publike Ministers, (as I have already proved at large in
the 35. Chapter;) and thereby to change, not the thing Consecrated, but
onely the use of it, from being Profane and common, to be Holy, and
peculiar to Gods service. But when by such words, the nature of qualitie of
the thing it selfe, is pretended to be changed, it is not Consecration, but
either an extraordinary worke of God, or a vaine and impious Conjuration.
But seeing (for the frequency of pretending the change of Nature in their
Consecrations,) it cannot be esteemed a work extraordinary, it is no other
than a Conjuration or Incantation, whereby they would have men to
beleeve an alteration of Nature that is not, contrary to the testimony of
mans Sight, and of all the rest of his Senses. As for example, when the
Priest, in stead of Consecrating Bread and Wine to Gods peculiar service
in the Sacrament of the Lords Supper, (which is but a separation of it from
the common use, to signifie, that is, to put men in mind of their
Redemption, by the Passion of Christ, whose body was broken, and blood
shed upon the Crosse for our transgressions,) pretends, that by saying of
the words of our Saviour, "This is my Body," and "This is my Blood," the
nature of Bread is no more there, but his very Body; notwithstanding there
appeared not to the Sight, or other Sense of the Receiver, any thing that
appeareth not before the Consecration. The Egyptian Conjurers, that are
said to have turned their Rods to Serpents, and the Water into Bloud, are
thought but to have deluded the senses of the Spectators by a false shew of
things, yet are esteemed Enchanters: But what should wee have thought of
them, if there had appeared in their Rods nothing like a Serpent, and in the
Water enchanted, nothing like Bloud, nor like any thing else but Water, but
that they had faced down the King, that they were Serpents that looked like

Rods, and that it was Bloud that seemed Water? That had been both
Enchantment, and Lying. And yet in this daily act of the Priest, they doe
the very same, by turning the holy words into the manner of a Charme,
which produceth nothing now to the Sense; but they face us down, that it
hath turned the Bread into a Man; nay more, into a God; and require men
to worship it, as if it were our Saviour himself present God and Man, and
thereby to commit most grosse Idolatry. For if it bee enough to excuse it of
Idolatry, to say it is no more Bread, but God; why should not the same
excuse serve the Egyptians, in case they had the faces to say, the Leeks,
and Onyons they worshipped, were not very Leeks, and Onyons, but a
Divinity under their Species, or likenesse. The words, "This is my Body,"
are aequivalent to these, "This signifies, or represents my Body;" and it is
an ordinary figure of Speech: but to take it literally, is an abuse; nor
though so taken, can it extend any further, than to the Bread which Christ
himself with his own hands Consecrated. For hee never said, that of what
Bread soever, any Priest whatsoever, should say, "This is my Body," or,
"This is Christs Body," the same should presently be transubstantiated. Nor
did the Church of Rome ever establish this Transubstantiation, till the time
of Innocent the third; which was not above 500. years agoe, when the
Power of Popes was at the Highest, and the Darknesse of the time grown
so great, as men discerned not the Bread that was given them to eat,
especially when it was stamped with the figure of Christ upon the Crosse,
as if they would have men beleeve it were Transubstantiated, not onely
into the Body of Christ, but also into the Wood of his Crosse, and that they
did eat both together in the Sacrament.

Incantation In The Ceremonies Of Baptisme
The like incantation, in stead of Consecration, is used also in the
Sacrament of Baptisme: Where the abuse of Gods name in each severall
Person, and in the whole Trinity, with the sign of the Crosse at each name,
maketh up the Charm: As first, when they make the Holy water, the Priest
saith, "I Conjure thee, thou Creature of Water, in the name of God the
Father Almighty, and in the name of Jesus Christ his onely Son our Lord,
and in vertue of the Holy Ghost, that thou become Conjured water, to drive
away all the Powers of the Enemy, and to eradicate, and supplant the
Enemy, &c." And the same in the Benediction of the Salt to be mingled
with it; "That thou become Conjured Salt, that all Phantasmes, and
Knavery of the Devills fraud may fly and depart from the place wherein
thou art sprinkled; and every unclean Spirit bee Conjured by Him that
shall come to judge the quicke and the dead." The same in the Benediction
of the Oyle. "That all the Power of the Enemy, all the Host of the Devill,
all Assaults and Phantasmes of Satan, may be driven away by this Creature
of Oyle." And for the Infant that is to be Baptized, he is subject to many
Charms; First, at the Church dore the Priest blows thrice in the Childs
face, and sayes, "Goe out of him unclean Spirit, and give place to the Holy
Ghost the Comforter." As if all Children, till blown on by the Priest were
Daemoniaques: Again, before his entrance into the Church, he saith as
before, "I Conjure thee, &c. to goe out, and depart from this Servant of
God:" And again the same Exorcisme is repeated once more before he be
Baptized. These, and some other Incantations, and Consecrations, in
administration of the Sacraments of Baptisme, and the Lords Supper;
wherein every thing that serveth to those holy men (except the unhallowed
Spittle of the Priest) hath some set form of Exorcisme.

In Marriage, In Visitation Of The Sick, And In
Consecration Of Places
Nor are the other rites, as of Marriage, of Extreme Unction, of Visitation
of the Sick, of Consecrating Churches, and Church-yards, and the like,
exempt from Charms; in as much as there is in them the use of Enchanted
Oyle, and Water, with the abuse of the Crosse, and of the holy word of
David, "Asperges me Domine Hyssopo," as things of efficacy to drive
away Phantasmes, and Imaginery Spirits.

Errors From Mistaking Eternall Life, And
Everlasting Death
Another generall Error, is from the Misinterpretation of the words
Eternall Life, Everlasting Death, and the Second Death. For though we
read plainly in Holy Scripture, that God created Adam in an estate of
Living for Ever, which was conditionall, that is to say, if he disobeyed not
his Commandement; which was not essentiall to Humane Nature, but
consequent to the vertue of the Tree of Life; whereof hee had liberty to
eat, as long as hee had not sinned; and that hee was thrust out of Paradise
after he had sinned, lest hee should eate thereof, and live for ever; and that
Christs Passion is a Discharge of sin to all that beleeve on him; and by
consequence, a restitution of Eternall Life, to all the Faithfull, and to them
onely: yet the Doctrine is now, and hath been a long time far otherwise;
namely, that every man hath Eternity of Life by Nature, in as much as his
Soul is Immortall: So that the flaming Sword at the entrance of Paradise,
though it hinder a man from coming to the Tree of Life, hinders him not
from the Immortality which God took from him for his Sin; nor makes
him to need the sacrificing of Christ, for the recovering of the same; and
consequently, not onely the faithfull and righteous, but also the wicked,
and the Heathen, shall enjoy Eternall Life, without any Death at all; much
lesse a Second, and Everlasting Death. To salve this, it is said, that by
Second, and Everlasting Death, is meant a Second, and Everlasting Life,
but in Torments; a Figure never used, but in this very Case.
All which Doctrine is founded onely on some of the obscurer places of
the New Testament; which neverthelesse, the whole scope of the Scripture
considered, are cleer enough in a different sense, and unnecessary to the
Christian Faith. For supposing that when a man dies, there remaineth
nothing of him but his carkasse; cannot God that raised inanimated dust
and clay into a living creature by his Word, as easily raise a dead carkasse
to life again, and continue him alive for Ever, or make him die again, by
another Word? The Soule in Scripture, signifieth alwaies, either the Life,
or the Living Creature; and the Body and Soule jointly, the Body Alive. In
the fift day of the Creation, God said, Let the water produce Reptile

Animae Viventis, the creeping thing that hath in it a Living Soule; the
English translate it, "that hath Life:" And again, God created Whales, "&
omnem animam viventem;" which in the English is, "every living
Creature:" And likewise of Man, God made him of the dust of the earth,
and breathed in his face the breath of Life, "& factus est Homo in animam
viventem," that is, "and Man was made a Living Creature;" And after Noah
came out of the Arke, God saith, hee will no more smite "omnem animam
viventem," that is "every Living Creature;" And Deut. 12.23. "Eate not the
Bloud, for the Bloud is the Soule;" that is "the Life." From which places, if
by Soule were meant a Substance Incorporeall, with an existence separated
from the Body, it might as well be inferred of any other living Creature, as
of Man. But that the Souls of the Faithfull, are not of their own Nature, but
by Gods speciall Grace, to remaine in their bodies, from the Resurrection
to all Eternity, I have already I think sufficiently proved out of the
Scriptures, in the 38. Chapter. And for the places of the New Testament,
where it is said that any man shall be cast Body and Soul into Hell fire, it
is no more than Body and Life; that is to say, they shall be cast alive into
the perpetuall fire of Gehenna.

As The Doctrine Of Purgatory, And Exorcismes,
And Invocation Of Saints
This window it is, that gives entrance to the Dark Doctrine, first, of
Eternall Torments; and afterwards of Purgatory, and consequently of the
walking abroad, especially in places Consecrated, Solitary, or Dark, of the
Ghosts of men deceased; and thereby to the pretences of Exorcisme and
Conjuration of Phantasmes; as also of Invocation of men dead; and to the
Doctrine of Indulgences; that is to say, of exemption for a time, or for
ever, from the fire of Purgatory, wherein these Incorporeall Substances are
pretended by burning to be cleansed, and made fit for Heaven. For men
being generally possessed before the time of our Saviour, by contagion of
the Daemonology of the Greeks, of an opinion, that the Souls of men were
substances distinct from their Bodies, and therefore that when the Body
was dead, the Soule of every man, whether godly, or wicked, must subsist
somewhere by vertue of its own nature, without acknowledging therein
any supernaturall gift of Gods; the Doctors of the Church doubted a long
time, what was the place, which they were to abide in, till they should be
re-united to their Bodies in the Resurrection; supposing for a while, they
lay under the Altars: but afterward the Church of Rome found it more
profitable, to build for them this place of Purgatory; which by some other
Churches in this later age, has been demolished.

The Texts Alledged For The Doctrines
Aforementioned Have Been Answered
Before
Let us now consider, what texts of Scripture seem most to confirm these
three generall Errors, I have here touched. As for those which Cardinall
Bellarmine hath alledged, for the present Kingdome of God administred
by the Pope, (than which there are none that make a better show of proof,)
I have already answered them; and made it evident, that the Kingdome of
God, instituted by Moses, ended in the election of Saul: After which time
the Priest of his own authority never deposed any King. That which the
High Priest did to Athaliah, was not done in his own right, but in the right
of the young King Joash her Son: But Solomon in his own right deposed
the High Priest Abiathar, and set up another in his place. The most
difficult place to answer, of all those than can be brought, to prove the
Kingdome of God by Christ is already in this world, is alledged, not by
Bellarmine, nor any other of the Church of Rome; but by Beza; that will
have it to begin from the Resurrection of Christ. But whether hee intend
thereby, to entitle the Presbytery to the Supreme Power Ecclesiasticall in
the Common-wealth of Geneva, (and consequently to every Presbytery in
every other Common-wealth,) or to Princes, and other Civill Soveraignes,
I doe not know. For the Presbytery hath challenged the power to
Excommunicate their owne Kings, and to bee the Supreme Moderators in
Religion, in the places where they have that form of Church government,
no lesse then the Pope challengeth it universally.

Answer To The Text On Which Beza Infereth
That The Kingdome Of Christ Began At The Resurrection The words are
(Marke 9.1.) "Verily, I say unto you, that there be some of them that stand
here, which shall not tast of death, till they have seene the Kingdome of
God come with power." Which words, if taken grammatically, make it
certaine, that either some of those men that stood by Christ at that time,
are yet alive; or else, that the Kingdome of God must be now in this
present world. And then there is another place more difficult: For when the
Apostles after our Saviours Resurrection, and immediately before his
Ascension, asked our Saviour, saying, (Acts.1.6.) "Wilt thou at this time
restore again the Kingdome to Israel," he answered them, "It is not for you
to know the times and the seasons, which the Father hath put in his own
power; But ye shall receive power by the comming of the Holy Ghost upon
you, and yee shall be my (Martyrs) witnesses both in Jerusalem, & in all
Judaea, and in Samaria, and unto the uttermost part of the Earth:" Which is
as much as to say, My Kingdome is not yet come, nor shall you foreknow
when it shall come, for it shall come as a theefe in the night; But I will
send you the Holy Ghost, and by him you shall have power to beare
witnesse to all the world (by your preaching) of my Resurrection, and the
workes I have done, and the doctrine I have taught, that they may beleeve
in me, and expect eternall life, at my comming againe: How does this
agree with the comming of Christs Kingdome at the Resurrection? And
that which St. Paul saies (1 Thessal. 1.9, 10.) "That they turned from Idols,
to serve the living and true God, and to waite for his Sonne from Heaven:"
Where to waite for his Sonne from Heaven, is to wait for his comming to
be King in power; which were not necessary, if this Kingdome had beene
then present. Againe, if the Kingdome of God began (as Beza on that place
(Mark 9.1.) would have it) at the Resurrection; what reason is there for
Christians ever since the Resurrection to say in their prayers, "Let thy
Kingdome Come"? It is therefore manifest, that the words of St. Mark are
not so to be interpreted. There be some of them that stand here (saith our
Saviour) that shall not tast of death till they have seen the Kingdome of
God come in power. If then this Kingdome were to come at the

Resurrection of Christ, why is it said, "some of them" rather than all? For
they all lived till after Christ was risen.

Explication Of The Place In Mark 9.1
But they that require an exact interpretation of this text, let them
interpret first the like words of our Saviour to St. Peter concerning St.
John, (chap. 21.22.) "If I will that he tarry till I come, what is that to
thee?" upon which was grounded a report that hee should not dye:
Neverthelesse the truth of that report was neither confirmed, as well
grounded; nor refuted, as ill grounded on those words; but left as a saying
not understood. The same difficulty is also in the place of St. Marke. And
if it be lawfull to conjecture at their meaning, by that which immediately
followes, both here, and in St. Luke, where the same is againe repeated, it
is not unprobable, to say they have relation to the Transfiguration, which
is described in the verses immediately following; where it is said, that
"After six dayes Jesus taketh with him Peter, and James, and John (not all,
but some of his Disciples) and leadeth them up into an high mountaine
apart by themselves, and was transfigured before them. And his rayment
became shining, exceeding white as snow; so as no Fuller on earth can
white them. And there appeared unto them Elias with Moses, and they
were talking with Jesus, &c." So that they saw Christ in Glory and
Majestie, as he is to come; insomuch as "They were sore afraid." And thus
the promise of our Saviour was accomplished by way of Vision: For it was
a Vision, as may probably bee inferred out of St. Luke, that reciteth the
same story (ch. 9. ve. 28.) and saith, that Peter and they that were with
him, were heavy with sleep; But most certainly out of Matth. 17.9. (where
the same is again related;) for our Saviour charged them, saying, "Tell no
man the Vision untill the Son of man be Risen from the dead." Howsoever
it be, yet there can from thence be taken no argument, to prove that the
Kingdome of God taketh beginning till the day of Judgement.

Abuse Of Some Other Texts In Defence Of The
Power Of The Pope
As for some other texts, to prove the Popes Power over civill
Soveraignes (besides those of Bellarmine;) as that the two Swords that
Christ and his Apostles had amongst them, were the Spirituall and the
Temporall Sword, which they say St. Peter had given him by Christ: And,
that of the two Luminaries, the greater signifies the Pope, and the lesser
the King; One might as well inferre out of the first verse of the Bible, that
by Heaven is meant the Pope, and by Earth the King: Which is not arguing
from Scripture, but a wanton insulting over Princes, that came in fashion
after the time the Popes were growne so secure of their greatnesse, as to
contemne all Christian Kings; and Treading on the necks of Emperours, to
mocke both them, and the Scripture, in the words of the 91. Psalm, "Thou
shalt Tread upon the Lion and the Adder, the young Lion and the Dragon
thou shalt Trample under thy feet."

The Manner Of Consecrations In The Scripture,
Was Without Exorcisms
As for the rites of Consecration, though they depend for the most part
upon the discretion and judgement of the governors of the Church, and not
upon the Scriptures; yet those governors are obliged to such direction, as
the nature of the action it selfe requireth; as that the ceremonies, words,
and gestures, be both decent, and significant, or at least conformable to the
action. When Moses consecrated the Tabernacle, the Altar, and the Vessels
belonging to them (Exod. 40.) he anointed them with the Oyle which God
had commanded to bee made for that purpose; and they were holy; There
was nothing Exorcised, to drive away Phantasmes. The same Moses (the
civill Soveraigne of Israel) when he consecrated Aaron (the High Priest,)
and his Sons, did wash them with Water, (not Exorcised water,) put their
Garments upon them, and anointed them with Oyle; and they were
sanctified, to minister unto the Lord in the Priests office; which was a
simple and decent cleansing, and adorning them, before hee presented
them to God, to be his servants. When King Solomon, (the civill
Soveraigne of Israel) consecrated the Temple hee had built, (2 Kings 8.) he
stood before all the Congregation of Israel; and having blessed them, he
gave thanks to God, for putting into the heart of his father, to build it; and
for giving to himselfe the grace to accomplish the same; and then prayed
unto him, first, to accept that House, though it were not sutable to his
infinite Greatnesse; and to hear the prayers of his Servants that should
pray therein, or (if they were absent) towards it; and lastly, he offered a
sacrifice of Peace-offering, and the House was dedicated. Here was no
Procession; the King stood still in his first place; no Exorcised Water; no
Asperges Me, nor other impertinent application of words spoken upon
another occasion; but a decent, and rationall speech, and such as in making
to God a present of his new built House, was most conformable to the
occasion. We read not that St. John did Exorcise the Water of Jordan; nor
Philip the Water of the river wherein he baptized the Eunuch; nor that any
Pastor in the time of the Apostles, did take his spittle, and put it to the
nose of the person to be Baptized, and say, "In odorem suavitatis," that is,

"for a sweet savour unto the Lord;" wherein neither the Ceremony of
Spittle, for the uncleannesse; nor the application of that Scripture for the
levity, can by any authority of man be justified.

The Immortality Of Mans Soule, Not Proved By
Scripture To Be Of Nature,
But Of Grace
To prove that the Soule separated from the Body liveth eternally, not
onely the Soules of the Elect, by especiall grace, and restauration of the
Eternall Life which Adam lost by Sinne, and our Saviour restored by the
Sacrifice of himself, to the Faithfull, but also the Soules of Reprobates, as
a property naturally consequent to the essence of mankind, without other
grace of God, but that which is universally given to all mankind; there are
divers places, which at the first sight seem sufficiently to serve the turn:
but such, as when I compare them with that which I have before (Chapter
38.) alledged out of the 14 of Job, seem to mee much more subject to a
divers interpretation, than the words of Job.
And first there are the words of Solomon (Ecclesiastes 12.7.) "Then
shall the Dust return to Dust, as it was, and the Spirit shall return to God
that gave it." Which may bear well enough (if there be no other text
directly against it) this interpretation, that God onely knows, (but Man
not,) what becomes of a mans spirit, when he expireth; and the same
Solomon, in the same Book, (Chap. 3. ver. 20,21.) delivereth in the same
sentence in the sense I have given it: His words are, "All goe, (man and
beast) to the same place; all are of the dust, and all turn to dust again; who
knoweth that the spirit of Man goeth upward, and the spirit of the Beast
goeth downward to the earth?" That is, none knows but God; Nor is it an
unusuall phrase to say of things we understand not, "God knows what," and
"God knows where." That of Gen. 5.24. "Enoch walked with God, and he
was not; for God took him;" which is expounded Heb. 13.5. "He was
translated, that he should not die; and was not found, because God had
translated him. For before his Translation, he had this testimony, that he
pleased God," making as much for the Immortality of the Body, as of the
Soule, proveth, that this his translation was peculiar to them that please
God; not common to them with the wicked; and depending on Grace, not
on Nature. But on the contrary, what interpretation shall we give, besides

the literall sense of the words of Solomon (Eccles. 3.19.) "That which
befalleth the Sons of Men, befalleth Beasts, even one thing befalleth them;
as the one dyeth, so doth the other; yea, they have all one breath (one
spirit;) so that a Man hath no praeeminence above a Beast, for all is
vanity." By the literall sense, here is no Naturall Immortality of the Soule;
nor yet any repugnancy with the Life Eternall, which the Elect shall enjoy
by Grace. And (chap. 4. ver.3.) "Better is he that hath not yet been, than
both they;" that is, than they that live, or have lived; which, if the Soule of
all them that have lived, were Immortall, were a hard saying; for then to
have an Immortall Soule, were worse than to have no Soule at all. And
againe,(Chapt. 9.5.) "The living know they shall die, but the dead know not
any thing;" that is, Naturally, and before the resurrection of the body.
Another place which seems to make for a Naturall Immortality of the
Soule, is that, where our Saviour saith, that Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are
living: but this is spoken of the promise of God, and of their certitude to
rise again, not of a Life then actuall; and in the same sense that God said
to Adam, that on the day hee should eate of the forbidden fruit, he should
certainly die; from that time forward he was a dead man by sentence; but
not by execution, till almost a thousand years after. So Abraham, Isaac,
and Jacob were alive by promise, then, when Christ spake; but are not
actually till the Resurrection. And the History of Dives and Lazarus, make
nothing against this, if wee take it (as it is) for a Parable.
But there be other places of the New Testament, where an Immortality
seemeth to be directly attributed to the wicked. For it is evident, that they
shall all rise to Judgement. And it is said besides in many places, that they
shall goe into "Everlasting fire, Everlasting torments, Everlasting
punishments; and that the worm of conscience never dyeth;" and all this is
comprehended in the word Everlasting Death, which is ordinarily
interpreted Everlasting Life In Torments: And yet I can find no where that
any man shall live in torments Everlastingly. Also, it seemeth hard, to say,
that God who is the Father of Mercies, that doth in Heaven and Earth all
that hee will; that hath the hearts of all men in his disposing; that worketh
in men both to doe, and to will; and without whose free gift a man hath
neither inclination to good, nor repentance of evill, should punish mens
transgressions without any end of time, and with all the extremity of
torture, that men can imagine, and more. We are therefore to consider,

what the meaning is, of Everlasting Fire, and other the like phrases of
Scripture.
I have shewed already, that the Kingdome of God by Christ beginneth at
the day of Judgment: That in that day, the Faithfull shall rise again, with
glorious, and spirituall Bodies, and bee his Subjects in that his Kingdome,
which shall be Eternall; That they shall neither marry, nor be given in
marriage, nor eate and drink, as they did in their naturall bodies; but live
for ever in their individuall persons, without the specificall eternity of
generation: And that the Reprobates also shall rise again, to receive
punishments for their sins: As also, that those of the Elect, which shall be
alive in their earthly bodies at that day, shall have their bodies suddenly
changed, and made spirituall, and Immortall. But that the bodies of the
Reprobate, who make the Kingdome of Satan, shall also be glorious, or
spirituall bodies, or that they shall bee as the Angels of God, neither
eating, nor drinking, nor engendring; or that their life shall be Eternall in
their individuall persons, as the life of every faithfull man is, or as the life
of Adam had been if hee had not sinned, there is no place of Scripture to
prove it; save onely these places concerning Eternall Torments; which may
otherwise be interpreted.
From whence may be inferred, that as the Elect after the Resurrection
shall be restored to the estate, wherein Adam was before he had sinned; so
the Reprobate shall be in the estate, that Adam, and his posterity were in
after the sin committed; saving that God promised a Redeemer to Adam,
and such of his seed as should trust in him, and repent; but not to them that
should die in their sins, as do the Reprobate.

Eternall Torments What
These things considered, the texts that mention Eternall Fire, Eternal
Torments, or the Word That Never Dieth, contradict not the Doctrine of a
Second, and Everlasting Death, in the proper and naturall sense of the
word Death. The Fire, or Torments prepared for the wicked in Gehenna,
Tophet, or in what place soever, may continue for ever; and there may
never want wicked men to be tormented in them; though not every, nor any
one Eternally. For the wicked being left in the estate they were in after
Adams sin, may at the Resurrection live as they did, marry, and give in
marriage, and have grosse and corruptible bodies, as all mankind now
have; and consequently may engender perpetually, after the Resurrection,
as they did before: For there is no place of Scripture to the contrary. For
St. Paul, speaking of the Resurrection (1 Cor. 15.) understandeth it onely
of the Resurrection to Life Eternall; and not the Resurrection to
Punishment. And of the first, he saith that the Body is "Sown in
Corruption, raised in Incorruption; sown in Dishonour, raised in Honour;
sown in Weaknesse, raised in Power; sown a Naturall body, raised a
Spirituall body:" There is no such thing can be said of the bodies of them
that rise to Punishment. The text is Luke 20. Verses 34,35,36. a fertile text.
"The Children of this world marry, and are given in marriage; but they that
shall be counted worthy to obtaine that world, and the Resurrection from
the dead, neither marry, nor are given in marriage: Neither can they die
any more; for they are equall to the Angells, and are the Children of God,
being the Children of the Resurrection:" The Children of this world, that
are in the estate which Adam left them in, shall marry, and be given in
marriage; that is corrupt, and generate successively; which is an
Immortality of the Kind, but not of the Persons of men: They are not
worthy to be counted amongst them that shall obtain the next world, and
an absolute Resurrection from the dead; but onely a short time, as inmates
of that world; and to the end onely to receive condign punishment for their
contumacy. The Elect are the onely children of the Resurrection; that is to
say the sole heirs of Eternall Life: they only can die no more; it is they
that are equall to the Angels, and that are the children of God; and not the

Reprobate. To the Reprobate there remaineth after the Resurrection, a
Second, and Eternall Death: between which Resurrection, and their
Second, and Eternall death, is but a time of Punishment and Torment; and
to last by succession of sinners thereunto, as long as the kind of Man by
propagation shall endure, which is Eternally.

Answer Of The Texts Alledged For Purgatory
Upon this Doctrine of the Naturall Eternity of separated Soules, is
founded (as I said) the Doctrine of Purgatory. For supposing Eternall Life
by Grace onely, there is no Life, but the Life of the Body; and no
Immortality till the Resurrection. The texts for Purgatory alledged by
Bellarmine out of the Canonicall Scripture of the old Testament, are first,
the Fasting of David for Saul and Jonathan, mentioned (2 Kings, 1. 12.);
and againe, (2 Sam. 3. 35.) for the death of Abner. This Fasting of David,
he saith, was for the obtaining of something for them at Gods hands, after
their death; because after he had Fasted to procure the recovery of his
owne child, assoone as he know it was dead, he called for meate. Seeing
then the Soule hath an existence separate from the Body, and nothing can
be obtained by mens Fasting for the Soules that are already either in
Heaven, or Hell, it followeth that there be some Soules of dead men, what
are neither in Heaven, nor in Hell; and therefore they must bee in some
third place, which must be Purgatory. And thus with hard straining, hee has
wrested those places to the proofe of a Purgatory; whereas it is manifest,
that the ceremonies of Mourning, and Fasting, when they are used for the
death of men, whose life was not profitable to the Mourners, they are used
for honours sake to their persons; and when tis done for the death of them
by whose life the Mourners had benefit, it proceeds from their particular
dammage: And so David honoured Saul, and Abner, with his Fasting; and
in the death of his owne child, recomforted himselfe, by receiving his
ordinary food.
In the other places, which he alledgeth out of the old Testament, there is
not so much as any shew, or colour of proofe. He brings in every text
wherein there is the word Anger, or Fire, or Burning, or Purging, or
Clensing, in case any of the Fathers have but in a Sermon rhetorically
applied it to the Doctrine of Purgatory, already beleeved. The first verse of
Psalme, 37. "O Lord rebuke me not in thy wrath, nor chasten me in thy hot
displeasure:" What were this to Purgatory, if Augustine had not applied the
Wrath to the fire of Hell, and the Displeasure, to that of Purgatory? And
what is it to Purgatory, that of Psalme, 66. 12. "Wee went through fire and

water, and thou broughtest us to a moist place;" and other the like texts,
(with which the Doctors of those times entended to adorne, or extend their
Sermons, or Commentaries) haled to their purposes by force of wit?

Places Of The New Testament For Purgatory
Answered
But he alledgeth other places of the New Testament, that are not so easie
to be answered: And first that of Matth. 12.32. "Whosoever speaketh a
word against the Sonne of man, it shall be forgiven him; but whosoever
speaketh against the Holy Ghost, it shall not bee forgiven him neither in
this world, nor in the world to come:" Where he will have Purgatory to be
the World to come, wherein some sinnes may be forgiven, which in this
World were not forgiven: notwithstanding that it is manifest, there are but
three Worlds; one from the Creation to the Flood, which was destroyed by
Water, and is called in Scripture the Old World; another from the Flood to
the day of Judgement, which is the Present World, and shall bee destroyed
by Fire; and the third, which shall bee from the day of Judgement forward,
everlasting, which is called the World To Come; and in which it is agreed
by all, there shall be no Purgatory; And therefore the World to come, and
Purgatory, are inconsistent. But what then can bee the meaning of those
our Saviours words? I confesse they are very hardly to bee reconciled with
all the Doctrines now unanimously received: Nor is it any shame, to
confesse the profoundnesse of the Scripture, to bee too great to be sounded
by the shortnesse of humane understanding. Neverthelesse, I may
propound such things to the consideration of more learned Divines, as the
text it selfe suggesteth. And first, seeing to speake against the Holy Ghost,
as being the third Person of the Trinity, is to speake against the Church, in
which the Holy Ghost resideth; it seemeth the comparison is made,
betweene the Easinesse of our Saviour, in bearing with offences done to
him while he was on earth, and the Severity of the Pastors after him,
against those which should deny their authority, which was from the Holy
Ghost: As if he should say, You that deny my Power; nay you that shall
crucifie me, shall be pardoned by mee, as often as you turne unto mee by
Repentance: But if you deny the Power of them that teach you hereafter,
by vertue of the Holy Ghost, they shall be inexorable, and shall not forgive
you, but persecute you in this World, and leave you without absolution,
(though you turn to me, unlesse you turn also to them,) to the punishments

(as much as lies in them) of the World to come: And so the words may be
taken as a Prophecy, or Praediction concerning the times, as they have
along been in the Christian Church: Or if this be not the meaning, (for I
am not peremptory in such difficult places,) perhaps there may be place
left after the Resurrection for the Repentance of some sinners: And there
is also another place, that seemeth to agree therewith. For considering the
words of St. Paul (1 Cor. 15. 29.) "What shall they doe which are Baptized
for the dead, if the dead rise not at all? why also are they Baptized for the
dead?" a man may probably inferre, as some have done, that in St. Pauls
time, there was a custome by receiving Baptisme for the dead, (as men
that now beleeve, are Sureties and Undertakers for the Faith of Infants,
that are not capable of beleeving,) to undertake for the persons of their
deceased friends, that they should be ready to obey, and receive our
Saviour for their King, at his coming again; and then the forgivenesse of
sins in the world to come, has no need of a Purgatory. But in both these
interpretations, there is so much of paradox, that I trust not to them; but
propound them to those that are throughly versed in the Scripture, to
inquire if there be no clearer place that contradicts them. Onely of thus
much, I see evident Scripture, to perswade men, that there is neither the
word, nor the thing of Purgatory, neither in this, nor any other text; nor any
thing that can prove a necessity of a place for the Soule without the Body;
neither for the Soule of Lazarus during the four days he was dead; nor for
the Soules of them which the Romane Church pretend to be tormented now
in Purgatory. For God, that could give a life to a peece of clay, hath the
same power to give life again to a dead man, and renew his inanimate, and
rotten Carkasse, into a glorious, spirituall, and immortall Body.
Another place is that of 1 Cor. 3. where it is said that they which built
Stubble, Hay, &c. on the true Foundation, their work shall perish; but "they
themselves shall be saved; but as through Fire:" This Fire, he will have to
be the Fire of Purgatory. The words, as I have said before, are an allusion
to those of Zach. 13. 9. where he saith, "I will bring the third part through
the Fire, and refine them as Silver is refined, and will try them as Gold is
tryed;" Which is spoken of the comming of the Messiah in Power and
Glory; that is, at the day of Judgment, and Conflagration of the present
world; wherein the Elect shall not be consumed, but be refined; that is,
depose their erroneous Doctrines, and Traditions, and have them as it were
sindged off; and shall afterwards call upon the name of the true God. In

like manner, the Apostle saith of them, that holding this Foundation Jesus
Is The Christ, shall build thereon some other Doctrines that be erroneous,
that they shall not be consumed in that fire which reneweth the world, but
shall passe through it to Salvation; but so, as to see, and relinquish their
former Errours. The Builders, are the Pastors; the Foundation, that Jesus Is
The Christ; the Stubble and Hay, False Consequences Drawn From It
Through Ignorance, Or Frailty; the Gold, Silver, and pretious Stones, are
their True Doctrines; and their Refining or Purging, the Relinquishing Of
Their Errors. In all which there is no colour at all for the burning of
Incorporeall, that is to say, Impatible Souls.

Baptisme For The Dead, How Understood
A third place is that of 1 Cor. 15. before mentioned, concerning
Baptisme for the Dead: out of which he concludeth, first, that Prayers for
the Dead are not unprofitable; and out of that, that there is a Fire of
Purgatory: But neither of them rightly. For of many interpretations of the
word Baptisme, he approveth this in the first place, that by Baptisme is
meant (metaphorically) a Baptisme of Penance; and that men are in this
sense Baptized, when they Fast, and Pray, and give Almes: And so
Baptisme for the Dead, and Prayer of the Dead, is the same thing. But this
is a Metaphor, of which there is no example, neither in the Scripture, nor
in any other use of language; and which is also discordant to the harmony,
and scope of the Scripture. The word Baptisme is used (Mar. 10. 38. &
Luk. 12. 59.) for being Dipped in ones own bloud, as Christ was upon the
Cross, and as most of the Apostles were, for giving testimony of him. But
it is hard to say, that Prayer, Fasting, and Almes, have any similitude with
Dipping. The same is used also Mat. 3. 11. (which seemeth to make
somewhat for Purgatory) for a Purging with Fire. But it is evident the Fire
and Purging here mentioned, is the same whereof the Prophet Zachary
speaketh (chap. 13. v. 9.) "I will bring the third part through the Fire, and
will Refine them, &c." And St. Peter after him (1 Epist. 1. 7.) "That the
triall of your Faith, which is much more precious than of Gold that
perisheth, though it be tryed with fire, might be found unto praise, and
honour, and glory at the Appearing of Jesus Christ;" And St. Paul (1 Cor. 3.
13.) The Fire shall trie every mans work of what sort it is." But St. Peter,
and St. Paul speak of the Fire that shall be at the Second Appearing of
Christ; and the Prophet Zachary of the Day of Judgment: And therefore
this place of S. Mat. may be interpreted of the same; and then there will be
no necessity of the Fire of Purgatory.
Another interpretation of Baptisme for the Dead, is that which I have
before mentioned, which he preferreth to the second place of probability;
And thence also he inferreth the utility of Prayer for the Dead. For if after
the Resurrection, such as have not heard of Christ, or not beleeved in him,
may be received into Christs Kingdome; it is not in vain, after their death,

that their friends should pray for them, till they should be risen. But
granting that God, at the prayers of the faithfull, may convert unto him
some of those that have not heard Christ preached, and consequently
cannot have rejected Christ, and that the charity of men in that point,
cannot be blamed; yet this concludeth nothing for Purgatory, because to
rise from Death to Life, is one thing; to rise from Purgatory to Life is
another; and being a rising from Life to Life, from a Life in torments to a
Life in joy.
A fourth place is that of Mat. 5. 25. "Agree with thine Adversary
quickly, whilest thou art in the way with him, lest at any time the
Adversary deliver thee to the Officer, and thou be cast into prison. Verily I
say unto thee, thou shalt by no means come out thence, till thou has paid
the uttermost farthing." In which Allegory, the Offender is the Sinner; both
the Adversary and the Judge is God; the Way is this Life; the Prison is the
Grave; the Officer, Death; from which, the sinner shall not rise again to
life eternall, but to a second Death, till he have paid the utmost farthing, or
Christ pay it for him by his Passion, which is a full Ransome for all
manner of sin, as well lesser sins, as greater crimes; both being made by
the passion of Christ equally veniall.
The fift place, is that of Matth. 5. 22. "Whosoever is angry with his
Brother without a cause, shall be guilty in Judgment. And whosoever shall
say to his Brother, RACHA, shall be guilty in the Councel. But whosoever
shall say, Thou Foole, shall be guilty to hell fire." From which words he
inferreth three sorts of Sins, and three sorts of Punishments; and that none
of those sins, but the last, shall be punished with hell fire; and
consequently, that after this life, there is punishment of lesser sins in
Purgatory. Of which inference, there is no colour in any interpretation that
hath yet been given to them: Shall there be a distinction after this life of
Courts of Justice, as there was amongst the Jews in our Saviours time, to
hear, and determine divers sorts of Crimes; as the Judges, and the
Councell? Shall not all Judicature appertain to Christ, and his Apostles? To
understand therefore this text, we are not to consider it solitarily, but
jointly with the words precedent, and subsequent. Our Saviour in this
Chapter interpreteth the Law of Moses; which the Jews thought was then
fulfilled, when they had not transgressed the Grammaticall sense thereof,
howsoever they had transgressed against the sentence, or meaning of the
Legislator. Therefore whereas they thought the Sixth Commandement was

not broken, but by Killing a man; nor the Seventh, but when a man lay
with a woman, not his wife; our Saviour tells them, the inward Anger of a
man against his brother, if it be without just cause, is Homicide: You have
heard (saith hee) the Law of Moses, "Thou shalt not Kill," and that
"Whosoever shall Kill, shall be condemned before the Judges," or before
the Session of the Seventy: But I say unto you, to be Angry with ones
Brother without cause; or to say unto him Racha, or Foole, is Homicide,
and shall be punished at the day of Judgment, and Session of Christ, and
his Apostles, with Hell fire: so that those words were not used to
distinguish between divers Crimes, and divers Courts of Justice, and
divers Punishments; but to taxe the distinction between sin, and sin, which
the Jews drew not from the difference of the Will in Obeying God, but
from the difference of their Temporall Courts of Justice; and to shew them
that he that had the Will to hurt his Brother, though the effect appear but
in Reviling, or not at all, shall be cast into hell fire, by the Judges, and by
the Session, which shall be the same, not different Courts at the day of
Judgment. This Considered, what can be drawn from this text, to maintain
Purgatory, I cannot imagine.
The sixth place is Luke 16. 9. "Make yee friends of the unrighteous
Mammon, that when yee faile, they may receive you into Everlasting
Tabernacles." This he alledges to prove Invocation of Saints departed. But
the sense is plain, That we should make friends with our Riches, of the
Poore, and thereby obtain their Prayers whilest they live. "He that giveth
to the Poore, lendeth to the Lord. "The seventh is Luke 23. 42. "Lord
remember me when thou commest into thy Kingdome:" Therefore, saith
hee, there is Remission of sins after this life. But the consequence is not
good. Our Saviour then forgave him; and at his comming againe in Glory,
will remember to raise him againe to Life Eternall.
The Eight is Acts 2. 24. where St. Peter saith of Christ, "that God had
raised him up, and loosed the Paines of Death, because it was not possible
he should be holden of it;" Which hee interprets to bee a descent of Christ
into Purgatory, to loose some Soules there from their torments; whereas it
is manifest, that it was Christ that was loosed; it was hee that could not
bee holden of Death, or the Grave; and not the Souls in Purgatory. But if
that which Beza sayes in his notes on this place be well observed, there is
none that will not see, that in stead of Paynes, it should be Bands; and then
there is no further cause to seek for Purgatory in this Text.

CHAPTER XLV. OF DAEMONOLOGY, AND
OTHER RELIQUES OF THE RELIGION OF
THE
GENTILES

The Originall Of Daemonology
The impression made on the organs of Sight, by lucide Bodies, either in
one direct line, or in many lines, reflected from Opaque, or refracted in the
passage through Diaphanous Bodies, produceth in living Creatures, in
whom God hath placed such Organs, an Imagination of the Object, from
whence the Impression proceedeth; which Imagination is called Sight; and
seemeth not to bee a meer Imagination, but the Body it selfe without us; in
the same manner, as when a man violently presseth his eye, there appears
to him a light without, and before him, which no man perceiveth but
himselfe; because there is indeed no such thing without him, but onely a
motion in the interiour organs, pressing by resistance outward, that makes
him think so. And the motion made by this pressure, continuing after the
object which caused it is removed, is that we call Imagination, and
Memory, and (in sleep, and sometimes in great distemper of the organs by
Sicknesse, or Violence) a Dream: of which things I have already spoken
briefly, in the second and third Chapters.
This nature of Sight having never been discovered by the ancient
pretenders to Naturall Knowledge; much lesse by those that consider not
things so remote (as that Knowledge is) from their present use; it was hard
for men to conceive of those Images in the Fancy, and in the Sense,
otherwise, than of things really without us: Which some (because they
vanish away, they know not whither, nor how,) will have to be absolutely
Incorporeall, that is to say Immateriall, of Formes without Matter; Colour
and Figure, without any coloured or figured Body; and that they can put on
Aiery bodies (as a garment) to make them Visible when they will to our
bodily Eyes; and others say, are Bodies, and living Creatures, but made of
Air, or other more subtile and aethereall Matter, which is, then, when they
will be seen, condensed. But Both of them agree on one generall
appellation of them, DAEMONS. As if the Dead of whom they Dreamed,
were not Inhabitants of their own Brain, but of the Air, or of Heaven, or
Hell; not Phantasmes, but Ghosts; with just as much reason, as if one
should say, he saw his own Ghost in a Looking-Glasse, or the Ghosts of the
Stars in a River; or call the ordinary apparition of the Sun, of the quantity

of about a foot, the Daemon, or Ghost of that great Sun that enlighteneth
the whole visible world: And by that means have feared them, as things of
an unknown, that is, of an unlimited power to doe them good, or harme;
and consequently, given occasion to the Governours of the Heathen
Common-wealths to regulate this their fear, by establishing that
DAEMONOLOGY (in which the Poets, as Principal Priests of the Heathen
Religion, were specially employed, or reverenced) to the Publique Peace,
and to the Obedience of Subjects necessary thereunto; and to make some
of them Good Daemons, and others Evill; the one as a Spurre to the
Observance, the other, as Reines to withhold them from Violation of the
Laws.

What Were The Daemons Of The Ancients
What kind of things they were, to whom they attributed the name of
Daemons, appeareth partly in the Genealogie of their Gods, written by
Hesiod, one of the most ancient Poets of the Graecians; and partly in other
Histories; of which I have observed some few before, in the 12. Chapter of
this discourse.

How That Doctrine Was Spread
The Graecians, by their Colonies and Conquests, communicated their
Language and Writings into Asia, Egypt, and Italy; and therein, by
necessary consequence their Daemonology, or (as St. Paul calles it) "their
Doctrines of Devils;" And by that meanes, the contagion was derived also
to the Jewes, both of Judaea, and Alexandria, and other parts, whereinto
they were dispersed. But the name of Daemon they did not (as the
Graecians) attribute to Spirits both Good, and Evill; but to the Evill onely:
And to the Good Daemons they gave the name of the Spirit of God; and
esteemed those into whose bodies they entred to be Prophets. In summe,
all singularity if Good, they attributed to the Spirit of God; and if Evill, to
some Daemon, but a kakodaimen, an Evill Daemon, that is, a Devill. And
therefore, they called Daemoniaques, that is, possessed by the Devill, such
as we call Madmen or Lunatiques; or such as had the Falling Sicknesse; or
that spoke any thing, which they for want of understanding, thought
absurd: As also of an Unclean person in a notorious degree, they used to
say he had an Unclean Spirit; of a Dumbe man, that he had a Dumbe
Devill; and of John Baptist (Math. 11. 18.) for the singularity of his
fasting, that he had a Devill; and of our Saviour, because he said, hee that
keepeth his sayings should not see Death In Aeternum, (John 8. 52.) "Now
we know thou hast a Devill; Abraham is dead, and the Prophets are dead:"
And again, because he said (John 7. 20.) "They went about to kill him," the
people answered, "Thou hast a Devill, who goeth about to kill thee?"
Whereby it is manifest, that the Jewes had the same opinions concerning
Phantasmes, namely, that they were not Phantasmes that is, Idols of the
braine, but things reall, and independent on the Fancy.

Why Our Saviour Controlled It Not
Which doctrine if it be not true, why (may some say) did not our
Saviour contradict it, and teach the Contrary? nay why does he use on
diverse occasions, such forms of speech as seem to confirm it? To this I
answer, that first, where Christ saith, "A Spirit hath not flesh and bone,"
though hee shew that there be Spirits, yet he denies not that they are
Bodies: And where St. Paul sais, "We shall rise Spirituall Bodies," he
acknowledgeth the nature of Spirits, but that they are Bodily Spirits; which
is not difficult to understand. For Air and many other things are Bodies,
though not Flesh and Bone, or any other grosse body, to bee discerned by
the eye. But when our Saviour speaketh to the Devill, and commandeth
him to go out of a man, if by the Devill, be meant a Disease, as Phrenesy,
or Lunacy, or a corporeal Spirit, is not the speech improper? can Diseases
heare? or can there be a corporeall Spirit in a Body of Flesh and Bone, full
already of vitall and animall Spirits? Are there not therefore Spirits, that
neither have Bodies, nor are meer Imaginations? To the first I answer, that
the addressing of our Saviours command to the Madnesse, or Lunacy he
cureth, is no more improper, then was his rebuking of the Fever, or of the
Wind, and Sea; for neither do these hear: Or than was the command of
God, to the Light, to the Firmament, to the Sunne, and Starres, when he
commanded them to bee; for they could not heare before they had a
beeing. But those speeches are not improper, because they signifie the
power of Gods Word: no more therefore is it improper, to command
Madnesse, or Lunacy (under the appellation of Devils, by which they were
then commonly understood,) to depart out of a mans body. To the second,
concerning their being Incorporeall, I have not yet observed any place of
Scripture, from whence it can be gathered, that any man was ever
possessed with any other Corporeal Spirit, but that of his owne, by which
his body is naturally moved.

The Scriptures Doe Not Teach That Spirits Are
Incorporeall
Our Saviour, immediately after the Holy Ghost descended upon him in
the form of a Dove, is said by St. Matthew (Chapt. 4. 1.) to have been "led
up by the Spirit into the Wildernesse;" and the same is recited (Luke 4. 1.)
in these words, "Jesus being full of the Holy Ghost, was led in the Spirit
into the Wildernesse;" Whereby it is evident, that by Spirit there, is meant
the Holy Ghost. This cannot be interpreted for a Possession: For Christ,
and the Holy Ghost, are but one and the same substance; which is no
possession of one substance, or body, by another. And whereas in the
verses following, he is said "to have been taken up by the Devill into the
Holy City, and set upon a pinnacle of the Temple," shall we conclude
thence that hee was possessed of the Devill, or carryed thither by
violence? And again, "carryed thence by the Devill into an exceeding high
mountain, who shewed him them thence all the Kingdomes of the world:"
herein, wee are not to beleeve he was either possessed, or forced by the
Devill; nor that any Mountaine is high enough, (according to the literall
sense,) to shew him one whole Hemisphere. What then can be the meaning
of this place, other than that he went of himself into the Wildernesse; and
that this carrying of him up and down, from the Wildernesse to the City,
and from thence into a Mountain, was a Vision? Conformable whereunto,
is also the phrase of St. Luke, that hee was led into the Wildernesse, not
By, but In the Spirit: whereas concerning His being Taken up into the
Mountaine, and unto the Pinnacle of the Temple, hee speaketh as St.
Matthew doth. Which suiteth with the nature of a Vision.
Again, where St. Luke sayes of Judas Iscariot, that "Satan entred into
him, and thereupon that he went and communed with the Chief Priests, and
Captaines, how he might betray Christ unto them:" it may be answered,
that by the Entring of Satan (that is the Enemy) into him, is meant, the
hostile and traiterous intention of selling his Lord and Master. For as by
the Holy Ghost, is frequently in Scripture understood, the Graces and good
Inclinations given by the Holy Ghost; so by the Entring of Satan, may bee
understood the wicked Cogitations, and Designes of the Adversaries of

Christ, and his Disciples. For as it is hard to say, that the Devill was entred
into Judas, before he had any such hostile designe; so it is impertinent to
say, he was first Christs Enemy in his heart, and that the Devill entred into
him afterwards. Therefore the Entring of Satan, and his Wicked Purpose,
was one and the same thing.
But if there be no Immateriall Spirit, nor any Possession of mens bodies
by any Spirit Corporeall, it may again be asked, why our Saviour and his
Apostles did not teach the People so; and in such cleer words, as they
might no more doubt thereof. But such questions as these, are more
curious, than necessary for a Christian mans Salvation. Men may as well
aske, why Christ that could have given to all men Faith, Piety, and all
manner of morall Vertues, gave it to some onely, and not to all: and why he
left the search of naturall Causes, and Sciences, to the naturall Reason and
Industry of men, and did not reveal it to all, or any man supernaturally;
and many other such questions: Of which neverthelesse there may be
alledged probable and pious reasons. For as God, when he brought the
Israelites into the Land of Promise, did not secure them therein, by
subduing all the Nations round about them; but left many of them, as
thornes in their sides, to awaken from time to time their Piety and
Industry: so our Saviour, in conducting us toward his heavenly Kingdome,
did not destroy all the difficulties of Naturall Questions; but left them to
exercise our Industry, and Reason; the Scope of his preaching, being onely
to shew us this plain and direct way to Salvation, namely, the beleef of this
Article, "that he was the Christ, the Son of the living God, sent into the
world to sacrifice himselfe for our Sins, and at his comming again,
gloriously to reign over his Elect, and to save them from their Enemies
eternally:" To which, the opinion of Possession by Spirits, or Phantasmes,
are no impediment in the way; though it be to some an occasion of going
out of the way, and to follow their own Inventions. If wee require of the
Scripture an account of all questions, which may be raised to trouble us in
the performance of Gods commands; we may as well complaine of Moses
for not having set downe the time of the creation of such Spirits, as well as
of the Creation of the Earth, and Sea, and of Men, and Beasts. To conclude,
I find in Scripture that there be Angels, and Spirits, good and evill; but not
that they are Incorporeall, as are the Apparitions men see in the Dark, or in
a Dream, or Vision; which the Latines call Spectra, and took for Daemons.
And I find that there are Spirits Corporeal, (though subtile and Invisible;)

but not that any mans body was possessed, or inhabited by them; And that
the Bodies of the Saints shall be such, namely, Spirituall Bodies, as St.
Paul calls them.

The Power Of Casting Out Devills, Not The Same
It Was In The Primitive
Church
Neverthelesse, the contrary Doctrine, namely, that there be Incorporeall
Spirits, hath hitherto so prevailed in the Church, that the use of Exorcisme,
(that is to say, of ejection of Devills by Conjuration) is thereupon built;
and (though rarely and faintly practised) is not yet totally given over. That
there were many Daemoniaques in the Primitive Church, and few Madmen, and other such singular diseases; whereas in these times we hear of,
and see many Mad-men, and few Daemoniaques, proceeds not from the
change of Nature; but of Names. But how it comes to passe, that whereas
heretofore the Apostles, and after them for a time, the Pastors of the
Church, did cure those singular Diseases, which now they are not seen to
doe; as likewise, why it is not in the power of every true Beleever now, to
doe all that the Faithfull did then, that is to say, as we read (Mark 16. 17.)
"In Christs name to cast out Devills, to speak with new Tongues, to take up
Serpents, to drink deadly Poison without harm taking, and to cure the Sick
by the laying on of their hands," and all this without other words, but "in
the Name of Jesus," is another question. And it is probable, that those
extraordinary gifts were given to the Church, for no longer a time, than
men trusted wholly to Christ, and looked for their felicity onely in his
Kingdome to come; and consequently, that when they sought Authority,
and Riches, and trusted to their own Subtilty for a Kingdome of this world,
these supernaturall gifts of God were again taken from them.

Another Relique Of Gentilisme, Worshipping
Images, Left In The Church
Not Brought Into It
Another relique of Gentilisme, is the Worship of Images, neither
instituted by Moses in the Old, nor by Christ in the New Testament; nor
yet brought in from the Gentiles; but left amongst them, after they had
given their names to Christ. Before our Saviour preached, it was the
generall Religion of the Gentiles, to worship for Gods, those Apparences
that remain in the Brain from the impression of externall Bodies upon the
organs of their Senses, which are commonly called Ideas, Idols,
Phantasmes, Conceits, as being Representations of those externall Bodies,
which cause them, and have nothing in them of reality, no more than there
is in the things that seem to stand before us in a Dream: And this is the
reason why St. Paul says, "Wee know that an Idol is Nothing:" Not that he
thought that an Image of Metall, Stone, or Wood, was nothing; but that the
thing which they honored, or feared in the Image, and held for a God, was
a meer Figment, without place, habitation, motion, or existence, but in the
motions of the Brain. And the worship of these with Divine Honour, is that
which is in the Scripture called Idolatry, and Rebellion against God. For
God being King of the Jews, and his Lieutenant being first Moses, and
afterward the High Priest; if the people had been permitted to worship, and
pray to Images, (which are Representations of their own Fancies,) they had
had no farther dependence on the true God, of whom there can be no
similitude; nor on his prime Ministers, Moses, and the High Priests; but
every man had governed himself according to his own appetite, to the utter
eversion of the Common-wealth, and their own destruction for want of
Union. And therefore the first Law of God was, "They should not take for
Gods, ALIENOS DEOS, that is, the Gods of other nations, but that onely
true God, who vouchsafed to commune with Moses, and by him to give
them laws and directions, for their peace, and for their salvation from their
enemies." And the second was, that "they should not make to themselves
any Image to Worship, of their own Invention." For it is the same deposing

of a King, to submit to another King, whether he be set up by a neighbour
nation, or by our selves.

Answer To Certain Seeming Texts For Images
The places of Scripture pretended to countenance the setting up of
Images, to worship them; or to set them up at all in the places where God
is worshipped, are First, two Examples; one of the Cherubins over the Ark
of God; the other of the Brazen Serpent: Secondly, some texts whereby we
are commanded to worship certain Creatures for their relation to God; as
to worship his Footstool: And lastly, some other texts, by which is
authorized, a religious honoring of Holy things. But before I examine the
force of those places, to prove that which is pretended, I must first explain
what is to be understood by Worshipping, and what by Images, and Idols.

What Is Worship
I have already shewn in the 20 Chapter of this Discourse, that to Honor,
is to value highly the Power of any person: and that such value is
measured, by our comparing him with others. But because there is nothing
to be compared with God in Power; we Honor him not but Dishonour him
by any Value lesse than Infinite. And thus Honor is properly of its own
nature, secret, and internall in the heart. But the inward thoughts of men,
which appeare outwardly in their words and actions, are the signes of our
Honoring, and these goe by the name of WORSHIP, in Latine, CULTUS.
Therefore, to Pray to, to Swear by, to Obey, to bee Diligent, and Officious
in Serving: in summe, all words and actions that betoken Fear to Offend,
or Desire to Please, is Worship, whether those words and actions be
sincere, or feigned: and because they appear as signes of Honoring, are
ordinarily also called Honor.

Distinction Between Divine And Civill Worship
The Worship we exhibite to those we esteem to be but men, as to Kings,
and men in Authority, is Civill Worship: But the worship we exhibite to
that which we think to bee God, whatsoever the words, ceremonies,
gestures, or other actions be, is Divine Worship. To fall prostrate before a
King, in him that thinks him but a Man, is but Civill Worship: And he that
but putteth off his hat in the Church, for this cause, that he thinketh it the
House of God, worshippeth with Divine Worship. They that seek the
distinction of Divine and Civill Worship, not in the intention of the
Worshipper, but in the Words douleia, and latreia, deceive themselves. For
whereas there be two sorts of Servants; that sort, which is of those that are
absolutely in the power of their Masters, as Slaves taken in war, and their
Issue, whose bodies are not in their own power, (their lives depending on
the Will of their Masters, in such manner as to forfeit them upon the least
disobedience,) and that are bought and sold as Beasts, were called Douloi,
that is properly, Slaves, and their Service, Douleia: The other, which is of
those that serve (for hire, or in hope of benefit from their Masters)
voluntarily; are called Thetes; that is, Domestique Servants; to whose
service the Masters have no further right, than is contained in the
Covenants made betwixt them. These two kinds of Servants have thus
much common to them both, that their labour is appointed them by
another, whether, as a Slave, or a voluntary Servant: And the word Latris,
is the general name of both, signifying him that worketh for another,
whether, as a Slave, or a voluntary Servant: So that Latreia signifieth
generally all Service; but Douleia the service of Bondmen onely, and the
condition of Slavery: And both are used in Scripture (to signifie our
Service of God) promiscuously. Douleia, because we are Gods Slaves;
Latreia, because wee Serve him: and in all kinds of Service is contained,
not onely Obedience, but also Worship, that is, such actions, gestures, and
words, as signifie Honor.

An Image What Phantasmes
An IMAGE (in the most strict signification of the word) is the
Resemblance of some thing visible: In which sense the Phantasticall
Formes, Apparitions, or Seemings of Visible Bodies to the Sight, are onely
Images; such as are the Shew of a man, or other thing in the Water, by
Reflexion, or Refraction; or of the Sun, or Stars by Direct Vision in the
Air; which are nothing reall in the things seen, nor in the place where thy
seem to bee; nor are their magnitudes and figures the same with that of the
object; but changeable, by the variation of the organs of Sight, or by
glasses; and are present oftentimes in our Imagination, and in our Dreams,
when the object is absent; or changed into other colours, and shapes, as
things that depend onely upon the Fancy. And these are the Images which
are originally and most properly called Ideas, and IDOLS, and derived
from the language of the Graecians, with whom the word Eido signifieth to
See. They are also called PHANTASMES, which is in the same language,
Apparitions. And from these Images it is that one of the faculties of mans
Nature, is called the Imagination. And from hence it is manifest, that there
neither is, nor can bee any Image made of a thing Invisible.
It is also evident, that there can be no Image of a thing Infinite: for all
the Images, and Phantasmes that are made by the Impression of things
visible, are figured: but Figure is a quantity every way determined: And
therefore there can bee no Image of God: nor of the Soule of Man; nor of
Spirits, but onely of Bodies Visible, that is, Bodies that have light in
themselves, or are by such enlightened.

Fictions; Materiall Images
And whereas a man can fancy Shapes he never saw; making up a Figure
out of the parts of divers creatures; as the Poets make their Centaures,
Chimaeras, and other Monsters never seen: So can he also give Matter to
those Shapes, and make them in Wood, Clay or Metall. And these are also
called Images, not for the resemblance of any corporeall thing, but for the
resemblance of some Phantasticall Inhabitants of the Brain of the Maker.
But in these Idols, as they are originally in the Brain, and as they are
painted, carved, moulded, or moulten in matter, there is a similitude of the
one to the other, for which the Materiall Body made by Art, may be said to
be the Image of the Phantasticall Idoll made by Nature.
But in a larger use of the word Image, is contained also, any
Representation of one thing by another. So an earthly Soveraign may be
called the Image of God: And an inferiour Magistrate the Image of an
earthly Soveraign. And many times in the Idolatry of the Gentiles there
was little regard to the similitude of their Materiall Idoll to the Idol in
their fancy, and yet it was called the Image of it. For a Stone unhewn has
been set up for Neptune, and divers other shapes far different from the
shapes they conceived of their Gods. And at this day we see many Images
of the Virgin Mary, and other Saints, unlike one another, and without
correspondence to any one mans Fancy; and yet serve well enough for the
purpose they were erected for; which was no more but by the Names onely,
to represent the Persons mentioned in the History; to which every man
applyeth a Mentall Image of his owne making, or none at all. And thus an
Image in the largest sense, is either the Resemblance, or the
Representation of some thing Visible; or both together, as it happeneth for
the most part.
But the name of Idoll is extended yet further in Scripture, to signifie
also the Sunne, or a Starre, or any other Creature, visible or invisible,
when they are worshipped for Gods.

Idolatry What
Having shewn what is Worship, and what an Image; I will now put them
together, and examine what that IDOLATRY is, which is forbidden in the
Second Commandement, and other places of the Scripture.
To worship an Image, is voluntarily to doe those externall acts, which
are signes of honoring either the matter of the Image, which is Wood,
Stone, or Metall, or some other visible creature; or the Phantasme of the
brain, for the resemblance, or representation whereof, the matter was
formed and figured; or both together, as one animate Body, composed of
the Matter and the Phantasme, as of a Body and Soule.
To be uncovered, before a man of Power and Authority, or before the
Throne of a Prince, or in such other places as hee ordaineth to that purpose
in his absence, is to Worship that man, or Prince with Civill Worship; as
being a signe, not of honoring the stoole, or place, but the Person; and is
not Idolatry. But if hee that doth it, should suppose the Soule of the Prince
to be in the Stool, or should present a Petition to the Stool, it were Divine
Worship, and Idolatry.
To pray to a King for such things, as hee is able to doe for us, though we
prostrate our selves before him, is but Civill Worship; because we
acknowledge no other power in him, but humane: But voluntarily to pray
unto him for fair weather, or for any thing which God onely can doe for us,
is Divine Worship, and Idolatry. On the other side, if a King compell a man
to it by the terrour of Death, or other great corporall punishment, it is not
Idolatry: For the Worship which the Soveraign commandeth to bee done
unto himself by the terrour of his Laws, is not a sign that he that obeyeth
him, does inwardly honour him as a God, but that he is desirous to save
himselfe from death, or from a miserable life; and that which is not a sign
of internall honor, is no Worship; and therefore no Idolatry. Neither can it
bee said, that hee that does it, scandalizeth, or layeth any stumbling block
before his Brother; because how wise, or learned soever he be that
worshippeth in that manner, another man cannot from thence argue, that
he approveth it; but that he doth it for fear; and that it is not his act, but the
act of the Soveraign.

To worship God, in some peculiar Place, or turning a mans face towards
an Image, or determinate Place, is not to worship, or honor the Place, or
Image; but to acknowledge it Holy, that is to say, to acknowledge the
Image, or the Place to be set apart from common use: for that is the
meaning of the word Holy; which implies no new quality in the Place, or
Image; but onely a new Relation by Appropriation to God; and therefore is
not Idolatry; no more than it was Idolatry to worship God before the
Brazen Serpent; or for the Jews when they were out of their owne countrey,
to turn their faces (when they prayed) toward the Temple of Jerusalem; or
for Moses to put off his Shoes when he was before the Flaming Bush, the
ground appertaining to Mount Sinai; which place God had chosen to
appear in, and to give his Laws to the People of Israel, and was therefore
Holy ground, not by inhaerent sanctity, but by separation to Gods use; or
for Christians to worship in the Churches, which are once solemnly
dedicated to God for that purpose, by the Authority of the King, or other
true Representant of the Church. But to worship God, is inanimating, or
inhibiting, such Image, or place; that is to say, an infinite substance in a
finite place, is Idolatry: for such finite Gods, are but Idols of the brain,
nothing reall; and are commonly called in the Scripture by the names of
Vanity, and Lyes, and Nothing. Also to worship God, not as inanimating, or
present in the place, or Image; but to the end to be put in mind of him, or
of some works of his, in case the Place, or Image be dedicated, or set up by
private authority, and not by the authority of them that are our Soveraign
Pastors, is Idolatry. For the Commandement is, "Thou shalt not make to
thy selfe any graven image." God commanded Moses to set up the Brazen
Serpent; hee did not make it to himselfe; it was not therefore against the
Commandement. But the making of the Golden Calfe by Aaron, and the
People, as being done without authority from God, was Idolatry; not onely
because they held it for God, but also because they made it for a Religious
use, without warrant either from God their Soveraign, or from Moses, that
was his Lieutenant.
The Gentiles worshipped for Gods, Jupiter, and others; that living, were
men perhaps that had done great and glorious Acts; and for the Children of
God, divers men and women, supposing them gotten between an Immortall
Deity, and a mortall man. This was Idolatry, because they made them so to
themselves, having no authority from God, neither in his eternall Law of
Reason, nor in his positive and revealed Will. But though our Saviour was

a man, whom wee also beleeve to bee God Immortall, and the Son of God;
yet this is no Idolatry; because wee build not that beleef upon our own
fancy, or judgment, but upon the Word of God revealed in the Scriptures.
And for the adoration of the Eucharist, if the words of Christ, "This is my
Body," signifie, "that he himselfe, and the seeming bread in his hand; and
not onely so, but that all the seeming morsells of bread that have ever
since been, and any time hereafter shall bee consecrated by Priests, bee so
many Christs bodies, and yet all of them but one body," then is that no
Idolatry, because it is authorized by our Saviour: but if that text doe not
signifie that, (for there is no other that can be alledged for it,) then,
because it is a worship of humane institution, it is Idolatry. For it is not
enough to say, God can transubstantiate the Bread into Christs Body: For
the Gentiles also held God to be Omnipotent; and might upon that ground
no lesse excuse their Idolatry, by pretending, as well as others, as
transubstantiation of their Wood, and Stone into God Almighty.
Whereas there be, that pretend Divine Inspiration, to be a supernaturall
entring of the Holy Ghost into a man, and not an acquisition of Gods
grace, by doctrine, and study; I think they are in a very dangerous
Dilemma. For if they worship not the men whom they beleeve to be so
inspired, they fall into Impiety; as not adoring Gods supernaturall
Presence. And again, if they worship them, they commit Idolatry; for the
Apostles would never permit themselves to be so worshipped. Therefore
the safest way is to beleeve, that by the Descending of the Dove upon the
Apostles; and by Christs Breathing on them, when hee gave them the Holy
Ghost; and by the giving of it by Imposition of Hands, are understood the
signes which God hath been pleased to use, or ordain to be used, of his
promise to assist those persons in their study to Preach his Kingdome, and
in their Conversation, that it might not be Scandalous, but Edifying to
others.

Scandalous Worship Of Images
Besides the Idolatrous Worship of Images, there is also a Scandalous
Worship of them; which is also a sin; but not Idolatry. For Idolatry is to
worship by signes of an internall, and reall honour: but Scandalous
Worship, is but Seeming Worship; and may sometimes bee joined with an
inward, and hearty detestation, both of the Image, and of the Phantasticall
Daemon, or Idol, to which it is dedicated; and proceed onely from the fear
of death, or other grievous punishment; and is neverthelesse a sin in them
that so worship, in case they be men whose actions are looked at by others,
as lights to guide them by; because following their ways, they cannot but
stumble, and fall in the way of Religion: Whereas the example of those we
regard not, works not on us at all, but leaves us to our own diligence and
caution; and consequently are no causes of our falling.
If therefore a Pastor lawfully called to teach and direct others, or any
other, of whose knowledge there is a great opinion, doe externall honor to
an Idol for fear; unlesse he make his feare, and unwillingnesse to it, as
evident as the worship; he Scandalizeth his Brother, by seeming to
approve Idolatry. For his Brother, arguing from the action of his teacher,
or of him whose knowledge he esteemeth great, concludes it to bee lawfull
in it selfe. And this Scandall, is Sin, and a Scandall given. But if one being
no Pastor, nor of eminent reputation for knowledge in Christian Doctrine,
doe the same, and another follow him; this is no Scandall given; for he had
no cause to follow such example: but is a pretence of Scandall which hee
taketh of himselfe for an excuse before men: For an unlearned man, that is
in the power of an idolatrous King, or State, if commanded on pain of
death to worship before an Idoll, hee detesteth the Idoll in his heart, hee
doth well; though if he had the fortitude to suffer death, rather than
worship it, he should doe better. But if a Pastor, who as Christs Messenger,
has undertaken to teach Christs Doctrine to all nations, should doe the
same, it were not onely a sinfull Scandall, in respect of other Christian
mens consciences, but a perfidious forsaking of his charge.
The summe of that which I have said hitherto, concerning the Worship
of Images, is that, that he that worshippeth in an Image, or any Creature,

either the Matter thereof, or any Fancy of his own, which he thinketh to
dwell in it; or both together; or beleeveth that such things hear his Prayers,
or see his Devotions, without Ears, or Eyes, committeth Idolatry: and he
that counterfeiteth such Worship for fear of punishment, if he bee a man
whose example hath power amongst his Brethren, committeth a sin: But he
that worshippeth the Creator of the world before such an Image, or in such
a place as he hath not made, or chosen of himselfe, but taken from the
commandement of Gods Word, as the Jewes did in worshipping God
before the Cherubins, and before the Brazen Serpent for a time, and in, or
towards the Temple of Jerusalem, which was also but for a time,
committeth not Idolatry.
Now for the Worship of Saints, and Images, and Reliques, and other
things at this day practised in the Church of Rome, I say they are not
allowed by the Word of God, not brought into the Church of Rome, from
the Doctrine there taught; but partly left in it at the first conversion of the
Gentiles; and afterwards countenanced, and confirmed, and augmented by
the Bishops of Rome.

Answer To The Argument From The Cherubins,
And Brazen Serpent
As for the proofs alledged out of Scripture, namely, those examples of
Images appointed by God to bee set up; They were not set up for the
people, or any man to worship; but that they should worship God himselfe
before them: as before the Cherubins over the Ark, and the Brazen
Serpent. For we read not, that the Priest, or any other did worship the
Cherubins; but contrarily wee read (2 Kings 18.4.) that Hezekiah brake in
pieces the Brazen Serpent which Moses had set up, because the People
burnt incense to it. Besides, those examples are not put for our Imitation,
that we also should set up Images, under pretence of worshipping God
before them; because the words of the second Commandement, "Thou
shalt not make to thy selfe any graven Image, &c." distinguish between the
Images that God commanded to be set up, and those which wee set up to
our selves. And therefore from the Cherubins, or Brazen Serpent, to the
Images of mans devising; and from the Worship commanded by God, to
the Will-Worship of men, the argument is not good. This also is to bee
considered, that as Hezekiah brake in pieces the Brazen Serpent, because
the Jews did worship it, to the end they should doe so no more; so also
Christian Soveraigns ought to break down the Images which their Subjects
have been accustomed to worship; that there be no more occasion of such
Idolatry. For at this day, the ignorant People, where Images are
worshipped, doe really beleeve there is a Divine Power in the Images; and
are told by their Pastors, that some of them have spoken; and have bled;
and that miracles have been done by them; which they apprehend as done
by the Saint, which they think either is the Image it self, or in it. The
Israelites, when they worshipped the Calfe, did think they worshipped the
God that brought them out of Egypt; and yet it was Idolatry, because they
thought the Calfe either was that God, or had him in his belly. And though
some man may think it impossible for people to be so stupid, as to think
the Image to be God, or a Saint; or to worship it in that notion; yet it is
manifest in Scripture to the contrary; where when the Golden Calfe was
made, the people said, (Exod. 32. 2.) "These are thy Gods O Israel;" and

where the Images of Laban (Gen. 31.30.) are called his Gods. And wee see
daily by experience in all sorts of People, that such men as study nothing
but their food and ease, are content to beleeve any absurdity, rather than to
trouble themselves to examine it; holding their faith as it were by entaile
unalienable, except by an expresse and new Law.

Painting Of Fancies No Idolatry: Abusing Them
To Religious Worship Is
But they inferre from some other places, that it is lawfull to paint
Angels, and also God himselfe: as from Gods walking in the Garden; from
Jacobs seeing God at the top of the ladder; and from other Visions, and
Dreams. But Visions, and Dreams whether naturall, or supernaturall, are
but Phantasmes: and he that painteth an Image of any of them, maketh not
an Image of God, but of his own Phantasm, which is, making of an Idol. I
say not, that to draw a Picture after a fancy, is a Sin; but when it is drawn,
to hold it for a Representation of God, is against the second
Commandement; and can be of no use, but to worship. And the same may
be said of the Images of Angels, and of men dead; unlesse as Monuments
of friends, or of men worthy remembrance: For such use of an Image, is
not Worship of the Image; but a civill honoring of the Person, not that is,
but that was: But when it is done to the Image which we make of a Saint,
for no other reason, but that we think he heareth our prayers, and is
pleased with the honour wee doe him, when dead, and without sense, wee
attribute to him more than humane power; and therefore it is Idolatry.
Seeing therefore there is no authority, neither in the Law of Moses, nor
in the Gospel, for the religious Worship of Images, or other
Representations of God, which men set up to themselves; or for the
Worship of the Image of any Creature in Heaven, or Earth, or under the
Earth: And whereas Christian Kings, who are living Representants of God,
are not to be worshipped by their Subjects, by any act, that signifieth a
greater esteem of his power, than the nature of mortall man is capable of;
It cannot be imagined, that the Religious Worship now in use, was brought
into the Church, by misunderstanding of the Scripture. It resteth therefore,
that it was left in it, by not destroying the Images themselves, in the
conversion of the Gentiles that worshipped them.

How Idolatry Was Left In The Church
The cause whereof, was the immoderate esteem, and prices set upon the
workmanship of them, which made the owners (though converted, from
worshipping them as they had done Religiously for Daemons) to retain
them still in their houses, upon pretence of doing it in the honor of Christ,
of the Virgin Mary, and of the Apostles, and other the Pastors of the
Primitive Church; as being easie, by giving them new names, to make that
an Image of the Virgin Mary, and of her Sonne our Saviour, which before
perhaps was called the Image of Venus, and Cupid; and so of a Jupiter to
make a Barnabas, and of Mercury a Paul, and the like. And as worldly
ambition creeping by degrees into the Pastors, drew them to an endeavour
of pleasing the new made Christians; and also to a liking of this kind of
honour, which they also might hope for after their decease, as well as
those that had already gained it: so the worshipping of the Images of
Christ and his Apostles, grow more and more Idolatrous; save that
somewhat after the time of Constantine, divers Emperors, and Bishops,
and generall Councells observed, and opposed the unlawfulnesse thereof;
but too late, or too weakly.

Canonizing Of Saints
The Canonizing of Saints, is another Relique of Gentilisme: It is neither
a misunderstanding of Scripture, nor a new invention of the Roman
Church, but a custome as ancient as the Common-wealth of Rome it self.
The first that ever was canonized at Rome, was Romulus, and that upon
the narration of Julius Proculus, that swore before the Senate, he spake
with him after his death, and was assured by him, he dwelt in Heaven, and
was there called Quirinius, and would be propitious to the State of their
new City: And thereupon the Senate gave Publique Testimony of his
Sanctity. Julius Caesar, and other Emperors after him, had the like
Testimony; that is, were Canonized for Saints; now defined; and is the
same with the Apotheosis of the Heathen.

The Name Of Pontifex
It is also from the Roman Heathen, that the Popes have received the
name, and power of PONTIFEX MAXIMUS. This was the name of him
that in the ancient Common-wealth of Rome, had the Supreme Authority
under the Senate and People, of regulating all Ceremonies, and Doctrines
concerning their Religion: And when Augustus Caesar changed the State
into a Monarchy, he took to himselfe no more but this office, and that of
Tribune of the People, (than is to say, the Supreme Power both in State,
and Religion;) and the succeeding Emperors enjoyed the same. But when
the Emperour Constantine lived, who was the first that professed and
authorized Christian Religion, it was consonant to his profession, to cause
Religion to be regulated (under his authority) by the Bishop of Rome:
Though it doe not appear they had so soon the name of Pontifex; but
rather, that the succeeding Bishops took it of themselves, to countenance
the power they exercised over the Bishops of the Roman Provinces. For it
is not any Priviledge of St. Peter, but the Priviledge of the City of Rome,
which the Emperors were alwaies willing to uphold; that gave them such
authority over other Bishops; as may be evidently seen by that, that the
Bishop of Constantinople, when the Emperour made that City the Seat of
the Empire, pretended to bee equall to the Bishop of Rome; though at last,
not without contention, the Pope carryed it, and became the Pontifex
Maximus; but in right onely of the Emperour; and not without the bounds
of the Empire; nor any where, after the Emperour had lost his power in
Rome; though it were the Pope himself that took his power from him.
From whence wee may by the way observe, that there is no place for the
superiority of the Pope over other Bishops, except in the territories
whereof he is himself the Civill Soveraign; and where the Emperour
having Soveraign Power Civill, hath expressely chosen the Pope for the
chief Pastor under himselfe, of his Christian Subjects.

Procession Of Images
The carrying about of Images in Procession, is another Relique of the
Religion of the Greeks, and Romans: For they also carried their Idols from
place to place, in a kind of Chariot, which was peculiarly dedicated to that
use, which the Latines called Thensa, and Vehiculum Deorum; and the
Image was placed in a frame, or Shrine, which they called Ferculum: And
that which they called Pompa, is the same that now is named Procession:
According whereunto, amongst the Divine Honors which were given to
Julius Caesar by the Senate, this was one, that in the Pompe (or
Procession) at the Circaean games, he should have Thensam & Ferculum,
a sacred Chariot, and a Shrine; which was as much, as to be carried up and
down as a God: Just as at this day the Popes are carried by Switzers under
a Canopie.

Wax Candles, And Torches Lighted
To these Processions also belonged the bearing of burning Torches, and
Candles, before the Images of the Gods, both amongst the Greeks, and
Romans. For afterwards the Emperors of Rome received the same honor;
as we read of Caligula, that at his reception to the Empire, he was carried
from Misenum to Rome, in the midst of a throng of People, the wayes
beset with Altars, and Beasts for Sacrifice, and burning Torches: And of
Caracalla that was received into Alexandria with Incense, and with casting
of Flowers, and Dadouchiais, that is, with Torches; for Dadochoi were they
that amongst the Greeks carried Torches lighted in the Processions of their
Gods: And in processe of time, the devout, but ignorant People, did many
times honor their Bishops with the like pompe of Wax Candles, and the
Images of our Saviour, and the Saints, constantly, in the Church it self.
And thus came in the use of Wax Candles; and was also established by
some of the ancient Councells.
The Heathens had also their Aqua Lustralis, that is to say, Holy Water.
The Church of Rome imitates them also in their Holy Dayes. They had
their Bacchanalia; and we have our Wakes, answering to them: They their
Saturnalia, and we our Carnevalls, and Shrove-tuesdays liberty of
Servants: They their Procession of Priapus; wee our fetching in, erection,
and dancing about May-poles; and Dancing is one kind of Worship: They
had their Procession called Ambarvalia; and we our Procession about the
fields in the Rogation Week. Nor do I think that these are all the
Ceremonies that have been left in the Church, from the first conversion of
the Gentiles: but they are all that I can for the present call to mind; and if a
man would wel observe that which is delivered in the Histories,
concerning the Religious Rites of the Greeks and Romanes, I doubt not but
he might find many more of these old empty Bottles of Gentilisme, which
the Doctors of the Romane Church, either by Negligence, or Ambition,
have filled up again with the new Wine of Christianity, that will not faile
in time to break them.

CHAPTER XLVI. OF DARKNESSE FROM VAIN
PHILOSOPHY, AND FABULOUS TRADITIONS

What Philosophy Is
By Philosophy is understood "the Knowledge acquired by Reasoning,
from the Manner of the Generation of any thing, to the Properties; or from
the Properties, to some possible Way of Generation of the same; to the end
to bee able to produce, as far as matter, and humane force permit, such
Effects, as humane life requireth." So the Geometrician, from the
Construction of Figures, findeth out many Properties thereof; and from the
Properties, new Ways of their Construction, by Reasoning; to the end to be
able to measure Land and Water; and for infinite other uses. So the
Astronomer, from the Rising, Setting, and Moving of the Sun, and Starres,
in divers parts of the Heavens, findeth out the Causes of Day, and Night,
and of the different Seasons of the Year; whereby he keepeth an account of
Time: And the like of other Sciences.

Prudence No Part Of Philosophy
By which Definition it is evident, that we are not to account as any part
thereof, that originall knowledge called Experience, in which consisteth
Prudence: Because it is not attained by Reasoning, but found as well in
Brute Beasts, as in Man; and is but a Memory of successions of events in
times past, wherein the omission of every little circumstance altering the
effect, frustrateth the expectation of the most Prudent: whereas nothing is
produced by Reasoning aright, but generall, eternall, and immutable Truth.

No False Doctrine Is Part Of Philosophy
Nor are we therefore to give that name to any false Conclusions: For he
that Reasoneth aright in words he understandeth, can never conclude an
Error:
No More Is Revelation Supernaturall
Nor to that which any man knows by supernaturall Revelation; because
it is not acquired by Reasoning:

Nor Learning Taken Upon Credit Of Authors
Nor that which is gotten by Reasoning from the Authority of Books;
because it is not by Reasoning from the Cause to the Effect, nor from the
Effect to the Cause; and is not Knowledge, but Faith.

Of The Beginnings And Progresse Of Philosophy
The faculty of Reasoning being consequent to the use of Speech, it was
not possible, but that there should have been some generall Truthes found
out by Reasoning, as ancient almost as Language it selfe. The Savages of
America, are not without some good Morall Sentences; also they have a
little Arithmetick, to adde, and divide in Numbers not too great: but they
are not therefore Philosophers. For as there were Plants of Corn and Wine
in small quantity dispersed in the Fields and Woods, before men knew
their vertue, or made use of them for their nourishment, or planted them
apart in Fields, and Vineyards; in which time they fed on Akorns, and
drank Water: so also there have been divers true, generall, and profitable
Speculations from the beginning; as being the naturall plants of humane
Reason: But they were at first but few in number; men lived upon grosse
Experience; there was no Method; that is to say, no Sowing, nor Planting
of Knowledge by it self, apart from the Weeds, and common Plants of
Errour and Conjecture: And the cause of it being the want of leasure from
procuring the necessities of life, and defending themselves against their
neighbours, it was impossible, till the erecting of great Common-wealths,
it should be otherwise. Leasure is the mother of Philosophy; and Commonwealth, the mother of Peace, and Leasure: Where first were great and
flourishing Cities, there was first the study of Philosophy. The
Gymnosophists of India, the Magi of Persia, and the Priests of Chaldea
and Egypt, are counted the most ancient Philosophers; and those
Countreys were the most ancient of Kingdomes. Philosophy was not risen
to the Graecians, and other people of the West, whose Common-wealths
(no greater perhaps then Lucca, or Geneva) had never Peace, but when
their fears of one another were equall; nor the Leasure to observe any
thing but one another. At length, when Warre had united many of these
Graecian lesser Cities, into fewer, and greater; then began Seven Men, of
severall parts of Greece, to get the reputation of being Wise; some of them
for Morall and Politique Sentences; and others for the learning of the
Chaldeans and Egyptians, which was Astronomy, and Geometry. But we
hear not yet of any Schools of Philosophy.

Of The Schools Of Philosophy Amongst The
Athenians
After the Athenians by the overthrow of the Persian Armies, had gotten
the Dominion of the Sea; and thereby, of all the Islands, and Maritime
Cities of the Archipelago, as well of Asia as Europe; and were grown
wealthy; they that had no employment, neither at home, nor abroad, had
little else to employ themselves in, but either (as St. Luke says, Acts
17.21.) "in telling and hearing news," or in discoursing of Philosophy
publiquely to the youth of the City. Every Master took some place for that
purpose. Plato in certaine publique Walks called Academia, from one
Academus: Aristotle in the Walk of the Temple of Pan, called Lycaeum:
others in the Stoa, or covered Walk, wherein the Merchants Goods were
brought to land: others in other places; where they spent the time of their
Leasure, in teaching or in disputing of their Opinions: and some in any
place, where they could get the youth of the City together to hear them
talk. And this was it which Carneades also did at Rome, when he was
Ambassadour: which caused Cato to advise the Senate to dispatch him
quickly, for feare of corrupting the manners of the young men that
delighted to hear him speak (as they thought) fine things.
From this it was, that the place where any of them taught, and disputed,
was called Schola, which in their Tongue signifieth Leasure; and their
Disputations, Diatribae, that is to say, Passing of The Time. Also the
Philosophers themselves had the name of their Sects, some of them from
these their Schools: For they that followed Plato's Doctrine, were called
Academiques; The followers of Aristotle, Peripatetiques, from the Walk
hee taught in; and those that Zeno taught, Stoiques, from the Stoa: as if we
should denominate men from More-fields, from Pauls-Church, and from
the Exchange, because they meet there often, to prate and loyter.
Neverthelesse, men were so much taken with this custome, that in time
it spread it selfe over all Europe, and the best part of Afrique; so as there
were Schools publiquely erected, and maintained for Lectures, and
Disputations, almost in every Common-wealth.

Of The Schools Of The Jews
There were also Schools, anciently, both before, and after the time of
our Saviour, amongst the Jews: but they were Schools of their Law. For
though they were called Synagogues, that is to say, Congregations of the
People; yet in as much as the Law was every Sabbath day read, expounded,
and disputed in them, they differed not in nature, but in name onely from
Publique Schools; and were not onely in Jerusalem, but in every City of
the Gentiles, where the Jews inhabited. There was such a Schoole at
Damascus, whereinto Paul entred, to persecute. There were others at
Antioch, Iconium and Thessalonica, whereinto he entred, to dispute: And
such was the Synagogue of the Libertines, Cyrenians, Alexandrians,
Cilicians, and those of Asia; that is to say, the Schoole of Libertines, and
of Jewes, that were strangers in Jerusalem: And of this Schoole they were
that disputed with Saint Steven.

The Schoole Of Graecians Unprofitable
But what has been the Utility of those Schools? what Science is there at
this day acquired by their Readings and Disputings? That wee have of
Geometry, which is the Mother of all Naturall Science, wee are not
indebted for it to the Schools. Plato that was the best Philosopher of the
Greeks, forbad entrance into his Schoole, to all that were not already in
some measure Geometricians. There were many that studied that Science
to the great advantage of mankind: but there is no mention of their
Schools; nor was there any Sect of Geometricians; nor did they then passe
under the name of Philosophers. The naturall Philosophy of those Schools,
was rather a Dream than Science, and set forth in senselesse and
insignificant Language; which cannot be avoided by those that will teach
Philosophy, without having first attained great knowledge in Geometry:
For Nature worketh by Motion; the Wayes, and Degrees whereof cannot be
known, without the knowledge of the Proportions and Properties of Lines,
and Figures. Their Morall Philosophy is but a description of their own
Passions. For the rule of Manners, without Civill Government, is the Law
of Nature; and in it, the Law Civill; that determineth what is Honest, and
Dishonest; what is Just, and Unjust; and generally what is Good, and Evill:
whereas they make the Rules of Good, and Bad, by their own Liking, and
Disliking: By which means, in so great diversity of taste, there is nothing
generally agreed on; but every one doth (as far as he dares) whatsoever
seemeth good in his own eyes, to the subversion of Common-wealth. Their
Logique which should bee the Method of Reasoning, is nothing else but
Captions of Words, and Inventions how to puzzle such as should goe about
to pose them. To conclude there is nothing so absurd, that the old
Philosophers (as Cicero saith, who was one of them) have not some of
them maintained. And I beleeve that scarce any thing can be more
absurdly said in naturall Philosophy, than that which now is called
Aristotles Metaphysiques, nor more repugnant to Government, than much
of that hee hath said in his Politiques; nor more ignorantly, than a great
part of his Ethiques.

The Schools Of The Jews Unprofitable
The Schoole of the Jews, was originally a Schoole of the Law of Moses;
who commanded (Deut. 31.10.) that at the end of every seventh year, at the
Feast of the Tabernacles, it should be read to all the people, that they
might hear, and learn it: Therefore the reading of the Law (which was in
use after the Captivity) every Sabbath day, ought to have had no other end,
but the acquainting of the people with the Commandements which they
were to obey, and to expound unto them the writings of the Prophets. But it
is manifest, by the many reprehensions of them by our Saviour, that they
corrupted the Text of the Law with their false Commentaries, and vain
Traditions; and so little understood the Prophets, that they did neither
acknowledge Christ, nor the works he did; for which the Prophets
prophecyed. So that by their Lectures and Disputations in their
Synagogues, they turned the Doctrine of their Law into a Phantasticall
kind of Philosophy, concerning the incomprehensible nature of God, and of
Spirits; which they compounded of the Vain Philosophy and Theology of
the Graecians, mingled with their own fancies, drawn from the obscurer
places of the Scripture, and which might most easily bee wrested to their
purpose; and from the Fabulous Traditions of their Ancestors.

University What It Is
That which is now called an University, is a Joyning together, and an
Incorporation under one Government of many Publique Schools, in one
and the same Town or City. In which, the principal Schools were ordained
for the three Professions, that is to say, of the Romane Religion, of the
Romane Law, and of the Art of Medicine. And for the study of Philosophy
it hath no otherwise place, then as a handmaid to the Romane Religion:
And since the Authority of Aristotle is onely current there, that study is
not properly Philosophy, (the nature whereof dependeth not on Authors,)
but Aristotelity. And for Geometry, till of very late times it had no place at
all; as being subservient to nothing but rigide Truth. And if any man by the
ingenuity of his owne nature, had attained to any degree of perfection
therein, hee was commonly thought a Magician, and his Art Diabolicall.

Errors Brought Into Religion From Aristotles
Metaphysiques
Now to descend to the particular Tenets of Vain Philosophy, derived to
the Universities, and thence into the Church, partly from Aristotle, partly
from Blindnesse of understanding; I shall first consider their Principles.
There is a certain Philosophia Prima, on which all other Philosophy ought
to depend; and consisteth principally, in right limiting of the significations
of such Appellations, or Names, as are of all others the most Universall:
Which Limitations serve to avoid ambiguity, and aequivocation in
Reasoning; and are commonly called Definitions; such as are the
Definitions of Body, Time, Place, Matter, Forme, Essence, Subject,
Substance, Accident, Power, Act, Finite, Infinite, Quantity, Quality,
Motion, Action, Passion, and divers others, necessary to the explaining of
a mans Conceptions concerning the Nature and Generation of Bodies. The
Explication (that is, the setling of the meaning) of which, and the like
Terms, is commonly in the Schools called Metaphysiques; as being a part
of the Philosophy of Aristotle, which hath that for title: but it is in another
sense; for there it signifieth as much, as "Books written, or placed after his
naturall Philosophy:" But the Schools take them for Books Of
Supernaturall Philosophy: for the word Metaphysiques will bear both these
senses. And indeed that which is there written, is for the most part so far
from the possibility of being understood, and so repugnant to naturall
Reason, that whosoever thinketh there is any thing to bee understood by it,
must needs think it supernaturall.

Errors Concerning Abstract Essences
From these Metaphysiques, which are mingled with the Scripture to
make Schoole Divinity, wee are told, there be in the world certaine
Essences separated from Bodies, which they call Abstract Essences, and
Substantiall Formes: For the Interpreting of which Jargon, there is need of
somewhat more than ordinary attention in this place. Also I ask pardon of
those that are not used to this kind of Discourse, for applying my selfe to
those that are. The World, (I mean not the Earth onely, that denominates
the Lovers of it Worldly Men, but the Universe, that is, the whole masse of
all things that are) is Corporeall, that is to say, Body; and hath the
dimensions of Magnitude, namely, Length, Bredth, and Depth: also every
part of Body, is likewise Body, and hath the like dimensions; and
consequently every part of the Universe, is Body, and that which is not
Body, is no part of the Universe: And because the Universe is all, that
which is no part of it, is Nothing; and consequently No Where. Nor does it
follow from hence, that Spirits are Nothing: for they have dimensions, and
are therefore really Bodies; though that name in common Speech be given
to such Bodies onely, as are visible, or palpable; that is, that have some
degree of Opacity: But for Spirits, they call them Incorporeall; which is a
name of more honour, and may therefore with more piety bee attributed to
God himselfe; in whom wee consider not what Attribute expresseth best
his Nature, which is Incomprehensible; but what best expresseth our desire
to honour him.
To know now upon what grounds they say there be Essences Abstract, or
Substantiall Formes, wee are to consider what those words do properly
signifie. The use of Words, is to register to our selves, and make manifest
to others the Thoughts and Conceptions of our Minds. Of which Words,
some are the names of the Things conceived; as the names of all sorts of
Bodies, that work upon the Senses, and leave an Impression in the
Imagination: Others are the names of the Imaginations themselves; that is
to say, of those Ideas, or mentall Images we have of all things wee see, or
remember: And others againe are names of Names; or of different sorts of
Speech: As Universall, Plurall, Singular, Negation, True, False,

Syllogisme, Interrogation, Promise, Covenant, are the names of certain
Forms of Speech. Others serve to shew the Consequence, or Repugnance
of one name to another; as when one saith, "A Man is a Body," hee
intendeth that the name of Body is necessarily consequent to the name of
Man; as being but severall names of the same thing, Man; which
Consequence is signified by coupling them together with the word Is. And
as wee use the Verbe Is; so the Latines use their Verbe Est, and the Greeks
their Esti through all its Declinations. Whether all other Nations of the
world have in their severall languages a word that answereth to it, or not, I
cannot tell; but I am sure they have not need of it: For the placing of two
names in order may serve to signifie their Consequence, if it were the
custome, (for Custome is it, that give words their force,) as well as the
words Is, or Bee, or Are, and the like.
And if it were so, that there were a Language without any Verb
answerable to Est, or Is, or Bee; yet the men that used it would bee not a
jot the lesse capable of Inferring, Concluding, and of all kind of
Reasoning, than were the Greeks, and Latines. But what then would
become of these Terms, of Entity, Essence, Essentiall, Essentially, that are
derived from it, and of many more that depend on these, applyed as most
commonly they are? They are therefore no Names of Things; but Signes,
by which wee make known, that wee conceive the Consequence of one
name or Attribute to another: as when we say, "a Man, is, a living Body,"
wee mean not that the Man is one thing, the Living Body another, and the
Is, or Beeing a third: but that the Man, and the Living Body, is the same
thing: because the Consequence, "If hee bee a Man, hee is a living Body,"
is a true Consequence, signified by that word Is. Therefore, to bee a Body,
to Walke, to bee Speaking, to Live, to See, and the like Infinitives; also
Corporeity, Walking, Speaking, Life, Sight, and the like, that signifie just
the same, are the names of Nothing; as I have elsewhere more amply
expressed.
But to what purpose (may some man say) is such subtilty in a work of
this nature, where I pretend to nothing but what is necessary to the
doctrine of Government and Obedience? It is to this purpose, that men
may no longer suffer themselves to be abused, by them, that by this
doctrine of Separated Essences, built on the Vain Philosophy of Aristotle,
would fright them from Obeying the Laws of their Countrey, with empty
names; as men fright Birds from the Corn with an empty doublet, a hat,

and a crooked stick. For it is upon this ground, that when a Man is dead
and buried, they say his Soule (that is his Life) can walk separated from
his Body, and is seen by night amongst the graves. Upon the same ground
they say, that the Figure, and Colour, and Tast of a peece of Bread, has a
being, there, where they say there is no Bread: And upon the same ground
they say, that Faith, and Wisdome, and other Vertues are sometimes
powred into a man, sometimes blown into him from Heaven; as if the
Vertuous, and their Vertues could be asunder; and a great many other
things that serve to lessen the dependance of Subjects on the Soveraign
Power of their Countrey. For who will endeavour to obey the Laws, if he
expect Obedience to be Powred or Blown into him? Or who will not obey a
Priest, that can make God, rather than his Soveraign; nay than God
himselfe? Or who, that is in fear of Ghosts, will not bear great respect to
those that can make the Holy Water, that drives them from him? And this
shall suffice for an example of the Errors, which are brought into the
Church, from the Entities, and Essences of Aristotle: which it may be he
knew to be false Philosophy; but writ it as a thing consonant to, and
corroborative of their Religion; and fearing the fate of Socrates.
Being once fallen into this Error of Separated Essences, they are thereby
necessarily involved in many other absurdities that follow it. For seeing
they will have these Forms to be reall, they are obliged to assign them
some place. But because they hold them Incorporeall, without all
dimension of Quantity, and all men know that Place is Dimension, and not
to be filled, but by that which is Corporeall; they are driven to uphold their
credit with a distinction, that they are not indeed any where
Circumscriptive, but Definitive: Which Terms being meer Words, and in
this occasion insignificant, passe onely in Latine, that the vanity of them
may bee concealed. For the Circumscription of a thing, is nothing else but
the Determination, or Defining of its Place; and so both the Terms of the
Distinction are the same. And in particular, of the Essence of a Man,
which (they say) is his Soule, they affirm it, to be All of it in his little
Finger, and All of it in every other Part (how small soever) of his Body;
and yet no more Soule in the Whole Body, than in any one of those Parts.
Can any man think that God is served with such absurdities? And yet all
this is necessary to beleeve, to those that will beleeve the Existence of an
Incorporeall Soule, Separated from the Body.

And when they come to give account, how an Incorporeall Substance
can be capable of Pain, and be tormented in the fire of Hell, or Purgatory,
they have nothing at all to answer, but that it cannot be known how fire
can burn Soules.
Again, whereas Motion is change of Place, and Incorporeall Substances
are not capable of Place, they are troubled to make it seem possible, how a
Soule can goe hence, without the Body to Heaven, Hell, or Purgatory; and
how the Ghosts of men (and I may adde of their clothes which they appear
in) can walk by night in Churches, Church-yards, and other places of
Sepulture. To which I know not what they can answer, unlesse they will
say, they walke Definitive, not Circumscriptive, or Spiritually, not
Temporally: for such egregious distinctions are equally applicable to any
difficulty whatsoever.

Nunc-stans
For the meaning of Eternity, they will not have it to be an Endlesse
Succession of Time; for then they should not be able to render a reason
how Gods Will, and Praeordaining of things to come, should not be before
his Praescience of the same, as the Efficient Cause before the Effect, or
Agent before the Action; nor of many other their bold opinions concerning
the Incomprehensible Nature of God. But they will teach us, that Eternity
is the Standing still of the Present Time, a Nunc-stans (as the Schools call
it;) which neither they, nor any else understand, no more than they would a
Hic-stans for an Infinite greatnesse of Place.

One Body In Many Places, And Many Bodies In
One Place At Once
And whereas men divide a Body in their thought, by numbring parts of
it, and in numbring those parts, number also the parts of the Place it filled;
it cannot be, but in making many parts, wee make also many places of
those parts; whereby there cannot bee conceived in the mind of any man,
more, or fewer parts, than there are places for: yet they will have us
beleeve, that by the Almighty power of God, one body may be at one and
the same time in many places; and many bodies at one and the same time
in one place; as if it were an acknowledgment of the Divine Power, to say,
that which is, is not; or that which has been, has not been. And these are
but a small part of the Incongruities they are forced to, from their
disputing Philosophically, in stead of admiring, and adoring of the Divine
and Incomprehensible Nature; whose Attributes cannot signifie what he is,
but ought to signifie our desire to honour him, with the best Appellations
we can think on. But they that venture to reason of his Nature, from these
Attributes of Honour, losing their understanding in the very first attempt,
fall from one Inconvenience into another, without end, and without
number; in the same manner, as when a man ignorant of the Ceremonies of
Court, comming into the presence of a greater Person than he is used to
speak to, and stumbling at his entrance, to save himselfe from falling, lets
slip his Cloake; to recover his Cloake, lets fall his Hat; and with one
disorder after another, discovers his astonishment and rusticity.

Absurdities In Naturall Philosophy, As Gravity
The Cause Of Heavinesse
Then for Physiques, that is, the knowledge of the subordinate, and
secundary causes of naturall events; they render none at all, but empty
words. If you desire to know why some kind of bodies sink naturally
downwards toward the Earth, and others goe naturally from it; The
Schools will tell you out of Aristotle, that the bodies that sink downwards,
are Heavy; and that this Heavinesse is it that causes them to descend: But
if you ask what they mean by Heavinesse, they will define it to bee an
endeavour to goe to the center of the Earth: so that the cause why things
sink downward, is an Endeavour to be below: which is as much as to say,
that bodies descend, or ascend, because they doe. Or they will tell you the
center of the Earth is the place of Rest, and Conservation for Heavy things;
and therefore they endeavour to be there: As if Stones, and Metalls had a
desire, or could discern the place they would bee at, as Man does; or loved
Rest, as Man does not; or that a peece of Glasse were lesse safe in the
Window, than falling into the Street.

Quantity Put Into Body Already Made
If we would know why the same Body seems greater (without adding to
it) one time, than another; they say, when it seems lesse, it is Condensed;
when greater, Rarefied. What is that Condensed, and Rarefied? Condensed,
is when there is in the very same Matter, lesse Quantity than before; and
Rarefied, when more. As if there could be Matter, that had not some
determined Quantity; when Quantity is nothing else but the Determination
of Matter; that is to say of Body, by which we say one Body is greater, or
lesser than another, by thus, or thus much. Or as if a Body were made
without any Quantity at all, and that afterwards more, or lesse were put
into it, according as it is intended the Body should be more, or lesse
Dense.

Powring In Of Soules
For the cause of the Soule of Man, they say, Creatur Infundendo, and
Creando Infunditur: that is, "It is Created by Powring it in," and "Powred
in by Creation."

Ubiquity Of Apparition
For the Cause of Sense, an ubiquity of Species; that is, of the Shews or
Apparitions of objects; which when they be Apparitions to the Eye, is
Sight; when to the Eare, Hearing; to the Palate, Tast; to the Nostrill,
Smelling; and to the rest of the Body, Feeling.

Will, The Cause Of Willing
For cause of the Will, to doe any particular action, which is called
Volitio, they assign the Faculty, that is to say, the Capacity in generall, that
men have, to will sometimes one thing, sometimes another, which is
called Voluntas; making the Power the cause of the Act: As if one should
assign for cause of the good or evill Acts of men, their Ability to doe
them.

Ignorance An Occult Cause
And in many occasions they put for cause of Naturall events, their own
Ignorance, but disguised in other words: As when they say, Fortune is the
cause of things contingent; that is, of things whereof they know no cause:
And as when they attribute many Effects to Occult Qualities; that is,
qualities not known to them; and therefore also (as they thinke) to no Man
else. And to Sympathy, Antipathy, Antiperistasis, Specificall Qualities, and
other like Termes, which signifie neither the Agent that produceth them,
nor the Operation by which they are produced.
If such Metaphysiques, and Physiques as this, be not Vain Philosophy,
there was never any; nor needed St. Paul to give us warning to avoid it.

One Makes The Things Incongruent, Another The
Incongruity
And for their Morall, and Civill Philosophy, it hath the same, or greater
absurdities. If a man doe an action of Injustice, that is to say, an action
contrary to the Law, God they say is the prime cause of the Law, and also
the prime cause of that, and all other Actions; but no cause at all of the
Injustice; which is the Inconformity of the Action to the Law. This is Vain
Philosophy. A man might as well say, that one man maketh both a streight
line, and a crooked, and another maketh their Incongruity. And such is the
Philosophy of all men that resolve of their Conclusions, before they know
their Premises; pretending to comprehend, that which is
Incomprehensible; and of Attributes of Honour to make Attributes of
Nature; as this distinction was made to maintain the Doctrine of FreeWill, that is, of a Will of man, not subject to the Will of God.

Private Appetite The Rule Of Publique Good:
Aristotle, and other Heathen Philosophers define Good, and Evill, by the
Appetite of men; and well enough, as long as we consider them governed
every one by his own Law: For in the condition of men that have no other
Law but their own Appetites, there can be no generall Rule of Good, and
Evill Actions. But in a Common-wealth this measure is false: Not the
Appetite of Private men, but the Law, which is the Will and Appetite of the
State is the measure. And yet is this Doctrine still practised; and men
judge the Goodnesse, or Wickednesse of their own, and of other mens
actions, and of the actions of the Common-wealth it selfe, by their own
Passions; and no man calleth Good or Evill, but that which is so in his own
eyes, without any regard at all to the Publique Laws; except onely Monks,
and Friers, that are bound by Vow to that simple obedience to their
Superiour, to which every Subject ought to think himself bound by the
Law of Nature to the Civill Soveraign. And this private measure of Good,
is a Doctrine, not onely Vain, but also Pernicious to the Publique State.

And That Lawfull Marriage Is Unchastity
It is also Vain and false Philosophy, to say the work of Marriage is
repugnant to Chastity, or Continence, and by consequence to make them
Morall Vices; as they doe, that pretend Chastity, and Continence, for the
ground of denying Marriage to the Clergy. For they confesse it is no more,
but a Constitution of the Church, that requireth in those holy Orders that
continually attend the Altar, and administration of the Eucharist, a
continuall Abstinence from women, under the name of continuall Chastity,
Continence, and Purity. Therefore they call the lawfull use of Wives, want
of Chastity, and Continence; and so make Marriage a Sin, or at least a
thing so impure, and unclean, as to render a man unfit for the Altar. If the
Law were made because the use of Wives is Incontinence, and contrary to
Chastity, then all marriage is vice; If because it is a thing too impure, and
unclean for a man consecrated to God; much more should other naturall,
necessary, and daily works which all men doe, render men unworthy to bee
Priests, because they are more unclean.
But the secret foundation of this prohibition of Marriage of Priests, is
not likely to have been laid so slightly, as upon such errours in Morall
Philosophy; nor yet upon the preference of single life, to the estate of
Matrimony; which proceeded from the wisdome of St. Paul, who
perceived how inconvenient a thing it was, for those that in those times of
persecution were Preachers of the Gospel, and forced to fly from one
countrey to another, to be clogged with the care of wife and children; but
upon the design of the Popes, and Priests of after times, to make
themselves the Clergy, that is to say, sole Heirs of the Kingdome of God in
this world; to which it was necessary to take from them the use of
Marriage, because our Saviour saith, that at the coming of his Kingdome
the Children of God shall "neither Marry, nor bee given in Marriage, but
shall bee as the Angels in heaven;" that is to say, Spirituall. Seeing then
they had taken on them the name of Spirituall, to have allowed themselves
(when there was no need) the propriety of Wives, had been an Incongruity.

And That All Government But Popular, Is
Tyranny
From Aristotles Civill Philosophy, they have learned, to call all manner
of Common-wealths but the Popular, (such as was at that time the state of
Athens,) Tyranny. All Kings they called Tyrants; and the Aristocracy of the
thirty Governours set up there by the Lacedemonians that subdued them,
the thirty Tyrants: As also to call the condition of the people under the
Democracy, Liberty. A Tyrant originally signified no more simply, but a
Monarch: But when afterwards in most parts of Greece that kind of
government was abolished, the name began to signifie, not onely the thing
it did before, but with it, the hatred which the Popular States bare towards
it: As also the name of King became odious after the deposing of the
Kings in Rome, as being a thing naturall to all men, to conceive some
great Fault to be signified in any Attribute, that is given in despight, and to
a great Enemy. And when the same men shall be displeased with those that
have the administration of the Democracy, or Aristocracy, they are not to
seek for disgraceful names to expresse their anger in; but call readily the
one Anarchy, and the other Oligarchy, or the Tyranny Of A Few. And that
which offendeth the People, is no other thing, but that they are governed,
not as every one of them would himselfe, but as the Publique
Representant, be it one Man, or an Assembly of men thinks fit; that is, by
an Arbitrary government: for which they give evill names to their
Superiors; never knowing (till perhaps a little after a Civill warre) that
without such Arbitrary government, such Warre must be perpetuall; and
that it is Men, and Arms, not Words, and Promises, that make the Force
and Power of the Laws.

That Not Men, But Law Governs
And therefore this is another Errour of Aristotles Politiques, that in a
wel ordered Common-wealth, not Men should govern, but the Laws. What
man, that has his naturall Senses, though he can neither write nor read,
does not find himself governed by them he fears, and beleeves can kill or
hurt him when he obeyeth not? or that beleeves the Law can hurt him; that
is, Words, and Paper, without the Hands, and Swords of men? And this is
of the number of pernicious Errors: for they induce men, as oft as they like
not their Governours, to adhaere to those that call them Tyrants, and to
think it lawfull to raise warre against them: And yet they are many times
cherished from the Pulpit, by the Clergy.

Laws Over The Conscience
There is another Errour in their Civill Philosophy (which they never
learned of Aristotle, nor Cicero, nor any other of the Heathen,) to extend
the power of the Law, which is the Rule of Actions onely, to the very
Thoughts, and Consciences of men, by Examination, and Inquisition of
what they Hold, notwithstanding the Conformity of their Speech and
Actions: By which, men are either punished for answering the truth of
their thoughts, or constrained to answer an untruth for fear of punishment.
It is true, that the Civill Magistrate, intending to employ a Minister in the
charge of Teaching, may enquire of him, if hee bee content to Preach such,
and such Doctrines; and in case of refusall, may deny him the
employment: But to force him to accuse himselfe of Opinions, when his
Actions are not by Law forbidden, is against the Law of Nature; and
especially in them, who teach, that a man shall bee damned to Eternall and
extream torments, if he die in a false opinion concerning an Article of the
Christian Faith. For who is there, that knowing there is so great danger in
an error, when the naturall care of himself, compelleth not to hazard his
Soule upon his own judgement, rather than that of any other man that is
unconcerned in his damnation?

Private Interpretation Of Law
For a Private man, without the Authority of the Common-wealth, that is
to say, without permission from the Representant thereof, to Interpret the
Law by his own Spirit, is another Error in the Politiques; but not drawn
from Aristotle, nor from any other of the Heathen Philosophers. For none
of them deny, but that in the Power of making Laws, is comprehended also
the Power of Explaining them when there is need. And are not the
Scriptures, in all places where they are Law, made Law by the Authority of
the Common-wealth, and consequently, a part of the Civill Law?
Of the same kind it is also, when any but the Soveraign restraineth in
any man that power which the Common-wealth hath not restrained: as they
do, that impropriate the Preaching of the Gospell to one certain Order of
men, where the Laws have left it free. If the State give me leave to preach,
or teach; that is, if it forbid me not, no man can forbid me. If I find my
selfe amongst the Idolaters of America, shall I that am a Christian, though
not in Orders, think it a sin to preach Jesus Christ, till I have received
Orders from Rome? or when I have preached, shall not I answer their
doubts, and expound the Scriptures to them; that is shall I not Teach? But
for this may some say, as also for administring to them the Sacraments,
the necessity shall be esteemed for a sufficient Mission; which is true: But
this is true also, that for whatsoever, a dispensation is due for the
necessity, for the same there needs no dispensation, when there is no Law
that forbids it. Therefore to deny these Functions to those, to whom the
Civill Soveraigne hath not denyed them, is a taking away of a lawfull
Liberty, which is contrary to the Doctrine of Civill Government.

Language Of Schoole-Divines
More examples of Vain Philosophy, brought into Religion by the
Doctors of Schoole-Divinity, might be produced; but other men may if
they please observe them of themselves. I shall onely adde this, that the
Writings of Schoole-Divines, are nothing else for the most part, but
insignificant Traines of strange and barbarous words, or words otherwise
used, then in the common use of the Latine tongue; such as would pose
Cicero, and Varro, and all the Grammarians of ancient Rome. Which if any
man would see proved, let him (as I have said once before) see whether he
can translate any Schoole-Divine into any of the Modern tongues, as
French, English, or any other copious language: for that which cannot in
most of these be made Intelligible, is no Intelligible in the Latine. Which
Insignificancy of language, though I cannot note it for false Philosophy;
yet it hath a quality, not onely to hide the Truth, but also to make men
think they have it, and desist from further search.

Errors From Tradition
Lastly, for the errors brought in from false, or uncertain History, what is
all the Legend of fictitious Miracles, in the lives of the Saints; and all the
Histories of Apparitions, and Ghosts, alledged by the Doctors of the
Romane Church, to make good their Doctrines of Hell, and purgatory, the
power of Exorcisme, and other Doctrines which have no warrant, neither
in Reason, nor Scripture; as also all those Traditions which they call the
unwritten Word of God; but old Wives Fables? Whereof, though they find
dispersed somewhat in the Writings of the ancient Fathers; yet those
Fathers were men, that might too easily beleeve false reports; and the
producing of their opinions for testimony of the truth of what they
beleeved, hath no other force with them that (according to the Counsell of
St. John 1 Epist. chap. 4. verse 1.) examine Spirits, than in all things that
concern the power of the Romane Church, (the abuse whereof either they
suspected not, or had benefit by it,) to discredit their testimony, in respect
of too rash beleef of reports; which the most sincere men, without great
knowledge of naturall causes, (such as the Fathers were) are commonly the
most subject to: For naturally, the best men are the least suspicious of
fraudulent purposes. Gregory the Pope, and S. Bernard have somewhat of
Apparitions of Ghosts, that said they were in Purgatory; and so has our
Beda: but no where, I beleeve, but by report from others. But if they, or
any other, relate any such stories of their own knowledge, they shall not
thereby confirm the more such vain reports; but discover their own
Infirmity, or Fraud.

Suppression Of Reason
With the Introduction of False, we may joyn also the suppression of
True Philosophy, by such men, as neither by lawfull authority, nor
sufficient study, are competent Judges of the truth. Our own Navigations
make manifest, and all men learned in humane Sciences, now
acknowledge there are Antipodes: And every day it appeareth more and
more, that Years, and Dayes are determined by Motions of the Earth.
Neverthelesse, men that have in their Writings but supposed such
Doctrine, as an occasion to lay open the reasons for, and against it, have
been punished for it by Authority Ecclesiasticall. But what reason is there
for it? Is it because such opinions are contrary to true Religion? that
cannot be, if they be true. Let therefore the truth be first examined by
competent Judges, or confuted by them that pretend to know the contrary.
Is it because they be contrary to the Religion established? Let them be
silenced by the Laws of those, to whom the Teachers of them are subject;
that is, by the Laws Civill: For disobedience may lawfully be punished in
them, that against the Laws teach even true Philosophy. Is it because they
tend to disorder in Government, as countenancing Rebellion, or Sedition?
then let them be silenced, and the Teachers punished by vertue of his
power to whom the care of the Publique quiet is committed; which is the
Authority Civill. For whatsoever Power Ecclesiastiques take upon
themselves (in any place where they are subject to the State) in their own
Right, though they call it Gods Right, is but Usurpation.

CHAPTER XLVII. OF THE BENEFIT THAT
PROCEEDETH FROM SUCH DARKNESSE,
AND TO WHOM IT ACCREWETH

He That Receiveth Benefit By A Fact, Is Presumed
To Be The Author
Cicero maketh honorable mention of one of the Cassii, a severe Judge
amongst the Romans, for a custome he had, in Criminal causes, (when the
testimony of the witnesses was not sufficient,) to ask the Accusers, Cui
Bono; that is to say, what Profit, Honor, or other Contentment, the accused
obtained, or expected by the Fact. For amongst Praesumptions, there is
none that so evidently declareth the Author, as doth the BENEFIT of the
Action. By the same rule I intend in this place to examine, who they may
be, that have possessed the People so long in this part of Christendome,
with these Doctrines, contrary to the Peaceable Societies of Mankind.

That The Church Militant Is The Kingdome Of
God, Was First Taught By
The Church Of Rome
And first, to this Error, That The Present Church Now Militant On
Earth, Is The Kingdome Of God, (that is, the Kingdome of Glory, or the
Land of Promise; not the Kingdome of Grace, which is but a Promise of
the Land,) are annexed these worldly Benefits, First, that the Pastors, and
Teachers of the Church, are entitled thereby, as Gods Publique Ministers,
to a Right of Governing the Church; and consequently (because the
Church, and Common-wealth are the same Persons) to be Rectors, and
Governours of the Common-wealth. By this title it is, that the Pope
prevailed with the subjects of all Christian Princes, to beleeve, that to
disobey him, was to disobey Christ himselfe; and in all differences
between him and other Princes, (charmed with the word Power Spirituall,)
to abandon their lawfull Soveraigns; which is in effect an universall
Monarchy over all Christendome. For though they were first invested in
the right of being Supreme Teachers of Christian Doctrine, by, and under
Christian Emperors, within the limits of the Romane Empire (as is
acknowledged by themselves) by the title of Pontifex Maximus, who was
an Officer subject to the Civill State; yet after the Empire was divided, and
dissolved, it was not hard to obtrude upon the people already subject to
them, another Title, namely, the Right of St. Peter; not onely to save entire
their pretended Power; but also to extend the same over the same Christian
Provinces, though no more united in the Empire of Rome. This Benefit of
an Universall Monarchy, (considering the desire of men to bear Rule) is a
sufficient Presumption, that the popes that pretended to it, and for a long
time enjoyed it, were the Authors of the Doctrine, by which it was
obtained; namely, that the Church now on Earth, is the Kingdome of
Christ. For that granted, it must be understood, that Christ hath some
Lieutenant amongst us, by whom we are to be told what are his
Commandements.

After that certain Churches had renounced this universall Power of the
Pope, one would expect in reason, that the Civill Soveraigns in all those
Churches, should have recovered so much of it, as (before they had
unadvisedly let it goe) was their own Right, and in their own hands. And in
England it was so in effect; saving that they, by whom the Kings
administred the Government of Religion, by maintaining their imployment
to be in Gods Right, seemed to usurp, if not a Supremacy, yet an
Independency on the Civill Power: and they but seemed to usurp it, in as
much as they acknowledged a Right in the King, to deprive them of the
Exercise of their Functions at his pleasure.

And Maintained Also By The Presbytery
But in those places where the Presbytery took that Office, though many
other Doctrines of the Church of Rome were forbidden to be taught; yet
this Doctrine, that the Kingdome of Christ is already come, and that it
began at the Resurrection of our Saviour, was still retained. But Cui Bono?
What Profit did they expect from it? The same which the Popes expected:
to have a Soveraign Power over the People. For what is it for men to
excommunicate their lawful King, but to keep him from all places of Gods
publique Service in his own Kingdom? and with force to resist him, when
he with force endeavoureth to correct them? Or what is it, without
Authority from the Civill Soveraign, to excommunicate any person, but to
take from him his Lawfull Liberty, that is, to usurpe an unlawfull Power
over their Brethren? The Authors therefore of this Darknesse in Religion,
are the Romane, and the Presbyterian Clergy.

Infallibility
To this head, I referre also all those Doctrines, that serve them to keep
the possession of this spirituall Soveraignty after it is gotten. As first, that
the Pope In His Publique Capacity Cannot Erre. For who is there, that
beleeving this to be true, will not readily obey him in whatsoever he
commands?

Subjection Of Bishops
Secondly, that all other Bishops, in what Common-wealth soever, have
not their Right, neither immediately from God, nor mediately from their
Civill Soveraigns, but from the Pope, is a Doctrine, by which there comes
to be in every Christian Common-wealth many potent men, (for so are
Bishops,) that have their dependance on the Pope, and owe obedience to
him, though he be a forraign Prince; by which means he is able, (as he hath
done many times) to raise a Civill War against the State that submits not it
self to be governed according to his pleasure and Interest.

Exemptions Of The Clergy
Thirdly, the exemption of these, and of all other Priests, and of all
Monkes, and Fryers, from the Power of the Civill Laws. For by this means,
there is a great part of every Common-wealth, that enjoy the benefit of the
Laws, and are protected by the Power of the Civill State, which
neverthelesse pay no part of the Publique expence; nor are lyable to the
penalties, as other Subjects, due to their crimes; and consequently, stand
not in fear of any man, but the Pope; and adhere to him onely, to uphold
his universall Monarchy.

The Names Of Sacerdotes, And Sacrifices
Fourthly, the giving to their Priests (which is no more in the New
Testament but Presbyters, that is, Elders) the name of Sacerdotes, that is,
Sacrificers, which was the title of the Civill Soveraign, and his publique
Ministers, amongst the Jews, whilest God was their King. Also, the
making the Lords Supper a Sacrifice, serveth to make the People beleeve
the Pope hath the same power over all Christian, that Moses and Aaron
had over the Jews; that is to say, all power, both Civill and Ecclesiasticall,
as the High Priest then had.

The Sacramentation Of Marriage
Fiftly, the teaching that Matrimony is a Sacrament, giveth to the Clergy
the Judging of the lawfulnesse of Marriages; and thereby, of what Children
are Legitimate; and consequently, of the Right of Succession to
haereditary Kingdomes.

The Single Life Of Priests
Sixtly, the Deniall of Marriage to Priests, serveth to assure this Power of
the pope over Kings. For if a King be a Priest, he cannot Marry, and
transmit his Kingdome to his Posterity; If he be not a Priest then the Pope
pretendeth this Authority Ecclesiasticall over him, and over his people.

Auricular Confession
Seventhly, from Auricular Confession, they obtain, for the assurance of
their Power, better intelligence of the designs of Princes, and great persons
in the Civill State, than these can have of the designs of the State
Ecclesiasticall.

Canonization Of Saints, And Declaring Of
Martyrs
Eighthly, by the Canonization of Saints, and declaring who are Martyrs,
they assure their Power, in that they induce simple men into an obstinacy
against the Laws and Commands of their Civill Soveraigns even to death,
if by the Popes excommunication, they be declared Heretiques or Enemies
to the Church; that is, (as they interpret it,) to the Pope.

Transubstantiation, Penance, Absolution
Ninthly, they assure the same, by the Power they ascribe to every Priest,
of making Christ; and by the Power of ordaining Pennance; and of
Remitting, and Retaining of sins.

Purgatory, Indulgences, Externall Works
Tenthly, by the Doctrine of Purgatory, of Justification by externall
works, and of Indulgences, the Clergy is enriched.

Daemonology And Exorcism
Eleventhly, by their Daemonology, and the use of Exorcisme, and other
things appertaining thereto, they keep (or thinke they keep) the People
more in awe of their Power.

School-Divinity
Lastly, the Metaphysiques, Ethiques, and Politiques of Aristotle, the
frivolous Distinctions, barbarous Terms, and obscure Language of the
Schoolmen, taught in the Universities, (which have been all erected and
regulated by the Popes Authority,) serve them to keep these Errors from
being detected, and to make men mistake the Ignis Fatuus of Vain
Philosophy, for the Light of the Gospell.

The Authors Of Spirituall Darknesse, Who They
Be
To these, if they sufficed not, might be added other of their dark
Doctrines, the profit whereof redoundeth manifestly, to the setting up of an
unlawfull Power over the lawfull Soveraigns of Christian People; or for
the sustaining of the same, when it is set up; or to the worldly Riches,
Honour, and Authority of those that sustain it. And therefore by the
aforesaid rule, of Cui Bono, we may justly pronounce for the Authors of
all this Spirituall Darknesse, the Pope, and Roman Clergy, and all those
besides that endeavour to settle in the mindes of men this erroneous
Doctrine, that the Church now on Earth, is that Kingdome of God
mentioned in the Old and New Testament.
But the Emperours, and other Christian Soveraigns, under whose
Government these Errours, and the like encroachments of Ecclesiastiques
upon their Office, at first crept in, to the disturbance of their possessions,
and of the tranquillity of their Subjects, though they suffered the same for
want of foresight of the Sequel, and of insight into the designs of their
Teachers, may neverthelesse bee esteemed accessories to their own, and
the Publique dammage; For without their Authority there could at first no
seditious Doctrine have been publiquely preached. I say they might have
hindred the same in the beginning: But when the people were once
possessed by those spirituall men, there was no humane remedy to be
applyed, that any man could invent: And for the remedies that God should
provide, who never faileth in his good time to destroy all the Machinations
of men against the Truth, wee are to attend his good pleasure, that
suffereth many times the prosperity of his enemies, together with their
ambition, to grow to such a height, as the violence thereof openeth the
eyes, which the warinesse of their predecessours had before sealed up, and
makes men by too much grasping let goe all, as Peters net was broken, by
the struggling of too great a multitude of Fishes; whereas the Impatience
of those, that strive to resist such encroachment, before their Subjects eyes
were opened, did but encrease the power they resisted. I doe not therefore
blame the Emperour Frederick for holding the stirrop to our countryman

Pope Adrian; for such was the disposition of his subjects then, as if hee
had not doe it, hee was not likely to have succeeded in the Empire: But I
blame those, that in the beginning, when their power was entire, by
suffering such Doctrines to be forged in the Universities of their own
Dominions, have holden the Stirrop to all the succeeding Popes, whilest
they mounted into the Thrones of all Christian Soveraigns, to ride, and
tire, both them, and their people, at their pleasure.
But as the Inventions of men are woven, so also are they ravelled out;
the way is the same, but the order is inverted: The web begins at the first
Elements of Power, which are Wisdom, Humility, Sincerity, and other
vertues of the Apostles, whom the people converted, obeyed, out of
Reverence, not by Obligation: Their Consciences were free, and their
Words and Actions subject to none but the Civill Power. Afterwards the
Presbyters (as the Flocks of Christ encreased) assembling to consider what
they should teach, and thereby obliging themselves to teach nothing
against the Decrees of their Assemblies, made it to be thought the people
were thereby obliged to follow their Doctrine, and when they refused,
refused to keep them company, (that was then called Excommunication,)
not as being Infidels, but as being disobedient: And this was the first knot
upon their Liberty. And the number of Presbyters encreasing, the
Presbyters of the chief City or Province, got themselves an authority over
the parochiall Presbyters, and appropriated to themselves the names of
Bishops: And this was a second knot on Christian Liberty. Lastly, the
Bishop of Rome, in regard of the Imperiall City, took upon him an
Authority (partly by the wills of the Emperours themselves, and by the
title of Pontifex Maximus, and at last when the Emperours were grown
weak, by the priviledges of St. Peter) over all other Bishops of the Empire:
Which was the third and last knot, and the whole Synthesis and
Construction of the Pontificall Power.
And therefore the Analysis, or Resolution is by the same way; but
beginning with the knot that was last tyed; as wee may see in the
dissolution of the praeterpoliticall Church Government in England.
First, the Power of the Popes was dissolved totally by Queen Elizabeth;
and the Bishops, who before exercised their Functions in Right of the
Pope, did afterwards exercise the same in Right of the Queen and her
Successours; though by retaining the phrase of Jure Divino, they were

thought to demand it by immediate Right from God: And so was untyed
the first knot. After this, the Presbyterians lately in England obtained the
putting down of Episcopacy: And so was the second knot dissolved: And
almost at the same time, the Power was taken also from the Presbyterians:
And so we are reduced to the Independency of the Primitive Christians to
follow Paul, or Cephas, or Apollos, every man as he liketh best: Which, if
it be without contention, and without measuring the Doctrine of Christ, by
our affection to the Person of his Minister, (the fault which the Apostle
reprehended in the Corinthians,) is perhaps the best: First, because there
ought to be no Power over the Consciences of men, but of the Word it
selfe, working Faith in every one, not alwayes according to the purpose of
them that Plant and Water, but of God himself, that giveth the Increase:
and secondly, because it is unreasonable in them, who teach there is such
danger in every little Errour, to require of a man endued with Reason of
his own, to follow the Reason of any other man, or of the most voices of
many other men; Which is little better, then to venture his Salvation at
crosse and pile. Nor ought those Teachers to be displeased with this losse
of their antient Authority: For there is none should know better then they,
that power is preserved by the same Vertues by which it is acquired; that is
to say, by Wisdome, Humility, Clearnesse of Doctrine, and sincerity of
Conversation; and not by suppression of the Naturall Sciences, and of the
Morality of Naturall Reason; nor by obscure Language; nor by Arrogating
to themselves more Knowledge than they make appear; nor by Pious
Frauds; nor by such other faults, as in the Pastors of Gods Church are not
only Faults, but also scandalls, apt to make men stumble one time or other
upon the suppression of their Authority.

Comparison Of The Papacy With The Kingdome
Of Fayries
But after this Doctrine, "that the Church now Militant, is the Kingdome
of God spoken of in the Old and New Testament," was received in the
World; the ambition, and canvasing for the Offices that belong thereunto,
and especially for that great Office of being Christs Lieutenant, and the
Pompe of them that obtained therein the principal Publique Charges,
became by degrees so evident, that they lost the inward Reverence due to
the Pastorall Function: in so much as the Wisest men, of them that had any
power in the Civill State, needed nothing but the authority of their Princes,
to deny them any further Obedience. For, from the time that the Bishop of
Rome had gotten to be acknowledged for Bishop Universall, by pretence
of Succession to St. Peter, their whole Hierarchy, or Kingdome of
Darknesse, may be compared not unfitly to the Kingdome of Fairies; that
is, to the old wives Fables in England, concerning Ghosts and Spirits, and
the feats they play in the night. And if a man consider the originall of this
great Ecclesiasticall Dominion, he will easily perceive, that the Papacy, is
no other, than the Ghost of the deceased Romane Empire, sitting crowned
upon the grave thereof: For so did the Papacy start up on a Sudden out of
the Ruines of that Heathen Power.
The Language also, which they use, both in the Churches, and in their
Publique Acts, being Latine, which is not commonly used by any Nation
now in the world, what is it but the Ghost of the Old Romane Language.
The Fairies in what Nation soever they converse, have but one
Universall King, which some Poets of ours call King Oberon; but the
Scripture calls Beelzebub, Prince of Daemons. The Ecclesiastiques
likewise, in whose Dominions soever they be found, acknowledge but one
Universall King, the Pope.
The Ecclesiastiques are Spirituall men, and Ghostly Fathers. The Fairies
are Spirits, and Ghosts. Fairies and Ghosts inhabite Darknesse, Solitudes,
and Graves. The Ecclesiastiques walke in Obscurity of Doctrine, in
Monasteries, Churches, and Churchyards.

The Ecclesiastiques have their Cathedral Churches; which, in what
Towne soever they be erected, by vertue of Holy Water, and certain
Charmes called Exorcismes, have the power to make those Townes, cities,
that is to say, Seats of Empire. The Fairies also have their enchanted
Castles, and certain Gigantique Ghosts, that domineer over the Regions
round about them.
The fairies are not to be seized on; and brought to answer for the hurt
they do. So also the Ecclesiastiques vanish away from the Tribunals of
Civill Justice.
The Ecclesiastiques take from young men, the use of Reason, by certain
Charms compounded of Metaphysiques, and Miracles, and Traditions, and
Abused Scripture, whereby they are good for nothing else, but to execute
what they command them. The Fairies likewise are said to take young
Children out of their Cradles, and to change them into Naturall Fools,
which Common people do therefore call Elves, and are apt to mischief.
In what Shop, or Operatory the Fairies make their Enchantment, the old
Wives have not determined. But the Operatories of the Clergy, are well
enough known to be the Universities, that received their Discipline from
Authority Pontificall.
When the Fairies are displeased with any body, they are said to send
their Elves, to pinch them. The Ecclesiastiques, when they are displeased
with any Civill State, make also their Elves, that is, Superstitious,
Enchanted Subjects, to pinch their Princes, by preaching Sedition; or one
Prince enchanted with promises, to pinch another.
The Fairies marry not; but there be amongst them Incubi, that have
copulation with flesh and bloud. The Priests also marry not.
The Ecclesiastiques take the Cream of the Land, by Donations of
ignorant men, that stand in aw of them, and by Tythes: So also it is in the
Fable of Fairies, that they enter into the Dairies, and Feast upon the
Cream, which they skim from the Milk.
What kind of Money is currant in the Kingdome of Fairies, is not
recorded in the Story. But the Ecclesiastiques in their Receipts accept of
the same Money that we doe; though when they are to make any Payment,
it is in Canonizations, Indulgences, and Masses.

To this, and such like resemblances between the Papacy, and the
Kingdome of Fairies, may be added this, that as the Fairies have no
existence, but in the Fancies of ignorant people, rising from the Traditions
of old Wives, or old Poets: so the Spirituall Power of the Pope (without the
bounds of his own Civill Dominion) consisteth onely in the Fear that
Seduced people stand in, of their Excommunication; upon hearing of false
Miracles, false Traditions, and false Interpretations of the Scripture.
It was not therefore a very difficult matter, for Henry 8. by his
Exorcisme; nor for Qu. Elizabeth by hers, to cast them out. But who knows
that this Spirit of Rome, now gone out, and walking by Missions through
the dry places of China, Japan, and the Indies, that yeeld him little fruit,
may not return, or rather an Assembly of Spirits worse than he, enter, and
inhabite this clean swept house, and make the End thereof worse than the
beginning? For it is not the Romane Clergy onely, that pretends the
Kingdome of God to be of this World, and thereby to have a Power therein,
distinct from that of the Civill State. And this is all I had a designe to say,
concerning the Doctrine of the POLITIQUES. Which when I have
reviewed, I shall willingly expose it to the censure of my Countrey.

A REVIEW, AND CONCLUSION
From the contrariety of some of the Naturall Faculties of the Mind, one
to another, as also of one Passion to another, and from their reference to
Conversation, there has been an argument taken, to inferre an
impossibility that any one man should be sufficiently disposed to all sorts
of Civill duty. The Severity of Judgment, they say, makes men Censorious,
and unapt to pardon the Errours and Infirmities of other men: and on the
other side, Celerity of Fancy, makes the thoughts lesse steddy than is
necessary, to discern exactly between Right and Wrong. Again, in all
Deliberations, and in all Pleadings, the faculty of solid Reasoning, is
necessary: for without it, the Resolutions of men are rash, and their
Sentences unjust: and yet if there be not powerfull Eloquence, which
procureth attention and Consent, the effect of Reason will be little. But
these are contrary Faculties; the former being grounded upon principles of
Truth; the other upon Opinions already received, true, or false; and upon
the Passions and Interests of men, which are different, and mutable.
And amongst the Passions, Courage, (by which I mean the Contempt of
Wounds, and violent Death) enclineth men to private Revenges, and
sometimes to endeavour the unsetling of the Publique Peace; And
Timorousnesse, many times disposeth to the desertion of the Publique
Defence. Both these they say cannot stand together in the same person.
And to consider the contrariety of mens Opinions, and Manners in
generall, It is they say, impossible to entertain a constant Civill Amity
with all those, with whom the Businesse of the world constrains us to
converse: Which Businesse consisteth almost in nothing else but a
perpetuall contention for Honor, Riches, and Authority.
To which I answer, that these are indeed great difficulties, but not
Impossibilities: For by Education, and Discipline, they may bee, and are
sometimes reconciled. Judgment, and Fancy may have place in the same
man; but by turnes; as the end which he aimeth at requireth. As the
Israelites in Egypt, were sometimes fastened to their labour of making
Bricks, and other times were ranging abroad to gather Straw: So also may
the Judgment sometimes be fixed upon one certain Consideration, and the

Fancy at another time wandring about the world. So also Reason, and
Eloquence, (though not perhaps in the Naturall Sciences, yet in the Morall)
may stand very well together. For wheresoever there is place for adorning
and preferring of Errour, there is much more place for adorning and
preferring of Truth, if they have it to adorn. Nor is there any repugnancy
between fearing the Laws, and not fearing a publique Enemy; nor between
abstaining from Injury, and pardoning it in others. There is therefore no
such Inconsistence of Humane Nature, with Civill Duties, as some think. I
have known cleernesse of Judgment, and largenesse of Fancy; strength of
Reason, and gracefull Elocution; a Courage for the Warre, and a Fear for
the Laws, and all eminently in one man; and that was my most noble and
honored friend Mr. Sidney Godolphin; who hating no man, nor hated of
any, was unfortunately slain in the beginning of the late Civill warre, in the
Publique quarrel, by an indiscerned, and an undiscerning hand.
To the Laws of Nature, declared in the 15. Chapter, I would have this
added, "That every man is bound by Nature, as much as in him lieth, to
protect in Warre, the Authority, by which he is himself protected in time of
Peace." For he that pretendeth a Right of Nature to preserve his owne body,
cannot pretend a Right of Nature to destroy him, by whose strength he is
preserved: It is a manifest contradiction of himselfe. And though this Law
may bee drawn by consequence, from some of those that are there already
mentioned; yet the Times require to have it inculcated, and remembred.
And because I find by divers English Books lately printed, that the
Civill warres have not yet sufficiently taught men, in what point of time it
is, that a Subject becomes obliged to the Conquerour; nor what is
Conquest; nor how it comes about, that it obliges men to obey his Laws:
Therefore for farther satisfaction of men therein, I say, the point of time,
wherein a man becomes subject of a Conquerour, is that point, wherein
having liberty to submit to him, he consenteth, either by expresse words,
or by other sufficient sign, to be his Subject. When it is that a man hath the
liberty to submit, I have showed before in the end of the 21. Chapter;
namely, that for him that hath no obligation to his former Soveraign but
that of an ordinary Subject, it is then, when the means of his life is within
the Guards and Garrisons of the Enemy; for it is then, that he hath no
longer Protection from him, but is protected by the adverse party for his
Contribution. Seeing therefore such contribution is every where, as a thing
inevitable, (notwithstanding it be an assistance to the Enemy,) esteemed

lawfull; as totall Submission, which is but an assistance to the Enemy,
cannot be esteemed unlawfull. Besides, if a man consider that they who
submit, assist the Enemy but with part of their estates, whereas they that
refuse, assist him with the whole, there is no reason to call their
Submission, or Composition an Assistance; but rather a Detriment to the
Enemy. But if a man, besides the obligation of a Subject, hath taken upon
him a new obligation of a Souldier, then he hath not the liberty to submit
to a new Power, as long as the old one keeps the field, and giveth him
means of subsistence, either in his Armies, or Garrisons: for in this case,
he cannot complain of want of Protection, and means to live as a Souldier:
But when that also failes, a Souldier also may seek his Protection
wheresoever he has most hope to have it; and may lawfully submit himself
to his new Master. And so much for the Time when he may do it lawfully,
if hee will. If therefore he doe it, he is undoubtedly bound to be a true
Subject: For a Contract lawfully made, cannot lawfully be broken.
By this also a man may understand, when it is, that men may be said to
be Conquered; and in what the nature of Conquest, and the Right of a
Conquerour consisteth: For this Submission is it implyeth them all.
Conquest, is not the Victory it self; but the Acquisition by Victory, of a
Right, over the persons of men. He therefore that is slain, is Overcome, but
not Conquered; He that is taken, and put into prison, or chaines, is not
Conquered, though Overcome; for he is still an Enemy, and may save
himself if hee can: But he that upon promise of Obedience, hath his Life
and Liberty allowed him, is then Conquered, and a Subject; and not before.
The Romanes used to say, that their Generall had Pacified such a Province,
that is to say, in English, Conquered it; and that the Countrey was Pacified
by Victory, when the people of it had promised Imperata Facere, that is, To
Doe What The Romane People Commanded Them: this was to be
Conquered. But this promise may be either expresse, or tacite: Expresse,
by Promise: Tacite, by other signes. As for example, a man that hath not
been called to make such an expresse Promise, (because he is one whose
power perhaps is not considerable;) yet if he live under their Protection
openly, hee is understood to submit himselfe to the Government: But if he
live there secretly, he is lyable to any thing that may bee done to a Spie,
and Enemy of the State. I say not, hee does any Injustice, (for acts of open
Hostility bear not that name); but that he may be justly put to death.
Likewise, if a man, when his Country is conquered, be out of it, he is not

Conquered, nor Subject: but if at his return, he submit to the Government,
he is bound to obey it. So that Conquest (to define it) is the Acquiring of
the Right of Soveraignty by Victory. Which Right, is acquired, in the
peoples Submission, by which they contract with the Victor, promising
Obedience, for Life and Liberty.
In the 29th Chapter I have set down for one of the causes of the
Dissolutions of Common-wealths, their Imperfect Generation, consisting
in the want of an Absolute and Arbitrary Legislative Power; for want
whereof, the Civill Soveraign is fain to handle the Sword of Justice
unconstantly, and as if it were too hot for him to hold: One reason whereof
(which I have not there mentioned) is this, That they will all of them
justifie the War, by which their Power was at first gotten, and whereon (as
they think) their Right dependeth, and not on the Possession. As if, for
example, the Right of the Kings of England did depend on the goodnesse
of the cause of William the Conquerour, and upon their lineall, and
directest Descent from him; by which means, there would perhaps be no
tie of the Subjects obedience to their Soveraign at this day in all the world:
wherein whilest they needlessely think to justifie themselves, they justifie
all the successefull Rebellions that Ambition shall at any time raise
against them, and their Successors. Therefore I put down for one of the
most effectuall seeds of the Death of any State, that the Conquerours
require not onely a Submission of mens actions to them for the future, but
also an Approbation of all their actions past; when there is scarce a
Common-wealth in the world, whose beginnings can in conscience be
justified.
And because the name of Tyranny, signifieth nothing more, nor lesse,
than the name of Soveraignty, be it in one, or many men, saving that they
that use the former word, are understood to bee angry with them they call
Tyrants; I think the toleration of a professed hatred of Tyranny, is a
Toleration of hatred to Common-wealth in general, and another evill seed,
not differing much from the former. For to the Justification of the Cause of
a Conqueror, the Reproach of the Cause of the Conquered, is for the most
part necessary: but neither of them necessary for the Obligation of the
Conquered. And thus much I have thought fit to say upon the Review of
the first and second part of this Discourse.

In the 35th Chapter, I have sufficiently declared out of the Scripture,
that in the Common-wealth of the Jewes, God himselfe was made the
Soveraign, by Pact with the People; who were therefore called his Peculiar
People, to distinguish them from the rest of the world, over whom God
reigned not by their Consent, but by his own Power: And that in this
Kingdome Moses was Gods Lieutenant on Earth; and that it was he that
told them what Laws God appointed to doe Execution; especially in
Capitall Punishments; not then thinking it a matter of so necessary
consideration, as I find it since. Wee know that generally in all Commonwealths, the Execution of Corporeall Punishments, was either put upon the
Guards, or other Souldiers of the Soveraign Power; or given to those, in
whom want of means, contempt of honour, and hardnesse of heart,
concurred, to make them sue for such an Office. But amongst the Israelites
it was a Positive Law of God their Soveraign, that he that was convicted of
a capitall Crime, should be stoned to death by the People; and that the
Witnesses should cast the first Stone, and after the Witnesses, then the rest
of the People. This was a Law that designed who were to be the
Executioners; but not that any one should throw a Stone at him before
Conviction and Sentence, where the Congregation was Judge. The
Witnesses were neverthelesse to be heard before they proceeded to
Execution, unlesse the Fact were committed in the presence of the
Congregation it self, or in sight of the lawfull Judges; for then there
needed no other Witnesses but the Judges themselves. Neverthelesse, this
manner of proceeding being not throughly understood, hath given occasion
to a dangerous opinion, that any man may kill another, is some cases, by a
Right of Zeal; as if the Executions done upon Offenders in the Kingdome
of God in old time, proceeded not from the Soveraign Command, but from
the Authority of Private Zeal: which, if we consider the texts that seem to
favour it, is quite contrary.
First, where the Levites fell upon the People, that had made and
worshipped the Golden Calfe, and slew three thousand of them; it was by
the Commandement of Moses, from the mouth of God; as is manifest,
Exod. 32.27. And when the Son of a woman of Israel had blasphemed God,
they that heard it, did not kill him, but brought him before Moses, who put
him under custody, till God should give Sentence against him; as appears,
Levit. 25.11, 12. Again, (Numbers 25.6, 7.) when Phinehas killed Zimri
and Cosbi, it was not by right of Private Zeale: Their Crime was

committed in the sight of the Assembly; there needed no Witnesse; the
Law was known, and he the heir apparent to the Soveraignty; and which is
the principall point, the Lawfulnesse of his Act depended wholly upon a
subsequent Ratification by Moses, whereof he had no cause to doubt. And
this Presumption of a future Ratification, is sometimes necessary to the
safety [of] a Common-wealth; as in a sudden Rebellion, any man that can
suppresse it by his own Power in the Countrey where it begins, may
lawfully doe it, and provide to have it Ratified, or Pardoned, whilest it is
in doing, or after it is done. Also Numb. 35.30. it is expressely said,
"Whosoever shall kill the Murtherer, shall kill him upon the word of
Witnesses:" but Witnesses suppose a formall Judicature, and consequently
condemn that pretence of Jus Zelotarum. The Law of Moses concerning
him that enticeth to Idolatry, (that is to say, in the Kingdome of God to a
renouncing of his Allegiance) (Deut. 13.8.) forbids to conceal him, and
commands the Accuser to cause him to be put to death, and to cast the first
stone at him; but not to kill him before he be Condemned. And (Deut. 17.
ver.4, 5, 6.) the Processe against Idolatry is exactly set down: For God
there speaketh to the People, as Judge, and commandeth them, when a man
is Accused of Idolatry, to Enquire diligently of the Fact, and finding it
true, then to Stone him; but still the hand of the Witnesse throweth the
first stone. This is not Private Zeal, but Publique Condemnation. In like
manner when a Father hath a rebellious Son, the Law is (Deut. 21. 18.) that
he shall bring him before the Judges of the Town, and all the people of the
Town shall Stone him. Lastly, by pretence of these Laws it was, that St.
Steven was Stoned, and not by pretence of Private Zeal: for before hee was
carried away to Execution, he had Pleaded his Cause before the High
Priest. There is nothing in all this, nor in any other part of the Bible, to
countenance Executions by Private Zeal; which being oftentimes but a
conjunction of Ignorance and Passion, is against both the Justice and Peace
of a Common-wealth.
In the 36th Chapter I have said, that it is not declared in what manner
God spake supernaturally to Moses: Not that he spake not to him
sometimes by Dreams and Visions, and by a supernaturall Voice, as to
other Prophets: For the manner how he spake unto him from the Mercyseat, is expressely set down (Numbers 7.89.) in these words, "From that
time forward, when Moses entred into the Tabernacle of the Congregation
to speak with God, he heard a Voice which spake unto him from over the

Mercy-Seate, which is over the Arke of the Testimony, from between the
Cherubins he spake unto him." But it is not declared in what consisted the
praeeminence of the manner of Gods speaking to Moses, above that of his
speaking to other Prophets, as to Samuel, and to Abraham, to whom he
also spake by a Voice, (that is, by Vision) Unlesse the difference consist in
the cleernesse of the Vision. For Face to Face, and Mouth to Mouth, cannot
be literally understood of the Infinitenesse, and Incomprehensibility of the
Divine Nature.
And as to the whole Doctrine, I see not yet, but the principles of it are
true and proper; and the Ratiocination solid. For I ground the Civill Right
of Soveraigns, and both the Duty and Liberty of Subjects, upon the known
naturall Inclinations of Mankind, and upon the Articles of the Law of
Nature; of which no man, that pretends but reason enough to govern his
private family, ought to be ignorant. And for the Power Ecclesiasticall of
the same Soveraigns, I ground it on such Texts, as are both evident in
themselves, and consonant to the Scope of the whole Scripture. And
therefore am perswaded, that he that shall read it with a purpose onely to
be informed, shall be informed by it. But for those that by Writing, or
Publique Discourse, or by their eminent actions, have already engaged
themselves to the maintaining of contrary opinions, they will not bee so
easily satisfied. For in such cases, it is naturall for men, at one and the
same time, both to proceed in reading, and to lose their attention, in the
search of objections to that they had read before: Of which, in a time
wherein the interests of men are changed (seeing much of that Doctrine,
which serveth to the establishing of a new Government, must needs be
contrary to that which conduced to the dissolution of the old,) there cannot
choose but be very many.
In that part which treateth of a Christian Common-wealth, there are
some new Doctrines, which, it may be, in a State where the contrary were
already fully determined, were a fault for a Subject without leave to
divulge, as being an usurpation of the place of a Teacher. But in this time,
that men call not onely for Peace, but also for Truth, to offer such
Doctrines as I think True, and that manifestly tend to Peace and Loyalty, to
the consideration of those that are yet in deliberation, is no more, but to
offer New Wine, to bee put into New Cask, that bothe may be preserved
together. And I suppose, that then, when Novelty can breed no trouble, nor
disorder in a State, men are not generally so much inclined to the

reverence of Antiquity, as to preferre Ancient Errors, before New and well
proved Truth.
There is nothing I distrust more than my Elocution; which neverthelesse
I am confident (excepting the Mischances of the Presse) is not obscure.
That I have neglected the Ornament of quoting ancient Poets, Orators, and
Philosophers, contrary to the custome of late time, (whether I have done
well or ill in it,) proceedeth from my judgment, grounded on many
reasons. For first, all Truth of Doctrine dependeth either upon Reason, or
upon Scripture; both which give credit to many, but never receive it from
any Writer. Secondly, the matters in question are not of Fact, but of Right,
wherein there is no place for Witnesses. There is scarce any of those old
Writers, that contradicteth not sometimes both himself, and others; which
makes their Testimonies insufficient. Fourthly, such Opinions as are taken
onely upon Credit of Antiquity, are not intrinsically the Judgment of those
that cite them, but Words that passe (like gaping) from mouth to mouth.
Fiftly, it is many times with a fraudulent Designe that men stick their
corrupt Doctrine with the Cloves of other mens Wit. Sixtly, I find not that
the Ancients they cite, took it for an Ornament, to doe the like with those
that wrote before them. Seventhly, it is an argument of Indigestion, when
Greek and Latine Sentences unchewed come up again, as they use to doe,
unchanged. Lastly, though I reverence those men of Ancient time, that
either have written Truth perspicuously, or set us in a better way to find it
out our selves; yet to the Antiquity it self I think nothing due: For if we
will reverence the Age, the Present is the Oldest. If the Antiquity of the
Writer, I am not sure, that generally they to whom such honor is given,
were more Ancient when they wrote, than I am that am Writing: But if it
bee well considered, the praise of Ancient Authors, proceeds not from the
reverence of the Dead, but from the competition, and mutuall envy of the
Living.
To conclude, there is nothing in this whole Discourse, nor in that I writ
before of the same Subject in Latine, as far as I can perceive, contrary
either to the Word of God, or to good Manners; or to the disturbance of the
Publique Tranquillity. Therefore I think it may be profitably printed, and
more profitably taught in the Universities, in case they also think so, to
whom the judgment of the same belongeth. For seeing the Universities are
the Fountains of Civill, and Morall Doctrine, from whence the Preachers,
and the Gentry, drawing such water as they find, use to sprinkle the same

(both from the Pulpit, and in their Conversation) upon the People, there
ought certainly to be great care taken, to have it pure, both from the
Venime of Heathen Politicians, and from the Incantation of Deceiving
Spirits. And by that means the most men, knowing their Duties, will be the
less subject to serve the Ambition of a few discontented persons, in their
purposes against the State; and be the lesse grieved with the Contributions
necessary for their Peace, and Defence; and the Governours themselves
have the lesse cause, to maintain at the Common charge any greater Army,
than is necessary to make good the Publique Liberty, against the Invasions
and Encroachments of forraign Enemies.
And thus I have brought to an end my Discourse of Civill and
Ecclesiasticall Government, occasioned by the disorders of the present
time, without partiality, without application, and without other designe,
than to set before mens eyes the mutuall Relation between Protection and
Obedience; of which the condition of Humane Nature, and the Laws
Divine, (both Naturall and Positive) require an inviolable observation. And
though in the revolution of States, there can be no very good Constellation
for Truths of this nature to be born under, (as having an angry aspect from
the dissolvers of an old Government, and seeing but the backs of them that
erect a new;) yet I cannot think it will be condemned at this time, either by
the Publique Judge of Doctrine, or by any that desires the continuance of
Publique Peace. And in this hope I return to my interrupted Speculation of
Bodies Naturall; wherein, (if God give me health to finish it,) I hope the
Novelty will as much please, as in the Doctrine of this Artificiall Body it
useth to offend. For such Truth, as opposeth no man profit, nor pleasure, is
to all men welcome.
FINIS
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INTRODUCTION
Nicolo Machiavelli was born at Florence on 3rd May 1469. He was the
second son of Bernardo di Nicolo Machiavelli, a lawyer of some repute,
and of Bartolommea di Stefano Nelli, his wife. Both parents were members
of the old Florentine nobility.
His life falls naturally into three periods, each of which singularly
enough constitutes a distinct and important era in the history of Florence.
His youth was concurrent with the greatness of Florence as an Italian power
under the guidance of Lorenzo de' Medici, Il Magnifico. The downfall of
the Medici in Florence occurred in 1494, in which year Machiavelli entered
the public service. During his official career Florence was free under the
government of a Republic, which lasted until 1512, when the Medici
returned to power, and Machiavelli lost his office. The Medici again ruled
Florence from 1512 until 1527, when they were once more driven out. This
was the period of Machiavelli's literary activity and increasing influence;
but he died, within a few weeks of the expulsion of the Medici, on 22nd
June 1527, in his fifty-eighth year, without having regained office.

YOUTH — Aet. 1-25—1469-94
Although there is little recorded of the youth of Machiavelli, the Florence
of those days is so well known that the early environment of this
representative citizen may be easily imagined. Florence has been described
as a city with two opposite currents of life, one directed by the fervent and
austere Savonarola, the other by the splendour-loving Lorenzo.
Savonarola's influence upon the young Machiavelli must have been slight,
for although at one time he wielded immense power over the fortunes of
Florence, he only furnished Machiavelli with a subject of a gibe in "The
Prince," where he is cited as an example of an unarmed prophet who came
to a bad end. Whereas the magnificence of the Medicean rule during the life
of Lorenzo appeared to have impressed Machiavelli strongly, for he
frequently recurs to it in his writings, and it is to Lorenzo's grandson that he
dedicates "The Prince."
Machiavelli, in his "History of Florence," gives us a picture of the young
men among whom his youth was passed. He writes: "They were freer than
their forefathers in dress and living, and spent more in other kinds of
excesses, consuming their time and money in idleness, gaming, and women;
their chief aim was to appear well dressed and to speak with wit and
acuteness, whilst he who could wound others the most cleverly was thought
the wisest." In a letter to his son Guido, Machiavelli shows why youth
should avail itself of its opportunities for study, and leads us to infer that his
own youth had been so occupied. He writes: "I have received your letter,
which has given me the greatest pleasure, especially because you tell me
you are quite restored in health, than which I could have no better news; for
if God grant life to you, and to me, I hope to make a good man of you if you
are willing to do your share." Then, writing of a new patron, he continues:
"This will turn out well for you, but it is necessary for you to study; since,
then, you have no longer the excuse of illness, take pains to study letters
and music, for you see what honour is done to me for the little skill I have.
Therefore, my son, if you wish to please me, and to bring success and
honour to yourself, do right and study, because others will help you if you
help yourself."

OFFICE — Aet. 25-43—1494-1512
The second period of Machiavelli's life was spent in the service of the
free Republic of Florence, which flourished, as stated above, from the
expulsion of the Medici in 1494 until their return in 1512. After serving
four years in one of the public offices he was appointed Chancellor and
Secretary to the Second Chancery, the Ten of Liberty and Peace. Here we
are on firm ground when dealing with the events of Machiavelli's life, for
during this time he took a leading part in the affairs of the Republic, and we
have its decrees, records, and dispatches to guide us, as well as his own
writings. A mere recapitulation of a few of his transactions with the
statesmen and soldiers of his time gives a fair indication of his activities,
and supplies the sources from which he drew the experiences and characters
which illustrate "The Prince."
His first mission was in 1499 to Catherina Sforza, "my lady of Forli" of
"The Prince," from whose conduct and fate he drew the moral that it is far
better to earn the confidence of the people than to rely on fortresses. This is
a very noticeable principle in Machiavelli, and is urged by him in many
ways as a matter of vital importance to princes.
In 1500 he was sent to France to obtain terms from Louis XII for
continuing the war against Pisa: this king it was who, in his conduct of
affairs in Italy, committed the five capital errors in statecraft summarized in
"The Prince," and was consequently driven out. He, also, it was who made
the dissolution of his marriage a condition of support to Pope Alexander VI;
which leads Machiavelli to refer those who urge that such promises should
be kept to what he has written concerning the faith of princes.
Machiavelli's public life was largely occupied with events arising out of
the ambitions of Pope Alexander VI and his son, Cesare Borgia, the Duke
Valentino, and these characters fill a large space of "The Prince."
Machiavelli never hesitates to cite the actions of the duke for the benefit of
usurpers who wish to keep the states they have seized; he can, indeed, find
no precepts to offer so good as the pattern of Cesare Borgia's conduct,
insomuch that Cesare is acclaimed by some critics as the "hero" of "The
Prince." Yet in "The Prince" the duke is in point of fact cited as a type of the

man who rises on the fortune of others, and falls with them; who takes
every course that might be expected from a prudent man but the course
which will save him; who is prepared for all eventualities but the one which
happens; and who, when all his abilities fail to carry him through, exclaims
that it was not his fault, but an extraordinary and unforeseen fatality.
On the death of Pius III, in 1503, Machiavelli was sent to Rome to watch
the election of his successor, and there he saw Cesare Borgia cheated into
allowing the choice of the College to fall on Giuliano delle Rovere (Julius
II), who was one of the cardinals that had most reason to fear the duke.
Machiavelli, when commenting on this election, says that he who thinks
new favours will cause great personages to forget old injuries deceives
himself. Julius did not rest until he had ruined Cesare.
It was to Julius II that Machiavelli was sent in 1506, when that pontiff
was commencing his enterprise against Bologna; which he brought to a
successful issue, as he did many of his other adventures, owing chiefly to
his impetuous character. It is in reference to Pope Julius that Machiavelli
moralizes on the resemblance between Fortune and women, and concludes
that it is the bold rather than the cautious man that will win and hold them
both.
It is impossible to follow here the varying fortunes of the Italian states,
which in 1507 were controlled by France, Spain, and Germany, with results
that have lasted to our day; we are concerned with those events, and with
the three great actors in them, so far only as they impinge on the personality
of Machiavelli. He had several meetings with Louis XII of France, and his
estimate of that monarch's character has already been alluded to.
Machiavelli has painted Ferdinand of Aragon as the man who accomplished
great things under the cloak of religion, but who in reality had no mercy,
faith, humanity, or integrity; and who, had he allowed himself to be
influenced by such motives, would have been ruined. The Emperor
Maximilian was one of the most interesting men of the age, and his
character has been drawn by many hands; but Machiavelli, who was an
envoy at his court in 1507-8, reveals the secret of his many failures when he
describes him as a secretive man, without force of character—ignoring the
human agencies necessary to carry his schemes into effect, and never
insisting on the fulfilment of his wishes.

The remaining years of Machiavelli's official career were filled with
events arising out of the League of Cambrai, made in 1508 between the
three great European powers already mentioned and the pope, with the
object of crushing the Venetian Republic. This result was attained in the
battle of Vaila, when Venice lost in one day all that she had won in eight
hundred years. Florence had a difficult part to play during these events,
complicated as they were by the feud which broke out between the pope
and the French, because friendship with France had dictated the entire
policy of the Republic. When, in 1511, Julius II finally formed the Holy
League against France, and with the assistance of the Swiss drove the
French out of Italy, Florence lay at the mercy of the Pope, and had to submit
to his terms, one of which was that the Medici should be restored. The
return of the Medici to Florence on 1st September 1512, and the consequent
fall of the Republic, was the signal for the dismissal of Machiavelli and his
friends, and thus put an end to his public career, for, as we have seen, he
died without regaining office.

LITERATURE AND DEATH — Aet. 43-58—
1512-27
On the return of the Medici, Machiavelli, who for a few weeks had vainly
hoped to retain his office under the new masters of Florence, was dismissed
by decree dated 7th November 1512. Shortly after this he was accused of
complicity in an abortive conspiracy against the Medici, imprisoned, and
put to the question by torture. The new Medicean pope, Leo X, procured his
release, and he retired to his small property at San Casciano, near Florence,
where he devoted himself to literature. In a letter to Francesco Vettori, dated
13th December 1513, he has left a very interesting description of his life at
this period, which elucidates his methods and his motives in writing "The
Prince." After describing his daily occupations with his family and
neighbours, he writes: "The evening being come, I return home and go to
my study; at the entrance I pull off my peasant-clothes, covered with dust
and dirt, and put on my noble court dress, and thus becomingly re-clothed I
pass into the ancient courts of the men of old, where, being lovingly
received by them, I am fed with that food which is mine alone; where I do
not hesitate to speak with them, and to ask for the reason of their actions,
and they in their benignity answer me; and for four hours I feel no
weariness, I forget every trouble, poverty does not dismay, death does not
terrify me; I am possessed entirely by those great men. And because Dante
says:
Knowledge doth come of learning well retained,
Unfruitful else,

I have noted down what I have gained from their conversation, and have
composed a small work on 'Principalities,' where I pour myself out as fully
as I can in meditation on the subject, discussing what a principality is, what
kinds there are, how they can be acquired, how they can be kept, why they
are lost: and if any of my fancies ever pleased you, this ought not to
displease you: and to a prince, especially to a new one, it should be
welcome: therefore I dedicate it to his Magnificence Giuliano. Filippo
Casavecchio has seen it; he will be able to tell you what is in it, and of the

discourses I have had with him; nevertheless, I am still enriching and
polishing it."
The "little book" suffered many vicissitudes before attaining the form in
which it has reached us. Various mental influences were at work during its
composition; its title and patron were changed; and for some unknown
reason it was finally dedicated to Lorenzo de' Medici. Although Machiavelli
discussed with Casavecchio whether it should be sent or presented in person
to the patron, there is no evidence that Lorenzo ever received or even read
it: he certainly never gave Machiavelli any employment. Although it was
plagiarized during Machiavelli's lifetime, "The Prince" was never published
by him, and its text is still disputable.
Machiavelli concludes his letter to Vettori thus: "And as to this little thing
[his book], when it has been read it will be seen that during the fifteen years
I have given to the study of statecraft I have neither slept nor idled; and men
ought ever to desire to be served by one who has reaped experience at the
expense of others. And of my loyalty none could doubt, because having
always kept faith I could not now learn how to break it; for he who has been
faithful and honest, as I have, cannot change his nature; and my poverty is a
witness to my honesty."
Before Machiavelli had got "The Prince" off his hands he commenced his
"Discourse on the First Decade of Titus Livius," which should be read
concurrently with "The Prince." These and several minor works occupied
him until the year 1518, when he accepted a small commission to look after
the affairs of some Florentine merchants at Genoa. In 1519 the Medicean
rulers of Florence granted a few political concessions to her citizens, and
Machiavelli with others was consulted upon a new constitution under which
the Great Council was to be restored; but on one pretext or another it was
not promulgated.
In 1520 the Florentine merchants again had recourse to Machiavelli to
settle their difficulties with Lucca, but this year was chiefly remarkable for
his re-entry into Florentine literary society, where he was much sought after,
and also for the production of his "Art of War." It was in the same year that
he received a commission at the instance of Cardinal de' Medici to write the
"History of Florence," a task which occupied him until 1525. His return to
popular favour may have determined the Medici to give him this
employment, for an old writer observes that "an able statesman out of work,

like a huge whale, will endeavour to overturn the ship unless he has an
empty cask to play with."
When the "History of Florence" was finished, Machiavelli took it to
Rome for presentation to his patron, Giuliano de' Medici, who had in the
meanwhile become pope under the title of Clement VII. It is somewhat
remarkable that, as, in 1513, Machiavelli had written "The Prince" for the
instruction of the Medici after they had just regained power in Florence, so,
in 1525, he dedicated the "History of Florence" to the head of the family
when its ruin was now at hand. In that year the battle of Pavia destroyed the
French rule in Italy, and left Francis I a prisoner in the hands of his great
rival, Charles V. This was followed by the sack of Rome, upon the news of
which the popular party at Florence threw off the yoke of the Medici, who
were once more banished.
Machiavelli was absent from Florence at this time, but hastened his
return, hoping to secure his former office of secretary to the "Ten of Liberty
and Peace." Unhappily he was taken ill soon after he reached Florence,
where he died on 22nd June 1527.

THE MAN AND HIS WORKS
No one can say where the bones of Machiavelli rest, but modern Florence
has decreed him a stately cenotaph in Santa Croce, by the side of her most
famous sons; recognizing that, whatever other nations may have found in
his works, Italy found in them the idea of her unity and the germs of her
renaissance among the nations of Europe. Whilst it is idle to protest against
the world-wide and evil signification of his name, it may be pointed out that
the harsh construction of his doctrine which this sinister reputation implies
was unknown to his own day, and that the researches of recent times have
enabled us to interpret him more reasonably. It is due to these inquiries that
the shape of an "unholy necromancer," which so long haunted men's vision,
has begun to fade.
Machiavelli was undoubtedly a man of great observation, acuteness, and
industry; noting with appreciative eye whatever passed before him, and
with his supreme literary gift turning it to account in his enforced retirement
from affairs. He does not present himself, nor is he depicted by his
contemporaries, as a type of that rare combination, the successful statesman
and author, for he appears to have been only moderately prosperous in his
several embassies and political employments. He was misled by Catherina
Sforza, ignored by Louis XII, overawed by Cesare Borgia; several of his
embassies were quite barren of results; his attempts to fortify Florence
failed, and the soldiery that he raised astonished everybody by their
cowardice. In the conduct of his own affairs he was timid and time-serving;
he dared not appear by the side of Soderini, to whom he owed so much, for
fear of compromising himself; his connection with the Medici was open to
suspicion, and Giuliano appears to have recognized his real forte when he
set him to write the "History of Florence," rather than employ him in the
state. And it is on the literary side of his character, and there alone, that we
find no weakness and no failure.
Although the light of almost four centuries has been focused on "The
Prince," its problems are still debatable and interesting, because they are the
eternal problems between the ruled and their rulers. Such as they are, its
ethics are those of Machiavelli's contemporaries; yet they cannot be said to

be out of date so long as the governments of Europe rely on material rather
than on moral forces. Its historical incidents and personages become
interesting by reason of the uses which Machiavelli makes of them to
illustrate his theories of government and conduct.
Leaving out of consideration those maxims of state which still furnish
some European and eastern statesmen with principles of action, "The
Prince" is bestrewn with truths that can be proved at every turn. Men are
still the dupes of their simplicity and greed, as they were in the days of
Alexander VI. The cloak of religion still conceals the vices which
Machiavelli laid bare in the character of Ferdinand of Aragon. Men will not
look at things as they really are, but as they wish them to be—and are
ruined. In politics there are no perfectly safe courses; prudence consists in
choosing the least dangerous ones. Then—to pass to a higher plane—
Machiavelli reiterates that, although crimes may win an empire, they do not
win glory. Necessary wars are just wars, and the arms of a nation are
hallowed when it has no other resource but to fight.
It is the cry of a far later day than Machiavelli's that government should
be elevated into a living moral force, capable of inspiring the people with a
just recognition of the fundamental principles of society; to this "high
argument" "The Prince" contributes but little. Machiavelli always refused to
write either of men or of governments otherwise than as he found them, and
he writes with such skill and insight that his work is of abiding value. But
what invests "The Prince" with more than a merely artistic or historical
interest is the incontrovertible truth that it deals with the great principles
which still guide nations and rulers in their relationship with each other and
their neighbours.
In translating "The Prince" my aim has been to achieve at all costs an
exact literal rendering of the original, rather than a fluent paraphrase
adapted to the modern notions of style and expression. Machiavelli was no
facile phrasemonger; the conditions under which he wrote obliged him to
weigh every word; his themes were lofty, his substance grave, his manner
nobly plain and serious. "Quis eo fuit unquam in partiundis rebus, in
definiendis, in explanandis pressior?" In "The Prince," it may be truly said,
there is reason assignable, not only for every word, but for the position of
every word. To an Englishman of Shakespeare's time the translation of such
a treatise was in some ways a comparatively easy task, for in those times

the genius of the English more nearly resembled that of the Italian
language; to the Englishman of to-day it is not so simple. To take a single
example: the word "intrattenere," employed by Machiavelli to indicate the
policy adopted by the Roman Senate towards the weaker states of Greece,
would by an Elizabethan be correctly rendered "entertain," and every
contemporary reader would understand what was meant by saying that
"Rome entertained the Aetolians and the Achaeans without augmenting
their power." But to-day such a phrase would seem obsolete and
ambiguous, if not unmeaning: we are compelled to say that "Rome
maintained friendly relations with the Aetolians," etc., using four words to
do the work of one. I have tried to preserve the pithy brevity of the Italian
so far as was consistent with an absolute fidelity to the sense. If the result
be an occasional asperity I can only hope that the reader, in his eagerness to
reach the author's meaning, may overlook the roughness of the road that
leads him to it.
The following is a list of the works of Machiavelli:
Principal works. Discorso sopra le cose di Pisa, 1499; Del modo di
trattare i popoli della Valdichiana ribellati, 1502; Del modo tenuto dal duca
Valentino nell' ammazzare Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da Fermo, etc.,
1502; Discorso sopra la provisione del danaro, 1502; Decennale primo
(poem in terza rima), 1506; Ritratti delle cose dell' Alemagna, 1508-12;
Decennale secondo, 1509; Ritratti delle cose di Francia, 1510; Discorsi
sopra la prima deca di T. Livio, 3 vols., 1512-17; Il Principe, 1513; Andria,
comedy translated from Terence, 1513 (?); Mandragola, prose comedy in
five acts, with prologue in verse, 1513; Della lingua (dialogue), 1514;
Clizia, comedy in prose, 1515 (?); Belfagor arcidiavolo (novel), 1515;
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Discorso sopra il riformare lo stato di Firenze, 1520; Sommario delle cose
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Other poems include Sonetti, Canzoni, Ottave, and Canti carnascialeschi.
Editions. Aldo, Venice, 1546; della Tertina, 1550; Cambiagi, Florence, 6
vols., 1782-5; dei Classici, Milan, 10 1813; Silvestri, 9 vols., 1820-2;
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1857; Letters to F. Vettori, see A. Ridolfi, Pensieri intorno allo scopo di N.
Machiavelli nel libro Il Principe, etc.; D. Ferrara, The Private
Correspondence of Nicolo Machiavelli, 1929.

DEDICATION
To the Magnificent Lorenzo Di Piero De' Medici:
Those who strive to obtain the good graces of a prince are
accustomed to come before him with such things as they hold most
precious, or in which they see him take most delight; whence one
often sees horses, arms, cloth of gold, precious stones, and
similar ornaments presented to princes, worthy of their greatness.
Desiring therefore to present myself to your Magnificence with
some testimony of my devotion towards you, I have not found among
my possessions anything which I hold more dear than, or value so
much as, the knowledge of the actions of great men, acquired by
long experience in contemporary affairs, and a continual study of
antiquity; which, having reflected upon it with great and
prolonged diligence, I now send, digested into a little volume, to
your Magnificence.
And although I may consider this work unworthy of your
countenance, nevertheless I trust much to your benignity that it
may be acceptable, seeing that it is not possible for me to make a
better gift than to offer you the opportunity of understanding in
the shortest time all that I have learnt in so many years, and
with so many troubles and dangers; which work I have not
embellished with swelling or magnificent words, nor stuffed with
rounded periods, nor with any extrinsic allurements or adornments
whatever, with which so many are accustomed to embellish their
works; for I have wished either that no honour should be given it,
or else that the truth of the matter and the weightiness of the
theme shall make it acceptable.
Nor do I hold with those who regard it as a presumption if a man
of low and humble condition dare to discuss and settle the
concerns of princes; because, just as those who draw landscapes
place themselves below in the plain to contemplate the nature of
the mountains and of lofty places, and in order to contemplate the
plains place themselves upon high mountains, even so to understand
the nature of the people it needs to be a prince, and to
understand that of princes it needs to be of the people.
Take then, your Magnificence, this little gift in the spirit in
which I send it; wherein, if it be diligently read and considered
by you, you will learn my extreme desire that you should attain
that greatness which fortune and your other attributes promise.
And if your Magnificence from the summit of your greatness will
sometimes turn your eyes to these lower regions, you will see how
unmeritedly I suffer a great and continued malignity of fortune.

THE PRINCE

CHAPTER I — HOW MANY KINDS OF
PRINCIPALITIES THERE ARE, AND BY
WHAT MEANS THEY ARE ACQUIRED
All states, all powers, that have held and hold rule over men have been
and are either republics or principalities.
Principalities are either hereditary, in which the family has been long
established; or they are new.
The new are either entirely new, as was Milan to Francesco Sforza, or
they are, as it were, members annexed to the hereditary state of the prince
who has acquired them, as was the kingdom of Naples to that of the King of
Spain.
Such dominions thus acquired are either accustomed to live under a
prince, or to live in freedom; and are acquired either by the arms of the
prince himself, or of others, or else by fortune or by ability.

CHAPTER II — CONCERNING HEREDITARY
PRINCIPALITIES
I will leave out all discussion on republics, inasmuch as in another place I
have written of them at length, and will address myself only to
principalities. In doing so I will keep to the order indicated above, and
discuss how such principalities are to be ruled and preserved.
I say at once there are fewer difficulties in holding hereditary states, and
those long accustomed to the family of their prince, than new ones; for it is
sufficient only not to transgress the customs of his ancestors, and to deal
prudently with circumstances as they arise, for a prince of average powers
to maintain himself in his state, unless he be deprived of it by some
extraordinary and excessive force; and if he should be so deprived of it,
whenever anything sinister happens to the usurper, he will regain it.
We have in Italy, for example, the Duke of Ferrara, who could not have
withstood the attacks of the Venetians in '84, nor those of Pope Julius in '10,
unless he had been long established in his dominions. For the hereditary
prince has less cause and less necessity to offend; hence it happens that he
will be more loved; and unless extraordinary vices cause him to be hated, it
is reasonable to expect that his subjects will be naturally well disposed
towards him; and in the antiquity and duration of his rule the memories and
motives that make for change are lost, for one change always leaves the
toothing for another.

CHAPTER III — CONCERNING MIXED
PRINCIPALITIES
But the difficulties occur in a new principality. And firstly, if it be not
entirely new, but is, as it were, a member of a state which, taken
collectively, may be called composite, the changes arise chiefly from an
inherent difficulty which there is in all new principalities; for men change
their rulers willingly, hoping to better themselves, and this hope induces
them to take up arms against him who rules: wherein they are deceived,
because they afterwards find by experience they have gone from bad to
worse. This follows also on another natural and common necessity, which
always causes a new prince to burden those who have submitted to him
with his soldiery and with infinite other hardships which he must put upon
his new acquisition.
In this way you have enemies in all those whom you have injured in
seizing that principality, and you are not able to keep those friends who put
you there because of your not being able to satisfy them in the way they
expected, and you cannot take strong measures against them, feeling bound
to them. For, although one may be very strong in armed forces, yet in
entering a province one has always need of the goodwill of the natives.
For these reasons Louis the Twelfth, King of France, quickly occupied
Milan, and as quickly lost it; and to turn him out the first time it only
needed Lodovico's own forces; because those who had opened the gates to
him, finding themselves deceived in their hopes of future benefit, would not
endure the ill-treatment of the new prince. It is very true that, after
acquiring rebellious provinces a second time, they are not so lightly lost
afterwards, because the prince, with little reluctance, takes the opportunity
of the rebellion to punish the delinquents, to clear out the suspects, and to
strengthen himself in the weakest places. Thus to cause France to lose
Milan the first time it was enough for the Duke Lodovico(*) to raise
insurrections on the borders; but to cause him to lose it a second time it was
necessary to bring the whole world against him, and that his armies should

be defeated and driven out of Italy; which followed from the causes above
mentioned.
(*) Duke Lodovico was Lodovico Moro, a son of Francesco
Sforza, who married Beatrice d'Este. He ruled over Milan
from 1494 to 1500, and died in 1510.

Nevertheless Milan was taken from France both the first and the second
time. The general reasons for the first have been discussed; it remains to
name those for the second, and to see what resources he had, and what any
one in his situation would have had for maintaining himself more securely
in his acquisition than did the King of France.
Now I say that those dominions which, when acquired, are added to an
ancient state by him who acquires them, are either of the same country and
language, or they are not. When they are, it is easier to hold them,
especially when they have not been accustomed to self-government; and to
hold them securely it is enough to have destroyed the family of the prince
who was ruling them; because the two peoples, preserving in other things
the old conditions, and not being unlike in customs, will live quietly
together, as one has seen in Brittany, Burgundy, Gascony, and Normandy,
which have been bound to France for so long a time: and, although there
may be some difference in language, nevertheless the customs are alike, and
the people will easily be able to get on amongst themselves. He who has
annexed them, if he wishes to hold them, has only to bear in mind two
considerations: the one, that the family of their former lord is extinguished;
the other, that neither their laws nor their taxes are altered, so that in a very
short time they will become entirely one body with the old principality.
But when states are acquired in a country differing in language, customs,
or laws, there are difficulties, and good fortune and great energy are needed
to hold them, and one of the greatest and most real helps would be that he
who has acquired them should go and reside there. This would make his
position more secure and durable, as it has made that of the Turk in Greece,
who, notwithstanding all the other measures taken by him for holding that
state, if he had not settled there, would not have been able to keep it.
Because, if one is on the spot, disorders are seen as they spring up, and one
can quickly remedy them; but if one is not at hand, they are heard of only
when they are great, and then one can no longer remedy them. Besides this,
the country is not pillaged by your officials; the subjects are satisfied by
prompt recourse to the prince; thus, wishing to be good, they have more

cause to love him, and wishing to be otherwise, to fear him. He who would
attack that state from the outside must have the utmost caution; as long as
the prince resides there it can only be wrested from him with the greatest
difficulty.
The other and better course is to send colonies to one or two places,
which may be as keys to that state, for it is necessary either to do this or
else to keep there a great number of cavalry and infantry. A prince does not
spend much on colonies, for with little or no expense he can send them out
and keep them there, and he offends a minority only of the citizens from
whom he takes lands and houses to give them to the new inhabitants; and
those whom he offends, remaining poor and scattered, are never able to
injure him; whilst the rest being uninjured are easily kept quiet, and at the
same time are anxious not to err for fear it should happen to them as it has
to those who have been despoiled. In conclusion, I say that these colonies
are not costly, they are more faithful, they injure less, and the injured, as has
been said, being poor and scattered, cannot hurt. Upon this, one has to
remark that men ought either to be well treated or crushed, because they can
avenge themselves of lighter injuries, of more serious ones they cannot;
therefore the injury that is to be done to a man ought to be of such a kind
that one does not stand in fear of revenge.
But in maintaining armed men there in place of colonies one spends
much more, having to consume on the garrison all the income from the
state, so that the acquisition turns into a loss, and many more are
exasperated, because the whole state is injured; through the shifting of the
garrison up and down all become acquainted with hardship, and all become
hostile, and they are enemies who, whilst beaten on their own ground, are
yet able to do hurt. For every reason, therefore, such guards are as useless
as a colony is useful.
Again, the prince who holds a country differing in the above respects
ought to make himself the head and defender of his less powerful
neighbours, and to weaken the more powerful amongst them, taking care
that no foreigner as powerful as himself shall, by any accident, get a footing
there; for it will always happen that such a one will be introduced by those
who are discontented, either through excess of ambition or through fear, as
one has seen already. The Romans were brought into Greece by the
Aetolians; and in every other country where they obtained a footing they

were brought in by the inhabitants. And the usual course of affairs is that, as
soon as a powerful foreigner enters a country, all the subject states are
drawn to him, moved by the hatred which they feel against the ruling
power. So that in respect to those subject states he has not to take any
trouble to gain them over to himself, for the whole of them quickly rally to
the state which he has acquired there. He has only to take care that they do
not get hold of too much power and too much authority, and then with his
own forces, and with their goodwill, he can easily keep down the more
powerful of them, so as to remain entirely master in the country. And he
who does not properly manage this business will soon lose what he has
acquired, and whilst he does hold it he will have endless difficulties and
troubles.
The Romans, in the countries which they annexed, observed closely these
measures; they sent colonies and maintained friendly relations with(*) the
minor powers, without increasing their strength; they kept down the greater,
and did not allow any strong foreign powers to gain authority. Greece
appears to me sufficient for an example. The Achaeans and Aetolians were
kept friendly by them, the kingdom of Macedonia was humbled, Antiochus
was driven out; yet the merits of the Achaeans and Aetolians never secured
for them permission to increase their power, nor did the persuasions of
Philip ever induce the Romans to be his friends without first humbling him,
nor did the influence of Antiochus make them agree that he should retain
any lordship over the country. Because the Romans did in these instances
what all prudent princes ought to do, who have to regard not only present
troubles, but also future ones, for which they must prepare with every
energy, because, when foreseen, it is easy to remedy them; but if you wait
until they approach, the medicine is no longer in time because the malady
has become incurable; for it happens in this, as the physicians say it
happens in hectic fever, that in the beginning of the malady it is easy to cure
but difficult to detect, but in the course of time, not having been either
detected or treated in the beginning, it becomes easy to detect but difficult
to cure. Thus it happens in affairs of state, for when the evils that arise have
been foreseen (which it is only given to a wise man to see), they can be
quickly redressed, but when, through not having been foreseen, they have
been permitted to grow in a way that every one can see them, there is no
longer a remedy. Therefore, the Romans, foreseeing troubles, dealt with
them at once, and, even to avoid a war, would not let them come to a head,

for they knew that war is not to be avoided, but is only to be put off to the
advantage of others; moreover they wished to fight with Philip and
Antiochus in Greece so as not to have to do it in Italy; they could have
avoided both, but this they did not wish; nor did that ever please them
which is forever in the mouths of the wise ones of our time:—Let us enjoy
the benefits of the time—but rather the benefits of their own valour and
prudence, for time drives everything before it, and is able to bring with it
good as well as evil, and evil as well as good.

(*) See remark in the introduction on the word
"intrattenere."

But let us turn to France and inquire whether she has done any of the
things mentioned. I will speak of Louis(*) (and not of Charles)(+) as the
one whose conduct is the better to be observed, he having held possession
of Italy for the longest period; and you will see that he has done the
opposite to those things which ought to be done to retain a state composed
of divers elements.
(*) Louis XII, King of France, "The Father of the People,"
born 1462, died 1515.
(+) Charles VIII, King of France, born 1470, died 1498.

King Louis was brought into Italy by the ambition of the Venetians, who
desired to obtain half the state of Lombardy by his intervention. I will not
blame the course taken by the king, because, wishing to get a foothold in
Italy, and having no friends there—seeing rather that every door was shut to
him owing to the conduct of Charles—he was forced to accept those
friendships which he could get, and he would have succeeded very quickly
in his design if in other matters he had not made some mistakes. The king,
however, having acquired Lombardy, regained at once the authority which
Charles had lost: Genoa yielded; the Florentines became his friends; the
Marquess of Mantua, the Duke of Ferrara, the Bentivogli, my lady of Forli,
the Lords of Faenza, of Pesaro, of Rimini, of Camerino, of Piombino, the
Lucchese, the Pisans, the Sienese—everybody made advances to him to
become his friend. Then could the Venetians realize the rashness of the
course taken by them, which, in order that they might secure two towns in
Lombardy, had made the king master of two-thirds of Italy.
Let any one now consider with what little difficulty the king could have
maintained his position in Italy had he observed the rules above laid down,
and kept all his friends secure and protected; for although they were
numerous they were both weak and timid, some afraid of the Church, some
of the Venetians, and thus they would always have been forced to stand in
with him, and by their means he could easily have made himself secure
against those who remained powerful. But he was no sooner in Milan than
he did the contrary by assisting Pope Alexander to occupy the Romagna. It
never occurred to him that by this action he was weakening himself,
depriving himself of friends and of those who had thrown themselves into
his lap, whilst he aggrandized the Church by adding much temporal power
to the spiritual, thus giving it greater authority. And having committed this

prime error, he was obliged to follow it up, so much so that, to put an end to
the ambition of Alexander, and to prevent his becoming the master of
Tuscany, he was himself forced to come into Italy.
And as if it were not enough to have aggrandized the Church, and
deprived himself of friends, he, wishing to have the kingdom of Naples,
divided it with the King of Spain, and where he was the prime arbiter in
Italy he takes an associate, so that the ambitious of that country and the
malcontents of his own should have somewhere to shelter; and whereas he
could have left in the kingdom his own pensioner as king, he drove him out,
to put one there who was able to drive him, Louis, out in turn.
The wish to acquire is in truth very natural and common, and men always
do so when they can, and for this they will be praised not blamed; but when
they cannot do so, yet wish to do so by any means, then there is folly and
blame. Therefore, if France could have attacked Naples with her own forces
she ought to have done so; if she could not, then she ought not to have
divided it. And if the partition which she made with the Venetians in
Lombardy was justified by the excuse that by it she got a foothold in Italy,
this other partition merited blame, for it had not the excuse of that necessity.
Therefore Louis made these five errors: he destroyed the minor powers,
he increased the strength of one of the greater powers in Italy, he brought in
a foreign power, he did not settle in the country, he did not send colonies.
Which errors, had he lived, were not enough to injure him had he not made
a sixth by taking away their dominions from the Venetians; because, had he
not aggrandized the Church, nor brought Spain into Italy, it would have
been very reasonable and necessary to humble them; but having first taken
these steps, he ought never to have consented to their ruin, for they, being
powerful, would always have kept off others from designs on Lombardy, to
which the Venetians would never have consented except to become masters
themselves there; also because the others would not wish to take Lombardy
from France in order to give it to the Venetians, and to run counter to both
they would not have had the courage.
And if any one should say: "King Louis yielded the Romagna to
Alexander and the kingdom to Spain to avoid war," I answer for the reasons
given above that a blunder ought never to be perpetrated to avoid war,
because it is not to be avoided, but is only deferred to your disadvantage.
And if another should allege the pledge which the king had given to the

Pope that he would assist him in the enterprise, in exchange for the
dissolution of his marriage(*) and for the cap to Rouen,(+) to that I reply
what I shall write later on concerning the faith of princes, and how it ought
to be kept.
(*) Louis XII divorced his wife, Jeanne, daughter of Louis
XI, and married in 1499 Anne of Brittany, widow of Charles
VIII, in order to retain the Duchy of Brittany for the
crown.
(+) The Archbishop of Rouen. He was Georges d'Amboise,
created a cardinal by Alexander VI. Born 1460, died 1510.

Thus King Louis lost Lombardy by not having followed any of the
conditions observed by those who have taken possession of countries and
wished to retain them. Nor is there any miracle in this, but much that is
reasonable and quite natural. And on these matters I spoke at Nantes with
Rouen, when Valentino, as Cesare Borgia, the son of Pope Alexander, was
usually called, occupied the Romagna, and on Cardinal Rouen observing to
me that the Italians did not understand war, I replied to him that the French
did not understand statecraft, meaning that otherwise they would not have
allowed the Church to reach such greatness. And in fact it has been seen
that the greatness of the Church and of Spain in Italy has been caused by
France, and her ruin may be attributed to them. From this a general rule is
drawn which never or rarely fails: that he who is the cause of another
becoming powerful is ruined; because that predominancy has been brought
about either by astuteness or else by force, and both are distrusted by him
who has been raised to power.

CHAPTER IV — WHY THE KINGDOM OF
DARIUS, CONQUERED BY ALEXANDER, DID
NOT REBEL AGAINST THE SUCCESSORS OF
ALEXANDER AT HIS DEATH
Considering the difficulties which men have had to hold to a newly
acquired state, some might wonder how, seeing that Alexander the Great
became the master of Asia in a few years, and died whilst it was scarcely
settled (whence it might appear reasonable that the whole empire would
have rebelled), nevertheless his successors maintained themselves, and had
to meet no other difficulty than that which arose among themselves from
their own ambitions.
I answer that the principalities of which one has record are found to be
governed in two different ways; either by a prince, with a body of servants,
who assist him to govern the kingdom as ministers by his favour and
permission; or by a prince and barons, who hold that dignity by antiquity of
blood and not by the grace of the prince. Such barons have states and their
own subjects, who recognize them as lords and hold them in natural
affection. Those states that are governed by a prince and his servants hold
their prince in more consideration, because in all the country there is no one
who is recognized as superior to him, and if they yield obedience to another
they do it as to a minister and official, and they do not bear him any
particular affection.
The examples of these two governments in our time are the Turk and the
King of France. The entire monarchy of the Turk is governed by one lord,
the others are his servants; and, dividing his kingdom into sanjaks, he sends
there different administrators, and shifts and changes them as he chooses.
But the King of France is placed in the midst of an ancient body of lords,
acknowledged by their own subjects, and beloved by them; they have their
own prerogatives, nor can the king take these away except at his peril.
Therefore, he who considers both of these states will recognize great
difficulties in seizing the state of the Turk, but, once it is conquered, great
ease in holding it. The causes of the difficulties in seizing the kingdom of

the Turk are that the usurper cannot be called in by the princes of the
kingdom, nor can he hope to be assisted in his designs by the revolt of those
whom the lord has around him. This arises from the reasons given above;
for his ministers, being all slaves and bondmen, can only be corrupted with
great difficulty, and one can expect little advantage from them when they
have been corrupted, as they cannot carry the people with them, for the
reasons assigned. Hence, he who attacks the Turk must bear in mind that he
will find him united, and he will have to rely more on his own strength than
on the revolt of others; but, if once the Turk has been conquered, and routed
in the field in such a way that he cannot replace his armies, there is nothing
to fear but the family of this prince, and, this being exterminated, there
remains no one to fear, the others having no credit with the people; and as
the conqueror did not rely on them before his victory, so he ought not to
fear them after it.
The contrary happens in kingdoms governed like that of France, because
one can easily enter there by gaining over some baron of the kingdom, for
one always finds malcontents and such as desire a change. Such men, for
the reasons given, can open the way into the state and render the victory
easy; but if you wish to hold it afterwards, you meet with infinite
difficulties, both from those who have assisted you and from those you have
crushed. Nor is it enough for you to have exterminated the family of the
prince, because the lords that remain make themselves the heads of fresh
movements against you, and as you are unable either to satisfy or
exterminate them, that state is lost whenever time brings the opportunity.
Now if you will consider what was the nature of the government of
Darius, you will find it similar to the kingdom of the Turk, and therefore it
was only necessary for Alexander, first to overthrow him in the field, and
then to take the country from him. After which victory, Darius being killed,
the state remained secure to Alexander, for the above reasons. And if his
successors had been united they would have enjoyed it securely and at their
ease, for there were no tumults raised in the kingdom except those they
provoked themselves.
But it is impossible to hold with such tranquillity states constituted like
that of France. Hence arose those frequent rebellions against the Romans in
Spain, France, and Greece, owing to the many principalities there were in
these states, of which, as long as the memory of them endured, the Romans

always held an insecure possession; but with the power and long
continuance of the empire the memory of them passed away, and the
Romans then became secure possessors. And when fighting afterwards
amongst themselves, each one was able to attach to himself his own parts of
the country, according to the authority he had assumed there; and the family
of the former lord being exterminated, none other than the Romans were
acknowledged.
When these things are remembered no one will marvel at the ease with
which Alexander held the Empire of Asia, or at the difficulties which others
have had to keep an acquisition, such as Pyrrhus and many more; this is not
occasioned by the little or abundance of ability in the conqueror, but by the
want of uniformity in the subject state.

CHAPTER V — CONCERNING THE WAY TO
GOVERN CITIES OR PRINCIPALITIES
WHICH LIVED UNDER THEIR OWN LAWS
BEFORE THEY WERE ANNEXED
Whenever those states which have been acquired as stated have been
accustomed to live under their own laws and in freedom, there are three
courses for those who wish to hold them: the first is to ruin them, the next is
to reside there in person, the third is to permit them to live under their own
laws, drawing a tribute, and establishing within it an oligarchy which will
keep it friendly to you. Because such a government, being created by the
prince, knows that it cannot stand without his friendship and interest, and
does its utmost to support him; and therefore he who would keep a city
accustomed to freedom will hold it more easily by the means of its own
citizens than in any other way.
There are, for example, the Spartans and the Romans. The Spartans held
Athens and Thebes, establishing there an oligarchy: nevertheless they lost
them. The Romans, in order to hold Capua, Carthage, and Numantia,
dismantled them, and did not lose them. They wished to hold Greece as the
Spartans held it, making it free and permitting its laws, and did not succeed.
So to hold it they were compelled to dismantle many cities in the country,
for in truth there is no safe way to retain them otherwise than by ruining
them. And he who becomes master of a city accustomed to freedom and
does not destroy it, may expect to be destroyed by it, for in rebellion it has
always the watchword of liberty and its ancient privileges as a rallying
point, which neither time nor benefits will ever cause it to forget. And
whatever you may do or provide against, they never forget that name or
their privileges unless they are disunited or dispersed, but at every chance
they immediately rally to them, as Pisa after the hundred years she had been
held in bondage by the Florentines.
But when cities or countries are accustomed to live under a prince, and
his family is exterminated, they, being on the one hand accustomed to obey
and on the other hand not having the old prince, cannot agree in making one

from amongst themselves, and they do not know how to govern themselves.
For this reason they are very slow to take up arms, and a prince can gain
them to himself and secure them much more easily. But in republics there is
more vitality, greater hatred, and more desire for vengeance, which will
never permit them to allow the memory of their former liberty to rest; so
that the safest way is to destroy them or to reside there.

CHAPTER VI — CONCERNING NEW
PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED
BY ONE'S OWN ARMS AND ABILITY
Let no one be surprised if, in speaking of entirely new principalities as I
shall do, I adduce the highest examples both of prince and of state; because
men, walking almost always in paths beaten by others, and following by
imitation their deeds, are yet unable to keep entirely to the ways of others or
attain to the power of those they imitate. A wise man ought always to
follow the paths beaten by great men, and to imitate those who have been
supreme, so that if his ability does not equal theirs, at least it will savour of
it. Let him act like the clever archers who, designing to hit the mark which
yet appears too far distant, and knowing the limits to which the strength of
their bow attains, take aim much higher than the mark, not to reach by their
strength or arrow to so great a height, but to be able with the aid of so high
an aim to hit the mark they wish to reach.
I say, therefore, that in entirely new principalities, where there is a new
prince, more or less difficulty is found in keeping them, accordingly as
there is more or less ability in him who has acquired the state. Now, as the
fact of becoming a prince from a private station presupposes either ability
or fortune, it is clear that one or other of these things will mitigate in some
degree many difficulties. Nevertheless, he who has relied least on fortune is
established the strongest. Further, it facilitates matters when the prince,
having no other state, is compelled to reside there in person.
But to come to those who, by their own ability and not through fortune,
have risen to be princes, I say that Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus, and
such like are the most excellent examples. And although one may not
discuss Moses, he having been a mere executor of the will of God, yet he
ought to be admired, if only for that favour which made him worthy to
speak with God. But in considering Cyrus and others who have acquired or
founded kingdoms, all will be found admirable; and if their particular deeds
and conduct shall be considered, they will not be found inferior to those of
Moses, although he had so great a preceptor. And in examining their actions

and lives one cannot see that they owed anything to fortune beyond
opportunity, which brought them the material to mould into the form which
seemed best to them. Without that opportunity their powers of mind would
have been extinguished, and without those powers the opportunity would
have come in vain.
It was necessary, therefore, to Moses that he should find the people of
Israel in Egypt enslaved and oppressed by the Egyptians, in order that they
should be disposed to follow him so as to be delivered out of bondage. It
was necessary that Romulus should not remain in Alba, and that he should
be abandoned at his birth, in order that he should become King of Rome
and founder of the fatherland. It was necessary that Cyrus should find the
Persians discontented with the government of the Medes, and the Medes
soft and effeminate through their long peace. Theseus could not have shown
his ability had he not found the Athenians dispersed. These opportunities,
therefore, made those men fortunate, and their high ability enabled them to
recognize the opportunity whereby their country was ennobled and made
famous.
Those who by valorous ways become princes, like these men, acquire a
principality with difficulty, but they keep it with ease. The difficulties they
have in acquiring it rise in part from the new rules and methods which they
are forced to introduce to establish their government and its security. And it
ought to be remembered that there is nothing more difficult to take in hand,
more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the
lead in the introduction of a new order of things, because the innovator has
for enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions, and
lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new. This coolness
arises partly from fear of the opponents, who have the laws on their side,
and partly from the incredulity of men, who do not readily believe in new
things until they have had a long experience of them. Thus it happens that
whenever those who are hostile have the opportunity to attack they do it
like partisans, whilst the others defend lukewarmly, in such wise that the
prince is endangered along with them.
It is necessary, therefore, if we desire to discuss this matter thoroughly, to
inquire whether these innovators can rely on themselves or have to depend
on others: that is to say, whether, to consummate their enterprise, have they
to use prayers or can they use force? In the first instance they always

succeed badly, and never compass anything; but when they can rely on
themselves and use force, then they are rarely endangered. Hence it is that
all armed prophets have conquered, and the unarmed ones have been
destroyed. Besides the reasons mentioned, the nature of the people is
variable, and whilst it is easy to persuade them, it is difficult to fix them in
that persuasion. And thus it is necessary to take such measures that, when
they believe no longer, it may be possible to make them believe by force.
If Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus had been unarmed they could
not have enforced their constitutions for long—as happened in our time to
Fra Girolamo Savonarola, who was ruined with his new order of things
immediately the multitude believed in him no longer, and he had no means
of keeping steadfast those who believed or of making the unbelievers to
believe. Therefore such as these have great difficulties in consummating
their enterprise, for all their dangers are in the ascent, yet with ability they
will overcome them; but when these are overcome, and those who envied
them their success are exterminated, they will begin to be respected, and
they will continue afterwards powerful, secure, honoured, and happy.
To these great examples I wish to add a lesser one; still it bears some
resemblance to them, and I wish it to suffice me for all of a like kind: it is
Hiero the Syracusan.(*) This man rose from a private station to be Prince of
Syracuse, nor did he, either, owe anything to fortune but opportunity; for
the Syracusans, being oppressed, chose him for their captain, afterwards he
was rewarded by being made their prince. He was of so great ability, even
as a private citizen, that one who writes of him says he wanted nothing but
a kingdom to be a king. This man abolished the old soldiery, organized the
new, gave up old alliances, made new ones; and as he had his own soldiers
and allies, on such foundations he was able to build any edifice: thus, whilst
he had endured much trouble in acquiring, he had but little in keeping.
(*) Hiero II, born about 307 B.C., died 216 B.C.

CHAPTER VII — CONCERNING NEW
PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED
EITHER BY THE ARMS OF OTHERS OR BY
GOOD FORTUNE
Those who solely by good fortune become princes from being private
citizens have little trouble in rising, but much in keeping atop; they have not
any difficulties on the way up, because they fly, but they have many when
they reach the summit. Such are those to whom some state is given either
for money or by the favour of him who bestows it; as happened to many in
Greece, in the cities of Ionia and of the Hellespont, where princes were
made by Darius, in order that they might hold the cities both for his security
and his glory; as also were those emperors who, by the corruption of the
soldiers, from being citizens came to empire. Such stand simply elevated
upon the goodwill and the fortune of him who has elevated them—two
most inconstant and unstable things. Neither have they the knowledge
requisite for the position; because, unless they are men of great worth and
ability, it is not reasonable to expect that they should know how to
command, having always lived in a private condition; besides, they cannot
hold it because they have not forces which they can keep friendly and
faithful.
States that rise unexpectedly, then, like all other things in nature which
are born and grow rapidly, cannot leave their foundations and
correspondencies(*) fixed in such a way that the first storm will not
overthrow them; unless, as is said, those who unexpectedly become princes
are men of so much ability that they know they have to be prepared at once
to hold that which fortune has thrown into their laps, and that those
foundations, which others have laid BEFORE they became princes, they
must lay AFTERWARDS.
(*) "Le radici e corrispondenze," their roots (i.e.
foundations) and correspondencies or relations with other
states—a common meaning of "correspondence" and
"correspondency" in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Concerning these two methods of rising to be a prince by ability or
fortune, I wish to adduce two examples within our own recollection, and
these are Francesco Sforza(*) and Cesare Borgia. Francesco, by proper
means and with great ability, from being a private person rose to be Duke of
Milan, and that which he had acquired with a thousand anxieties he kept
with little trouble. On the other hand, Cesare Borgia, called by the people
Duke Valentino, acquired his state during the ascendancy of his father, and
on its decline he lost it, notwithstanding that he had taken every measure
and done all that ought to be done by a wise and able man to fix firmly his
roots in the states which the arms and fortunes of others had bestowed on
him.
(*) Francesco Sforza, born 1401, died 1466. He married
Bianca Maria Visconti, a natural daughter of Filippo
Visconti, the Duke of Milan, on whose death he procured his
own elevation to the duchy. Machiavelli was the accredited
agent of the Florentine Republic to Cesare Borgia (14781507) during the transactions which led up to the
assassinations of the Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigalia, and
along with his letters to his chiefs in Florence he has left
an account, written ten years before "The Prince," of the
proceedings of the duke in his "Descritione del modo tenuto
dal duca Valentino nello ammazzare Vitellozzo Vitelli,"
etc., a translation of which is appended to the present
work.

Because, as is stated above, he who has not first laid his foundations may
be able with great ability to lay them afterwards, but they will be laid with
trouble to the architect and danger to the building. If, therefore, all the steps
taken by the duke be considered, it will be seen that he laid solid
foundations for his future power, and I do not consider it superfluous to
discuss them, because I do not know what better precepts to give a new
prince than the example of his actions; and if his dispositions were of no
avail, that was not his fault, but the extraordinary and extreme malignity of
fortune.
Alexander the Sixth, in wishing to aggrandize the duke, his son, had
many immediate and prospective difficulties. Firstly, he did not see his way
to make him master of any state that was not a state of the Church; and if he
was willing to rob the Church he knew that the Duke of Milan and the
Venetians would not consent, because Faenza and Rimini were already
under the protection of the Venetians. Besides this, he saw the arms of Italy,
especially those by which he might have been assisted, in hands that would
fear the aggrandizement of the Pope, namely, the Orsini and the Colonnesi
and their following. It behoved him, therefore, to upset this state of affairs

and embroil the powers, so as to make himself securely master of part of
their states. This was easy for him to do, because he found the Venetians,
moved by other reasons, inclined to bring back the French into Italy; he
would not only not oppose this, but he would render it more easy by
dissolving the former marriage of King Louis. Therefore the king came into
Italy with the assistance of the Venetians and the consent of Alexander. He
was no sooner in Milan than the Pope had soldiers from him for the attempt
on the Romagna, which yielded to him on the reputation of the king. The
duke, therefore, having acquired the Romagna and beaten the Colonnesi,
while wishing to hold that and to advance further, was hindered by two
things: the one, his forces did not appear loyal to him, the other, the
goodwill of France: that is to say, he feared that the forces of the Orsini,
which he was using, would not stand to him, that not only might they hinder
him from winning more, but might themselves seize what he had won, and
that the king might also do the same. Of the Orsini he had a warning when,
after taking Faenza and attacking Bologna, he saw them go very
unwillingly to that attack. And as to the king, he learned his mind when he
himself, after taking the Duchy of Urbino, attacked Tuscany, and the king
made him desist from that undertaking; hence the duke decided to depend
no more upon the arms and the luck of others.
For the first thing he weakened the Orsini and Colonnesi parties in Rome,
by gaining to himself all their adherents who were gentlemen, making them
his gentlemen, giving them good pay, and, according to their rank,
honouring them with office and command in such a way that in a few
months all attachment to the factions was destroyed and turned entirely to
the duke. After this he awaited an opportunity to crush the Orsini, having
scattered the adherents of the Colonna house. This came to him soon and he
used it well; for the Orsini, perceiving at length that the aggrandizement of
the duke and the Church was ruin to them, called a meeting of the Magione
in Perugia. From this sprung the rebellion at Urbino and the tumults in the
Romagna, with endless dangers to the duke, all of which he overcame with
the help of the French. Having restored his authority, not to leave it at risk
by trusting either to the French or other outside forces, he had recourse to
his wiles, and he knew so well how to conceal his mind that, by the
mediation of Signor Pagolo—whom the duke did not fail to secure with all
kinds of attention, giving him money, apparel, and horses—the Orsini were
reconciled, so that their simplicity brought them into his power at Sinigalia.

(*) Having exterminated the leaders, and turned their partisans into his
friends, the duke laid sufficiently good foundations to his power, having all
the Romagna and the Duchy of Urbino; and the people now beginning to
appreciate their prosperity, he gained them all over to himself. And as this
point is worthy of notice, and to be imitated by others, I am not willing to
leave it out.
(*) Sinigalia, 31st December 1502.

When the duke occupied the Romagna he found it under the rule of weak
masters, who rather plundered their subjects than ruled them, and gave them
more cause for disunion than for union, so that the country was full of
robbery, quarrels, and every kind of violence; and so, wishing to bring back
peace and obedience to authority, he considered it necessary to give it a
good governor. Thereupon he promoted Messer Ramiro d'Orco,(*) a swift
and cruel man, to whom he gave the fullest power. This man in a short time
restored peace and unity with the greatest success. Afterwards the duke
considered that it was not advisable to confer such excessive authority, for
he had no doubt but that he would become odious, so he set up a court of
judgment in the country, under a most excellent president, wherein all cities
had their advocates. And because he knew that the past severity had caused
some hatred against himself, so, to clear himself in the minds of the people,
and gain them entirely to himself, he desired to show that, if any cruelty had
been practised, it had not originated with him, but in the natural sternness of
the minister. Under this pretence he took Ramiro, and one morning caused
him to be executed and left on the piazza at Cesena with the block and a
bloody knife at his side. The barbarity of this spectacle caused the people to
be at once satisfied and dismayed.
(*) Ramiro d'Orco. Ramiro de Lorqua.

But let us return whence we started. I say that the duke, finding himself
now sufficiently powerful and partly secured from immediate dangers by
having armed himself in his own way, and having in a great measure
crushed those forces in his vicinity that could injure him if he wished to
proceed with his conquest, had next to consider France, for he knew that the
king, who too late was aware of his mistake, would not support him. And
from this time he began to seek new alliances and to temporize with France
in the expedition which she was making towards the kingdom of Naples
against the Spaniards who were besieging Gaeta. It was his intention to

secure himself against them, and this he would have quickly accomplished
had Alexander lived.
Such was his line of action as to present affairs. But as to the future he
had to fear, in the first place, that a new successor to the Church might not
be friendly to him and might seek to take from him that which Alexander
had given him, so he decided to act in four ways. Firstly, by exterminating
the families of those lords whom he had despoiled, so as to take away that
pretext from the Pope. Secondly, by winning to himself all the gentlemen of
Rome, so as to be able to curb the Pope with their aid, as has been observed.
Thirdly, by converting the college more to himself. Fourthly, by acquiring
so much power before the Pope should die that he could by his own
measures resist the first shock. Of these four things, at the death of
Alexander, he had accomplished three. For he had killed as many of the
dispossessed lords as he could lay hands on, and few had escaped; he had
won over the Roman gentlemen, and he had the most numerous party in the
college. And as to any fresh acquisition, he intended to become master of
Tuscany, for he already possessed Perugia and Piombino, and Pisa was
under his protection. And as he had no longer to study France (for the
French were already driven out of the kingdom of Naples by the Spaniards,
and in this way both were compelled to buy his goodwill), he pounced
down upon Pisa. After this, Lucca and Siena yielded at once, partly through
hatred and partly through fear of the Florentines; and the Florentines would
have had no remedy had he continued to prosper, as he was prospering the
year that Alexander died, for he had acquired so much power and reputation
that he would have stood by himself, and no longer have depended on the
luck and the forces of others, but solely on his own power and ability.
But Alexander died five years after he had first drawn the sword. He left
the duke with the state of Romagna alone consolidated, with the rest in the
air, between two most powerful hostile armies, and sick unto death. Yet
there were in the duke such boldness and ability, and he knew so well how
men are to be won or lost, and so firm were the foundations which in so
short a time he had laid, that if he had not had those armies on his back, or
if he had been in good health, he would have overcome all difficulties. And
it is seen that his foundations were good, for the Romagna awaited him for
more than a month. In Rome, although but half alive, he remained secure;
and whilst the Baglioni, the Vitelli, and the Orsini might come to Rome,
they could not effect anything against him. If he could not have made Pope

him whom he wished, at least the one whom he did not wish would not
have been elected. But if he had been in sound health at the death of
Alexander,(*) everything would have been different to him. On the day that
Julius the Second(+) was elected, he told me that he had thought of
everything that might occur at the death of his father, and had provided a
remedy for all, except that he had never anticipated that, when the death did
happen, he himself would be on the point to die.
(*) Alexander VI died of fever, 18th August 1503.
(+) Julius II was Giuliano della Rovere, Cardinal of San
Pietro ad Vincula, born 1443, died 1513.

When all the actions of the duke are recalled, I do not know how to
blame him, but rather it appears to be, as I have said, that I ought to offer
him for imitation to all those who, by the fortune or the arms of others, are
raised to government. Because he, having a lofty spirit and far-reaching
aims, could not have regulated his conduct otherwise, and only the
shortness of the life of Alexander and his own sickness frustrated his
designs. Therefore, he who considers it necessary to secure himself in his
new principality, to win friends, to overcome either by force or fraud, to
make himself beloved and feared by the people, to be followed and revered
by the soldiers, to exterminate those who have power or reason to hurt him,
to change the old order of things for new, to be severe and gracious,
magnanimous and liberal, to destroy a disloyal soldiery and to create new,
to maintain friendship with kings and princes in such a way that they must
help him with zeal and offend with caution, cannot find a more lively
example than the actions of this man.
Only can he be blamed for the election of Julius the Second, in whom he
made a bad choice, because, as is said, not being able to elect a Pope to his
own mind, he could have hindered any other from being elected Pope; and
he ought never to have consented to the election of any cardinal whom he
had injured or who had cause to fear him if they became pontiffs. For men
injure either from fear or hatred. Those whom he had injured, amongst
others, were San Pietro ad Vincula, Colonna, San Giorgio, and Ascanio.(*)
The rest, in becoming Pope, had to fear him, Rouen and the Spaniards
excepted; the latter from their relationship and obligations, the former from
his influence, the kingdom of France having relations with him. Therefore,
above everything, the duke ought to have created a Spaniard Pope, and,
failing him, he ought to have consented to Rouen and not San Pietro ad

Vincula. He who believes that new benefits will cause great personages to
forget old injuries is deceived. Therefore, the duke erred in his choice, and
it was the cause of his ultimate ruin.
(*) San Giorgio is Raffaello Riario. Ascanio is Ascanio
Sforza.

CHAPTER VIII — CONCERNING THOSE
WHO HAVE OBTAINED A PRINCIPALITY BY
WICKEDNESS
Although a prince may rise from a private station in two ways, neither of
which can be entirely attributed to fortune or genius, yet it is manifest to me
that I must not be silent on them, although one could be more copiously
treated when I discuss republics. These methods are when, either by some
wicked or nefarious ways, one ascends to the principality, or when by the
favour of his fellow-citizens a private person becomes the prince of his
country. And speaking of the first method, it will be illustrated by two
examples—one ancient, the other modern—and without entering further
into the subject, I consider these two examples will suffice those who may
be compelled to follow them.
Agathocles, the Sicilian,(*) became King of Syracuse not only from a
private but from a low and abject position. This man, the son of a potter,
through all the changes in his fortunes always led an infamous life.
Nevertheless, he accompanied his infamies with so much ability of mind
and body that, having devoted himself to the military profession, he rose
through its ranks to be Praetor of Syracuse. Being established in that
position, and having deliberately resolved to make himself prince and to
seize by violence, without obligation to others, that which had been
conceded to him by assent, he came to an understanding for this purpose
with Amilcar, the Carthaginian, who, with his army, was fighting in Sicily.
One morning he assembled the people and the senate of Syracuse, as if he
had to discuss with them things relating to the Republic, and at a given
signal the soldiers killed all the senators and the richest of the people; these
dead, he seized and held the princedom of that city without any civil
commotion. And although he was twice routed by the Carthaginians, and
ultimately besieged, yet not only was he able to defend his city, but leaving
part of his men for its defence, with the others he attacked Africa, and in a
short time raised the siege of Syracuse. The Carthaginians, reduced to

extreme necessity, were compelled to come to terms with Agathocles, and,
leaving Sicily to him, had to be content with the possession of Africa.
(*) Agathocles the Sicilian, born 361 B.C., died 289 B.C.

Therefore, he who considers the actions and the genius of this man will
see nothing, or little, which can be attributed to fortune, inasmuch as he
attained pre-eminence, as is shown above, not by the favour of any one, but
step by step in the military profession, which steps were gained with a
thousand troubles and perils, and were afterwards boldly held by him with
many hazardous dangers. Yet it cannot be called talent to slay fellowcitizens, to deceive friends, to be without faith, without mercy, without
religion; such methods may gain empire, but not glory. Still, if the courage
of Agathocles in entering into and extricating himself from dangers be
considered, together with his greatness of mind in enduring and overcoming
hardships, it cannot be seen why he should be esteemed less than the most
notable captain. Nevertheless, his barbarous cruelty and inhumanity with
infinite wickedness do not permit him to be celebrated among the most
excellent men. What he achieved cannot be attributed either to fortune or
genius.
In our times, during the rule of Alexander the Sixth, Oliverotto da Fermo,
having been left an orphan many years before, was brought up by his
maternal uncle, Giovanni Fogliani, and in the early days of his youth sent to
fight under Pagolo Vitelli, that, being trained under his discipline, he might
attain some high position in the military profession. After Pagolo died, he
fought under his brother Vitellozzo, and in a very short time, being
endowed with wit and a vigorous body and mind, he became the first man
in his profession. But it appearing a paltry thing to serve under others, he
resolved, with the aid of some citizens of Fermo, to whom the slavery of
their country was dearer than its liberty, and with the help of the Vitelleschi,
to seize Fermo. So he wrote to Giovanni Fogliani that, having been away
from home for many years, he wished to visit him and his city, and in some
measure to look upon his patrimony; and although he had not laboured to
acquire anything except honour, yet, in order that the citizens should see he
had not spent his time in vain, he desired to come honourably, so would be
accompanied by one hundred horsemen, his friends and retainers; and he
entreated Giovanni to arrange that he should be received honourably by the
Fermians, all of which would be not only to his honour, but also to that of
Giovanni himself, who had brought him up.

Giovanni, therefore, did not fail in any attentions due to his nephew, and
he caused him to be honourably received by the Fermians, and he lodged
him in his own house, where, having passed some days, and having
arranged what was necessary for his wicked designs, Oliverotto gave a
solemn banquet to which he invited Giovanni Fogliani and the chiefs of
Fermo. When the viands and all the other entertainments that are usual in
such banquets were finished, Oliverotto artfully began certain grave
discourses, speaking of the greatness of Pope Alexander and his son Cesare,
and of their enterprises, to which discourse Giovanni and others answered;
but he rose at once, saying that such matters ought to be discussed in a more
private place, and he betook himself to a chamber, whither Giovanni and
the rest of the citizens went in after him. No sooner were they seated than
soldiers issued from secret places and slaughtered Giovanni and the rest.
After these murders Oliverotto, mounted on horseback, rode up and down
the town and besieged the chief magistrate in the palace, so that in fear the
people were forced to obey him, and to form a government, of which he
made himself the prince. He killed all the malcontents who were able to
injure him, and strengthened himself with new civil and military
ordinances, in such a way that, in the year during which he held the
principality, not only was he secure in the city of Fermo, but he had become
formidable to all his neighbours. And his destruction would have been as
difficult as that of Agathocles if he had not allowed himself to be
overreached by Cesare Borgia, who took him with the Orsini and Vitelli at
Sinigalia, as was stated above. Thus one year after he had committed this
parricide, he was strangled, together with Vitellozzo, whom he had made
his leader in valour and wickedness.
Some may wonder how it can happen that Agathocles, and his like, after
infinite treacheries and cruelties, should live for long secure in his country,
and defend himself from external enemies, and never be conspired against
by his own citizens; seeing that many others, by means of cruelty, have
never been able even in peaceful times to hold the state, still less in the
doubtful times of war. I believe that this follows from severities(*) being
badly or properly used. Those may be called properly used, if of evil it is
possible to speak well, that are applied at one blow and are necessary to
one's security, and that are not persisted in afterwards unless they can be
turned to the advantage of the subjects. The badly employed are those
which, notwithstanding they may be few in the commencement, multiply

with time rather than decrease. Those who practise the first system are able,
by aid of God or man, to mitigate in some degree their rule, as Agathocles
did. It is impossible for those who follow the other to maintain themselves.
(*) Mr Burd suggests that this word probably comes near the
modern equivalent of Machiavelli's thought when he speaks of
"crudelta" than the more obvious "cruelties."

Hence it is to be remarked that, in seizing a state, the usurper ought to
examine closely into all those injuries which it is necessary for him to
inflict, and to do them all at one stroke so as not to have to repeat them
daily; and thus by not unsettling men he will be able to reassure them, and
win them to himself by benefits. He who does otherwise, either from
timidity or evil advice, is always compelled to keep the knife in his hand;
neither can he rely on his subjects, nor can they attach themselves to him,
owing to their continued and repeated wrongs. For injuries ought to be done
all at one time, so that, being tasted less, they offend less; benefits ought to
be given little by little, so that the flavour of them may last longer.
And above all things, a prince ought to live amongst his people in such a
way that no unexpected circumstances, whether of good or evil, shall make
him change; because if the necessity for this comes in troubled times, you
are too late for harsh measures; and mild ones will not help you, for they
will be considered as forced from you, and no one will be under any
obligation to you for them.

CHAPTER IX — CONCERNING A CIVIL
PRINCIPALITY
But coming to the other point—where a leading citizen becomes the
prince of his country, not by wickedness or any intolerable violence, but by
the favour of his fellow citizens—this may be called a civil principality: nor
is genius or fortune altogether necessary to attain to it, but rather a happy
shrewdness. I say then that such a principality is obtained either by the
favour of the people or by the favour of the nobles. Because in all cities
these two distinct parties are found, and from this it arises that the people do
not wish to be ruled nor oppressed by the nobles, and the nobles wish to
rule and oppress the people; and from these two opposite desires there
arises in cities one of three results, either a principality, self-government, or
anarchy.
A principality is created either by the people or by the nobles,
accordingly as one or other of them has the opportunity; for the nobles,
seeing they cannot withstand the people, begin to cry up the reputation of
one of themselves, and they make him a prince, so that under his shadow
they can give vent to their ambitions. The people, finding they cannot resist
the nobles, also cry up the reputation of one of themselves, and make him a
prince so as to be defended by his authority. He who obtains sovereignty by
the assistance of the nobles maintains himself with more difficulty than he
who comes to it by the aid of the people, because the former finds himself
with many around him who consider themselves his equals, and because of
this he can neither rule nor manage them to his liking. But he who reaches
sovereignty by popular favour finds himself alone, and has none around
him, or few, who are not prepared to obey him.
Besides this, one cannot by fair dealing, and without injury to others,
satisfy the nobles, but you can satisfy the people, for their object is more
righteous than that of the nobles, the latter wishing to oppress, while the
former only desire not to be oppressed. It is to be added also that a prince
can never secure himself against a hostile people, because of there being too
many, whilst from the nobles he can secure himself, as they are few in

number. The worst that a prince may expect from a hostile people is to be
abandoned by them; but from hostile nobles he has not only to fear
abandonment, but also that they will rise against him; for they, being in
these affairs more far-seeing and astute, always come forward in time to
save themselves, and to obtain favours from him whom they expect to
prevail. Further, the prince is compelled to live always with the same
people, but he can do well without the same nobles, being able to make and
unmake them daily, and to give or take away authority when it pleases him.
Therefore, to make this point clearer, I say that the nobles ought to be
looked at mainly in two ways: that is to say, they either shape their course
in such a way as binds them entirely to your fortune, or they do not. Those
who so bind themselves, and are not rapacious, ought to be honoured and
loved; those who do not bind themselves may be dealt with in two ways;
they may fail to do this through pusillanimity and a natural want of courage,
in which case you ought to make use of them, especially of those who are
of good counsel; and thus, whilst in prosperity you honour them, in
adversity you do not have to fear them. But when for their own ambitious
ends they shun binding themselves, it is a token that they are giving more
thought to themselves than to you, and a prince ought to guard against such,
and to fear them as if they were open enemies, because in adversity they
always help to ruin him.
Therefore, one who becomes a prince through the favour of the people
ought to keep them friendly, and this he can easily do seeing they only ask
not to be oppressed by him. But one who, in opposition to the people,
becomes a prince by the favour of the nobles, ought, above everything, to
seek to win the people over to himself, and this he may easily do if he takes
them under his protection. Because men, when they receive good from him
of whom they were expecting evil, are bound more closely to their
benefactor; thus the people quickly become more devoted to him than if he
had been raised to the principality by their favours; and the prince can win
their affections in many ways, but as these vary according to the
circumstances one cannot give fixed rules, so I omit them; but, I repeat, it is
necessary for a prince to have the people friendly, otherwise he has no
security in adversity.
Nabis,(*) Prince of the Spartans, sustained the attack of all Greece, and
of a victorious Roman army, and against them he defended his country and

his government; and for the overcoming of this peril it was only necessary
for him to make himself secure against a few, but this would not have been
sufficient had the people been hostile. And do not let any one impugn this
statement with the trite proverb that "He who builds on the people, builds
on the mud," for this is true when a private citizen makes a foundation
there, and persuades himself that the people will free him when he is
oppressed by his enemies or by the magistrates; wherein he would find
himself very often deceived, as happened to the Gracchi in Rome and to
Messer Giorgio Scali(+) in Florence. But granted a prince who has
established himself as above, who can command, and is a man of courage,
undismayed in adversity, who does not fail in other qualifications, and who,
by his resolution and energy, keeps the whole people encouraged—such a
one will never find himself deceived in them, and it will be shown that he
has laid his foundations well.

(*) Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, conquered by the Romans under
Flamininus in 195 B.C.; killed 192 B.C.
(+) Messer Giorgio Scali. This event is to be found in
Machiavelli's "Florentine History," Book III.

These principalities are liable to danger when they are passing from the
civil to the absolute order of government, for such princes either rule
personally or through magistrates. In the latter case their government is
weaker and more insecure, because it rests entirely on the goodwill of those
citizens who are raised to the magistracy, and who, especially in troubled
times, can destroy the government with great ease, either by intrigue or
open defiance; and the prince has not the chance amid tumults to exercise
absolute authority, because the citizens and subjects, accustomed to receive
orders from magistrates, are not of a mind to obey him amid these
confusions, and there will always be in doubtful times a scarcity of men
whom he can trust. For such a prince cannot rely upon what he observes in
quiet times, when citizens have need of the state, because then every one
agrees with him; they all promise, and when death is far distant they all
wish to die for him; but in troubled times, when the state has need of its
citizens, then he finds but few. And so much the more is this experiment
dangerous, inasmuch as it can only be tried once. Therefore a wise prince
ought to adopt such a course that his citizens will always in every sort and
kind of circumstance have need of the state and of him, and then he will
always find them faithful.

CHAPTER X — CONCERNING THE WAY IN
WHICH THE STRENGTH OF ALL
PRINCIPALITIES OUGHT TO BE MEASURED
It is necessary to consider another point in examining the character of
these principalities: that is, whether a prince has such power that, in case of
need, he can support himself with his own resources, or whether he has
always need of the assistance of others. And to make this quite clear I say
that I consider those who are able to support themselves by their own
resources who can, either by abundance of men or money, raise a sufficient
army to join battle against any one who comes to attack them; and I
consider those always to have need of others who cannot show themselves
against the enemy in the field, but are forced to defend themselves by
sheltering behind walls. The first case has been discussed, but we will speak
of it again should it recur. In the second case one can say nothing except to
encourage such princes to provision and fortify their towns, and not on any
account to defend the country. And whoever shall fortify his town well, and
shall have managed the other concerns of his subjects in the way stated
above, and to be often repeated, will never be attacked without great
caution, for men are always adverse to enterprises where difficulties can be
seen, and it will be seen not to be an easy thing to attack one who has his
town well fortified, and is not hated by his people.
The cities of Germany are absolutely free, they own but little country
around them, and they yield obedience to the emperor when it suits them,
nor do they fear this or any other power they may have near them, because
they are fortified in such a way that every one thinks the taking of them by
assault would be tedious and difficult, seeing they have proper ditches and
walls, they have sufficient artillery, and they always keep in public depots
enough for one year's eating, drinking, and firing. And beyond this, to keep
the people quiet and without loss to the state, they always have the means of
giving work to the community in those labours that are the life and strength
of the city, and on the pursuit of which the people are supported; they also

hold military exercises in repute, and moreover have many ordinances to
uphold them.
Therefore, a prince who has a strong city, and had not made himself
odious, will not be attacked, or if any one should attack he will only be
driven off with disgrace; again, because that the affairs of this world are so
changeable, it is almost impossible to keep an army a whole year in the
field without being interfered with. And whoever should reply: If the people
have property outside the city, and see it burnt, they will not remain patient,
and the long siege and self-interest will make them forget their prince; to
this I answer that a powerful and courageous prince will overcome all such
difficulties by giving at one time hope to his subjects that the evil will not
be for long, at another time fear of the cruelty of the enemy, then preserving
himself adroitly from those subjects who seem to him to be too bold.
Further, the enemy would naturally on his arrival at once burn and ruin
the country at the time when the spirits of the people are still hot and ready
for the defence; and, therefore, so much the less ought the prince to hesitate;
because after a time, when spirits have cooled, the damage is already done,
the ills are incurred, and there is no longer any remedy; and therefore they
are so much the more ready to unite with their prince, he appearing to be
under obligations to them now that their houses have been burnt and their
possessions ruined in his defence. For it is the nature of men to be bound by
the benefits they confer as much as by those they receive. Therefore, if
everything is well considered, it will not be difficult for a wise prince to
keep the minds of his citizens steadfast from first to last, when he does not
fail to support and defend them.

CHAPTER XI — CONCERNING
ECCLESIASTICAL PRINCIPALITIES
It only remains now to speak of ecclesiastical principalities, touching
which all difficulties are prior to getting possession, because they are
acquired either by capacity or good fortune, and they can be held without
either; for they are sustained by the ancient ordinances of religion, which
are so all-powerful, and of such a character that the principalities may be
held no matter how their princes behave and live. These princes alone have
states and do not defend them; and they have subjects and do not rule them;
and the states, although unguarded, are not taken from them, and the
subjects, although not ruled, do not care, and they have neither the desire
nor the ability to alienate themselves. Such principalities only are secure
and happy. But being upheld by powers, to which the human mind cannot
reach, I shall speak no more of them, because, being exalted and maintained
by God, it would be the act of a presumptuous and rash man to discuss
them.
Nevertheless, if any one should ask of me how comes it that the Church
has attained such greatness in temporal power, seeing that from Alexander
backwards the Italian potentates (not only those who have been called
potentates, but every baron and lord, though the smallest) have valued the
temporal power very slightly—yet now a king of France trembles before it,
and it has been able to drive him from Italy, and to ruin the Venetians—
although this may be very manifest, it does not appear to me superfluous to
recall it in some measure to memory.
Before Charles, King of France, passed into Italy,(*) this country was
under the dominion of the Pope, the Venetians, the King of Naples, the
Duke of Milan, and the Florentines. These potentates had two principal
anxieties: the one, that no foreigner should enter Italy under arms; the other,
that none of themselves should seize more territory. Those about whom
there was the most anxiety were the Pope and the Venetians. To restrain the
Venetians the union of all the others was necessary, as it was for the defence
of Ferrara; and to keep down the Pope they made use of the barons of

Rome, who, being divided into two factions, Orsini and Colonnesi, had
always a pretext for disorder, and, standing with arms in their hands under
the eyes of the Pontiff, kept the pontificate weak and powerless. And
although there might arise sometimes a courageous pope, such as Sixtus,
yet neither fortune nor wisdom could rid him of these annoyances. And the
short life of a pope is also a cause of weakness; for in the ten years, which
is the average life of a pope, he can with difficulty lower one of the
factions; and if, so to speak, one people should almost destroy the
Colonnesi, another would arise hostile to the Orsini, who would support
their opponents, and yet would not have time to ruin the Orsini. This was
the reason why the temporal powers of the pope were little esteemed in
Italy.
(*) Charles VIII invaded Italy in 1494.

Alexander the Sixth arose afterwards, who of all the pontiffs that have
ever been showed how a pope with both money and arms was able to
prevail; and through the instrumentality of the Duke Valentino, and by
reason of the entry of the French, he brought about all those things which I
have discussed above in the actions of the duke. And although his intention
was not to aggrandize the Church, but the duke, nevertheless, what he did
contributed to the greatness of the Church, which, after his death and the
ruin of the duke, became the heir to all his labours.
Pope Julius came afterwards and found the Church strong, possessing all
the Romagna, the barons of Rome reduced to impotence, and, through the
chastisements of Alexander, the factions wiped out; he also found the way
open to accumulate money in a manner such as had never been practised
before Alexander's time. Such things Julius not only followed, but
improved upon, and he intended to gain Bologna, to ruin the Venetians, and
to drive the French out of Italy. All of these enterprises prospered with him,
and so much the more to his credit, inasmuch as he did everything to
strengthen the Church and not any private person. He kept also the Orsini
and Colonnesi factions within the bounds in which he found them; and
although there was among them some mind to make disturbance,
nevertheless he held two things firm: the one, the greatness of the Church,
with which he terrified them; and the other, not allowing them to have their
own cardinals, who caused the disorders among them. For whenever these
factions have their cardinals they do not remain quiet for long, because
cardinals foster the factions in Rome and out of it, and the barons are

compelled to support them, and thus from the ambitions of prelates arise
disorders and tumults among the barons. For these reasons his Holiness
Pope Leo(*) found the pontificate most powerful, and it is to be hoped that,
if others made it great in arms, he will make it still greater and more
venerated by his goodness and infinite other virtues.
(*) Pope Leo X was the Cardinal de' Medici.

CHAPTER XII — HOW MANY KINDS OF
SOLDIERY THERE ARE, AND CONCERNING
MERCENARIES
Having discoursed particularly on the characteristics of such
principalities as in the beginning I proposed to discuss, and having
considered in some degree the causes of there being good or bad, and
having shown the methods by which many have sought to acquire them and
to hold them, it now remains for me to discuss generally the means of
offence and defence which belong to each of them.
We have seen above how necessary it is for a prince to have his
foundations well laid, otherwise it follows of necessity he will go to ruin.
The chief foundations of all states, new as well as old or composite, are
good laws and good arms; and as there cannot be good laws where the state
is not well armed, it follows that where they are well armed they have good
laws. I shall leave the laws out of the discussion and shall speak of the
arms.
I say, therefore, that the arms with which a prince defends his state are
either his own, or they are mercenaries, auxiliaries, or mixed. Mercenaries
and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds his state based
on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe; for they are disunited,
ambitious, and without discipline, unfaithful, valiant before friends,
cowardly before enemies; they have neither the fear of God nor fidelity to
men, and destruction is deferred only so long as the attack is; for in peace
one is robbed by them, and in war by the enemy. The fact is, they have no
other attraction or reason for keeping the field than a trifle of stipend, which
is not sufficient to make them willing to die for you. They are ready enough
to be your soldiers whilst you do not make war, but if war comes they take
themselves off or run from the foe; which I should have little trouble to
prove, for the ruin of Italy has been caused by nothing else than by resting
all her hopes for many years on mercenaries, and although they formerly
made some display and appeared valiant amongst themselves, yet when the
foreigners came they showed what they were. Thus it was that Charles,

King of France, was allowed to seize Italy with chalk in hand;(*) and he
who told us that our sins were the cause of it told the truth, but they were
not the sins he imagined, but those which I have related. And as they were
the sins of princes, it is the princes who have also suffered the penalty.
(*) "With chalk in hand," "col gesso." This is one of the
bons mots of Alexander VI, and refers to the ease with
which Charles VIII seized Italy, implying that it was only
necessary for him to send his quartermasters to chalk up the
billets for his soldiers to conquer the country. Cf. "The
History of Henry VII," by Lord Bacon: "King Charles had
conquered the realm of Naples, and lost it again, in a kind
of a felicity of a dream. He passed the whole length of
Italy without resistance: so that it was true what Pope
Alexander was wont to say: That the Frenchmen came into
Italy with chalk in their hands, to mark up their lodgings,
rather than with swords to fight."

I wish to demonstrate further the infelicity of these arms. The mercenary
captains are either capable men or they are not; if they are, you cannot trust
them, because they always aspire to their own greatness, either by
oppressing you, who are their master, or others contrary to your intentions;
but if the captain is not skilful, you are ruined in the usual way.
And if it be urged that whoever is armed will act in the same way,
whether mercenary or not, I reply that when arms have to be resorted to,
either by a prince or a republic, then the prince ought to go in person and
perform the duty of a captain; the republic has to send its citizens, and when
one is sent who does not turn out satisfactorily, it ought to recall him, and
when one is worthy, to hold him by the laws so that he does not leave the
command. And experience has shown princes and republics, single-handed,
making the greatest progress, and mercenaries doing nothing except
damage; and it is more difficult to bring a republic, armed with its own
arms, under the sway of one of its citizens than it is to bring one armed with
foreign arms. Rome and Sparta stood for many ages armed and free. The
Switzers are completely armed and quite free.
Of ancient mercenaries, for example, there are the Carthaginians, who
were oppressed by their mercenary soldiers after the first war with the
Romans, although the Carthaginians had their own citizens for captains.
After the death of Epaminondas, Philip of Macedon was made captain of
their soldiers by the Thebans, and after victory he took away their liberty.
Duke Filippo being dead, the Milanese enlisted Francesco Sforza against
the Venetians, and he, having overcome the enemy at Caravaggio,(*) allied
himself with them to crush the Milanese, his masters. His father, Sforza,

having been engaged by Queen Johanna(+) of Naples, left her unprotected,
so that she was forced to throw herself into the arms of the King of Aragon,
in order to save her kingdom. And if the Venetians and Florentines formerly
extended their dominions by these arms, and yet their captains did not make
themselves princes, but have defended them, I reply that the Florentines in
this case have been favoured by chance, for of the able captains, of whom
they might have stood in fear, some have not conquered, some have been
opposed, and others have turned their ambitions elsewhere. One who did
not conquer was Giovanni Acuto,(%) and since he did not conquer his
fidelity cannot be proved; but every one will acknowledge that, had he
conquered, the Florentines would have stood at his discretion. Sforza had
the Bracceschi always against him, so they watched each other. Francesco
turned his ambition to Lombardy; Braccio against the Church and the
kingdom of Naples. But let us come to that which happened a short while
ago. The Florentines appointed as their captain Pagolo Vitelli, a most
prudent man, who from a private position had risen to the greatest renown.
If this man had taken Pisa, nobody can deny that it would have been proper
for the Florentines to keep in with him, for if he became the soldier of their
enemies they had no means of resisting, and if they held to him they must
obey him. The Venetians, if their achievements are considered, will be seen
to have acted safely and gloriously so long as they sent to war their own
men, when with armed gentlemen and plebians they did valiantly. This was
before they turned to enterprises on land, but when they began to fight on
land they forsook this virtue and followed the custom of Italy. And in the
beginning of their expansion on land, through not having much territory,
and because of their great reputation, they had not much to fear from their
captains; but when they expanded, as under Carmignuola,(#) they had a
taste of this mistake; for, having found him a most valiant man (they beat
the Duke of Milan under his leadership), and, on the other hand, knowing
how lukewarm he was in the war, they feared they would no longer conquer
under him, and for this reason they were not willing, nor were they able, to
let him go; and so, not to lose again that which they had acquired, they were
compelled, in order to secure themselves, to murder him. They had
afterwards for their captains Bartolomeo da Bergamo, Roberto da San
Severino, the count of Pitigliano,(&) and the like, under whom they had to
dread loss and not gain, as happened afterwards at Vaila,($) where in one
battle they lost that which in eight hundred years they had acquired with so

much trouble. Because from such arms conquests come but slowly, long
delayed and inconsiderable, but the losses sudden and portentous.
(*) Battle of Caravaggio, 15th September 1448.
(+) Johanna II of Naples, the widow of Ladislao, King of
Naples.
(%) Giovanni Acuto. An English knight whose name was Sir
John Hawkwood. He fought in the English wars in France, and
was knighted by Edward III; afterwards he collected a body
of troops and went into Italy. These became the famous
"White Company." He took part in many wars, and died in
Florence in 1394. He was born about 1320 at Sible Hedingham,
a village in Essex. He married Domnia, a daughter of Bernabo
Visconti.
(#) Carmignuola. Francesco Bussone, born at Carmagnola about
1390, executed at Venice, 5th May 1432.
(&) Bartolomeo Colleoni of Bergamo; died 1457. Roberto of
San Severino; died fighting for Venice against Sigismund,
Duke of Austria, in 1487. "Primo capitano in Italia."—
Machiavelli. Count of Pitigliano; Nicolo Orsini, born 1442,
died 1510.
($) Battle of Vaila in 1509.

And as with these examples I have reached Italy, which has been ruled
for many years by mercenaries, I wish to discuss them more seriously, in
order that, having seen their rise and progress, one may be better prepared
to counteract them. You must understand that the empire has recently come
to be repudiated in Italy, that the Pope has acquired more temporal power,
and that Italy has been divided up into more states, for the reason that many
of the great cities took up arms against their nobles, who, formerly favoured
by the emperor, were oppressing them, whilst the Church was favouring
them so as to gain authority in temporal power: in many others their citizens
became princes. From this it came to pass that Italy fell partly into the
hands of the Church and of republics, and, the Church consisting of priests
and the republic of citizens unaccustomed to arms, both commenced to
enlist foreigners.
The first who gave renown to this soldiery was Alberigo da Conio,(*) the
Romagnian. From the school of this man sprang, among others, Braccio and
Sforza, who in their time were the arbiters of Italy. After these came all the
other captains who till now have directed the arms of Italy; and the end of
all their valour has been, that she has been overrun by Charles, robbed by
Louis, ravaged by Ferdinand, and insulted by the Switzers. The principle
that has guided them has been, first, to lower the credit of infantry so that

they might increase their own. They did this because, subsisting on their
pay and without territory, they were unable to support many soldiers, and a
few infantry did not give them any authority; so they were led to employ
cavalry, with a moderate force of which they were maintained and
honoured; and affairs were brought to such a pass that, in an army of twenty
thousand soldiers, there were not to be found two thousand foot soldiers.
They had, besides this, used every art to lessen fatigue and danger to
themselves and their soldiers, not killing in the fray, but taking prisoners
and liberating without ransom. They did not attack towns at night, nor did
the garrisons of the towns attack encampments at night; they did not
surround the camp either with stockade or ditch, nor did they campaign in
the winter. All these things were permitted by their military rules, and
devised by them to avoid, as I have said, both fatigue and dangers; thus they
have brought Italy to slavery and contempt.
(*) Alberigo da Conio. Alberico da Barbiano, Count of Cunio
in Romagna. He was the leader of the famous "Company of St
George," composed entirely of Italian soldiers. He died in
1409.

CHAPTER XIII — CONCERNING
AUXILIARIES, MIXED SOLDIERY, AND
ONE'S OWN
Auxiliaries, which are the other useless arm, are employed when a prince
is called in with his forces to aid and defend, as was done by Pope Julius in
the most recent times; for he, having, in the enterprise against Ferrara, had
poor proof of his mercenaries, turned to auxiliaries, and stipulated with
Ferdinand, King of Spain,(*) for his assistance with men and arms. These
arms may be useful and good in themselves, but for him who calls them in
they are always disadvantageous; for losing, one is undone, and winning,
one is their captive.
(*) Ferdinand V (F. II of Aragon and Sicily, F. III of
Naples), surnamed "The Catholic," born 1452, died 1516.

And although ancient histories may be full of examples, I do not wish to
leave this recent one of Pope Julius the Second, the peril of which cannot
fail to be perceived; for he, wishing to get Ferrara, threw himself entirely
into the hands of the foreigner. But his good fortune brought about a third
event, so that he did not reap the fruit of his rash choice; because, having
his auxiliaries routed at Ravenna, and the Switzers having risen and driven
out the conquerors (against all expectation, both his and others), it so came
to pass that he did not become prisoner to his enemies, they having fled, nor
to his auxiliaries, he having conquered by other arms than theirs.
The Florentines, being entirely without arms, sent ten thousand
Frenchmen to take Pisa, whereby they ran more danger than at any other
time of their troubles.
The Emperor of Constantinople,(*) to oppose his neighbours, sent ten
thousand Turks into Greece, who, on the war being finished, were not
willing to quit; this was the beginning of the servitude of Greece to the
infidels.
(*) Joannes Cantacuzenus, born 1300, died 1383.

Therefore, let him who has no desire to conquer make use of these arms,
for they are much more hazardous than mercenaries, because with them the

ruin is ready made; they are all united, all yield obedience to others; but
with mercenaries, when they have conquered, more time and better
opportunities are needed to injure you; they are not all of one community,
they are found and paid by you, and a third party, which you have made
their head, is not able all at once to assume enough authority to injure you.
In conclusion, in mercenaries dastardy is most dangerous; in auxiliaries,
valour. The wise prince, therefore, has always avoided these arms and
turned to his own; and has been willing rather to lose with them than to
conquer with the others, not deeming that a real victory which is gained
with the arms of others.
I shall never hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and his actions. This duke
entered the Romagna with auxiliaries, taking there only French soldiers,
and with them he captured Imola and Forli; but afterwards, such forces not
appearing to him reliable, he turned to mercenaries, discerning less danger
in them, and enlisted the Orsini and Vitelli; whom presently, on handling
and finding them doubtful, unfaithful, and dangerous, he destroyed and
turned to his own men. And the difference between one and the other of
these forces can easily be seen when one considers the difference there was
in the reputation of the duke, when he had the French, when he had the
Orsini and Vitelli, and when he relied on his own soldiers, on whose fidelity
he could always count and found it ever increasing; he was never esteemed
more highly than when every one saw that he was complete master of his
own forces.
I was not intending to go beyond Italian and recent examples, but I am
unwilling to leave out Hiero, the Syracusan, he being one of those I have
named above. This man, as I have said, made head of the army by the
Syracusans, soon found out that a mercenary soldiery, constituted like our
Italian condottieri, was of no use; and it appearing to him that he could
neither keep them not let them go, he had them all cut to pieces, and
afterwards made war with his own forces and not with aliens.
I wish also to recall to memory an instance from the Old Testament
applicable to this subject. David offered himself to Saul to fight with
Goliath, the Philistine champion, and, to give him courage, Saul armed him
with his own weapons; which David rejected as soon as he had them on his
back, saying he could make no use of them, and that he wished to meet the

enemy with his sling and his knife. In conclusion, the arms of others either
fall from your back, or they weigh you down, or they bind you fast.
Charles the Seventh,(*) the father of King Louis the Eleventh,(+) having
by good fortune and valour liberated France from the English, recognized
the necessity of being armed with forces of his own, and he established in
his kingdom ordinances concerning men-at-arms and infantry. Afterwards
his son, King Louis, abolished the infantry and began to enlist the Switzers,
which mistake, followed by others, is, as is now seen, a source of peril to
that kingdom; because, having raised the reputation of the Switzers, he has
entirely diminished the value of his own arms, for he has destroyed the
infantry altogether; and his men-at-arms he has subordinated to others, for,
being as they are so accustomed to fight along with Switzers, it does not
appear that they can now conquer without them. Hence it arises that the
French cannot stand against the Switzers, and without the Switzers they do
not come off well against others. The armies of the French have thus
become mixed, partly mercenary and partly national, both of which arms
together are much better than mercenaries alone or auxiliaries alone, but
much inferior to one's own forces. And this example proves it, for the
kingdom of France would be unconquerable if the ordinance of Charles had
been enlarged or maintained.
(*) Charles VII of France, surnamed "The Victorious," born
1403, died 1461.
(+) Louis XI, son of the above, born 1423, died 1483.

But the scanty wisdom of man, on entering into an affair which looks
well at first, cannot discern the poison that is hidden in it, as I have said
above of hectic fevers. Therefore, if he who rules a principality cannot
recognize evils until they are upon him, he is not truly wise; and this insight
is given to few. And if the first disaster to the Roman Empire(*) should be
examined, it will be found to have commenced only with the enlisting of
the Goths; because from that time the vigour of the Roman Empire began to
decline, and all that valour which had raised it passed away to others.
(*) "Many speakers to the House the other night in the
debate on the reduction of armaments seemed to show a most
lamentable ignorance of the conditions under which the
British Empire maintains its existence. When Mr Balfour
replied to the allegations that the Roman Empire sank under
the weight of its military obligations, he said that this
was 'wholly unhistorical.' He might well have added that the
Roman power was at its zenith when every citizen
acknowledged his liability to fight for the State, but that

it began to decline as soon as this obligation was no longer
recognized."—Pall Mall Gazette, 15th May 1906.

I conclude, therefore, that no principality is secure without having its
own forces; on the contrary, it is entirely dependent on good fortune, not
having the valour which in adversity would defend it. And it has always
been the opinion and judgment of wise men that nothing can be so uncertain
or unstable as fame or power not founded on its own strength. And one's
own forces are those which are composed either of subjects, citizens, or
dependents; all others are mercenaries or auxiliaries. And the way to make
ready one's own forces will be easily found if the rules suggested by me
shall be reflected upon, and if one will consider how Philip, the father of
Alexander the Great, and many republics and princes have armed and
organized themselves, to which rules I entirely commit myself.

CHAPTER XIV — THAT WHICH CONCERNS
A PRINCE ON THE SUBJECT OF THE ART
OF WAR
A prince ought to have no other aim or thought, nor select anything else
for his study, than war and its rules and discipline; for this is the sole art that
belongs to him who rules, and it is of such force that it not only upholds
those who are born princes, but it often enables men to rise from a private
station to that rank. And, on the contrary, it is seen that when princes have
thought more of ease than of arms they have lost their states. And the first
cause of your losing it is to neglect this art; and what enables you to acquire
a state is to be master of the art. Francesco Sforza, through being martial,
from a private person became Duke of Milan; and the sons, through
avoiding the hardships and troubles of arms, from dukes became private
persons. For among other evils which being unarmed brings you, it causes
you to be despised, and this is one of those ignominies against which a
prince ought to guard himself, as is shown later on. Because there is nothing
proportionate between the armed and the unarmed; and it is not reasonable
that he who is armed should yield obedience willingly to him who is
unarmed, or that the unarmed man should be secure among armed servants.
Because, there being in the one disdain and in the other suspicion, it is not
possible for them to work well together. And therefore a prince who does
not understand the art of war, over and above the other misfortunes already
mentioned, cannot be respected by his soldiers, nor can he rely on them. He
ought never, therefore, to have out of his thoughts this subject of war, and in
peace he should addict himself more to its exercise than in war; this he can
do in two ways, the one by action, the other by study.
As regards action, he ought above all things to keep his men well
organized and drilled, to follow incessantly the chase, by which he
accustoms his body to hardships, and learns something of the nature of
localities, and gets to find out how the mountains rise, how the valleys open
out, how the plains lie, and to understand the nature of rivers and marshes,
and in all this to take the greatest care. Which knowledge is useful in two

ways. Firstly, he learns to know his country, and is better able to undertake
its defence; afterwards, by means of the knowledge and observation of that
locality, he understands with ease any other which it may be necessary for
him to study hereafter; because the hills, valleys, and plains, and rivers and
marshes that are, for instance, in Tuscany, have a certain resemblance to
those of other countries, so that with a knowledge of the aspect of one
country one can easily arrive at a knowledge of others. And the prince that
lacks this skill lacks the essential which it is desirable that a captain should
possess, for it teaches him to surprise his enemy, to select quarters, to lead
armies, to array the battle, to besiege towns to advantage.
Philopoemen,(*) Prince of the Achaeans, among other praises which
writers have bestowed on him, is commended because in time of peace he
never had anything in his mind but the rules of war; and when he was in the
country with friends, he often stopped and reasoned with them: "If the
enemy should be upon that hill, and we should find ourselves here with our
army, with whom would be the advantage? How should one best advance to
meet him, keeping the ranks? If we should wish to retreat, how ought we to
pursue?" And he would set forth to them, as he went, all the chances that
could befall an army; he would listen to their opinion and state his,
confirming it with reasons, so that by these continual discussions there
could never arise, in time of war, any unexpected circumstances that he
could not deal with.
(*) Philopoemen, "the last of the Greeks," born 252 B.C.,
died 183 B.C.

But to exercise the intellect the prince should read histories, and study
there the actions of illustrious men, to see how they have borne themselves
in war, to examine the causes of their victories and defeat, so as to avoid the
latter and imitate the former; and above all do as an illustrious man did,
who took as an exemplar one who had been praised and famous before him,
and whose achievements and deeds he always kept in his mind, as it is said
Alexander the Great imitated Achilles, Caesar Alexander, Scipio Cyrus.
And whoever reads the life of Cyrus, written by Xenophon, will recognize
afterwards in the life of Scipio how that imitation was his glory, and how in
chastity, affability, humanity, and liberality Scipio conformed to those
things which have been written of Cyrus by Xenophon. A wise prince ought
to observe some such rules, and never in peaceful times stand idle, but
increase his resources with industry in such a way that they may be

available to him in adversity, so that if fortune chances it may find him
prepared to resist her blows.

CHAPTER XV — CONCERNING THINGS FOR
WHICH MEN, AND ESPECIALLY PRINCES,
ARE PRAISED OR BLAMED
It remains now to see what ought to be the rules of conduct for a prince
towards subject and friends. And as I know that many have written on this
point, I expect I shall be considered presumptuous in mentioning it again,
especially as in discussing it I shall depart from the methods of other
people. But, it being my intention to write a thing which shall be useful to
him who apprehends it, it appears to me more appropriate to follow up the
real truth of the matter than the imagination of it; for many have pictured
republics and principalities which in fact have never been known or seen,
because how one lives is so far distant from how one ought to live, that he
who neglects what is done for what ought to be done, sooner effects his ruin
than his preservation; for a man who wishes to act entirely up to his
professions of virtue soon meets with what destroys him among so much
that is evil.
Hence it is necessary for a prince wishing to hold his own to know how
to do wrong, and to make use of it or not according to necessity. Therefore,
putting on one side imaginary things concerning a prince, and discussing
those which are real, I say that all men when they are spoken of, and chiefly
princes for being more highly placed, are remarkable for some of those
qualities which bring them either blame or praise; and thus it is that one is
reputed liberal, another miserly, using a Tuscan term (because an avaricious
person in our language is still he who desires to possess by robbery, whilst
we call one miserly who deprives himself too much of the use of his own);
one is reputed generous, one rapacious; one cruel, one compassionate; one
faithless, another faithful; one effeminate and cowardly, another bold and
brave; one affable, another haughty; one lascivious, another chaste; one
sincere, another cunning; one hard, another easy; one grave, another
frivolous; one religious, another unbelieving, and the like. And I know that
every one will confess that it would be most praiseworthy in a prince to
exhibit all the above qualities that are considered good; but because they

can neither be entirely possessed nor observed, for human conditions do not
permit it, it is necessary for him to be sufficiently prudent that he may know
how to avoid the reproach of those vices which would lose him his state;
and also to keep himself, if it be possible, from those which would not lose
him it; but this not being possible, he may with less hesitation abandon
himself to them. And again, he need not make himself uneasy at incurring a
reproach for those vices without which the state can only be saved with
difficulty, for if everything is considered carefully, it will be found that
something which looks like virtue, if followed, would be his ruin; whilst
something else, which looks like vice, yet followed brings him security and
prosperity.

CHAPTER XVI — CONCERNING
LIBERALITY AND MEANNESS
Commencing then with the first of the above-named characteristics, I say
that it would be well to be reputed liberal. Nevertheless, liberality exercised
in a way that does not bring you the reputation for it, injures you; for if one
exercises it honestly and as it should be exercised, it may not become
known, and you will not avoid the reproach of its opposite. Therefore, any
one wishing to maintain among men the name of liberal is obliged to avoid
no attribute of magnificence; so that a prince thus inclined will consume in
such acts all his property, and will be compelled in the end, if he wish to
maintain the name of liberal, to unduly weigh down his people, and tax
them, and do everything he can to get money. This will soon make him
odious to his subjects, and becoming poor he will be little valued by any
one; thus, with his liberality, having offended many and rewarded few, he is
affected by the very first trouble and imperilled by whatever may be the
first danger; recognizing this himself, and wishing to draw back from it, he
runs at once into the reproach of being miserly.
Therefore, a prince, not being able to exercise this virtue of liberality in
such a way that it is recognized, except to his cost, if he is wise he ought not
to fear the reputation of being mean, for in time he will come to be more
considered than if liberal, seeing that with his economy his revenues are
enough, that he can defend himself against all attacks, and is able to engage
in enterprises without burdening his people; thus it comes to pass that he
exercises liberality towards all from whom he does not take, who are
numberless, and meanness towards those to whom he does not give, who
are few.
We have not seen great things done in our time except by those who have
been considered mean; the rest have failed. Pope Julius the Second was
assisted in reaching the papacy by a reputation for liberality, yet he did not
strive afterwards to keep it up, when he made war on the King of France;
and he made many wars without imposing any extraordinary tax on his
subjects, for he supplied his additional expenses out of his long thriftiness.

The present King of Spain would not have undertaken or conquered in so
many enterprises if he had been reputed liberal. A prince, therefore,
provided that he has not to rob his subjects, that he can defend himself, that
he does not become poor and abject, that he is not forced to become
rapacious, ought to hold of little account a reputation for being mean, for it
is one of those vices which will enable him to govern.
And if any one should say: Caesar obtained empire by liberality, and
many others have reached the highest positions by having been liberal, and
by being considered so, I answer: Either you are a prince in fact, or in a way
to become one. In the first case this liberality is dangerous, in the second it
is very necessary to be considered liberal; and Caesar was one of those who
wished to become pre-eminent in Rome; but if he had survived after
becoming so, and had not moderated his expenses, he would have destroyed
his government. And if any one should reply: Many have been princes, and
have done great things with armies, who have been considered very liberal,
I reply: Either a prince spends that which is his own or his subjects' or else
that of others. In the first case he ought to be sparing, in the second he
ought not to neglect any opportunity for liberality. And to the prince who
goes forth with his army, supporting it by pillage, sack, and extortion,
handling that which belongs to others, this liberality is necessary, otherwise
he would not be followed by soldiers. And of that which is neither yours
nor your subjects' you can be a ready giver, as were Cyrus, Caesar, and
Alexander; because it does not take away your reputation if you squander
that of others, but adds to it; it is only squandering your own that injures
you.
And there is nothing wastes so rapidly as liberality, for even whilst you
exercise it you lose the power to do so, and so become either poor or
despised, or else, in avoiding poverty, rapacious and hated. And a prince
should guard himself, above all things, against being despised and hated;
and liberality leads you to both. Therefore it is wiser to have a reputation
for meanness which brings reproach without hatred, than to be compelled
through seeking a reputation for liberality to incur a name for rapacity
which begets reproach with hatred.

CHAPTER XVII — CONCERNING CRUELTY
AND CLEMENCY, AND WHETHER IT IS
BETTER TO BE LOVED THAN FEARED
Coming now to the other qualities mentioned above, I say that every
prince ought to desire to be considered clement and not cruel. Nevertheless
he ought to take care not to misuse this clemency. Cesare Borgia was
considered cruel; notwithstanding, his cruelty reconciled the Romagna,
unified it, and restored it to peace and loyalty. And if this be rightly
considered, he will be seen to have been much more merciful than the
Florentine people, who, to avoid a reputation for cruelty, permitted Pistoia
to be destroyed.(*) Therefore a prince, so long as he keeps his subjects
united and loyal, ought not to mind the reproach of cruelty; because with a
few examples he will be more merciful than those who, through too much
mercy, allow disorders to arise, from which follow murders or robberies; for
these are wont to injure the whole people, whilst those executions which
originate with a prince offend the individual only.
(*) During the rioting between the Cancellieri and
Panciatichi factions in 1502 and 1503.

And of all princes, it is impossible for the new prince to avoid the
imputation of cruelty, owing to new states being full of dangers. Hence
Virgil, through the mouth of Dido, excuses the inhumanity of her reign
owing to its being new, saying:
"Res dura, et regni novitas me talia cogunt
Moliri, et late fines custode tueri."(*)

Nevertheless he ought to be slow to believe and to act, nor should he
himself show fear, but proceed in a temperate manner with prudence and
humanity, so that too much confidence may not make him incautious and
too much distrust render him intolerable.
(*) . . . against my will, my fate
A throne unsettled, and an infant state,
Bid me defend my realms with all my pow'rs,
And guard with these severities my shores.
Christopher Pitt.

Upon this a question arises: whether it be better to be loved than feared
or feared than loved? It may be answered that one should wish to be both,
but, because it is difficult to unite them in one person, it is much safer to be
feared than loved, when, of the two, either must be dispensed with. Because
this is to be asserted in general of men, that they are ungrateful, fickle,
false, cowardly, covetous, and as long as you succeed they are yours
entirely; they will offer you their blood, property, life, and children, as is
said above, when the need is far distant; but when it approaches they turn
against you. And that prince who, relying entirely on their promises, has
neglected other precautions, is ruined; because friendships that are obtained
by payments, and not by greatness or nobility of mind, may indeed be
earned, but they are not secured, and in time of need cannot be relied upon;
and men have less scruple in offending one who is beloved than one who is
feared, for love is preserved by the link of obligation which, owing to the
baseness of men, is broken at every opportunity for their advantage; but fear
preserves you by a dread of punishment which never fails.
Nevertheless a prince ought to inspire fear in such a way that, if he does
not win love, he avoids hatred; because he can endure very well being
feared whilst he is not hated, which will always be as long as he abstains
from the property of his citizens and subjects and from their women. But
when it is necessary for him to proceed against the life of someone, he must
do it on proper justification and for manifest cause, but above all things he
must keep his hands off the property of others, because men more quickly
forget the death of their father than the loss of their patrimony. Besides,
pretexts for taking away the property are never wanting; for he who has
once begun to live by robbery will always find pretexts for seizing what
belongs to others; but reasons for taking life, on the contrary, are more
difficult to find and sooner lapse. But when a prince is with his army, and
has under control a multitude of soldiers, then it is quite necessary for him
to disregard the reputation of cruelty, for without it he would never hold his
army united or disposed to its duties.
Among the wonderful deeds of Hannibal this one is enumerated: that
having led an enormous army, composed of many various races of men, to
fight in foreign lands, no dissensions arose either among them or against the
prince, whether in his bad or in his good fortune. This arose from nothing
else than his inhuman cruelty, which, with his boundless valour, made him
revered and terrible in the sight of his soldiers, but without that cruelty, his

other virtues were not sufficient to produce this effect. And short-sighted
writers admire his deeds from one point of view and from another condemn
the principal cause of them. That it is true his other virtues would not have
been sufficient for him may be proved by the case of Scipio, that most
excellent man, not only of his own times but within the memory of man,
against whom, nevertheless, his army rebelled in Spain; this arose from
nothing but his too great forbearance, which gave his soldiers more license
than is consistent with military discipline. For this he was upbraided in the
Senate by Fabius Maximus, and called the corrupter of the Roman soldiery.
The Locrians were laid waste by a legate of Scipio, yet they were not
avenged by him, nor was the insolence of the legate punished, owing
entirely to his easy nature. Insomuch that someone in the Senate, wishing to
excuse him, said there were many men who knew much better how not to
err than to correct the errors of others. This disposition, if he had been
continued in the command, would have destroyed in time the fame and
glory of Scipio; but, he being under the control of the Senate, this injurious
characteristic not only concealed itself, but contributed to his glory.
Returning to the question of being feared or loved, I come to the
conclusion that, men loving according to their own will and fearing
according to that of the prince, a wise prince should establish himself on
that which is in his own control and not in that of others; he must endeavour
only to avoid hatred, as is noted.

CHAPTER XVIII(*) — CONCERNING THE
WAY IN WHICH PRINCES SHOULD KEEP
FAITH
(*) "The present chapter has given greater offence than any
other portion of Machiavelli's writings." Burd, "Il
Principe," p. 297.

Every one admits how praiseworthy it is in a prince to keep faith, and to
live with integrity and not with craft. Nevertheless our experience has been
that those princes who have done great things have held good faith of little
account, and have known how to circumvent the intellect of men by craft,
and in the end have overcome those who have relied on their word. You
must know there are two ways of contesting,(*) the one by the law, the
other by force; the first method is proper to men, the second to beasts; but
because the first is frequently not sufficient, it is necessary to have recourse
to the second. Therefore it is necessary for a prince to understand how to
avail himself of the beast and the man. This has been figuratively taught to
princes by ancient writers, who describe how Achilles and many other
princes of old were given to the Centaur Chiron to nurse, who brought them
up in his discipline; which means solely that, as they had for a teacher one
who was half beast and half man, so it is necessary for a prince to know
how to make use of both natures, and that one without the other is not
durable. A prince, therefore, being compelled knowingly to adopt the beast,
ought to choose the fox and the lion; because the lion cannot defend himself
against snares and the fox cannot defend himself against wolves. Therefore,
it is necessary to be a fox to discover the snares and a lion to terrify the
wolves. Those who rely simply on the lion do not understand what they are
about. Therefore a wise lord cannot, nor ought he to, keep faith when such
observance may be turned against him, and when the reasons that caused
him to pledge it exist no longer. If men were entirely good this precept
would not hold, but because they are bad, and will not keep faith with you,
you too are not bound to observe it with them. Nor will there ever be
wanting to a prince legitimate reasons to excuse this non-observance. Of
this endless modern examples could be given, showing how many treaties

and engagements have been made void and of no effect through the
faithlessness of princes; and he who has known best how to employ the fox
has succeeded best.
(*) "Contesting," i.e. "striving for mastery." Mr Burd
points out that this passage is imitated directly from
Cicero's "De Officiis": "Nam cum sint duo genera decertandi,
unum per disceptationem, alterum per vim; cumque illud
proprium sit hominis, hoc beluarum; confugiendum est ad
posterius, si uti non licet superiore."

But it is necessary to know well how to disguise this characteristic, and
to be a great pretender and dissembler; and men are so simple, and so
subject to present necessities, that he who seeks to deceive will always find
someone who will allow himself to be deceived. One recent example I
cannot pass over in silence. Alexander the Sixth did nothing else but
deceive men, nor ever thought of doing otherwise, and he always found
victims; for there never was a man who had greater power in asserting, or
who with greater oaths would affirm a thing, yet would observe it less;
nevertheless his deceits always succeeded according to his wishes,(*)
because he well understood this side of mankind.
(*) "Nondimanco sempre gli succederono gli inganni (ad
votum)." The words "ad votum" are omitted in the Testina
addition, 1550.
Alexander never did what he said,
Cesare never said what he did.
Italian Proverb.

Therefore it is unnecessary for a prince to have all the good qualities I
have enumerated, but it is very necessary to appear to have them. And I
shall dare to say this also, that to have them and always to observe them is
injurious, and that to appear to have them is useful; to appear merciful,
faithful, humane, religious, upright, and to be so, but with a mind so framed
that should you require not to be so, you may be able and know how to
change to the opposite.
And you have to understand this, that a prince, especially a new one,
cannot observe all those things for which men are esteemed, being often
forced, in order to maintain the state, to act contrary to fidelity,(*)
friendship, humanity, and religion. Therefore it is necessary for him to have
a mind ready to turn itself accordingly as the winds and variations of
fortune force it, yet, as I have said above, not to diverge from the good if he
can avoid doing so, but, if compelled, then to know how to set about it.

(*) "Contrary to fidelity" or "faith," "contro alla fede,"
and "tutto fede," "altogether faithful," in the next
paragraph. It is noteworthy that these two phrases, "contro
alla fede" and "tutto fede," were omitted in the Testina
edition, which was published with the sanction of the papal
authorities. It may be that the meaning attached to the word
"fede" was "the faith," i.e. the Catholic creed, and not as
rendered here "fidelity" and "faithful." Observe that the
word "religione" was suffered to stand in the text of the
Testina, being used to signify indifferently every shade of
belief, as witness "the religion," a phrase inevitably
employed to designate the Huguenot heresy. South in his
Sermon IX, p. 69, ed. 1843, comments on this passage as
follows: "That great patron and Coryphaeus of this tribe,
Nicolo Machiavel, laid down this for a master rule in his
political scheme: 'That the show of religion was helpful to
the politician, but the reality of it hurtful and
pernicious.'"

For this reason a prince ought to take care that he never lets anything slip
from his lips that is not replete with the above-named five qualities, that he
may appear to him who sees and hears him altogether merciful, faithful,
humane, upright, and religious. There is nothing more necessary to appear
to have than this last quality, inasmuch as men judge generally more by the
eye than by the hand, because it belongs to everybody to see you, to few to
come in touch with you. Every one sees what you appear to be, few really
know what you are, and those few dare not oppose themselves to the
opinion of the many, who have the majesty of the state to defend them; and
in the actions of all men, and especially of princes, which it is not prudent
to challenge, one judges by the result.
For that reason, let a prince have the credit of conquering and holding his
state, the means will always be considered honest, and he will be praised by
everybody; because the vulgar are always taken by what a thing seems to be
and by what comes of it; and in the world there are only the vulgar, for the
few find a place there only when the many have no ground to rest on.
One prince(*) of the present time, whom it is not well to name, never
preaches anything else but peace and good faith, and to both he is most
hostile, and either, if he had kept it, would have deprived him of reputation
and kingdom many a time.
(*) Ferdinand of Aragon. "When Machiavelli was writing 'The
Prince' it would have been clearly impossible to mention
Ferdinand's name here without giving offence." Burd's "Il
Principe," p. 308.

CHAPTER XIX — THAT ONE SHOULD AVOID
BEING DESPISED AND HATED
Now, concerning the characteristics of which mention is made above, I
have spoken of the more important ones, the others I wish to discuss briefly
under this generality, that the prince must consider, as has been in part said
before, how to avoid those things which will make him hated or
contemptible; and as often as he shall have succeeded he will have fulfilled
his part, and he need not fear any danger in other reproaches.
It makes him hated above all things, as I have said, to be rapacious, and
to be a violator of the property and women of his subjects, from both of
which he must abstain. And when neither their property nor their honor is
touched, the majority of men live content, and he has only to contend with
the ambition of a few, whom he can curb with ease in many ways.
It makes him contemptible to be considered fickle, frivolous, effeminate,
mean-spirited, irresolute, from all of which a prince should guard himself as
from a rock; and he should endeavour to show in his actions greatness,
courage, gravity, and fortitude; and in his private dealings with his subjects
let him show that his judgments are irrevocable, and maintain himself in
such reputation that no one can hope either to deceive him or to get round
him.
That prince is highly esteemed who conveys this impression of himself,
and he who is highly esteemed is not easily conspired against; for, provided
it is well known that he is an excellent man and revered by his people, he
can only be attacked with difficulty. For this reason a prince ought to have
two fears, one from within, on account of his subjects, the other from
without, on account of external powers. From the latter he is defended by
being well armed and having good allies, and if he is well armed he will
have good friends, and affairs will always remain quiet within when they
are quiet without, unless they should have been already disturbed by
conspiracy; and even should affairs outside be disturbed, if he has carried
out his preparations and has lived as I have said, as long as he does not
despair, he will resist every attack, as I said Nabis the Spartan did.

But concerning his subjects, when affairs outside are disturbed he has
only to fear that they will conspire secretly, from which a prince can easily
secure himself by avoiding being hated and despised, and by keeping the
people satisfied with him, which it is most necessary for him to accomplish,
as I said above at length. And one of the most efficacious remedies that a
prince can have against conspiracies is not to be hated and despised by the
people, for he who conspires against a prince always expects to please them
by his removal; but when the conspirator can only look forward to
offending them, he will not have the courage to take such a course, for the
difficulties that confront a conspirator are infinite. And as experience
shows, many have been the conspiracies, but few have been successful;
because he who conspires cannot act alone, nor can he take a companion
except from those whom he believes to be malcontents, and as soon as you
have opened your mind to a malcontent you have given him the material
with which to content himself, for by denouncing you he can look for every
advantage; so that, seeing the gain from this course to be assured, and
seeing the other to be doubtful and full of dangers, he must be a very rare
friend, or a thoroughly obstinate enemy of the prince, to keep faith with
you.
And, to reduce the matter into a small compass, I say that, on the side of
the conspirator, there is nothing but fear, jealousy, prospect of punishment
to terrify him; but on the side of the prince there is the majesty of the
principality, the laws, the protection of friends and the state to defend him;
so that, adding to all these things the popular goodwill, it is impossible that
any one should be so rash as to conspire. For whereas in general the
conspirator has to fear before the execution of his plot, in this case he has
also to fear the sequel to the crime; because on account of it he has the
people for an enemy, and thus cannot hope for any escape.
Endless examples could be given on this subject, but I will be content
with one, brought to pass within the memory of our fathers. Messer
Annibale Bentivogli, who was prince in Bologna (grandfather of the present
Annibale), having been murdered by the Canneschi, who had conspired
against him, not one of his family survived but Messer Giovanni,(*) who
was in childhood: immediately after his assassination the people rose and
murdered all the Canneschi. This sprung from the popular goodwill which
the house of Bentivogli enjoyed in those days in Bologna; which was so
great that, although none remained there after the death of Annibale who

was able to rule the state, the Bolognese, having information that there was
one of the Bentivogli family in Florence, who up to that time had been
considered the son of a blacksmith, sent to Florence for him and gave him
the government of their city, and it was ruled by him until Messer Giovanni
came in due course to the government.
(*) Giovanni Bentivogli, born in Bologna 1438, died at Milan
1508. He ruled Bologna from 1462 to 1506. Machiavelli's
strong condemnation of conspiracies may get its edge from
his own very recent experience (February 1513), when he had
been arrested and tortured for his alleged complicity in the
Boscoli conspiracy.

For this reason I consider that a prince ought to reckon conspiracies of
little account when his people hold him in esteem; but when it is hostile to
him, and bears hatred towards him, he ought to fear everything and
everybody. And well-ordered states and wise princes have taken every care
not to drive the nobles to desperation, and to keep the people satisfied and
contented, for this is one of the most important objects a prince can have.
Among the best ordered and governed kingdoms of our times is France,
and in it are found many good institutions on which depend the liberty and
security of the king; of these the first is the parliament and its authority,
because he who founded the kingdom, knowing the ambition of the nobility
and their boldness, considered that a bit to their mouths would be necessary
to hold them in; and, on the other side, knowing the hatred of the people,
founded in fear, against the nobles, he wished to protect them, yet he was
not anxious for this to be the particular care of the king; therefore, to take
away the reproach which he would be liable to from the nobles for
favouring the people, and from the people for favouring the nobles, he set
up an arbiter, who should be one who could beat down the great and favour
the lesser without reproach to the king. Neither could you have a better or a
more prudent arrangement, or a greater source of security to the king and
kingdom. From this one can draw another important conclusion, that
princes ought to leave affairs of reproach to the management of others, and
keep those of grace in their own hands. And further, I consider that a prince
ought to cherish the nobles, but not so as to make himself hated by the
people.
It may appear, perhaps, to some who have examined the lives and deaths
of the Roman emperors that many of them would be an example contrary to
my opinion, seeing that some of them lived nobly and showed great
qualities of soul, nevertheless they have lost their empire or have been

killed by subjects who have conspired against them. Wishing, therefore, to
answer these objections, I will recall the characters of some of the
emperors, and will show that the causes of their ruin were not different to
those alleged by me; at the same time I will only submit for consideration
those things that are noteworthy to him who studies the affairs of those
times.
It seems to me sufficient to take all those emperors who succeeded to the
empire from Marcus the philosopher down to Maximinus; they were
Marcus and his son Commodus, Pertinax, Julian, Severus and his son
Antoninus Caracalla, Macrinus, Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Maximinus.
There is first to note that, whereas in other principalities the ambition of
the nobles and the insolence of the people only have to be contended with,
the Roman emperors had a third difficulty in having to put up with the
cruelty and avarice of their soldiers, a matter so beset with difficulties that it
was the ruin of many; for it was a hard thing to give satisfaction both to
soldiers and people; because the people loved peace, and for this reason
they loved the unaspiring prince, whilst the soldiers loved the warlike
prince who was bold, cruel, and rapacious, which qualities they were quite
willing he should exercise upon the people, so that they could get double
pay and give vent to their own greed and cruelty. Hence it arose that those
emperors were always overthrown who, either by birth or training, had no
great authority, and most of them, especially those who came new to the
principality, recognizing the difficulty of these two opposing humours, were
inclined to give satisfaction to the soldiers, caring little about injuring the
people. Which course was necessary, because, as princes cannot help being
hated by someone, they ought, in the first place, to avoid being hated by
every one, and when they cannot compass this, they ought to endeavour
with the utmost diligence to avoid the hatred of the most powerful.
Therefore, those emperors who through inexperience had need of special
favour adhered more readily to the soldiers than to the people; a course
which turned out advantageous to them or not, accordingly as the prince
knew how to maintain authority over them.
From these causes it arose that Marcus, Pertinax, and Alexander, being
all men of modest life, lovers of justice, enemies to cruelty, humane, and
benignant, came to a sad end except Marcus; he alone lived and died
honoured, because he had succeeded to the throne by hereditary title, and

owed nothing either to the soldiers or the people; and afterwards, being
possessed of many virtues which made him respected, he always kept both
orders in their places whilst he lived, and was neither hated nor despised.
But Pertinax was created emperor against the wishes of the soldiers, who,
being accustomed to live licentiously under Commodus, could not endure
the honest life to which Pertinax wished to reduce them; thus, having given
cause for hatred, to which hatred there was added contempt for his old age,
he was overthrown at the very beginning of his administration. And here it
should be noted that hatred is acquired as much by good works as by bad
ones, therefore, as I said before, a prince wishing to keep his state is very
often forced to do evil; for when that body is corrupt whom you think you
have need of to maintain yourself—it may be either the people or the
soldiers or the nobles—you have to submit to its humours and to gratify
them, and then good works will do you harm.
But let us come to Alexander, who was a man of such great goodness,
that among the other praises which are accorded him is this, that in the
fourteen years he held the empire no one was ever put to death by him
unjudged; nevertheless, being considered effeminate and a man who
allowed himself to be governed by his mother, he became despised, the
army conspired against him, and murdered him.
Turning now to the opposite characters of Commodus, Severus,
Antoninus Caracalla, and Maximinus, you will find them all cruel and
rapacious-men who, to satisfy their soldiers, did not hesitate to commit
every kind of iniquity against the people; and all, except Severus, came to a
bad end; but in Severus there was so much valour that, keeping the soldiers
friendly, although the people were oppressed by him, he reigned
successfully; for his valour made him so much admired in the sight of the
soldiers and people that the latter were kept in a way astonished and awed
and the former respectful and satisfied. And because the actions of this
man, as a new prince, were great, I wish to show briefly that he knew well
how to counterfeit the fox and the lion, which natures, as I said above, it is
necessary for a prince to imitate.
Knowing the sloth of the Emperor Julian, he persuaded the army in
Sclavonia, of which he was captain, that it would be right to go to Rome
and avenge the death of Pertinax, who had been killed by the praetorian
soldiers; and under this pretext, without appearing to aspire to the throne, he

moved the army on Rome, and reached Italy before it was known that he
had started. On his arrival at Rome, the Senate, through fear, elected him
emperor and killed Julian. After this there remained for Severus, who
wished to make himself master of the whole empire, two difficulties; one in
Asia, where Niger, head of the Asiatic army, had caused himself to be
proclaimed emperor; the other in the west where Albinus was, who also
aspired to the throne. And as he considered it dangerous to declare himself
hostile to both, he decided to attack Niger and to deceive Albinus. To the
latter he wrote that, being elected emperor by the Senate, he was willing to
share that dignity with him and sent him the title of Caesar; and, moreover,
that the Senate had made Albinus his colleague; which things were accepted
by Albinus as true. But after Severus had conquered and killed Niger, and
settled oriental affairs, he returned to Rome and complained to the Senate
that Albinus, little recognizing the benefits that he had received from him,
had by treachery sought to murder him, and for this ingratitude he was
compelled to punish him. Afterwards he sought him out in France, and took
from him his government and life. He who will, therefore, carefully
examine the actions of this man will find him a most valiant lion and a most
cunning fox; he will find him feared and respected by every one, and not
hated by the army; and it need not be wondered at that he, a new man, was
able to hold the empire so well, because his supreme renown always
protected him from that hatred which the people might have conceived
against him for his violence.
But his son Antoninus was a most eminent man, and had very excellent
qualities, which made him admirable in the sight of the people and
acceptable to the soldiers, for he was a warlike man, most enduring of
fatigue, a despiser of all delicate food and other luxuries, which caused him
to be beloved by the armies. Nevertheless, his ferocity and cruelties were so
great and so unheard of that, after endless single murders, he killed a large
number of the people of Rome and all those of Alexandria. He became
hated by the whole world, and also feared by those he had around him, to
such an extent that he was murdered in the midst of his army by a
centurion. And here it must be noted that such-like deaths, which are
deliberately inflicted with a resolved and desperate courage, cannot be
avoided by princes, because any one who does not fear to die can inflict
them; but a prince may fear them the less because they are very rare; he has
only to be careful not to do any grave injury to those whom he employs or

has around him in the service of the state. Antoninus had not taken this
care, but had contumeliously killed a brother of that centurion, whom also
he daily threatened, yet retained in his bodyguard; which, as it turned out,
was a rash thing to do, and proved the emperor's ruin.
But let us come to Commodus, to whom it should have been very easy to
hold the empire, for, being the son of Marcus, he had inherited it, and he
had only to follow in the footsteps of his father to please his people and
soldiers; but, being by nature cruel and brutal, he gave himself up to
amusing the soldiers and corrupting them, so that he might indulge his
rapacity upon the people; on the other hand, not maintaining his dignity,
often descending to the theatre to compete with gladiators, and doing other
vile things, little worthy of the imperial majesty, he fell into contempt with
the soldiers, and being hated by one party and despised by the other, he was
conspired against and was killed.
It remains to discuss the character of Maximinus. He was a very warlike
man, and the armies, being disgusted with the effeminacy of Alexander, of
whom I have already spoken, killed him and elected Maximinus to the
throne. This he did not possess for long, for two things made him hated and
despised; the one, his having kept sheep in Thrace, which brought him into
contempt (it being well known to all, and considered a great indignity by
every one), and the other, his having at the accession to his dominions
deferred going to Rome and taking possession of the imperial seat; he had
also gained a reputation for the utmost ferocity by having, through his
prefects in Rome and elsewhere in the empire, practised many cruelties, so
that the whole world was moved to anger at the meanness of his birth and to
fear at his barbarity. First Africa rebelled, then the Senate with all the
people of Rome, and all Italy conspired against him, to which may be added
his own army; this latter, besieging Aquileia and meeting with difficulties in
taking it, were disgusted with his cruelties, and fearing him less when they
found so many against him, murdered him.
I do not wish to discuss Heliogabalus, Macrinus, or Julian, who, being
thoroughly contemptible, were quickly wiped out; but I will bring this
discourse to a conclusion by saying that princes in our times have this
difficulty of giving inordinate satisfaction to their soldiers in a far less
degree, because, notwithstanding one has to give them some indulgence,
that is soon done; none of these princes have armies that are veterans in the

governance and administration of provinces, as were the armies of the
Roman Empire; and whereas it was then more necessary to give satisfaction
to the soldiers than to the people, it is now more necessary to all princes,
except the Turk and the Soldan, to satisfy the people rather the soldiers,
because the people are the more powerful.
From the above I have excepted the Turk, who always keeps round him
twelve thousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry on which depend the
security and strength of the kingdom, and it is necessary that, putting aside
every consideration for the people, he should keep them his friends. The
kingdom of the Soldan is similar; being entirely in the hands of soldiers, it
follows again that, without regard to the people, he must keep them his
friends. But you must note that the state of the Soldan is unlike all other
principalities, for the reason that it is like the Christian pontificate, which
cannot be called either an hereditary or a newly formed principality;
because the sons of the old prince are not the heirs, but he who is elected to
that position by those who have authority, and the sons remain only
noblemen. And this being an ancient custom, it cannot be called a new
principality, because there are none of those difficulties in it that are met
with in new ones; for although the prince is new, the constitution of the
state is old, and it is framed so as to receive him as if he were its hereditary
lord.
But returning to the subject of our discourse, I say that whoever will
consider it will acknowledge that either hatred or contempt has been fatal to
the above-named emperors, and it will be recognized also how it happened
that, a number of them acting in one way and a number in another, only one
in each way came to a happy end and the rest to unhappy ones. Because it
would have been useless and dangerous for Pertinax and Alexander, being
new princes, to imitate Marcus, who was heir to the principality; and
likewise it would have been utterly destructive to Caracalla, Commodus,
and Maximinus to have imitated Severus, they not having sufficient valour
to enable them to tread in his footsteps. Therefore a prince, new to the
principality, cannot imitate the actions of Marcus, nor, again, is it necessary
to follow those of Severus, but he ought to take from Severus those parts
which are necessary to found his state, and from Marcus those which are
proper and glorious to keep a state that may already be stable and firm.

CHAPTER XX — ARE FORTRESSES, AND
MANY OTHER THINGS TO WHICH PRINCES
OFTEN RESORT, ADVANTAGEOUS OR
HURTFUL?
1. Some princes, so as to hold securely the state, have disarmed their
subjects; others have kept their subject towns distracted by factions; others
have fostered enmities against themselves; others have laid themselves out
to gain over those whom they distrusted in the beginning of their
governments; some have built fortresses; some have overthrown and
destroyed them. And although one cannot give a final judgment on all of
these things unless one possesses the particulars of those states in which a
decision has to be made, nevertheless I will speak as comprehensively as
the matter of itself will admit.
2. There never was a new prince who has disarmed his subjects; rather
when he has found them disarmed he has always armed them, because, by
arming them, those arms become yours, those men who were distrusted
become faithful, and those who were faithful are kept so, and your subjects
become your adherents. And whereas all subjects cannot be armed, yet
when those whom you do arm are benefited, the others can be handled more
freely, and this difference in their treatment, which they quite understand,
makes the former your dependents, and the latter, considering it to be
necessary that those who have the most danger and service should have the
most reward, excuse you. But when you disarm them, you at once offend
them by showing that you distrust them, either for cowardice or for want of
loyalty, and either of these opinions breeds hatred against you. And because
you cannot remain unarmed, it follows that you turn to mercenaries, which
are of the character already shown; even if they should be good they would
not be sufficient to defend you against powerful enemies and distrusted
subjects. Therefore, as I have said, a new prince in a new principality has
always distributed arms. Histories are full of examples. But when a prince
acquires a new state, which he adds as a province to his old one, then it is
necessary to disarm the men of that state, except those who have been his

adherents in acquiring it; and these again, with time and opportunity, should
be rendered soft and effeminate; and matters should be managed in such a
way that all the armed men in the state shall be your own soldiers who in
your old state were living near you.
3. Our forefathers, and those who were reckoned wise, were accustomed
to say that it was necessary to hold Pistoia by factions and Pisa by
fortresses; and with this idea they fostered quarrels in some of their
tributary towns so as to keep possession of them the more easily. This may
have been well enough in those times when Italy was in a way balanced, but
I do not believe that it can be accepted as a precept for to-day, because I do
not believe that factions can ever be of use; rather it is certain that when the
enemy comes upon you in divided cities you are quickly lost, because the
weakest party will always assist the outside forces and the other will not be
able to resist. The Venetians, moved, as I believe, by the above reasons,
fostered the Guelph and Ghibelline factions in their tributary cities; and
although they never allowed them to come to bloodshed, yet they nursed
these disputes amongst them, so that the citizens, distracted by their
differences, should not unite against them. Which, as we saw, did not
afterwards turn out as expected, because, after the rout at Vaila, one party at
once took courage and seized the state. Such methods argue, therefore,
weakness in the prince, because these factions will never be permitted in a
vigorous principality; such methods for enabling one the more easily to
manage subjects are only useful in times of peace, but if war comes this
policy proves fallacious.
4. Without doubt princes become great when they overcome the
difficulties and obstacles by which they are confronted, and therefore
fortune, especially when she desires to make a new prince great, who has a
greater necessity to earn renown than an hereditary one, causes enemies to
arise and form designs against him, in order that he may have the
opportunity of overcoming them, and by them to mount higher, as by a
ladder which his enemies have raised. For this reason many consider that a
wise prince, when he has the opportunity, ought with craft to foster some
animosity against himself, so that, having crushed it, his renown may rise
higher.
5. Princes, especially new ones, have found more fidelity and assistance
in those men who in the beginning of their rule were distrusted than among

those who in the beginning were trusted. Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena,
ruled his state more by those who had been distrusted than by others. But on
this question one cannot speak generally, for it varies so much with the
individual; I will only say this, that those men who at the commencement of
a princedom have been hostile, if they are of a description to need
assistance to support themselves, can always be gained over with the
greatest ease, and they will be tightly held to serve the prince with fidelity,
inasmuch as they know it to be very necessary for them to cancel by deeds
the bad impression which he had formed of them; and thus the prince
always extracts more profit from them than from those who, serving him in
too much security, may neglect his affairs. And since the matter demands it,
I must not fail to warn a prince, who by means of secret favours has
acquired a new state, that he must well consider the reasons which induced
those to favour him who did so; and if it be not a natural affection towards
him, but only discontent with their government, then he will only keep them
friendly with great trouble and difficulty, for it will be impossible to satisfy
them. And weighing well the reasons for this in those examples which can
be taken from ancient and modern affairs, we shall find that it is easier for
the prince to make friends of those men who were contented under the
former government, and are therefore his enemies, than of those who, being
discontented with it, were favourable to him and encouraged him to seize it.
6. It has been a custom with princes, in order to hold their states more
securely, to build fortresses that may serve as a bridle and bit to those who
might design to work against them, and as a place of refuge from a first
attack. I praise this system because it has been made use of formerly.
Notwithstanding that, Messer Nicolo Vitelli in our times has been seen to
demolish two fortresses in Citta di Castello so that he might keep that state;
Guido Ubaldo, Duke of Urbino, on returning to his dominion, whence he
had been driven by Cesare Borgia, razed to the foundations all the fortresses
in that province, and considered that without them it would be more
difficult to lose it; the Bentivogli returning to Bologna came to a similar
decision. Fortresses, therefore, are useful or not according to circumstances;
if they do you good in one way they injure you in another. And this
question can be reasoned thus: the prince who has more to fear from the
people than from foreigners ought to build fortresses, but he who has more
to fear from foreigners than from the people ought to leave them alone. The
castle of Milan, built by Francesco Sforza, has made, and will make, more

trouble for the house of Sforza than any other disorder in the state. For this
reason the best possible fortress is—not to be hated by the people, because,
although you may hold the fortresses, yet they will not save you if the
people hate you, for there will never be wanting foreigners to assist a
people who have taken arms against you. It has not been seen in our times
that such fortresses have been of use to any prince, unless to the Countess
of Forli,(*) when the Count Girolamo, her consort, was killed; for by that
means she was able to withstand the popular attack and wait for assistance
from Milan, and thus recover her state; and the posture of affairs was such
at that time that the foreigners could not assist the people. But fortresses
were of little value to her afterwards when Cesare Borgia attacked her, and
when the people, her enemy, were allied with foreigners. Therefore, it
would have been safer for her, both then and before, not to have been hated
by the people than to have had the fortresses. All these things considered
then, I shall praise him who builds fortresses as well as him who does not,
and I shall blame whoever, trusting in them, cares little about being hated
by the people.
(*) Catherine Sforza, a daughter of Galeazzo Sforza and
Lucrezia Landriani, born 1463, died 1509. It was to the
Countess of Forli that Machiavelli was sent as envoy on 1499.
A letter from Fortunati to the countess announces the
appointment: "I have been with the signori," wrote
Fortunati, "to learn whom they would send and when. They
tell me that Nicolo Machiavelli, a learned young Florentine
noble, secretary to my Lords of the Ten, is to leave with me
at once." Cf. "Catherine Sforza," by Count Pasolini,
translated by P. Sylvester, 1898.

CHAPTER XXI — HOW A PRINCE SHOULD
CONDUCT HIMSELF SO AS TO GAIN
RENOWN
Nothing makes a prince so much esteemed as great enterprises and
setting a fine example. We have in our time Ferdinand of Aragon, the
present King of Spain. He can almost be called a new prince, because he
has risen, by fame and glory, from being an insignificant king to be the
foremost king in Christendom; and if you will consider his deeds you will
find them all great and some of them extraordinary. In the beginning of his
reign he attacked Granada, and this enterprise was the foundation of his
dominions. He did this quietly at first and without any fear of hindrance, for
he held the minds of the barons of Castile occupied in thinking of the war
and not anticipating any innovations; thus they did not perceive that by
these means he was acquiring power and authority over them. He was able
with the money of the Church and of the people to sustain his armies, and
by that long war to lay the foundation for the military skill which has since
distinguished him. Further, always using religion as a plea, so as to
undertake greater schemes, he devoted himself with pious cruelty to driving
out and clearing his kingdom of the Moors; nor could there be a more
admirable example, nor one more rare. Under this same cloak he assailed
Africa, he came down on Italy, he has finally attacked France; and thus his
achievements and designs have always been great, and have kept the minds
of his people in suspense and admiration and occupied with the issue of
them. And his actions have arisen in such a way, one out of the other, that
men have never been given time to work steadily against him.
Again, it much assists a prince to set unusual examples in internal affairs,
similar to those which are related of Messer Bernabo da Milano, who, when
he had the opportunity, by any one in civil life doing some extraordinary
thing, either good or bad, would take some method of rewarding or
punishing him, which would be much spoken about. And a prince ought,
above all things, always endeavour in every action to gain for himself the
reputation of being a great and remarkable man.

A prince is also respected when he is either a true friend or a downright
enemy, that is to say, when, without any reservation, he declares himself in
favour of one party against the other; which course will always be more
advantageous than standing neutral; because if two of your powerful
neighbours come to blows, they are of such a character that, if one of them
conquers, you have either to fear him or not. In either case it will always be
more advantageous for you to declare yourself and to make war
strenuously; because, in the first case, if you do not declare yourself, you
will invariably fall a prey to the conqueror, to the pleasure and satisfaction
of him who has been conquered, and you will have no reasons to offer, nor
anything to protect or to shelter you. Because he who conquers does not
want doubtful friends who will not aid him in the time of trial; and he who
loses will not harbour you because you did not willingly, sword in hand,
court his fate.
Antiochus went into Greece, being sent for by the Aetolians to drive out
the Romans. He sent envoys to the Achaeans, who were friends of the
Romans, exhorting them to remain neutral; and on the other hand the
Romans urged them to take up arms. This question came to be discussed in
the council of the Achaeans, where the legate of Antiochus urged them to
stand neutral. To this the Roman legate answered: "As for that which has
been said, that it is better and more advantageous for your state not to
interfere in our war, nothing can be more erroneous; because by not
interfering you will be left, without favour or consideration, the guerdon of
the conqueror." Thus it will always happen that he who is not your friend
will demand your neutrality, whilst he who is your friend will entreat you to
declare yourself with arms. And irresolute princes, to avoid present dangers,
generally follow the neutral path, and are generally ruined. But when a
prince declares himself gallantly in favour of one side, if the party with
whom he allies himself conquers, although the victor may be powerful and
may have him at his mercy, yet he is indebted to him, and there is
established a bond of amity; and men are never so shameless as to become a
monument of ingratitude by oppressing you. Victories after all are never so
complete that the victor must not show some regard, especially to justice.
But if he with whom you ally yourself loses, you may be sheltered by him,
and whilst he is able he may aid you, and you become companions on a
fortune that may rise again.

In the second case, when those who fight are of such a character that you
have no anxiety as to who may conquer, so much the more is it greater
prudence to be allied, because you assist at the destruction of one by the aid
of another who, if he had been wise, would have saved him; and
conquering, as it is impossible that he should not do with your assistance,
he remains at your discretion. And here it is to be noted that a prince ought
to take care never to make an alliance with one more powerful than himself
for the purposes of attacking others, unless necessity compels him, as is
said above; because if he conquers you are at his discretion, and princes
ought to avoid as much as possible being at the discretion of any one. The
Venetians joined with France against the Duke of Milan, and this alliance,
which caused their ruin, could have been avoided. But when it cannot be
avoided, as happened to the Florentines when the Pope and Spain sent
armies to attack Lombardy, then in such a case, for the above reasons, the
prince ought to favour one of the parties.
Never let any Government imagine that it can choose perfectly safe
courses; rather let it expect to have to take very doubtful ones, because it is
found in ordinary affairs that one never seeks to avoid one trouble without
running into another; but prudence consists in knowing how to distinguish
the character of troubles, and for choice to take the lesser evil.
A prince ought also to show himself a patron of ability, and to honour the
proficient in every art. At the same time he should encourage his citizens to
practise their callings peaceably, both in commerce and agriculture, and in
every other following, so that the one should not be deterred from
improving his possessions for fear lest they be taken away from him or
another from opening up trade for fear of taxes; but the prince ought to offer
rewards to whoever wishes to do these things and designs in any way to
honour his city or state.
Further, he ought to entertain the people with festivals and spectacles at
convenient seasons of the year; and as every city is divided into guilds or
into societies,(*) he ought to hold such bodies in esteem, and associate with
them sometimes, and show himself an example of courtesy and liberality;
nevertheless, always maintaining the majesty of his rank, for this he must
never consent to abate in anything.
(*) "Guilds or societies," "in arti o in tribu." "Arti" were
craft or trade guilds, cf. Florio: "Arte . . . a whole
company of any trade in any city or corporation town." The
guilds of Florence are most admirably described by Mr

Edgcumbe Staley in his work on the subject (Methuen, 1906).
Institutions of a somewhat similar character, called
"artel," exist in Russia to-day, cf. Sir Mackenzie Wallace's
"Russia," ed. 1905: "The sons . . . were always during the
working season members of an artel. In some of the larger
towns there are artels of a much more complex kind—
permanent associations, possessing large capital, and
pecuniarily responsible for the acts of the individual
members." The word "artel," despite its apparent similarity,
has, Mr Aylmer Maude assures me, no connection with "ars" or
"arte." Its root is that of the verb "rotisya," to bind
oneself by an oath; and it is generally admitted to be only
another form of "rota," which now signifies a "regimental
company." In both words the underlying idea is that of a
body of men united by an oath. "Tribu" were possibly gentile
groups, united by common descent, and included individuals
connected by marriage. Perhaps our words "sects" or "clans"
would be most appropriate.

CHAPTER XXII — CONCERNING THE
SECRETARIES OF PRINCES
The choice of servants is of no little importance to a prince, and they are
good or not according to the discrimination of the prince. And the first
opinion which one forms of a prince, and of his understanding, is by
observing the men he has around him; and when they are capable and
faithful he may always be considered wise, because he has known how to
recognize the capable and to keep them faithful. But when they are
otherwise one cannot form a good opinion of him, for the prime error which
he made was in choosing them.
There were none who knew Messer Antonio da Venafro as the servant of
Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, who would not consider Pandolfo to be
a very clever man in having Venafro for his servant. Because there are three
classes of intellects: one which comprehends by itself; another which
appreciates what others comprehended; and a third which neither
comprehends by itself nor by the showing of others; the first is the most
excellent, the second is good, the third is useless. Therefore, it follows
necessarily that, if Pandolfo was not in the first rank, he was in the second,
for whenever one has judgment to know good and bad when it is said and
done, although he himself may not have the initiative, yet he can recognize
the good and the bad in his servant, and the one he can praise and the other
correct; thus the servant cannot hope to deceive him, and is kept honest.
But to enable a prince to form an opinion of his servant there is one test
which never fails; when you see the servant thinking more of his own
interests than of yours, and seeking inwardly his own profit in everything,
such a man will never make a good servant, nor will you ever be able to
trust him; because he who has the state of another in his hands ought never
to think of himself, but always of his prince, and never pay any attention to
matters in which the prince is not concerned.
On the other hand, to keep his servant honest the prince ought to study
him, honouring him, enriching him, doing him kindnesses, sharing with him
the honours and cares; and at the same time let him see that he cannot stand

alone, so that many honours may not make him desire more, many riches
make him wish for more, and that many cares may make him dread
chances. When, therefore, servants, and princes towards servants, are thus
disposed, they can trust each other, but when it is otherwise, the end will
always be disastrous for either one or the other.

CHAPTER XXIII — HOW FLATTERERS
SHOULD BE AVOIDED
I do not wish to leave out an important branch of this subject, for it is a
danger from which princes are with difficulty preserved, unless they are
very careful and discriminating. It is that of flatterers, of whom courts are
full, because men are so self-complacent in their own affairs, and in a way
so deceived in them, that they are preserved with difficulty from this pest,
and if they wish to defend themselves they run the danger of falling into
contempt. Because there is no other way of guarding oneself from flatterers
except letting men understand that to tell you the truth does not offend you;
but when every one may tell you the truth, respect for you abates.
Therefore a wise prince ought to hold a third course by choosing the wise
men in his state, and giving to them only the liberty of speaking the truth to
him, and then only of those things of which he inquires, and of none others;
but he ought to question them upon everything, and listen to their opinions,
and afterwards form his own conclusions. With these councillors, separately
and collectively, he ought to carry himself in such a way that each of them
should know that, the more freely he shall speak, the more he shall be
preferred; outside of these, he should listen to no one, pursue the thing
resolved on, and be steadfast in his resolutions. He who does otherwise is
either overthrown by flatterers, or is so often changed by varying opinions
that he falls into contempt.
I wish on this subject to adduce a modern example. Fra Luca, the man of
affairs to Maximilian,(*) the present emperor, speaking of his majesty, said:
He consulted with no one, yet never got his own way in anything. This
arose because of his following a practice the opposite to the above; for the
emperor is a secretive man—he does not communicate his designs to any
one, nor does he receive opinions on them. But as in carrying them into
effect they become revealed and known, they are at once obstructed by
those men whom he has around him, and he, being pliant, is diverted from
them. Hence it follows that those things he does one day he undoes the

next, and no one ever understands what he wishes or intends to do, and no
one can rely on his resolutions.
(*) Maximilian I, born in 1459, died 1519, Emperor of the
Holy Roman Empire. He married, first, Mary, daughter of
Charles the Bold; after her death, Bianca Sforza; and thus
became involved in Italian politics.

A prince, therefore, ought always to take counsel, but only when he
wishes and not when others wish; he ought rather to discourage every one
from offering advice unless he asks it; but, however, he ought to be a
constant inquirer, and afterwards a patient listener concerning the things of
which he inquired; also, on learning that any one, on any consideration, has
not told him the truth, he should let his anger be felt.
And if there are some who think that a prince who conveys an impression
of his wisdom is not so through his own ability, but through the good
advisers that he has around him, beyond doubt they are deceived, because
this is an axiom which never fails: that a prince who is not wise himself will
never take good advice, unless by chance he has yielded his affairs entirely
to one person who happens to be a very prudent man. In this case indeed he
may be well governed, but it would not be for long, because such a
governor would in a short time take away his state from him.
But if a prince who is not inexperienced should take counsel from more
than one he will never get united counsels, nor will he know how to unite
them. Each of the counsellors will think of his own interests, and the prince
will not know how to control them or to see through them. And they are not
to be found otherwise, because men will always prove untrue to you unless
they are kept honest by constraint. Therefore it must be inferred that good
counsels, whencesoever they come, are born of the wisdom of the prince,
and not the wisdom of the prince from good counsels.

CHAPTER XXIV — WHY THE PRINCES OF
ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR STATES
The previous suggestions, carefully observed, will enable a new prince to
appear well established, and render him at once more secure and fixed in
the state than if he had been long seated there. For the actions of a new
prince are more narrowly observed than those of an hereditary one, and
when they are seen to be able they gain more men and bind far tighter than
ancient blood; because men are attracted more by the present than by the
past, and when they find the present good they enjoy it and seek no further;
they will also make the utmost defence of a prince if he fails them not in
other things. Thus it will be a double glory for him to have established a
new principality, and adorned and strengthened it with good laws, good
arms, good allies, and with a good example; so will it be a double disgrace
to him who, born a prince, shall lose his state by want of wisdom.
And if those seigniors are considered who have lost their states in Italy in
our times, such as the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and others, there
will be found in them, firstly, one common defect in regard to arms from
the causes which have been discussed at length; in the next place, some one
of them will be seen, either to have had the people hostile, or if he has had
the people friendly, he has not known how to secure the nobles. In the
absence of these defects states that have power enough to keep an army in
the field cannot be lost.
Philip of Macedon, not the father of Alexander the Great, but he who was
conquered by Titus Quintius, had not much territory compared to the
greatness of the Romans and of Greece who attacked him, yet being a
warlike man who knew how to attract the people and secure the nobles, he
sustained the war against his enemies for many years, and if in the end he
lost the dominion of some cities, nevertheless he retained the kingdom.
Therefore, do not let our princes accuse fortune for the loss of their
principalities after so many years' possession, but rather their own sloth,
because in quiet times they never thought there could be a change (it is a
common defect in man not to make any provision in the calm against the

tempest), and when afterwards the bad times came they thought of flight
and not of defending themselves, and they hoped that the people, disgusted
with the insolence of the conquerors, would recall them. This course, when
others fail, may be good, but it is very bad to have neglected all other
expedients for that, since you would never wish to fall because you trusted
to be able to find someone later on to restore you. This again either does not
happen, or, if it does, it will not be for your security, because that
deliverance is of no avail which does not depend upon yourself; those only
are reliable, certain, and durable that depend on yourself and your valour.

CHAPTER XXV — WHAT FORTUNE CAN
EFFECT IN HUMAN AFFAIRS AND HOW TO
WITHSTAND HER
It is not unknown to me how many men have had, and still have, the
opinion that the affairs of the world are in such wise governed by fortune
and by God that men with their wisdom cannot direct them and that no one
can even help them; and because of this they would have us believe that it is
not necessary to labour much in affairs, but to let chance govern them. This
opinion has been more credited in our times because of the great changes in
affairs which have been seen, and may still be seen, every day, beyond all
human conjecture. Sometimes pondering over this, I am in some degree
inclined to their opinion. Nevertheless, not to extinguish our free will, I
hold it to be true that Fortune is the arbiter of one-half of our actions,(*) but
that she still leaves us to direct the other half, or perhaps a little less.
(*) Frederick the Great was accustomed to say: "The older
one gets the more convinced one becomes that his Majesty
King Chance does three-quarters of the business of this
miserable universe." Sorel's "Eastern Question."

I compare her to one of those raging rivers, which when in flood
overflows the plains, sweeping away trees and buildings, bearing away the
soil from place to place; everything flies before it, all yield to its violence,
without being able in any way to withstand it; and yet, though its nature be
such, it does not follow therefore that men, when the weather becomes fair,
shall not make provision, both with defences and barriers, in such a manner
that, rising again, the waters may pass away by canal, and their force be
neither so unrestrained nor so dangerous. So it happens with fortune, who
shows her power where valour has not prepared to resist her, and thither she
turns her forces where she knows that barriers and defences have not been
raised to constrain her.
And if you will consider Italy, which is the seat of these changes, and
which has given to them their impulse, you will see it to be an open country
without barriers and without any defence. For if it had been defended by
proper valour, as are Germany, Spain, and France, either this invasion

would not have made the great changes it has made or it would not have
come at all. And this I consider enough to say concerning resistance to
fortune in general.
But confining myself more to the particular, I say that a prince may be
seen happy to-day and ruined to-morrow without having shown any change
of disposition or character. This, I believe, arises firstly from causes that
have already been discussed at length, namely, that the prince who relies
entirely on fortune is lost when it changes. I believe also that he will be
successful who directs his actions according to the spirit of the times, and
that he whose actions do not accord with the times will not be successful.
Because men are seen, in affairs that lead to the end which every man has
before him, namely, glory and riches, to get there by various methods; one
with caution, another with haste; one by force, another by skill; one by
patience, another by its opposite; and each one succeeds in reaching the
goal by a different method. One can also see of two cautious men the one
attain his end, the other fail; and similarly, two men by different
observances are equally successful, the one being cautious, the other
impetuous; all this arises from nothing else than whether or not they
conform in their methods to the spirit of the times. This follows from what I
have said, that two men working differently bring about the same effect,
and of two working similarly, one attains his object and the other does not.
Changes in estate also issue from this, for if, to one who governs himself
with caution and patience, times and affairs converge in such a way that his
administration is successful, his fortune is made; but if times and affairs
change, he is ruined if he does not change his course of action. But a man is
not often found sufficiently circumspect to know how to accommodate
himself to the change, both because he cannot deviate from what nature
inclines him to do, and also because, having always prospered by acting in
one way, he cannot be persuaded that it is well to leave it; and, therefore,
the cautious man, when it is time to turn adventurous, does not know how
to do it, hence he is ruined; but had he changed his conduct with the times
fortune would not have changed.
Pope Julius the Second went to work impetuously in all his affairs, and
found the times and circumstances conform so well to that line of action
that he always met with success. Consider his first enterprise against
Bologna, Messer Giovanni Bentivogli being still alive. The Venetians were

not agreeable to it, nor was the King of Spain, and he had the enterprise still
under discussion with the King of France; nevertheless he personally
entered upon the expedition with his accustomed boldness and energy, a
move which made Spain and the Venetians stand irresolute and passive, the
latter from fear, the former from desire to recover the kingdom of Naples;
on the other hand, he drew after him the King of France, because that king,
having observed the movement, and desiring to make the Pope his friend so
as to humble the Venetians, found it impossible to refuse him. Therefore
Julius with his impetuous action accomplished what no other pontiff with
simple human wisdom could have done; for if he had waited in Rome until
he could get away, with his plans arranged and everything fixed, as any
other pontiff would have done, he would never have succeeded. Because
the King of France would have made a thousand excuses, and the others
would have raised a thousand fears.
I will leave his other actions alone, as they were all alike, and they all
succeeded, for the shortness of his life did not let him experience the
contrary; but if circumstances had arisen which required him to go
cautiously, his ruin would have followed, because he would never have
deviated from those ways to which nature inclined him.
I conclude, therefore that, fortune being changeful and mankind steadfast
in their ways, so long as the two are in agreement men are successful, but
unsuccessful when they fall out. For my part I consider that it is better to be
adventurous than cautious, because fortune is a woman, and if you wish to
keep her under it is necessary to beat and ill-use her; and it is seen that she
allows herself to be mastered by the adventurous rather than by those who
go to work more coldly. She is, therefore, always, woman-like, a lover of
young men, because they are less cautious, more violent, and with more
audacity command her.

CHAPTER XXVI — AN EXHORTATION TO
LIBERATE ITALY FROM THE BARBARIANS
Having carefully considered the subject of the above discourses, and
wondering within myself whether the present times were propitious to a
new prince, and whether there were elements that would give an
opportunity to a wise and virtuous one to introduce a new order of things
which would do honour to him and good to the people of this country, it
appears to me that so many things concur to favour a new prince that I
never knew a time more fit than the present.
And if, as I said, it was necessary that the people of Israel should be
captive so as to make manifest the ability of Moses; that the Persians should
be oppressed by the Medes so as to discover the greatness of the soul of
Cyrus; and that the Athenians should be dispersed to illustrate the
capabilities of Theseus: then at the present time, in order to discover the
virtue of an Italian spirit, it was necessary that Italy should be reduced to
the extremity that she is now in, that she should be more enslaved than the
Hebrews, more oppressed than the Persians, more scattered than the
Athenians; without head, without order, beaten, despoiled, torn, overrun;
and to have endured every kind of desolation.
Although lately some spark may have been shown by one, which made
us think he was ordained by God for our redemption, nevertheless it was
afterwards seen, in the height of his career, that fortune rejected him; so that
Italy, left as without life, waits for him who shall yet heal her wounds and
put an end to the ravaging and plundering of Lombardy, to the swindling
and taxing of the kingdom and of Tuscany, and cleanse those sores that for
long have festered. It is seen how she entreats God to send someone who
shall deliver her from these wrongs and barbarous insolencies. It is seen
also that she is ready and willing to follow a banner if only someone will
raise it.
Nor is there to be seen at present one in whom she can place more hope
than in your illustrious house,(*) with its valour and fortune, favoured by
God and by the Church of which it is now the chief, and which could be

made the head of this redemption. This will not be difficult if you will recall
to yourself the actions and lives of the men I have named. And although
they were great and wonderful men, yet they were men, and each one of
them had no more opportunity than the present offers, for their enterprises
were neither more just nor easier than this, nor was God more their friend
than He is yours.
(*) Giuliano de Medici. He had just been created a cardinal
by Leo X. In 1523 Giuliano was elected Pope, and took the
title of Clement VII.

With us there is great justice, because that war is just which is necessary,
and arms are hallowed when there is no other hope but in them. Here there
is the greatest willingness, and where the willingness is great the difficulties
cannot be great if you will only follow those men to whom I have directed
your attention. Further than this, how extraordinarily the ways of God have
been manifested beyond example: the sea is divided, a cloud has led the
way, the rock has poured forth water, it has rained manna, everything has
contributed to your greatness; you ought to do the rest. God is not willing to
do everything, and thus take away our free will and that share of glory
which belongs to us.
And it is not to be wondered at if none of the above-named Italians have
been able to accomplish all that is expected from your illustrious house; and
if in so many revolutions in Italy, and in so many campaigns, it has always
appeared as if military virtue were exhausted, this has happened because the
old order of things was not good, and none of us have known how to find a
new one. And nothing honours a man more than to establish new laws and
new ordinances when he himself was newly risen. Such things when they
are well founded and dignified will make him revered and admired, and in
Italy there are not wanting opportunities to bring such into use in every
form.
Here there is great valour in the limbs whilst it fails in the head. Look
attentively at the duels and the hand-to-hand combats, how superior the
Italians are in strength, dexterity, and subtlety. But when it comes to armies
they do not bear comparison, and this springs entirely from the
insufficiency of the leaders, since those who are capable are not obedient,
and each one seems to himself to know, there having never been any one so
distinguished above the rest, either by valour or fortune, that others would
yield to him. Hence it is that for so long a time, and during so much fighting

in the past twenty years, whenever there has been an army wholly Italian, it
has always given a poor account of itself; the first witness to this is Il Taro,
afterwards Allesandria, Capua, Genoa, Vaila, Bologna, Mestri.(*)
(*) The battles of Il Taro, 1495; Alessandria, 1499; Capua,
1501; Genoa, 1507; Vaila, 1509; Bologna, 1511; Mestri, 1513.

If, therefore, your illustrious house wishes to follow these remarkable
men who have redeemed their country, it is necessary before all things, as a
true foundation for every enterprise, to be provided with your own forces,
because there can be no more faithful, truer, or better soldiers. And although
singly they are good, altogether they will be much better when they find
themselves commanded by their prince, honoured by him, and maintained
at his expense. Therefore it is necessary to be prepared with such arms, so
that you can be defended against foreigners by Italian valour.
And although Swiss and Spanish infantry may be considered very
formidable, nevertheless there is a defect in both, by reason of which a third
order would not only be able to oppose them, but might be relied upon to
overthrow them. For the Spaniards cannot resist cavalry, and the Switzers
are afraid of infantry whenever they encounter them in close combat.
Owing to this, as has been and may again be seen, the Spaniards are unable
to resist French cavalry, and the Switzers are overthrown by Spanish
infantry. And although a complete proof of this latter cannot be shown,
nevertheless there was some evidence of it at the battle of Ravenna, when
the Spanish infantry were confronted by German battalions, who follow the
same tactics as the Swiss; when the Spaniards, by agility of body and with
the aid of their shields, got in under the pikes of the Germans and stood out
of danger, able to attack, while the Germans stood helpless, and, if the
cavalry had not dashed up, all would have been over with them. It is
possible, therefore, knowing the defects of both these infantries, to invent a
new one, which will resist cavalry and not be afraid of infantry; this need
not create a new order of arms, but a variation upon the old. And these are
the kind of improvements which confer reputation and power upon a new
prince.
This opportunity, therefore, ought not to be allowed to pass for letting
Italy at last see her liberator appear. Nor can one express the love with
which he would be received in all those provinces which have suffered so
much from these foreign scourings, with what thirst for revenge, with what
stubborn faith, with what devotion, with what tears. What door would be

closed to him? Who would refuse obedience to him? What envy would
hinder him? What Italian would refuse him homage? To all of us this
barbarous dominion stinks. Let, therefore, your illustrious house take up
this charge with that courage and hope with which all just enterprises are
undertaken, so that under its standard our native country may be ennobled,
and under its auspices may be verified that saying of Petrarch:
Virtu contro al Furore
Prendera l'arme, e fia il combatter corto:
Che l'antico valore
Negli italici cuor non e ancor morto.
Virtue against fury shall advance the fight,
And it i' th' combat soon shall put to flight:
For the old Roman valour is not dead,
Nor in th' Italians' brests extinguished.
Edward Dacre, 1640.

DESCRIPTION OF THE METHODS ADOPTED
BY THE DUKE VALENTINO WHEN
MURDERING VITELLOZZO VITELLI,
OLIVEROTTO DA FERMO, THE SIGNOR
PAGOLO, AND THE DUKE DI GRAVINA
ORSINI
BY

NICOLO MACHIAVELLI
The Duke Valentino had returned from Lombardy, where he had been to
clear himself with the King of France from the calumnies which had been
raised against him by the Florentines concerning the rebellion of Arezzo
and other towns in the Val di Chiana, and had arrived at Imola, whence he
intended with his army to enter upon the campaign against Giovanni
Bentivogli, the tyrant of Bologna: for he intended to bring that city under
his domination, and to make it the head of his Romagnian duchy.
These matters coming to the knowledge of the Vitelli and Orsini and their
following, it appeared to them that the duke would become too powerful,
and it was feared that, having seized Bologna, he would seek to destroy
them in order that he might become supreme in Italy. Upon this a meeting
was called at Magione in the district of Perugia, to which came the cardinal,
Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina Orsini, Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da
Fermo, Gianpagolo Baglioni, the tyrant of Perugia, and Messer Antonio da
Venafro, sent by Pandolfo Petrucci, the Prince of Siena. Here were
discussed the power and courage of the duke and the necessity of curbing
his ambitions, which might otherwise bring danger to the rest of being
ruined. And they decided not to abandon the Bentivogli, but to strive to win
over the Florentines; and they sent their men to one place and another,
promising to one party assistance and to another encouragement to unite
with them against the common enemy. This meeting was at once reported
throughout all Italy, and those who were discontented under the duke,
among whom were the people of Urbino, took hope of effecting a
revolution.
Thus it arose that, men's minds being thus unsettled, it was decided by
certain men of Urbino to seize the fortress of San Leo, which was held for
the duke, and which they captured by the following means. The castellan
was fortifying the rock and causing timber to be taken there; so the
conspirators watched, and when certain beams which were being carried to
the rock were upon the bridge, so that it was prevented from being drawn
up by those inside, they took the opportunity of leaping upon the bridge and

thence into the fortress. Upon this capture being effected, the whole state
rebelled and recalled the old duke, being encouraged in this, not so much by
the capture of the fort, as by the Diet at Magione, from whom they expected
to get assistance.
Those who heard of the rebellion at Urbino thought they would not lose
the opportunity, and at once assembled their men so as to take any town,
should any remain in the hands of the duke in that state; and they sent again
to Florence to beg that republic to join with them in destroying the common
firebrand, showing that the risk was lessened and that they ought not to wait
for another opportunity.
But the Florentines, from hatred, for sundry reasons, of the Vitelli and
Orsini, not only would not ally themselves, but sent Nicolo Machiavelli,
their secretary, to offer shelter and assistance to the duke against his
enemies. The duke was found full of fear at Imola, because, against
everybody's expectation, his soldiers had at once gone over to the enemy
and he found himself disarmed and war at his door. But recovering courage
from the offers of the Florentines, he decided to temporize before fighting
with the few soldiers that remained to him, and to negotiate for a
reconciliation, and also to get assistance. This latter he obtained in two
ways, by sending to the King of France for men and by enlisting men-atarms and others whom he turned into cavalry of a sort: to all he gave
money.
Notwithstanding this, his enemies drew near to him, and approached
Fossombrone, where they encountered some men of the duke and, with the
aid of the Orsini and Vitelli, routed them. When this happened, the duke
resolved at once to see if he could not close the trouble with offers of
reconciliation, and being a most perfect dissembler he did not fail in any
practices to make the insurgents understand that he wished every man who
had acquired anything to keep it, as it was enough for him to have the title
of prince, whilst others might have the principality.
And the duke succeeded so well in this that they sent Signor Pagolo to
him to negotiate for a reconciliation, and they brought their army to a
standstill. But the duke did not stop his preparations, and took every care to
provide himself with cavalry and infantry, and that such preparations might
not be apparent to the others, he sent his troops in separate parties to every
part of the Romagna. In the meanwhile there came also to him five hundred

French lancers, and although he found himself sufficiently strong to take
vengeance on his enemies in open war, he considered that it would be safer
and more advantageous to outwit them, and for this reason he did not stop
the work of reconciliation.
And that this might be effected the duke concluded a peace with them in
which he confirmed their former covenants; he gave them four thousand
ducats at once; he promised not to injure the Bentivogli; and he formed an
alliance with Giovanni; and moreover he would not force them to come
personally into his presence unless it pleased them to do so. On the other
hand, they promised to restore to him the duchy of Urbino and other places
seized by them, to serve him in all his expeditions, and not to make war
against or ally themselves with any one without his permission.
This reconciliation being completed, Guido Ubaldo, the Duke of Urbino,
again fled to Venice, having first destroyed all the fortresses in his state;
because, trusting in the people, he did not wish that the fortresses, which he
did not think he could defend, should be held by the enemy, since by these
means a check would be kept upon his friends. But the Duke Valentino,
having completed this convention, and dispersed his men throughout the
Romagna, set out for Imola at the end of November together with his
French men-at-arms: thence he went to Cesena, where he stayed some time
to negotiate with the envoys of the Vitelli and Orsini, who had assembled
with their men in the duchy of Urbino, as to the enterprise in which they
should now take part; but nothing being concluded, Oliverotto da Fermo
was sent to propose that if the duke wished to undertake an expedition
against Tuscany they were ready; if he did not wish it, then they would
besiege Sinigalia. To this the duke replied that he did not wish to enter into
war with Tuscany, and thus become hostile to the Florentines, but that he
was very willing to proceed against Sinigalia.
It happened that not long afterwards the town surrendered, but the
fortress would not yield to them because the castellan would not give it up
to any one but the duke in person; therefore they exhorted him to come
there. This appeared a good opportunity to the duke, as, being invited by
them, and not going of his own will, he would awaken no suspicions. And
the more to reassure them, he allowed all the French men-at-arms who were
with him in Lombardy to depart, except the hundred lancers under Mons. di
Candales, his brother-in-law. He left Cesena about the middle of December,

and went to Fano, and with the utmost cunning and cleverness he persuaded
the Vitelli and Orsini to wait for him at Sinigalia, pointing out to them that
any lack of compliance would cast a doubt upon the sincerity and
permanency of the reconciliation, and that he was a man who wished to
make use of the arms and councils of his friends. But Vitellozzo remained
very stubborn, for the death of his brother warned him that he should not
offend a prince and afterwards trust him; nevertheless, persuaded by Pagolo
Orsini, whom the duke had corrupted with gifts and promises, he agreed to
wait.
Upon this the duke, before his departure from Fano, which was to be on
30th December 1502, communicated his designs to eight of his most trusted
followers, among whom were Don Michele and the Monsignor d'Euna, who
was afterwards cardinal; and he ordered that, as soon as Vitellozzo, Pagolo
Orsini, the Duke di Gravina, and Oliverotto should arrive, his followers in
pairs should take them one by one, entrusting certain men to certain pairs,
who should entertain them until they reached Sinigalia; nor should they be
permitted to leave until they came to the duke's quarters, where they should
be seized.
The duke afterwards ordered all his horsemen and infantry, of which
there were more than two thousand cavalry and ten thousand footmen, to
assemble by daybreak at the Metauro, a river five miles distant from Fano,
and await him there. He found himself, therefore, on the last day of
December at the Metauro with his men, and having sent a cavalcade of
about two hundred horsemen before him, he then moved forward the
infantry, whom he accompanied with the rest of the men-at-arms.
Fano and Sinigalia are two cities of La Marca situated on the shore of the
Adriatic Sea, fifteen miles distant from each other, so that he who goes
towards Sinigalia has the mountains on his right hand, the bases of which
are touched by the sea in some places. The city of Sinigalia is distant from
the foot of the mountains a little more than a bow-shot and from the shore
about a mile. On the side opposite to the city runs a little river which bathes
that part of the walls looking towards Fano, facing the high road. Thus he
who draws near to Sinigalia comes for a good space by road along the
mountains, and reaches the river which passes by Sinigalia. If he turns to
his left hand along the bank of it, and goes for the distance of a bow-shot,
he arrives at a bridge which crosses the river; he is then almost abreast of

the gate that leads into Sinigalia, not by a straight line, but transversely.
Before this gate there stands a collection of houses with a square to which
the bank of the river forms one side.
The Vitelli and Orsini having received orders to wait for the duke, and to
honour him in person, sent away their men to several castles distant from
Sinigalia about six miles, so that room could be made for the men of the
duke; and they left in Sinigalia only Oliverotto and his band, which
consisted of one thousand infantry and one hundred and fifty horsemen,
who were quartered in the suburb mentioned above. Matters having been
thus arranged, the Duke Valentino left for Sinigalia, and when the leaders of
the cavalry reached the bridge they did not pass over, but having opened it,
one portion wheeled towards the river and the other towards the country,
and a way was left in the middle through which the infantry passed, without
stopping, into the town.
Vitellozzo, Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina on mules, accompanied by a
few horsemen, went towards the duke; Vitellozo, unarmed and wearing a
cape lined with green, appeared very dejected, as if conscious of his
approaching death—a circumstance which, in view of the ability of the man
and his former fortune, caused some amazement. And it is said that when he
parted from his men before setting out for Sinigalia to meet the duke he
acted as if it were his last parting from them. He recommended his house
and its fortunes to his captains, and advised his nephews that it was not the
fortune of their house, but the virtues of their fathers that should be kept in
mind. These three, therefore, came before the duke and saluted him
respectfully, and were received by him with goodwill; they were at once
placed between those who were commissioned to look after them.
But the duke noticing that Oliverotto, who had remained with his band in
Sinigalia, was missing—for Oliverotto was waiting in the square before his
quarters near the river, keeping his men in order and drilling them—
signalled with his eye to Don Michelle, to whom the care of Oliverotto had
been committed, that he should take measures that Oliverotto should not
escape. Therefore Don Michele rode off and joined Oliverotto, telling him
that it was not right to keep his men out of their quarters, because these
might be taken up by the men of the duke; and he advised him to send them
at once to their quarters and to come himself to meet the duke. And
Oliverotto, having taken this advice, came before the duke, who, when he

saw him, called to him; and Oliverotto, having made his obeisance, joined
the others.
So the whole party entered Sinigalia, dismounted at the duke's quarters,
and went with him into a secret chamber, where the duke made them
prisoners; he then mounted on horseback, and issued orders that the men of
Oliverotto and the Orsini should be stripped of their arms. Those of
Oliverotto, being at hand, were quickly settled, but those of the Orsini and
Vitelli, being at a distance, and having a presentiment of the destruction of
their masters, had time to prepare themselves, and bearing in mind the
valour and discipline of the Orsinian and Vitellian houses, they stood
together against the hostile forces of the country and saved themselves.
But the duke's soldiers, not being content with having pillaged the men of
Oliverotto, began to sack Sinigalia, and if the duke had not repressed this
outrage by killing some of them they would have completely sacked it.
Night having come and the tumult being silenced, the duke prepared to kill
Vitellozzo and Oliverotto; he led them into a room and caused them to be
strangled. Neither of them used words in keeping with their past lives:
Vitellozzo prayed that he might ask of the pope full pardon for his sins;
Oliverotto cringed and laid the blame for all injuries against the duke on
Vitellozzo. Pagolo and the Duke di Gravina Orsini were kept alive until the
duke heard from Rome that the pope had taken the Cardinal Orsino, the
Archbishop of Florence, and Messer Jacopo da Santa Croce. After which
news, on 18th January 1502, in the castle of Pieve, they also were strangled
in the same way.
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CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI 1284-1328
It appears, dearest Zanobi and Luigi, a wonderful thing to those who
have considered the matter, that all men, or the larger number of them, who
have performed great deeds in the world, and excelled all others in their
day, have had their birth and beginning in baseness and obscurity; or have
been aggrieved by Fortune in some outrageous way. They have either been
exposed to the mercy of wild beasts, or they have had so mean a parentage
that in shame they have given themselves out to be sons of Jove or of some
other deity. It would be wearisome to relate who these persons may have
been because they are well known to everybody, and, as such tales would
not be particularly edifying to those who read them, they are omitted. I
believe that these lowly beginnings of great men occur because Fortune is
desirous of showing to the world that such men owe much to her and little
to wisdom, because she begins to show her hand when wisdom can really
take no part in their career: thus all success must be attributed to her.
Castruccio Castracani of Lucca was one of those men who did great deeds,
if he is measured by the times in which he lived and the city in which he
was born; but, like many others, he was neither fortunate nor distinguished
in his birth, as the course of this history will show. It appeared to be
desirable to recall his memory, because I have discerned in him such
indications of valour and fortune as should make him a great exemplar to
men. I think also that I ought to call your attention to his actions, because
you of all men I know delight most in noble deeds.
The family of Castracani was formerly numbered among the noble
families of Lucca, but in the days of which I speak it had somewhat fallen
in estate, as so often happens in this world. To this family was born a son
Antonio, who became a priest of the order of San Michele of Lucca, and for
this reason was honoured with the title of Messer Antonio. He had an only
sister, who had been married to Buonaccorso Cenami, but Buonaccorso
dying she became a widow, and not wishing to marry again went to live
with her brother. Messer Antonio had a vineyard behind the house where he
resided, and as it was bounded on all sides by gardens, any person could
have access to it without difficulty. One morning, shortly after sunrise,

Madonna Dianora, as the sister of Messer Antonio was called, had occasion
to go into the vineyard as usual to gather herbs for seasoning the dinner, and
hearing a slight rustling among the leaves of a vine she turned her eyes in
that direction, and heard something resembling the cry of an infant.
Whereupon she went towards it, and saw the hands and face of a baby who
was lying enveloped in the leaves and who seemed to be crying for its
mother. Partly wondering and partly fearing, yet full of compassion, she
lifted it up and carried it to the house, where she washed it and clothed it
with clean linen as is customary, and showed it to Messer Antonio when he
returned home. When he heard what had happened and saw the child he
was not less surprised or compassionate than his sister. They discussed
between themselves what should be done, and seeing that he was priest and
that she had no children, they finally determined to bring it up. They had a
nurse for it, and it was reared and loved as if it were their own child. They
baptized it, and gave it the name of Castruccio after their father. As the
years passed Castruccio grew very handsome, and gave evidence of wit and
discretion, and learnt with a quickness beyond his years those lessons which
Messer Antonio imparted to him. Messer Antonio intended to make a priest
of him, and in time would have inducted him into his canonry and other
benefices, and all his instruction was given with this object; but Antonio
discovered that the character of Castruccio was quite unfitted for the
priesthood. As soon as Castruccio reached the age of fourteen he began to
take less notice of the chiding of Messer Antonio and Madonna Dianora
and no longer to fear them; he left off reading ecclesiastical books, and
turned to playing with arms, delighting in nothing so much as in learning
their uses, and in running, leaping, and wrestling with other boys. In all
exercises he far excelled his companions in courage and bodily strength,
and if at any time he did turn to books, only those pleased him which told of
wars and the mighty deeds of men. Messer Antonio beheld all this with
vexation and sorrow.
There lived in the city of Lucca a gentleman of the Guinigi family, named
Messer Francesco, whose profession was arms and who in riches, bodily
strength, and valour excelled all other men in Lucca. He had often fought
under the command of the Visconti of Milan, and as a Ghibelline was the
valued leader of that party in Lucca. This gentleman resided in Lucca and
was accustomed to assemble with others most mornings and evenings under
the balcony of the Podesta, which is at the top of the square of San Michele,

the finest square in Lucca, and he had often seen Castruccio taking part
with other children of the street in those games of which I have spoken.
Noticing that Castruccio far excelled the other boys, and that he appeared to
exercise a royal authority over them, and that they loved and obeyed him,
Messer Francesco became greatly desirous of learning who he was. Being
informed of the circumstances of the bringing up of Castruccio he felt a
greater desire to have him near to him. Therefore he called him one day and
asked him whether he would more willingly live in the house of a
gentleman, where he would learn to ride horses and use arms, or in the
house of a priest, where he would learn nothing but masses and the services
of the Church. Messer Francesco could see that it pleased Castruccio
greatly to hear horses and arms spoken of, even though he stood silent,
blushing modestly; but being encouraged by Messer Francesco to speak, he
answered that, if his master were agreeable, nothing would please him more
than to give up his priestly studies and take up those of a soldier. This reply
delighted Messer Francesco, and in a very short time he obtained the
consent of Messer Antonio, who was driven to yield by his knowledge of
the nature of the lad, and the fear that he would not be able to hold him
much longer.
Thus Castruccio passed from the house of Messer Antonio the priest to
the house of Messer Francesco Guinigi the soldier, and it was astonishing to
find that in a very short time he manifested all that virtue and bearing which
we are accustomed to associate with a true gentleman. In the first place he
became an accomplished horseman, and could manage with ease the most
fiery charger, and in all jousts and tournaments, although still a youth, he
was observed beyond all others, and he excelled in all exercises of strength
and dexterity. But what enhanced so much the charm of these
accomplishments, was the delightful modesty which enabled him to avoid
offence in either act or word to others, for he was deferential to the great
men, modest with his equals, and courteous to his inferiors. These gifts
made him beloved, not only by all the Guinigi family, but by all Lucca.
When Castruccio had reached his eighteenth year, the Ghibellines were
driven from Pavia by the Guelphs, and Messer Francesco was sent by the
Visconti to assist the Ghibellines, and with him went Castruccio, in charge
of his forces. Castruccio gave ample proof of his prudence and courage in
this expedition, acquiring greater reputation than any other captain, and his

name and fame were known, not only in Pavia, but throughout all
Lombardy.
Castruccio, having returned to Lucca in far higher estimation than he left
it, did not omit to use all the means in his power to gain as many friends as
he could, neglecting none of those arts which are necessary for that
purpose. About this time Messer Francesco died, leaving a son thirteen
years of age named Pagolo, and having appointed Castruccio to be his son's
tutor and administrator of his estate. Before he died Francesco called
Castruccio to him, and prayed him to show Pagolo that goodwill which he
(Francesco) had always shown to HIM, and to render to the son the
gratitude which he had not been able to repay to the father. Upon the death
of Francesco, Castruccio became the governor and tutor of Pagolo, which
increased enormously his power and position, and created a certain amount
of envy against him in Lucca in place of the former universal goodwill, for
many men suspected him of harbouring tyrannical intentions. Among these
the leading man was Giorgio degli Opizi, the head of the Guelph party. This
man hoped after the death of Messer Francesco to become the chief man in
Lucca, but it seemed to him that Castruccio, with the great abilities which
he already showed, and holding the position of governor, deprived him of
his opportunity; therefore he began to sow those seeds which should rob
Castruccio of his eminence. Castruccio at first treated this with scorn, but
afterwards he grew alarmed, thinking that Messer Giorgio might be able to
bring him into disgrace with the deputy of King Ruberto of Naples and have
him driven out of Lucca.
The Lord of Pisa at that time was Uguccione of the Faggiuola of Arezzo,
who being in the first place elected their captain afterwards became their
lord. There resided in Paris some exiled Ghibellines from Lucca, with
whom Castruccio held communications with the object of effecting their
restoration by the help of Uguccione. Castruccio also brought into his plans
friends from Lucca who would not endure the authority of the Opizi.
Having fixed upon a plan to be followed, Castruccio cautiously fortified the
tower of the Onesti, filling it with supplies and munitions of war, in order
that it might stand a siege for a few days in case of need. When the night
came which had been agreed upon with Uguccione, who had occupied the
plain between the mountains and Pisa with many men, the signal was given,
and without being observed Uguccione approached the gate of San Piero
and set fire to the portcullis. Castruccio raised a great uproar within the city,

calling the people to arms and forcing open the gate from his side.
Uguccione entered with his men, poured through the town, and killed
Messer Giorgio with all his family and many of his friends and supporters.
The governor was driven out, and the government reformed according to
the wishes of Uguccione, to the detriment of the city, because it was found
that more than one hundred families were exiled at that time. Of those who
fled, part went to Florence and part to Pistoia, which city was the
headquarters of the Guelph party, and for this reason it became most hostile
to Uguccione and the Lucchese.
As it now appeared to the Florentines and others of the Guelph party that
the Ghibellines absorbed too much power in Tuscany, they determined to
restore the exiled Guelphs to Lucca. They assembled a large army in the Val
di Nievole, and seized Montecatini; from thence they marched to
Montecarlo, in order to secure the free passage into Lucca. Upon this
Uguccione assembled his Pisan and Lucchese forces, and with a number of
German cavalry which he drew out of Lombardy, he moved against the
quarters of the Florentines, who upon the appearance of the enemy
withdrew from Montecarlo, and posted themselves between Montecatini
and Pescia. Uguccione now took up a position near to Montecarlo, and
within about two miles of the enemy, and slight skirmishes between the
horse of both parties were of daily occurrence. Owing to the illness of
Uguccione, the Pisans and Lucchese delayed coming to battle with the
enemy. Uguccione, finding himself growing worse, went to Montecarlo to
be cured, and left the command of the army in the hands of Castruccio. This
change brought about the ruin of the Guelphs, who, thinking that the hostile
army having lost its captain had lost its head, grew over-confident.
Castruccio observed this, and allowed some days to pass in order to
encourage this belief; he also showed signs of fear, and did not allow any of
the munitions of the camp to be used. On the other side, the Guelphs grew
more insolent the more they saw these evidences of fear, and every day they
drew out in the order of battle in front of the army of Castruccio. Presently,
deeming that the enemy was sufficiently emboldened, and having mastered
their tactics, he decided to join battle with them. First he spoke a few words
of encouragement to his soldiers, and pointed out to them the certainty of
victory if they would but obey his commands. Castruccio had noticed how
the enemy had placed all his best troops in the centre of the line of battle,
and his less reliable men on the wings of the army; whereupon he did

exactly the opposite, putting his most valiant men on the flanks, while those
on whom he could not so strongly rely he moved to the centre. Observing
this order of battle, he drew out of his lines and quickly came in sight of the
hostile army, who, as usual, had come in their insolence to defy him. He
then commanded his centre squadrons to march slowly, whilst he moved
rapidly forward those on the wings. Thus, when they came into contact with
the enemy, only the wings of the two armies became engaged, whilst the
center battalions remained out of action, for these two portions of the line of
battle were separated from each other by a long interval and thus unable to
reach each other. By this expedient the more valiant part of Castruccio's
men were opposed to the weaker part of the enemy's troops, and the most
efficient men of the enemy were disengaged; and thus the Florentines were
unable to fight with those who were arrayed opposite to them, or to give
any assistance to their own flanks. So, without much difficulty, Castruccio
put the enemy to flight on both flanks, and the centre battalions took to
flight when they found themselves exposed to attack, without having a
chance of displaying their valour. The defeat was complete, and the loss in
men very heavy, there being more than ten thousand men killed with many
officers and knights of the Guelph party in Tuscany, and also many princes
who had come to help them, among whom were Piero, the brother of King
Ruberto, and Carlo, his nephew, and Filippo, the lord of Taranto. On the
part of Castruccio the loss did not amount to more than three hundred men,
among whom was Francesco, the son of Uguccione, who, being young and
rash, was killed in the first onset.
This victory so greatly increased the reputation of Castruccio that
Uguccione conceived some jealousy and suspicion of him, because it
appeared to Uguccione that this victory had given him no increase of power,
but rather than diminished it. Being of this mind, he only waited for an
opportunity to give effect to it. This occurred on the death of Pier Agnolo
Micheli, a man of great repute and abilities in Lucca, the murderer of whom
fled to the house of Castruccio for refuge. On the sergeants of the captain
going to arrest the murderer, they were driven off by Castruccio, and the
murderer escaped. This affair coming to the knowledge of Uguccione, who
was then at Pisa, it appeared to him a proper opportunity to punish
Castruccio. He therefore sent for his son Neri, who was the governor of
Lucca, and commissioned him to take Castruccio prisoner at a banquet and
put him to death. Castruccio, fearing no evil, went to the governor in a

friendly way, was entertained at supper, and then thrown into prison. But
Neri, fearing to put him to death lest the people should be incensed, kept
him alive, in order to hear further from his father concerning his intentions.
Ugucionne cursed the hesitation and cowardice of his son, and at once set
out from Pisa to Lucca with four hundred horsemen to finish the business in
his own way; but he had not yet reached the baths when the Pisans rebelled
and put his deputy to death and created Count Gaddo della Gherardesca
their lord. Before Uguccione reached Lucca he heard of the occurrences at
Pisa, but it did not appear wise to him to turn back, lest the Lucchese with
the example of Pisa before them should close their gates against him. But
the Lucchese, having heard of what had happened at Pisa, availed
themselves of this opportunity to demand the liberation of Castruccio,
notwithstanding that Uguccione had arrived in their city. They first began to
speak of it in private circles, afterwards openly in the squares and streets;
then they raised a tumult, and with arms in their hands went to Uguccione
and demanded that Castruccio should be set at liberty. Uguccione, fearing
that worse might happen, released him from prison. Whereupon Castruccio
gathered his friends around him, and with the help of the people attacked
Uguccione; who, finding he had no resource but in flight, rode away with
his friends to Lombardy, to the lords of Scale, where he died in poverty.
But Castruccio from being a prisoner became almost a prince in Lucca,
and he carried himself so discreetly with his friends and the people that they
appointed him captain of their army for one year. Having obtained this, and
wishing to gain renown in war, he planned the recovery of the many towns
which had rebelled after the departure of Uguccione, and with the help of
the Pisans, with whom he had concluded a treaty, he marched to Serezzana.
To capture this place he constructed a fort against it, which is called to-day
Zerezzanello; in the course of two months Castruccio captured the town.
With the reputation gained at that siege, he rapidly seized Massa, Carrara,
and Lavenza, and in a short time had overrun the whole of Lunigiana. In
order to close the pass which leads from Lombardy to Lunigiana, he
besieged Pontremoli and wrested it from the hands of Messer Anastagio
Palavicini, who was the lord of it. After this victory he returned to Lucca,
and was welcomed by the whole people. And now Castruccio, deeming it
imprudent any longer to defer making himself a prince, got himself created
the lord of Lucca by the help of Pazzino del Poggio, Puccinello dal Portico,
Francesco Boccansacchi, and Cecco Guinigi, all of whom he had corrupted;

and he was afterwards solemnly and deliberately elected prince by the
people. At this time Frederick of Bavaria, the King of the Romans, came
into Italy to assume the Imperial crown, and Castruccio, in order that he
might make friends with him, met him at the head of five hundred
horsemen. Castruccio had left as his deputy in Lucca, Pagolo Guinigi, who
was held in high estimation, because of the people's love for the memory of
his father. Castruccio was received in great honour by Frederick, and many
privileges were conferred upon him, and he was appointed the emperor's
lieutenant in Tuscany. At this time the Pisans were in great fear of Gaddo
della Gherardesca, whom they had driven out of Pisa, and they had recourse
for assistance to Frederick. Frederick created Castruccio the lord of Pisa,
and the Pisans, in dread of the Guelph party, and particularly of the
Florentines, were constrained to accept him as their lord.
Frederick, having appointed a governor in Rome to watch his Italian
affairs, returned to Germany. All the Tuscan and Lombardian Ghibellines,
who followed the imperial lead, had recourse to Castruccio for help and
counsel, and all promised him the governorship of his country, if enabled to
recover it with his assistance. Among these exiles were Matteo Guidi,
Nardo Scolari, Lapo Uberti, Gerozzo Nardi, and Piero Buonaccorsi, all
exiled Florentines and Ghibellines. Castruccio had the secret intention of
becoming the master of all Tuscany by the aid of these men and of his own
forces; and in order to gain greater weight in affairs, he entered into a
league with Messer Matteo Visconti, the Prince of Milan, and organized for
him the forces of his city and the country districts. As Lucca had five gates,
he divided his own country districts into five parts, which he supplied with
arms, and enrolled the men under captains and ensigns, so that he could
quickly bring into the field twenty thousand soldiers, without those whom
he could summon to his assistance from Pisa. While he surrounded himself
with these forces and allies, it happened at Messer Matteo Visconti was
attacked by the Guelphs of Piacenza, who had driven out the Ghibellines
with the assistance of a Florentine army and the King Ruberto. Messer
Matteo called upon Castruccio to invade the Florentines in their own
territories, so that, being attacked at home, they should be compelled to
draw their army out of Lombardy in order to defend themselves. Castruccio
invaded the Valdarno, and seized Fucecchio and San Miniato, inflicting
immense damage upon the country. Whereupon the Florentines recalled

their army, which had scarcely reached Tuscany, when Castruccio was
forced by other necessities to return to Lucca.
There resided in the city of Lucca the Poggio family, who were so
powerful that they could not only elevate Castruccio, but even advance him
to the dignity of prince; and it appearing to them they had not received such
rewards for their services as they deserved, they incited other families to
rebel and to drive Castruccio out of Lucca. They found their opportunity
one morning, and arming themselves, they set upon the lieutenant whom
Castruccio had left to maintain order and killed him. They endeavoured to
raise the people in revolt, but Stefano di Poggio, a peaceable old man who
had taken no hand in the rebellion, intervened and compelled them by his
authority to lay down their arms; and he offered to be their mediator with
Castruccio to obtain from him what they desired. Therefore they laid down
their arms with no greater intelligence than they had taken them up.
Castruccio, having heard the news of what had happened at Lucca, at once
put Pagolo Guinigi in command of the army, and with a troop of cavalry set
out for home. Contrary to his expectations, he found the rebellion at an end,
yet he posted his men in the most advantageous places throughout the city.
As it appeared to Stefano that Castruccio ought to be very much obliged to
him, he sought him out, and without saying anything on his own behalf, for
he did not recognize any need for doing so, he begged Castruccio to pardon
the other members of his family by reason of their youth, their former
friendships, and the obligations which Castruccio was under to their house.
To this Castruccio graciously responded, and begged Stefano to reassure
himself, declaring that it gave him more pleasure to find the tumult at an
end than it had ever caused him anxiety to hear of its inception. He
encouraged Stefano to bring his family to him, saying that he thanked God
for having given him the opportunity of showing his clemency and
liberality. Upon the word of Stefano and Castruccio they surrendered, and
with Stefano were immediately thrown into prison and put to death.
Meanwhile the Florentines had recovered San Miniato, whereupon it
seemed advisable to Castruccio to make peace, as it did not appear to him
that he was sufficiently secure at Lucca to leave him. He approached the
Florentines with the proposal of a truce, which they readily entertained, for
they were weary of the war, and desirous of getting rid of the expenses of it.
A treaty was concluded with them for two years, by which both parties
agreed to keep the conquests they had made. Castruccio thus released from

this trouble, turned his attention to affairs in Lucca, and in order that he
should not again be subject to the perils from which he had just escaped, he,
under various pretences and reasons, first wiped out all those who by their
ambition might aspire to the principality; not sparing one of them, but
depriving them of country and property, and those whom he had in his
hands of life also, stating that he had found by experience that none of them
were to be trusted. Then for his further security he raised a fortress in Lucca
with the stones of the towers of those whom he had killed or hunted out of
the state.
Whilst Castruccio made peace with the Florentines, and strengthened his
position in Lucca, he neglected no opportunity, short of open war, of
increasing his importance elsewhere. It appeared to him that if he could get
possession of Pistoia, he would have one foot in Florence, which was his
great desire. He, therefore, in various ways made friends with the
mountaineers, and worked matters so in Pistoia that both parties confided
their secrets to him. Pistoia was divided, as it always had been, into the
Bianchi and Neri parties; the head of the Bianchi was Bastiano di Possente,
and of the Neri, Jacopo da Gia. Each of these men held secret
communications with Castruccio, and each desired to drive the other out of
the city; and, after many threatenings, they came to blows. Jacopo fortified
himself at the Florentine gate, Bastiano at that of the Lucchese side of the
city; both trusted more in Castruccio than in the Florentines, because they
believed that Castruccio was far more ready and willing to fight than the
Florentines, and they both sent to him for assistance. He gave promises to
both, saying to Bastiano that he would come in person, and to Jacopo that
he would send his pupil, Pagolo Guinigi. At the appointed time he sent
forward Pagolo by way of Pisa, and went himself direct to Pistoia; at
midnight both of them met outside the city, and both were admitted as
friends. Thus the two leaders entered, and at a signal given by Castruccio,
one killed Jacopo da Gia, and the other Bastiano di Possente, and both took
prisoners or killed the partisans of either faction. Without further opposition
Pistoia passed into the hands of Castruccio, who, having forced the Signoria
to leave the palace, compelled the people to yield obedience to him, making
them many promises and remitting their old debts. The countryside flocked
to the city to see the new prince, and all were filled with hope and quickly
settled down, influenced in a great measure by his great valour.

About this time great disturbances arose in Rome, owing to the dearness
of living which was caused by the absence of the pontiff at Avignon. The
German governor, Enrico, was much blamed for what happened—murders
and tumults following each other daily, without his being able to put an end
to them. This caused Enrico much anxiety lest the Romans should call in
Ruberto, the King of Naples, who would drive the Germans out of the city,
and bring back the Pope. Having no nearer friend to whom he could apply
for help than Castruccio, he sent to him, begging him not only to give him
assistance, but also to come in person to Rome. Castruccio considered that
he ought not to hesitate to render the emperor this service, because he
believed that he himself would not be safe if at any time the emperor ceased
to hold Rome. Leaving Pagolo Guinigi in command at Lucca, Castruccio
set out for Rome with six hundred horsemen, where he was received by
Enrico with the greatest distinction. In a short time the presence of
Castruccio obtained such respect for the emperor that, without bloodshed or
violence, good order was restored, chiefly by reason of Castruccio having
sent by sea from the country round Pisa large quantities of corn, and thus
removed the source of the trouble. When he had chastised some of the
Roman leaders, and admonished others, voluntary obedience was rendered
to Enrico. Castruccio received many honours, and was made a Roman
senator. This dignity was assumed with the greatest pomp, Castruccio being
clothed in a brocaded toga, which had the following words embroidered on
its front: "I am what God wills." Whilst on the back was: "What God
desires shall be."
During this time the Florentines, who were much enraged that Castruccio
should have seized Pistoia during the truce, considered how they could
tempt the city to rebel, to do which they thought would not be difficult in
his absence. Among the exiled Pistoians in Florence were Baldo Cecchi and
Jacopo Baldini, both men of leading and ready to face danger. These men
kept up communications with their friends in Pistoia, and with the aid of the
Florentines entered the city by night, and after driving out some of
Castruccio's officials and partisans, and killing others, they restored the city
to its freedom. The news of this greatly angered Castruccio, and taking
leave of Enrico, he pressed on in great haste to Pistoia. When the
Florentines heard of his return, knowing that he would lose no time, they
decided to intercept him with their forces in the Val di Nievole, under the
belief that by doing so they would cut off his road to Pistoia. Assembling a

great army of the supporters of the Guelph cause, the Florentines entered
the Pistoian territories. On the other hand, Castruccio reached Montecarlo
with his army; and having heard where the Florentines' lay, he decided not
to encounter it in the plains of Pistoia, nor to await it in the plains of Pescia,
but, as far as he possibly could, to attack it boldly in the Pass of Serravalle.
He believed that if he succeeded in this design, victory was assured,
although he was informed that the Florentines had thirty thousand men,
whilst he had only twelve thousand. Although he had every confidence in
his own abilities and the valour of his troops, yet he hesitated to attack his
enemy in the open lest he should be overwhelmed by numbers. Serravalle is
a castle between Pescia and Pistoia, situated on a hill which blocks the Val
di Nievole, not in the exact pass, but about a bowshot beyond; the pass
itself is in places narrow and steep, whilst in general it ascends gently, but is
still narrow, especially at the summit where the waters divide, so that
twenty men side by side could hold it. The lord of Serravalle was Manfred,
a German, who, before Castruccio became lord of Pistoia, had been allowed
to remain in possession of the castle, it being common to the Lucchese and
the Pistoians, and unclaimed by either—neither of them wishing to displace
Manfred as long as he kept his promise of neutrality, and came under
obligations to no one. For these reasons, and also because the castle was
well fortified, he had always been able to maintain his position. It was here
that Castruccio had determined to fall upon his enemy, for here his few men
would have the advantage, and there was no fear lest, seeing the large
masses of the hostile force before they became engaged, they should not
stand. As soon as this trouble with Florence arose, Castruccio saw the
immense advantage which possession of this castle would give him, and
having an intimate friendship with a resident in the castle, he managed
matters so with him that four hundred of his men were to be admitted into
the castle the night before the attack on the Florentines, and the castellan
put to death.
Castruccio, having prepared everything, had now to encourage the
Florentines to persist in their desire to carry the seat of war away from
Pistoia into the Val di Nievole, therefore he did not move his army from
Montecarlo. Thus the Florentines hurried on until they reached their
encampment under Serravalle, intending to cross the hill on the following
morning. In the meantime, Castruccio had seized the castle at night, had
also moved his army from Montecarlo, and marching from thence at

midnight in dead silence, had reached the foot of Serravalle: thus he and the
Florentines commenced the ascent of the hill at the same time in the
morning. Castruccio sent forward his infantry by the main road, and a troop
of four hundred horsemen by a path on the left towards the castle. The
Florentines sent forward four hundred cavalry ahead of their army which
was following, never expecting to find Castruccio in possession of the hill,
nor were they aware of his having seized the castle. Thus it happened that
the Florentine horsemen mounting the hill were completely taken by
surprise when they discovered the infantry of Castruccio, and so close were
they upon it they had scarcely time to pull down their visors. It was a case
of unready soldiers being attacked by ready, and they were assailed with
such vigour that with difficulty they could hold their own, although some
few of them got through. When the noise of the fighting reached the
Florentine camp below, it was filled with confusion. The cavalry and
infantry became inextricably mixed: the captains were unable to get their
men either backward or forward, owing to the narrowness of the pass, and
amid all this tumult no one knew what ought to be done or what could be
done. In a short time the cavalry who were engaged with the enemy's
infantry were scattered or killed without having made any effective defence
because of their unfortunate position, although in sheer desperation they
had offered a stout resistance. Retreat had been impossible, with the
mountains on both flanks, whilst in front were their enemies, and in the rear
their friends. When Castruccio saw that his men were unable to strike a
decisive blow at the enemy and put them to flight, he sent one thousand
infantrymen round by the castle, with orders to join the four hundred
horsemen he had previously dispatched there, and commanded the whole
force to fall upon the flank of the enemy. These orders they carried out with
such fury that the Florentines could not sustain the attack, but gave way,
and were soon in full retreat—conquered more by their unfortunate position
than by the valour of their enemy. Those in the rear turned towards Pistoia,
and spread through the plains, each man seeking only his own safety. The
defeat was complete and very sanguinary. Many captains were taken
prisoners, among whom were Bandini dei Rossi, Francesco Brunelleschi,
and Giovanni della Tosa, all Florentine noblemen, with many Tuscans and
Neapolitans who fought on the Florentine side, having been sent by King
Ruberto to assist the Guelphs. Immediately the Pistoians heard of this
defeat they drove out the friends of the Guelphs, and surrendered to

Castruccio. He was not content with occupying Prato and all the castles on
the plains on both sides of the Arno, but marched his army into the plain of
Peretola, about two miles from Florence. Here he remained many days,
dividing the spoils, and celebrating his victory with feasts and games,
holding horse races, and foot races for men and women. He also struck
medals in commemoration of the defeat of the Florentines. He endeavoured
to corrupt some of the citizens of Florence, who were to open the city gates
at night; but the conspiracy was discovered, and the participators in it taken
and beheaded, among whom were Tommaso Lupacci and Lambertuccio
Frescobaldi. This defeat caused the Florentines great anxiety, and
despairing of preserving their liberty, they sent envoys to King Ruberto of
Naples, offering him the dominion of their city; and he, knowing of what
immense importance the maintenance of the Guelph cause was to him,
accepted it. He agreed with the Florentines to receive from them a yearly
tribute of two hundred thousand florins, and he sent his son Carlo to
Florence with four thousand horsemen.
Shortly after this the Florentines were relieved in some degree of the
pressure of Castruccio's army, owing to his being compelled to leave his
positions before Florence and march on Pisa, in order to suppress a
conspiracy that had been raised against him by Benedetto Lanfranchi, one
of the first men in Pisa, who could not endure that his fatherland should be
under the dominion of the Lucchese. He had formed this conspiracy,
intending to seize the citadel, kill the partisans of Castruccio, and drive out
the garrison. As, however, in a conspiracy paucity of numbers is essential to
secrecy, so for its execution a few are not sufficient, and in seeking more
adherents to his conspiracy Lanfranchi encountered a person who revealed
the design to Castruccio. This betrayal cannot be passed by without severe
reproach to Bonifacio Cerchi and Giovanni Guidi, two Florentine exiles
who were suffering their banishment in Pisa. Thereupon Castruccio seized
Benedetto and put him to death, and beheaded many other noble citizens,
and drove their families into exile. It now appeared to Castruccio that both
Pisa and Pistoia were thoroughly disaffected; he employed much thought
and energy upon securing his position there, and this gave the Florentines
their opportunity to reorganize their army, and to await the coming of Carlo,
the son of the King of Naples. When Carlo arrived they decided to lose no
more time, and assembled a great army of more than thirty thousand
infantry and ten thousand cavalry—having called to their aid every Guelph

there was in Italy. They consulted whether they should attack Pistoia or Pisa
first, and decided that it would be better to march on the latter—a course,
owing to the recent conspiracy, more likely to succeed, and of more
advantage to them, because they believed that the surrender of Pistoia
would follow the acquisition of Pisa.
In the early part of May 1328, the Florentines put in motion this army
and quickly occupied Lastra, Signa, Montelupo, and Empoli, passing from
thence on to San Miniato. When Castruccio heard of the enormous army
which the Florentines were sending against him, he was in no degree
alarmed, believing that the time had now arrived when Fortune would
deliver the empire of Tuscany into his hands, for he had no reason to think
that his enemy would make a better fight, or had better prospects of success,
than at Pisa or Serravalle. He assembled twenty thousand foot soldiers and
four thousand horsemen, and with this army went to Fucecchio, whilst he
sent Pagolo Guinigi to Pisa with five thousand infantry. Fucecchio has a
stronger position than any other town in the Pisan district, owing to its
situation between the rivers Arno and Gusciana and its slight elevation
above the surrounding plain. Moreover, the enemy could not hinder its
being victualled unless they divided their forces, nor could they approach it
either from the direction of Lucca or Pisa, nor could they get through to
Pisa, or attack Castruccio's forces except at a disadvantage. In one case they
would find themselves placed between his two armies, the one under his
own command and the other under Pagolo, and in the other case they would
have to cross the Arno to get to close quarters with the enemy, an
undertaking of great hazard. In order to tempt the Florentines to take this
latter course, Castruccio withdrew his men from the banks of the river and
placed them under the walls of Fucecchio, leaving a wide expanse of land
between them and the river.
The Florentines, having occupied San Miniato, held a council of war to
decide whether they should attack Pisa or the army of Castruccio, and,
having weighed the difficulties of both courses, they decided upon the
latter. The river Arno was at that time low enough to be fordable, yet the
water reached to the shoulders of the infantrymen and to the saddles of the
horsemen. On the morning of 10 June 1328, the Florentines commenced the
battle by ordering forward a number of cavalry and ten thousand infantry.
Castruccio, whose plan of action was fixed, and who well knew what to do,
at once attacked the Florentines with five thousand infantry and three

thousand horsemen, not allowing them to issue from the river before he
charged them; he also sent one thousand light infantry up the river bank,
and the same number down the Arno. The infantry of the Florentines were
so much impeded by their arms and the water that they were not able to
mount the banks of the river, whilst the cavalry had made the passage of the
river more difficult for the others, by reason of the few who had crossed
having broken up the bed of the river, and this being deep with mud, many
of the horses rolled over with their riders and many of them had stuck so
fast that they could not move. When the Florentine captains saw the
difficulties their men were meeting, they withdrew them and moved higher
up the river, hoping to find the river bed less treacherous and the banks
more adapted for landing. These men were met at the bank by the forces
which Castruccio had already sent forward, who, being light armed with
bucklers and javelins in their hands, let fly with tremendous shouts into the
faces and bodies of the cavalry. The horses, alarmed by the noise and the
wounds, would not move forward, and trampled each other in great
confusion. The fight between the men of Castruccio and those of the enemy
who succeeded in crossing was sharp and terrible; both sides fought with
the utmost desperation and neither would yield. The soldiers of Castruccio
fought to drive the others back into the river, whilst the Florentines strove to
get a footing on land in order to make room for the others pressing forward,
who if they could but get out of the water would be able to fight, and in this
obstinate conflict they were urged on by their captains. Castruccio shouted
to his men that these were the same enemies whom they had before
conquered at Serravalle, whilst the Florentines reproached each other that
the many should be overcome by the few. At length Castruccio, seeing how
long the battle had lasted, and that both his men and the enemy were utterly
exhausted, and that both sides had many killed and wounded, pushed
forward another body of infantry to take up a position at the rear of those
who were fighting; he then commanded these latter to open their ranks as if
they intended to retreat, and one part of them to turn to the right and another
to the left. This cleared a space of which the Florentines at once took
advantage, and thus gained possession of a portion of the battlefield. But
when these tired soldiers found themselves at close quarters with
Castruccio's reserves they could not stand against them and at once fell
back into the river. The cavalry of either side had not as yet gained any
decisive advantage over the other, because Castruccio, knowing his

inferiority in this arm, had commanded his leaders only to stand on the
defensive against the attacks of their adversaries, as he hoped that when he
had overcome the infantry he would be able to make short work of the
cavalry. This fell out as he had hoped, for when he saw the Florentine army
driven back across the river he ordered the remainder of his infantry to
attack the cavalry of the enemy. This they did with lance and javelin, and,
joined by their own cavalry, fell upon the enemy with the greatest fury and
soon put him to flight. The Florentine captains, having seen the difficulty
their cavalry had met with in crossing the river, had attempted to make their
infantry cross lower down the river, in order to attack the flanks of
Castruccio's army. But here, also, the banks were steep and already lined by
the men of Castruccio, and this movement was quite useless. Thus the
Florentines were so completely defeated at all points that scarcely a third of
them escaped, and Castruccio was again covered with glory. Many captains
were taken prisoners, and Carlo, the son of King Ruberto, with
Michelagnolo Falconi and Taddeo degli Albizzi, the Florentine
commissioners, fled to Empoli. If the spoils were great, the slaughter was
infinitely greater, as might be expected in such a battle. Of the Florentines
there fell twenty thousand two hundred and thirty-one men, whilst
Castruccio lost one thousand five hundred and seventy men.

But Fortune growing envious of the glory of Castruccio took away his
life just at the time when she should have preserved it, and thus ruined all
those plans which for so long a time he had worked to carry into effect, and
in the successful prosecution of which nothing but death could have stopped
him. Castruccio was in the thick of the battle the whole of the day; and
when the end of it came, although fatigued and overheated, he stood at the
gate of Fucecchio to welcome his men on their return from victory and
personally thank them. He was also on the watch for any attempt of the
enemy to retrieve the fortunes of the day; he being of the opinion that it was
the duty of a good general to be the first man in the saddle and the last out
of it. Here Castruccio stood exposed to a wind which often rises at midday
on the banks of the Arno, and which is often very unhealthy; from this he
took a chill, of which he thought nothing, as he was accustomed to such
troubles; but it was the cause of his death. On the following night he was
attacked with high fever, which increased so rapidly that the doctors saw it
must prove fatal. Castruccio, therefore, called Pagolo Guinigi to him, and
addressed him as follows:
"If I could have believed that Fortune would have cut me off in the midst
of the career which was leading to that glory which all my successes
promised, I should have laboured less, and I should have left thee, if a
smaller state, at least with fewer enemies and perils, because I should have
been content with the governorships of Lucca and Pisa. I should neither
have subjugated the Pistoians, nor outraged the Florentines with so many
injuries. But I would have made both these peoples my friends, and I should
have lived, if no longer, at least more peacefully, and have left you a state
without a doubt smaller, but one more secure and established on a surer
foundation. But Fortune, who insists upon having the arbitrament of human
affairs, did not endow me with sufficient judgment to recognize this from
the first, nor the time to surmount it. Thou hast heard, for many have told
thee, and I have never concealed it, how I entered the house of thy father
whilst yet a boy—a stranger to all those ambitions which every generous
soul should feel—and how I was brought up by him, and loved as though I
had been born of his blood; how under his governance I learned to be
valiant and capable of availing myself of all that fortune, of which thou hast
been witness. When thy good father came to die, he committed thee and all
his possessions to my care, and I have brought thee up with that love, and
increased thy estate with that care, which I was bound to show. And in

order that thou shouldst not only possess the estate which thy father left, but
also that which my fortune and abilities have gained, I have never married,
so that the love of children should never deflect my mind from that
gratitude which I owed to the children of thy father. Thus I leave thee a vast
estate, of which I am well content, but I am deeply concerned, inasmuch as
I leave it thee unsettled and insecure. Thou hast the city of Lucca on thy
hands, which will never rest contented under thy government. Thou hast
also Pisa, where the men are of nature changeable and unreliable, who,
although they may be sometimes held in subjection, yet they will ever
disdain to serve under a Lucchese. Pistoia is also disloyal to thee, she being
eaten up with factions and deeply incensed against thy family by reason of
the wrongs recently inflicted upon them. Thou hast for neighbours the
offended Florentines, injured by us in a thousand ways, but not utterly
destroyed, who will hail the news of my death with more delight than they
would the acquisition of all Tuscany. In the Emperor and in the princes of
Milan thou canst place no reliance, for they are far distant, slow, and their
help is very long in coming. Therefore, thou hast no hope in anything but in
thine own abilities, and in the memory of my valour, and in the prestige
which this latest victory has brought thee; which, as thou knowest how to
use it with prudence, will assist thee to come to terms with the Florentines,
who, as they are suffering under this great defeat, should be inclined to
listen to thee. And whereas I have sought to make them my enemies,
because I believed that war with them would conduce to my power and
glory, thou hast every inducement to make friends of them, because their
alliance will bring thee advantages and security. It is of the greatest
important in this world that a man should know himself, and the measure of
his own strength and means; and he who knows that he has not a genius for
fighting must learn how to govern by the arts of peace. And it will be well
for thee to rule thy conduct by my counsel, and to learn in this way to enjoy
what my life-work and dangers have gained; and in this thou wilt easily
succeed when thou hast learnt to believe that what I have told thee is true.
And thou wilt be doubly indebted to me, in that I have left thee this realm
and have taught thee how to keep it."
After this there came to Castruccio those citizens of Pisa, Pistoia, and
Lucca, who had been fighting at his side, and whilst recommending Pagolo
to them, and making them swear obedience to him as his successor, he died.
He left a happy memory to those who had known him, and no prince of

those times was ever loved with such devotion as he was. His obsequies
were celebrated with every sign of mourning, and he was buried in San
Francesco at Lucca. Fortune was not so friendly to Pagolo Guinigi as she
had been to Castruccio, for he had not the abilities. Not long after the death
of Castruccio, Pagolo lost Pisa, and then Pistoia, and only with difficulty
held on to Lucca. This latter city continued in the family of Guinigi until the
time of the great-grandson of Pagolo.
From what has been related here it will be seen that Castruccio was a
man of exceptional abilities, not only measured by men of his own time, but
also by those of an earlier date. In stature he was above the ordinary height,
and perfectly proportioned. He was of a gracious presence, and he
welcomed men with such urbanity that those who spoke with him rarely left
him displeased. His hair was inclined to be red, and he wore it cut short
above the ears, and, whether it rained or snowed, he always went without a
hat. He was delightful among friends, but terrible to his enemies; just to his
subjects; ready to play false with the unfaithful, and willing to overcome by
fraud those whom he desired to subdue, because he was wont to say that it
was the victory that brought the glory, not the methods of achieving it. No
one was bolder in facing danger, none more prudent in extricating himself.
He was accustomed to say that men ought to attempt everything and fear
nothing; that God is a lover of strong men, because one always sees that the
weak are chastised by the strong. He was also wonderfully sharp or biting
though courteous in his answers; and as he did not look for any indulgence
in this way of speaking from others, so he was not angered with others did
not show it to him. It has often happened that he has listened quietly when
others have spoken sharply to him, as on the following occasions. He had
caused a ducat to be given for a partridge, and was taken to task for doing
so by a friend, to whom Castruccio had said: "You would not have given
more than a penny." "That is true," answered the friend. Then said
Castruccio to him: "A ducat is much less to me." Having about him a
flatterer on whom he had spat to show that he scorned him, the flatterer said
to him: "Fisherman are willing to let the waters of the sea saturate them in
order that they may take a few little fishes, and I allow myself to be wetted
by spittle that I may catch a whale"; and this was not only heard by
Castruccio with patience but rewarded. When told by a priest that it was
wicked for him to live so sumptuously, Castruccio said: "If that be a vice
then you should not fare so splendidly at the feasts of our saints." Passing

through a street he saw a young man as he came out of a house of ill fame
blush at being seen by Castruccio, and said to him: "Thou shouldst not be
ashamed when thou comest out, but when thou goest into such places." A
friend gave him a very curiously tied knot to undo and was told: "Fool, do
you think that I wish to untie a thing which gave so much trouble to fasten."
Castruccio said to one who professed to be a philosopher: "You are like the
dogs who always run after those who will give them the best to eat," and
was answered: "We are rather like the doctors who go to the houses of those
who have the greatest need of them." Going by water from Pisa to Leghorn,
Castruccio was much disturbed by a dangerous storm that sprang up, and
was reproached for cowardice by one of those with him, who said that he
did not fear anything. Castruccio answered that he did not wonder at that,
since every man valued his soul for what is was worth. Being asked by one
what he ought to do to gain estimation, he said: "When thou goest to a
banquet take care that thou dost not seat one piece of wood upon another."
To a person who was boasting that he had read many things, Castruccio
said: "He knows better than to boast of remembering many things."
Someone bragged that he could drink much without becoming intoxicated.
Castruccio replied: "An ox does the same." Castruccio was acquainted with
a girl with whom he had intimate relations, and being blamed by a friend
who told him that it was undignified for him to be taken in by a woman, he
said: "She has not taken me in, I have taken her." Being also blamed for
eating very dainty foods, he answered: "Thou dost not spend as much as I
do?" and being told that it was true, he continued: "Then thou art more
avaricious than I am gluttonous." Being invited by Taddeo Bernardi, a very
rich and splendid citizen of Luca, to supper, he went to the house and was
shown by Taddeo into a chamber hung with silk and paved with fine stones
representing flowers and foliage of the most beautiful colouring. Castruccio
gathered some saliva in his mouth and spat it out upon Taddeo, and seeing
him much disturbed by this, said to him: "I knew not where to spit in order
to offend thee less." Being asked how Caesar died he said: "God willing I
will die as he did." Being one night in the house of one of his gentlemen
where many ladies were assembled, he was reproved by one of his friends
for dancing and amusing himself with them more than was usual in one of
his station, so he said: "He who is considered wise by day will not be
considered a fool at night." A person came to demand a favour of
Castruccio, and thinking he was not listening to his plea threw himself on

his knees to the ground, and being sharply reproved by Castruccio, said:
"Thou art the reason of my acting thus for thou hast thy ears in thy feet,"
whereupon he obtained double the favour he had asked. Castruccio used to
say that the way to hell was an easy one, seeing that it was in a downward
direction and you travelled blindfolded. Being asked a favour by one who
used many superfluous words, he said to him: "When you have another
request to make, send someone else to make it." Having been wearied by a
similar man with a long oration who wound up by saying: "Perhaps I have
fatigued you by speaking so long," Castruccio said: "You have not, because
I have not listened to a word you said." He used to say of one who had been
a beautiful child and who afterwards became a fine man, that he was
dangerous, because he first took the husbands from the wives and now he
took the wives from their husbands. To an envious man who laughed, he
said: "Do you laugh because you are successful or because another is
unfortunate?" Whilst he was still in the charge of Messer Francesco
Guinigi, one of his companions said to him: "What shall I give you if you
will let me give you a blow on the nose?" Castruccio answered: "A helmet."
Having put to death a citizen of Lucca who had been instrumental in raising
him to power, and being told that he had done wrong to kill one of his old
friends, he answered that people deceived themselves; he had only killed a
new enemy. Castruccio praised greatly those men who intended to take a
wife and then did not do so, saying that they were like men who said they
would go to sea, and then refused when the time came. He said that it
always struck him with surprise that whilst men in buying an earthen or
glass vase would sound it first to learn if it were good, yet in choosing a
wife they were content with only looking at her. He was once asked in what
manner he would wish to be buried when he died, and answered: "With the
face turned downwards, for I know when I am gone this country will be
turned upside down." On being asked if it had ever occurred to him to
become a friar in order to save his soul, he answered that it had not, because
it appeared strange to him that Fra Lazerone should go to Paradise and
Uguccione della Faggiuola to the Inferno. He was once asked when should
a man eat to preserve his health, and replied: "If the man be rich let him eat
when he is hungry; if he be poor, then when he can." Seeing one of his
gentlemen make a member of his family lace him up, he said to him: "I pray
God that you will let him feed you also." Seeing that someone had written
upon his house in Latin the words: "May God preserve this house from the

wicked," he said, "The owner must never go in." Passing through one of the
streets he saw a small house with a very large door, and remarked: "That
house will fly through the door." He was having a discussion with the
ambassador of the King of Naples concerning the property of some
banished nobles, when a dispute arose between them, and the ambassador
asked him if he had no fear of the king. "Is this king of yours a bad man or a
good one?" asked Castruccio, and was told that he was a good one,
whereupon he said, "Why should you suggest that I should be afraid of a
good man?"
I could recount many other stories of his sayings both witty and weighty,
but I think that the above will be sufficient testimony to his high qualities.
He lived forty-four years, and was in every way a prince. And as he was
surrounded by many evidences of his good fortune, so he also desired to
have near him some memorials of his bad fortune; therefore the manacles
with which he was chained in prison are to be seen to this day fixed up in
the tower of his residence, where they were placed by him to testify forever
to his days of adversity. As in his life he was inferior neither to Philip of
Macedon, the father of Alexander, nor to Scipio of Rome, so he died in the
same year of his age as they did, and he would doubtless have excelled both
of them had Fortune decreed that he should be born, not in Lucca, but in
Macedonia or Rome.
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MANIFESTO OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY
[From the English edition of 1888, edited by Friedrich Engels]
A spectre is haunting Europe—the spectre of Communism.
All the Powers of old Europe have entered into a holy alliance to
exorcise this spectre: Pope and Czar, Metternich and Guizot,
French Radicals and German police-spies.
Where is the party in opposition that has not been decried as Communistic
by its opponents in power? Where is the Opposition that has not hurled
back the branding reproach of Communism, against the more advanced
opposition parties, as well as against its reactionary adversaries?
Two things result from this fact.
I. Communism is already acknowledged by all European Powers to be itself
a Power.
II. It is high time that Communists should openly, in the face of the whole
world, publish their views, their aims, their tendencies, and meet this
nursery tale of the Spectre of Communism with a Manifesto of the party
itself.
To this end, Communists of various nationalities have assembled in
London, and sketched the following Manifesto, to be published in the
English, French, German, Italian, Flemish and Danish languages.

I. BOURGEOIS AND PROLETARIANS
The history of all hitherto existing societies is the history of class struggles.

Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and
journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant
opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now
open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending
classes.
In the earlier epochs of history, we find almost everywhere a complicated
arrangement of society into various orders, a manifold gradation of social
rank. In ancient Rome we have patricians, knights, plebeians, slaves; in the
Middle Ages, feudal lords, vassals, guild-masters, journeymen, apprentices,
serfs; in almost all of these classes, again, subordinate gradations.
The modern bourgeois society that has sprouted from the ruins of feudal
society has not done away with class antagonisms. It has but established
new classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms of struggle in place
of the old ones. Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses,
however, this distinctive feature: it has simplified the class antagonisms.
Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile
camps, into two great classes, directly facing each other: Bourgeoisie and
Proletariat.
From the serfs of the Middle Ages sprang the chartered burghers of the
earliest towns. From these burgesses the first elements of the bourgeoisie
were developed.
The discovery of America, the rounding of the Cape, opened up fresh
ground for the rising bourgeoisie. The East-Indian and Chinese markets, the
colonisation of America, trade with the colonies, the increase in the means
of exchange and in commodities generally, gave to commerce, to
navigation, to industry, an impulse never before known, and thereby, to the
revolutionary element in the tottering feudal society, a rapid development.
The feudal system of industry, under which industrial production was
monopolised by closed guilds, now no longer sufficed for the growing
wants of the new markets. The manufacturing system took its place. The
guild-masters were pushed on one side by the manufacturing middle class;

division of labour between the different corporate guilds vanished in the
face of division of labour in each single workshop.
Meantime the markets kept ever growing, the demand ever rising. Even
manufacture no longer sufficed. Thereupon, steam and machinery
revolutionised industrial production. The place of manufacture was taken
by the giant, Modern Industry, the place of the industrial middle class, by
industrial millionaires, the leaders of whole industrial armies, the modern
bourgeois.
Modern industry has established the world-market, for which the discovery
of America paved the way. This market has given an immense development
to commerce, to navigation, to communication by land. This development
has, in its time, reacted on the extension of industry; and in proportion as
industry, commerce, navigation, railways extended, in the same proportion
the bourgeoisie developed, increased its capital, and pushed into the
background every class handed down from the Middle Ages.
We see, therefore, how the modern bourgeoisie is itself the product of a
long course of development, of a series of revolutions in the modes of
production and of exchange.
Each step in the development of the bourgeoisie was accompanied by a
corresponding political advance of that class. An oppressed class under the
sway of the feudal nobility, an armed and self-governing association in the
mediaeval commune; here independent urban republic (as in Italy and
Germany), there taxable "third estate" of the monarchy (as in France),
afterwards, in the period of manufacture proper, serving either the semifeudal or the absolute monarchy as a counterpoise against the nobility, and,
in fact, corner-stone of the great monarchies in general, the bourgeoisie has
at last, since the establishment of Modern Industry and of the world-market,
conquered for itself, in the modern representative State, exclusive political
sway. The executive of the modern State is but a committee for managing
the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie.
The bourgeoisie, historically, has played a most revolutionary part.

The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all
feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley
feudal ties that bound man to his "natural superiors," and has left remaining
no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous
"cash payment." It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious
fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy
water of egotistical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into
exchange value, and in place of the numberless and indefeasible chartered
freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom—Free Trade. In
one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, naked,
shameless, direct, brutal exploitation.
The bourgeoisie has stripped of its halo every occupation hitherto honoured
and looked up to with reverent awe. It has converted the physician, the
lawyer, the priest, the poet, the man of science, into its paid wage labourers.
The bourgeoisie has torn away from the family its sentimental veil, and has
reduced the family relation to a mere money relation.
The bourgeoisie has disclosed how it came to pass that the brutal display of
vigour in the Middle Ages, which Reactionists so much admire, found its
fitting complement in the most slothful indolence. It has been the first to
show what man's activity can bring about. It has accomplished wonders far
surpassing Egyptian pyramids, Roman aqueducts, and Gothic cathedrals; it
has conducted expeditions that put in the shade all former Exoduses of
nations and crusades.
The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the
instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with
them the whole relations of society. Conservation of the old modes of
production in unaltered form, was, on the contrary, the first condition of
existence for all earlier industrial classes. Constant revolutionising of
production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting
uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier
ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and
venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones
become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all

that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober
senses, his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind.
The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the
bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere,
settle everywhere, establish connexions everywhere.
The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world-market given a
cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country. To
the great chagrin of Reactionists, it has drawn from under the feet of
industry the national ground on which it stood. All old-established national
industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. They are
dislodged by new industries, whose introduction becomes a life and death
question for all civilised nations, by industries that no longer work up
indigenous raw material, but raw material drawn from the remotest zones;
industries whose products are consumed, not only at home, but in every
quarter of the globe. In place of the old wants, satisfied by the productions
of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the
products of distant lands and climes. In place of the old local and national
seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction,
universal inter-dependence of nations. And as in material, so also in
intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations
become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness
become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and
local literatures, there arises a world literature.
The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production,
by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the
most barbarian, nations into civilisation. The cheap prices of its
commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese
walls, with which it forces the barbarians' intensely obstinate hatred of
foreigners to capitulate. It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to
adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what
it calls civilisation into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. In
one word, it creates a world after its own image.
The bourgeoisie has subjected the country to the rule of the towns. It has
created enormous cities, has greatly increased the urban population as

compared with the rural, and has thus rescued a considerable part of the
population from the idiocy of rural life. Just as it has made the country
dependent on the towns, so it has made barbarian and semi-barbarian
countries dependent on the civilised ones, nations of peasants on nations of
bourgeois, the East on the West.
The bourgeoisie keeps more and more doing away with the scattered state
of the population, of the means of production, and of property. It has
agglomerated production, and has concentrated property in a few hands.
The necessary consequence of this was political centralisation. Independent,
or but loosely connected provinces, with separate interests, laws,
governments and systems of taxation, became lumped together into one
nation, with one government, one code of laws, one national class-interest,
one frontier and one customs-tariff. The bourgeoisie, during its rule of
scarce one hundred years, has created more massive and more colossal
productive forces than have all preceding generations together. Subjection
of Nature's forces to man, machinery, application of chemistry to industry
and agriculture, steam-navigation, railways, electric telegraphs, clearing of
whole continents for cultivation, canalisation of rivers, whole populations
conjured out of the ground—what earlier century had even a presentiment
that such productive forces slumbered in the lap of social labour?
We see then: the means of production and of exchange, on whose
foundation the bourgeoisie built itself up, were generated in feudal society.
At a certain stage in the development of these means of production and of
exchange, the conditions under which feudal society produced and
exchanged, the feudal organisation of agriculture and manufacturing
industry, in one word, the feudal relations of property became no longer
compatible with the already developed productive forces; they became so
many fetters. They had to be burst asunder; they were burst asunder.
Into their place stepped free competition, accompanied by a social and
political constitution adapted to it, and by the economical and political sway
of the bourgeois class.
A similar movement is going on before our own eyes. Modern bourgeois
society with its relations of production, of exchange and of property, a
society that has conjured up such gigantic means of production and of

exchange, is like the sorcerer, who is no longer able to control the powers of
the nether world whom he has called up by his spells. For many a decade
past the history of industry and commerce is but the history of the revolt of
modern productive forces against modern conditions of production, against
the property relations that are the conditions for the existence of the
bourgeoisie and of its rule. It is enough to mention the commercial crises
that by their periodical return put on its trial, each time more threateningly,
the existence of the entire bourgeois society. In these crises a great part not
only of the existing products, but also of the previously created productive
forces, are periodically destroyed. In these crises there breaks out an
epidemic that, in all earlier epochs, would have seemed an absurdity—the
epidemic of over-production. Society suddenly finds itself put back into a
state of momentary barbarism; it appears as if a famine, a universal war of
devastation had cut off the supply of every means of subsistence; industry
and commerce seem to be destroyed; and why? Because there is too much
civilisation, too much means of subsistence, too much industry, too much
commerce. The productive forces at the disposal of society no longer tend
to further the development of the conditions of bourgeois property; on the
contrary, they have become too powerful for these conditions, by which
they are fettered, and so soon as they overcome these fetters, they bring
disorder into the whole of bourgeois society, endanger the existence of
bourgeois property. The conditions of bourgeois society are too narrow to
comprise the wealth created by them. And how does the bourgeoisie get
over these crises? On the one hand inforced destruction of a mass of
productive forces; on the other, by the conquest of new markets, and by the
more thorough exploitation of the old ones. That is to say, by paving the
way for more extensive and more destructive crises, and by diminishing the
means whereby crises are prevented.
The weapons with which the bourgeoisie felled feudalism to the ground are
now turned against the bourgeoisie itself.
But not only has the bourgeoisie forged the weapons that bring death to
itself; it has also called into existence the men who are to wield those
weapons—the modern working class—the proletarians.

In proportion as the bourgeoisie, i.e., capital, is developed, in the same
proportion is the proletariat, the modern working class, developed—a class
of labourers, who live only so long as they find work, and who find work
only so long as their labour increases capital. These labourers, who must
sell themselves piece-meal, are a commodity, like every other article of
commerce, and are consequently exposed to all the vicissitudes of
competition, to all the fluctuations of the market.
Owing to the extensive use of machinery and to division of labour, the work
of the proletarians has lost all individual character, and consequently, all
charm for the workman. He becomes an appendage of the machine, and it is
only the most simple, most monotonous, and most easily acquired knack,
that is required of him. Hence, the cost of production of a workman is
restricted, almost entirely, to the means of subsistence that he requires for
his maintenance, and for the propagation of his race. But the price of a
commodity, and therefore also of labour, is equal to its cost of production.
In proportion therefore, as the repulsiveness of the work increases, the wage
decreases. Nay more, in proportion as the use of machinery and division of
labour increases, in the same proportion the burden of toil also increases,
whether by prolongation of the working hours, by increase of the work
exacted in a given time or by increased speed of the machinery, etc.
Modern industry has converted the little workshop of the patriarchal master
into the great factory of the industrial capitalist. Masses of labourers,
crowded into the factory, are organised like soldiers. As privates of the
industrial army they are placed under the command of a perfect hierarchy of
officers and sergeants. Not only are they slaves of the bourgeois class, and
of the bourgeois State; they are daily and hourly enslaved by the machine,
by the over-looker, and, above all, by the individual bourgeois manufacturer
himself. The more openly this despotism proclaims gain to be its end and
aim, the more petty, the more hateful and the more embittering it is.
The less the skill and exertion of strength implied in manual labour, in other
words, the more modern industry becomes developed, the more is the
labour of men superseded by that of women. Differences of age and sex
have no longer any distinctive social validity for the working class. All are

instruments of labour, more or less expensive to use, according to their age
and sex.
No sooner is the exploitation of the labourer by the manufacturer, so far at
an end, that he receives his wages in cash, than he is set upon by the other
portions of the bourgeoisie, the landlord, the shopkeeper, the pawnbroker,
etc.
The lower strata of the middle class—the small tradespeople, shopkeepers,
retired tradesmen generally, the handicraftsmen and peasants—all these
sink gradually into the proletariat, partly because their diminutive capital
does not suffice for the scale on which Modern Industry is carried on, and is
swamped in the competition with the large capitalists, partly because their
specialized skill is rendered worthless by the new methods of production.
Thus the proletariat is recruited from all classes of the population.
The proletariat goes through various stages of development. With its birth
begins its struggle with the bourgeoisie. At first the contest is carried on by
individual labourers, then by the workpeople of a factory, then by the
operatives of one trade, in one locality, against the individual bourgeois
who directly exploits them. They direct their attacks not against the
bourgeois conditions of production, but against the instruments of
production themselves; they destroy imported wares that compete with their
labour, they smash to pieces machinery, they set factories ablaze, they seek
to restore by force the vanished status of the workman of the Middle Ages.
At this stage the labourers still form an incoherent mass scattered over the
whole country, and broken up by their mutual competition. If anywhere
they unite to form more compact bodies, this is not yet the consequence of
their own active union, but of the union of the bourgeoisie, which class, in
order to attain its own political ends, is compelled to set the whole
proletariat in motion, and is moreover yet, for a time, able to do so. At this
stage, therefore, the proletarians do not fight their enemies, but the enemies
of their enemies, the remnants of absolute monarchy, the landowners, the
non-industrial bourgeois, the petty bourgeoisie. Thus the whole historical
movement is concentrated in the hands of the bourgeoisie; every victory so
obtained is a victory for the bourgeoisie.

But with the development of industry the proletariat not only increases in
number; it becomes concentrated in greater masses, its strength grows, and
it feels that strength more. The various interests and conditions of life
within the ranks of the proletariat are more and more equalised, in
proportion as machinery obliterates all distinctions of labour, and nearly
everywhere reduces wages to the same low level. The growing competition
among the bourgeois, and the resulting commercial crises, make the wages
of the workers ever more fluctuating. The unceasing improvement of
machinery, ever more rapidly developing, makes their livelihood more and
more precarious; the collisions between individual workmen and individual
bourgeois take more and more the character of collisions between two
classes. Thereupon the workers begin to form combinations (Trades
Unions) against the bourgeois; they club together in order to keep up the
rate of wages; they found permanent associations in order to make
provision beforehand for these occasional revolts. Here and there the
contest breaks out into riots.
Now and then the workers are victorious, but only for a time. The real fruit
of their battles lies, not in the immediate result, but in the ever-expanding
union of the workers. This union is helped on by the improved means of
communication that are created by modern industry and that place the
workers of different localities in contact with one another. It was just this
contact that was needed to centralise the numerous local struggles, all of the
same character, into one national struggle between classes. But every class
struggle is a political struggle. And that union, to attain which the burghers
of the Middle Ages, with their miserable highways, required centuries, the
modern proletarians, thanks to railways, achieve in a few years.
This organisation of the proletarians into a class, and consequently into a
political party, is continually being upset again by the competition between
the workers themselves. But it ever rises up again, stronger, firmer,
mightier. It compels legislative recognition of particular interests of the
workers, by taking advantage of the divisions among the bourgeoisie itself.
Thus the ten-hours' bill in England was carried.
Altogether collisions between the classes of the old society further, in many
ways, the course of development of the proletariat. The bourgeoisie finds

itself involved in a constant battle. At first with the aristocracy; later on,
with those portions of the bourgeoisie itself, whose interests have become
antagonistic to the progress of industry; at all times, with the bourgeoisie of
foreign countries. In all these battles it sees itself compelled to appeal to the
proletariat, to ask for its help, and thus, to drag it into the political arena.
The bourgeoisie itself, therefore, supplies the proletariat with its own
instruments of political and general education, in other words, it furnishes
the proletariat with weapons for fighting the bourgeoisie.
Further, as we have already seen, entire sections of the ruling classes are, by
the advance of industry, precipitated into the proletariat, or are at least
threatened in their conditions of existence. These also supply the proletariat
with fresh elements of enlightenment and progress.
Finally, in times when the class struggle nears the decisive hour, the process
of dissolution going on within the ruling class, in fact within the whole
range of society, assumes such a violent, glaring character, that a small
section of the ruling class cuts itself adrift, and joins the revolutionary class,
the class that holds the future in its hands. Just as, therefore, at an earlier
period, a section of the nobility went over to the bourgeoisie, so now a
portion of the bourgeoisie goes over to the proletariat, and in particular, a
portion of the bourgeois ideologists, who have raised themselves to the
level of comprehending theoretically the historical movement as a whole.
Of all the classes that stand face to face with the bourgeoisie today, the
proletariat alone is a really revolutionary class. The other classes decay and
finally disappear in the face of Modern Industry; the proletariat is its special
and essential product. The lower middle class, the small manufacturer, the
shopkeeper, the artisan, the peasant, all these fight against the bourgeoisie,
to save from extinction their existence as fractions of the middle class. They
are therefore not revolutionary, but conservative. Nay more, they are
reactionary, for they try to roll back the wheel of history. If by chance they
are revolutionary, they are so only in view of their impending transfer into
the proletariat, they thus defend not their present, but their future interests,
they desert their own standpoint to place themselves at that of the
proletariat.

The "dangerous class," the social scum, that passively rotting mass thrown
off by the lowest layers of old society, may, here and there, be swept into
the movement by a proletarian revolution; its conditions of life, however,
prepare it far more for the part of a bribed tool of reactionary intrigue.
In the conditions of the proletariat, those of old society at large are already
virtually swamped. The proletarian is without property; his relation to his
wife and children has no longer anything in common with the bourgeois
family-relations; modern industrial labour, modern subjection to capital, the
same in England as in France, in America as in Germany, has stripped him
of every trace of national character. Law, morality, religion, are to him so
many bourgeois prejudices, behind which lurk in ambush just as many
bourgeois interests.
All the preceding classes that got the upper hand, sought to fortify their
already acquired status by subjecting society at large to their conditions of
appropriation. The proletarians cannot become masters of the productive
forces of society, except by abolishing their own previous mode of
appropriation, and thereby also every other previous mode of appropriation.
They have nothing of their own to secure and to fortify; their mission is to
destroy all previous securities for, and insurances of, individual property.
All previous historical movements were movements of minorities, or in the
interests of minorities. The proletarian movement is the self-conscious,
independent movement of the immense majority, in the interests of the
immense majority. The proletariat, the lowest stratum of our present society,
cannot stir, cannot raise itself up, without the whole superincumbent strata
of official society being sprung into the air.
Though not in substance, yet in form, the struggle of the proletariat with the
bourgeoisie is at first a national struggle. The proletariat of each country
must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own bourgeoisie.
In depicting the most general phases of the development of the proletariat,
we traced the more or less veiled civil war, raging within existing society,
up to the point where that war breaks out into open revolution, and where
the violent overthrow of the bourgeoisie lays the foundation for the sway of
the proletariat.

Hitherto, every form of society has been based, as we have already seen, on
the antagonism of oppressing and oppressed classes. But in order to oppress
a class, certain conditions must be assured to it under which it can, at least,
continue its slavish existence. The serf, in the period of serfdom, raised
himself to membership in the commune, just as the petty bourgeois, under
the yoke of feudal absolutism, managed to develop into a bourgeois. The
modern laborer, on the contrary, instead of rising with the progress of
industry, sinks deeper and deeper below the conditions of existence of his
own class. He becomes a pauper, and pauperism develops more rapidly than
population and wealth. And here it becomes evident, that the bourgeoisie is
unfit any longer to be the ruling class in society, and to impose its
conditions of existence upon society as an over-riding law. It is unfit to rule
because it is incompetent to assure an existence to its slave within his
slavery, because it cannot help letting him sink into such a state, that it has
to feed him, instead of being fed by him. Society can no longer live under
this bourgeoisie, in other words, its existence is no longer compatible with
society.
The essential condition for the existence, and for the sway of the bourgeois
class, is the formation and augmentation of capital; the condition for capital
is wage-labour. Wage-labour rests exclusively on competition between the
laborers. The advance of industry, whose involuntary promoter is the
bourgeoisie, replaces the isolation of the labourers, due to competition, by
their revolutionary combination, due to association. The development of
Modern Industry, therefore, cuts from under its feet the very foundation on
which the bourgeoisie produces and appropriates products. What the
bourgeoisie, therefore, produces, above all, is its own grave-diggers. Its fall
and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable.

II. PROLETARIANS AND COMMUNISTS
In what relation do the Communists stand to the proletarians as a whole?
The Communists do not form a separate party opposed to other workingclass parties.

They have no interests separate and apart from those of the proletariat as a
whole.
They do not set up any sectarian principles of their own, by which to shape
and mould the proletarian movement.
The Communists are distinguished from the other working-class parties by
this only: (1) In the national struggles of the proletarians of the different
countries, they point out and bring to the front the common interests of the
entire proletariat, independently of all nationality. (2) In the various stages
of development which the struggle of the working class against the
bourgeoisie has to pass through, they always and everywhere represent the
interests of the movement as a whole.
The Communists, therefore, are on the one hand, practically, the most
advanced and resolute section of the working-class parties of every country,
that section which pushes forward all others; on the other hand,
theoretically, they have over the great mass of the proletariat the advantage
of clearly understanding the line of march, the conditions, and the ultimate
general results of the proletarian movement.
The immediate aim of the Communist is the same as that of all the other
proletarian parties: formation of the proletariat into a class, overthrow of the
bourgeois supremacy, conquest of political power by the proletariat.
The theoretical conclusions of the Communists are in no way based on
ideas or principles that have been invented, or discovered, by this or that
would-be universal reformer. They merely express, in general terms, actual
relations springing from an existing class struggle, from a historical
movement going on under our very eyes. The abolition of existing property
relations is not at all a distinctive feature of Communism.
All property relations in the past have continually been subject to historical
change consequent upon the change in historical conditions.
The French Revolution, for example, abolished feudal property in favour of
bourgeois property.

The distinguishing feature of Communism is not the abolition of property
generally, but the abolition of bourgeois property. But modern bourgeois
private property is the final and most complete expression of the system of
producing and appropriating products, that is based on class antagonisms,
on the exploitation of the many by the few.
In this sense, the theory of the Communists may be summed up in the single
sentence: Abolition of private property.
We Communists have been reproached with the desire of abolishing the
right of personally acquiring property as the fruit of a man's own labour,
which property is alleged to be the groundwork of all personal freedom,
activity and independence.
Hard-won, self-acquired, self-earned property! Do you mean the property of
the petty artisan and of the small peasant, a form of property that preceded
the bourgeois form? There is no need to abolish that; the development of
industry has to a great extent already destroyed it, and is still destroying it
daily.
Or do you mean modern bourgeois private property?
But does wage-labour create any property for the labourer? Not a bit. It
creates capital, i.e., that kind of property which exploits wage-labour, and
which cannot increase except upon condition of begetting a new supply of
wage-labour for fresh exploitation. Property, in its present form, is based on
the antagonism of capital and wage-labour. Let us examine both sides of
this antagonism.
To be a capitalist, is to have not only a purely personal, but a social status in
production. Capital is a collective product, and only by the united action of
many members, nay, in the last resort, only by the united action of all
members of society, can it be set in motion.
Capital is, therefore, not a personal, it is a social power.
When, therefore, capital is converted into common property, into the
property of all members of society, personal property is not thereby

transformed into social property. It is only the social character of the
property that is changed. It loses its class-character.
Let us now take wage-labour.
The average price of wage-labour is the minimum wage, i.e., that quantum
of the means of subsistence, which is absolutely requisite in bare existence
as a labourer. What, therefore, the wage-labourer appropriates by means of
his labour, merely suffices to prolong and reproduce a bare existence. We
by no means intend to abolish this personal appropriation of the products of
labour, an appropriation that is made for the maintenance and reproduction
of human life, and that leaves no surplus wherewith to command the labour
of others. All that we want to do away with, is the miserable character of
this appropriation, under which the labourer lives merely to increase capital,
and is allowed to live only in so far as the interest of the ruling class
requires it.
In bourgeois society, living labour is but a means to increase accumulated
labour. In Communist society, accumulated labour is but a means to widen,
to enrich, to promote the existence of the labourer.
In bourgeois society, therefore, the past dominates the present; in
Communist society, the present dominates the past. In bourgeois society
capital is independent and has individuality, while the living person is
dependent and has no individuality.
And the abolition of this state of things is called by the bourgeois, abolition
of individuality and freedom! And rightly so. The abolition of bourgeois
individuality, bourgeois independence, and bourgeois freedom is
undoubtedly aimed at.
By freedom is meant, under the present bourgeois conditions of production,
free trade, free selling and buying.
But if selling and buying disappears, free selling and buying disappears
also. This talk about free selling and buying, and all the other "brave words"
of our bourgeoisie about freedom in general, have a meaning, if any, only in
contrast with restricted selling and buying, with the fettered traders of the

Middle Ages, but have no meaning when opposed to the Communistic
abolition of buying and selling, of the bourgeois conditions of production,
and of the bourgeoisie itself.
You are horrified at our intending to do away with private property. But in
your existing society, private property is already done away with for ninetenths of the population; its existence for the few is solely due to its nonexistence in the hands of those nine-tenths. You reproach us, therefore, with
intending to do away with a form of property, the necessary condition for
whose existence is the non-existence of any property for the immense
majority of society.
In one word, you reproach us with intending to do away with your property.
Precisely so; that is just what we intend.
From the moment when labour can no longer be converted into capital,
money, or rent, into a social power capable of being monopolised, i.e., from
the moment when individual property can no longer be transformed into
bourgeois property, into capital, from that moment, you say individuality
vanishes.
You must, therefore, confess that by "individual" you mean no other person
than the bourgeois, than the middle-class owner of property. This person
must, indeed, be swept out of the way, and made impossible.
Communism deprives no man of the power to appropriate the products of
society; all that it does is to deprive him of the power to subjugate the
labour of others by means of such appropriation.
It has been objected that upon the abolition of private property all work will
cease, and universal laziness will overtake us.
According to this, bourgeois society ought long ago to have gone to the
dogs through sheer idleness; for those of its members who work, acquire
nothing, and those who acquire anything, do not work. The whole of this
objection is but another expression of the tautology: that there can no longer
be any wage-labour when there is no longer any capital.

All objections urged against the Communistic mode of producing and
appropriating material products, have, in the same way, been urged against
the Communistic modes of producing and appropriating intellectual
products. Just as, to the bourgeois, the disappearance of class property is the
disappearance of production itself, so the disappearance of class culture is
to him identical with the disappearance of all culture.
That culture, the loss of which he laments, is, for the enormous majority, a
mere training to act as a machine.
But don't wrangle with us so long as you apply, to our intended abolition of
bourgeois property, the standard of your bourgeois notions of freedom,
culture, law, etc. Your very ideas are but the outgrowth of the conditions of
your bourgeois production and bourgeois property, just as your
jurisprudence is but the will of your class made into a law for all, a will,
whose essential character and direction are determined by the economical
conditions of existence of your class.
The selfish misconception that induces you to transform into eternal laws of
nature and of reason, the social forms springing from your present mode of
production and form of property—historical relations that rise and
disappear in the progress of production—this misconception you share with
every ruling class that has preceded you. What you see clearly in the case of
ancient property, what you admit in the case of feudal property, you are of
course forbidden to admit in the case of your own bourgeois form of
property.
Abolition of the family! Even the most radical flare up at this infamous
proposal of the Communists.
On what foundation is the present family, the bourgeois family, based? On
capital, on private gain. In its completely developed form this family exists
only among the bourgeoisie. But this state of things finds its complement in
the practical absence of the family among the proletarians, and in public
prostitution.
The bourgeois family will vanish as a matter of course when its
complement vanishes, and both will vanish with the vanishing of capital.

Do you charge us with wanting to stop the exploitation of children by their
parents? To this crime we plead guilty.
But, you will say, we destroy the most hallowed of relations, when we
replace home education by social.
And your education! Is not that also social, and determined by the social
conditions under which you educate, by the intervention, direct or indirect,
of society, by means of schools, etc.? The Communists have not invented
the intervention of society in education; they do but seek to alter the
character of that intervention, and to rescue education from the influence of
the ruling class.
The bourgeois clap-trap about the family and education, about the hallowed
co-relation of parent and child, becomes all the more disgusting, the more,
by the action of Modern Industry, all family ties among the proletarians are
torn asunder, and their children transformed into simple articles of
commerce and instruments of labour.
But you Communists would introduce community of women, screams the
whole bourgeoisie in chorus.
The bourgeois sees in his wife a mere instrument of production. He hears
that the instruments of production are to be exploited in common, and,
naturally, can come to no other conclusion than that the lot of being
common to all will likewise fall to the women.
He has not even a suspicion that the real point is to do away with the status
of women as mere instruments of production.
For the rest, nothing is more ridiculous than the virtuous indignation of our
bourgeois at the community of women which, they pretend, is to be openly
and officially established by the Communists. The Communists have no
need to introduce community of women; it has existed almost from time
immemorial.
Our bourgeois, not content with having the wives and daughters of their
proletarians at their disposal, not to speak of common prostitutes, take the

greatest pleasure in seducing each other's wives.
Bourgeois marriage is in reality a system of wives in common and thus, at
the most, what the Communists might possibly be reproached with, is that
they desire to introduce, in substitution for a hypocritically concealed, an
openly legalised community of women. For the rest, it is self-evident that
the abolition of the present system of production must bring with it the
abolition of the community of women springing from that system, i.e., of
prostitution both public and private.
The Communists are further reproached with desiring to abolish countries
and nationality.
The working men have no country. We cannot take from them what they
have not got. Since the proletariat must first of all acquire political
supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must constitute
itself the nation, it is, so far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois
sense of the word.
National differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and
more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of
commerce, to the world-market, to uniformity in the mode of production
and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto.
The supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster.
United action, of the leading civilised countries at least, is one of the first
conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat.
In proportion as the exploitation of one individual by another is put an end
to, the exploitation of one nation by another will also be put an end to. In
proportion as the antagonism between classes within the nation vanishes,
the hostility of one nation to another will come to an end.
The charges against Communism made from a religious, a philosophical,
and, generally, from an ideological standpoint, are not deserving of serious
examination.

Does it require deep intuition to comprehend that man's ideas, views and
conceptions, in one word, man's consciousness, changes with every change
in the conditions of his material existence, in his social relations and in his
social life?
What else does the history of ideas prove, than that intellectual production
changes its character in proportion as material production is changed? The
ruling ideas of each age have ever been the ideas of its ruling class.
When people speak of ideas that revolutionise society, they do but express
the fact, that within the old society, the elements of a new one have been
created, and that the dissolution of the old ideas keeps even pace with the
dissolution of the old conditions of existence.
When the ancient world was in its last throes, the ancient religions were
overcome by Christianity. When Christian ideas succumbed in the 18th
century to rationalist ideas, feudal society fought its death battle with the
then revolutionary bourgeoisie. The ideas of religious liberty and freedom
of conscience merely gave expression to the sway of free competition
within the domain of knowledge.
"Undoubtedly," it will be said, "religious, moral, philosophical and juridical
ideas have been modified in the course of historical development. But
religion, morality philosophy, political science, and law, constantly survived
this change."
"There are, besides, eternal truths, such as Freedom, Justice, etc. that are
common to all states of society. But Communism abolishes eternal truths, it
abolishes all religion, and all morality, instead of constituting them on a
new basis; it therefore acts in contradiction to all past historical
experience."
What does this accusation reduce itself to? The history of all past society
has consisted in the development of class antagonisms, antagonisms that
assumed different forms at different epochs.
But whatever form they may have taken, one fact is common to all past
ages, viz., the exploitation of one part of society by the other. No wonder,

then, that the social consciousness of past ages, despite all the multiplicity
and variety it displays, moves within certain common forms, or general
ideas, which cannot completely vanish except with the total disappearance
of class antagonisms.
The Communist revolution is the most radical rupture with traditional
property relations; no wonder that its development involves the most radical
rupture with traditional ideas.
But let us have done with the bourgeois objections to Communism.
We have seen above, that the first step in the revolution by the working
class, is to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling as to win the battle
of democracy.
The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all
capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralise all instruments of production in
the hands of the State, i.e., of the proletariat organised as the ruling class;
and to increase the total of productive forces as rapidly as possible.
Of course, in the beginning, this cannot be effected except by means of
despotic inroads on the rights of property, and on the conditions of
bourgeois production; by means of measures, therefore, which appear
economically insufficient and untenable, but which, in the course of the
movement, outstrip themselves, necessitate further inroads upon the old
social order, and are unavoidable as a means of entirely revolutionising the
mode of production.
These measures will of course be different in different countries.
Nevertheless in the most advanced countries, the following will be pretty
generally applicable.
1. Abolition of property in land and application of all rents of land to public
purposes.
2. A heavy progressive or graduated income tax.

3. Abolition of all right of inheritance.
4. Confiscation of the property of all emigrants and rebels.
5. Centralisation of credit in the hands of the State, by means of a national
bank with State capital and an exclusive monopoly.
6. Centralisation of the means of communication and transport in the hands
of the State.
7. Extension of factories and instruments of production owned by the State;
the bringing into cultivation of waste-lands, and the improvement of the soil
generally in accordance with a common plan.
8. Equal liability of all to labour. Establishment of industrial armies,
especially for agriculture.
9. Combination of agriculture with manufacturing industries; gradual
abolition of the distinction between town and country, by a more equable
distribution of the population over the country.
10. Free education for all children in public schools.
Abolition of children's factory labour in its present form.
Combination of education with industrial production, &c., &c.
When, in the course of development, class distinctions have disappeared,
and all production has been concentrated in the hands of a vast association
of the whole nation, the public power will lose its political character.
Political power, properly so called, is merely the organised power of one
class for oppressing another. If the proletariat during its contest with the
bourgeoisie is compelled, by the force of circumstances, to organise itself as
a class, if, by means of a revolution, it makes itself the ruling class, and, as
such, sweeps away by force the old conditions of production, then it will,
along with these conditions, have swept away the conditions for the
existence of class antagonisms and of classes generally, and will thereby
have abolished its own supremacy as a class.

In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms,
we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the
condition for the free development of all.

III. SOCIALIST AND COMMUNIST LITERATURE
1. REACTIONARY SOCIALISM
A. Feudal Socialism
Owing to their historical position, it became the vocation of the
aristocracies of France and England to write pamphlets against modern
bourgeois society. In the French revolution of July 1830, and in the English
reform agitation, these aristocracies again succumbed to the hateful upstart.
Thenceforth, a serious political contest was altogether out of the question. A
literary battle alone remained possible. But even in the domain of literature
the old cries of the restoration period had become impossible.
In order to arouse sympathy, the aristocracy were obliged to lose sight,
apparently, of their own interests, and to formulate their indictment against
the bourgeoisie in the interest of the exploited working class alone. Thus the
aristocracy took their revenge by singing lampoons on their new master,
and whispering in his ears sinister prophecies of coming catastrophe.
In this way arose Feudal Socialism: half lamentation, half lampoon; half
echo of the past, half menace of the future; at times, by its bitter, witty and
incisive criticism, striking the bourgeoisie to the very heart's core; but
always ludicrous in its effect, through total incapacity to comprehend the
march of modern history.
The aristocracy, in order to rally the people to them, waved the proletarian
alms-bag in front for a banner. But the people, so often as it joined them,
saw on their hindquarters the old feudal coats of arms, and deserted with
loud and irreverent laughter.

One section of the French Legitimists and "Young England" exhibited this
spectacle.
In pointing out that their mode of exploitation was different to that of the
bourgeoisie, the feudalists forget that they exploited under circumstances
and conditions that were quite different, and that are now antiquated. In
showing that, under their rule, the modern proletariat never existed, they
forget that the modern bourgeoisie is the necessary offspring of their own
form of society.
For the rest, so little do they conceal the reactionary character of their
criticism that their chief accusation against the bourgeoisie amounts to this,
that under the bourgeois regime a class is being developed, which is
destined to cut up root and branch the old order of society.
What they upbraid the bourgeoisie with is not so much that it creates a
proletariat, as that it creates a revolutionary proletariat.
In political practice, therefore, they join in all coercive measures against the
working class; and in ordinary life, despite their high falutin phrases, they
stoop to pick up the golden apples dropped from the tree of industry, and to
barter truth, love, and honour for traffic in wool, beetroot-sugar, and potato
spirits.
As the parson has ever gone hand in hand with the landlord, so has Clerical
Socialism with Feudal Socialism.
Nothing is easier than to give Christian asceticism a Socialist tinge. Has not
Christianity declaimed against private property, against marriage, against
the State? Has it not preached in the place of these, charity and poverty,
celibacy and mortification of the flesh, monastic life and Mother Church?
Christian Socialism is but the holy water with which the priest consecrates
the heart-burnings of the aristocrat.
B. Petty-Bourgeois Socialism

The feudal aristocracy was not the only class that was ruined by the
bourgeoisie, not the only class whose conditions of existence pined and
perished in the atmosphere of modern bourgeois society. The mediaeval
burgesses and the small peasant proprietors were the precursors of the
modern bourgeoisie. In those countries which are but little developed,
industrially and commercially, these two classes still vegetate side by side
with the rising bourgeoisie.
In countries where modern civilisation has become fully developed, a new
class of petty bourgeois has been formed, fluctuating between proletariat
and bourgeoisie and ever renewing itself as a supplementary part of
bourgeois society. The individual members of this class, however, are being
constantly hurled down into the proletariat by the action of competition,
and, as modern industry develops, they even see the moment approaching
when they will completely disappear as an independent section of modern
society, to be replaced, in manufactures, agriculture and commerce, by
overlookers, bailiffs and shopmen.
In countries like France, where the peasants constitute far more than half of
the population, it was natural that writers who sided with the proletariat
against the bourgeoisie, should use, in their criticism of the bourgeois
regime, the standard of the peasant and petty bourgeois, and from the
standpoint of these intermediate classes should take up the cudgels for the
working class. Thus arose petty-bourgeois Socialism. Sismondi was the
head of this school, not only in France but also in England.
This school of Socialism dissected with great acuteness the contradictions
in the conditions of modern production. It laid bare the hypocritical
apologies of economists. It proved, incontrovertibly, the disastrous effects
of machinery and division of labour; the concentration of capital and land in
a few hands; overproduction and crises; it pointed out the inevitable ruin of
the petty bourgeois and peasant, the misery of the proletariat, the anarchy in
production, the crying inequalities in the distribution of wealth, the
industrial war of extermination between nations, the dissolution of old
moral bonds, of the old family relations, of the old nationalities.
In its positive aims, however, this form of Socialism aspires either to
restoring the old means of production and of exchange, and with them the

old property relations, and the old society, or to cramping the modern
means of production and of exchange, within the framework of the old
property relations that have been, and were bound to be, exploded by those
means. In either case, it is both reactionary and Utopian.
Its last words are: corporate guilds for manufacture, patriarchal relations in
agriculture.
Ultimately, when stubborn historical facts had dispersed all intoxicating
effects of self-deception, this form of Socialism ended in a miserable fit of
the blues.
C. German, or "True," Socialism
The Socialist and Communist literature of France, a literature that
originated under the pressure of a bourgeoisie in power, and that was the
expression of the struggle against this power, was introduced into Germany
at a time when the bourgeoisie, in that country, had just begun its contest
with feudal absolutism.
German philosophers, would-be philosophers, and beaux esprits, eagerly
seized on this literature, only forgetting, that when these writings
immigrated from France into Germany, French social conditions had not
immigrated along with them. In contact with German social conditions, this
French literature lost all its immediate practical significance, and assumed a
purely literary aspect. Thus, to the German philosophers of the eighteenth
century, the demands of the first French Revolution were nothing more than
the demands of "Practical Reason" in general, and the utterance of the will
of the revolutionary French bourgeoisie signified in their eyes the law of
pure Will, of Will as it was bound to be, of true human Will generally.
The world of the German literate consisted solely in bringing the new
French ideas into harmony with their ancient philosophical conscience, or
rather, in annexing the French ideas without deserting their own philosophic
point of view.

This annexation took place in the same way in which a foreign language is
appropriated, namely, by translation.
It is well known how the monks wrote silly lives of Catholic Saints over the
manuscripts on which the classical works of ancient heathendom had been
written. The German literate reversed this process with the profane French
literature. They wrote their philosophical nonsense beneath the French
original. For instance, beneath the French criticism of the economic
functions of money, they wrote "Alienation of Humanity," and beneath the
French criticism of the bourgeois State they wrote "dethronement of the
Category of the General," and so forth.
The introduction of these philosophical phrases at the back of
the French historical criticisms they dubbed "Philosophy of
Action," "True Socialism," "German Science of Socialism,"
"Philosophical Foundation of Socialism," and so on.
The French Socialist and Communist literature was thus completely
emasculated. And, since it ceased in the hands of the German to express the
struggle of one class with the other, he felt conscious of having overcome
"French one-sidedness" and of representing, not true requirements, but the
requirements of truth; not the interests of the proletariat, but the interests of
Human Nature, of Man in general, who belongs to no class, has no reality,
who exists only in the misty realm of philosophical fantasy.
This German Socialism, which took its schoolboy task so seriously and
solemnly, and extolled its poor stock-in-trade in such mountebank fashion,
meanwhile gradually lost its pedantic innocence.
The fight of the German, and especially, of the Prussian bourgeoisie, against
feudal aristocracy and absolute monarchy, in other words, the liberal
movement, became more earnest.
By this, the long wished-for opportunity was offered to "True" Socialism of
confronting the political movement with the Socialist demands, of hurling
the traditional anathemas against liberalism, against representative
government, against bourgeois competition, bourgeois freedom of the press,
bourgeois legislation, bourgeois liberty and equality, and of preaching to the

masses that they had nothing to gain, and everything to lose, by this
bourgeois movement. German Socialism forgot, in the nick of time, that the
French criticism, whose silly echo it was, presupposed the existence of
modern bourgeois society, with its corresponding economic conditions of
existence, and the political constitution adapted thereto, the very things
whose attainment was the object of the pending struggle in Germany.
To the absolute governments, with their following of parsons, professors,
country squires and officials, it served as a welcome scarecrow against the
threatening bourgeoisie.
It was a sweet finish after the bitter pills of floggings and bullets with which
these same governments, just at that time, dosed the German working-class
risings.
While this "True" Socialism thus served the governments as a weapon for
fighting the German bourgeoisie, it, at the same time, directly represented a
reactionary interest, the interest of the German Philistines. In Germany the
petty-bourgeois class, a relic of the sixteenth century, and since then
constantly cropping up again under various forms, is the real social basis of
the existing state of things.
To preserve this class is to preserve the existing state of things in Germany.
The industrial and political supremacy of the bourgeoisie threatens it with
certain destruction; on the one hand, from the concentration of capital; on
the other, from the rise of a revolutionary proletariat. "True" Socialism
appeared to kill these two birds with one stone. It spread like an epidemic.
The robe of speculative cobwebs, embroidered with flowers of rhetoric,
steeped in the dew of sickly sentiment, this transcendental robe in which the
German Socialists wrapped their sorry "eternal truths," all skin and bone,
served to wonderfully increase the sale of their goods amongst such a
public. And on its part, German Socialism recognised, more and more, its
own calling as the bombastic representative of the petty-bourgeois
Philistine.
It proclaimed the German nation to be the model nation, and the German
petty Philistine to be the typical man. To every villainous meanness of this

model man it gave a hidden, higher, Socialistic interpretation, the exact
contrary of its real character. It went to the extreme length of directly
opposing the "brutally destructive" tendency of Communism, and of
proclaiming its supreme and impartial contempt of all class struggles. With
very few exceptions, all the so-called Socialist and Communist publications
that now (1847) circulate in Germany belong to the domain of this foul and
enervating literature.
2. CONSERVATIVE, OR BOURGEOIS, SOCIALISM
A part of the bourgeoisie is desirous of redressing social grievances, in
order to secure the continued existence of bourgeois society.
To this section belong economists, philanthropists, humanitarians,
improvers of the condition of the working class, organisers of charity,
members of societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals, temperance
fanatics, hole-and-corner reformers of every imaginable kind. This form of
Socialism has, moreover, been worked out into complete systems.
We may cite Proudhon's Philosophie de la Misere as an example of this
form.
The Socialistic bourgeois want all the advantages of modern social
conditions without the struggles and dangers necessarily resulting
therefrom. They desire the existing state of society minus its revolutionary
and disintegrating elements. They wish for a bourgeoisie without a
proletariat. The bourgeoisie naturally conceives the world in which it is
supreme to be the best; and bourgeois Socialism develops this comfortable
conception into various more or less complete systems. In requiring the
proletariat to carry out such a system, and thereby to march straightway into
the social New Jerusalem, it but requires in reality, that the proletariat
should remain within the bounds of existing society, but should cast away
all its hateful ideas concerning the bourgeoisie.
A second and more practical, but less systematic, form of this Socialism
sought to depreciate every revolutionary movement in the eyes of the
working class, by showing that no mere political reform, but only a change

in the material conditions of existence, in economic relations, could be of
any advantage to them. By changes in the material conditions of existence,
this form of Socialism, however, by no means understands abolition of the
bourgeois relations of production, an abolition that can be effected only by
a revolution, but administrative reforms, based on the continued existence
of these relations; reforms, therefore, that in no respect affect the relations
between capital and labour, but, at the best, lessen the cost, and simplify the
administrative work, of bourgeois government.
Bourgeois Socialism attains adequate expression, when, and only when, it
becomes a mere figure of speech.
Free trade: for the benefit of the working class. Protective duties: for the
benefit of the working class. Prison Reform: for the benefit of the working
class. This is the last word and the only seriously meant word of bourgeois
Socialism.
It is summed up in the phrase: the bourgeois is a bourgeois—for the benefit
of the working class.
3. CRITICAL-UTOPIAN SOCIALISM AND COMMUNISM
We do not here refer to that literature which, in every great modern
revolution, has always given voice to the demands of the proletariat, such as
the writings of Babeuf and others.
The first direct attempts of the proletariat to attain its own ends, made in
times of universal excitement, when feudal society was being overthrown,
these attempts necessarily failed, owing to the then undeveloped state of the
proletariat, as well as to the absence of the economic conditions for its
emancipation, conditions that had yet to be produced, and could be
produced by the impending bourgeois epoch alone. The revolutionary
literature that accompanied these first movements of the proletariat had
necessarily a reactionary character. It inculcated universal asceticism and
social levelling in its crudest form.

The Socialist and Communist systems properly so called, those of SaintSimon, Fourier, Owen and others, spring into existence in the early
undeveloped period, described above, of the struggle between proletariat
and bourgeoisie (see Section 1. Bourgeois and Proletarians).
The founders of these systems see, indeed, the class antagonisms, as well as
the action of the decomposing elements, in the prevailing form of society.
But the proletariat, as yet in its infancy, offers to them the spectacle of a
class without any historical initiative or any independent political
movement.
Since the development of class antagonism keeps even pace with the
development of industry, the economic situation, as they find it, does not as
yet offer to them the material conditions for the emancipation of the
proletariat. They therefore search after a new social science, after new
social laws, that are to create these conditions.
Historical action is to yield to their personal inventive action, historically
created conditions of emancipation to fantastic ones, and the gradual,
spontaneous class-organisation of the proletariat to the organisation of
society specially contrived by these inventors. Future history resolves itself,
in their eyes, into the propaganda and the practical carrying out of their
social plans.
In the formation of their plans they are conscious of caring chiefly for the
interests of the working class, as being the most suffering class. Only from
the point of view of being the most suffering class does the proletariat exist
for them.
The undeveloped state of the class struggle, as well as their own
surroundings, causes Socialists of this kind to consider themselves far
superior to all class antagonisms. They want to improve the condition of
every member of society, even that of the most favoured. Hence, they
habitually appeal to society at large, without distinction of class; nay, by
preference, to the ruling class. For how can people, when once they
understand their system, fail to see in it the best possible plan of the best
possible state of society?

Hence, they reject all political, and especially all revolutionary, action; they
wish to attain their ends by peaceful means, and endeavour, by small
experiments, necessarily doomed to failure, and by the force of example, to
pave the way for the new social Gospel.
Such fantastic pictures of future society, painted at a time when the
proletariat is still in a very undeveloped state and has but a fantastic
conception of its own position correspond with the first instinctive
yearnings of that class for a general reconstruction of society.
But these Socialist and Communist publications contain also a critical
element. They attack every principle of existing society. Hence they are full
of the most valuable materials for the enlightenment of the working class.
The practical measures proposed in them—such as the abolition of the
distinction between town and country, of the family, of the carrying on of
industries for the account of private individuals, and of the wage system,
the proclamation of social harmony, the conversion of the functions of the
State into a mere superintendence of production, all these proposals, point
solely to the disappearance of class antagonisms which were, at that time,
only just cropping up, and which, in these publications, are recognised in
their earliest, indistinct and undefined forms only. These proposals,
therefore, are of a purely Utopian character.
The significance of Critical-Utopian Socialism and Communism bears an
inverse relation to historical development. In proportion as the modern class
struggle develops and takes definite shape, this fantastic standing apart from
the contest, these fantastic attacks on it, lose all practical value and all
theoretical justification. Therefore, although the originators of these
systems were, in many respects, revolutionary, their disciples have, in every
case, formed mere reactionary sects. They hold fast by the original views of
their masters, in opposition to the progressive historical development of the
proletariat. They, therefore, endeavour, and that consistently, to deaden the
class struggle and to reconcile the class antagonisms. They still dream of
experimental realisation of their social Utopias, of founding isolated
"phalansteres," of establishing "Home Colonies," of setting up a "Little
Icaria"—duodecimo editions of the New Jerusalem—and to realise all these
castles in the air, they are compelled to appeal to the feelings and purses of

the bourgeois. By degrees they sink into the category of the reactionary
conservative Socialists depicted above, differing from these only by more
systematic pedantry, and by their fanatical and superstitious belief in the
miraculous effects of their social science.

They, therefore, violently oppose all political action on the part of the
working class; such action, according to them, can only result from blind
unbelief in the new Gospel.
The Owenites in England, and the Fourierists in France, respectively,
oppose the Chartists and the Reformistes.

IV. POSITION OF THE COMMUNISTS IN RELATION TO
THE VARIOUS EXISTING OPPOSITION PARTIES
Section II has made clear the relations of the Communists to the existing working-class parties,
such as the Chartists in England and the Agrarian Reformers in America.

The Communists fight for the attainment of the immediate aims, for the
enforcement of the momentary interests of the working class; but in the
movement of the present, they also represent and take care of the future of
that movement. In France the Communists ally themselves with the SocialDemocrats, against the conservative and radical bourgeoisie, reserving,
however, the right to take up a critical position in regard to phrases and
illusions traditionally handed down from the great Revolution.
In Switzerland they support the Radicals, without losing sight of the fact
that this party consists of antagonistic elements, partly of Democratic
Socialists, in the French sense, partly of radical bourgeois.
In Poland they support the party that insists on an agrarian revolution as the
prime condition for national emancipation, that party which fomented the
insurrection of Cracow in 1846.
In Germany they fight with the bourgeoisie whenever it acts in a
revolutionary way, against the absolute monarchy, the feudal squirearchy,
and the petty bourgeoisie.
But they never cease, for a single instant, to instil into the working class the
clearest possible recognition of the hostile antagonism between bourgeoisie

and proletariat, in order that the German workers may straightaway use, as
so many weapons against the bourgeoisie, the social and political conditions
that the bourgeoisie must necessarily introduce along with its supremacy,
and in order that, after the fall of the reactionary classes in Germany, the
fight against the bourgeoisie itself may immediately begin.
The Communists turn their attention chiefly to Germany, because that
country is on the eve of a bourgeois revolution that is bound to be carried
out under more advanced conditions of European civilisation, and with a
much more developed proletariat, than that of England was in the
seventeenth, and of France in the eighteenth century, and because the
bourgeois revolution in Germany will be but the prelude to an immediately
following proletarian revolution.
In short, the Communists everywhere support every revolutionary
movement against the existing social and political order of things.
In all these movements they bring to the front, as the leading question in
each, the property question, no matter what its degree of development at the
time.
Finally, they labour everywhere for the union and agreement of the
democratic parties of all countries.
The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims.
They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by
the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions.
Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communistic revolution.
The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains.
They have a world to win.
WORKING MEN OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!
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Translator's Preface
"The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte" is one of Karl Marx' most
profound and most brilliant monographs. It may be considered the best
work extant on the philosophy of history, with an eye especially upon the
history of the Movement of the Proletariat, together with the bourgeois and
other manifestations that accompany the same, and the tactics that such
conditions dictate.
The recent populist uprising; the more recent "Debs Movement"; the
thousand and one utopian and chimerical notions that are flaring up; the
capitalist maneuvers; the hopeless, helpless grasping after straws, that
characterize the conduct of the bulk of the working class; all of these,
together with the empty-headed, ominous figures that are springing into
notoriety for a time and have their day, mark the present period of the Labor
Movement in the nation a critical one. The best information acquirable, the
best mental training obtainable are requisite to steer through the existing
chaos that the death-tainted social system of today creates all around us. To
aid in this needed information and mental training, this instructive work is
now made accessible to English readers, and is commended to the serious
study of the serious.
The teachings contained in this work are hung on an episode in recent
French history. With some this fact may detract of its value. A pedantic,
supercilious notion is extensively abroad among us that we are an "Anglo
Saxon" nation; and an equally pedantic, supercilious habit causes many to
look to England for inspiration, as from a racial birthplace Nevertheless, for
weal or for woe, there is no such thing extant as "Anglo-Saxon"—of all
nations, said to be "Anglo-Saxon," in the United States least. What we still
have from England, much as appearances may seem to point the other way,
is not of our bone-and-marrow, so to speak, but rather partakes of the nature
of "importations." We are no more English on account of them than we are
Chinese because we all drink tea.
Of all European nations, France is the on to which we come nearest.
Besides its republican form of government—the directness of its history, the
unity of its actions, the sharpness that marks its internal development, are

all characteristics that find their parallel her best, and vice versa. In all
essentials the study of modern French history, particularly when sketched
by such a master hand as Marx', is the most valuable one for the acquisition
of that historic, social and biologic insight that our country stands
particularly in need of, and that will be inestimable during the approaching
critical days.
For the assistance of those who, unfamiliar with the history of France,
may be confused by some of the terms used by Marx, the following
explanations may prove aidful:
On the 18th Brumaire (Nov. 9th), the post-revolutionary development of
affairs in France enabled the first Napoleon to take a step that led with
inevitable certainty to the imperial throne. The circumstance that fifty and
odd years later similar events aided his nephew, Louis Bonaparte, to take a
similar step with a similar result, gives the name to this work—"The
Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte."
As to the other terms and allusions that occur, the following sketch will
suffice:
Upon the overthrow of the first Napoleon came the restoration of the
Bourbon throne (Louis XVIII, succeeded by Charles X). In July, 1830, an
uprising of the upper tier of the bourgeoisie, or capitalist class—the
aristocracy of finance—overthrew the Bourbon throne, or landed
aristocracy, and set up the throne of Orleans, a younger branch of the house
of Bourbon, with Louis Philippe as king. From the month in which this
revolution occurred, Louis Philippe's monarchy is called the "July
Monarchy." In February, 1848, a revolt of a lower tier of the capitalist class
—the industrial bourgeoisie—against the aristocracy of finance, in turn
dethroned Louis Philippe. The affair, also named from the month in which
it took place, is the "February Revolution". "The Eighteenth Brumaire"
starts with that event.
Despite the inapplicableness to our affairs of the political names and
political leadership herein described, both these names and leaderships are
to such an extent the products of an economic-social development that has
here too taken place with even greater sharpens, and they have their present
or threatened counterparts here so completely, that, by the light of this work
of Marx', we are best enabled to understand our own history, to know
whence we came, and whither we are going and how to conduct ourselves.

D.D.L. New York, Sept. 12, 1897
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I
Hegel says somewhere that that great historic facts and personages recur
twice. He forgot to add: "Once as tragedy, and again as farce." Caussidiere
for Danton, Louis Blanc for Robespierre, the "Mountain" of 1848-51 for the
"Mountain" of 1793-05, the Nephew for the Uncle. The identical caricature
marks also the conditions under which the second edition of the eighteenth
Brumaire is issued.
Man makes his own history, but he does not make it out of the whole
cloth; he does not make it out of conditions chosen by himself, but out of
such as he finds close at hand. The tradition of all past generations weighs
like an alp upon the brain of the living. At the very time when men appear
engaged in revolutionizing things and themselves, in bringing about what
never was before, at such very epochs of revolutionary crisis do they
anxiously conjure up into their service the spirits of the past, assume their
names, their battle cries, their costumes to enact a new historic scene in
such time-honored disguise and with such borrowed language Thus did
Luther masquerade as the Apostle Paul; thus did the revolution of 17891814 drape itself alternately as Roman Republic and as Roman Empire; nor
did the revolution of 1818 know what better to do than to parody at one
time the year 1789, at another the revolutionary traditions of 1793-95 Thus
does the beginner, who has acquired a new language, keep on translating it
back into his own mother tongue; only then has he grasped the spirit of the
new language and is able freely to express himself therewith when he
moves in it without recollections of the old, and has forgotten in its use his
own hereditary tongue.
When these historic configurations of the dead past are closely observed
a striking difference is forthwith noticeable. Camille Desmoulins, Danton,
Robespierre, St. Juste, Napoleon, the heroes as well as the parties and the
masses of the old French revolution, achieved in Roman costumes and with
Roman phrases the task of their time: the emancipation and the
establishment of modern bourgeois society. One set knocked to pieces the
old feudal groundwork and mowed down the feudal heads that had grown
upon it; Napoleon brought about, within France, the conditions under which

alone free competition could develop, the partitioned lands be exploited the
nation's unshackled powers of industrial production be utilized; while,
beyond the French frontier, he swept away everywhere the establishments
of feudality, so far as requisite, to furnish the bourgeois social system of
France with fit surroundings of the European continent, and such as were in
keeping with the times. Once the new social establishment was set on foot,
the antediluvian giants vanished, and, along with them, the resuscitated
Roman world—the Brutuses, Gracchi, Publicolas, the Tribunes, the
Senators, and Caesar himself. In its sober reality, bourgeois society had
produced its own true interpretation in the Says, Cousins, Royer-Collards,
Benjamin Constants and Guizots; its real generals sat behind the office
desks; and the mutton-head of Louis XVIII was its political lead. Wholly
absorbed in the production of wealth and in the peaceful fight of
competition, this society could no longer understand that the ghosts of the
days of Rome had watched over its cradle. And yet, lacking in heroism as
bourgeois society is, it nevertheless had stood in need of heroism, of selfsacrifice, of terror, of civil war, and of bloody battle fields to bring it into
the world. Its gladiators found in the stern classic traditions of the Roman
republic the ideals and the form, the self-deceptions, that they needed in
order to conceal from themselves the narrow bourgeois substance of their
own struggles, and to keep their passion up to the height of a great historic
tragedy. Thus, at another stage of development a century before, did
Cromwell and the English people draw from the Old Testament the
language, passions and illusions for their own bourgeois revolution. When
the real goal was reached, when the remodeling of English society was
accomplished, Locke supplanted Habakuk.
Accordingly, the reviving of the dead in those revolutions served the
purpose of glorifying the new struggles, not of parodying the old; it served
the purpose of exaggerating to the imagination the given task, not to recoil
before its practical solution; it served the purpose of rekindling the
revolutionary spirit, not to trot out its ghost.
In 1848-51 only the ghost of the old revolution wandered about, from
Marrast the "Republicain en gaunts jaunes," [#1 Silk-stocking republican]
who disguised himself in old Bailly, down to the adventurer, who hid his
repulsively trivial features under the iron death mask of Napoleon. A whole
people, that imagines it has imparted to itself accelerated powers of motion
through a revolution, suddenly finds itself transferred back to a dead epoch,

and, lest there be any mistake possible on this head, the old dates turn up
again; the old calendars; the old names; the old edicts, which long since had
sunk to the level of the antiquarian's learning; even the old bailiffs, who had
long seemed mouldering with decay. The nation takes on the appearance of
that crazy Englishman in Bedlam, who imagines he is living in the days of
the Pharaohs, and daily laments the hard work that he must do in the
Ethiopian mines as gold digger, immured in a subterranean prison, with a
dim lamp fastened on his head, behind him the slave overseer with a long
whip, and, at the mouths of the mine a mob of barbarous camp servants
who understand neither the convicts in the mines nor one another, because
they do not speak a common language. "And all this," cries the crazy
Englishman, "is demanded of me, the free-born Englishman, in order to
make gold for old Pharaoh." "In order to pay off the debts of the Bonaparte
family"—sobs the French nation. The Englishman, so long as he was in his
senses, could not rid himself of the rooted thought making gold. The
Frenchmen, so long as they were busy with a revolution, could not rid then
selves of the Napoleonic memory, as the election of December 10th proved.
They longed to escape from the dangers of revolution back to the flesh pots
of Egypt; the 2d of December, 1851 was the answer. They have not merely
the character of the old Napoleon, but the old Napoleon himself-caricatured
as he needs must appear in the middle of the nineteenth century.
The social revolution of the nineteenth century can not draw its poetry
from the past, it can draw that only from the future. It cannot start upon its
work before it has stricken off all superstition concerning the past. Former
revolutions require historic reminiscences in order to intoxicate themselves
with their own issues. The revolution of the nineteenth century must let the
dead bury their dead in order to reach its issue. With the former, the phrase
surpasses the substance; with this one, the substance surpasses the phrase.
The February revolution was a surprisal; old society was taken unawares;
and the people proclaimed this political stroke a great historic act whereby
the new era was opened. On the 2d of December, the February revolution is
jockeyed by the trick of a false player, and what is seer to be overthrown is
no longer the monarchy, but the liberal concessions which had been wrung
from it by centuries of struggles. Instead of society itself having conquered
a new point, only the State appears to have returned to its oldest form, to the
simply brazen rule of the sword and the club. Thus, upon the "coup de
main" of February, 1848, comes the response of the "coup de tete"

December, 1851. So won, so lost. Meanwhile, the interval did not go by
unutilized. During the years 1848-1851, French society retrieved in
abbreviated, because revolutionary, method the lessons and teachings,
which—if it was to be more than a disturbance of the surface-should have
preceded the February revolution, had it developed in regular order, by rule,
so to say. Now French society seems to have receded behind its point of
departure; in fact, however, it was compelled to first produce its own
revolutionary point of departure, the situation, circumstances, conditions,
under which alone the modern revolution is in earnest.
Bourgeois revolutions, like those of the eighteenth century, rush onward
rapidly from success to success, their stage effects outbid one another, men
and things seem to be set in flaming brilliants, ecstasy is the prevailing
spirit; but they are short-lived, they reach their climax speedily, then society
relapses into a long fit of nervous reaction before it learns how to
appropriate the fruits of its period of feverish excitement. Proletarian
revolutions, on the contrary, such as those of the nineteenth century,
criticize themselves constantly; constantly interrupt themselves in their own
course; come back to what seems to have been accomplished, in order to
start over anew; scorn with cruel thoroughness the half measures,
weaknesses and meannesses of their first attempts; seem to throw down
their adversary only in order to enable him to draw fresh strength from the
earth, and again, to rise up against them in more gigantic stature; constantly
recoil in fear before the undefined monster magnitude of their own objects
—until finally that situation is created which renders all retreat impossible,
and the conditions themselves cry out:
"Hic Rhodus, hic salta!" [#2 Here is Rhodes, leap here! An allusion to
Aesop's Fables.]
Every observer of average intelligence; even if he failed to follow step by
step the course of French development, must have anticipated that an
unheard of fiasco was in store for the revolution. It was enough to hear the
self-satisfied yelpings of victory wherewith the Messieurs Democrats
mutually congratulated one another upon the pardons of May 2d, 1852.
Indeed, May 2d had become a fixed idea in their heads; it had become a
dogma with them—something like the day on which Christ was to reappear
and the Millennium to begin had formed in the heads of the Chiliasts.
Weakness had, as it ever does, taken refuge in the wonderful; it believed the

enemy was overcome if, in its imagination, it hocus-pocused him away; and
it lost all sense of the present in the imaginary apotheosis of the future, that
was at hand, and of the deeds, that it had "in petto," but which it did not yet
want to bring to the scratch. The heroes, who ever seek to refute their
established incompetence by mutually bestowing their sympathy upon one
another and by pulling together, had packed their satchels, taken their
laurels in advance payments and were just engaged in the work of getting
discounted "in partibus," on the stock exchange, the republics for which, in
the silence of their unassuming dispositions, they had carefully organized
the government personnel. The 2d of December struck them like a bolt from
a clear sky; and the 'peoples, who, in periods of timid despondency, gladly
allow their hidden fears to be drowned by the loudest screamers, will
perhaps have become convinced that the days are gone by when the
cackling of geese could save the Capitol.
The constitution, the national assembly, the dynastic parties, the blue and
the red republicans, the heroes from Africa, the thunder from the tribune,
the flash-lightnings from the daily press, the whole literature, the political
names and the intellectual celebrities, the civil and the criminal law, the
"liberte', egalite', fraternite'," together with the 2d of May 1852—all
vanished like a phantasmagoria before the ban of one man, whom his
enemies themselves do not pronounce an adept at witchcraft. Universal
suffrage seems to have survived only for a moment, to the end that, before
the eyes of the whole world, it should make its own testament with its own
hands, and, in the name of the people, declare: "All that exists deserves to
perish."
It is not enough to say, as the Frenchmen do, that their nation was taken
by surprise. A nation, no more than a woman, is excused for the unguarded
hour when the first adventurer who comes along can do violence to her. The
riddle is not solved by such shifts, it is only formulated in other words.
There remains to be explained how a nation of thirty-six millions can be
surprised by three swindlers, and taken to prison without resistance.
Let us recapitulate in general outlines the phases which the French
revolution of' February 24th, 1848, to December, 1851, ran through.
Three main periods are unmistakable:
First—The February period;

Second—The period of constituting the republic, or of the constitutive
national assembly (May 4, 1848, to May 29th, 1849);
Third—The period of the constitutional republic, or of the legislative
national assembly (May 29, 1849, to December 2, 1851).
The first period, from February 24, or the downfall of Louis Philippe, to
May 4, 1848, the date of the assembling of the constitutive assembly—the
February period proper—may be designated as the prologue of the
revolution. It officially expressed its' own character in this, that the
government which it improvised declared itself "provisional;" and, like the
government, everything that was broached, attempted, or uttered,
pronounced itself provisional. Nobody and nothing dared to assume the
right of permanent existence and of an actual fact. All the elements that had
prepared or determined the revolution—dynastic opposition, republican
bourgeoisie, democratic-republican small traders' class, social-democratic
labor element-all found "provisionally" their place in the February
government.
It could not be otherwise. The February days contemplated originally a
reform of the suffrage laws, whereby the area of the politically privileged
among the property-holding class was to be extended, while the exclusive
rule of the aristocracy of finance was to be overthrown. When however, it
came to a real conflict, when the people mounted the barricades, when the
National Guard stood passive, when the army offered no serious resistance,
and the kingdom ran away, then the republic seemed self-understood. Each
party interpreted it in its own sense. Won, arms in hand, by the proletariat,
they put upon it the stamp of their own class, and proclaimed the social
republic. Thus the general purpose of modern revolutions was indicated, a
purpose, however, that stood in most singular contradiction to every thing
that, with the material at hand, with the stage of enlightenment that the
masses had reached, and under existing circumstances and conditions, could
be immediately used. On the other hand, the claims of all the other
elements, that had cooperated in the revolution of February, were
recognized by the lion's share that they received in the government. Hence,
in no period do we find a more motley mixture of high-sounding phrases
together with actual doubt and helplessness; of more enthusiastic reform
aspirations, together with a more slavish adherence to the old routine; more
seeming harmony permeating the whole of society together with a deeper

alienation of its several elements. While the Parisian proletariat was still
gloating over the sight of the great perspective that had disclosed itself to
their view, and was indulging in seriously meant discussions over the social
problems, the old powers of society had groomed themselves, had gathered
together, had deliberated and found an unexpected support in the mass of
the nation—the peasants and small traders—all of whom threw themselves
on a sudden upon the political stage, after the barriers of the July monarchy
had fallen down.
The second period, from May 4, 1848, to the end of May, 1849, is the
period of the constitution, of the founding of the bourgeois republic
immediately after the February days, not only was the dynastic opposition
surprised by the republicans, and the republicans by the Socialists, but all
France was surprised by Paris. The national assembly, that met on May 4,
1848, to frame a constitution, was the outcome of the national elections; it
represented the nation. It was a living protest against the assumption of the
February days, and it was intended to bring the results of the revolution
back to the bourgeois measure. In vain did the proletariat of Paris, which
forthwith understood the character of this national assembly, endeavor, a
few days after its meeting; on May 15, to deny its existence by force, to
dissolve it, to disperse the organic apparition, in which the reacting spirit of
the nation was threatening them, and thus reduce it back to its separate
component parts. As is known, the 15th of May had no other result than that
of removing Blanqui and his associates, i.e. the real leaders of the
proletarian party, from the public scene for the whole period of the cycle
which we are here considering.
Upon the bourgeois monarchy of Louis Philippe, only the bourgeois
republic could follow; that is to say, a limited portion of the bourgeoisie
having ruled under the name of the king, now the whole bourgeoisie was to
rule under the name of the people. The demands of the Parisian proletariat
are utopian tom-fooleries that have to be done away with. To this
declaration of the constitutional national assembly, the Paris proletariat
answers with the June insurrection, the most colossal event in the history of
European civil wars. The bourgeois republic won. On its side stood the
aristocracy of finance, the industrial bourgeoisie; the middle class; the small
traders' class; the army; the slums, organized as Guarde Mobile; the
intellectual celebrities, the parsons' class, and the rural population. On the
side of the Parisian proletariat stood none but itself. Over 3,000 insurgents

were massacred, after the victory 15,000 were transported without trial.
With this defeat, the proletariat steps to the background on the revolutionary
stage. It always seeks to crowd forward, so soon as the movement seems to
acquire new impetus, but with ever weaker effort and ever smaller results;
So soon as any of the above lying layers of society gets into revolutionary
fermentation, it enters into alliance therewith and thus shares all the defeats
which the several parties successively suffer. But these succeeding blows
become ever weaker the more generally they are distributed over the whole
surface of society. The more important leaders of the Proletariat, in its
councils, and the press, fall one after another victims of the courts, and ever
more questionable figures step to the front. It partly throws itself it upon
doctrinaire experiments, "co-operative banking" and "labor exchange"
schemes; in other words, movements, in which it goes into movements in
which it gives up the task of revolutionizing the old world with its own
large collective weapons and on the contrary, seeks to bring about its
emancipation, behind the back of society, in private ways, within the
narrow bounds of its own class conditions, and, consequently, inevitably
fails. The proletariat seems to be able neither to find again the revolutionary
magnitude within itself nor to draw new energy from the newly formed
alliances until all the classes, with whom it contended in June, shall lie
prostrate along with itself. But in all these defeats, the proletariat succumbs
at least with the honor that attaches to great historic struggles; not France
alone, all Europe trembles before the June earthquake, while the successive
defeats inflicted upon the higher classes are bought so easily that they need
the brazen exaggeration of the victorious party itself to be at all able to pass
muster as an event; and these defeats become more disgraceful the further
removed the defeated party stands from the proletariat.
True enough, the defeat of the June insurgents prepared, leveled the
ground, upon which the bourgeois republic could be founded and erected;
but it, at the same time, showed that there are in Europe other issues besides
that of "Republic or Monarchy." It revealed the fact that here the Bourgeois
Republic meant the unbridled despotism of one class over another. It proved
that, with nations enjoying an older civilization, having developed class
distinctions, modern conditions of production, an intellectual
consciousness, wherein all traditions of old have been dissolved through the
work of centuries, that with such countries the republic means only the
political revolutionary form of bourgeois society, not its conservative form

of existence, as is the case in the United States of America, where, true
enough, the classes already exist, but have not yet acquired permanent
character, are in constant flux and reflux, constantly changing their
elements and yielding them up to one another where the modern means of
production, instead of coinciding with a stagnant population, rather
compensate for the relative scarcity of heads and hands; and, finally, where
the feverishly youthful life of material production, which has to appropriate
a new world to itself, has so far left neither time nor opportunity to abolish
the illusions of old. [#3 This was written at the beginning of 1852.]
All classes and parties joined hands in the June days in a "Party of Order"
against the class of the proletariat, which was designated as the "Party of
Anarchy," of Socialism, of Communism. They claimed to have "saved"
society against the "enemies of society." They gave out the slogans of the
old social order—"Property, Family, Religion, Order"—as the passwords
for their army, and cried out to the counter-revolutionary crusaders: "In this
sign thou wilt conquer!" From that moment on, so soon as any of the
numerous parties, which had marshaled themselves under this sign against
the June insurgents, tries, in turn, to take the revolutionary field in the
interest of its own class, it goes down in its turn before the cry: "Property,
Family, Religion, Order." Thus it happens that "society is saved" as often as
the circle of its ruling class is narrowed, as often as a more exclusive
interest asserts itself over the general. Every demand for the most simple
bourgeois financial reform, for the most ordinary liberalism, for the most
commonplace republicanism, for the flattest democracy, is forthwith
punished as an "assault upon society," and is branded as "Socialism."
Finally the High Priests of "Religion and Order" themselves are kicked off
their tripods; are fetched out of their beds in the dark; hurried into patrol
wagons, thrust into jail or sent into exile; their temple is razed to the
ground, their mouths are sealed, their pen is broken, their law torn to pieces
in the name of Religion, of Family, of Property, and of Order. Bourgeois,
fanatic on the point of "Order," are shot down on their own balconies by
drunken soldiers, forfeit their family property, and their houses are
bombarded for pastime—all in the name of Property, of Family, of Religion,
and of Order. Finally, the refuse of bourgeois society constitutes the "holy
phalanx of Order," and the hero Crapulinsky makes his entry into the
Tuileries as the "Savior of Society."

II
Let us resume the thread of events.
The history of the Constitutional National Assembly from the June days
on, is the history of the supremacy and dissolution of the republican
bourgeois party, the party which is known under several names of "Tricolor
Republican," "True Republican," "Political Republican," "Formal
Republican," etc., etc. Under the bourgeois monarchy of Louis Philippe,
this party had constituted the Official Republican Opposition, and
consequently had been a recognized element in the then political world. It
had its representatives in the Chambers, and commanded considerable
influence in the press. Its Parisian organ, the "National," passed, in its way,
for as respectable a paper as the "Journal des Debats." This position in the
constitutional monarchy corresponded to its character. The party was not a
fraction of the bourgeoisie, held together by great and common interests,
and marked by special business requirements. It was a coterie of bourgeois
with republican ideas-writers, lawyers, officers and civil employees, whose
influence rested upon the personal antipathies of the country for Louis
Philippe, upon reminiscences of the old Republic, upon the republican faith
of a number of enthusiasts, and, above all, upon the spirit of French
patriotism, whose hatred of the treaties of Vienna and of the alliance with
England kept them perpetually on the alert. The "National" owed a large
portion of its following under Louis Philippe to this covert imperialism,
that, later under the republic, could stand up against it as a deadly
competitor in the person of Louis Bonaparte. The fought the aristocracy of
finance just the same as did the rest of the bourgeois opposition. The
polemic against the budget, which in France, was closely connected with
the opposition to the aristocracy of finance, furnished too cheap a
popularity and too rich a material for Puritanical leading articles, not to be
exploited. The industrial bourgeoisie was thankful to it for its servile
defense of the French tariff system, which, however, the paper had taken
up, more out of patriotic than economic reasons the whole bourgeois class
was thankful to it for its vicious denunciations of Communism and
Socialism For the rest, the party of the "National" was purely republican,

i.e. it demanded a republican instead of a monarchic form of bourgeois
government; above all, it demanded for the bourgeoisie the lion's share of
the government. As to how this transformation was to be accomplished, the
party was far from being clear. What, however, was clear as day to it and
was openly declared at the reform banquets during the last days of Louis
Philippe's reign, was its unpopularity with the democratic middle class,
especially with the revolutionary proletariat. These pure republicans, as
pure republicans go, were at first on the very point of contenting themselves
with the regency of the Duchess of Orleans, when the February revolution
broke out, and when it gave their best known representatives a place in the
provisional government. Of course, they enjoyed from the start the
confidence of the bourgeoisie and of the majority of the Constitutional
National Assembly. The Socialist elements of the Provisional Government
were promptly excluded from the Executive Committee which the
Assembly had elected upon its convening, and the party of the "National"
subsequently utilized the outbreak of the June insurrection to dismiss this
Executive Committee also, and thus rid itself of its nearest rivals—the small
traders' class or democratic republicans (Ledru-Rollin, etc.). Cavaignac, the
General of the bourgeois republican party, who command at the battle of
June, stepped into the place of the Executive Committee with a sort of
dictatorial power. Marrast, former editor-in-chief of the "National", became
permanent President of the Constitutional National Assembly, and the
Secretaryship of State, together with all the other important posts, devolved
upon the pure republicans.
The republican bourgeois party, which since long had looked upon itself
as the legitimate heir of the July monarchy, thus found itself surpassed in its
own ideal; but it cam to power, not as it had dreamed under Louis Philippe,
through a liberal revolt of the bourgeoisie against the throne, but through a
grape-shot-and-canistered mutiny of the proletariat against Capital. That
which it imagined to be the most revolutionary, came about as the most
counter-revolutionary event. The fruit fell into its lap, but it fell from the
Tree of Knowledge, not from the Tree of life.
The exclusive power of the bourgeois republic lasted only from June 24
to the 10th of December, 1848. It is summed up in the framing of a
republican constitution and in the state of siege of Paris.

The new Constitution was in substance only a republicanized edition of
the constitutional charter of 1830. The limited suffrage of the July
monarchy, which excluded even a large portion of the bourgeoisie from
political power, was irreconcilable with the existence of the bourgeois
republic. The February revolution had forthwith proclaimed direct and
universal suffrage in place of the old law. The bourgeois republic could not
annul this act. They had to content themselves with tacking to it the
limitation a six months' residence. The old organization of the
administrative law, of municipal government, of court procedures of the
army, etc., remained untouched, or, where the constitution did change them,
the change affected their index, not their subject; their name, not their
substance.
The inevitable "General Staff" of the "freedoms" of 1848—personal
freedom, freedom of the press, of speech, of association and of assemblage,
freedom of instruction, of religion, etc.—received a constitutional uniform
that rendered them invulnerable. Each of these freedoms is proclaimed the
absolute right of the French citizen, but always with the gloss that it is
unlimited in so far only as it be not curtailed by the "equal rights of others,"
and by the "public safety," or by the "laws," which are intended to effect
this harmony. For instance:
"Citizens have the right of association, of peaceful and unarmed
assemblage, of petitioning, and of expressing their opinions through the
press or otherwise. The enjoyment of these rights has no limitation other
than the equal rights of others and the public safety." (Chap. II. of the
French Constitution, Section 8.)
"Education is free. The freedom of education shall be enjoyed under the
conditions provided by law, and under the supervision of the State."
(Section 9.)
"The domicile of the citizen is inviolable, except under the forms
prescribed by law." (Chap. I., Section 3), etc., etc.
The Constitution, it will be noticed, constantly alludes to future organic
laws, that are to carry out the glosses, and are intended to regulate the
enjoyment of these unabridged freedoms, to the end that they collide neither
with one another nor with the public safety. Later on, the organic laws are
called into existence by the "Friends of Order," and all the above named
freedoms are so regulated that, in their enjoyment, the bourgeoisie

encounter no opposition from the like rights of the other classes. Wherever
the bourgeoisie wholly interdicted these rights to "others," or allowed them
their enjoyment under conditions that were but so many police snares, it
was always done only in the interest of the "public safety," i. e., of the
bourgeoisie, as required by the Constitution.
Hence it comes that both sides-the "Friends of Order," who abolished all
those freedoms, as, well as the democrats, who had demanded them all—
appeal with full right to the Constitution: Each paragraph of the
Constitution contains its own antithesis, its own Upper and Lower Housefreedom as a generalization, the abolition of freedom as a specification.
Accordingly, so long as the name of freedom was respected, and only its
real enforcement was prevented in a legal way, of course the constitutional
existence of freedom remained uninjured, untouched, however completely
its common existence might be extinguished.
This Constitution, so ingeniously made invulnerable, was, however, like
Achilles, vulnerable at one point: not in its heel, but in its head, or rather, in
the two heads into which it ran out-the Legislative Assembly, on the one
hand, and the President on the other. Run through the Constitution and it
will be found that only those paragraphs wherein the relation of the
President to the Legislative Assembly is defined, are absolute, positive,
uncontradictory, undistortable.
Here the bourgeois republicans were concerned in securing their own
position. Articles 45-70 of the Constitution are so framed that the National
Assembly can constitutionally remove the President, but the President can
set aside the National Assembly only unconstitutionally, he can set it aside
only by setting aside the Constitution itself. Accordingly, by these
provisions, the National Assembly challenges its own violent destruction. It
not only consecrates, like the character of 1830, the division of powers, but
it extends this feature to an unbearably contradictory extreme. The "play of
constitutional powers," as Guizot styled the clapper-clawings between the
legislative and the executive powers, plays permanent "vabanque" in the
Constitution of 1848. On the one side, 750 representatives of the people,
elected and qualified for re-election by universal suffrage, who constitute an
uncontrollable, indissoluble, indivisible National Assembly, a National
Assembly that enjoys legislative omnipotence, that decides in the last
instance over war, peace and commercial treaties, that alone has the power

to grant amnesties, and that, through its perpetuity, continually maintains
the foreground on the stage; on the other, a President, clad with all the
attributes of royalty, with the right to appoint and remove his ministers
independently from the national assembly, holding in his hands all the
means of executive power, the dispenser of all posts, and thereby the arbiter
of at least one and a half million existences in France, so many being
dependent upon the 500,000 civil employees and upon the officers of all
grades. He has the whole armed power behind him. He enjoys the privilege
of granting pardons to individual criminals; suspending the National
Guards; of removing with the consent of the Council of State the general,
cantonal and municipal Councilmen, elected by the citizens themselves.
The initiative and direction of all negotiations with foreign countries are
reserved to him. While the Assembly itself is constantly acting upon the
stage, and is exposed to the critically vulgar light of day, he leads a hidden
life in the Elysian fields, only with Article 45 of the Constitution before his
eyes and in his heart daily calling out to him, "Frere, il faut mourir!" [#1
Brother, you must die!] Your power expires on the second Sunday of the
beautiful month of May, in the fourth year after your election! The glory is
then at an end; the play is not performed twice; and, if you have any debts,
see to it betimes that you pay them off with the 600,000 francs that the
Constitution has set aside for you, unless, perchance, you should prefer
traveling to Clichy [#2 The debtors' prison.] on the second Monday of the
beautiful month of May.
While the Constitution thus clothes the President with actual power, it
seeks to secure the moral power to the National Assembly. Apart from the
circumstance that it is impossible to create a moral power through
legislative paragraphs, the Constitution again neutralizes itself in that it
causes the President to be chosen by all the Frenchmen through direct
suffrage. While the votes of France are splintered to pieces upon the 750
members of the National Assembly they are here, on the contrary,
concentrated upon one individual. While each separate Representative
represents only this or that party, this or that city, this or that dunghill, or
possibly only the necessity of electing some one Seven-hundred-and-fiftieth
or other, with whom neither the issue nor the man is closely considered, that
one, the President, on the contrary, is the elect of the nation, and the act of
his election is the trump card, that, the sovereign people plays out once
every four years. The elected National Assembly stands in a metaphysical,

but the elected President in a personal, relation to the nation. True enough,
the National Assembly presents in its several Representatives the various
sides of the national spirit, but, in the President, this spirit is incarnated. As
against the National Assembly, the President possesses a sort of divine
right, he is by the grace of the people.
Thetis, the sea-goddess, had prophesied to Achilles that he would die in
the bloom of youth. The Constitution, which had its weak spot, like
Achilles, had also, like Achilles, the presentiment that it would depart by
premature death. It was enough for the pure republicans, engaged at the
work of framing a constitution, to cast a glance from the misty heights of
their ideal republic down upon the profane world in order to realize how the
arrogance of the royalists, of the Bonapartists, of the democrats, of the
Communists, rose daily, together with their own discredit, and in the same
measure as they approached the completion of their legislative work of art,
without Thetis having for this purpose to leave the sea and impart the secret
to them. They ought to outwit fate by means of constitutional artifice,
through Section 111 of the Constitution, according to which every motion to
revise the Constitution had to be discussed three successive times between
each of which a full month was to elapse and required at least a threefourths majority, with the additional proviso that not less than 500 members
of the National Assembly voted. They thereby only made the impotent
attempt, still to exercise as a parliamentary minority, to which in their
mind's eye they prophetically saw themselves reduced, a power, that, at this
very time, when they still disposed over the parliamentary majority and
over all the machinery of government, was daily slipping from their weak
hands.
Finally, the Constitution entrusts itself for safe keeping, in a
melodramatic paragraph, "to the watchfulness and patriotism of the whole
French people, and of each individual Frenchman," after having just before,
in another paragraph entrusted the "watchful" and the "patriotic" themselves
to the tender, inquisitorial attention of the High Court, instituted by itself.
That was the Constitution of 1848, which on, the 2d of December, 1851,
was not overthrown by one head, but tumbled down at the touch of a mere
hat; though, true enough, that hat was a three-cornered Napoleon hat.
While the bourgeois' republicans were engaged in the Assembly with the
work of splicing this Constitution, of discussing and voting, Cavaignac, on

the outside, maintained the state of siege of Paris. The state of siege of Paris
was the midwife of the constitutional assembly, during its republican pains
of travail. When the Constitution is later on swept off the earth by the
bayonet, it should not be forgotten that it was by the bayonet, likewise—and
the bayonet turned against the people, at that—that it had to be protected in
its mother's womb, and that by the bayonet it had to be planted on earth.
The ancestors of these "honest republicans" had caused their symbol, the
tricolor, to make the tour of Europe. These, in their turn also made a
discovery, which all of itself, found its way over the whole continent, but,
with ever renewed love, came back to France, until, by this time, if had
acquired the right of citizenship in one-half of her Departments—the state
of siege. A wondrous discovery this was, periodically applied at each
succeeding crisis in the course of the French revolution. But the barrack and
the bivouac, thus periodically laid on the head of French society, to
compress her brain and reduce her to quiet; the sabre and the musket,
periodically made to perform the functions of judges and of administrators,
of guardians and of censors, of police officers and of watchmen; the
military moustache and the soldier's jacket, periodically heralded as the
highest wisdom and guiding stars of society;—were not all of these, the
barrack and the bivouac, the sabre and the musket, the moustache and the
soldier's jacket bound, in the end, to hit upon the idea that they might as
well save, society once for all, by proclaiming their own regime as supreme,
and relieve bourgeois society wholly of the care of ruling itself? The
barrack and the bivouac, the sabre and the musket, the moustache and the
soldier's jacket were all the more bound to hit upon this idea, seeing that
they could then also expect better cash payment for their increased deserts,
while at the merely periodic states of siege and the transitory savings of
society at the behest of this or that bourgeois faction, very little solid matter
fell to them except some dead and wounded, besides some friendly
bourgeois grimaces. Should not the military, finally, in and for its own
interest, play the game of "state of siege," and simultaneously besiege the
bourgeois exchanges? Moreover, it must not be forgotten, and be it
observed in passing, that Col. Bernard, the same President of the Military
Committee, who, under Cavaignac, helped to deport 15,000 insurgents
without trial, moves at this period again at the head of the Military
Committees now active in Paris.

Although the honest, the pure republicans built with the state of siege the
nursery in which the Praetorian guards of December 2, 1851, were to be
reared, they, on the other hand, deserve praise in that, instead of
exaggerating the feeling of patriotism, as under Louis Philippe, now; they
themselves are in command of the national power, they crawl before foreign
powers; instead of making Italy free, they allow her to be reconquered by
Austrians and Neapolitans. The election of Louis Bonaparte for President
on December 10, 1848, put an end to the dictatorship of Cavaignac and to
the constitutional assembly.
In Article 44 of the Constitution it is said "The President of the French
Republic must never have lost his status as a French citizen." The first
President of the French Republic, L. N. Bonaparte, had not only lost his
status as a French citizen, had not only been an English special constable,
but was even a naturalized Swiss citizen.
In the previous chapter I have explained the meaning of the election of
December 10. I shall not here return to it. Suffice it here to say that it was a
reaction of the farmers' class, who had been expected to pay the costs of the
February revolution, against the other classes of the nation: it was a reaction
of the country against the city. It met with great favor among the soldiers, to
whom the republicans of the "National" had brought neither fame nor
funds; among the great bourgeoisie, who hailed Bonaparte as a bridge to the
monarchy; and among the proletarians and small traders, who hailed him as
a scourge to Cavaignac. I shall later have occasion to enter closer into the
relation of the farmers to the French revolution.
The epoch between December 20, 1848, and the dissolution of the
constitutional assembly in May, 1849, embraces the history of the downfall
of the bourgeois republicans. After they had founded a republic for the
bourgeoisie, had driven the revolutionary proletariat from the field and had
meanwhile silenced the democratic middle class, they are themselves
shoved aside by the mass of the bourgeoisie who justly appropriate this
republic as their property. This bourgeois mass was Royalist, however. A
part thereof, the large landed proprietors, had ruled under the restoration,
hence, was Legitimist; the other part, the aristocrats of finance and the large
industrial capitalists, had ruled under the July monarchy, hence, was
Orleanist. The high functionaries of the Army, of the University, of the
Church, in the civil service, of the Academy and of the press, divided

themselves on both sides, although in unequal parts. Here, in the bourgeois
republic, that bore neither the name of Bourbon, nor of Orleans, but the
name of Capital, they had found the form of government under which they
could all rule in common. Already the June insurrection had united them all
into a "Party of Order." The next thing to do was to remove the bourgeois
republicans who still held the seats in the National Assembly. As brutally as
these pure republicans had abused their own physical power against the
people, so cowardly, low-spirited, disheartened, broken, powerless did they
yield, now when the issue was the maintenance of their own republicanism
and their own legislative rights against the Executive power and the
royalists I need not here narrate the shameful history of their dissolution. It
was not a downfall, it was extinction. Their history is at an end for all time.
In the period that follows, they figure, whether within or without the
Assembly, only as memories—memories that seem again to come to life so
soon as the question is again only the word "Republic," and as often as the
revolutionary conflict threatens to sink down to the lowest level. In passing,
I might observe that the journal which gave to this party its name, the
"National," goes over to Socialism during the following period.
Before we close this period, we must look back upon the two powers, one
of destroys the other on December 2, 1851, while, from December 20,
1848, down to the departure of the constitutional assembly, they live marital
relations. We mean Louis Bonaparte, on the-one hand, on the other, the
party of the allied royalists; of Order, and of the large bourgeoisie.
At the inauguration of his presidency, Bonaparte forthwith framed a
ministry out of the party of Order, at whose head he placed Odillon Barrot,
be it noted, the old leader of the liberal wing of the parliamentary
bourgeoisie. Mr. Barrot had finally hunted down a seat in the ministry, the
spook of which had been pursuing him since 1830; and what is more, he
had the chairmanship in this ministry, although not, as he had imagined
under Louis Philippe, the promoted leader of the parliamentary opposition,
but with the commission to kill a parliament, and, moreover, as an ally of
all his arch enemies, the Jesuits and the Legitimists. Finally he leads the
bride home, but only after she has been prostituted. As to Bonaparte, he
seemed to eclipse himself completely. The party of Order acted for him.
Immediately at the first session of the ministry the expedition to Rome
was decided upon, which it was there agreed, was to be carried out behind I

the back of the National Assembly, and the funds for which, it was equally
agreed, were to be wrung from the Assembly under false pretences. Thus
the start was made with a swindle on the National Assembly, together with
a secret conspiracy with the absolute foreign powers against the
revolutionary Roman republic. In the same way, and with a similar
maneuver, did Bonaparte prepare his stroke of December 2 against the
royalist legislature and its constitutional republic. Let it not be forgotten that
the same party, which, on December 20, 1848, constituted Bonaparte's
ministry, constituted also, on December 2, 1851, the majority of the
legislative National Assembly.
In August the constitutive assembly decided not to dissolve until it had
prepared and promulgated a whole series of organic laws, intended to
supplement the Constitution. The party of Order proposed to the assembly,
through Representative Rateau, on January 6, 1849, to let the Organic laws
go, and rather to order its own dissolution. Not the ministry alone, with Mr.
Odillon Barrot at its head, but all the royalist members of the National
Assembly were also at this time hectoring to it that its dissolution was
necessary for the restoration of the public credit, for the consolidation of
order, to put an end to the existing uncertain and provisional, and establish a
definite state of things; they claimed that its continued existence hindered
the effectiveness of the new Government, that it sought to prolong its life
out of pure malice, and that the country was tired of it. Bonaparte took
notice of all these invectives hurled at the legislative power, he learned
them by heart, and, on December 21, 1851, he showed the parliamentary
royalists that he had learned from them. He repeated their own slogans
against themselves.
The Barrot ministry and the party of Order went further. They called all
over France for petitions to the National Assembly in which that body was
politely requested to disappear. Thus they led the people's unorganic masses
to the fray against the National Assembly, i.e., the constitutionally
organized expression of people itself. They taught Bonaparte, to appeal
from the parliamentary body to the people. Finally, on January 29, 1849, the
day arrived when the constitutional assembly was to decide about its own
dissolution. On that day the body found its building occupied by the
military; Changarnier, the General of the party of Order, in whose hands
was joined the supreme command of both the National Guards and the
regulars, held that day a great military review, as though a battle were

imminent; and the coalized royalists declared threateningly to the
constitutional assembly that force would be applied if it did not act
willingly. It was willing, and chaffered only for a very short respite. What
else was the 29th of January, 1849, than the "coup d'etat" of December 2,
1851, only executed by the royalists with Napoleon's aid against the
republican National Assembly? These gentlemen did not notice, or did not
want to notice, that Napoleon utilized the 29th of January, 1849, to cause a
part of the troops to file before him in front of the Tuileries, and that he
seized with avidity this very first open exercise of the military against the
parliamentary power in order to hint at Caligula. The allied royalists saw
only their own Changarnier.
Another reason that particularly moved the party of Order forcibly to
shorten the term of the constitutional assembly were the organic laws, the
laws that were to supplement the Constitution, as, for instance, the laws on
education, on religion, etc. The allied royalists had every interest in framing
these laws themselves, and not allowing them to be framed by the already
suspicious republicans. Among these organic laws, there was, however, one
on the responsibility of the President of the republic. In 1851 the
Legislature was just engaged in framing such a law when Bonaparte
forestalled that political stroke by his own of December 2. What all would
not the coalized royalists have given in their winter parliamentary campaign
of 1851, had they but found this "Responsibility law" ready made, and
framed at that, by the suspicious, the vicious republican Assembly!
After, on January 29, 1849, the constitutive assembly had itself broken its
last weapon, the Barrot ministry and the "Friends of Order" harassed it to
death, left nothing undone to humiliate it, and wrung from its weakness,
despairing of itself, laws that cost it the last vestige of respect with the
public. Bonaparte, occupied with his own fixed Napoleonic idea, was
audacious enough openly to exploit this degradation of the parliamentary
power: When the National Assembly, on May 8, 1849, passed a vote of
censure upon the Ministry on account of the occupation of Civita-Vecchia
by Oudinot, and ordered that the Roman expedition be brought back to its
alleged purpose, Bonaparte published that same evening in the "Moniteur" a
letter to Oudinot, in which he congratulated him on his heroic feats, and
already, in contrast with the quill-pushing parliamentarians, posed as the
generous protector of the Army. The royalists smiled at this. They took him
simply for their dupe. Finally, as Marrast, the President of the constitutional

assembly, believed on a certain occasion the safety of the body to be in
danger, and, resting on the Constitution, made a requisition upon a Colonel,
together with his regiment, the Colonel refused obedience, took refuge
behind the "discipline," and referred Marrast to Changarnier, who
scornfully sent him off with the remark that he did not like "bayonettes
intelligentes." [#1 Intelligent bayonets] In November, 1851, as the coalized
royalists wanted to begin the decisive struggle with Bonaparte, they sought,
by means of their notorious "Questors Bill," to enforce the principle of the
right of the President of the National Assembly to issue direct requisitions
for troops. One of their Generals, Leflo, supported the motion. In vain did
Changarnier vote for it, or did Thiers render homage to the cautious wisdom
of the late constitutional assembly. The Minister of War, St. Arnaud,
answered him as Changarnier had answered Marrast—and he did so amidst
the plaudits of the Mountain.
Thus did the party of Order itself, when as yet it was not the National
Assembly, when as yet it was only a Ministry, brand the parliamentary
regime. And yet this party objects vociferously when the 2d of December,
1851, banishes that regime from France!
We wish it a happy journey.

III
On May 29, 1849, the legislative National Assembly convened. On
December 2, 1851, it was broken up. This period embraces the term of the
Constitutional or Parliamentary public.
In the first French revolution, upon the reign of the Constitutionalists
succeeds that of the Girondins; and upon the reign of the Girondins follows
that of the Jacobins. Each of these parties in succession rests upon its more
advanced element. So soon as it has carried the revolution far enough not to
be able to keep pace with, much less march ahead of it, it is shoved aside by
its more daring allies, who stand behind it, and it is sent to the guillotine.
Thus the revolution moves along an upward line.
Just the reverse in 1848. The proletarian party appears as an appendage to
the small traders' or democratic party; it is betrayed by the latter and
allowed to fall on April 16, May 15, and in the June days. In its turn, the
democratic party leans upon the shoulders of the bourgeois republicans;
barely do the bourgeois republicans believe themselves firmly in power,
than they shake off these troublesome associates for the purpose of
themselves leaning upon the shoulders of the party of Order. The party of
Order draws in its shoulders, lets the bourgeois republicans tumble down
heels over head, and throws itself upon the shoulders of the armed power.
Finally, still of the mind that it is sustained by the shoulders of the armed
power, the party of Order notices one fine morning that these shoulders
have turned into bayonets. Each party kicks backward at those that are
pushing forward, and leans forward upon those that are crowding backward;
no wonder that, in this ludicrous posture, each loses its balance, and, after
having cut the unavoidable grimaces, breaks down amid singular
somersaults. Accordingly, the revolution moves along a downward line. It
finds itself in this retreating motion before the last February-barricade is
cleared away, and the first governmental authority of the revolution has
been constituted.
The period we now have before us embraces the motliest jumble of
crying contradictions: constitutionalists, who openly conspire against the
Constitution; revolutionists, who admittedly are constitutional; a National

Assembly that wishes to be omnipotent yet remains parliamentary; a
Mountain, that finds its occupation in submission, that parries its present
defeats with prophecies of future victories; royalists, who constitute the
"patres conscripti" of the republic, and are compelled by the situation to
uphold abroad the hostile monarchic houses, whose adherents they are,
while in France they support the republic that they hate; an Executive
power that finds its strength in its very weakness, and its dignity in the
contempt that it inspires; a republic, that is nothing else than the combined
infamy of two monarchies—the Restoration and the July Monarchy—with
an imperial label; unions, whose first clause is disunion; struggles, whose
first law is in-decision; in the name of peace, barren and hollow agitation;
in the name of the revolution, solemn sermonizings on peace; passions
without truth; truths without passion; heroes without heroism; history
without events; development, whose only moving force seems to be the
calendar, and tiresome by the constant reiteration of the same tensions and
relaxes; contrasts, that seem to intensify themselves periodically, only in
order to wear themselves off and collapse without a solution; pretentious
efforts made for show, and bourgeois frights at the danger of the destruction
of the world, simultaneous with the carrying on of the pettiest intrigues and
the performance of court comedies by the world's saviours, who, in their
"laisser aller," recall the Day of Judgment not so much as the days of the
Fronde; the official collective genius of France brought to shame by the
artful stupidity of a single individual; the collective will of the nation, as
often as it speaks through the general suffrage, seeking its true expression in
the prescriptive enemies of the public interests until it finally finds it in the
arbitrary will of a filibuster. If ever a slice from history is drawn black upon
black, it is this. Men and events appear as reversed "Schlemihls," [#1 The
hero In Chamisso's "Peter Schiemihi," who loses his own shadow.] as
shadows, the bodies of which have been lost. The revolution itself paralyzes
its own apostles, and equips only its adversaries with passionate violence.
When the "Red Spectre," constantly conjured up and exorcised by the
counter-revolutionists finally does appear, it does not appear with the
Anarchist Phrygian cap on its head, but in the uniform of Order, in the Red
Breeches of the French Soldier.
We saw that the Ministry, which Bonaparte installed on December 20,
1849, the day of his "Ascension," was a ministry of the party of Order, of
the Legitimist and Orleanist coalition. The Barrot-Falloux ministry had

weathered the republican constitutive convention, whose term of life it had
shortened with more or less violence, and found itself still at the helm.
Changamier, the General of the allied royalists continued to unite in his
person the command-in-chief of the First Military Division and of the
Parisian National Guard. Finally, the general elections had secured the large
majority in the National Assembly to the party of Order. Here the Deputies
and Peers of Louis Phillipe met a saintly crowd of Legitimists, for whose
benefit numerous ballots of the nation had been converted into admission
tickets to the political stage. The Bonapartist representatives were too thinly
sowed to be able to build an independent parliamentary party. They
appeared only as "mauvaise queue" [#2 Practical joke] played upon the
party of Order. Thus the party of Order was in possession of the
Government, of the Army, and of the legislative body, in short, of the total
power of the State, morally strengthened by the general elections, that
caused their sovereignty to appear as the will of the people, and by the
simultaneous victory of the counter-revolution on the whole continent of
Europe.
Never did party open its campaign with larger means at its disposal and
under more favorable auspices.
The shipwrecked pure republicans found themselves in the legislative
National Assembly melted down to a clique of fifty men, with the African
Generals Cavaignac, Lamorciere and Bedeau at its head. The great
Opposition party was, however, formed by the Mountain. This
parliamentary baptismal name was given to itself by the Social Democratic
party. It disposed of more than two hundred votes out of the seven hundred
and fifty in the National Assembly, and, hence, was at least just as powerful
as any one of the three factions of the party of Order. Its relative minority to
the total royalist coalition seemed counterbalanced by special
circumstances. Not only did the Departmental election returns show that it
had gained a considerable following among the rural population, but,
furthermore, it numbered almost all the Paris Deputies in its camp; the
Army had, by the election of three under-officers, made a confession of
democratic faith; and the leader of the Mountain, Ledru-Rollin had in
contrast to all the representatives of the party of Order, been raised to the
rank of the "parliamentary nobility" by five Departments, who combined
their suffrages upon him. Accordingly, in view of the inevitable collisions
of the royalists among themselves, on the one hand, and of the whole party

of Order with Bonaparte, on the other, the Mountain seemed on May
29,1849, to have before it all the elements of success. A fortnight later, it
had lost everything, its honor included.
Before we follow this parliamentary history any further, a few
observations are necessary, in order to avoid certain common deceptions
concerning the whole character of the epoch that lies before us. According
to the view of the democrats, the issue, during the period of the legislative
National Assembly, was, the same as during the period of the constitutive
assembly, simply the struggle between republicans and royalists; the
movement itself was summed up by them in the catch-word Reaction—
night, in which all cats are grey, and allows them to drawl out their drowsy
commonplaces. Indeed, at first sight, the party of Order presents the
appearance of a tangle of royalist factions, that, not only intrigue against
each other, each aiming to raise its own Pretender to the throne, and exclude
the Pretender of the Opposite party, but also are all united in a common
hatred for and common attacks against the "Republic." On its side, the
Mountain appears, in counter-distinction to the royalist conspiracy, as the
representative of the "Republic." The party of Order seems constantly
engaged in a "Reaction," which, neither more nor less than in Prussia, is
directed against the press, the right of association and the like, and is
enforced by brutal police interventions on the part of the bureaucracy, the
police and the public prosecutor—just as in Prussia; the Mountain on the
contrary, is engaged with equal assiduity in parrying these attacks, and thus
in defending the "eternal rights of man"—as every so-called people's party
has more or less done for the last hundred and fifty years. At a closer
inspection, however, of the situation and of the parties, this superficial
appearance, which veils the Class Struggle, together with the peculiar
physiognomy of this period, vanishes wholly.
Legitimists and Orleanists constituted, as said before, the two large
factions of the party of Order. What held these two factions to their
respective Pretenders, and inversely kept them apart from each other, what
else was it but the lily and the tricolor, the House of Bourbon and the house
of Orleans, different shades of royalty? Under the Bourbons, Large Landed
Property ruled together with its parsons and lackeys; under the Orleanist, it
was the high finance, large industry, large commerce, i.e., Capital, with its
retinue of lawyers, professors and orators. The Legitimate kingdom was but
the political expression for the hereditary rule of the landlords, as the July

monarchy was bur the political expression for the usurped rule of the
bourgeois upstarts. What, accordingly, kept these two factions apart was no
so-called set of principles, it was their material conditions for life—two
different sorts of property—; it was the old antagonism of the City and the
Country, the rivalry between Capital and Landed property. That
simultaneously old recollections; personal animosities, fears and hopes;
prejudices and illusions; sympathies and antipathies; convictions, faith and
principles bound these factions to one House or the other, who denies it?
Upon the several forms of property, upon the social conditions of existence,
a whole superstructure is reared of various and peculiarly shaped feelings,
illusions, habits of thought and conceptions of life. The whole class
produces and shapes these out of its material foundation and out of the
corresponding social conditions. The individual unit to whom they flow
through tradition and education, may fancy that they constitute the true
reasons for and premises of his conduct. Although Orleanists and
Legitimists, each of these factions, sought to make itself and the other
believe that what kept the two apart was the attachment of each to its
respective royal House; nevertheless, facts proved later that it rather was
their divided interest that forbade the union of the two royal Houses. As, in
private life, the distinction is made between what a man thinks of himself
and says, and that which he really is and does, so, all the more, must the
phrases and notions of parties in historic struggles be distinguished from the
real organism, and their real interests, their notions and their reality.
Orleanists and Legitimists found themselves in the republic beside each
other with equal claims. Each side wishing, in opposition to the other, to
carry out the restoration of its own royal House, meant nothing else than
that each of the two great Interests into which the bourgeoisie is divided—
Land and Capital—sought to restore its own supremacy and the
subordinacy of the other. We speak of two bourgeois interests because large
landed property, despite its feudal coquetry and pride of race, has become
completely bourgeois through the development of modern society. Thus did
the Tories of England long fancy that they were enthusiastic for the
Kingdom, the Church and the beauties of the old English Constitution, until
the day of danger wrung from them the admission that their enthusiasm was
only for Ground Rent.
The coalized royalists carried on their intrigues against each other in the
press, in Ems, in Clarmont—outside of the parliament. Behind the scenes,

they don again their old Orleanist and Legitimist liveries, and conduct their
old tourneys; on the public stage, however, in their public acts, as a great
parliamentary party, they dispose of their respective royal houses with mere
courtesies, adjourn "in infinitum" the restoration of the monarchy. Their real
business is transacted as Party of Order, i. e., under a Social, not a Political
title; as representatives of the bourgeois social system; not as knights of
traveling princesses, but as the bourgeois class against the other classes; not
as royalists against republicans. Indeed, as party of Order they exercised a
more unlimited and harder dominion over the other classes of society than
ever before either under the restoration or the July monarchy-a thing
possible only under the form of a parliamentary republic, because under this
form alone could the two large divisions of the French bourgeoisie be
united; in other words, only under this form could they place on the order of
business the sovereignty of their class, in lieu of the regime of a privileged
faction of the same. If, this notwithstanding, they are seen as the party of
Order to insult the republic and express their antipathy for it, it happened
not out of royalist traditions only: Instinct taught them that while, indeed,
the republic completes their authority, it at the same time undermined their
social foundation, in that, without intermediary, without the mask of the
crown, without being able to turn aside the national interest by means of its
subordinate struggles among its own conflicting elements and with the
crown, the republic is compelled to stand up sharp against the subjugated
classes, and wrestle with them. It was a sense of weakness that caused them
to recoil before the unqualified demands of their own class rule, and to
retreat to the less complete, less developed, and, for that very reason, less
dangerous forms of the same. As often, on the contrary, as the allied
royalists come into conflict with the Pretender who stands before them—
with Bonaparte—, as often as they believe their parliamentary omnipotence
to be endangered by the Executive, in other words, as often as they must
trot out the political title of their authority, they step up as Republicans, not
as Royalists—and this is done from the Orleanist Thiers, who warns the
National Assembly that the republic divides them least, down to Legitimist
Berryer, who, on December 2, 1851, the scarf of the tricolor around him,
harangues the people assembled before the Mayor's building of the Tenth
Arrondissement, as a tribune in the name of the Republic; the echo,
however, derisively answering back to him: "Henry V.! Henry V!" [#3 The
candidate of the Bourbons, or Legitimists, for the throne.]

However, against the allied bourgeois, a coalition was made between the
small traders and the workingmen—the so-called Social Democratic party.
The small traders found themselves ill rewarded after the June days of
1848; they saw their material interests endangered, and the democratic
guarantees, that were to uphold their interests, made doubtful. Hence, they
drew closer to the workingmen. On the other hand, their parliamentary
representatives—the Mountain—, after being shoved aside during the
dictatorship of the bourgeois republicans, had, during the last half of the
term of the constitutive convention, regained their lost popularity through
the struggle with Bonaparte and the royalist ministers. They had made an
alliance with the Socialist leaders. During February, 1849, reconciliation
banquets were held. A common program was drafted, joint election
committees were empanelled, and fusion candidates were set up. The
revolutionary point was thereby broken off from the social demands of the
proletariat and a democratic turn given to them; while, from the democratic
claims of the small traders' class, the mere political form was rubbed off
and the Socialist point was pushed forward. Thus came the Social
Democracy about. The new Mountain, the result of this combination,
contained, with the exception of some figures from the working class and
some Socialist sectarians, the identical elements of the old Mountain, only
numerically stronger. In the course of events it had, however, changed,
together with the class that it represented. The peculiar character of the
Social Democracy is summed up in this that democratic-republican
institutions are demanded as the means, not to remove the two extremes—
Capital and Wage-slavery—, but in order to weaken their antagonism and
transform them into a harmonious whole. However different the methods
may be that are proposed for the accomplishment of this object, however
much the object itself may be festooned with more or less revolutionary
fancies, the substance remains the same. This substance is the
transformation of society upon democratic lines, but a transformation
within the boundaries of the small traders' class. No one must run away
with the narrow notion that the small traders' class means on principle to
enforce a selfish class interest. It believes rather that the special conditions
for its own emancipation are the general conditions under which alone
modern society can be saved and the class struggle avoided. Likewise must
we avoid running away with the notion that the Democratic Representatives
are all "shopkeepers," or enthuse for these. They may—by education and

individual standing—be as distant from them as heaven is from earth. That
which makes them representatives of the small traders' class is that they do
not intellectually leap the bounds which that class itself does not leap in
practical life; that, consequently, they are theoretically driven to the same
problems and solutions, to which material interests and social standing
practically drive the latter. Such, in fact, is at all times the relation of the
"political" and the "literary" representatives of a class to the class they
represent.
After the foregoing explanations, it goes with-out saying that, while the
Mountain is constantly wrestling for the republic and the so-called "rights
of man," neither the republic nor the "rights of man" is its real goal, as little
as an army, whose weapons it is sought to deprive it of and that defends
itself, steps on the field of battle simply in order to remain in possession of
implements of warfare.
The party of Order provoked the Mountain immediately upon the
convening of the assembly. The bourgeoisie now felt the necessity of
disposing of the democratic small traders' class, just as a year before it had
understood the necessity of putting an end to the revolutionary proletariat.
But the position of the foe had changed. The strength of the proletarian
party was on the streets; that of the small traders' class was in the National
Assembly itself. The point was, accordingly, to wheedle them out of the
National Assembly into the street, and to have them break their
parliamentary power themselves, before time and opportunity could
consolidate them. The Mountain jumped with loose reins into the trap.
The bombardment of Rome by the French troops was the bait thrown at
the Mountain. It violated Article V. of the Constitution, which forbade the
French republic to use its forces against the liberties of other nations;
besides, Article IV. forbade all declaration of war by the Executive without
the consent of the National Assembly; furthermore, the constitutive
assembly had censured the Roman expedition by its resolution of May 8.
Upon these grounds, Ledru-Rollin submitted on June 11, 1849, a motion
impeaching Bonaparte and his Ministers. Instigated by the wasp-stings of
Thiers, he even allowed himself to be carried away to the point of
threatening to defend the Constitution by all means, even arms in hand. The
Mountain rose as one man, and repeated the challenge. On June 12, the
National Assembly rejected the notion to impeach, and the Mountain left

the parliament. The events of June 13 are known: the proclamation by a part
of the Mountain pronouncing Napoleon and his Ministers "outside the pale
of the Constitution"; the street parades of the democratic National Guards,
who, unarmed as they were, flew apart at contact with the troops of
Changarnier; etc., etc. Part of the Mountain fled abroad, another part was
assigned to the High Court of Bourges, and a parliamentary regulation
placed the rest under the school-master supervision of the President of the
National Assembly. Paris was again put under a state of siege; and the
democratic portion of the National Guards was disbanded. Thus the
influence of the Mountain in parliament was broken, together with the
power; of the small traders' class in Paris.
Lyons, where the 13th of June had given the signal to a bloody labor
uprising, was, together with the five surrounding Departments, likewise
pronounced in state of siege, a condition that continues down to this
moment. [#4 January, 1852]
The bulk of the Mountain had left its vanguard in the lurch by refusing
their signatures to the proclamation; the press had deserted: only two papers
dared to publish the pronunciamento; the small traders had betrayed their
Representatives: the National Guards stayed away, or, where they did turn
up, hindered the raising of barricades; the Representatives had duped the
small traders: nowhere were the alleged affiliated members from the Army
to be seen; finally, instead of gathering strength from them, the democratic
party had infected the proletariat with its own weakness, and, as usual with
democratic feats, the leaders had the satisfaction of charging "their people"
with desertion, and the people had the satisfaction of charging their leaders
with fraud.
Seldom was an act announced with greater noise than the campaign
contemplated by the Mountain; seldom was an event trumpeted ahead with
more certainty and longer beforehand than the "inevitable victory of the
democracy." This is evident: the democrats believe in the trombones before
whose blasts the walls of Jericho fall together; as often as they stand before
the walls of despotism, they seek to imitate the miracle. If the Mountain
wished to win in parliament, it should not appeal to arms; if it called to
arms in parliament, it should not conduct itself parliamentarily on the street;
if the friendly demonstration was meant seriously, it was silly not to foresee
that it would meet with a warlike reception; if it was intended for actual

war, it was rather original to lay aside the weapons with which war had to
be conducted. But the revolutionary threats of the middle class and of their
democratic representatives are mere attempts to frighten an adversary; when
they have run themselves into a blind alley, when they have sufficiently
compromised themselves and are compelled to execute their threats, the
thing is done in a hesitating manner that avoids nothing so much as the
means to the end, and catches at pretexts to succumb. The bray of the
overture, that announces the fray, is lost in a timid growl so soon as this is
to start; the actors cease to take themselves seriously, and the performance
falls flat like an inflated balloon that is pricked with a needle.
No party exaggerates to itself the means at its disposal more than the
democratic, none deceives itself with greater heedlessness on the situation.
A part of the Army voted for it, thereupon the Mountain is of the opinion
that the Army would revolt in its favor. And by what occasion? By an
occasion, that, from the standpoint of the troops, meant nothing else than
that the revolutionary soldiers should take the part of the soldiers of Rome
against French soldiers. On the other hand, the memory of June, 1848, was
still too fresh not to keep alive a deep aversion on the part of the proletariat
towards the National Guard, and a strong feeling of mistrust on the part of
the leaders of the secret societies for the democratic leaders. In order to
balance these differences, great common interests at stake were needed. The
violation of an abstract constitutional paragraph could not supply such
interests. Had not the constitution been repeatedly violated, according to the
assurances of the democrats themselves? Had not the most popular papers
branded them as a counter-revolutionary artifice? But the democrat—by
reason of his representing the middle class, that is to say, a Transition Class,
in which the interests of two other classes are mutually dulled—, imagines
himself above all class contrast. The democrats grant that opposed to them
stands a privileged class, but they, together with the whole remaining mass
of the nation, constitute the "PEOPLE." What they represent is the "people's
rights"; their interests are the "people's interests." Hence, they do not
consider that, at an impending struggle, they need to examine the interests
and attitude of the different classes. They need not too seriously weigh their
own means. All they have to do is to give the signal in order to have the
"people" fall upon the "oppressors" with all its inexhaustible resources. If,
thereupon, in the execution, their interests turn out to be uninteresting, and
their power to be impotence, it is ascribed either to depraved sophists, who

split up the "undivisible people" into several hostile camps; or to the army
being too far brutalized and blinded to appreciate the pure aims of the
democracy as its own best; or to some detail in the execution that wrecks
the whole plan; or, finally, to an unforeseen accident that spoiled the game
this time. At all events, the democrat comes out of the disgraceful defeat as
immaculate as he went innocently into it, and with the refreshed conviction
that he must win; not that he himself and his party must give up their old
standpoint, but that, on the contrary, conditions must come to his aid.
For all this, one must not picture to himself the decimated, broken, and,
by the new parliamentary regulation, humbled Mountain altogether too
unhappy. If June 13 removed its leaders, it, on the other hand, made room
for new ones of inferior capacity, who are flattered by their new position. If
their impotence in parliament could no longer be doubted, they were now
justified to limit their activity to outbursts of moral indignation. If the party
of Order pretended to see in them, as the last official representatives of the
revolution, all the horrors of anarchy incarnated, they were free to appear
all the more flat and modest in reality. Over June 13 they consoled
themselves with the profound expression: "If they but dare to assail
universal suffrage . . . then . . . then we will show who we are!" Nous
verrons. [#5 We shall see.]
As to the "Mountaineers," who had fled abroad, it suffices here to say
that Ledru-Rollin—he having accomplished the feat of hopelessly ruining,
in barely a fortnight, the powerful party at whose head he stood—, found
himself called upon to build up a French government "in partibus;" that his
figure, at a distance, removed from the field of action, seemed to gain in
size in the measure that the level of the revolution sank and the official
prominences of official France became more and more dwarfish; that he
could figure as republican Pretender for 1852, and periodically issued to the
Wallachians and other peoples circulars in which "despot of the continent"
is threatened with the feats that he and his allies had in contemplation. Was
Proudhon wholly wrong when he cried out to these gentlemen: "Vous n'etes
que des blaqueurs"? [#6 You are nothing but fakirs.]
The party of Order had, on June 13, not only broken up the Mountain, it
had also established the Subordination of the Constitution to the Majority
Decisions of the National Assembly. So, indeed, did the republic understand
it, to—wit, that the bourgeois ruled here in parliamentary form, without, as

in the monarchy, finding a check in the veto of the Executive power, or the
liability of parliament to dissolution. It was a "parliamentary republic," as
Thiers styled it. But if, on June 13, the bourgeoisie secured its omnipotence
within the parliament building, did it not also strike the parliament itself, as
against the Executive and the people, with incurable weakness by excluding
its most popular part? By giving up numerous Deputies, without further
ceremony to the mercies of the public prosecutor, it abolished its own
parliamentary inviolability. The humiliating regulation, that it subjected the
Mountain to, raised the President of the republic in the same measure that it
lowered the individual Representatives of the people. By branding an
insurrection in defense of the Constitution as anarchy, and as a deed looking
to the overthrow of society, it interdicted to itself all appeal to insurrection
whenever the Executive should violate the Constitution against it. And,
indeed, the irony of history wills it that the very General, who by order of
Bonaparte bombarded Rome, and thus gave the immediate occasion to the
constitutional riot of June 13, that Oudinot, on December 22, 1851, is the
one imploringly and vainly to be offered to the people by the party of Order
as the General of the Constitution. Another hero of June 13, Vieyra, who
earned praise from the tribune of the National Assembly for the brutalities
that he had committed in the democratic newspaper offices at the head of a
gang of National Guards in the hire of the high finance—this identical
Vieyra was initiated in the conspiracy of Bonaparte, and contributed
materially in cutting off all protection that could come to the National
Assembly, in the hour of its agony, from the side of the National Guard.
June 13 had still another meaning. The Mountain had wanted to place
Bonaparte under charges. Their defeat was, accordingly, a direct victory of
Bonaparte; it was his personal triumph over his democratic enemies. The
party of Order fought for the victory, Bonaparte needed only to pocket it.
He did so. On June 14, a proclamation was to be read on the walls of Paris
wherein the President, as it were, without his connivance, against his will,
driven by the mere force of circumstances, steps forward from his cloisterly
seclusion like misjudged virtue, complains of the calumnies of his
antagonists, and, while seeming to identify his own person with the cause of
order, rather identifies the cause of order with his own person. Besides this,
the National Assembly had subsequently approved the expedition against
Rome; Bonaparte, however, had taken the initiative in the affair. After he
had led the High Priest Samuel back into the Vatican, he could hope as King

David to occupy the Tuileries. He had won the parson-interests over to
himself.
The riot of June 13 limited itself, as we have seen, to a peaceful street
procession. There were, consequently, no laurels to be won from it.
Nevertheless, in these days, poor in heroes and events, the party of Order
converted this bloodless battle into a second Austerlitz. Tribune and press
lauded the army as the power of order against the popular multitude, and
the impotence of anarchy; and Changarnier as the "bulwark of society"—a
mystification that he finally believed in himself. Underhand, however, the
corps that seemed doubtful were removed from Paris; the regiments whose
suffrage had turned out most democratic were banished from France to
Algiers the restless heads among the troops were consigned to penal
quarters; finally, the shutting out of the press from the barracks, and of the
barracks from contact with the citizens was systematically carried out.
We stand here at the critical turning point in the history of the French
National Guard. In 1830, it had decided the downfall of the restoration.
Under Louis Philippe, every riot failed, at which the National Guard stood
on the side of the troops. When, in the February days of 1848, it showed
itself passive against the uprising and doubtful toward Louis Philippe
himself, he gave himself up for lost. Thus the conviction cast root that a
revolution could not win without, nor the Army against the National Guard.
This was the superstitious faith of the Army in bourgeois omnipotence. The
June days of 1548, when the whole National Guard, jointly with the regular
troops, threw down the insurrection, had confirmed the superstition. After
the inauguration of Bonaparte's administration, the position of the National
Guard sank somewhat through the unconstitutional joining of their
command with the command of the First Military Division in the person of
Changarnier.
As the command of the National Guard appeared here merely an attribute
of the military commander-in-chief, so did the Guard itself appear only as
an appendage of the regular troops. Finally, on June 13, the National Guard
was broken up, not through its partial dissolution only, that from that date
forward was periodically repeated at all points of France, leaving only
wrecks of its former self behind. The demonstration of June 13 was, above
all, a demonstration of the National Guards. True, they had not carried their
arms, but they had carried their uniforms against the Army—and the

talisman lay just in these uniforms. The Army then learned that this uniform
was but a woolen rag, like any other. The spell was broken. In the June days
of 1848, bourgeoisie and small traders were united as National Guard with
the Army against the proletariat; on June 13, 1849, the bourgeoisie had the
small traders' National Guard broken up; on December 2, 1851, the
National Guard of the bourgeoisie itself vanished, and Bonaparte attested
the fact when he subsequently signed the decree for its disbandment. Thus
the bourgeoisie had itself broken its last weapon against the army, from the
moment when the small traders' class no longer stood as a vassal behind,
but as a rebel before it; indeed, it was bound to do so, as it was bound to
destroy with its own hand all its means of defence against absolutism, so
soon as itself was absolute.
In the meantime, the party of Order celebrated the recovery of a power
that seemed lost in 1848 only in order that, freed from its trammels in 1849,
it be found again through invectives against the republic and the
Constitution; through the malediction of all future, present and past
revolutions, that one included which its own leaders had made; and, finally,
in laws by which the press was gagged, the right of association destroyed,
and the stage of siege regulated as an organic institution. The National
Assembly then adjourned from the middle of August to the middle of
October, after it had appointed a Permanent Committee for the period of its
absence. During these vacations, the Legitimists intrigued with Ems; the
Orleanists with Claremont; Bonaparte through princely excursions; the
Departmental Councilmen in conferences over the revision of the
Constitution;—occurrences, all of which recurred regularly at the periodical
vacations of the National Assembly, and upon which I shall not enter until
they have matured into events. Be it here only observed that the National
Assembly was impolitic in vanishing from the stage for long intervals, and
leaving in view, at the head of the republic, only one, however sorry, figure
—Louis Bonaparte's—, while, to the public scandal, the party of Order
broke up into its own royalist component parts, that pursued their
conflicting aspirations after the restoration. As often as, during these
vacations the confusing noise of the parliament was hushed, and its body
was dissolved in the nation, it was unmistakably shown that only one thing
was still wanting to complete the true figure of the republic: to make the
vacation of the National Assembly permanent, and substitute its inscription

—"Liberty, Equality, Fraternity"—by the unequivocal words, "Infantry,
Cavalry, Artillery".

IV
The National Assembly reconvened in the middle of October. On
November 1, Bonaparte surprised it with a message, in which he announced
the dismissal of the Barrot-Falloux Ministry, and the framing of a new.
Never have lackeys been chased from service with less ceremony than
Bonaparte did his ministers. The kicks, that were eventually destined for the
National Assembly, Barrot & Company received in the meantime.
The Barrot Ministry was, as we have seen, composed of Legitimists and
Orleanists; it was a Ministry of the party of Order. Bonaparte needed that
Ministry in order to dissolve the republican constituent assembly, to effect
the expedition against Rome, and to break up the democratic party. He had
seemingly eclipsed himself behind this Ministry, yielded the reins to the
hands of the party of Order, and assumed the modest mask, which, under
Louis Philippe, had been worn by the responsible overseer of the
newspapers—the mask of "homme de paille." [#1 Man of straw] Now he
threw off the mask, it being no longer the light curtain behind which he
could conceal, but the Iron Mask, which prevented him from revealing his
own physiognomy. He had instituted the Barrot Ministry in order to break
up the republican National Assembly in the name of the party of Order; he
now dismissed it in order to declare his own name independent of the
parliament of the party of Order.
There was no want of plausible pretexts for this dismissal. The Barrot
Ministry had neglected even the forms of decency that would have allowed
the president of the republic to appear as a power along with the National
Assembly. For instance, during the vacation of the National Assembly,
Bonaparte published a letter to Edgar Ney, in which he seemed to
disapprove the liberal attitude of the Pope, just as, in opposition to the
constitutive assembly, he had published a letter, in which he praised
Oudinot for his attack upon the Roman republic; when the National
Assembly came to vote on the budget for the Roman expedition, Victor
Hugo, out of pretended liberalism, brought up that letter for discussion; the
party of Order drowned this notion of Bonaparte's under exclamations of
contempt and incredulity as though notions of Bonaparte could not possibly

have any political weight;—and none of the Ministers took up the gauntlet
for him. On another occasion, Barrot, with his well-known hollow pathos,
dropped, from the speakers' tribune in the Assembly, words of indignation
upon the "abominable machinations," which, according to him, went on in
the immediate vicinity of the President. Finally, while the Ministry obtained
from the National Assembly a widow's pension for the Duchess of Orleans,
it denied every motion to raise the Presidential civil list;—and, in
Bonaparte, be it always remembered, the Imperial Pretender was so closely
blended with the impecunious adventurer, that the great idea of his being
destined to restore the Empire was ever supplemented by that other, to-wit,
that the French people was destined to pay his debts.
The Barrot-Falloux Ministry was the first and last parliamentary Ministry
that Bonaparte called into life. Its dismissal marks, accordingly, a decisive
period. With the Ministry, the party of Order lost, never to regain, an
indispensable post to the maintenance of the parliamentary regime,—the
handle to the Executive power. It is readily understood that, in a country
like France, where the Executive disposes over an army of more than half a
million office-holders, and, consequently, keeps permanently a large mass
of interests and existences in the completest dependence upon itself; where
the Government surrounds, controls, regulates, supervises and guards
society, from its mightiest acts of national life, down to its most
insignificant motions; from its common life, down to the private life of each
individual; where, due to such extraordinary centralization, this body of
parasites acquires a ubiquity and omniscience, a quickened capacity for
motion and rapidity that finds an analogue only in the helpless lack of selfreliance, in the unstrung weakness of the body social itself;—that in such a
country the National Assembly lost, with the control of the ministerial
posts, all real influence; unless it simultaneously simplified the
administration; if possible, reduced the army of office-holders; and, finally,
allowed society and public opinion to establish its own organs, independent
of government censorship. But the Material Interest of the French
bourgeoisie is most intimately bound up in maintenance of just such a large
and extensively ramified governmental machine. There the bourgeoisie
provides for its own superfluous membership; and supplies, in the shape of
government salaries, what it can not pocket in the form of profit, interest,
rent and fees. On the other hand, its Political Interests daily compel it to
increase the power of repression, i.e., the means and the personnel of the

government; it is at the same time forced to conduct an uninterrupted
warfare against public opinion, and, full of suspicion, to hamstring and
lame the independent organs of society—whenever it does not succeed in
amputating them wholly. Thus the bourgeoisie of France was forced by its
own class attitude, on the one hand, to destroy the conditions for all
parliamentary power, its own included, and, on the other, to render
irresistible the Executive power that stood hostile to it.
The new Ministry was called the d'Hautpoul Ministry. Not that General
d'Hautpoul had gained the rank of Ministerial President. Along with Barrot,
Bonaparte abolished this dignity, which, it must be granted, condemned the
President of the republic to the legal nothingness of a constitutional kind, of
a constitutional king at that, without throne and crown, without sceptre and
without sword, without irresponsibility, without the imperishable possession
of the highest dignity in the State, and, what was most untoward of all—
without a civil list. The d'Hautpoul Ministry numbered only one man of
parliamentary reputation, the Jew Fould, one of the most notorious
members of the high finance. To him fell the portfolio of finance. Turn to
the Paris stock quotations, and it will be found that from November 1, 1849,
French stocks fall and rise with the falling and rising of the Bonapartist
shares. While Bonaparte had thus found his ally in the Bourse, he at the
same time took possession of the Police through the appointment of Carlier
as Prefect of Police.
But the consequences of the change of Ministry could reveal themselves
only in the course of events. So far, Bonaparte had taken only one step
forward, to be all the more glaringly driven back. Upon his harsh message,
followed the most servile declarations of submissiveness to the National
Assembly. As often as the Ministers made timid attempts to introduce his
own personal hobbies as bills, they themselves seemed unwilling and
compelled only by their position to run the comic errands, of whose futility
they were convinced in advance. As often as Bonaparte blabbed out his
plans behind the backs of his Ministers, and sported his "idees
napoleoniennes," [#2 Napoleonic ideas.] his own Ministers disavowed him
from the speakers' tribune in the National Assembly. His aspirations after
usurpation seemed to become audible only to the end that the ironical
laughter of his adversaries should not die out. He deported himself like an
unappreciated genius, whom the world takes for a simpleton. Never did lie
enjoy in fuller measure the contempt of all classes than at this period. Never

did the bourgeoisie rule more absolutely; never did it more boastfully
display the insignia of sovereignty.
It is not here my purpose to write the history of its legislative activity,
which is summed up in two laws passed during this period: the law
reestablishing the duty on wine, and the laws on education, to suppress
infidelity. While the drinking of wine was made difficult to the Frenchmen,
all the more bounteously was the water of pure life poured out to them.
Although in the law on the duty on wine the bourgeoisie declares the old
hated French tariff system to be inviolable, it sought, by means of the laws
on education, to secure the old good will of the masses that made the former
bearable. One wonders to see the Orleanists, the liberal bourgeois, these old
apostles of Voltarianism and of eclectic philosophy, entrusting the
supervision of the French intellect to their hereditary enemies, the Jesuits.
But, while Orleanists and Legitimists could part company on the question
of the Pretender to the crown, they understood full well that their joint reign
dictated the joining of the means of oppression of two distinct epochs; that
the means of subjugation of the July monarchy had to be supplemented with
and strengthened by the means of subjugation of the restoration.
The farmers, deceived in all their expectations, more than ever ground
down by the law scale of the price of corn, on the one hand, and, on the
other, by the growing load of taxation and mortgages, began to stir in the
Departments. They were answered by the systematic baiting of the school
masters, whom the Government subjected to the clergy; by the systematic
baiting of the Mayors, whom it subjected to the Prefects; and by a system of
espionage to which all were subjected. In Paris and the large towns, the
reaction itself carries the physiognomy of its own epoch; it irritates more
than it cows; in the country, it becomes low, moan, petty, tiresome,
vexatious,—in a word, it becomes "gensdarme." It is easily understood how
three years of the gensdarme regime, sanctified by the regime of the
clergyman, was bound to demoralize unripe masses.
Whatever the mass of passion and declamation, that the party of Order
expended from the speakers' tribune in the National Assembly against the
minority, its speech remained monosyllabic, like that of the Christian,
whose speech was to be "Aye, aye; nay, nay." It was monosyllabic, whether
from the tribune or the press; dull as a conundrum, whose solution is known
beforehand. Whether the question was the right of petition or the duty on

wine, the liberty of the press or free trade, clubs or municipal laws,
protection of individual freedom or the regulation of national economy, the
slogan returns ever again, the theme is monotonously the same, the verdict
is ever ready and unchanged: Socialism! Even bourgeois liberalism is
pronounced socialistic; socialistic, alike, is pronounced popular education;
and, likewise, socialistic national financial reform. It was socialistic to build
a railroad where already a canal was; and it was socialistic to defend oneself
with a stick when attacked with a sword.
This was not a mere form of speech, a fashion, nor yet party tactics. The
bourgeoisie perceives correctly that all the weapons, which it forged against
feudalism, turn their edges against itself; that all the means of education,
which it brought forth, rebel against its own civilization; that all the gods,
which it made, have fallen away from it. It understands that all its so-called
citizens' rights and progressive organs assail and menace its class rule, both
in its social foundation and its political superstructure—consequently, have
become "socialistic." It justly scents in this menace and assault the secret of
Socialism, whose meaning and tendency it estimates more correctly than
the spurious, so-called Socialism, is capable of estimating itself, and which,
consequently, is unable to understand how it is that the bourgeoisie
obdurately shuts up its ears to it, alike whether it sentimentally whines
about the sufferings of humanity; or announces in Christian style the
millennium and universal brotherhood; or twaddles humanistically about
the soul, culture and freedom; or doctrinally matches out a system of
harmony and wellbeing for all classes. What, however, the bourgeoisie does
not understand is the consequence that its own parliamentary regime, its
own political reign, is also of necessity bound to fall under the general ban
of "socialistic." So long as the rule of the bourgeoisie is not fully organized,
has not acquired its purely political character, the contrast with the other
classes cannot come into view in all its sharpness; and, where it does come
into view, it cannot take that dangerous turn that converts every conflict
with the Government into a conflict with Capital. When, however, the
French bourgeoisie began to realize in every pulsation of society a menace
to "peace," how could it, at the head of society, pretend to uphold the
regime of unrest, its own regime, the parliamentary regime, which,
according to the expression of one of its own orators, lives in struggle, and
through struggle? The parliamentary regime lives on discussion,—how can
it forbid discussion? Every single interest, every single social institution is

there converted into general thoughts, is treated as a thought,—how could
any interest or institution claim to be above thought, and impose itself as an
article of faith? The orators' conflict in the tribune calls forth the conflict of
the rowdies in the press the debating club in parliament is necessarily
supplemented by debating clubs in the salons and the barrooms; the
representatives, who are constantly appealing to popular opinion, justify
popular opinion in expressing its real opinion in petitions. The
parliamentary regime leaves everything to the decision of majorities,—how
can the large majorities beyond parliament be expected not to wish to
decide? If, from above, they hear the fiddle screeching, what else is to be
expected than that those below should dance?
Accordingly, by now persecuting as Socialist what formerly it had
celebrated as Liberal, the bourgeoisie admits that its own interest orders it
to raise itself above the danger of self government; that, in order to restore
rest to the land, its own bourgeois parliament must, before all, be brought to
rest; that, in order to preserve its social power unhurt, its political power
must be broken; that the private bourgeois can continue to exploit the other
classes and rejoice in "property," "family," "religion" and "order" only
under the condition that his own class be condemned to the same political
nullity of the other classes, that, in order to save their purse, the crown must
be knocked off their heads, and the sword that was to shield them, must at
the same time be hung over their heads as a sword of Damocles.
In the domain of general bourgeois interests, the National Assembly
proved itself so barren, that, for instance, the discussion over the ParisAvignon railroad, opened in the winter of 1850, was not yet ripe for a vote
on December 2, 1851. Wherever it did not oppress or was reactionary, the
bourgeoisie was smitten with incurable barrenness.
While Bonaparte's Ministry either sought to take the initiative of laws in
the spirit of the party of Order, or even exaggerated their severity in their
enforcement and administration, he, on his part, sought to win popularity by
means of childishly silly propositions, to exhibit the contrast between
himself and the National Assembly, and to hint at a secret plan, held in
reserve and only through circumstances temporarily prevented from
disclosing its hidden treasures to the French people. Of this nature was the
proposition to decree a daily extra pay of four sous to the under-officers; so,
likewise, the proposition for a "word of honor" loan bank for working-men.

To have money given and money borrowed—that was the perspective that
he hoped to cajole the masses with. Presents and loans—to that was limited
the financial wisdom of the slums, the high as well as the low; to that were
limited the springs which Bonaparte knew how to set in motion. Never did
Pretender speculate more dully upon the dullness of the masses.
Again and again did the National Assembly fly into a passion at these
unmistakable attempts to win popularity at its expense, and at the growing
danger that this adventurer, lashed on by debts and unrestrained by
reputation, might venture upon some desperate act. The strained relations
between the party of Order and the President had taken on a threatening
aspect, when an unforeseen event threw him back, rueful into its arms. We
mean the supplementary elections of March, 1850. These elections took
place to fill the vacancies created in the National Assembly, after June 13,
by imprisonment and exile. Paris elected only Social-Democratic
candidates; it even united the largest vote upon one of the insurgents of
June, 1848,—Deflotte. In this way the small traders' world of Paris, now
allied with the proletariat, revenged itself for the defeat of June 13, 1849. It
seemed to have disappeared from the field of battle at the hour of danger
only to step on it again at a more favorable opportunity, with increased
forces for the fray, and with a bolder war cry. A circumstance seemed to
heighten the danger of this electoral victory. The Army voted in Paris for a
June insurgent against Lahitte, a Minister of Bonaparte's, and, in the
Departments, mostly for the candidates of the Mountain, who, there also,
although not as decisively as in Paris, maintained the upper hand over their
adversaries.
Bonaparte suddenly saw himself again face to face with the revolution.
As on January 29, 1849, as on June 13, 1849, on May 10, 1850, he vanished
again behind the party of Order. He bent low; he timidly apologized; he
offered to appoint any Ministry whatever at the behest of the parliamentary
majority; he even implored the Orleanist and Legitimist party leaders—the
Thiers, Berryers, Broglies, Moles, in short, the so-called burgraves—to take
hold of the helm of State in person. The party of Order did not know how to
utilize this opportunity, that was never to return. Instead of boldly taking
possession of the proffered power, it did not even force Bonaparte to restore
the Ministry dismissed on November 1; it contented itself with humiliating
him with its pardon, and with affiliating Mr. Baroche to the d'Hautpoul
Ministry. This Baroche had, as Public Prosecutor, stormed before the High

Court at Bourges, once against the revolutionists of May 15, another time
against the Democrats of June 13, both times on the charge of "attentats"
against the National Assembly. None of Bonaparte's Ministers contributed
later more towards the degradation of the National Assembly; and, after
December 2, 1851, we meet him again as the comfortably stalled and dearly
paid Vice-President of the Senate. He had spat into the soup of the
revolutionists for Bonaparte to eat it.
On its part, the Social Democratic party seemed only to look for pretexts
in order to make its own victory doubtful, and to dull its edge. Vidal, one of
the newly elected Paris representatives, was returned for Strassburg also. He
was induced to decline the seat for Paris and accept the one for Strassburg.
Thus, instead of giving a definite character to their victory at the hustings,
and thereby compelling the party of Order forthwith to contest it in
parliament; instead of thus driving the foe to battle at the season of popular
enthusiasm and of a favorable temper in the Army, the democratic party
tired out Paris with a new campaign during the months of March and April;
it allowed the excited popular passions to wear themselves out in this
second provisional electoral play it allowed the revolutionary vigor to
satiate itself with constitutional successes, and lose its breath in petty
intrigues, hollow declamation and sham moves; it gave the bourgeoisie time
to collect itself and make its preparations finally, it allowed the significance
of the March elections to find a sentimentally weakening commentary at the
subsequent April election in the victory of Eugene Sue. In one word, it
turned the 10th of March into an April Fool.
The parliamentary majority perceived the weakness of its adversary. Its
seventeen burgraves—Bonaparte had left to it the direction of and
responsibility for the attack—, framed a new election law, the moving of
which was entrusted to Mr. Faucher, who had applied for the honor. On
May 8, he introduced the new law whereby universal suffrage was
abolished; a three years residence in the election district imposed as a
condition for voting; and, finally, the proof of this residence made
dependent, for the working-man, upon the testimony of his employer.
As revolutionarily as the democrats had agitated and stormed during the
constitutional struggles, so constitutionally did they, now, when it was
imperative to attest, arms in hand, the earnestness of their late electoral
victories, preach order, "majestic calmness," lawful conduct, i. e., blind

submission to the will of the counter-revolution, which revealed itself as
law. During the debate, the Mountain put the party of Order to shame by
maintaining the passionless attitude of the law-abiding burger, who upholds
the principle of law against revolutionary passions; and by twitting the party
of Order with the fearful reproach of proceeding in a revolutionary manner.
Even the newly elected deputies took pains to prove by their decent and
thoughtful deportment what an act of misjudgment it was to decry them as
anarchists, or explain their election as a victory of the revolution. The new
election law was passed on May 31. The Mountain contented itself with
smuggling a protest into the pockets of the President of the Assembly. To
the election law followed a new press law, whereby the revolutionary press
was completely done away with. It had deserved its fate. The "National"
and the "Presse," two bourgeois organs, remained after this deluge the
extreme outposts of the revolution.
We have seen how, during March and April, the democratic leaders did
everything to involve the people of Paris in a sham battle, and how, after
May 8, they did everything to keep it away from a real battle. We may not
here forget that the year 1850 was one of the most brilliant years of
industrial and commercial prosperity; consequently, that the Parisian
proletariat was completely employed. But the election law of May 31, 1850
excluded them from all participation in political power; it cut the field of
battle itself from under them; it threw the workingmen back into the state of
pariahs, which they had occupied before the February revolution. In
allowing themselves, in sight of such an occurrence, to be led by the
democrats, and in forgetting the revolutionary interests of their class
through temporary comfort, the workingmen abdicated the honor of being a
conquering power; they submitted to their fate; they proved that the defeat
of June, 1848, had incapacitated them from resistance for many a year to
come finally, that the historic process must again, for the time being,
proceed over their heads. As to the small traders' democracy, which, on
June 13, had cried out: "If they but dare to assail universal suffrage . . . then
. . . then we will show who we are!"—they now consoled themselves with
the thought that the counter-revolutionary blow, which had struck them, was
no blow at all, and that the law of May 31 was no law. On May 2, 1852,
according to them, every Frenchman would appear at the hustings, in one
hand the ballot, in the other the sword. With this prophecy they set their
hearts at ease. Finally, the Army was punished by its superiors for the

elections of May and April, 1850, as it was punished for the election of
May 29, 1849. This time, however, it said to itself determinately: "The
revolution shall not cheat us a third time."
The law of May 31, 1850, was the "coup d'etat" of the bourgeoisie. All its
previous conquests over the revolution had only a temporary character: they
became uncertain the moment the National Assembly stepped off the stage;
they depended upon the accident of general elections, and the history of the
elections since 1848 proved irrefutably that, in the same measure as the
actual reign of the bourgeoisie gathered strength, its moral reign over the
masses wore off. Universal suffrage pronounced itself on May 10 pointedly
against the reign of the bourgeoisie; the bourgeoisie answered with the
banishment of universal suffrage. The law of May 31 was, accordingly, one
of the necessities of the class struggle. On the other hand, the constitution
required a minimum of two million votes for the valid ejection of the
President of the republic. If none of the Presidential candidates polled this
minimum, then the National Assembly was to elect the President out of the
three candidates polling the highest votes. At the time that the constitutive
body made this law, ten million voters were registered on the election rolls.
In its opinion, accordingly, one-fifth of the qualified voters sufficed to make
a choice for President valid. The law of May 31 struck at least three million
voters off the rolls, reduced the number of qualified voters to seven
millions, and yet, not withstanding, it kept the lawful minimum at two
millions for the election of a President. Accordingly, it raised the lawful
minimum from a fifth to almost a third of the qualified voters, i.e., it did all
it could to smuggle the Presidential election out of the hands of the people
into those of the National Assembly. Thus, by the election law of May 31,
the party of Order seemed to have doubly secured its empire, in that it
placed the election of both the National Assembly and the President of the
republic in the keeping of the stable portion of society.

V
The strife immediately broke out again between the National Assembly
and Bonaparte, so soon as the revolutionary crisis was weathered, and
universal suffrage was abolished.
The Constitution had fixed the salary of Bonaparte at 600,000 francs.
Barely half a year after his installation, he succeeded in raising this sum to
its double: Odillon Barrot had wrung from the constitutive assembly a
yearly allowance of 600,000 francs for so-called representation expenses.
After June 13, Bonaparte hinted at similar solicitations, to which, however,
Barrot then turned a deaf ear. Now, after May 31, he forthwith utilized the
favorable moment, and caused his ministers to move a civil list of three
millions in the National Assembly. A long adventurous, vagabond career
had gifted him with the best developed antennae for feeling out the weak
moments when he could venture upon squeezing money from his bourgeois.
He carried on regular blackmail. The National Assembly had maimed the
sovereignty of the people with his aid and his knowledge: he now
threatened to denounce its crime to the tribunal of the people, if it did not
pull out its purse and buy his silence with three millions annually. It had
robbed three million Frenchmen of the suffrage: for every Frenchman
thrown "out of circulation," he demanded a franc "in circulation." He, the
elect of six million, demanded indemnity for the votes he had been
subsequently cheated of. The Committee of the National Assembly turned
the importunate fellow away. The Bonapartist press threatened: Could the
National Assembly break with the President of the republic at a time when
it had broken definitely and on principle with the mass of the nation? It
rejected the annual civil list, but granted, for this once, an allowance of
2,160,000 francs. Thus it made itself guilty of the double weakness of
granting the money, and, at the same time, showing by its anger that it did
so only unwillingly. We shall presently see to what use Bonaparte put the
money. After this aggravating after-play, that followed upon the heels of the
abolition of universal suffrage, and in which Bonaparte exchanged his
humble attitude of the days of the crisis of March and April for one of
defiant impudence towards the usurping parliament, the National Assembly

adjourned for three months, from August 11, to November 11. It left behind
in its place a Permanent Committee of 18 members that contained no
Bonapartist, but did contain a few moderate republicans. The Permanent
Committee of the year 1849 had numbered only men of order and
Bonapartists. At that time, however, the party of Order declared itself in
permanence against the revolution; now the parliamentary republic declared
itself in permanence against the President. After the law of May 31, only
this rival still confronted the party of Order.
When the National Assembly reconvened in November, 1850, instead of
its former petty skirmishes with the President, a great headlong struggle, a
struggle for life between the two powers, seemed to have become
inevitable.
As in the year 1849, the party of Order had during this year's vacation,
dissolved into its two separate factions, each occupied with its own
restoration intrigues, which had received new impetus from the death of
Louis Philippe. The Legitimist King, Henry V, had even appointed a regular
Ministry, that resided in Paris, and in which sat members of the Permanent
Committee. Hence, Bonaparte was, on his part, justified in making tours
through the French Departments, and—according to the disposition of the
towns that he happened to be gladdening with his presence—some times
covertly, other times more openly blabbing out his own restoration plans,
and gaining votes for himself On these excursions, which the large official
"Moniteur" and the small private "Moniteurs" of Bonaparte were, of course,
bound to celebrate as triumphal marches, he was constantly accompanied
by affiliated members of the "Society of December 10" This society dated
from the year 1849. Under the pretext of founding a benevolent association,
the slum-proletariat of Paris was organized into secret sections, each section
led by Bonapartist agents, with a Bonapartist General at the head of all.
Along with ruined roues of questionable means of support and questionable
antecedents, along with the foul and adventures-seeking dregs of the
bourgeoisie, there were vagabonds, dismissed soldiers, discharged convicts,
runaway galley slaves, sharpers, jugglers, lazzaroni, pickpockets, sleight-ofhand performers, gamblers, procurers, keepers of disorderly houses, porters,
literati, organ grinders, rag pickers, scissors grinders, tinkers, beggars—in
short, that whole undefined, dissolute, kicked-about mass that the
Frenchmen style "la Boheme" With this kindred element, Bonaparte formed
the stock of the "Society of December 10," a "benevolent association" in so

far as, like Bonaparte himself, all its members felt the need of being
benevolent to themselves at the expense of the toiling nation. The
Bonaparte, who here constitutes himself Chief of the Slum-Proletariat; who
only here finds again in plenteous form the interests which he personally
pursues; who, in this refuse, offal and wreck of all classes, recognizes the
only class upon which he can depend unconditionally;—this is the real
Bonaparte, the Bonaparte without qualification. An old and crafty roue, he
looks upon the historic life of nations, upon their great and public acts, as
comedies in the ordinary sense, as a carnival, where the great costumes,
words and postures serve only as masks for the pettiest chicaneries. So, on
the occasion of his expedition against Strassburg when a trained Swiss
vulture impersonated the Napoleonic eagle; so, again, on the occasion of his
raid upon Boulogne, when he struck a few London lackeys into French
uniform: they impersonated the army; [#1 Under the reign of Louis
Philippe, Bonaparte made two attempts to restore the throne of Napoleon:
one in October, 1836, in an expedition from Switzerland upon Strassburg
and one in August, 1840, in an expedition from England upon Boulogne.]
and so now, in his "Society of December 10," he collects 10,000 loafers
who are to impersonate the people as Snug the Joiner does the lion. At a
period when the bourgeoisie itself is playing the sheerest comedy, but in the
most solemn manner in the world, without doing violence to any of the
pedantic requirements of French dramatic etiquette, and is itself partly
deceived by, partly convinced of, the solemnity of its own public acts, the
adventurer, who took the comedy for simple comedy, was bound to win.
Only after he has removed his solemn opponent, when he himself takes
seriously his own role of emperor, and, with the Napoleonic mask on,
imagines he impersonates the real Napoleon, only then does he become the
victim of his own peculiar conception of history—the serious clown, who
no longer takes history for a comedy, but a comedy for history. What the
national work-shops were to the socialist workingmen, what the "Gardes
mobiles" were to the bourgeois republicans, that was to Bonaparte the
"Society of December 10,"—a force for partisan warfare peculiar to
himself. On his journeys, the divisions of the Society, packed away on the
railroads, improvised an audience for him, performed public enthusiasm,
shouted "vive l'Empereur," insulted and clubbed the republicans,—all, of
course, under the protection of the police. On his return stages to Paris, this
rabble constituted his vanguard, it forestalled or dispersed counter-

demonstrations. The "Society of December 10" belonged to him, it was his
own handiwork, his own thought. Whatever else he appropriates, the power
of circumstances places in his hands; whatever else he does, either
circumstances do for him, or he is content to copy from the deeds of others,
but he posing before the citizens with the official phrases about "Order,"
"Religion," "Family," "Property," and, behind him, the secret society of
skipjacks and picaroons, the society of disorder, of prostitution, and of theft,
—that is Bonaparte himself as the original author; and the history of the
"Society of December 10" is his own history. Now, then, it happened that
Representatives belonging to the party of order occasionally got under the
clubs of the Decembrists. Nay, more. Police Commissioner Yon, who had
been assigned to the National Assembly, and was charged with the
guardianship of its safety, reported to the Permanent Committee upon the
testimony of one Alais, that a Section of the Decembrists had decided on
the murder of General Changarnier and of Dupin, the President of the
National Assembly, and had already settled upon the men to execute the
decree. One can imagine the fright of Mr. Dupin. A parliamentary inquest
over the "Society of December 10," i. e., the profanation of the Bonapartist
secret world now seemed inevitable. Just before the reconvening of the
National Assembly, Bonaparte circumspectly dissolved his Society, of
course, on paper only. As late as the end of 1851, Police Prefect Carlier
vainly sought, in an exhaustive memorial, to move him to the real
dissolution of the Decembrists.
The "Society of December 10" was to remain the private army of
Bonaparte until he should have succeeded in converting the public Army
into a "Society of December 10." Bonaparte made the first attempt in this
direction shortly after the adjournment of the National Assembly, and he
did so with the money which he had just wrung from it. As a fatalist, he
lives devoted to the conviction that there are certain Higher Powers, whom
man, particularly the soldier, cannot resist. First among these Powers he
numbers cigars and champagne, cold poultry and garlic-sausage.
Accordingly, in the apartments of the Elysee, he treated first the officers and
under-officers to cigars and champagne, to cold poultry and garlic-sausage.
On October 3, he repeats this manoeuvre with the rank and file of the troops
by the review of St. Maur; and, on October 10, the same manoeuvre again,
upon a larger scale, at the army parade of Satory. The Uncle bore in
remembrance the campaigns of Alexander in Asia: the Nephew bore in

remembrance the triumphal marches of Bacchus in the same country.
Alexander was, indeed, a demigod; but Bacchus was a full-fledged god, and
the patron deity, at that, of the "Society of December 10."
After the review of October 3, the Permanent Committee summoned the
Minister of War, d'Hautpoul, before it. He promised that such breaches of
discipline should not recur. We have seen how, on October 10th, Bonaparte
kept d'Hautpoul's word. At both reviews Changarnier had commanded as
Commander-in-chief of the Army of Paris. He, at once member of the
Permanent Committee, Chief of the National Guard, the "Savior" of January
29, and June 13, the "Bulwark of Society," candidate of the Party of Order
for the office of President, the suspected Monk of two monarchies,—he had
never acknowledged his subordination to the Minister of War, had ever
openly scoffed at the republican Constitution, and had pursued Bonaparte
with a protection that was ambiguously distinguished. Now he became
zealous for the discipline in opposition to Bonaparte. While, on October 10,
a part of the cavalry cried: "Vive Napoleon! Vivent les saucissons;" [#2
Long live Napoleon! Long live the sausages!] Changarnier saw to it that at
least the infantry, which filed by under the command of his friend
Neumeyer, should observe an icy silence. In punishment, the Minister of
War, at the instigation of Bonaparte, deposed General Neumeyer from his
post in Paris, under the pretext of providing for him as Commander-in-chief
of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Military Divisions. Neumeyer declined the
exchange, and had, in consequence, to give his resignation. On his part,
Changarnier published on November 2, an order, wherein he forbade the
troops to indulge, while under arms, in any sort of political cries or
demonstrations. The papers devoted to the Elysee interests attacked
Changarnier; the papers of the party of Order attacked Bonaparte; the
Permanent Committee held frequent secret sessions, at which it was
repeatedly proposed to declare the fatherland in danger; the Army seemed
divided into two hostile camps, with two hostile staffs; one at the Elysee,
where Bonaparte, the other at the Tuileries, where Changarnier resided. All
that seemed wanting for the signal of battle to sound was the convening of
the National Assembly. The French public looked upon the friction between
Bonaparte and Changarnier in the light of the English journalist, who
characterized it in these words: "The political servant girls of France are
mopping away the glowing lava of the revolution with old mops, and they
scold each other while doing their work."

Meanwhile, Bonaparte hastened to depose the Minister of War,
d'Hautpoul; to expedite him heels over head to Algiers; and to appoint in his
place General Schramm as Minister of War. On November 12, he sent to the
National Assembly a message of American excursiveness, overloaded with
details, redolent of order, athirst for conciliation, resignful to the
Constitution, dealing with all and everything, only not with the burning
questions of the moment. As if in passing he dropped the words that
according to the express provisions of the Constitution, the President alone
disposes over the Army. The message closed with the following highsounding protestations:
"France demands, above all things, peace . . . Alone bound by an oath, I
shall keep myself within the narrow bounds marked out by it to me . . . As
to me, elected by the people, and owing my power to it alone, I shall always
submit to its lawfully expressed will. Should you at this session decide upon
the revision of the Constitution, a Constitutional Convention will regulate
the position of the Executive power. If you do not, then, the people will, in
1852, solemnly announce its decision. But, whatever the solution may be
that the future has in store, let us arrive at an understanding to the end that
never may passion, surprise or violence decide over the fate of a great
nation. . . . That which, above all, bespeaks my attention is, not who will, in
1852, rule over France, but to so devote the time at my disposal that the
interval may pass by with-out agitation and disturbance. I have
straightforwardly opened my heart to you, you will answer my frankness
with your confidence, my good efforts with your co-operation. God will do
the rest."
The honnete, hypocritically temperate, commonplace-virtuous language
of the bourgeoisie reveals its deep meaning in the mouth of the selfappointed ruler of the "Society of December 10," and of the picnic-hero of
St. Maur and Satory.
The burgraves of the party of Order did not for a moment deceive
themselves on the confidence that this unbosoming deserved. They were
long blase on oaths; they numbered among themselves veterans and virtuosi
of perjury. The passage about the army did not, however, escape them. They
observed with annoyance that the message, despite its prolix enumeration of
the lately enacted laws, passed, with affected silence, over the most
important of all, the election law, and, moreover, in case no revision of the

Constitution was held, left the choice of the President, in 1852, with the
people. The election law was the ball-and-chain to the feet of the party of
Order, that hindered them from walking, and now assuredly from storming.
Furthermore, by the official disbandment of the "Society of December 10,"
and the dismissal of the Minister of War, d'Hautpoul, Bonaparte had, with
his own hands, sacrificed the scapegoats on the altar of the fatherland. He
had turned off the expected collision. Finally, the party of Order itself
anxiously sought to avoid every decisive conflict with the Executive, to
weaken and to blur it over. Fearing to lose its conquests over the revolution,
it let its rival gather the fruits thereof. "France demands, above all things,
peace," with this language had the party of Order been apostrophizing the
revolution, since February; with this language did Bonaparte's message now
apostrophize the party of Order: "France demands, above all things, peace."
Bonaparte committed acts that aimed at usurpation, but the party of Order
committed a "disturbance of the peace," if it raised the hue and cry, and
explained them hypochrondriacally. The sausages of Satory were mousestill when nobody talked about them;—France demands, above all things,
"peace." Accordingly, Bonaparte demanded that he be let alone; and the
parliamentary party was lamed with a double fear: the fear of re-conjuring
up the revolutionary disturbance of the peace, and the fear of itself
appearing as the disturber of the peace in the eyes of its own class, of the
bourgeosie. Seeing that, above all things, France demanded peace, the party
of Order did not dare, after Bonaparte had said "peace" in his message, to
answer "war." The public, who had promised to itself the pleasure of seeing
great scenes of scandal at the opening of the National Assembly, was
cheated out of its expectations. The opposition deputies, who demanded the
submission of the minutes of the Permanent Committee over the October
occurrences, were outvoted. All debate that might excite was fled from on
principle. The labors of the National Assembly during November and
December, 1850, were without interest.
Finally, toward the end of December, began a guerilla warfare about
certain prerogatives of the parliament. The movement sank into the mire of
petty chicaneries on the prerogative of the two powers, since, with the
abolition of universal suffrage, the bourgeoisie had done away with the
class struggle.
A judgment for debt had been secured against Mauguin, one of the
Representatives. Upon inquiry by the President of the Court, the Minister of

Justice, Rouher, declared that an order of arrest should be made out without
delay. Manguin was, accordingly, cast into the debtors' prison. The National
Assembly bristled up when it heard of the "attentat." It not only ordered his
immediate release, but had him forcibly taken out of Clichy the same
evening by its own greffier. In order, nevertheless, to shield its belief in the
"sacredness of private property," and also with the ulterior thought of
opening, in case of need, an asylum for troublesome Mountainers, it
declared the imprisonment of a Representative for debt to be permissible
upon its previous consent. It forgot to decree that the President also could
be locked up for debt. By its act, it wiped out the last semblance of
inviolability that surrounded the members of its own body.
It will be remembered that, upon the testimony of one Allais, Police
Commissioner Yon had charged a Section of Decembrists with a plan to
murder Dupin and Changarnier. With an eye upon that, the questors
proposed at the very first session, that the parliament organize a police force
of its own, paid for out of the private budget of the National Assembly
itself, and wholly independent of the Police Prefects. The Minister of the
Interior, Baroche, protested against this trespass on his preserves. A
miserable compromise followed, according to which the Police
Commissioner of the Assembly was to be paid out of its own private budget
and was to be subject to the appointment and dismissal of its own questors,
but only upon previous agreement with the Minister of the Interior. In the
meantime Allais had been prosecuted by the Government. It was an easy
thing in Court, to present his testimony in the light of a mystification, and,
through the mouth of the Public Prosecutor, to throw Dupin, Changarnier,
Yon, together with the whole National Assembly, into a ridiculous light.
Thereupon, on December 29, Minister Baroche writes a letter to Dupin, in
which he demands the dismissal of Yon. The Committee of the National
Assembly decides to keep Yon in office; nevertheless, the National
Assembly, frightened by its own violence in the affair of Mauguin, and
accustomed, every time it has shied a blow at the Executive, to receive back
from it two in exchange, does not sanction this decision. It dismisses Yon in
reward for his zeal in office, and robs itself of a parliamentary prerogative,
indispensable against a person who does not decide by night to execute by
day, but decides by day and executes by night.
We have seen how, during the months of November and December, under
great and severe provocations, the National Assembly evaded and refused

the combat with the Executive power. Now we see it compelled to accept it
on the smallest occasions. In the affair of Mauguin, it confirms in principle
the liability of a Representative to imprisonment for debt, but to itself
reserves the power of allowing the principle to be applied only to the
Representatives whom it dislikes,-and for this infamous privilege we see it
wrangling with the Minister of Justice. Instead of utilizing the alleged
murder plan to the end of fastening an inquest upon the "Society of
December 10," and of exposing Bonaparte beyond redemption before
France and his true figure, as the head of the slum-proletariat of Paris, it
allows the collision to sink to a point where the only issue between itself
and the Minister of the Interior is. Who has jurisdiction over the
appointment and dismissal of a Police Commissioner? Thus we see the
party of Order, during this whole period, compelled by its ambiguous
position to wear out and fritter away its conflict with the Executive power
in small quarrels about jurisdiction, in chicaneries, in pettifogging, in
boundary disputes, and to turn the stalest questions of form into the very
substance of its activity. It dares not accept the collision at the moment
when it involves a principle, when the Executive power has really given
itself a blank, and when the cause of the National Assembly would be the
cause of the nation. It would thereby have issued to the nation an order of
march; and it feared nothing so much as that the nation should move.
Hence, on these occasions, it rejects the motions of the Mountain, and
proceeds to the order of the day. After the issue has in this way lost all
magnitude, the Executive power quietly awaits the moment when it can
take it up again upon small and insignificant occasions; when, so to say, the
issue offers only a parliamentary local interest. Then does the repressed
valor of the party of Order break forth, then it tears away the curtain from
the scene, then it denounces the President, then it declares the republic to be
in danger,—but then all its pathos appears stale, and the occasion for the
quarrel a hypocritical pretext, or not at all worth the effort. The
parliamentary tempest becomes a tempest in a tea-pot, the struggle an
intrigue, the collision a scandal. While the revolutionary classes gloat with
sardonic laughter over the humiliation of the National Assembly—they, of
course, being as enthusiastic for the prerogatives of the parliament as that
body is for public freedom—the bourgeoisie, outside of the parliament,
does not understand how the bourgeoisie, inside of the parliament, can
squander its time with such petty bickerings, and can endanger peace by

such wretched rivalries with the President. It is puzzled at a strategy that
makes peace the very moment when everybody expects battles, and that
attacks the very moment everybody believes peace has been concluded.
On December 20, Pascal Duprat interpellated the Minister of the Interior
on the "Goldbar Lottery." This lottery was a "Daughter from Elysium";
Bonaparte, together with his faithful, had given her birth; and Police Prefect
Carlier had placed her under his official protection, although the French law
forbade all lotteries, with the exception of games for benevolent purposes.
Seven million tickets, a franc a piece, and the profit ostensibly destined to
the shipping of Parisian vagabonds to California. Golden dreams were to
displace the Socialist dreams of the Parisian proletariat; the tempting
prospect of a prize was to displace the doctrinal right to labor. Of course,
the workingmen of Paris did not recognize in the lustre of the California
gold bars the lack-lustre francs that had been wheedled out of their pockets.
In the main, however, the scheme was an unmitigated swindle. The
vagabonds, who meant to open California gold mines without taking the
pains to leave Paris, were Bonaparte himself and his Round Table of
desperate insolvents. The three millions granted by the National Assembly
were rioted away; the Treasury had to be refilled somehow or another. In
vain did Bonaparte open a national subscription, at the head of which he
himself figured with a large sum, for the establishment of so-called "cites
ouvrieres." [#3 Work cities.] The hard-hearted bourgeois waited, distrustful,
for the payment of his own shares; and, as this, of course, never took place,
the speculation in Socialist castles in the air fell flat. The gold bars drew
better. Bonaparte and his associates did not content themselves with putting
into their own pockets part of the surplus of the seven millions over and
above the bars that were to be drawn; they manufactured false tickets; they
sold, of Number 10 alone, fifteen to twenty lots—a financial operation fully
in the spirit of the "Society of December 10"! The National Assembly did
not here have before it the fictitious President of the Republic, but
Bonaparte himself in flesh and blood. Here it could catch him in the act, not
in conflict with the Constitution, but with the penal code. When, upon
Duprat's interpellation, the National Assembly went over to the order of the
day, this did not happen simply because Girardin's motion to declare itself
"satisfied" reminded the party of Order of its own systematic corruption: the
bourgeois, above all the bourgeois who has been inflated into a statesman,
supplements his practical meanness with theoretical pompousness. As

statesman, he becomes, like the Government facing him, a superior being,
who can be fought only in a higher, more exalted manner.
Bonaparte-who, for the very reason of his being a "bohemian," a princely
slum-proletarian, had over the scampish bourgeois the advantage that he
could carry on the fight after the Assembly itself had carried him with its
own hands over the slippery ground of the military banquets, of the
reviews, of the "Society of December 10," and, finally, of the penal codenow saw that the moment had arrived when he could move from the
seemingly defensive to the offensive. He was but little troubled by the
intermediate and trifling defeats of the Minister of Justice, of the Minister
of War, of the Minister of the Navy, of the Minister of Finance, whereby the
National Assembly indicated its growling displeasure. Not only did he
prevent the Ministers from resigning, and thus recognizing the
subordination of the executive power to the Parliament; he could now
accomplish what during the vacation of the National Assembly he had
commenced, the separation of the military power from the Assembly—the
deposition of Changarnier.
An Elysee paper published an order, issued during the month of May,
ostensibly to the First Military Division, and, hence, proceeding from
Changarnier, wherein the officers were recommended, in case of an
uprising, to give no quarter to the traitors in their own ranks, to shoot them
down on the spot, and to refuse troops to the National Assembly, should it
make a requisition for such. On January 3, 1851, the Cabinet was
interpellated on this order. The Cabinet demands for the examination of the
affair at first three months, then one week, finally only twenty-four hours'
time. The Assembly orders an immediate explanation Changarnier rises and
declares that this order never existed; he adds that he would ever hasten to
respond to the calls of the National Assembly, and that, in case of a
collision, they could count upon him. The Assembly receives his utterances
with inexpressible applause, and decrees a vote of confidence to him. It
thereby resign its own powers; it decrees its own impotence and the
omnipotence of the Army by committing itself to the private protection of a
general. But the general, in turn, deceives himself when he places at the
Assembly's disposal and against Bonaparte a power that he holds only as a
fief from that same Bonaparte, and when, on his part, he expects protection
from this Parliament, from his protege', itself needful of protection. But
Changarnier has faith in the mysterious power with which since January,

1849, he had been clad by the bourgeoisie. He takes himself for the Third
Power, standing beside the other Powers of Government. He shares the faith
of all the other heroes, or rather saints, of this epoch, whose greatness
consists but in the interested good opinion that their own party holds of
them, and who shrink into every-day figures so soon as circumstances
invite them to perform miracles. Infidelity is, indeed, the deadly enemy of
these supposed heroes and real saints. Hence their virtuously proud
indignation at the unenthusiastic wits and scoffers.
That same evening the Ministers were summoned to the Elysee;
Bonaparte presses the removal of Changarnier; five Ministers refuse to sign
the order; the "Moniteur" announces a Ministerial crisis; and the party of
Order threatens the formation of a Parliamentary army under the command
of Changarnier. The party of Order had the constitutional power hereto. It
needed only to elect Changarnier President of the National Assembly in
order to make a requisition for whatever military forces it needed for its
own safety. It could do this all the more safely, seeing that Changarnier still
stood at the head of the Army and of the Parisian National Guard, and only
lay in wait to be summoned, together with the Army. The Bonapartist press
did not even dare to question the right of the National Assembly to issue a
direct requisition for troops;—a legal scruple, that, under the given
circumstances, did not promise success. That the Army would have obeyed
the orders of the National Assembly is probable, when it is considered that
Bonaparte had to look eight days all over Paris to find two generals—
Baraguay d'Hilliers and St. Jean d'Angley—who declared themselves ready
to countersign the order cashiering Changamier. That, however, the party of
Order would have found in its own ranks and in the parliament the requisite
vote for such a decision is more than doubtful, when it is considered that,
eight days later, 286 votes pulled away from it, and that, as late as
December, 1851, at the last decisive hour, the Mountain rejected a similar
proposition. Nevertheless, the burgraves might still have succeeded in
driving the mass of their party to an act of heroism, consisting in feeling
safe behind a forest of bayonets, and in accepting the services of the Army,
which found itself deserted in its camp. Instead of this, the Messieurs
Burgraves betook themselves to the Elysee on the evening of January 6,
with the view of inducing Bonaparte, by means of politic words and
considerations, to drop the removal of Changarnier. Him whom we must
convince we recognize as the master of the situation. Bonaparte, made to

feel secure by this step, appoints on January 12 a new Ministry, in which
the leaders of the old, Fould and Baroche, are retained. St Jean d'Angley
becomes Minister of War; the "Moniteur" announces the decree cashiering
Changarnier; his command is divided up between Baraguay d'Hilliers, who
receives the First Division, and Perrot, who is placed over the National
Guard. The "Bulwark of Society" is turned down; and, although no dog
barks over the event, in the Bourses the stock quotations rise.
By repelling the Army, that, in Changarnier's person, put itself at its
disposal, and thus irrevocably stood up against the President, the party of
Order declares that the bourgeoisie has lost its vocation to reign. Already
there was no parliamentary Ministry. By losing, furthermore, the handle to
the Army and to the National Guard, what instrument of force was there left
to the National Assembly in order to maintain both the usurped power of
the parliament over the people, and its constitutional power over the
President? None. All that was left to it was the appeal to peaceful
principles, that itself had always explained as "general rules" merely, to be
prescribed to third parties, and only in order to enable itself to move all the
more freely. With the removal of Changarnier, with the transfer of the
military power to Bonaparte, closes the first part of the period that we are
considering, the period of the struggle between the party of Order and the
Executive power. The war between the two powers is now openly declared;
it is conducted openly; but only after the party of Order has lost both arms
and soldier. With-out a Ministry, without any army, without a people,
without the support of public opinion; since its election law of May 31, no
longer the representative of the sovereign nation sans eyes, sans ears, sans
teeth, sans everything, the National Assembly had gradually converted itself
into a French Parliament of olden days, that must leave all action to the
Government, and content itself with growling remonstrances "post festum."
[#4 After the act is done; after the fact.]
The party of Order receives the new Ministry with a storm of indignation.
General Bedeau calls to mind the mildness of the Permanent Committee
during the vacation, and the excessive prudence with which it had
renounced the privilege of disclosing its minutes. Now, the Minister of the
Interior himself insists upon the disclosure of these minutes, that have now,
of course, become dull as stagnant waters, reveal no new facts, and fall
without making the slightest effect upon the blase public. Upon Remusat's
proposition, the National Assembly retreats into its Committees, and

appoints a "Committee on Extraordinary Measures." Paris steps all the less
out of the ruts of its daily routine, seeing that business is prosperous at the
time, the manufactories busy, the prices of cereals low, provisions abundant,
the savings banks receiving daily new deposits. The "extraordinary
measures," that the parliament so noisily announced fizzle out on January
18 in a vote of lack of confidence against the Ministry, without General
Changarnier's name being even mentioned. The party of Order was forced
to frame its motion in that way so as to secure the votes of the republicans,
because, of all the acts of the Ministry, Changarnier's dismissal only was the
very one they approved, while the party of Order cannot in fact, condemn
the other Ministerial acts which it had itself dictated. The January 18 vote
of lack of confidence was decided by 415 ayes against 286 nays. It was,
accordingly put through by a coalition of the uncompromising Legitimists
and Orleanists with the pure republicans and the Mountain. Thus it revealed
the fact that, in its conflicts with Bonaparte, not only the Ministry, not only
the Army, but also its independent parliamentary majority; that a troop of
Representatives had deserted its camp out of a fanatic zeal for harmony, out
of fear of fight, out of lassitude, out of family considerations for the salaries
of relatives in office, out of speculations on vacancies in the Ministry
(Odillon Barrot), or out of that unmitigated selfishness that causes the
average bourgeois to be ever inclined to sacrifice the interests of his class to
this or that private motive. The Bonapartist Representatives belonged from
the start to the party of Order only in the struggle against the revolution.
The leader of the Catholic party, Montalembert, already then threw his
influence in the scale of Bonaparte, since he despaired of the vitality of the
parliamentary party. Finally, the leaders of this party itself, Thiers and
Berryer—the Orleanist and the Legitimist—were compelled to proclaim
themselves openly as republicans; to admit that their heart favored royalty,
but their head the republic; that their parliamentary republic was the only
possible form for the rule of the bourgeoisie Thus were they compelled to
brand, before the eyes of the bourgeois class itself, as an intrigue—as
dangerous as it was senseless—the restoration plans, which they continued
to pursue indefatigably behind the back of the parliament.
The January 18 vote of lack of confidence struck the Ministers, not the
President. But it was not the Ministry, it was the President who had deposed
Changarnier. Should the party of Order place Bonaparte himself under
charges? On account of his restoration hankerings? These only

supplemented their own. On account of his conspiracy at the military
reviews and of the "Society of December 10"? They had long since buried
these subjects under simple orders of business. On account of the discharge
of the hero of January 29 and June 13, of the man who, in May, 1850,
threatened, in case of riot, to set Paris on fire at all its four corners? Their
allies of the Mountain and Cavaignac did not even allow them to console
the fallen "Bulwark of Society" with an official testimony of their
sympathy. They themselves could not deny the constitutional right of the
President to remove a General. They stormed only because he made an
unparliamentary use of his constitutional right. Had they not themselves
constantly made an unconstitutional use of their parliamentary prerogative,
notably by the abolition of universal suffrage? Consequently they were
reminded to move exclusively within parliamentary bounds. Indeed, it
required that peculiar disease, a disease that, since 1848, has raged over the
whole continent, "Parliamentary Idiocy,"—that fetters those whom it infects
to an imaginary world, and robs them of all sense, all remembrance, all
understanding of the rude outside world;—it required this "Parliamentary
Idiocy" in order that the party of Order, which had, with its own hands,
destroyed all the conditions for parliamentary power, and, in its struggle
with the other classes, was obliged to destroy them, still should consider its
parliamentary victories as victories, and imagine it hit the President by
striking his Ministers. They only afforded him an opportunity to humble the
National Assembly anew in the eyes of the nation. On January 20, the
"Moniteur" announced that the whole the dismissal of the whole Ministry
was accepted. Under the pretext that none of the parliamentary parties had
any longer the majority—as proved by the January 18 vote, that fruit of the
coalition between mountain and royalists—, and, in order to await the reformation of a majority, Bonaparte appointed a so-called transition
Ministry, of whom no member belonged to the parliament-altogether
wholly unknown and insignificant individuals; a Ministry of mere clerks
and secretaries. The party of Order could now wear itself out in the game
with these puppets; the Executive power no longer considered it worth the
while to be seriously represented in the National Assembly. By this act
Bonaparte concentrated the whole executive power all the more securely in
his own person; he had all the freer elbow-room to exploit the same to his
own ends, the more his Ministers became mere supernumeraries.

The party of Order, now allied with the Mountain, revenged itself by
rejecting the Presidential endowment project of 1,800.000 francs, which the
chief of the "Society of December 10" had compelled his Ministerial clerks
to present to the Assembly. This time a majority of only 102 votes carried
the day accordingly since January 18, 27 more votes had fallen off: the
dissolution of the party of Order was making progress. Lest any one might
for a moment be deceived touching the meaning of its coalition with the
Mountain, the party of Order simultaneously scorned even to consider a
motion, signed by 189 members of the Mountain, for a general amnesty to
political criminals. It was enough that the Minister of the Interior, one
Baisse, declared that the national tranquility was only in appearance, in
secret there reigned deep agitation, in secret, ubiquitous societies were
organized, the democratic papers were preparing to reappear, the reports
from the Departments were unfavorable, the fugitives of Geneva conducted
a conspiracy via Lyons through the whole of southern France, France stood
on the verge of an industrial and commercial crisis, the manufacturers of
Roubaix were working shorter hours, the prisoners of Belle Isle had
mutinied;—it was enough that even a mere Baisse should conjure up the
"Red Spectre" for the party of Order to reject without discussion a motion
that would have gained for the National Assembly a tremendous popularity,
and thrown Bonaparte back into its arms. Instead of allowing itself to be
intimidated by the Executive power with the perspective of fresh
disturbances, the party of Order should rather have allowed a little elbowroom to the class struggle, in order to secure the dependence of the
Executive upon itself. But it did not feel itself equal to the task of playing
with fire.
Meanwhile, the so-called transition Ministry vegetated along until the
middle of April. Bonaparte tired out and fooled the National Assembly with
constantly new Ministerial combinations. Now he seemed to intend
constructing a republican Ministry with Lamartine and Billault; then, a
parliamentary one with the inevitable Odillon Barrot, whose name must
never be absent when a dupe is needed; then again, a Legitimist, with
Batismenil and Lenoist d'Azy; and yet again, an Orleansist, with Malleville.
While thus throwing the several factions of the party of Order into strained
relations with one another, and alarming them all with the prospect of a
republican Ministry, together with the there-upon inevitable restoration of
universal suffrage, Bonaparte simultaneously raises in the bourgeoisie the

conviction that his sincere efforts for a parliamentary Ministry are wrecked
upon the irreconcilable antagonism of the royalist factions. All the while the
bourgeoisie was clamoring louder and louder for a "strong Government,"
and was finding it less and less pardonable to leave France "without an
administration," in proportion as a general commercial crisis seemed to be
under way and making recruits for Socialism in the cities, as did the
ruinously low price of grain in the rural districts. Trade became daily duller;
the unemployed hands increased perceptibly; in Paris, at least 10,000
workingmen were without bread; in Rouen, Muehlhausen, Lyons, Roubaix,
Tourcoign, St. Etienue, Elbeuf, etc., numerous factories stood idle. Under
these circumstances Bonaparte could venture to restore, on April 11, the
Ministry of January 18; Messieurs Rouher, Fould, Baroche, etc., reinforced
by Mr. Leon Faucher, whom the constitutive assembly had, during its last
days, unanimously, with the exception of five Ministerial votes, branded
with a vote of censure for circulating false telegraphic dispatches.
Accordingly, the National Assembly had won a victory on January 18 over
the Ministry, it had, for the period of three months, been battling with
Bonaparte, and all this merely to the end that, on April 11, Fould and
Baroche should be able to take up the Puritan Faucher as third in their
ministerial league.
In November, 1849, Bonaparte had satisfied himself with an
Unparliamentary, in January, 1851, with an Extra-Parliamentary, on April
11, he felt strong enough to form an Anti-Parliamentary Ministry, that
harmoniously combined within itself the votes of lack of confidence of both
assemblies-the constitutive and the legislative, the republican and the
royalist. This ministerial progression was a thermometer by which the
parliament could measure the ebbing temperature of its own life. This had
sunk so low by the end of April that, at a personal interview, Persigny could
invite Changarnier to go over to the camp of the President. Bonaparte, he
assured Changarnier, considered the influence of the National Assembly to
be wholly annihilated, and already the proclamation was ready, that was to
be published after the steadily contemplated, but again accidentally
postponed "coup d'etat." Changarnier communicated this announcement of
its death to the leaders of the party of Order; but who was there to believe a
bed-bug bite could kill? The parliament, however beaten, however
dissolved, however death-tainted it was, could not persuade itself to see, in
the duel with the grotesque chief of the "Society of December 10," anything

but a duel with a bed-bug. But Bonaparte answered the party of Order as
Agesilaus did King Agis: "I seem to you an ant; but shall one day be a
lion."

VI
The coalition with the Mountain and the pure republicans, to which the
party of Order found itself condemned in its fruitless efforts to keep
possession of the military and to reconquer supreme control over the
Executive power, proved conclusively that it had forfeited its independent
parliamentary majority. The calendar and clock merely gave, on May 29,
the signal for its complete dissolution. With May 29 commenced the last
year of the life of the National Assembly. It now had to decide for the
unchanged continuance or the revision of the Constitution. But a revision of
the Constitution meant not only the definitive supremacy of either the
bourgeoisie of the small traders' democracy, of either democracy or
proletarian anarchy, of either a parliamentary republic or Bonaparte, it
meant also either Orleans or Bourbon! Thus fell into the very midst of the
parliament the apple of discord, around which the conflict of interests, that
cut up the party of Order into hostile factions, was to kindle into an open
conflagration. The party of Order was a combination of heterogeneous
social substances. The question of revision raised a political temperature, in
which the product was reduced to its original components.
The interest of the Bonapartists in the revision was simple: they were
above all concerned in the abolition of Article 45, which forbade
Bonaparte's reelection and the prolongation of his term. Not less simple
seemed to be the position of the republicans; they rejected all revision,
seeing in that only a general conspiracy against the republic; as they
disposed over more than one-fourth of the votes in the National Assembly,
and, according to the Constitution, a three-fourths majority was requisite to
revise and to call a revisory convention, they needed only to count their
own votes to be certain of victory. Indeed, they were certain of it.
Over and against these clear-cut positions, the party of Order found itself
tangled in inextricable contradictions. If it voted against the revision, it
endangered the "status quo," by leaving to Bonaparte only one expedient—
that of violence and handing France over, on May 2, 1852, at the very time
of election, a prey to revolutionary anarchy, with a President whose
authority was at an end; with a parliament that the party had long ceased to

own, and with a people that it meant to re-conquer. If it voted
constitutionally for a revision, it knew that it voted in vain and would
constitutionally have to go under before the veto of the republicans. If,
unconstitutionally, it pronounced a simple majority binding, it could hope to
control the revolution only in case it surrendered unconditionally to the
domination of the Executive power: it then made Bonaparte master of the
Constitution, of the revision and of itself. A merely partial revision,
prolonging the term of the President, opened the way to imperial
usurpation; a general revision, shortening the existence of the republic,
threw the dynastic claims into an inevitable conflict: the conditions for a
Bourbon and those for an Orleanist restoration were not only different, they
mutually excluded each other.
The parliamentary republic was more than a neutral ground on which the
two factions of the French bourgeoisie—Legitimists and Orleanists, large
landed property and manufacture—could lodge together with equal rights.
It was the indispensable condition for their common reign, the only form of
government in which their common class interest could dominate both the
claims of their separate factions and all the other classes of society. As
royalists, they relapsed into their old antagonism into the struggle for the
overlordship of either landed property or of money; and the highest
expression of this antagonism, its personification, were the two kings
themselves, their dynasties. Hence the resistance of the party of Order to the
recall of the Bourbons.
The Orleanist Representative Creton moved periodically in 1849, 1850
and 1851 the repeal of the decree of banishment against the royal families;
as periodically did the parliament present the spectacle of an Assembly of
royalists who stubbornly shut to their banished kings the door through
which they could return home. Richard III murdered Henry VI, with the
remark that he was too good for this world, and belonged in heaven. They
declared France too bad to have her kings back again. Forced by the power
of circumstances, they had become republicans, and repeatedly sanctioned
the popular mandate that exiled their kings from France.
The revision of the Constitution, and circumstances compelled its
consideration, at once made uncertain not only the republic itself, but also
the joint reign of the two bourgeois factions; and it revived, with the
possibility of the monarchy, both the rivalry of interests which these two

factions had alternately allowed to preponderate, and the struggle for the
supremacy of the one over the other. The diplomats of the party of Order
believed they could allay the struggle by a combination of the two dynasties
through a so-called fusion of the royalist parties and their respective royal
houses. The true fusion of the restoration and the July monarchy was,
however, the parliamentary republic, in which the Orleanist and Legitimist
colors were dissolved, and the bourgeois species vanished in the plain
bourgeois, in the bourgeois genus. Now however, the plan was to turn the
Orleanist Legitimist and the Legitimist Orleanist. The kingship, in which
their antagonism was personified, was to incarnate their unity, the
expression of their exclusive faction interests was to become the expression
of their common class interest; the monarchy was to accomplish what only
the abolition of two monarchies—the republic could and did accomplish.
This was the philosopher's stone, for the finding of which the doctors of the
party of Order were breaking their heads. As though the Legitimate
monarchy ever could be the monarchy of the industrial bourgeoisie, or the
bourgeois monarchy the monarchy of the hereditary landed aristocracy! As
though landed property and industry could fraternize under one crown,
where the crown could fall only upon one head, the head of the older or the
younger brother! As though industry could at all deal upon a footing of
equality with landed property, so long as landed property did not decide
itself to become industrial. If Henry V were to die tomorrow, the Count of
Paris would not, therefore, become the king of the Legitimists, unless he
ceased to be the King of the Orleanists. Nevertheless, the fusion
philosophers, who became louder in the measure that the question of
revision stepped to the fore, who had provided themselves with a daily
organ in the "Assemblee Nationale," who, even at this very moment
(February, 1852) are again at work, explained the whole difficulty by the
opposition and rivalries of the two dynasties. The attempts to reconcile the
family of Orleans with Henry V., begun since the death of Louis Philippe,
but, as all these dynastic intrigues carried on only during the vacation of the
National Assembly, between acts, behind the scenes, more as a sentimental
coquetry with the old superstition than as a serious affair, were now raised
by the party of Order to the dignity of a great State question, and were
conducted upon the public stage, instead of, as heretofore in the amateurs'
theater. Couriers flew from Paris to Venice, from Venice to Claremont, from
Claremont to Paris. The Duke of Chambord issues a manifesto in which he

announces not his own, but the "national" restoration, "with the aid of all
the members of his family." The Oleanist Salvandy throws himself at the
feet of Henry V. The Legitimist leaders Berryer, Benoit d'Azy, St. Priest
travel to Claremont, to persuade the Orleans; but in vain. The fusionists
learn too late that the interests of the two bourgeois factions neither lose in
exclusiveness nor gain in pliancy where they sharpen to a point in the form
of family interests, of the interests of the two royal houses. When Henry V.
recognized the Count of Paris as his successor—the only success that the
fusion could at best score—the house of Orleans acquired no claim that the
childlessness of Henry V. had not already secured to it; but, on the other
hand, it lost all the claims that it had conquered by the July revolution. It
renounced its original claims, all the title, that, during a struggle nearly one
hundred years long, it had wrested from the older branch of the Bourbons; it
bartered away its historic prerogative, the prerogative of its family-tree.
Fusion, accordingly, amounted to nothing else than the resignation of the
house of Orleans, its Legitimist resignation, a repentful return from the
Protestant State Church into the Catholic;—a return, at that, that did not
even place it on the throne that it had lost, but on the steps of the throne on
which it was born. The old Orleanist Ministers Guizot, Duchatel, etc., who
likewise hastened to Claremont, to advocate the fusion, represented in fact
only the nervous reaction of the July monarchy; despair, both in the citizen
kingdom and the kingdom of citizens; the superstitious belief in legitimacy
as the last amulet against anarchy. Mediators, in their imagination, between
Orleans and Bourbon, they were in reality but apostate Orleanists, and as
such were they received by the Prince of Joinville. The virile, bellicose part
of the Orleanists, on the contrary—Thiers, Baze, etc.—, persuaded the
family of Louis Philippe all the easier that, seeing every plan for the
immediate restoration of the monarchy presupposed the fusion of the two
dynasties, and every plan for fusion the resignation of the house of Orleans,
it corresponded, on the contrary, wholly with the tradition of its ancestors to
recognize the republic for the time being, and to wait until circumstances
permitted I the conversion of the Presidential chair into a throne. Joinville's
candidacy was set afloat as a rumor, public curiosity was held in suspense,
and a few months later, after the revision was rejected, openly proclaimed
in September.
Accordingly, the essay of a royalist fusion between Orleanists and
Legitimists did not miscarry only, it broke up their parliamentary fusion, the

republican form that they had adopted in common, and it decomposed the
party of Order into its original components. But the wider the breach
became between Venice and Claremont, the further they drifted away from
each I other, and the greater the progress made by the Joinville agitation, all
the more active and earnest became the negotiations between Faucher, the
Minister of Bonaparte, and the Legitimists.
The dissolution of the party of Order went beyond its original elements.
Each of the two large factions fell in turn into new fragments. It was as if all
the old political shades, that formerly fought and crowded one another
within each of the two circles—be it that of the Legitimists or that of the
Orleanists—, had been thawed out like dried infusoria by contact with
water; as if they had recovered enough vitality to build their own groups
and assert their own antagonisms. The Legitimists dreamed they were back
amidst the quarrels between the Tuileries and the pavilion Marsan, between
Villele and Polignac; the Orleanists lived anew through the golden period of
the tourneys between Guizot, Mole, Broglie, Thiers, and Odillon Barrot.
That portion of the party of Order—eager for a revision of the
Constitution but disagreed upon the extent of revision—made up of the
Legitimists under Berryer and Falloux and of those under Laroche
Jacquelein, together with the tired-out Orleanists under Mole, Broglie,
Montalembert and Odillon Barrot, united with the Bonapartist
Representatives in the following indefinite and loosely drawn motion:
"The undersigned Representatives, with the end in view of restoring to
the nation the full exercise of her sovereignty, move that the Constitution be
revised."
At the same time, however, they unanimously declared through their
spokesman, Tocqueville, that the National Assembly had not the right to
move the abolition of the republic, that right being vested only in a
Constitutional Convention. For the rest, the Constitution could be revised
only in a "legal" way, that is to say, only in case a three-fourths majority
decided in favor of revision, as prescribed by the Constitution. After a six
days' stormy debate, the revision was rejected on July 19, as was to be
foreseen. In its favor 446 votes were cast, against it 278. The resolute
Oleanists, Thiers, Changarnier, etc., voted with the republicans and the
Mountain.

Thus the majority of the parliament pronounced itself against the
Constitution, while the Constitution itself pronounced itself for the
minority, and its decision binding. But had not the party of Order on May
31, 1850, had it not on June 13, 1849, subordinated the Constitution to the
parliamentary majority? Did not the whole republic they had been hitherto
having rest upon the subordination of the Constitutional clauses to the
majority decisions of the parliament? Had they not left to the democrats the
Old Testament superstitious belief in the letter of the law, and had they not
chastised the democrats therefor? At this moment, however, revision meant
nothing else than the continuance of the Presidential power, as the
continuance of the Constitution meant nothing else than the deposition of
Bonaparte. The parliament had pronounced itself for him, but the
Constitution pronounced itself against the parliament. Accordingly, he acted
both in the sense of the parliament when he tore up the Constitution, and in
the sense of the Constitution when he chased away the parliament.
The parliament pronounced the Constitution, and, thereby, also, its own
reign, "outside of the pale of the majority"; by its decision, it repealed the
Constitution, and continued the Presidential power, and it at once declared
that neither could the one live nor the other die so long as itself existed. The
feet of those who were to bury it stood at the door. While it was debating
the subject of revision, Bonaparte removed General Baraguay d'Hilliers,
who showed himself irresolute, from the command of the First Military
Division, and appointed in his place General Magnan, the conqueror of
Lyon; the hero of the December days, one of his own creatures, who already
under Louis Philippe, on the occasion of the Boulogne expedition, had
somewhat compromised himself in his favor.
By its decision on the revision, the party of Order proved that it knew
neither how to rule nor how to obey; neither how to live nor how to die;
neither how to bear with the republic nor how to overthrow it; neither how
to maintain the Constitution nor how to throw it overboard; neither how to
co-operate with the President nor how to break with him. From what quarter
did it then, look to for the solution of all the existing perplexities? From the
calendar, from the course of events. It ceased to assume the control of
events. It, accordingly, invited events to don its authority and also the power
to which in its struggle with the people, it had yielded one attribute after
another until it finally stood powerless before the same. To the end that the
Executive be able all the more freely to formulate his plan of campaign

against it, strengthen his means of attack, choose his tools, fortify his
positions, the party of Order decided, in the very midst of this critical
moment, to step off the stage, and adjourn for three months, from August 10
to November 4.
Not only was the parliamentary party dissolved into its two great
factions, not only was each of these dissolved within itself, but the party of
Order, inside of the parliament, was at odds with the party of Order, outside
of the parliament. The learned speakers and writers of the bourgeoisie, their
tribunes and their press, in short, the ideologists of the bourgeoisie and the
bourgeoisie itself, the representatives and the represented, stood estranged
from, and no longer understood one another.
The Legitimists in the provinces, with their cramped horizon and their
boundless enthusiasm, charged their parliamentary leaders Berryer and
Falloux with desertion to the Bonapartist camp, and with apostacy from
Henry V. Their lilymind [#1 An allusion to the lilies of the Bourbon coat-ofarms] believed in the fall of man, but not in diplomacy.
More fatal and completer, though different, was the breach between the
commercial bourgeoisie and its politicians. It twitted them, not as the
Legitimists did theirs, with having apostatized from their principle, but, on
the contrary, with adhering to principles that had become useless.
I have already indicated that, since the entry of Fould in the Ministry, that
portion of the commercial bourgeoisie that had enjoyed the lion's share in
Louis Philippe's reign, to-wit, the aristocracy of finance, had become
Bonapartist. Fould not only represented Bonaparte's interests at the Bourse,
he represented also the interests of the Bourse with Bonaparte. A passage
from the London "Economist," the European organ of the aristocracy of
finance, described most strikingly the attitude of this class. In its issue of
February 1, 1851, its Paris correspondent writes: "Now we have it stated
from numerous quarters that France wishes above all things for repose. The
President declares it in his message to the Legislative Assembly; it is
echoed from the tribune; it is asserted in the journals; it is announced from
the pulpit; it is demonstrated by the sensitiveness of the public funds at the
least prospect of disturbance, and their firmness the instant it is made
manifest that the Executive is far superior in wisdom and power to the
factious ex-officials of all former governments."

In its issue of November 29, 1851, the "Economist" declares editorially:
"The President is now recognized as the guardian of order on every Stock
Exchange of Europe." Accordingly, the Aristocracy of Finance condemned
the parliamentary strife of the party of Order with the Executive as a
"disturbance of order," and hailed every victory of the President over its
reputed representatives as a "victory of order." Under "aristocracy of
finance" must not, however, be understood merely the large bond
negotiators and speculators in government securities, of whom it may be
readily understood that their interests and the interests of the Government
coincide. The whole modern money trade, the whole banking industry, is
most intimately interwoven with the public credit. Part of their business
capital requires to be invested in interest-bearing government securities that
are promptly convertible into money; their deposits, i. e., the capital placed
at their disposal and by them distributed among merchants and industrial
establishments, flow partly out of the dividends on government securities.
The whole money market, together with the priests of this market, is part
and parcel of this "aristocracy of finance" at every epoch when the stability
of the government is to them synonymous with "Moses and his prophets."
This is so even before things have reached the present stage when every
deluge threatens to carry away the old governments themselves.
But the industrial Bourgeoisie also, in its fanaticism for order, was
annoyed at the quarrels of the Parliamentary party of Order with the
Executive. Thiers, Anglas, Sainte Beuve, etc., received, after their vote of
January 18, on the occasion of the discharge of Changarnier, public
reprimands from their constituencies, located in the industrial districts,
branding their coalition with the Mountain as an act of high treason to the
cause of order. Although, true enough, the boastful, vexatious and petty
intrigues, through which the struggle of the party of Order with the
President manifested itself, deserved no better reception, yet
notwithstanding, this bourgeois party, that expects of its representatives to
allow the military power to pass without resistance out of the hands of their
own Parliament into those of an adventurous Pretender, is not worth even
the intrigues that were wasted in its behalf. It showed that the struggle for
the maintenance of their public interests, of their class interests, of their
political power only incommoded and displeased them, as a disturbance of
their private business.

The bourgeois dignitaries of the provincial towns, the magistrates,
commercial judges, etc., with hardly any exception, received Bonaparte
everywhere on his excursions in the most servile manner, even when, as in
Dijon, he attacked the National Assembly and especially the party of Order
without reserve.
Business being brisk, as still at the beginning of 1851, the commercial
bourgeoisie stormed against every Parliamentary strife, lest business be put
out of temper. Business being dull, as from the end of February, 1851, on,
the bourgeoisie accused the Parliamentary strifes as the cause of the standstill, and clamored for quiet in order that business may revive. The debates
on revision fell just in the bad times. Seeing the question now was the to be
or not to be of the existing form of government, the bourgeoisie felt itself
all the more justified in demanding of its Representatives that they put an
end to this tormenting provisional status, and preserve the "status quo." This
was no contradiction. By putting an end to the provisional status, it
understood its continuance, the indefinite putting off of the moment when a
final decision had to be arrived at. The "status quo" could be preserved in
only one of two ways: either by the prolongation of Bonaparte's term of
office or by his constitutional withdrawal and the election of Cavaignac. A
part of the bourgeoisie preferred the latter solution, and knew no better
advice to give their Representatives than to be silent, to avoid the burning
point. If their Representatives did not speak, so argued they, Bonaparte
would not act. They desired an ostrich Parliament that would hide its head,
in order not to be seen. Another part of the bourgeoisie preferred that
Bonaparte, being once in the Presidential chair, be left in the Presidential
chair, in order that everything might continue to run in the old ruts. They
felt indignant that their Parliament did not openly break the Constitution
and resign without further ado. The General Councils of the Departments,
these provisional representative bodies of the large bourgeoisie, who had
adjourned during the vacation of the National Assembly since August 25,
pronounced almost unanimously for revision, that is to say, against the
Parliament and for Bonaparte.
Still more unequivocally than in its falling out with its Parliamentary
Representatives, did the bourgeoisie exhibit its wrath at its literary
Representatives, its own press. The verdicts of the bourgeois juries,
inflicting excessive fines and shameless sentences of imprisonment for
every attack of the bourgeois press upon the usurping aspirations of

Bonaparte, for every attempt of the press to defend the political rights of the
bourgeoisie against the Executive power, threw, not France alone, but all
Europe into amazement.
While on the one hand, as I have indicated, the Parliamentary party of
Order ordered itself to keep the peace by screaming for peace; and while it
pronounced the political rule of the bourgeoisie irreconcilable with the
safety and the existence of the bourgeoisie, by destroying with its own
hands in its struggle with the other classes of society all the conditions for
its own, the Parliamentary regime; on the other hand, the mass of the
bourgeoisie, outside of the Parliament, urged Bonaparte—by its servility
towards the President, by its insults to the Parliament, by the brutal
treatment of its own press—to suppress and annihilate its speaking and
writing organs, its politicians and its literati, its orators' tribune and its
press, to the end that, under the protection of a strong and unhampered
Government, it might ply its own private pursuits in safety. It declared
unmistakably that it longed to be rid of its own political rule, in order to
escape the troubles and dangers of ruling.
And this bourgeoisie, that had rebelled against even the Parliamentary
and literary contest for the supremacy of its own class, that had betrayed its
leaders in this contest, it now has the effrontery to blame the proletariat for
not having risen in its defence in a bloody struggle, in a struggle for life!
Those bourgeois, who at every turn sacrificed their common class interests
to narrow and dirty private interests, and who demanded a similar sacrifice
from their own Representatives, now whine that the proletariat has
sacrificed their idea-political to its own material interests! This bourgeois
class now strikes the attitude of a pure soul, misunderstood and abandoned,
at a critical moment, by the proletariat, that has been misled by the
Socialists. And its cry finds a general echo in the bourgeois world. Of
course, I do not refer to German crossroad politicians and kindred
blockheads. I refer, for instance, to the "Economist," which, as late as
November 29, 1851, that is to say, four days before the "coup d'etat"
pronounced Bonaparte the "Guardian of Order" and Thiers and Berryer
"Anarchists," and as early as December 27, 1851, after Bonaparte had
silenced those very Anarchists, cries out about the treason committed by
"the ignorant, untrained and stupid proletaires against the skill, knowledge,
discipline, mental influence, intellectual resources an moral weight of the

middle and upper ranks." The stupid, ignorant and contemptible mass was
none other than the bourgeoisie itself.
France had, indeed; experienced a sort of commercial crisis in 1851. At
the end of February, there was a falling off of exports as compared with
1850; in March, business languished and factories shut down; in April, the
condition of the industrial departments seemed as desperate as after the
February days; in May, business did not yet pick up; as late as June 28, the
reports of the Bank of France revealed through a tremendous increase of
deposits and an equal decrease of loans on exchange notes, the standstill of
production; not until the middle of October did a steady improvement of
business set in. The French bourgeoisie accounted for this stagnation of
business with purely political reasons; it imputed the dull times to the strife
between the Parliament and the Executive power, to the uncertainty of a
provisional form of government, to the alarming prospects of May 2, 1852.
I shall not deny that all these causes did depress some branches of industry
in Paris and in the Departments. At any rate, this effect of political
circumstances was only local and trifling. Is there any other proof needed
than that the improvement in business set in at the very time when the
political situation was growing worse, when the political horizon was
growing darker, and when at every moment a stroke of lightning was
expected out of the Elysee—in the middle of October? The French
bourgeois, whose "skill, knowledge, mental influence and intellectual
resources," reach no further than his nose, could, moreover, during the
whole period of the Industrial Exposition in London, have struck with his
nose the cause of his own business misery. At the same time that, in France,
the factories were being closed, commercial failures broke out in England.
While the industrial panic reached its height during April and May in
France, in England the commercial panic reached its height in April and
May. The same as the French, the English woolen industries suffered, and,
as the French, so did the English silk manufacture. Though the English
cotton factories went on working, it, nevertheless, was not with the same
old profit of 1849 and 1850. The only difference was this: that in France,
the crisis was an industrial, in England it was a commercial one; that while
in France the factories stood still, they spread themselves in England, but
under less favorable circumstances than they had done the years just
previous; that, in France, the export, in England, the import trade suffered
the heaviest blows. The common cause, which, as a matter of fact, is not to

be looked for with-in the bounds of the French political horizon, was
obvious. The years 1849 and 1850 were years of the greatest material
prosperity, and of an overproduction that did not manifest itself until 1851.
This was especially promoted at the beginning of 1851 by the prospect of
the Industrial Exposition; and, as special causes, there were added, first, the
failure of the cotton crop of 1850 and 1851; second, the certainty of a larger
cotton crop than was expected: first, the rise, then the sudden drop; in short,
the oscillations of the cotton market. The crop of raw silk in France had
been below the average. Finally, the manufacture of woolen goods had
received such an increment since 1849, that the production of wool could
not keep step with it, and the price of the raw material rose greatly out of
proportion to the price of the manufactured goods. Accordingly, we have
here in the raw material of three staple articles a threefold material for a
commercial crisis. Apart from these special circumstances, the seeming
crisis of the year 1851 was, after all, nothing but the halt that
overproduction and overspeculation make regularly in the course of the
industrial cycle, before pulling all their forces together in order to rush
feverishly over the last stretch, and arrive again at their point of departure—
the General Commercial Crisis. At such intervals in the history of trade,
commercial failures break out in England, while, in France, industry itself is
stopped, partly because it is compelled to retreat through the competition of
the English, that, at such times becomes resistless in all markets, and partly
because, as an industry of luxuries, it is affected with preference by every
stoppage of trade. Thus, besides the general crisis, France experiences her
own national crises, which, how-ever, are determined by and conditioned
upon the general state of the world's market much more than by local
French influences. It will not be devoid of interest to contrast the
prejudgment of the French bourgeois with the judgment of the English
bourgeois. One of the largest Liverpool firms writes in its yearly report of
trade for 1851: "Few years have more completely disappointed the
expectations entertained at their beginning than the year that has just
passed; instead of the great prosperity, that was unanimously looked
forward to, it proved itself one of the most discouraging years during the
last quarter of a century. This applies, of course, only to the mercantile, not
to the industrial classes. And yet, surely there were grounds at the
beginning of the year from which to draw a contrary conclusion; the stock
of products was scanty, capital was abundant, provisions cheap, a rich

autumn was assured, there was uninterrupted peace on the continent and no
political and financial disturbances at home; indeed, never were the wings
of trade more unshackled. . . . What is this unfavorable result to be ascribed
to? We believe to excessive trade in imports as well as exports. If our
merchants do not themselves rein in their activity, nothing can keep us
going, except a panic every three years."
Imagine now the French bourgeois, in the midst of this business panic,
having his trade-sick brain tortured, buzzed at and deafened with rumors of
a "coup d'etat" and the restoration of universal suffrage; with the struggle
between the Legislature and the Executive; with the Fronde warfare
between Orleanists and Legitimists; with communistic conspiracies in
southern France; with alleged Jacqueries [#2 Peasant revolts] in the
Departments of Nievre and Cher; with the advertisements of the several
candidates for President; with "social solutions" huckstered about by the
journals; with the threats of the republicans to uphold, arms in hand, the
Constitution and universal suffrage; with the gospels, according to the
emigrant heroes "in partibus," who announced the destruction of the world
for May 2,—imagine that, and one can understand how the bourgeois, in
this unspeakable and noisy confusion of fusion, revision, prorogation,
constitution, conspiracy, coalition, emigration, usurpation and revolution,
blurts out at his parliamentary republic: "Rather an End With Fright, Than a
Fright Without End."
Bonaparte understood this cry. His perspicacity was sharpened by the
growing anxiety of the creditors' class, who, with every sunset, that brought
nearer the day of payment, the 2d of May, 1852, saw in the motion of the
stars a protest against their earthly drafts. They had become regular
astrologers The National Assembly had cut off Bonaparte's hope of a
constitutional prolongation of his term; the candidature of the Prince of
Joinville tolerated no further vacillation.
If ever an event cast its shadow before it long before its occurrence, it
was Bonaparte's "coup d'etat." Already on January 29, 1849, barely a month
after his election, he had made to Changarnier a proposition to that effect.
His own Prime Minister. Odillon Barrot, had covertly, in 1849, and Thiers
openly in the winter of 1850, revealed the scheme of the "coup d'etat." In
May, 1851, Persigny had again sought to win Changarnier over to the
"coup," and the "Miessager de l'Assemblee" newspaper had published this

conversation. At every parliamentary storm, the Bonapartist papers
threatened a "coup," and the nearer the crisis approached, all the louder
grew their tone. At the orgies, that Bonaparte celebrated every night with a
swell mob of males and females, every time the hour of midnight drew nigh
and plenteous libations had loosened the tongues and heated the minds of
the revelers, the "coup" was resolved upon for the next morning. Swords
were then drawn, glasses clinked, the Representatives were thrown out at
the windows, the imperial mantle fell upon the shoulders of Bonaparte, until
the next morning again drove away the spook, and astonished Paris learned,
from not very reserved Vestals and indiscreet Paladins, the danger it had
once more escaped. During the months of September and October, the
rumors of a "coup d'etat" tumbled close upon one another's heels. At the
same time the shadow gathered color, like a confused daguerreotype.
Follow the issues of the European daily press for the months of September
and October, and items like this will be found literally:

"Rumors of a 'coup' fill Paris. The capital, it is said, is to be filled with
troops by night and the next morning decrees are to be issued dissolving the
National Assembly, placing the Department of the Seine in state of siege
restoring universal suffrage, and appealing to the people. Bonaparte is
rumored to be looking for Ministers to execute these illegal decrees."
The newspaper correspondence that brought this news always close
ominously with "postponed." The "coup" was ever the fixed idea of
Bonaparte. With this idea he had stepped again upon French soil. It had
such full possession of him that he was constantly betraying and blabbing it
out. He was so weak that he was as constantly giving it up again. The
shadow of the "coup" had become so familiar a spectre to the Parisians, that
they refused to believe it when it finally did appear in flesh and blood.
Consequently, it was neither the reticent backwardness of the chief of the
"Society of December 10," nor an unthought of surprise of the National
Assembly that caused the success of the "coup." When it succeeded, it did
so despite his indiscretion and with its anticipation—a necessary,
unavoidable result of the development that had preceded.
On October 10, Bonaparte announced to his Ministers his decision to
restore universal suffrage; on the 16th day they handed in their resignations;
on the 26th Paris learned of the formation of the Thorigny Ministry. The
Prefect of Police, Carlier, was simultaneously replaced by Maupas; and the
chief of the First Military Division Magnan, concentrated the most reliable
regiments in the capital. On November 4, the National Assembly re-opened
its sessions. There was nothing left for it to do but to repeat, in short
recapitulation, the course it had traversed, and to prove that it had been
buried only after it had expired. The first post that it had forfeited in the
struggle with the Executive was the Ministry. It had solemnly to admit this
loss by accepting as genuine the Thorigny Ministry, which was but a
pretence. The permanent Committee had received Mr. Giraud with laughter
when he introduced himself in the name of the new Ministers. So weak a
Ministry for so strong a measure as the restoration of universal suffrage!
The question, however, then was to do nothing in, everything against the
parliament.
On the very day of its re-opening, the National Assembly received the
message from Bonaparte demanding the restoration of universal suffrage
and the repeal of the law of May 31, 1850. On the same day, his Ministers

introduced a decree to that effect. The Assembly promptly rejected the
motion of urgency made by the Ministers, but repealed the law itself, on
November 13, by a vote of 355 against 348. Thus it once more tore to
pieces its own mandate, once more certified to the fact that it had
transformed itself from a freely chosen representative body of the nation
into the usurpatory parliament of a class; it once more admitted that it had
itself severed the muscles that connected the parliamentary head with the
body of the nation.
While the Executive power appealed from the National Assembly to the
people by its motion for the restoration of universal suffrage, the Legislative
power appealed from the people to the Army by its "Questors' Bill." This
bill was to establish its right to immediate requisitions for troops, to build
up a parliamentary army. By thus appointing the Army umpire between
itself and the people, between itself and Bonaparte; by thus recognizing the
Army as the decisive power in the State, the National Assembly was
constrained to admit that it had long given up all claim to supremacy. By
debating the right to make requisitions for troops, instead of forthwith
collecting them, it betrayed its own doubts touching its own power. By thus
subsequently rejecting the "Questors' Bill," it publicly confessed it
impotence. The bill fell through with a minority of 108 votes; the Mountain
had, accordingly, thrown the casting vote It now found itself in the
predicament of Buridan's donkey, not, indeed, between two sacks of hay,
forced to decide which of the two was the more attractive, but between two
showers of blows, forced to decide which of the two was the harder; fear of
Changarnier, on one side, fear of Bonaparte, on the other. It must be
admitted the position was not a heroic one.
On November 18, an amendment was moved to the Act, passed by the
party of Order, on municipal elections to the effect that, instead of three
years, a domicile of one year should suffice. The amendment was lost by a
single vote—but this vote, it soon transpired, was a mistake. Owing to the
divisions within its own hostile factions, the party of Order had long since
forfeited its independent parliamentary majority. It was now plain that there
was no longer any majority in the parliament. The National Assembly had
become impotent even to decide. Its atomic parts were no longer held
together by any cohesive power; it had expended its last breath, it was dead.

Finally, the mass of the bourgeoisie outside of the parliament was once
more solemnly to confirm its rupture with the bourgeoisie inside of the
parliament a few days before the catastrophe. Thiers, as a parliamentary
hero conspicuously smitten by that incurable disease—Parliamentary Idiocy
—, had hatched out jointly with the Council of State, after the death of the
parliament, a new parliamentary intrigue in the shape of a "Responsibility
Law," that was intended to lock up the President within the walls of the
Constitution. The same as, on September 15, Bonaparte bewitched the
fishwives, like a second Massaniello, on the occasion of laying the cornerstone for the Market of Paris,—though, it must be admitted, one fishwife
was equal to seventeen Burgraves in real power—; the same as, after the
introduction of the "Questors' Bill," he enthused the lieutenants, who were
being treated at the Elysee;—so, likewise, did he now, on November 25,
carry away with him the industrial bourgeoisie, assembled at the Circus, to
receive from his hands the prize-medals that had been awarded at the
London Industrial Exposition. I here reproduce the typical part of his
speech, from the "Journal des Debats":
"With such unhoped for successes, I am justified to repeat how great the
French republic would be if she were only allowed to pursue her real
interests, and reform her institutions, instead of being constantly disturbed
in this by demagogues, on one side, and, on the other, by monarchic
hallucinations. (Loud, stormy and continued applause from all parts of the
amphitheater). The monarchic hallucinations hamper all progress and all
serious departments of industry. Instead of progress, we have struggle only.
Men, formerly the most zealous supporters of royal authority and
prerogative, become the partisans of a convention that has no purpose other
than to weaken an authority that is born of universal suffrage. (Loud and
prolonged applause). We see men, who have suffered most from the
revolution and complained bitterest of it, provoking a new one for the sole
purpose of putting fetters on the will of the nation. . . . I promise you peace
for the future." (Bravo! Bravo! Stormy bravos.)
Thus the industrial bourgeoisie shouts its servile "Bravo!" to the "coup
d'etat" of December 2, to the destruction of the parliament, to the downfall
of their own reign, to the dictatorship of Bonaparte. The rear of the applause
of November 25 was responded to by the roar of cannon on December 4,
and the house of Mr. Sallandrouze, who had been loudest in applauding,
was the one demolished by most of the bombs.

Cromwell, when he dissolved the Long Parliament, walked alone into its
midst, pulled out his watch in order that the body should not continue to
exist one minute beyond the term fixed for it by him, and drove out each
individual member with gay and humorous invectives. Napoleon, smaller
than his prototype, at least went on the 18th Brumaire into the legislative
body, and, though in a tremulous voice, read to it its sentence of death. The
second Bonaparte, who, moreover, found himself in possession of an
executive power very different from that of either Cromwell or Napoleon,
did not look for his model in the annals of universal history, but in the
annals of the "Society of December 10," in the annals of criminal
jurisprudence. He robs the Bank of France of twenty-five million francs;
buys General Magnan with one million and the soldiers with fifteen francs
and a drink to each; comes secretly together with his accomplices like a
thief by night; has the houses of the most dangerous leaders in the
parliament broken into; Cavalignac, Lamorciere, Leflo, Changarnier,
Charras, Thiers, Baze, etc., taken out of their beds; the principal places of
Paris, the building of the parliament included, occupied with troops; and,
early the next morning, loud-sounding placards posted on all the walls
proclaiming the dissolution of the National Assembly and of the Council of
State, the restoration of universal suffrage, and the placing of the
Department of the Seine under the state of siege. In the same way he shortly
after sneaked into the "Moniateur" a false document, according to which
influential parliamentary names had grouped themselves round him in a
Committee of the Nation.
Amidst cries of "Long live the Republic!", the rump-parliament,
assembled at the Mayor's building of the Tenth Arrondissement, and
composed mainly of Legitimists and Orleanists, resolves to depose
Bonaparte; it harangues in vain the gaping mass gathered before the
building, and is finally dragged first, under the escort of African
sharpshooters, to the barracks of Orsay, and then bundled into convicts'
wagons and transported to the prisons of Mazas, Ham and Vincennes. Thus
ended the party of Order, the Legislative Assembly and the February
revolution.
Before hastening to the end, let us sum up shortly the plan of its history:
I.—First Period. From February 24 to May 4, 1848. February period.
Prologue. Universal fraternity swindle.

II.—Second Period. Period in which the republic is constituted, and of
the Constitutive National Assembly.
1. May 4 to June 25, 1848. Struggle of all the classes against the house of
Mr. proletariat. Defeat of the proletariat in the June days.
2. June 25 to December 10, 1848. Dictatorship of the pure bourgeois
republicans. Drafting of the Constitution. The state of siege hangs over
Paris. The Bourgeois dictatorship set aside on December 10 by the election
of Bonaparte as President.
3. December 20, 1848, to May 20, 1849. Struggle of the Constitutive
Assembly with Bonaparte and with the united party of Order. Death of the
Constitutive Assembly. Downfall of the republican bourgeoisie.
III.—Third Period. Period of the constitutional republic and of the
Legislative National Assembly.
1. May 29 to June 13, 1849. Struggle of the small traders', middle class
with the bourgeoisie and with Bonaparte. Defeat of the small traders'
democracy.
2. June 13, 1849, to May, 1850. Parliamentary dictatorship of the party of
Order. Completes its reign by the abolition of universal suffrage, but loses
the parliamentary Ministry.
3. May 31, 1850, to December 2, 1851. Struggle between the
parliamentary bourgeoisie and Bonaparte.
a. May 31, 1850, to January 12, 1851. The parliament loses the supreme
command over the Army.
b. January 12 to April 11, 1851. The parliament succumbs in the attempts
to regain possession of the administrative power. The party of Order loses
its independent parliamentary majority. Its coalition with the republicans
and the Mountain.
c. April 11 to October 9, 1851. Attempts at revision, fusion and
prorogation. The party of Order dissolves into its component parts. The
breach between the bourgeois parliament and the bourgeois press, on the
one hand, and the bourgeois mass, on the other, becomes permanent.
d. October 9 to December 2, 1851. Open breach between the parliament
and the executive power. It draws up its own decree of death, and goes
under, left in the lurch by its own class, by the Army, and by all the other

classes. Downfall of the parliamentary regime and of the reign of the
bourgeoisie. Bonaparte's triumph. Parody of the imperialist restoration.

VII
The Social Republic appeared as a mere phrase, as a prophecy on the
threshold of the February Revolution; it was smothered in the blood of the
Parisian proletariat during the days of 1848 but it stalks about as a spectre
throughout the following acts of the drama. The Democratic Republic next
makes its bow; it goes out in a fizzle on June 13, 1849, with its runaway
small traders; but, on fleeing, it scatters behind it all the more bragging
announcements of what it means do to. The Parliamentary Republic,
together with the bourgeoisie, then appropriates the whole stage; it lives its
life to the full extent of its being; but the 2d of December, 1851, buries it
under the terror-stricken cry of the allied royalists: "Long live the
Republic!"
The French bourgeoisie reared up against the reign of the working
proletariat;—it brought to power the slum-proletariat, with the chief of the
"Society of December 10" at its head. It kept France in breathless fear over
the prospective terror of "red anarchy;"—Bonaparte discounted the prospect
when, on December 4, he had the leading citizens of the Boulevard
Montmartre and the Boulevard des Italiens shot down from their windows
by the grog-inspired "Army of Order." It made the apotheosis of the sabre;
now the sabre rules it. It destroyed the revolutionary press;—now its own
press is annihilated. It placed public meetings under police surveillance;—
now its own salons are subject to police inspection. It disbanded the
democratic National Guards;—now its own National Guard is disbanded. It
instituted the state of siege;—now itself is made subject thereto. It
supplanted the jury by military commissions;—now military commissions
supplant its own juries. It subjected the education of the people to the
parsons' interests;—the parsons' interests now subject it to their own
systems. It ordered transportations without trial;—now itself is transported
without trial. It suppressed every movement of society with physical force;
—now every movement of its own class is suppressed by physical force.
Out of enthusiasm for the gold bag, it rebelled against its own political
leaders and writers;—now, its political leaders and writers are set aside, but
the gold hag is plundered, after the mouth of the bourgeoisie has been

gagged and its pen broken. The bourgeoisie tirelessly shouted to the
revolution, in the language of St. Orsenius to the Christians: "Fuge, Tace,
Quiesce!"—flee, be silent, submit!—; Bonaparte shouts to the bourgeoisie:
"Fuge, Tace, Oniesce!"—flee, be silent, submit!
The French bourgeoisie had long since solved Napoleon's dilemma:
"Dans cinquante ans l'Europe sera republicaine ou cosaque." [#1 Within
fifty years Europe will be either republican or Cossack.] It found the
solution in the "republique cosaque." [#2 Cossack republic.] No Circe
distorted with wicked charms the work of art of the bourgeois republic into
a monstrosity. That republic lost nothing but the appearance of decency.
The France of to-day was ready-made within the womb of the
Parliamentary republic. All that was wanted was a bayonet thrust, in order
that the bubble burst, and the monster leap forth to sight.
Why did not the Parisian proletariat rise after the 2d of December?
The downfall of the bourgeoisie was as yet merely decreed; the decree
was not yet executed. Any earnest uprising of the proletariat would have
forthwith revived this bourgeoisie, would have brought on its reconciliation
with the army, and would have insured a second June rout to the
workingmen.
On December 4, the proletariat was incited to fight by Messrs. Bourgeois
& Small-Trader. On the evening of that day, several legions of the National
Guard promised to appear armed and uniformed on the place of battle. This
arose from the circumstance that Messrs. Bourgeois & Small-Trader had got
wind that, in one of his decrees of December 2, Bonaparte abolished the
secret ballot, and ordered them to enter the words "Yes" and "No" after their
names in the official register. Bonaparte took alarm at the stand taken on
December 4. During the night he caused placards to be posted on all the
street corners of Paris, announcing the restoration of the secret ballot.
Messrs. Bourgeois & Small-Trader believed they had gained their point.
The absentees, the next morning, were Messieurs. Bourgeois & SmallTrader.
During the night of December 1 and 2, the Parisian proletariat was
robbed of its leaders and chiefs of barricades by a raid of Bonaparte's. An
army without officers, disinclined by the recollections of June, 1848 and
1849, and May, 1850, to fight under the banner of the Montagnards, it left
to its vanguard, the secret societies, the work of saving the insurrectionary

honor of Paris, which the bourgeoisie had yielded to the soldiery so
submissively that Bonaparte was later justified in disarming the National
Guard upon the scornful ground that he feared their arms would be used
against themselves by the Anarchists!
"C'est Ic triomphe complet et definitif du Socialism!"' Thus did Guizot
characterize the 2d of December. But, although the downfall of the
parliamentary republic carries with it the germ of the triumph of the
proletarian revolution, its immediate and tangible result was the triumph of
Bonaparte over parliament, of the Executive over the Legislative power, of
force without phrases over the force of phrases. In the parliament, the
nation raised its collective will to the dignity of law, i.e., it raised the law of
the ruling class to the dignity of its collective will. Before the Executive
power, the nation abdicates all will of its own, and submits to the orders of
an outsider of Authority. In contrast with the Legislative, the Executive
power expresses the heteronomy of the nation in contrast with its autonomy.
Accordingly, France seems to have escaped the despotism of a class only in
order to fall under the despotism of an individual, under the authority, at
that of an individual without authority The struggle seems to settle down to
the point where all classes drop down on their knees, equally impotent and
equally dumb.
All the same, the revolution is thoroughgoing. It still is on its passage
through purgatory. It does its work methodically: Down to December 2,
1851, it had fulfilled one-half of its programme, it now fulfils the other half.
It first ripens the power of the Legislature into fullest maturity in order to be
able to overthrow it. Now that it has accomplished that, the revolution
proceeds to ripen the power of the Executive into equal maturity; it reduces
this power to its purest expression; isolates it; places it before itself as the
sole subject for reproof in order to concentrate against it all the
revolutionary forces of destruction. When the revolution shall have
accomplished this second part of its preliminary programme, Europe will
jump up from her seat to exclaim: "Well hast thou grubbed, old mole!"
The Executive power, with its tremendous bureaucratic and military
organization; with its wide-spreading and artificial machinery of
government—an army of office-holders, half a million strong, together with
a military force of another million men—; this fearful body of parasites,
that coils itself like a snake around French society, stopping all its pores,

originated at the time of the absolute monarchy, along with the decline of
feudalism, which it helped to hasten. The princely privileges of the landed
proprietors and cities were transformed into so many at-tributes of the
Executive power; the feudal dignitaries into paid office-holders; and the
confusing design of conflicting medieval seigniories, into the well regulated
plan of a government, work is subdivided and centralized as in the factory.
The first French revolution, having as a mission to sweep away all local,
territorial, urban and provincial special privileges, with the object of
establishing the civic unity of the nation, was hound to develop what the
absolute monarchy had begun—the work of centralization, together with
the range, the attributes and the menials of government. Napoleon
completed this governmental machinery. The Legitimist and the July
Monarchy contribute nothing thereto, except a greater subdivision of labor,
that grew in the same measure as the division and subdivision of labor
within bourgeois society raised new groups and interests, i.e., new material
for the administration of government. Each Common interest was in turn
forthwith removed from society, set up against it as a higher Collective
interest, wrested from the individual activity of the members of society, and
turned into a subject for governmental administration, from the bridges, the
school house and the communal property of a village community, up to the
railroads, the national wealth and the national University of France. Finally,
the parliamentary republic found itself, in its struggle against the revolution,
compelled, with its repressive measures, to strengthen the means and the
centralization of the government. Each overturn, instead of breaking up,
carried this machine to higher perfection. The parties, that alternately
wrestled for supremacy, looked upon the possession of this tremendous
governmental structure as the principal spoils of their victory.
Nevertheless, under the absolute monarchy, was only the means whereby
the first revolution, and under Napoleon, to prepare the class rule of the
bourgeoisie; under the restoration, under Louis Philippe, and under the
parliamentary republic, it was the instrument of the ruling class, however
eagerly this class strained after autocracy. Not before the advent of the
second Bonaparte does the government seem to have made itself fully
independent. The machinery of government has by this time so thoroughly
fortified itself against society, that the chief of the "Society of December
10" is thought good enough to be at its head; a fortune-hunter, run in from
abroad, is raised on its shield by a drunken soldiery, bought by himself with

liquor and sausages, and whom he is forced ever again to throw sops to.
Hence the timid despair, the sense of crushing humiliation and degradation
that oppresses the breast of France and makes her to choke. She feels
dishonored.
And yet the French Government does not float in the air. Bonaparte
represents an economic class, and that the most numerous in the
commonweal of France—the Allotment Farmer. [#4 The first French
Revolution distributed the bulk of the territory of France, held at the time
by the feudal lords, in small patches among the cultivators of the soil. This
allotment of lands created the French farmer class.]
As the Bourbons are the dynasty of large landed property, as the Orleans
are the dynasty of money, so are the Bonapartes the dynasty of the farmer,
i.e. of the French masses. Not the Bonaparte, who threw himself at the feet
of the bourgeois parliament, but the Bonaparte, who swept away the
bourgeois parliament, is the elect of this farmer class. For three years the
cities had succeeded in falsifying the meaning of the election of December
10, and in cheating the farmer out of the restoration of the Empire. The
election of December 10, 1848, is not carried out until the "coup d'etat" of
December 2, 1851.
The allotment farmers are an immense mass, whose individual members
live in identical conditions, without, however, entering into manifold
relations with one another. Their method of production isolates them from
one another, instead of drawing them into mutual intercourse. This isolation
is promoted by the poor means of communication in France, together with
the poverty of the farmers themselves. Their field of production, the small
allotment of land that each cultivates, allows no room for a division of
labor, and no opportunity for the application of science; in other words, it
shuts out manifoldness of development, diversity of talent, and the luxury
of social relations. Every single farmer family is almost self-sufficient;
itself produces directly the greater part of what it consumes; and it earns its
livelihood more by means of an interchange with nature than by intercourse
with society. We have the allotted patch of land, the farmer and his family;
alongside of that another allotted patch of land, another farmer and another
family. A bunch of these makes up a village; a bunch of villages makes up a
Department. Thus the large mass of the French nation is constituted by the
simple addition of equal magnitudes—much as a bag with potatoes

constitutes a potato-bag. In so far as millions of families live under
economic conditions that separate their mode of life, their interests and their
culture from those of the other classes, and that place them in an attitude
hostile toward the latter, they constitute a class; in so far as there exists only
a local connection among these farmers, a connection which the
individuality and exclusiveness of their interests prevent from generating
among them any unity of interest, national connections, and political
organization, they do not constitute a class. Consequently, they are unable
to assert their class interests in their own name, be it by a parliament or by
convention. They can not represent one another, they must themselves be
represented. Their representative must at the same time appear as their
master, as an authority over them, as an unlimited governmental power, that
protects them from above, bestows rain and sunshine upon them.
Accordingly, the political influence of the allotment farmer finds its
ultimate expression in an Executive power that subjugates the commonweal
to its own autocratic will.
Historic tradition has given birth to the superstition among the French
farmers that a man named Napoleon would restore to them all manner of
glory. Now, then, an individual turns I up, who gives himself out as that
man because, obedient to the "Code Napoleon," which provides that "La
recherche de la paternite est interdite," [#5 The inquiry into paternity is
forbidden.] he carries the name of Napoleon. [#6 L. N. Bonaparte is said to
have been an illegitimate son.] After a vagabondage of twenty years, and a
series of grotesque adventures, the myth is verified, and that man becomes
the Emperor of the French. The rooted thought of the Nephew becomes a
reality because it coincided with the rooted thought of the most numerous
class among the French.
"But," I shall be objected to, "what about the farmers' uprisings over half
France, the raids of the Army upon the farmers, the wholesale
imprisonment and transportation of farmers?"
Indeed, since Louis XIV., France has not experienced such persecutions
of the farmer on the ground of his demagogic machinations.
But this should be well understood: The Bonaparte dynasty does not
represent the revolutionary, it represents the conservative farmer; it does not
represent the farmer, who presses beyond his own economic conditions, his
little allotment of land it represents him rather who would confirm these

conditions; it does not represent the rural population, that, thanks to its own
inherent energy, wishes, jointly with the cities to overthrow the old order, it
represents, on the contrary, the rural population that, hide-bound in the old
order, seeks to see itself, together with its allotments, saved and favored by
the ghost of the Empire; it represents, not the intelligence, but the
superstition of the farmer; not his judgment, but his bias; not his future, but
his past; not his modern Cevennes; [#7 The Cevennes were the theater of
the most numerous revolutionary uprisings of the farmer class.] but his
modern Vendee. [#8 La Vendee was the theater of protracted reactionary
uprisings of the farmer class under the first Revolution.]
The three years' severe rule of the parliamentary republic had freed a part
of the French farmers from the Napoleonic illusion, and, though even only
superficially; had revolutionized them The bourgeoisie threw them,
however, violently back every time that they set themselves in motion.
Under the parliamentary republic, the modern wrestled with the traditional
consciousness of the French farmer. The process went on in the form of a
continuous struggle between the school teachers and the parsons;—the
bourgeoisie knocked the school teachers down. For the first time, the farmer
made an effort to take an independent stand in the government of the
country; this manifested itself in the prolonged conflicts of the Mayors with
the Prefects;—the bourgeoisie deposed the Mayors. Finally, during period
of the parliamentary republic, the farmers of several localities rose against
their own product, the Army;—the bourgeoisie punished them with states of
siege and executions. And this is the identical bourgeoisie, that now howls
over the "stupidity of the masses," over the "vile multitude," which, it
claims, betrayed it to Bonaparte. Itself has violently fortified the
imperialism of the farmer class; it firmly maintained the conditions that
Constitute the birth-place of this farmer-religion. Indeed, the bourgeoisie
has every reason to fear the stupidity of the masses—so long as they remain
conservative; and their intelligence—so soon as they become revolutionary.
In the revolts that took place after the "coup d'etat" a part of the French
farmers protested, arms in hand, against their own vote of December 10,
1848. The school house had, since 1848, sharpened their wits. But they had
bound themselves over to the nether world of history, and history kept them
to their word. Moreover, the majority of this population was still so full of
prejudices that, just in the "reddest" Departments, it voted openly for
Bonaparte. The National Assembly prevented, as it thought, this population

from walking; the farmers now snapped the fetters which the cities had
struck upon the will of the country districts. In some places they even
indulged the grotesque hallucination of a "Convention together with a
Napoleon."
After the first revolution had converted the serf farmers into freeholders,
Napoleon fixed and regulated the conditions under which, unmolested, they
could exploit the soil of France, that had just fallen into their hands, and
expiate the youthful passion for property. But that which now bears the
French farmer down is that very allotment of land, it is the partition of the
soil, the form of ownership, which Napoleon had consolidated. These are
the material condition that turned French feudal peasant into a small or
allotment farmer, and Napoleon into an Emperor. Two generations have
sufficed to produce the inevitable result the progressive deterioration of
agriculture, and the progressive encumbering of the agriculturist The
"Napoleonic" form of ownership, which, at the beginning of the nineteenth
century was the condition for the emancipation and enrichment of the
French rural population, has, in the course of the century, developed into the
law of their enslavement and pauperism. Now, then, this very law is the first
of the "idees Napoleoniennes," which the second Bonaparte must uphold. If
he still shares with the farmers the illusion of seeking, not in the system of
the small allotment itself, but outside of that system, in the influence of
secondary conditions, the cause of their ruin, his experiments are bound to
burst like soap-bubbles against the modern system of production.
The economic development of the allotment system has turned bottom
upward the relation of the farmer to the other classes of society. Under
Napoleon, the parceling out of the agricultural lands into small allotments
supplemented in the country the free competition and the incipient large
production of the cities. The farmer class was the ubiquitous protest against
the aristocracy of land, just then overthrown. The roots that the system of
small allotments cast into the soil of France, deprived feudalism of all
nutriment. Its boundary-posts constituted the natural buttress of the
bourgeoisie against every stroke of the old overlords. But in the course of
the nineteenth century, the City Usurer stepped into the shoes of the Feudal
Lord, the Mortgage substituted the Feudal Duties formerly yielded by the
soil, bourgeois Capital took the place of the aristocracy of Landed Property.
The former allotments are now only a pretext that allows the capitalist class
to draw profit, interest and rent from agricultural lands, and to leave to the

farmer himself the task of seeing to it that he knock out his wages. The
mortgage indebtedness that burdens the soil of France imposes upon the
French farmer class they payment of an interest as great as the annual
interest on the whole British national debt. In this slavery of capital, whither
its development drives it irresistibly, the allotment system has transformed
the mass of the French nation into troglodytes. Sixteen million farmers
(women and children included), house in hovels most of which have only
one opening, some two, and the few most favored ones three. Windows are
to a house what the five senses are to the head. The bourgeois social order,
which, at the beginning of the century, placed the State as a sentinel before
the newly instituted allotment, and that manured this with laurels, has
become a vampire that sucks out its heart-blood and its very brain, and
throws it into the alchemist's pot of capital. The "Code Napoleon" is now
but the codex of execution, of sheriff's sales and of intensified taxation. To
the four million (children, etc., included) official paupers, vagabonds,
criminals and prostitutes, that France numbers, must be added five million
souls who hover over the precipice of life, and either sojourn in the country
itself, or float with their rags and their children from the country to the
cities, and from the cities back to the country. Accordingly, the interests of
the farmers are no longer, as under Napoleon, in harmony but in conflict
with the interests of the bourgeoisie, i.e., with capital; they find their natural
allies and leaders among the urban proletariat, whose mission is the
overthrow of the bourgeois social order. But the "strong and unlimited
government"—and this is the second of the "idees Napoleoniennes," which
the second Napoleon has to carried out—, has for its mission the forcible
defence of this very "material" social order, a "material order" that furnishes
the slogan in Bonaparte's proclamations against the farmers in revolt.
Along with the mortgage, imposed by capital upon the farmer's
allotment, this is burdened by taxation. Taxation is the fountain of life to the
bureaucracy, the Army, the parsons and the court, in short to the whole
apparatus of the Executive power. A strong government, and heavy taxes
are identical. The system of ownership, involved in the system of allotments
lends itself by nature for the groundwork of a powerful and numerous
bureaucracy: it produces an even level of conditions and of persons over the
whole surface of the country; it, therefore, allows the exercise of an even
influence upon all parts of this even mass from a high central point
downwards: it annihilates the aristocratic gradations between the popular

masses and the Government; it, consequently, calls from all sides for the
direct intervention of the Government and for the intervention of the latter's
immediate organs; and, finally, it produces an unemployed excess of
population, that finds no room either in the country or in the cities, that,
consequently, snatches after public office as a sort of dignified alms, and
provokes the creation of further offices. With the new markets, which he
opened at the point of the bayonet, and with the plunder of the continent,
Napoleon returned to the farmer class with interest the taxes wrung from
them. These taxes were then a goad to the industry of the farmer, while
now, on the contrary, they rob his industry of its last source of support, and
completely sap his power to resist poverty. Indeed, an enormous
bureaucracy, richly gallooned and well fed is that "idee Napoleonienne" that
above all others suits the requirements of the second Bonaparte. How else
should it be, seeing he is forced to raise alongside of the actual classes of
society, an artificial class, to which the maintenance of his own regime must
be a knife-and-fork question? One of his first financial operations was,
accordingly, the raising of the salaries of the government employees to their
former standard and the creation of new sinecures.
Another "idee Napoleonienne" is the rule of the parsons as an instrument
of government. But while the new-born allotment, in harmony with society,
in its dependence upon the powers of nature, and in its subordination to the
authority that protected it from above, was naturally religious, the debtbroken allotment, on the contrary, at odds with society and authority, and
driven beyond its own narrow bounds, becomes as naturally irreligious.
Heaven was quite a pretty gift thrown in with the narrow strip of land that
had just been won, all the more as it makes the weather; it, however,
becomes an insult from the moment it is forced upon the farmer as a
substitute for his allotment. Then the parson appears merely as the anointed
blood-hound of the earthly police,—yet another "idee Napoleonienne." The
expedition against Rome will next time take place in France, but in a
reverse sense from that of M. de Montalembert.
Finally, the culminating point of the "idees Napoleoniennes" is the
preponderance of the Army. The Army was the "point of honor" with the
allotment farmers: it was themselves turned into masters, defending abroad
their newly established property, glorifying their recently conquered
nationality, plundering and revolutionizing the world. The uniform was
their State costume; war was their poetry; the allotment, expanded and

rounded up in their phantasy, was the fatherland; and patriotism became the
ideal form of property. But the foe, against whom the French farmer must
now defend his property, are not the Cossacks, they are the sheriffs and the
tax collectors. The allotment no longer lies in the so-called fatherland, but
in the register of mortgages. The Army itself no longer is the flower of the
youth of the farmers, it is the swamp-blossom of the slum-proletariat of the
farmer class. It consists of "remplacants," substitutes, just as the second
Bonaparte himself is but a "remplacant," a substitute, for Napoleon. Its feats
of heroism are now performed in raids instituted against farmers and in the
service of the police;—and when the internal contradictions of his own
system shall drive the chief of the "Society of December 10" across the
French frontier, that Army will, after a few bandit-raids, gather no laurels
but only hard knocks.
It is evident that all the "idees Napoleoniennes" are the ideas of the
undeveloped and youthfully fresh allotment; they are an absurdity for the
allotment that now survives. They are only the hallucinations of its death
struggle; words turned to hollow phrases, spirits turned to spooks. But this
parody of the Empire was requisite in order to free the mass of the French
nation from the weight of tradition, and to elaborate sharply the contrast
between Government and Society. Along with the progressive decay of the
allotment, the governmental structure, reared upon it, breaks down. The
centralization of Government, required by modern society, rises only upon
the ruins of the military and bureaucratic governmental machinery that was
forged in contrast to feudalism.
The conditions of the French farmers' class solve to us the riddle of the
general elections of December 20 and 21, that led the second Bonaparte to
the top of Sinai, not to receive, but to decree laws.
The bourgeoisie had now, manifestly, no choice but to elect Bonaparte.
When at the Council of Constance, the puritans complained of the sinful life
of the Popes, and moaned about the need of a reform in morals, Cardinal
d'Ailly thundered into their faces: "Only the devil in his Own person can
now save the Catholic Church, and you demand angels." So, likewise, did
the French bourgeoisie cry out after the "coup d'etat": "Only the chief of the
'Society of December 10' can now save bourgeois society, only theft can
save property, only perjury religion, only bastardy the family, only disorder
order!"

Bonaparte, as autocratic Executive power, fulfills his mission to secure
"bourgeois order." But the strength of this bourgeois order lies in the middle
class. He feels himself the representative of the middle class, and issues his
decrees in that sense. Nevertheless, he is something only because he has
broken the political power of this class, and daily breaks it anew. Hence he
feels himself the adversary of the political and the literary power of the
middle class. But, by protecting their material, he nourishes anew their
political power. Consequently, the cause must be kept alive, but the result,
wherever it manifests itself, swept out of existence. But this procedure is
impossible without slight mistakings of causes and effects, seeing that both,
in their mutual action and reaction, lose their distinctive marks. Thereupon,
new decrees, that blur the line of distinction. Bonaparte, furthermore, feels
himself, as against the bourgeoisie, the representative of the farmer and the
people in general, who, within bourgeois society, is to render the lower
classes of society happy. To this end, new decrees, intended to exploit the
"true Socialists," together with their governmental wisdom. But, above all,
Bonaparte feels himself the chief of the "Society of December 10," the
representative of the slum-proletariat, to which he himself, his immediate
surroundings, his Government, and his army alike belong, the main object
with all of whom is to be good to themselves, and draw Californian tickets
out of the national treasury. An he affirms his chieftainship of the "Society
of December 10" with decrees, without decrees, and despite decrees.
This contradictory mission of the man explains the contradictions of his
own Government, and that confused groping about, that now seeks to win,
then to humiliate now this class and then that, and finishes by arraying
against itself all the classes; whose actual insecurity constitutes a highly
comical contrast with the imperious, categoric style of the Government acts,
copied closely from the Uncle.
Industry and commerce, i.e., the business of the middle class, are to be
made to blossom in hot-house style under the "strong Government." Loans
for a number of railroad grants. But the Bonapartist slum-proletariat is to
enrich itself. Peculation is carried on with railroad concessions on the
Bourse by the initiated; but no capital is forthcoming for the railroads. The
bank then pledges itself to make advances upon railroad stock; but the bank
is itself to be exploited; hence, it must be cajoled; it is released of the
obligation to publish its reports weekly. Then follows a leonine treaty
between the bank and the Government. The people are to be occupied:

public works are ordered; but the public works raise the tax rates upon the
people; thereupon the taxes are reduced by an attack upon the national
bond-holders through the conversion of the five per cent "rentes" [#9 The
name of the French national bonds.] into four-and-halves. Yet the middle
class must again be tipped: to this end, the tax on wine is doubled for the
people, who buy it at retail, and is reduced to one-half for the middle class,
that drink it at wholesale. Genuine labor organizations are dissolved, but
promises are made of future wonders to accrue from organization. The
farmers are to be helped: mortgage-banks are set up that must promote the
indebtedness; of the farmer and the concentration of property but again,
these banks are to be utilized especially to the end of squeezing money out
of the confiscated estates of the House of Orleans; no capitalist will listen to
this scheme, which, moreover, is not mentioned in the decree; the mortgage
bank remains a mere decree, etc., etc.
Bonaparte would like to appear as the patriarchal benefactor of all
classes; but he can give to none without taking from the others. As was said
of the Duke of Guise, at the time of the Fronde, that he was the most
obliging man in France because he had converted all his estates into bonds
upon himself for his Parisians, so would Napoleon like to be the most
obliging man in France and convert all property and all labor of France into
a personal bond upon himself. He would like to steal the whole of France to
make a present thereof to France, or rather to be able to purchase France
back again with French money;—as chief of the "Society of December 10,"
he must purchase that which is to be his. All the State institutions, the
Senate, the Council of State, the Legislature, the Legion of Honor, the
Soldiers' decorations, the public baths, the public buildings, the railroads,
the General Staff of the National Guard, exclusive of the rank and file, the
confiscated estates of the House of Orleans,—all are converted into
institutions for purchase and sale. Every place in the Army and the
machinery of Government becomes a purchasing power. The most
important thing, however, in this process, whereby France is taken to be
given back to herself, are the percentages that, in the transfer, drop into the
hands of the chief and the members of the "Society of December 10." The
witticisms with which the Countess of L., the mistress of de Morny,
characterized the confiscations of the Orleanist estates: "C'est le premier vol
de l'aigle," [#10 "It is the first flight of the eagle" The French word "vol"
means theft as well as flight.] fits every fight of the eagle that is rather a

crow. He himself and his followers daily call out to themselves, like the
Italian Carthusian monk in the legend does to the miser, who displayfully
counted the goods on which he could live for many years to come: "Tu fai
conto sopra i beni, bisogna prima far il conto sopra gli anni." [#11 "You
count your property you should rather count the years left to you."] In order
not to make a mistake in the years, they count by minutes. A crowd of
fellows, of the best among whom all that can be said is that one knows not
whence he comes—a noisy, restless "Boheme," greedy after plunder, that
crawls about in gallooned frocks with the same grotesque dignity as
Soulonque's [#12 Soulonque was the negro Emperor of the short-lived
negro Empire of Hayti.] Imperial dignitaries—, thronged the court crowded
the ministries, and pressed upon the head of the Government and of the
Army. One can picture to himself this upper crust of the "Society of
December 10" by considering that Veron Crevel [#13 Crevel is a character
of Balzac, drawn after Dr. Veron, the proprietor of the "Constitutional"
newspaper, as a type of the dissolute Parisian Philistine.] is their preacher of
morality, and Granier de Cassagnac their thinker. When Guizot, at the time
he was Minister, employed this Granier on an obscure sheet against the
dynastic opposition, he used to praise him with the term: "C'est le roi des
droles." [#14 "He Is the king of the clowns."] It were a mistake to recall the
days of the Regency or of Louis XV. by the court and the kit of Louis
Bonaparte's: "Often did France have a mistress-administration, but never
yet an administration of kept men." [#15 Madame de Girardin.]
Harassed by the contradictory demands of his situation, and compelled,
like a sleight-of-hands performer, to keep, by means of constant surprises,
the eyes of the public riveted upon himself as the substitute of Napoleon,
compelled, consequently, everyday to accomplish a sort of "coup" on a
small scale, Bonaparte throws the whole bourgeois social system into
disorder; he broaches everything that seemed unbroachable by the
revolution of 1848; he makes one set people patient under the revolution
and another anxious for it; he produces anarchy itself in the name of order
by rubbing off from the whole machinery of Government the veneer of
sanctity, by profaning it, by rendering it at once nauseating and laughable.
He rehearses in Paris the cult of the sacred coat of Trier with the cult of the
Napoleonic Imperial mantle. But when the Imperial Mantle shall have
finally fallen upon the shoulders of Louis Bonaparte, then will also the iron
statue of Napoleon drop down from the top of the Vendome column. [#16 A

prophecy that a few years later, after Bonaparte's coronation as Emperor,
was literally fulfilled. By order of Emperor Louis Napoleon, the military
statue of the Napoleon that originally surmounted the Vendome was taken
down and replaced by one of first Napoleon in imperial robes.]
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I
Bruno Bauer,
The Jewish Question,
Braunschweig, 1843
The German Jews desire emancipation. What kind of emancipation do they desire? Civic,
political emancipation.
Bruno Bauer replies to them: No one in Germany is politically emancipated. We
ourselves are not free. How are we to free you? You Jews are egoists if you demand a
special emancipation for yourselves as Jews. As Germans, you ought to work for the
political emancipation of Germany, and as human beings, for the emancipation of
mankind, and you should feel the particular kind of your oppression and your shame not
as an exception to the rule, but on the contrary as a confirmation of the rule.
Or do the Jews demand the same status as Christian subjects of the state? In that
case, they recognize that the Christian state is justified and they recognize, too, the
regime of general oppression. Why should they disapprove of their special yoke if they
approve of the general yoke? Why should the German be interested in the liberation of the
Jew, if the Jew is not interested in the liberation of the German?
The Christian state knows only privileges. In this state, the Jew has the privilege of
being a Jew. As a Jew, he has rights which the Christians do not have. Why should he want
rights which he does not have, but which the Christians enjoy?
In wanting to be emancipated from the Christian state, the Jew is demanding that the
Christian state should give up its religious prejudice. Does he, the Jew, give up his
religious prejudice? Has he, then, the right to demand that someone else should renounce
his religion?
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By its very nature, the Christian state is incapable of emancipating the Jew; but, adds
Bauer, by his very nature the Jew cannot be emancipated. So long as the state is Christian
and the Jew is Jewish, the one is as incapable of granting emancipation as the other is of
receiving it.
The Christian state can behave towards the Jew only in the way characteristic of the
Christian state – that is, by granting privileges, by permitting the separation of the Jew
from the other subjects, but making him feel the pressure of all the other separate spheres
of society, and feel it all the more intensely because he is in religious opposition to the
dominant religion. But the Jew, too, can behave towards the state only in a Jewish way –
that is, by treating it as something alien to him, by counterposing his imaginary nationality
to the real nationality, by counterposing his illusory law to the real law, by deeming
himself justified in separating himself from mankind, by abstaining on principle from
taking part in the historical movement, by putting his trust in a future which has nothing
in common with the future of mankind in general, and by seeing himself as a member of
the Jewish people, and the Jewish people as the chosen people.
On what grounds, then, do you Jews want emancipation? On account of your religion?
It is the mortal enemy of the state religion. As citizens? In Germany, there are no citizens.
As human beings? But you are no more human beings than those to whom you appeal.
Bauer has posed the question of Jewish emancipation in a new form, after giving a
critical analysis of the previous formulations and solutions of the question. What, he asks,
is the nature of the Jew who is to be emancipated and of the Christian state that is to
emancipate him? He replies by a critique of the Jewish religion, he analyzes the religious
opposition between Judaism and Christianity, he elucidates the essence of the Christian
state – and he does all this audaciously, trenchantly, wittily, and with profundity, in a style
of writing that is as precise as it is pithy and vigorous.
How, then, does Bauer solve the Jewish question? What is the result? The formulation
of a question is its solution. The critique of the Jewish question is the answer to the Jewish
question. The summary, therefore, is as follows:
We must emancipate ourselves before we can emancipate others.
The most rigid form of the opposition between the Jew and the Christian is the religious
opposition. How is an opposition resolved? By making it impossible. How is religious
opposition made impossible? By abolishing religion. As soon as Jew and Christian
recognize that their respective religions are no more than different stages in the
development of the human mind, different snake skins cast off by history, and that man
is the snake who sloughed them, the relation of Jew and Christian is no longer religious
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but is only a critical, scientific, and human relation. Science, then, constitutes their unity.
But, contradictions in science are resolved by science itself.
The German Jew, in particular, is confronted by the general absence of political
emancipation and the strongly marked Christian character of the state. In Bauer’s
conception, however, the Jewish question has a universal significance, independent of
specifically German conditions. It is the question of the relation of religion to the state, of
the contradiction

between

religious

constraint

and

political

emancipation.

Emancipation from religion is laid down as a condition, both to the Jew who wants to be
emancipated politically, and to the state which is to effect emancipation and is itself to be
emancipated.
“Very well,” it is said, and the Jew himself says it, “the Jew is to become emancipated
not as a Jew, not because he is a Jew, not because he possesses such an excellent,
universally human principle of morality; on the contrary, the Jew will retreat behind
the citizen and be a citizen, although he is a Jew and is to remain a Jew. That is to
say, he is and remains a Jew, although he is a citizen and lives in universally human
conditions: his Jewish and restricted nature triumphs always in the end over his
human and political obligations. The prejudice remains in spite of being outstripped
by general principles. But if it remains, then, on the contrary, it outstrips everything
else.”
“Only sophistically, only apparently, would the Jew be able to remain a Jew in the life
of the state. Hence, if he wanted to remain a Jew, the mere appearance would
become the essential and would triumph; that is to say, his life in the state would be
only a semblance or only a temporary exception to the essential and the rule.” (“The
Capacity of Present-Day Jews and Christians to Become Free,” Einundzwanzig
Bogen, pp. 57)

Let us hear, on the other hand, how Bauer presents the task of the state.
“France,” he says, “has recently shown us” (Proceedings of the Chamber of Deputies,
December 26, 1840) “in the connection with the Jewish question – just as it has
continually done in all other political questions – the spectacle of a life which is free,
but which revokes its freedom by law, hence declaring it to be an appearance, and on
the other hand contradicting its free laws by its action.” (The Jewish Question, p.
64)
“In France, universal freedom is not yet the law, the Jewish question too has not yet
been solved, because legal freedom – the fact that all citizens are equal – is restricted
in actual life, which is still dominated and divided by religious privileges, and this
lack of freedom in actual life reacts on law and compels the latter to sanction the
division of the citizens, who as such are free, into oppressed and oppressors.” (p. 65)

When, therefore, would the Jewish question be solved for France?
“The Jew, for example, would have ceased to be a Jew if he did not allow himself to
be prevented by his laws from fulfilling his duty to the state and his fellow citizens,
that is, for example, if on the Sabbath he attended the Chamber of Deputies and took
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part in the official proceedings. Every religious privilege, and therefore also the
monopoly of a privileged church, would have been abolished altogether, and if some
or many persons, or even the overwhelming majority, still believed themselves bound
to fulfil religious duties, this fulfilment ought to be left to them as a purely private
matter.” (p. 65)
“There is no longer any religion when there is no longer any privileged religion. Take
from religion its exclusive power and it will no longer exist.” (p. 66)
“Just as M. Martin du Nord saw the proposal to omit mention of Sunday in the law as
a motion to declare that Christianity has ceased to exist, with equal reason (and this
reason is very well founded) the declaration that the law of the Sabbath is no longer
binding on the Jew would be a proclamation abolishing Judaism.” (p. 71)

Bauer, therefore, demands, on the one hand, that the Jew should renounce Judaism, and
that mankind in general should renounce religion, in order to achieve civic emancipation.
On the other hand, he quite consistently regards the political abolition of religion as the
abolition of religion as such. The state which presupposes religion is not yet a true, real
state.
“Of course, the religious notion affords security to the state. But to what state? To
what kind of state?” (p. 97)

At this point, the one-sided formulation of the Jewish question becomes evident.
It was by no means sufficient to investigate: Who is to emancipate? Who is to be
emancipated? Criticism had to investigate a third point. It had to inquire: What kind of
emancipation is in question? What conditions follow from the very nature of the
emancipation that is demanded? Only the criticism of political emancipation itself would
have been the conclusive criticism of the Jewish question and its real merging in the
“general question of time.”
Because Bauer does not raise the question to this level, he becomes entangled in
contradictions. He puts forward conditions which are not based on the nature of political
emancipation itself. He raises questions which are not part of his problem, and he solves
problems which leave this question unanswered. When Bauer says of the opponents of
Jewish emancipation: “Their error was only that they assumed the Christian state to be the
only true one and did not subject it to the same criticism that they applied to Judaism”
(op. cit., p. 3), we find that his error lies in the fact that he subjects to criticism only the
“Christian state,” not the “state as such,” that he does not investigate the relation of
political emancipation to human emancipation and, therefore, puts forward conditions
which can be explained only by uncritical confusion of political emancipation with general
human emancipation. If Bauer asks the Jews: Have you, from your standpoint, the right to
want political emancipation? We ask the converse question: Does the standpoint of
political emancipation give the right to demand from the Jew the abolition of Judaism and
from man the abolition of religion?
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The Jewish question acquires a different form depending on the state in which the Jew
lives. In Germany, where there is no political state, no state as such, the Jewish question is
a purely theological one. The Jew finds himself in religious opposition to the state, which
recognizes Christianity as its basis. This state is a theologian ex professo. Criticism here is
criticism of theology, a double-edged criticism – criticism of Christian theology and of
Jewish theology. Hence, we continue to operate in the sphere of theology, however much
we may operate critically within it.
In France, a constitutional state, the Jewish question is a question of constitutionalism,
the question of the incompleteness of political emancipation. Since the semblance of a
state religion is retained here, although in a meaningless and self-contradictory formula,
that of a religion of the majority, the relation of the Jew to the state retains the
semblance of a religious, theological opposition.
Only in the North American states – at least, in some of them – does the Jewish
question lose its theological significance and become a really secular question. Only where
the political state exists in its completely developed form can the relation of the Jew, and
of the religious man in general, to the political state, and therefore the relation of religion
to the state, show itself in its specific character, in its purity. The criticism of this relation
ceases to be theological criticism as soon as the state ceases to adopt a theological attitude
toward religion, as soon as it behaves towards religion as a state – i.e., politically.
Criticism, then, becomes criticism of the political state. At this point, where the question
ceases to be theological, Bauer’s criticism ceases to be critical.
“In the United States there is neither a state religion nor a religion declared to be that
of the majority, nor the predominance of one cult over another. The state stands
aloof from all cults.” (Marie ou l’esclavage aux Etats-Unis, etc., by G. de Beaumont,
Paris, 1835, p. 214)
Indeed, there are some North American states where “the constitution does not
impose any religious belief or religious practice as a condition of political rights.” (op.
cit., p. 225)
Nevertheless, “in the United States people do not believe that a man without religion
could be an honest man.” (op. cit., p. 224)

Nevertheless, North America is pre-eminently the country of religiosity, as Beaumont,
Tocqueville, and the Englishman Hamilton unanimously assure us. The North American
states, however, serve us only as an example. The question is: What is the relation of
complete political emancipation to religion? If we find that even in the country of
complete political emancipation, religion not only exists, but displays a fresh and vigorous
vitality, that is proof that the existence of religion is not in contradiction to the perfection
of the state. Since, however, the existence of religion is the existence of defect, the source
of this defect can only be sought in the nature of the state itself. We no longer regard
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/jewish-question/

5/26

9/25/2020

On The Jewish Question by Karl Marx

religion as the cause, but only as the manifestation of secular narrowness. Therefore, we
explain the religious limitations of the free citizen by their secular limitations. We do not
assert that they must overcome their religious narrowness in order to get rid of their
secular restrictions, we assert that they will overcome their religious narrowness once they
get rid of their secular restrictions. We do not turn secular questions into theological ones.
History has long enough been merged in superstition, we now merge superstition in
history. The question of the relation of political emancipation to religion becomes for us
the question of the relation of political emancipation to human emancipation. We criticize
the religious weakness of the political state by criticizing the political state in its secular
form, apart from its weaknesses as regards religion. The contradiction between the state
and a particular religion, for instance Judaism, is given by us a human form as the
contradiction between the state and particular secular elements; the contradiction
between the state and religion in general as the contradiction between the state and its
presuppositions in general.
The political emancipation of the Jew, the Christian, and, in general, of religious man, is
the emancipation of the state from Judaism, from Christianity, from religion in general. In
its own form, in the manner characteristic of its nature, the state as a state emancipates
itself from religion by emancipating itself from the state religion – that is to say, by the
state as a state not professing any religion, but, on the contrary, asserting itself as a state.
The political emancipation from religion is not a religious emancipation that has been
carried through to completion and is free from contradiction, because political
emancipation is not a form of human emancipation which has been carried through to
completion and is free from contradiction.
The limits of political emancipation are evident at once from the fact that the state can
free itself from a restriction without man being really free from this restriction, that the
state can be a free state [pun on word Freistaat, which also means republic] without man
being a free man. Bauer himself tacitly admits this when he lays down the following
condition for political emancipation:
“Every religious privilege, and therefore also the monopoly of a privileged church,
would have been abolished altogether, and if some or many persons, or even the
overwhelming majority, still believed themselves bound to fulfil religious duties, this
fulfilment ought to be left to them as a purely private matter.” [The Jewish
Question, p. 65]

It is possible, therefore, for the state to have emancipated itself from religion even if the
overwhelming majority is still religious. And the overwhelming majority does not cease
to be religious through being religious in private.
But, the attitude of the state, and of the republic [free state] in particular, to religion is,
after all, only the attitude to religion of the men who compose the state. It follows from
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this that man frees himself through the medium of the state, that he frees himself
politically from a limitation when, in contradiction with himself, he raises himself above
this limitation in an abstract, limited, and partial way. It follows further that, by freeing
himself politically, man frees himself in a roundabout way, through an intermediary,
although an essential intermediary. It follows, finally, that man, even if he proclaims
himself an atheist through the medium of the state – that is, if he proclaims the state to be
atheist – still remains in the grip of religion, precisely because he acknowledges himself
only by a roundabout route, only through an intermediary. Religion is precisely the
recognition of man in a roundabout way, through an intermediary. The state is the
intermediary between man and man’s freedom. Just as Christ is the intermediary to whom
man transfers the burden of all his divinity, all his religious constraint, so the state is the
intermediary to whom man transfers all his non-divinity and all his human unconstraint.
The political elevation of man above religion shares all the defects and all the
advantages of political elevation in general. The state as a state annuls, for instance,
private property, man declares by political means that private property is abolished as
soon as the property qualification for the right to elect or be elected is abolished, as has
occurred in many states of North America. Hamilton quite correctly interprets this fact
from a political point of view as meaning:
“the masses have won a victory over the property owners and financial wealth.”
[Thomas Hamilton, Men and Manners in America, 2 vols, Edinburgh, 1833, p.
146]

Is not private property abolished in idea if the non-property owner has become the
legislator for the property owner? The property qualification for the suffrage is the last
political form of giving recognition to private property.
Nevertheless, the political annulment of private property not only fails to abolish private
property but even presupposes it. The state abolishes, in its own way, distinctions of birth,
social rank, education, occupation, when it declares that birth, social rank, education,
occupation, are non-political distinctions, when it proclaims, without regard to these
distinction, that every member of the nation is an equal participant in national
sovereignty, when it treats all elements of the real life of the nation from the standpoint of
the state. Nevertheless, the state allows private property, education, occupation, to act in
their way – i.e., as private property, as education, as occupation, and to exert the influence
of their special nature. Far from abolishing these real distinctions, the state only exists on
the presupposition of their existence; it feels itself to be a political state and asserts its
universality only in opposition to these elements of its being. Hegel, therefore, defines the
relation of the political state to religion quite correctly when he says:
“In order [...] that the state should come into existence as the self-knowing, moral
reality of the mind, its distinction from the form of authority and faith is essential.
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But this distinction emerges only insofar as the ecclesiastical aspect arrives at a
separation within itself. It is only in this way that the state, above the particular
churches, has achieved and brought into existence universality of thought, which is
the principle of its form” (Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, 1st edition, p. 346).

Of course! Only in this way, above the particular elements, does the state constitute itself
as universality.
The perfect political state is, by its nature, man’s species-life, as opposed to his material
life. All the preconditions of this egoistic life continue to exist in civil society outside the
sphere of the state, but as qualities of civil society. Where the political state has attained its
true development, man – not only in thought, in consciousness, but in reality, in life –
leads a twofold life, a heavenly and an earthly life: life in the political community, in which
he considers himself a communal being, and life in civil society, in which he acts as a
private individual, regards other men as a means, degrades himself into a means, and
becomes the plaything of alien powers. The relation of the political state to civil society is
just as spiritual as the relations of heaven to earth. The political state stands in the same
opposition to civil society, and it prevails over the latter in the same way as religion
prevails over the narrowness of the secular world – i.e., by likewise having always to
acknowledge it, to restore it, and allow itself to be dominated by it. In his most immediate
reality, in civil society, man is a secular being. Here, where he regards himself as a real
individual, and is so regarded by others, he is a fictitious phenomenon. In the state, on the
other hand, where man is regarded as a species-being, he is the imaginary member of an
illusory sovereignty, is deprived of his real individual life and endowed with an unreal
universality.
Man, as the adherent of a particular religion, finds himself in conflict with his
citizenship and with other men as members of the community. This conflict reduces itself
to the secular division between the political state and civil society. For man as a bourgeois
[i.e., as a member of civil society, “bourgeois society” in German], “life in the state” is “only
a semblance or a temporary exception to the essential and the rule.” Of course, the
bourgeois, like the Jew, remains only sophistically in the sphere of political life, just as the
citoyen [‘citizen’ in French, i.e., the participant in political life] only sophistically remains
a Jew or a bourgeois. But, this sophistry is not personal. It is the sophistry of the political
state itself. The difference between the merchant and the citizen [Staatsbürger], between
the day-laborer and the citizen, between the landowner and the citizen, between the
merchant and the citizen, between the living individual and the citizen. The contradiction
in which the religious man finds himself with the political man is the same contradiction
in which the bourgeois finds himself with the citoyen, and the member of civil society with
his political lion’s skin.
This secular conflict, to which the Jewish question ultimately reduces itself, the relation
between the political state and its preconditions, whether these are material elements,
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such as private property, etc., or spiritual elements, such as culture or religion, the conflict
between the general interest and private interest, the schism between the political state
and civil society – these secular antitheses Bauer allows to persist, whereas he conducts a
polemic against their religious expression.
“It is precisely the basis of civil society, the need that ensures the continuance of this
society and guarantees its necessity, which exposes its existence to continual dangers,
maintains in it an element of uncertainty, and produces that continually changing
mixture of poverty and riches, of distress and prosperity, and brings about change in
general.” (p. 8)

Compare the whole section: “Civil Society” (pp. 8-9), which has been drawn up along the
basic lines of Hegel’s philosophy of law. Civil society, in its opposition to the political state,
is recognized as necessary, because the political state is recognized as necessary.
Political emancipation is, of course, a big step forward. True, it is not the final form of
human emancipation in general, but it is the final form of human emancipation within the
hitherto existing world order. It goes without saying that we are speaking here of real,
practical emancipation.
Man emancipates himself politically from religion by banishing it from the sphere of
public law to that of private law. Religion is no longer the spirit of the state, in which man
behaves – although in a limited way, in a particular form, and in a particular sphere – as a
species-being, in community with other men. Religion has become the spirit of civil
society, of the sphere of egoism, of bellum omnium contra omnes. It is no longer the
essence of community, but the essence of difference. It has become the expression of
man’s separation from his community, from himself and from other men – as it was
originally. It is only the abstract avowal of specific perversity, private whimsy, and
arbitrariness. The endless fragmentation of religion in North America, for example, gives
it even externally the form of a purely individual affair. It has been thrust among the
multitude of private interests and ejected from the community as such. But one should be
under no illusion about the limits of political emancipation. The division of the human
being into a public man and a private man, the displacement of religion from the state
into civil society, this is not a stage of political emancipation but its completion; this
emancipation, therefore, neither abolished the real religiousness of man, nor strives to do
so.
The decomposition of man into Jew and citizen, Protestant and citizen, religious man
and citizen, is neither a deception directed against citizenhood, nor is it a circumvention
of political emancipation, it is political emancipation itself, the political method of
emancipating oneself from religion. Of course, in periods when the political state as such
is born violently out of civil society, when political liberation is the form in which men
strive to achieve their liberation, the state can and must go as far as the abolition of
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religion, the destruction of religion. But it can do so only in the same way that it proceeds
to the abolition of private property, to the maximum, to confiscation, to progressive
taxation, just as it goes as far as the abolition of life, the guillotine. At times of special selfconfidence, political life seeks to suppress its prerequisite, civil society and the elements
composing this society, and to constitute itself as the real species-life of man, devoid of
contradictions. But, it can achieve this only by coming into violent contradiction with its
own conditions of life, only by declaring the revolution to be permanent, and, therefore,
the political drama necessarily ends with the re-establishment of religion, private
property, and all elements of civil society, just as war ends with peace.
Indeed, the perfect Christian state is not the so-called Christian state – which
acknowledges Christianity as its basis, as the state religion, and, therefore, adopts an
exclusive attitude towards other religions. On the contrary, the perfect Christian state is
the atheistic state, the democratic state, the state which relegates religion to a place
among the other elements of civil society. The state which is still theological, which still
officially professes Christianity as its creed, which still does not dare to proclaim itself as
a state, has, in its reality as a state, not yet succeeded in expressing the human basis – of
which Christianity is the high-flown expression – in a secular, human form. The so-called
Christian state is simply nothing more than a non-state, since it is not Christianity as a
religion, but only the human background of the Christian religion, which can find its
expression in actual human creations.
The so-called Christian state is the Christian negation of the state, but by no means the
political realization of Christianity. The state which still professes Christianity in the form
of religion, does not yet profess it in the form appropriate to the state, for it still has a
religious attitude towards religion – that is to say, it is not the true implementation of the
human basis of religion, because it still relies on the unreal, imaginary form of this
human core. The so-called Christian state is the imperfect state, and the Christian religion
is regarded by it as the supplementation and sanctification of its imperfection. For the
Christian state, therefore, religion necessarily becomes a means; hence, it is a hypocritical
state. It makes a great difference whether the complete state, because of the defect
inherent in the general nature of the state, counts religion among its presuppositions, or
whether the incomplete state, because of the defect inherent in its particular existence as
a defective state, declares that religion is its basis. In the latter case, religion becomes
imperfect politics. In the former case, the imperfection even of consummate politics
becomes evident in religion. The so-called Christian state needs the Christian religion in
order to complete itself as a state. The democratic state, the real state, does not need
religion for its political completion. On the contrary, it can disregard religion because in it
the human basis of religion is realized in a secular manner. The so-called Christian state,
on the other hand, has a political attitude to religion and a religious attitude to politics. By
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degrading the forms of the state to mere semblance, it equally degrades religion to mere
semblance.
In order to make this contradiction clearer, let us consider Bauer’s projection of the
Christian state, a projection based on his observation of the Christian-German state.
“Recently,” says Bauer, “in order to prove the impossibility or non-existence of a
Christian state, reference has frequently been made to those sayings in the Gospel
with which the [present-day] state not only does not comply, but cannot possibly
comply, if it does not want to dissolve itself completely [as a state].” “But the matter
cannot be disposed of so easily. What do these Gospel sayings demand? Supernatural
renunciation of self, submission to the authority of revelation, a turning-away from
the state, the abolition of secular conditions. Well, the Christian state demands and
accomplishes all that. It has assimilated the spirit of the Gospel, and if it does not
reproduce this spirit in the same terms as the Gospel, that occurs only because it
expresses this spirit in political forms, i.e., in forms which, it is true, are taken from
the political system in this world, but which in the religious rebirth that they have to
undergo become degraded to a mere semblance. This is a turning-away from the
state while making use of political forms for its realization.” (p. 55)

Bauer then explains that the people of a Christian state is only a non-people, no longer
having a will of its own, but whose true existence lies in the leader to whom it is subjected,
although this leader by his origin and nature is alien to it – i.e., given by God and imposed
on the people without any co-operation on its part. Bauer declares that the laws of such a
people are not its own creation, but are actual revelations, that its supreme chief needs
privileged intermediaries with the people in the strict sense, with the masses, and that the
masses themselves are divided into a multitude of particular groupings which are formed
and determined by chance, which are differentiated by their interests, their particular
passions and prejudices, and obtain permission as a privilege, to isolate themselves from
one another, etc. (p. 56)
However, Bauer himself says:
“Politics, if it is to be nothing but religion, ought not to be politics, just as the
cleaning of saucepans, if it is to be accepted as a religious matter, ought not to be
regarded as a matter of domestic economy.” (p. 108)

In the Christian-German state, however, religion is an “economic matter” just as
“economic matters” belong to the sphere of religion. The domination of religion in the
Christian-German state is the religion of domination.
The separation of the “spirit of the Gospel” from the “letter of the Gospel” is an
irreligious act. A state which makes the Gospel speak in the language of politics – that is,
in another language than that of the Holy Ghost – commits sacrilege, if not in human eyes,
then in the eyes of its own religion. The state which acknowledges Christianity as its
supreme criterion, and the Bible as its Charter, must be confronted with the words of
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Holy Scripture, for every word of Scripture is holy. This state, as well as the human
rubbish on which it is based, is caught in a painful contradiction that is insoluble from the
standpoint of religious consciousness when it is referred to those sayings of the Gospel
with which it “not only does not comply, but cannot possibly comply, if it does not want to
dissolve itself completely as a state.” And why does it not want to dissolve itself
completely? The state itself cannot give an answer either to itself or to others. In its own
consciousness, the official Christian state is an imperative, the realization of which is
unattainable, the state can assert the reality of its existence only by lying to itself, and
therefore always remains in its own eyes an object of doubt, an unreliable, problematic
object. Criticism is, therefore, fully justified in forcing the state that relies on the Bible into
a mental derangement in which it no longer knows whether it is an illusion or a reality,
and in which the infamy of its secular aims, for which religion serves as a cloak, comes
into insoluble conflict with the sincerity of its religious consciousness, for which religion
appears as the aim of the world. This state can only save itself from its inner torment if it
becomes the police agent of the Catholic Church. In relation to the church, which declares
the secular power to be its servant, the state is powerless, the secular power which claims
to be the rule of the religious spirit is powerless.
It is, indeed, estrangement which matters in the so-called Christian state, but not man.
The only man who counts, the king, is a being specifically different from other men, and is,
moreover, a religious being, directly linked with heaven, with God. The relationships
which prevail here are still relationships dependent of faith. The religious spirit, therefore,
is still not really secularized.
But, furthermore, the religious spirit cannot be really secularized, for what is it in itself
but the non-secular form of a stage in the development of the human mind? The religious
spirit can only be secularized insofar as the stage of development of the human mind of
which it is the religious expression makes its appearance and becomes constituted in its
secular form. This takes place in the democratic state. Not Christianity, but the human
basis of Christianity is the basis of this state. Religion remains the ideal, non-secular
consciousness of its members, because religion is the ideal form of the stage of human
development achieved in this state.
The members of the political state are religious owing to the dualism between individual
life and species-life, between the life of civil society and political life. They are religious
because men treat the political life of the state, an area beyond their real individuality, as if
it were their true life. They are religious insofar as religion here is the spirit of civil society,
expressing the separation and remoteness of man from man. Political democracy is
Christian since in it man, not merely one man but everyman, ranks as sovereign, as the
highest being, but it is man in his uncivilized, unsocial form, man in his fortuitous
existence, man just as he is, man as he has been corrupted by the whole organization of
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our society, who has lost himself, been alienated, and handed over to the rule of inhuman
conditions and elements – in short, man who is not yet a real species-being. That which is
a creation of fantasy, a dream, a postulate of Christianity, i.e., the sovereignty of man – but
man as an alien being different from the real man – becomes, in democracy, tangible
reality, present existence, and secular principle.
In the perfect democracy, the religious and theological consciousness itself is in its own
eyes the more religious and the more theological because it is apparently without political
significance, without worldly aims, the concern of a disposition that shuns the world, the
expression of intellectual narrow-mindedness, the product of arbitrariness and fantasy,
and because it is a life that is really of the other world. Christianity attains, here, the
practical expression of its universal-religious significance in that the most diverse world
outlooks are grouped alongside one another in the form of Christianity and still more
because it does not require other people to profess Christianity, but only religion in
general, any kind of religion (cf. Beaumont’s work quoted above). The religious
consciousness revels in the wealth of religious contradictions and religious diversity.
We have, thus, shown that political emancipation from religion leaves religion in
existence, although not a privileged religion. The contradiction in which the adherent of a
particular religion finds himself involved in relation to his citizenship is only one aspect of
the universal secular contradiction between the political state and civil society. The
consummation of the Christian state is the state which acknowledges itself as a state and
disregards the religion of its members. The emancipation of the state from religion is not
the emancipation of the real man from religion.
Therefore, we do not say to the Jews, as Bauer does: You cannot be emancipated
politically without emancipating yourselves radically from Judaism. On the contrary, we
tell them: Because you can be emancipated politically without renouncing Judaism
completely and incontrovertibly, political emancipation itself is not human emancipation.
If you Jews want to be emancipated politically, without emancipating yourselves humanly,
the half-hearted approach and contradiction is not in you alone, it is inherent in the
nature and category of political emancipation. If you find yourself within the confines of
this category, you share in a general confinement. Just as the state evangelizes when,
although it is a state, it adopts a Christian attitude towards the Jews, so the Jew acts
politically when, although a Jew, he demands civic rights.
[*]
But, if a man, although a Jew, can be emancipated politically and receive civic rights,
can he lay claim to the so-called rights of man and receive them? Bauer denies it.
“The question is whether the Jew as such, that is, the Jew who himself admits that he
is compelled by his true nature to live permanently in separation from other men, is
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capable of receiving the universal rights of man and of conceding them to others.”
“For the Christian world, the idea of the rights of man was only discovered in the last
century. It is not innate in men; on the contrary, it is gained only in a struggle against
the historical traditions in which hitherto man was brought up. Thus the rights of
man are not a gift of nature, not a legacy from past history, but the reward of the
struggle against the accident of birth and against the privileges which up to now have
been handed down by history from generation to generation. These rights are the
result of culture, and only one who has earned and deserved them can possess them.”
“Can the Jew really take possession of them? As long as he is a Jew, the restricted
nature which makes him a Jew is bound to triumph over the human nature which
should link him as a man with other men, and will separate him from non-Jews. He
declares by this separation that the particular nature which makes him a Jew is his
true, highest nature, before which human nature has to give way.”
“Similarly, the Christian as a Christian cannot grant the rights of man.” (p. 19-20)

According to Bauer, man has to sacrifice the “privilege of faith” to be able to receive the
universal rights of man. Let us examine, for a moment, the so-called rights of man – to be
precise, the rights of man in their authentic form, in the form which they have among
those who discovered them, the North Americans and the French. These rights of man are,
in part, political rights, rights which can only be exercised in community with others.
Their content is participation in the community, and specifically in the political
community, in the life of the state. They come within the category of political freedom, the
category of civic rights, which, as we have seen, in no way presuppose the incontrovertible
and positive abolition of religion – nor, therefore, of Judaism. There remains to be
examined the other part of the rights of man – the droits de l’homme, insofar as these
differ from the droits du citoyen.
Included among them is freedom of conscience, the right to practice any religion one
chooses. The privilege of faith is expressly recognized either as a right of man or as the
consequence of a right of man, that of liberty.
Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen, 1791, Article 10: “No one is to be
subjected to annoyance because of his opinions, even religious opinions.” “The
freedom of every man to practice the religion of which he is an adherent.”
Declaration of the Rights of Man, etc., 1793, includes among the rights of man,
Article 7: “The free exercise of religion.” Indeed, in regard to man’s right to
express his thoughts and opinions, to hold meetings, and to exercise his religion,
it is even stated: “The necessity of proclaiming these rights presupposes either the
existence or the recent memory of despotism.” Compare the Constitution of 1795,
Section XIV, Article 354.
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Constitution of Pennsylvania, Article 9, § 3: “All men have received from nature
the imprescriptible right to worship the Almighty according to the dictates of their
conscience, and no one can be legally compelled to follow, establish, or support
against his will any religion or religious ministry. No human authority can, in any
circumstances, intervene in a matter of conscience or control the forces of the
soul.”
Constitution of New Hampshire, Article 5 and 6: “Among these natural rights
some are by nature inalienable since nothing can replace them. The rights of
conscience are among them.” (Beaumont, op. cit., pp. 213,214)
Incompatibility between religion and the rights of man is to such a degree absent from the
concept of the rights of man that, on the contrary, a man’s right to be religious, in any
way he chooses, to practise his own particular religion, is expressly included among the
rights of man. The privilege of faith is a universal right of man.
The droits de l’homme, the rights of man, are, as such, distinct from the droits du
citoyen, the rights of the citizen. Who is homme as distinct from citoyen? None other than
the member of civil society. Why is the member of civil society called “man,” simply man;
why are his rights called the rights of man? How is this fact to be explained? From the
relationship between the political state and civil society, from the nature of political
emancipation.
Above all, we note the fact that the so-called rights of man, the droits de l’homme as
distinct from the droits du citoyen, are nothing but the rights of a member of civil society
– i.e., the rights of egoistic man, of man separated from other men and from the
community. Let us hear what the most radical Constitution, the Constitution of 1793, has
to say:
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen.
Article 2. “These rights, etc., (the natural and imprescriptible rights) are: equality,
liberty, security, property.”
What constitutes liberty?
Article 6. “Liberty is the power which man has to do everything that does not
harm the rights of others,” or, according to the Declaration of the Rights of Man
of 1791: “Liberty consists in being able to do everything which does not harm
others.”
Liberty, therefore, is the right to do everything that harms no one else. The limits within
which anyone can act without harming someone else are defined by law, just as the
boundary between two fields is determined by a boundary post. It is a question of the
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liberty of man as an isolated monad, withdrawn into himself. Why is the Jew, according to
Bauer, incapable of acquiring the rights of man?
“As long as he is a Jew, the restricted nature which makes him a Jew is bound to
triumph over the human nature which should link him as a man with other men, and
will separate him from non-Jews.”

But, the right of man to liberty is based not on the association of man with man, but on the
separation of man from man. It is the right of this separation, the right of the restricted
individual, withdrawn into himself.
The practical application of man’s right to liberty is man’s right to private property.
What constitutes man’s right to private property?
Article 16. (Constitution of 1793): “The right of property is that which every citizen
has of enjoying and of disposing at his discretion of his goods and income, of the
fruits of his labor and industry.”

The right of man to private property is, therefore, the right to enjoy one’s property and to
dispose of it at one’s discretion (à son gré), without regard to other men, independently of
society, the right of self-interest. This individual liberty and its application form the basis
of civil society. It makes every man see in other men not the realization of his own
freedom, but the barrier to it. But, above all, it proclaims the right of man
“of enjoying and of disposing at his discretion of his goods and income, of the
fruits of his labor and industry.”
There remain the other rights of man: égalité and sûreté.
Equality, used here in its non-political sense, is nothing but the equality of the liberté
described above – namely: each man is to the same extent regarded as such a selfsufficient monad. The Constitution of 1795 defines the concept of this equality, in
accordance with this significance, as follows:
Article 3 (Constitution of 1795): “Equality consists in the law being the same for
all, whether it protects or punishes.”
And security?
Article 8 (Constitution of 1793): “Security consists in the protection afforded by
society to each of its members for the preservation of his person, his rights, and his
property.”

Security is the highest social concept of civil society, the concept of police, expressing the
fact that the whole of society exists only in order to guarantee to each of its members the
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preservation of his person, his rights, and his property. It is in this sense that Hegel calls
civil society “the state of need and reason.”
The concept of security does not raise civil society above its egoism. On the contrary,
security is the insurance of egoism.
None of the so-called rights of man, therefore, go beyond egoistic man, beyond man as a
member of civil society – that is, an individual withdrawn into himself, into the confines of
his private interests and private caprice, and separated from the community. In the rights
of man, he is far from being conceived as a species-being; on the contrary, species-life
itself, society, appears as a framework external to the individuals, as a restriction of their
original independence. The sole bond holding them together is natural necessity, need and
private interest, the preservation of their property and their egoistic selves.
It is puzzling enough that a people which is just beginning to liberate itself, to tear down
all the barriers between its various sections, and to establish a political community, that
such a people solemnly proclaims (Declaration of 1791) the rights of egoistic man
separated from his fellow men and from the community, and that indeed it repeats this
proclamation at a moment when only the most heroic devotion can save the nation, and is
therefore imperatively called for, at a moment when the sacrifice of all the interest of civil
society must be the order of the day, and egoism must be punished as a crime.
(Declaration of the Rights of Man, etc., of 1793) This fact becomes still more puzzling
when we see that the political emancipators go so far as to reduce citizenship, and the
political community, to a mere means for maintaining these so-called rights of man, that,
therefore, the citoyen is declared to be the servant of egotistic homme, that the sphere in
which man acts as a communal being is degraded to a level below the sphere in which he
acts as a partial being, and that, finally, it is not man as citoyen, but man as private
individual [bourgeois] who is considered to be the essential and true man.
“The aim of all political association is the preservation of the natural and
imprescriptible rights of man.” (Declaration of the Rights, etc., of 1791, Article 2)
“Government is instituted in order to guarantee man the enjoyment of his natural
and imprescriptible rights.” (Declaration, etc., of 1793, Article 1)

Hence, even in moments when its enthusiasm still has the freshness of youth and is
intensified to an extreme degree by the force of circumstances, political life declares itself
to be a mere means, whose purpose is the life of civil society. It is true that its
revolutionary practice is in flagrant contradiction with its theory. Whereas, for example,
security is declared one of the rights of man, violation of the privacy of correspondence is
openly declared to be the order of the day. Whereas “unlimited freedom of the press”
(Constitution of 1793, Article 122) is guaranteed as a consequence of the right of man to
individual liberty, freedom of the press is totally destroyed, because “freedom of the press
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should not be permitted when it endangers public liberty.” (“Robespierre jeune,” Historie
parlementaire de la Révolution française by Buchez and Roux, vol.28, p. 159) That is to
say, therefore: The right of man to liberty ceases to be a right as soon as it comes into
conflict with political life, whereas in theory political life is only the guarantee of human
rights, the rights of the individual, and therefore must be abandoned as soon as it comes
into contradiction with its aim, with these rights of man. But, practice is merely the
exception, theory is the rule. But even if one were to regard revolutionary practice as the
correct presentation of the relationship, there would still remain the puzzle of why the
relationship is turned upside-down in the minds of the political emancipators and the aim
appears as the means, while the means appears as the aim. This optical illusion of their
consciousness would still remain a puzzle, although now a psychological, a theoretical
puzzle.
The puzzle is easily solved.
Political emancipation is, at the same time, the dissolution of the old society on which
the state alienated from the people, the sovereign power, is based. What was the character
of the old society? It can be described in one word – feudalism. The character of the old
civil society was directly political – that is to say, the elements of civil life, for example,
property, or the family, or the mode of labor, were raised to the level of elements of
political life in the form of seigniory, estates, and corporations. In this form, they
determined the relation of the individual to the state as a whole – i.e., his political
relation, that is, his relation of separation and exclusion from the other components of
society. For that organization of national life did not raise property or labor to the level of
social elements; on the contrary, it completed their separation from the state as a whole
and constituted them as discrete societies within society. Thus, the vital functions and
conditions of life of civil society remained, nevertheless, political, although political in the
feudal sense – that is to say, they secluded the individual from the state as a whole and
they converted the particular relation of his corporation to the state as a whole into his
general relation to the life of the nation, just as they converted his particular civil activity
and situation into his general activity and situation. As a result of this organization, the
unity of the state, and also the consciousness, will, and activity of this unity, the general
power of the state, are likewise bound to appear as the particular affair of a ruler and of
his servants, isolated from the people.
The political revolution which overthrew this sovereign power and raised state affairs to
become affairs of the people, which constituted the political state as a matter of general
concern, that is, as a real state, necessarily smashed all estates, corporations, guilds, and
privileges, since they were all manifestations of the separation of the people from the
community. The political revolution thereby abolished the political character of civil
society. It broke up civil society into its simple component parts; on the one hand, the
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individuals; on the other hand, the material and spiritual elements constituting the
content of the life and social position of these individuals. It set free the political spirit,
which had been, as it were, split up, partitioned, and dispersed in the various blind alleys
of feudal society. It gathered the dispersed parts of the political spirit, freed it from its
intermixture with civil life, and established it as the sphere of the community, the general
concern of the nation, ideally independent of those particular elements of civil life. A
person’s distinct activity and distinct situation in life were reduced to a merely individual
significance. They no longer constituted the general relation of the individual to the state
as a whole. Public affairs as such, on the other hand, became the general affair of each
individual, and the political function became the individual’s general function.
But, the completion of the idealism of the state was at the same time the completion of
the materialism of civil society. Throwing off the political yoke meant at the same time
throwing off the bonds which restrained the egoistic spirit of civil society. Political
emancipation was, at the same time, the emancipation of civil society from politics, from
having even the semblance of a universal content.
Feudal society was resolved into its basic element – man, but man as he really formed
its basis – egoistic man.
This man, the member of civil society, is thus the basis, the precondition, of the political
state. He is recognized as such by this state in the rights of man.
The liberty of egoistic man and the recognition of this liberty, however, is rather the
recognition of the unrestrained movement of the spiritual and material elements which
form the content of his life.
Hence, man was not freed from religion, he received religious freedom. He was not
freed from property, he received freedom to own property. He was not freed from the
egoism of business, he received freedom to engage in business.
The establishment of the political state and the dissolution of civil society into
independent individuals – whose relation with one another epend on law, just as the
relations of men in the system of estates and guilds depended on privilege – is
accomplished by one and the same act. Man as a member of civil society, unpolitical man,
inevitably appears, however, as the natural man. The “rights of man” appears as “natural
rights,” because conscious activity is concentrated on the political act. Egoistic man is the
passive result of the dissolved society, a result that is simply found in existence, an object
of immediate certainty, therefore a natural object. The political revolution resolves civil
life into its component parts, without revolutionizing these components themselves or
subjecting them to criticism. It regards civil society, the world of needs, labor, private
interests, civil law, as the basis of its existence, as a precondition not requiring further
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substantiation and therefore as its natural basis. Finally, man as a member of civil society
is held to be man in the proper sense, homme as distinct from citoyen, because he is man
in his sensuous, individual, immediate existence, whereas political man is only abstract,
artificial man, man as an allegorical, juridical person. The real man is recognized only in
the shape of the egoistic individual, the true man is recognized only in the shape of the
abstract citizen.
Therefore, Rousseau correctly described the abstract idea of political man as follows:
“Whoever dares undertake to establish a people’s institutions must feel himself
capable of changing, as it were, human nature, of transforming each individual, who
by himself is a complete and solitary whole, into a part of a larger whole, from which,
in a sense, the individual receives his life and his being, of substituting a limited and
mental existence for the physical and independent existence. He has to take from
man his own powers, and give him in exchange alien powers which he cannot employ
without the help of other men.”

All emancipation is a reduction of the human world and relationships to man himself.
Political emancipation is the reduction of man, on the one hand, to a member of civil
society, to an egoistic, independent individual, and, on the other hand, to a citizen, a
juridical person.
Only when the real, individual man re-absorbs in himself the abstract citizen, and as an
individual human being has become a species-being in his everyday life, in his particular
work, and in his particular situation, only when man has recognized and organized his
“own powers” as social powers, and, consequently, no longer separates social power from
himself in the shape of political power, only then will human emancipation have been
accomplished.

II
Bruno Bauer,
“The Capacity of Present-day Jews and Christians to Become Free,”
Einundzwanzig Bogen aus der Schweiz, pp. 56-71
It is in this form that Bauer deals with the relation between the Jewish and the Christian
religions, and also with their relation to criticism. Their relation to criticism is their
relation “to the capacity to become free.”
The result arrived at is:
“The Christian has to surmount only one stage, namely, that of his religion, in order
to give up religion altogether,”

and therefore become free.
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/jewish-question/

20/26

9/25/2020

On The Jewish Question by Karl Marx

“The Jew, on the other hand, has to break not only with his Jewish nature, but also
with the development towards perfecting his religion, a development which has
remained alien to him.” (p. 71)

Thus, Bauer here transforms the question of Jewish emancipation into a purely religious
question. The theological problem as to whether the Jew or the Christian has the better
prospect of salvation is repeated here in the enlightened form: which of them is more
capable of emancipation. No longer is the question asked: Is it Judaism or Christianity
that makes a man free? On the contrary, the question is now: Which makes man freer, the
negation of Judaism or the negation of Christianity?
“If the Jews want to become free, they should profess belief not in Christianity, but in
the dissolution of Christianity, in the dissolution of religion in general, that is to say,
in enlightenment, criticism, and its consequences, free humanity.” (p. 70)

For the Jew, it is still a matter of a profession of faith, but no longer a profession of belief
in Christianity, but of belief in Christianity in dissolution.
Bauer demands of the Jews that they should break with the essence of the Christian
religion, a demand which, as he says himself, does not arise out of the development of
Judaism.
Since Bauer, at the end of his work on the Jewish question, had conceived Judaism only
as crude religious criticism of Christianity, and therefore saw in it “merely” a religious
significance, it could be foreseen that the emancipation of the Jews, too, would be
transformed into a philosophical-theological act.
Bauer considers that the ideal, abstract nature of the Jew, his religion, is his entire
nature. Hence, he rightly concludes:
“The Jew contributes nothing to mankind if he himself disregards his narrow law,” if
he invalidates his entire Judaism. (p. 65)

Accordingly, the relation between Jews and Christians becomes the following: the sole
interest of the Christian in the emancipation of the Jew is a general human interest, a
theoretical interest. Judaism is a fact that offends the religious eye of the Christian. As
soon as his eye ceases to be religious, this fact ceases to be offensive. The emancipation of
the Jew is, in itself, not a task for the Christian.
The Jew, on the other hand, in order to emancipate himself, has to carry out not only his
own work, but also that of the Christian – i.e., the Critique of the Evangelical History of
the Synoptics and the Life of Jesus, etc.
“It is up to them to deal with it: they themselves will decide their fate; but history is
not to be trifled with.” (p. 71)
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We are trying to break with the theological formulation of the question. For us, the
question of the Jew’s capacity for emancipation becomes the question: What particular
social element has to be overcome in order to abolish Judaism? For the present-day Jew’s
capacity for emancipation is the relation of Judaism to the emancipation of the modern
world. This relation necessarily results from the special position of Judaism in the
contemporary enslaved world.
Let us consider the actual, worldly Jew – not the Sabbath Jew, as Bauer does, but the
everyday Jew.
Let us not look for the secret of the Jew in his religion, but let us look for the secret of
his religion in the real Jew.
What is the secular basis of Judaism? Practical need, self-interest. What is the worldly
religion of the Jew? Huckstering. What is his worldly God? Money.
Very well then! Emancipation from huckstering and money, consequently from
practical, real Judaism, would be the self-emancipation of our time.
An organization of society which would abolish the preconditions for huckstering, and
therefore the possibility of huckstering, would make the Jew impossible. His religious
consciousness would be dissipated like a thin haze in the real, vital air of society. On the
other hand, if the Jew recognizes that this practical nature of his is futile and works to
abolish it, he extricates himself from his previous development and works for human
emancipation as such and turns against the supreme practical expression of human selfestrangement.
We recognize in Judaism, therefore, a general anti-social element of the present time,
an element which through historical development – to which in this harmful respect the
Jews have zealously contributed – has been brought to its present high level, at which it
must necessarily begin to disintegrate.
In the final analysis, the emancipation of the Jews is the emancipation of mankind from
Judaism.
The Jew has already emancipated himself in a Jewish way.
“The Jew, who in Vienna, for example, is only tolerated, determines the fate of the
whole Empire by his financial power. The Jew, who may have no rights in the
smallest German state, decides the fate of Europe. While corporations and guilds
refuse to admit Jews, or have not yet adopted a favorable attitude towards them, the
audacity of industry mocks at the obstinacy of the material institutions.” (Bruno
Bauer, The Jewish Question, p. 114)
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This is no isolated fact. The Jew has emancipated himself in a Jewish manner, not only
because he has acquired financial power, but also because, through him and also apart
from him, money has become a world power and the practical Jewish spirit has become
the practical spirit of the Christian nations. The Jews have emancipated themselves
insofar as the Christians have become Jews.
Captain Hamilton, for example, reports:
“The devout and politically free inhabitant of New England is a kind of Laocoön who
makes not the least effort to escape from the serpents which are crushing him.
Mammon is his idol which he adores not only with his lips but with the whole force
of his body and mind. In his view the world is no more than a Stock Exchange, and he
is convinced that he has no other destiny here below than to become richer than his
neighbor. Trade has seized upon all his thoughts, and he has no other recreation than
to exchange objects. When he travels he carries, so to speak, his goods and his
counter on his back and talks only of interest and profit. If he loses sight of his own
business for an instant it is only in order to pry into the business of his competitors.”

Indeed, in North America, the practical domination of Judaism over the Christian world
has achieved as its unambiguous and normal expression that the preaching of the Gospel
itself and the Christian ministry have become articles of trade, and the bankrupt trader
deals in the Gospel just as the Gospel preacher who has become rich goes in for business
deals.
“The man who you see at the head of a respectable congregation began as a trader;
his business having failed, he became a minister. The other began as a priest but as
soon as he had some money at his disposal he left the pulpit to become a trader. In
the eyes of very many people, the religious ministry is a veritable business career.”
(Beaumont, op. cit., pp. 185,186)

According to Bauer, it is
“a fictitious state of affairs when in theory the Jew is deprived of political rights,
whereas in practice he has immense power and exerts his political influence en gros,
although it is curtailed en détail.” (Die Judenfrage, p. 114)

The contradiction that exists between the practical political power of the Jew and his
political rights is the contradiction between politics and the power of money in general.
Although theoretically the former is superior to the latter, in actual fact politics has
become the serf of financial power.
Judaism has held its own alongside Christianity, not only as religious criticism of
Christianity, not only as the embodiment of doubt in the religious derivation of
Christianity, but equally because the practical Jewish spirit, Judaism, has maintained
itself and even attained its highest development in Christian society. The Jew, who exists
as a distinct member of civil society, is only a particular manifestation of the Judaism of
civil society.
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Judaism continues to exist not in spite of history, but owing to history.
The Jew is perpetually created by civil society from its own entrails.
What, in itself, was the basis of the Jewish religion? Practical need, egoism.
The monotheism of the Jew, therefore, is in reality the polytheism of the many needs, a
polytheism which makes even the lavatory an object of divine law. Practical need,
egoism, is the principle of civil society, and as such appears in pure form as soon as civil
society has fully given birth to the political state. The god of practical need and selfinterest is money.
Money is the jealous god of Israel, in face of which no other god may exist. Money
degrades all the gods of man – and turns them into commodities. Money is the universal
self-established value of all things. It has, therefore, robbed the whole world – both the
world of men and nature – of its specific value. Money is the estranged essence of man’s
work and man’s existence, and this alien essence dominates him, and he worships it.
The god of the Jews has become secularized and has become the god of the world. The
bill of exchange is the real god of the Jew. His god is only an illusory bill of exchange.
The view of nature attained under the domination of private property and money is a
real contempt for, and practical debasement of, nature; in the Jewish religion, nature
exists, it is true, but it exists only in imagination.
It is in this sense that [in a 1524 pamphlet] Thomas Münzer declares it intolerable
“that all creatures have been turned into property, the fishes in the water, the birds in
the air, the plants on the earth; the creatures, too, must become free.”

Contempt for theory, art, history, and for man as an end in himself, which is contained in
an abstract form in the Jewish religion, is the real, conscious standpoint, the virtue of the
man of money. The species-relation itself, the relation between man and woman, etc.,
becomes an object of trade! The woman is bought and sold.
The chimerical nationality of the Jew is the nationality of the merchant, of the man of
money in general.
The groundless law of the Jew is only a religious caricature of groundless morality and
right in general, of the purely formal rites with which the world of self-interest surrounds
itself.
Here, too, man’s supreme relation is the legal one, his relation to laws that are valid for
him not because they are laws of his own will and nature, but because they are the
dominant laws and because departure from them is avenged.
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Jewish Jesuitism, the same practical Jesuitism which Bauer discovers in the Talmud, is
the relation of the world of self-interest to the laws governing that world, the chief art of
which consists in the cunning circumvention of these laws.
Indeed, the movement of this world within its framework of laws is bound to be a
continual suspension of law.
Judaism could not develop further as a religion, could not develop further theoretically,
because the world outlook of practical need is essentially limited and is completed in a few
strokes.
By its very nature, the religion of practical need could find its consummation not in
theory, but only in practice, precisely because its truth is practice.
Judaism could not create a new world; it could only draw the new creations and
conditions of the world into the sphere of its activity, because practical need, the rationale
of which is self-interest, is passive and does not expand at will, but finds itself enlarged as
a result of the continuous development of social conditions.
Judaism reaches its highest point with the perfection of civil society, but it is only in the
Christian world that civil society attains perfection. Only under the dominance of
Christianity, which makes all national, natural, moral, and theoretical conditions extrinsic
to man, could civil society separate itself completely from the life of the state, sever all the
species-ties of man, put egoism and selfish need in the place of these species-ties, and
dissolve the human world into a world of atomistic individuals who are inimically opposed
to one another.
Christianity sprang from Judaism. It has merged again in Judaism.
From the outset, the Christian was the theorizing Jew, the Jew is, therefore, the
practical Christian, and the practical Christian has become a Jew again.
Christianity had only in semblance overcome real Judaism. It was too noble-minded,
too spiritualistic to eliminate the crudity of practical need in any other way than by
elevation to the skies.
Christianity is the sublime thought of Judaism, Judaism is the common practical
application of Christianity, but this application could only become general after
Christianity as a developed religion had completed theoretically the estrangement of man
from himself and from nature.
Only then could Judaism achieve universal dominance and make alienated man and
alienated nature into alienable, vendible objects subjected to the slavery of egoistic need
and to trading.
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Selling [verausserung] is the practical aspect of alienation [Entausserung]. Just as
man, as long as he is in the grip of religion, is able to objectify his essential nature only by
turning it into something alien, something fantastic, so under the domination of egoistic
need he can be active practically, and produce objects in practice, only by putting his
products, and his activity, under the domination of an alien being, and bestowing the
significance of an alien entity – money – on them.
In its perfected practice, Christian egoism of heavenly bliss is necessarily transformed
into the corporal egoism of the Jew, heavenly need is turned into world need, subjectivism
into self-interest. We explain the tenacity of the Jew not by his religion, but, on the
contrary, by the human basis of his religion – practical need, egoism.
Since in civil society the real nature of the Jew has been universally realized and
secularized, civil society could not convince the Jew of the unreality of his religious
nature, which is indeed only the ideal aspect of practical need. Consequently, not only in
the Pentateuch and the Talmud, but in present-day society we find the nature of the
modern Jew, and not as an abstract nature but as one that is in the highest degree
empirical, not merely as a narrowness of the Jew, but as the Jewish narrowness of society.
Once society has succeeded in abolishing the empirical essence of Judaism –
huckstering and its preconditions – the Jew will have become impossible, because his
consciousness no longer has an object, because the subjective basis of Judaism, practical
need, has been humanized, and because the conflict between man’s individual-sensuous
existence and his species-existence has been abolished.
The social emancipation of the Jew is the emancipation of society from Judaism.
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Preface
||XXXIX| I have already announced in the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher the critique of
jurisprudence and political science in the form of a critique of the Hegelian philosophy of law.
While preparing it for publication, the intermingling of criticism directed only against speculation
with criticism of the various subjects themselves proved utterly unsuitable, hampering the
development of the argument and rendering comprehension difficult. Moreover, the wealth and
diversity of the subjects to be treated could have been compressed into one work only in a purely
aphoristic style; whilst an aphoristic presentation of this kind, for its part, would have given the
impression of arbitrary systematism. I shall therefore publish the critique of law, ethics, politics,
etc., in a series of distinct, independent pamphlets, and afterwards try in a special work to present
them again as a connected whole showing the interrelationship of the separate parts, and lastly
attempt a critique of the speculative elaboration of that material. For this reason it will be found
that the interconnection between political economy and the state, law, ethics, civil life, etc., is
touched upon in the present work only to the extent to which political economy itself expressly
touches upon these subjects.
It is hardly necessary to assure the reader conversant with political economy that my results have
been attained by means of a wholly empirical analysis based on a conscientious critical study of
political economy.
(Whereas the uninformed reviewer who tries to hide his complete ignorance and intellectual
poverty by hurling the “utopian phrase” at the positive critic’s head, or again such phrases as
“quite pure, quite resolute, quite critical criticism,” the “not merely legal but social – utterly
social – society”, the “compact, massy mass”, the “outspoken spokesmen of the massy mass”2
this reviewer has yet to furnish the first proof that besides his theological family affairs he has
anything to contribute to a discussion of worldly matters.)
It goes without saying that besides the French and English socialists I have also used German
socialist works. The only original German works of substance in this science, however – other
than Weitling’s writings – are the essays by Hess published in Einundzwanzig Bogen3 and
Umrisse zu einer Kritik der Nationalökonomie by Engels in the Deutsch-Französische
Jahrbücher, where also the basic elements of this work [Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts
of 1844] have been indicated by me in a very general way.
(Besides being indebted to these authors who have given critical attention to political economy,
positive criticism as a whole – and therefore also German positive criticism of political economy
– owes its true foundation to the discoveries of Feuerbach, against whose Philosophie der Zukunft
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and Thesen zur Reform der Philosophie in the Anekdota, despite the tacit use that is made of
them, the petty envy of some and the veritable wrath of others seem to have instigated a regular
conspiracy of silence.
It is only with Feuerbach that positive, humanistic and naturalistic criticism begins. The less
noise they make, the more certain, profound, extensive, and enduring is the effect of Feuerbach’s
writings, the only writings since Hegel’s Phänomenologie and Logik to contain a real theoretical
revolution.
In contrast to the critical theologian of our day, I have deemed the concluding chapter of this
work – a critical discussion of Hegelian dialectic and philosophy as a whole to be absolutely
necessary, ||XL| a task not yet performed. This lack of thoroughness is not accidental, since even
the critical theologian remains a theologian. Hence, either he has to start from certain
presuppositions of philosophy accepted as authoritative; or, if in the process of criticism and as a
result of other people’s discoveries doubts about these philosophical presuppositions have arisen
in him, he abandons them in a cowardly and unwarrantable fashion, abstracts from them, thus
showing his servile dependence on these presuppositions and his resentment at this servility
merely in a negative, unconscious and sophistical manner.
(He does this either by constantly repeating assurances concerning the purity of his own criticism,
or by trying to make it seem as though all that was left for criticism to deal with now was some
other limited form of criticism outside itself – say eighteenth-century criticism – and also the
limitations of the masses, in order to divert the observer’s attention as well as his own from the
necessary task of settling accounts between criticism and its point of origin – Hegelian dialectic
and German philosophy as a whole – that is, from this necessary raising of modern criticism
above its own limitation and crudity. Eventually, however, whenever discoveries (such as
Feuerbach’s) are made regarding the nature of his own philosophic presuppositions, the critical
theologian partly makes it appear as if he were the one who had accomplished this, producing that
appearance by taking the results of these discoveries and, without being able to develop them,
hurling them in the form of catch-phrases at writers still caught in the confines of philosophy. He
partly even manages to acquire a sense of his own superiority to such discoveries by asserting in a
mysterious way and in a veiled, malicious and skeptical fashion elements of the Hegelian
dialectic which he still finds lacking in the criticism of that dialectic (which have not yet been
critically served up to him for his use) against such criticism – not having tried to bring such
elements into their proper relation or having been capable of doing so, asserting, say, the category
of mediating proof against the category of positive, self-originating truth, [...] in a way peculiar to
Hegelian dialectic. For to the theological critic it seems quite natural that everything has to be
done by philosophy, so that he can chatter away about purity, resoluteness, and quite critical
criticism; and he fancies himself the true conqueror of philosophy whenever he happens to feel
some element4 in Hegel to be lacking in Feuerbach – for however much he practices the spiritual
idolatry of “self-consciousness” and “mind” the theological critic does not get beyond feeling to
consciousness.)
On close inspection theological criticism – genuinely progressive though it was at the inception
of the movement – is seen in the final analysis to be nothing but the culmination and consequence
of the old philosophical, and especially the Hegelian, transcendentalism, twisted into a
theological caricature. This interesting example of historical justice, which now assigns to
theology, ever philosophy’s spot of infection, the further role of portraying in itself the negative
dissolution of philosophy, i.e., the process of its decay – this historical nemesis I shall
demonstrate on another occasion.5
(How far, on the other hand, Feuerbach’s discoveries about the nature of philosophy still, for
their proof at least, called for a critical discussion of philosophical dialectic will be seen from my
exposition itself.) |XL||

First Manuscript
Wages of Labor
Wages are determined through the antagonistic struggle between capitalist and worker. Victory
goes necessarily to the capitalist. The capitalist can live longer without the worker than can the
worker without the capitalist. Combination among the capitalists is customary and effective;
workers’ combination is prohibited and painful in its consequences for them. Besides, the
landowner and the capitalist can make use of industrial advantages to augment their revenues; the
worker has neither rent nor interest on capital to supplement his industrial income. Hence the
intensity of the competition among the workers. Thus only for the workers is the separation of
capital, landed property, and labour an inevitable, essential and detrimental separation. Capital
and landed property need not remain fixed in this abstraction, as must the labor of the workers.
The separation of capital, rent, and labor is thus fatal for the worker.
The lowest and the only necessary wage rate is that providing for the subsistence of the worker
for the duration of his work and as much more as is necessary for him to support a family and for
the race of laborers not to die out. The ordinary wage, according to Smith, is the lowest
compatible with common humanity6, that is, with cattle-like existence.
The demand for men necessarily governs the production of men, as of every other commodity.
Should supply greatly exceed demand, a section of the workers sinks into beggary or starvation.
The worker’s existence is thus brought under the same condition as the existence of every other
commodity. The worker has become a commodity, and it is a bit of luck for him if he can find a
buyer. And the demand on which the life of the worker depends, depends on the whim of the rich
and the capitalists. Should supply exceed demand, then one of the constituent parts of the price —
profit, rent or wages — is paid below its rate, [a part of these] factors is therefore withdrawn from
this application, and thus the market price gravitates [towards the] natural price as the centerpoint. But (1) where there is considerable division of labor it is most difficult for the worker to
direct his labor into other channels; (2) because of his subordinate relation to the capitalist, he is
the first to suffer.
Thus in the gravitation of market price to natural price it is the worker who loses most of all and
necessarily. And it is just the capacity of the capitalist to direct his capital into another channel
which either renders the worker, who is restricted to some particular branch of labor, destitute, or
forces him to submit to every demand of this capitalist.
The accidental and sudden fluctuations in market price hit rent less than they do that part of the
price which is resolved into profit and wages; but they hit profit less than they do wages. In most
cases, for every wage that rises, one remains stationary and one falls.
The worker need not necessarily gain when the capitalist does, but he necessarily loses when
the latter loses. Thus, the worker does not gain if the capitalist keeps the market price above the
natural price by virtue of some manufacturing or trading secret, or by virtue of monopoly or the
favorable situation of his land.
Furthermore, the prices of labor are much more constant than the prices of provisions. Often they
stand in inverse proportion. In a dear year wages fall on account of the decrease in demand, but
rise on account of the increase in the prices of provisions — and thus balance. In any case, a
number of workers are left without bread. In cheap years wages rise on account of the rise in
demand, but decrease on account of the fall in the prices of provisions — and thus balance.
Another respect in which the worker is at a disadvantage:
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The labor prices of the various kinds of workers show much wider differences than the profits
in the various branches in which capital is applied. In labor all the natural, spiritual, and social
variety of individual activity is manifested and is variously rewarded, whilst dead capital always
keeps the same pace and is indifferent to real individual activity.
In general we should observe that in those cases where worker and capitalist equally suffer, the
worker suffers in his very existence, the capitalist in the profit on his dead mammon.
The worker has to struggle not only for his physical means of subsistence; he has to struggle to
get work, i.e., the possibility, the means, to perform his activity.
Let us take the three chief conditions in which society can find itself and consider the situation of
the worker in them:
(1) If the wealth of society declines the worker suffers most of all, and for the following reason:
although the working class cannot gain so much as can the class of property owners in a
prosperous state of society, no one suffers so cruelly from its decline as the working class.
(2) Let us now take a society in which wealth is increasing. This condition is the only one
favorable to the worker. Here competition between the capitalists sets in. The demand for workers
exceeds their supply. But:
In the first place, the raising of wages gives rise to overwork among the workers. The more they
wish to earn, the more must they sacrifice their time and carry out slave-labor, completely losing
all their freedom, in the service of greed. Thereby they shorten their lives. This shortening of their
life-span is a favorable circumstance for the working class as a whole, for as a result of it an everfresh supply of labor becomes necessary. This class has always to sacrifice a part of itself in order
not to be wholly destroyed.
Furthermore: When does a society find itself in a condition of advancing wealth? When the
capitals and the revenues of a country are growing. But this is only possible:
(a) As the result of the accumulation of much labor, capital being accumulated labor; as the result,
therefore, of the fact that more and more of his products are being taken away from the worker,
that to an increasing extent his own labor confronts him as another man’s property and that the
means of his existence and his activity are increasingly concentrated in the hands of the capitalist.
(b) The accumulation of capital increases the division of labor, and the division of labor increases
the number of workers. Conversely, the number of workers increases the division of labor, just as
the division of labor increases the accumulation of capital. With this division of labor on the one
hand and the accumulation of capital on the other, the worker becomes ever more exclusively
dependent on labor, and on a particular, very one-sided, machine-like labor at that. Just as he is
thus depressed spiritually and physically to the condition of a machine and from being a man
becomes an abstract activity and a belly, so he also becomes ever more dependent on every
fluctuation in market price, on the application of capital, and on the whim of the rich. Equally, the
increase in the class of people wholly dependent on work intensifies competition among the
workers, thus lowering their price. In the factory system this situation of the worker reaches its
climax.
(c) In an increasingly prosperous society only the richest of the rich can continue to live on
money interest. Everyone else has to carry on a business with his capital, or venture it in trade. As
a result, the competition between the capitalists becomes more intense. The concentration of
capital increases, the big capitalists ruin the small, and a section of the erstwhile capitalists sinks
into the working class, which as a result of this supply again suffers to some extent a depression
of wages and passes into a still greater dependence on the few big capitalists. The number of
capitalists having been diminished, their competition with respect to the workers scarcely exists
any longer; and the number of workers having been increased, their competition among
themselves has become all the more intense, unnatural, and violent. Consequently, a section of
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the working class falls into beggary or starvation just as necessarily as a section of the middle
capitalists falls into the working class.
Hence even in the condition of society most favorable to the worker, the inevitable result for the
worker is overwork and premature death, decline to a mere machine, a bond servant of capital,
which piles up dangerously over and against him, more competition, and starvation or beggary for
a section of the workers.
The raising of wages excites in the worker the capitalist’s mania to get rich, which he, however,
can only satisfy by the sacrifice of his mind and body. The raising of wages presupposes and
entails the accumulation of capital, and thus sets the product of labor against the worker as
something ever more alien to him. Similarly, the division of labor renders him ever more onesided and dependent, bringing with it the competition not only of men but also of machines. Since
the worker has sunk to the level of a machine, he can be confronted by the machine as a
competitor. Finally, as the amassing of capital increases the amount of industry and therefore the
number of workers, it causes the same amount of industry to manufacture a larger amount of
products, which leads to over-production and thus either ends by throwing a large section of
workers out of work or by reducing their wages to the most miserable minimum.
Such are the consequences of a state of society most favorable to the worker — namely, of a state
of growing, advancing wealth.
Eventually, however, this state of growth must sooner or later reach its peak. What is the
worker’s position now?
3) “In a country which had acquired that full complement of riches both the wages
of labor and the profits of stock would probably be very low the competition for
employment would necessarily be so great as to reduce the wages of labor to what
was barely sufficient to keep up the number of laborers, and, the country being
already fully peopled, that number could never be augmented.” [Adam Smith,
Wealth of Nations, Vol. I, p. 84.]
The surplus would have to die.
Thus in a declining state of society — increasing misery of the worker; in an advancing state —
misery with complications; and in a fully developed state of society — static misery.
Since, however, according to Smith, a society is not happy, of which the greater part suffers —
yet even the wealthiest state of society leads to this suffering of the majority — and since the
economic system7 (and in general a society based on private interest) leads to this wealthiest
condition, it follows that the goal of the economic system is the unhappiness of society.
Concerning the relationship between worker and capitalist we should add that the capitalist is
more than compensated for rising wages by the reduction in the amount of labor time, and that
rising wages and rising interest on capital operate on the price of commodities like simple and
compound interest respectively.
Let us put ourselves now wholly at the standpoint of the political economist, and follow him in
comparing the theoretical and practical claims of the workers.
He tells us that originally and in theory the whole product of labor belongs to the worker. But at
the same time he tells us that in actual fact what the worker gets is the smallest and utterly
indispensable part of the product — as much, only, as is necessary for his existence, not as a
human being, but as a worker, and for the propagation, not of humanity, but of the slave class of
workers.
The political economist tells us that everything is bought with labor and that capital is nothing but
accumulated labor; but at the same time he tells us that the worker, far from being able to buy
everything, must sell himself and his humanity.
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Whilst the rent of the idle landowner usually amounts to a third of the product of the soil, and the
profit of the busy capitalist to as much as twice the interest on money, the “something more”
which the worker himself earns at the best of times amounts to so little that of four children of
his, two must starve and die.
Whilst according to the political economists it is solely through labor that man enhances the value
of the products of nature, whilst labor is man’s active possession, according to this same political
economy the landowner and the capitalist, who qua landowner and capitalist are merely
privileged and idle gods, are everywhere superior to the worker and lay down the law to him.
Whilst according to the political economists labor is the sole unchanging price of things, there is
nothing more fortuitous than the price of labor, nothing exposed to greater fluctuations.
Whilst the division of labor raises the productive power of labor and increases the wealth and
refinement of society, it impoverishes the worker and reduces him to a machine. Whilst labor
brings about the accumulation of capital and with this the increasing prosperity of society, it
renders the worker ever more dependent on the capitalist, leads him into competition of a new
intensity, and drives him into the headlong rush of overproduction, with its subsequent
corresponding slump.
Whilst the interest of the worker, according to the political economists, never stands opposed to
the interest of society, society always and necessarily stands opposed to the interest of the worker.
According to the political economists, the interest of the worker is never opposed to that of
society: (1) because the rising wages are more than compensated by the reduction in the amount
of labor time, together with the other consequences set forth above; and (2) because in relation to
society the whole gross product is the net product, and only in relation to the private individual
has the net product any significance.
But that labor itself, not merely in present conditions but insofar as its purpose in general is the
mere increase of wealth — that labor itself, I say, is harmful and pernicious — follows from the
political economist’s line of argument, without his being aware of it.
In theory, rent of land and profit on capital are deductions suffered by wages. In actual fact,
however, wages are a deduction which land and capital allow to go to the worker, a concession
from the product of labor to the workers, to labor.
When society is in a state of decline, the worker suffers most severely. The specific severity of
his burden he owes to his position as a worker, but the burden as such to the position of society.
But when society is in a state of progress, the ruin and impoverishment of the worker is the
product of his labor and of the wealth produced by him. The misery results, therefore, from the
essence of present-day labor itself.
Society in a state of maximum wealth — an ideal, but one which is approximately attained, and
which at least is the aim of political economy as of civil society — means for the workers static
misery.
It goes without saying that the proletarian, i.e., the man who, being without capital and rent, lives
purely by labor, and by a one-sided, abstract labor, is considered by political economy only as a
worker. Political economy can therefore advance the proposition that the proletarian, the same as
any horse, must get as much as will enable him to work. It does not consider him when he is not
working, as a human being; but leaves such consideration to criminal law, to doctors, to religion,
to the statistical tables, to politics and to the poor-house overseer.
Let us now rise above the level of political economy and try to answer two questions on the basis
of the above exposition, which has been presented almost in the words of the political
economists:
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(1) What in the evolution of mankind is the meaning of this reduction of the greater part of
mankind to abstract labor?
(2) What are the mistakes committed by the piecemeal reformers, who either want to raise wages
and in this way to improve the situation of the working class, or regard equality of wages (as
Proudhon does) as the goal of social revolution?
In political economy labor occurs only in the form of activity as a source of livelihood.
“It can be asserted that those occupations which presuppose specific talents or
longer training have become on the whole more lucrative; whilst the proportionate
reward for mechanically monotonous activity in which one person can be trained
as easily and quickly as another has fallen with growing competition, and was
inevitably bound to fall. And it is just this sort of work which in the present state
of the organization of labor is still by far the commonest. If therefore a worker in
the first category now earns seven times as much as he did, say, fifty years ago,
whilst the earnings of another in the second category have remained unchanged,
then of course both are earning on the average four times as much. But if the first
category comprises only a thousand workers in a particular country, and the
second a million, then 999,000 are no better off than fifty years ago — and they
are worse off if at the same time the prices of the necessaries of life have risen.
With such superficial calculations of averages people try to deceive themselves
about the most numerous class of the population. Moreover, the size of the wage
is only one factor in the estimation of the worker’s income, because it is essential
for the measurement of the latter to take into account the certainty of its duration
— which is obviously out of the question in the anarchy of so-called free
competition, with its ever-recurring fluctuations and periods of stagnation. Finally,
the hours of work customary formerly and now have to be considered. And for the
English cotton-workers these have been increased, as a result of the entrepreneurs’
mania for profit. to between twelve and sixteen hours a day during the past
twenty-five years or so — that is to say, precisely during the period of the
introduction of labor-saving machines; and this increase in one country and in one
branch of industry inevitably asserted itself elsewhere to a greater or lesser degree,
for the right of the unlimited exploitation of the poor by the rich is still universally
recognised.” (Wilhelm Schulz, Die Bewegung der Production, p. 65)
“But even if it were as true as it is false that the average income of every class of
society has increased, the income-differences and relative income-distances may
nevertheless have become greater and the contrasts between wealth and poverty
accordingly stand out more sharply. For just because total production rises — and
in the same measure as it rises — needs, desires and claims also multiply and thus
relative poverty can increase whilst absolute poverty diminishes. The Samoyed
living on fish oil and rancid fish is not poor because in his secluded society all
have the same needs. But in a state that is forging ahead, which in the course of a
decade, say, increased by a third its total production in proportion to the
population, the worker who is getting as much at the end of ten years as at the
beginning has not remained as well off, but has become poorer by a third.” (Ibid.
pp. 65-66)
But political economy knows the worker only as a working animal — as a beast reduced to the
strictest bodily needs.
“To develop in greater spiritual freedom, a people must break their bondage to
their bodily needs — they must cease to be the slaves of the body. They must,
above all, have time at their disposal for spiritual creative activity and spiritual
enjoyment. The developments in the labor organism gain this time. Indeed, with
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new motive forces and improved machinery, a single worker in the cotton mills
now often performs the work formerly requiring a hundred, or even 250 to 350
workers. Similar results can be observed in all branches of production, because
external natural forces are being compelled to participate to an ever-greater degree
in human labor. If the satisfaction of a given amount of material needs formerly
required a certain expenditure of time and human effort which has later been
reduced by half, then without any loss of material comfort the scope for spiritual
activity and enjoyment has been simultaneously extended by as much.... But again
the way in which the booty, that we win from old Kronos himself in his most
private domain, is shared out is still decided by the dice-throw of blind, unjust
Chance. In France it has been calculated that at the present stage in the
development of production an average working period of five hours a day by
every person capable of work could suffice for the satisfaction of all the material
interests of society.... Notwithstanding the time saved by the perfecting of
machinery. the duration of the slave-labor performed by a large population in the
factories has only increased.” (Schulz, op. cit., pp. 67, 68.)
“The transition from compound manual labor rests on a break-down of the latter
into its simple operations. At first, however, only some of the uniformly-recurring
operations will devolve on machines, while some will devolve on men. From the
nature of things, and from confirmatory experience, it is clear that unendingly
monotonous activity of this kind is as harmful to the mind as to the body; thus this
combination of machinery with mere division of labor among a greater number of
hands must inevitably show all the disadvantages of the latter. These
disadvantages appear, among other things, in the greater mortality of factory
workers.... Consideration has not been given ... to this big distinction as to how far
men work through machines or how far as machines.” (Ibid. p. 69)
“In the future life of the peoples, however, the inanimate forces of nature working
in machines will be our slaves and serfs.” (Ibid. p. 74)
“The English spinning mills employ 196,818 women and only 158,818 men. For
every 100 male workers in the cotton mills of Lancashire there are 103 female
workers, and in Scotland as many as 209. In the English flax mills of Leeds, for
every 100 male workers there were found to be 147 female workers. In Dundee
and on the east coast of Scotland as many as 280. In the English silk mills ... many
female workers; male workers predominate in the wool-mills where the work
requires greater physical strength. In 1833, no fewer than 38,927 women were
employed alongside 18,593 men in the North American cotton mills. As a result
of the changes in the labor organism, a wider sphere of gainful employment has
thus fallen to the share of the female sex.... Women now occupying an
economically more independent position ... the two sexes are drawn closer
together in their social conditions.” (Ibid. pp. 71, 72)
“Working in the English steam- and water-driven spinning mills in 1835 were:
20,558 children between the ages of eight and twelve; 35,867 between the ages of
twelve and thirteen; and, lastly, 108,208 children between the ages of thirteen and
eighteen.... Admittedly, further advances in mechanization, by more and more
removing all monotonous work from human hands, are operating in the direction
of a gradual elimination of this evil. But standing in the way of these more rapid
advances is the very circumstance that the capitalists can, in the easiest and
cheapest fashion, appropriate the energies of the lower classes down to the
children, to be used instead of mechanical devices.” (Ibid. pp. 70-71)
“Lord Brougham’s call to the workers — ‘Become capitalists’. ... This is the evil
that millions are able to earn a bare subsistence for themselves only by strenuous
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labor which shatters the body and cripples them morally and intellectually; that
they are even obliged to consider the misfortune of finding such work a piece of
good fortune.” (Ibid. p. 60)
“In order to live, then, the non-owners are obliged to place themselves, directly or
indirectly, at the service of the owners — to put themselves, that is to say, into a
position of dependence upon them.” (Pecqueur, Théorie nouvelle d’économie soc.,
etc., p. 409)
“Servants — pay: workers — wages; employees — salary or emoluments.” (Ibid.
pp. 409-410)
“To hire out one’s labor”, “to lend one’s labor at interest”, “to work in another’s
place.”
“To hire out the materials of labor”, “to lend the materials of labor at interest”, “to
make others work in one’s place.” (Ibid. p. 411)
“Such an economic order condemns men to occupations so mean, to a degradation
so devastating and bitter, that by comparison savagery seems like a kingly
condition.... (Ibid. pp. 417, 418) “Prostitution of the non-owning class in all its
forms.” (Ibid. p. 421f) “Ragmen.”
Charles Loudon in the book Solution du problème de la population, etc., Paris, 18428, declares
the number of prostitutes in England to be between sixty and seventy thousand. The number of
women of doubtful virtue is said to be equally large (p. 228).
“The average life of these unfortunate creatures on the streets, after they have
embarked on their career of vice, is about six or seven years. To maintain the
number of sixty to seventy thousand prostitutes, there must be in the three
kingdoms at least eight to nine thousand women who commit themselves to this
abject profession each year, or about twenty-four new victims each day — an
average of one per hour; and it follows that if the same proportion holds good over
the whole surface of the globe, there must constantly be in existence one and a
half million unfortunate women of this kind”. (Ibid. p. 229)
“The numbers of the poverty-stricken grow with their poverty, and at the extreme
limit of destitution human beings are crowded together in the greatest numbers
contending with each other for the right to suffer.... In 1821 the population of
Ireland was 6,801,827. In 1831 it had risen to 7,764,010 — an increase of 14 per
cent in ten years. In Leinster, the wealthiest province, the population increased by
only 8 per cent; whilst in Connaught, the most poverty-stricken province, the
increase reached 21 per cent. (Extract from the Enquiries Published in England on
Ireland, Vienna, 1840.)” (Buret, De la misère, etc., t. 1, pp. 36, 37)
Political economy considers labor in the abstract as a thing; “labor is a
commodity.” If the price is high, then the commodity is in great demand; if the
price is low, then the commodity is in great supply: “the price of labor as a
commodity must fall lower and lower.” (Buret, op. cit.) This is made inevitable
partly by the competition between capitalist and worker, partly by the competition
amongst the workers. “The working population, the seller of labor, is necessarily
reduced to accepting the most meager part of the product.... Is the theory of labor
as a commodity anything other than a theory of disguised bondage?” (Ibid. p. 43)
“Why then has nothing but an exchange-value been seen in labor?” (Ibid. p. 44)
The large workshops prefer to buy the labor of women and children, because this
costs less than that of men. (Op. cit.) “The worker is not at all in the position of a
free seller vis-à-vis the one who employs him.... The capitalist is always free to
employ labor, and the worker is always forced to sell it. The value of labor is
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completely destroyed if it is not sold every instant. Labor can neither be
accumulated nor even be saved, unlike true [commodities].
“Labor is life, and if life is not each day exchanged for food, it suffers and soon
perishes. To claim that human life is a commodity, one must, therefore, admit
slavery.” (Ibid. pp. 49, 50) If then labor is a commodity, it is a commodity with
the most unfortunate attributes. But even by the principles of political economy it
is no commodity, for it is not the “free result of a free transaction.” The present
economic regime “simultaneously lowers the price and the remuneration of labor;
it perfects the worker and degrades the man.” (Ibid. pp. 52, 53) “Industry has
become a war, and commerce a gamble.” (Ibid. p. 62)
The cotton-working machines (in England) alone represent 84,000,000 manual
workers. (Ibid. p. 193)
Up to the present, industry has been in a state of war, a war of conquest: “It has
squandered the lives of the men who made up its army with the same indifference
as the great conquerors. Its aim was the possession of wealth, not the happiness of
men.” (Buret, op. cit., p. 20) “These interests” (that is, economic interests), “freely
left to themselves ... must necessarily come into conflict; they have no other
arbiter but war, and the decisions of war assign defeat and death to some, in order
to give victory to the others.... It is in the conflict of opposed forces that science
seeks order and equilibrium: perpetual war, according to it, is the sole means of
obtaining peace; that war is called competition.” (Ibid. p. 23)
“The industrial war, to be conducted with success, demands large armies which it
can amass on one spot and profusely decimate. And it is neither from devotion nor
from duty that the soldiers of this army bear the exertions imposed on them, but
only to escape the hard necessity of hunger. They feel neither attachment nor
gratitude towards their bosses, nor are these bound to their subordinates by any
feeling of benevolence. They do not know them as men, but only as instruments of
production which have to yield as much as possible with as little cost as possible.
These populations of workers, ever more crowded together, have not even the
assurance of always being employed. Industry, which has called them together,
only lets them live while it needs them, and as soon as it can get rid of them it
abandons them without the slightest scruple; and the workers are compelled to
offer their persons and their powers for whatever price they can get. The longer,
more painful and more disgusting the work they are given, the less they are paid.
There are those who, with sixteen hours’ work a day and unremitting exertion,
scarcely buy the right not to die.” (Ibid. pp. 68-69)
“We are convinced ... as are the commissioners charged with the inquiry into the
condition of the hand-loom weavers, that the large industrial towns would in a
short time lose their population of workers if they were not all the time receiving
from the neighboring rural areas constant recruitments of healthy men, a constant
flow of fresh blood.” (Ibid. p. 362)

Profit of Capital
1. Capital
What is the basis of capital, that is, of private property in the products of other men’s labor?
“Even if capital itself does not merely amount to theft or fraud, it still requires the
cooperation of legislation to sanctify inheritance.” (Say, Traité d’economie
politique, t. I. P. 136, footnote)9
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How does one become a proprietor of productive stock? How does one become owner of the
products created by means of this stock?
By virtue of positive law. (Say, t. II, p. 4 )
What does one acquire with capital, with the inheritance of a large fortune, for instance?
“The person who [either acquires, or] succeeds to a great fortune, does not
necessarily [acquire or] succeed to any political power [.... ] The power which that
possession immediately and directly conveys to him, is the power of purchasing; a
certain command over all the labor, or over all the produce of labor, which is then
in the market.” (Wealth of Nations, by Adam Smith, Vol. I, pp. 26-27.)10
Capital is thus the governing power over labor and its products. The capitalist possesses this
power, not on account of his personal or human qualities, but inasmuch as he is an owner of
capital. His power is the purchasing power of his capital, which nothing can withstand.
Later we shall see first how the capitalist, by means of capital, exercises his governing power
over labor, then, however, we shall see the governing power of capital over the capitalist himself.
What is capital?
“A certain quantity of labor stocked and stored up to be employed.” (Adam Smith,
op. cit., Vol. I, p. 295.)
Capital is stored-up labor.
(2) Funds, or stock, is any accumulation of products of the soil or of manufacture. Stock is called
capital only when it yields to its owner a revenue or profit. (Adam Smith, op. cit., p. 243)
2. The Profit of Capital
The profit or gain of capital is altogether different from the wages of labor. This
difference is manifested in two ways: in the first place, the profits of capital are
regulated altogether by the value of the capital employed, although the labor of
inspection and direction associated with different capitals may be the same.
Moreover in large works the whole of this labor is committed to some principal
clerk, whose salary bears no regular proportion to the capital of which he oversees
the management. And although the labor of the proprietor is here reduced almost
to nothing, he still demands profits in proportion to his capital. (Adam Smith, op.
cit., Vol. I, p. 43)11
Why does the capitalist demand this proportion between profit and capital?
He would have no interest in employing the workers, unless he expected from the
sale of their work something more than is necessary to replace the stock advanced
by him as wages and he would have no interest to employ a great stock rather than
a small one, unless his profits were to bear some proportion to the extent of his
stock. (Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 42)
The capitalist thus makes a profit, first, on the wages, and secondly on the raw materials
advanced by him.
What proportion, then, does profit bear to capital?
If it is already difficult to determine the usual average level of wages at a
particular place and at a particular time, it is even more difficult to determine the
profit on capitals. A change in the price of the commodities in which the capitalist
deals, the good or bad fortune of his rivals and customers, a thousand other
accidents to which commodities are exposed both in transit and in the warehouses
— all produce a daily, almost hourly variation in profit. (Adam Smith, op. cit.,
Vol. I, pp. 78-79) But though it is impossible to determine with precision what are
the profits on capitals, some notion may be formed of them from the interest of
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money. Wherever a great deal can be made by the use of money, a great deal will
be given for the use of it; wherever little can be made by it, little will be given.
(Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 79) The proportion which the usual market rate of
interest ought to bear to the rate of clear profit, necessarily varies as profit rises or
falls. Double interest is in Great Britain reckoned what the merchants call a good,
moderate, reasonable profit, terms which mean no more than a common and usual
profit. (Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 87)
What is the lowest rate of profit? And what the highest?
The lowest rate of ordinary profit on capital must always be something more than
what is sufficient to compensate the occasional losses to which every employment
of stock is exposed. It is this surplus only which is neat or clear profit. The same
holds for the lowest rate of interest. (Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 86)
The highest rate to which ordinary profits can rise is that which in the price of the
greater part of commodities eats up the whole of the rent of the land, and reduces
the wages of labor contained in the commodity supplied to the lowest rate, the
bare subsistence of the laborer during his work. The worker must always be fed in
some way or other while he is required to work; rent can disappear entirely. For
example: the servants of the East India Company in Bengal. (Adam Smith, op.
cit., Vol. I, pp. 86-87)
Besides all the advantages of limited competition which the capitalist may exploit in this case, he
can keep the market price above the natural price by quite decorous means.
For one thing, by keeping secrets in trade if the market is at a great distance from
those who supply it, that is, by concealing a price change, its rise above the natural
level. This concealment has the effect that other capitalists do not follow him in
investing their capital in this branch of industry or trade.
Then again by keeping secrets in manufacture, which enable the capitalist to
reduce the costs of production and supply his commodity at the same or even at
lower prices than his competitors while obtaining a higher profit. (Deceiving by
keeping secrets is not immoral? Dealings on the Stock Exchange.) Furthermore,
where production is restricted to a particular locality (as in the case of a rare
wine), and where the effective demand can never he satisfied. Finally, through
monopolies exercised by individuals or companies. Monopoly price is the highest
possible. (Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 53-54)
Other fortuitous causes which can raise the profit on capital: the acquisition of
new territories, or of new branches of trade, often increases the profit on capital
even in a wealthy country, because they withdraw some capital from the old
branches of trade, reduce competition, and cause the market to be supplied with
fewer commodities, the prices of which then rise: those who deal in these
commodities can then afford to borrow at a higher rate of interest. (Adam Smith,
op. cit., Vol. I, p. 83)
The more a commodity comes to be manufactured — the more it becomes an
object of manufacture — the greater becomes that part of the price which resolves
itself into wages and profit in proportion to that which resolves itself into rent. In
the progress of the manufacture of a commodity, not only the number of profits
increases, but every subsequent profit is greater than the foregoing; because the
capital from which it is derived must always be greater. The capital which
employs the weavers, for example, must always be greater than that which
employs the spinners; because it not only replaces that capital with its profits, but
pays, besides, the wages of weavers; and the profits must always bear some
proportion to the capital. (Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 45)

13

Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. First Manuscript

Thus the advance made by human labor in converting the product of nature into the manufactured
product of nature increases, not the wages of labor, but in part the number of profitable capital
investments, and in part the size of every subsequent capital in comparison with the foregoing.
More about the advantages which the capitalist derives from the division of labor, later.
He profits doubly — first, by the division of labor; and secondly, in general, by the advance
which human labor makes on the natural product. The greater the human share in a commodity,
the greater the profit of dead capital.
In one and the same society the average rates of profit on capital are much more
nearly on the same level than the wages of the different sorts of labor. (Op. cit.,
Vol. I, p. 100.) In the different employments of capital, the ordinary rate of profit
varies with the certainty or uncertainty of the returns.
The ordinary profit of stock, though it rises with the risk, does not always seem to
rise in proportion to it. (Op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 99-100.)
It goes without saying that profits also rise if the means of circulation become less expensive or
easier available (e.g., paper money).
3. The Rule of Capital over Labor and the Motives of the Capitalist
The consideration of his own private profit is the sole motive which determines
the owner of any capital to employ it either in agriculture, in manufactures, or in
some particular branch of the wholesale or retail trade. The different quantities of
productive Labor which it may put into motion, and the different values which it
may add to the annual produce of the land and labor of his country, according as it
is employed in one or other of those different ways, never enter into his thoughts.
(Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 335)
The most useful employment of capital for the capitalist is that which, risks being
equal, yields him the greatest profit. This employment is not always the most
useful for society; the most useful employment is that which utilizes the
productive powers of nature. (Say, t. II, pp. 130-31.)
The plans and speculations of the employers of capitals regulate and direct all the
most important operations of labor, and profit is the end proposed by all those
plans and projects. But the rate of profit does not, like rent and wages, rise with
the prosperity and fall with the decline of the society. On the contrary, it is
naturally low in rich and high in poor countries, and it is always highest in the
countries which are going fastest to ruin. The interest of this class, therefore, has
not the same connection with the general interest of the society as that of the other
two.... The particular interest of the dealers in any particular branch of trade or
manufactures is always in some respects different from, and frequently even in
sharp opposition to, that of the public. To widen the market and to narrow the
sellers’ competition is always the interest of the dealer.... This is a class of people
whose interest is never exactly the same as that of society, a class of people who
have generally an interest to deceive and to oppress the public. (Adam Smith, op.
cit., Vol. I, pp. 231-32)
4. The Accumulation of Capitals and the Competition among the Capitalists
The increase of stock, which raises wages, tends to lower the capitalists’ profit,
because of the competition amongst the capitalists. (Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I,
p. 78)
If, for example, the capital which is necessary for the grocery trade of a particular
town “is divided between two different grocers, their competition will tend to
make both of them sell cheaper than if it were in the hands of one only; and if it
were divided among twenty, their competition would be just so much the greater,
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and the chance of their combining together, in order to raise the price, just so
much the less.” (Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 322)
Since we already know that monopoly prices are as high as possible, since the interest of the
capitalists, even from the point of view commonly held by political economists, stands in hostile
opposition to society, and since a rise of profit operates like compound interest on the price of the
commodity (Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 87-88), it follows that the sole defense against the
capitalists is competition, which according to the evidence of political economy acts beneficently
by both raising wages and lowering the prices of commodities to the advantage of the consuming
public.
But competition is only possible if capital multiplies, and is held in many hands. The formation of
many capital investments is only possible as a result of multilateral accumulation, since capital
comes into being only by accumulation; and multilateral accumulation necessarily turns into
unilateral accumulation. Competition among capitalists increases the accumulation of capital.
Accumulation, where private property prevails, is the concentration of capital in the hands of a
few, it is in general an inevitable consequence if capital is left to follow its natural course, and it
is precisely through competition that the way is cleared for this natural disposition of capital.
We have been told that the profit on capital is in proportion to the size of the capital. A large
capital therefore accumulates more quickly than a small capital in proportion to its size, even if
we disregard for the time being deliberate competition.
12
Accordingly, the accumulation of large capital proceeds much more rapidly than that of smaller
capital, quite irrespective of competition. But let us follow this process further.
With the increase of capital the profit on capital diminishes, because of competition. The first to
suffer, therefore, is the small capitalist.
The increase of capitals and a large number of capital investments presuppose, further, a
condition of advancing wealth in the country.
“In a country which had acquired its full complement of riches [ ... ] the ordinary
rate of clear profit would be very small, so the usual [market] rate of interest
which could be afforded out of it would be so low as to render it impossible for
any but the very wealthiest people to live upon the interest of their money. All
people of [...] middling fortunes would be obliged to superintend themselves the
employment of their own stocks. It would be necessary that almost every man
should be a man of business, or engage in some sort of trade.” (Adam Smith, op.
cit., Vol. I, p. 86)
This is the situation most dear to the heart of political economy.
“The proportion between capital and revenue, therefore, seems everywhere to
regulate the proportion between industry and idleness; wherever capital
predominates, industry prevails; wherever revenue, idleness.” (Adam Smith, op.
cit., Vol. I, p. 301.)
What about the employment of capital, then, in this condition of increased competition?
“As stock increases, the quantity of stock to be lent at interest grows gradually
greater and greater. As the quantity of stock to be lent at interest increases, the
interest ... diminishes (i) because the market price of things commonly diminishes
as their quantity increases. ... and (ii) because with the increase of capitals in any
country, “it becomes gradually more and more difficult to find within the country
a profitable method of employing any new capital. There arises in consequence a
competition between different capitals, the owner of one endeavoring to get
possession of that employment which is occupied by another. But upon most
occasions he can hope to jostle that other out of this employment by no other
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means but by dealing upon more reasonable terms. He must not only sell what he
deals in somewhat cheaper, but in order to get it to sell, he must sometimes, too,
buy it dearer. The demand for productive labor, by the increase of the funds which
are destined for maintaining it, grows every day greater and greater. Laborers
easily find employment, but the owners of capitals find it difficult to get laborers
to employ. Their competition raises the wages of labor and sinks the profits of
stock.” (Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 316)
Thus the small capitalist has the choice: (1) either to consume his capital, since he can no longer
live on the interest — and thus cease to be a capitalist; or (2) to set up a business himself, sell his
commodity cheaper, buy dearer than the wealthier capitalist, and pay higher wages — thus
ruining himself, the market price being already very low as a result of the intense competition
presupposed. If, however, the big capitalist wants to squeeze out the smaller capitalist, he has all
the advantages over him which the capitalist has as a capitalist over the worker. The larger size of
his capital compensates him for the smaller profits, and he can even bear temporary losses until
the smaller capitalist is ruined and he finds himself freed from this competition. In this way, he
accumulates the small capitalist’s profits.
Furthermore: the big capitalist always buys cheaper than the small one, because he buys bigger
quantities. He can therefore well afford to sell cheaper.
But if a fall in the rate of interest turns the middle capitalists from rentiers into businessmen, the
increase in business capital and the resulting smaller profit produce conversely a fall in the rate of
interest.
“When the profits which can be made by the use of a capital are diminished the
price which can be paid for the use of it [...] must necessarily be diminished with
them.” (Adam Smith, loc. cit., Vol. I, p. 316)
“As riches, improvement, and population have increased, interest has declined,”
and consequently the profits of capitalists, “after these [profits] are diminished,
stock may not only continue to increase, but to increase much faster than before.
[...] A great stock though with small profits, generally increases faster than a small
stock with great profits. Money, says the proverb, makes money.” (op. cit., Vol. I,
p. 83)
When, therefore, this large capital is opposed by small capitals with small profits, as it is under
the presupposed condition of intense competition, it crushes them completely.
The necessary result of this competition is a general deterioration of commodities, adulteration,
fake production and universal poisoning, evident in large towns.
An important circumstance in the competition of large and small capital is, furthermore, the
relation between fixed capital and circulating capital.
Circulating capital is a capital which is “employed in raising” provisions,
“manufacturing, or purchasing goods, and selling them again. [... ] The capital
employed in this manner yields no revenue or profit to its employer, while it either
remains in his possession, or continues in the same shape. [...] His capital is
continually going from him in one shape, and returning to him in another, and it is
only by means of such circulation, or successive exchanges” and transformations
“that it can yield him any profit.” Fixed capital consists of capital invested “in the
improvement of land, in the purchase of useful machines and instruments of trade,
or in such-like things.” (Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 243-44)
“Every saving in the expense of supporting the fixed capital is an improvement of
the net revenue of the society. The whole capital of the undertaker of every work
is necessarily divided between his fixed and his circulating capital. [Marx uses the
French terms capital fixe and capital circulant. – Ed.] While his whole capital
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remains the same, the smaller the one part, the greater must necessarily be the
other. It is the circulating capital which furnishes the materials and wages of labor,
and puts industry into motion. Every saving, therefore, in the expense of
maintaining the fixed capital, which does not diminish the productive powers of
labor, must increase the fund which puts industry into motion.” (Adam Smith, op.
cit., Vol. I, p. 257)
It is clear from the outset that the relation of fixed capital and circulating capital is much more
favorable to the big capitalist than to the smaller capitalist. The extra fixed capital required by a
very big banker as against a very small one is insignificant. Their fixed capital amounts to
nothing more than the office. The equipment of the bigger landowner does not increase in
proportion to the size of his estate. Similarly, the credit which a big capitalist enjoys compared
with a smaller one means for him all the greater saving in fixed capital — that is, in the amount of
ready money he must always have at hand. Finally, it is obvious that where industrial labor has
reached a high level, and where therefore almost all manual labor has become factory labor, the
entire capital of a small capitalist does not suffice to provide him even with the necessary fixed
capital. [As is well known, large-scale cultivation usually provides employment only for a small
number of hands. Note by Marx in French.]
It is generally true that the accumulation of large capital is also accompanied by a proportional
concentration and simplification of fixed capital, as compared to the smaller capitalists. The big
capitalist introduces for himself some kind of organization of the instruments of labor.
“Similarly, in the sphere of industry every manufactory and mill is already a
comprehensive combination of a large material fortune with numerous and varied
intellectual capacities and technical skills serving the common purpose of
production.... Where legislation preserves landed property in large units, the
surplus of a growing population flocks into trades, and it is therefore as in Great
Britain in the field of industry, principally, that proletarians aggregate in great
numbers. Where, however, the law permits the continuous division of the land, the
number of small, debt-encumbered proprietors increases, as in France; and the
continuing process of fragmentation throws them into the class of the needy and
the discontented. When eventually this fragmentation and indebtedness reaches a
higher degree still, big landed property once more swallows up small property,
just as large-scale industry destroys small industry. And as larger estates are
formed again, large numbers of propertyless workers not required for the
cultivation of the soil are again driven into industry.” (Schulz, Bewegung der
Production, pp. 58, 59.)
“Commodities of the same kind change in character as a result of changes in the
method of production, and especially as a result of the use of machinery. Only by
the exclusion of human power has it become possible to spin from a pound of
cotton worth 3 shillings and 8 pence 350 hanks of a total length of 167 English
miles (i.e., 36 German miles), and of a commercial value of 25 guineas.” (op. cit.,
p. 62.)
“On the average the prices of cotton-goods have decreased in England during the
past 45 years by eleven-twelfths, and according to Marshall’s calculations the
same amount of manufactured goods for which 16 shillings was still paid in 1814
is now supplied at 1 shilling and 10 pence. The greater cheapness of industrial
products expands both consumption at home and the market abroad, and because
of this the number of workers in cotton has not only not fallen in Great Britain
after the introduction of machines but has risen from forty thousand to one and a
half million. As to the earnings of industrial entrepreneurs and workers, the
growing competition between the factory owners has resulted in their profits
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necessarily falling relative to the amount of products supplied by them. In the
years 1820-33 the Manchester manufacturer’s gross profit on a piece of calico fell
from four shillings 1 1/3 pence to one shilling 9 pence. But to make up for this
loss, the volume of manufacture has been correspondingly increased. The
consequence of this is that separate branches of industry experience overproduction to some extent, that frequent bankruptcies occur causing property to
fluctuate and vacillate unstably within the class of capitalists and masters of labor,
thus throwing into the proletariat some of those who have been ruined
economically; and that, frequently and suddenly, close-downs or cuts in
employment become necessary, the painful effects of which are always bitterly
felt by the class of wage-laborers.” (Op. cit., p. 63.)
“To hire out one’s labor is to begin one’s enslavement. To hire out the materials of
labor is to establish one’s freedom.... Labor is man; the materials, on the other
hand, contain nothing human.” (Pecqueur, Théorie sociale, etc.)
“The material element, which is quite incapable of creating wealth without the
other element, labor, acquires the magical virtue of being fertile for them [who
own this material element] as if by their own action they had placed there this
indispensable element.” (Op. cit.)
“Supposing that the daily labor of a worker brings him on the average 400 francs a
year and that this sum suffices for every adult to live some sort of crude life, then
any proprietor receiving 2,000 francs in interest or rent, from a farm, a house, etc.,
compels indirectly five men to work for him; an income of 100,000 francs
represents the labor of 250 men, and that of 1,000,000 francs the labor of 2,500
individuals (hence, 300 million [Louis Philippe] therefore the labor of 750,000
workers).” (Op. cit., pp. 412-13.)
‘The human law has given owners the right to use and to abuse — that is to say,
the right to do what they will with the materials of labor.... They are in no way
obliged by law to provide work for the propertyless when required and at all
times, or to pay them always an adequate wage, etc. (Op. cit., p. 413.) “Complete
freedom concerning the nature, the quantity, the quality and the expediency of
production; concerning the use and the disposal of wealth; and full command over
the materials of all labor. Everyone is free to exchange what belongs to him as he
thinks fit, without considering anything other than his own interest as an
individual.” (Op. cit. p. 413.)
“Competition is merely the expression of the freedom to exchange, which itself is
the immediate and logical consequence of the individual’s right to use and abuse
all the instruments of production. The right to use and abuse, freedom of
exchange, and arbitrary competition — these three economic moments, which
form one unit, entail the following consequences; each produces what he wishes,
as he wishes, when he wishes, where he wishes, produces well or produces badly,
produces too much or not enough, too soon or too late, at too high a price or too
low a price; none knows whether he will sell, to whom he will sell, how he will
sell, when he will sell, where he will sell. And it is the same with regard to
purchases. The producer is ignorant of needs and resources, of demand and
supply. He sells when he wishes, when he can, where he wishes, to whom he
wishes, at the price he wishes. And he buys in the same way. In all this he is ever
the plaything of chance, the slave of the law of the strongest, of the least harassed,
of the richest.... Whilst at one place there is scarcity, at another there is glut and
waste. Whilst one producer sells a lot or at a very high price, and at an enormous
profit, the other sells nothing or sells at a loss.... The supply does not know the
demand, and the demand does not know the supply. You produce, trusting to a
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taste, a fashion, which prevails amongst the consuming public. But by the time
you are ready to deliver the commodity, the whim has already passed and has
settled on some other kind of product.... The inevitable consequences:
bankruptcies occurring constantly and universally; miscalculations, sudden ruin
and unexpected fortunes, commercial crises, stoppages, periodic gluts or
shortages; instability and depreciation of wages and profits, the loss or enormous
waste of wealth, time and effort in the arena of fierce competition.” (Op. cit., pp.
414-16.)
Ricardo in his book [On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (rent of land)]:
Nations are merely production-shops; man is a machine for consuming and producing; human life
is a kind of capital; economic laws blindly rule the world. For Ricardo men are nothing, the
product everything. In the 26th chapter of the French translation it says:
“To an individual with a capital of £20,000 whose profits were £2,000 per annum,
it would he a matter quite indifferent whether his capital would employ a hundred
or a thousand men.... Is not the real interest of the nation similar? Provided its net
real income, its rent and profits be the same, it is of no importance whether the
nation consists of ten or twelve millions of inhabitants.” — [t. II, pp. 194, 195.]
“In fact, says M. Sismondi (Nouveaux principes diconomie politique, t. II, p. 331),
nothing remains to be desired but that the King, living quite alone on the island,
should by continuously turning a crank cause automatons to do all the work of
England.”13
“The master who buys the worker’s labor at such a low price that it scarcely
suffices for the worker’s most pressing needs is responsible neither for the
inadequacy of the wage nor for the excessive duration of the labor: he himself has
to submit to the law which he imposes.... Poverty is not so much caused by men as
by the power of things.” (Buret, op. cit., p. 82.)
“The inhabitants of many different parts of Great Britain have not capital
sufficient to improve and cultivate all their lands. The wool of the southern
counties of Scotland is, a great part of it, after a long land carriage through very
bad roads, manufactured in Yorkshire, for want of capital to manufacture it at
home. There are many little manufacturing towns in Great Britain, of which the
inhabitants have not capital sufficient to transport the produce of their own
industry to those distant markets where there is demand and consumption for it. If
there are any merchants among them, they are properly only the agents of
wealthier merchants who reside in some of the greater commercial cities.” (Adam
Smith, Wealth of Nations, Vol. I, pp. 326-27)
“The annual produce of the land and labor of any nation can be increased in its
value by no other means but by increasing either the number of its productive
laborers, or the productive power of those laborers who had before been
employed.... In either case an additional capital is almost always required.” (Adam
Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 306-07.)
“As the accumulation of stock must, in the nature of things, be previous to the
division of labor, so labor can be more and more subdivided in proportion only as
stock is previously more and more accumulated. The quantity of materials which
the same number of people can work up, increases in a great proportion as labor
comes to be more and more subdivided; and as the operations of each workman
are gradually reduced to a greater degree of simplicity, a variety of new machines
come to be invented for facilitating and abridging those operations. As the
division of labor advances, therefore, in order to give constant employment to an
equal number of workmen, an equal stock of provisions, and a greater stock of

19

Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. First Manuscript

materials and tools than what would have been necessary in a ruder state of things,
must be accumulated beforehand. But the number of workmen in every branch of
business generally increases with the division of labor in that branch, or rather it is
the increase of their number which enables them to class and subdivide
themselves in this manner.” (Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 241-42)
“As the accumulation of stock is previously necessary for carrying on this great
improvement in the productive powers of labor, so that accumulation naturally
leads to this improvement. The person who employs his stock in maintaining
labor, necessarily wishes to employ it in such a manner as to produce as great a
quantity of work as possible. He endeavors, therefore, both to make among his
workmen the most proper distribution of employment, and to furnish them with
the best machines [... ]. His abilities in both these respects are generally in
proportion to the extent of his stock, or to the number of people whom it can
employ. The quantity of industry, therefore, not only increases in every country
with the increase of the stock which employs it, but, in consequence of that
increase, the same quantity of industry produces a much greater quantity of work.”
(Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 242) Hence overproduction.
“More comprehensive combinations of productive forces ... in industry and trade
by uniting more numerous and more diverse human and natural powers in largerscale enterprises. Already here and there, closer association of the chief branches
of production. Thus, big manufacturers will try to acquire also large estates in
order to become independent of others for at least a part of the raw materials
required for their industry; or they will go into trade in conjunction with their
industrial enterprises, not only to sell their own manufactures, but also to purchase
other kinds of products and to sell these to their workers. In England, where a
single factory owner sometimes employs ten to twelve thousand workers ... it is
already not uncommon to find such combinations of various branches of
production controlled by one brain, such smaller states or provinces within the
state. Thus, the mine owners in the Birmingham area have recently taken over the
whole process of iron production, which was previously distributed among
various entrepreneurs and owners, (See “Der bergmännische Distrikt bei
Birmingham,” Deutsche Vierteljahr-Schrift No. 3, 1838.) Finally in the large
joint-stock enterprises which have become so numerous, we see far-reaching
combinations of the financial resources of many participants with the scientific
and technical knowledge and skills of others to whom the carrying-out of the work
is handed over. The capitalists are thereby enabled to apply their savings in more
diverse ways and perhaps even to employ them simultaneously in agriculture,
industry and commerce. As a consequence their interest becomes more
comprehensive, and the contradictions between agricultural, industrial, and
commercial interests are reduced and disappear. But this increased possibility of
applying capital profitably in the most diverse ways cannot but intensify the
antagonism between the propertied and the non-propertied classes.” (Schulz, op.
cit., pp. 40-4l.)
The enormous profit which the landlords of houses make out of poverty. House rent stands in
inverse proportion to industrial poverty. So does the interest obtained from the vices of the ruined
proletarians. (Prostitution, drunkenness, pawnbroking.)
The accumulation of capital increases and the competition between capitalists decreases, when
capital and landed property are united in the same hand, also when capital is enabled by its size to
combine different branches of production.
Indifference towards men. Smith’s twenty lottery-tickets.14 Say’s net and gross revenue. |XVI||
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Rent of Land
Landlords’ right has its origin in robbery. (Say, t. 1) The landlords, like all other
men, love to reap where they never sowed, and demand a rent even for the natural
produce of the earth. (Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 44.)
“The rent of land, it may be thought, is frequently no more than a reasonable
profit or interest for the stock laid out by the landlord upon its improvement. This,
no doubt, may be partly the case upon some occasions.... The landlord demands”
(1) “a rent even for unimproved land, and the supposed interest or profit upon the
expense of improvement is generally an addition to this original rent.” (2) “Those
improvements, besides, are not always made by the stock of the landlord, but
sometimes by that of the tenant. When the lease comes to be renewed, however,
the landlord commonly demands the same augmentation of rent as if they had
been all made by his own.” (3) “He sometimes demands rent for what is altogether
incapable of human improvement.” (Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 131.)
Smith cites as an instance of the last case kelp,
“a species of seaweed, which, when burnt, yields an alkaline salt, useful for
making glass, soap, etc. It grows in several parts of Great Britain, particularly in
Scotland, upon such rocks only as lie within the high-water mark, which are twice
every day covered with the sea, and of which the produce, therefore, was never
augmented by human industry. The landlord, however, whose estate is bounded
by a kelp shore of this kind, demands a rent for it as much as for his corn fields.
The sea in the neighborhood of the Islands of Shetland is more than commonly
abundant in fish, which make a great part of the subsistence of their inhabitants.
But in order to profit by the produce of the water they must have a habitation upon
the neighboring land. The rent of the landlord is in proportion, not to what the
farmer can make by the land, but to what he can make both by the land and by the
water.” (Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 131.)
“This rent may be considered as the produce of those powers of nature, the use of
which the landlord lends to the farmer. It is greater or smaller according to the
supposed extent of those powers, or in other words, according to the supposed
natural or improved fertility of the land. It is the work of nature which remains
after deducting or compensating everything which can be regarded as the work of
man.” (Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 324-25.)
“The rent of land, therefore, considered as the price paid for the use of the land, is
naturally a monopoly price. It is not at all proportioned to what the landlord may
have laid out upon the improvement of the land, or to what he can afford to take;
but to what the farmer can afford to give.” (Adam Smith, op. cit., p. 131.)
Of the three original classes, that of the landlords is the one “whose revenue costs
them neither labor nor care, but comes to them, as it were, of its own accord, and
independent of any plan or project of their own”. (Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, p.
230.)
We have already learnt that the size of the rent depends on the degree of fertility of the land.
Another factor in its determination is situation.
“The rent of land not only varies with its fertility, whatever be its produce, but
with its situation whatever be its fertility.” (Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 133.)
“The produce of land, mines, and fisheries, when their natural fertility is equal, is
in proportion to the extent and proper application of the capitals employed about
them. When the capitals are equal and equally well applied, it is in proportion to
their natural fertility.” (Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 249.)
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These propositions of Smith are important, because, given equal costs of production and capital
of equal size, they reduce the rent of land to the greater or lesser fertility of the soil. Thereby
showing clearly the perversion of concepts in political economy, which turns the fertility of the
land into an attribute of the landlord.
Now, however, let us consider the rent of land as it is formed in real life.
The rent of land is established as a result of the struggle between tenant and landlord. We find
that the hostile antagonism of interests, the struggle, the war is recognised throughout political
economy as the basis of social organization.
Let us see now what the relations are between landlord and tenant.
“In adjusting the terms of the lease, the landlord endeavors to leave him no greater
share of the produce than what is sufficient to keep up the stock from which he
furnishes the seed, pays the labor, and purchases and maintains the cattle and
other instruments of husbandry, together with the ordinary profits of farming stock
in the neighborhood. This is evidently the smallest share with which the tenant can
content himself without being a loser, and the landlord seldom means to leave him
any more. Whatever part of the produce, or, what is the same thing, whatever part
of its price is over and above this share, he naturally endeavors to reserve to
himself as the rent of his land, which is evidently the highest the tenant can afford
to pay in the actual circumstances of the land. [.... ] This portion, however, may
still be considered as the natural rent of land, or the rent for which it is naturally
meant that land should for the most part be let.” (Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, pp.
130-31)
“The landlords,” says Say, “operate a certain kind of monopoly against the
tenants. The demand for their commodity, site and soil, can go on expanding
indefinitely; but there is only a given, limited amount of their commodity.... The
bargain struck between landlord and tenant is always advantageous to the former
in the greatest possible degree.... Besides the advantage he derives from the nature
of the case, he derives a further advantage from his position, his larger fortune and
greater credit and standing. But the first by itself suffices to enable him and him
alone to profit from the favorable circumstances of the land. The opening of a
canal, or a road; the increase of population and of the prosperity of a district,
always raises the rent.... Indeed, the tenant himself may improve the ground at his
own expense; but he only derives the profit from this capital for the duration of his
lease, with the expiry of which it remains with the proprietor of the land;
henceforth it is the latter who reaps the interest thereon, without having made the
outlay, for there is now a proportionate increase in the rent.” (Say, t. II.)
“Rent, considered as the price paid for the use of land, is naturally the highest
which the tenant can afford to pay in the actual circumstances of the land.” (Adam
Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 130.)
“The rent of an estate above ground commonly amounts to what is supposed to be
a third of the gross produce; and it is generally a rent certain and independent of
the occasional variations in the crop.” (Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 153.) This
rent “is seldom less than a fourth ... of the whole produce”. (Op. cit., Vol. I, p.
325.)
Rent cannot be paid on all commodities. For instance, in many districts no rent is paid for stones.
“Such parts only of the produce of land can commonly be brought to market of
which the ordinary price is sufficient to replace the stock which must be employed
in bringing them thither, together with its ordinary profits. If the ordinary price is
more than this, the surplus part of it will naturally go to the rent of the land. If it is
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not more, though the commodity may be brought to market, it can afford no rent
to the landlord. Whether the price is or is not more depends upon the demand.”
(Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 132.)
“Rent, it is to be observed, therefore, enters into the composition of the price of
commodities in a different way from wages and profit. High or low wages and
profit are the causes of high or low price; high or low rent is the effect of it.”
(Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 132.)
Food belongs to the products which always yield a rent.
As men, like all other animals, naturally multiply in proportion to the means of
their subsistence, food is always, more or less, in demand. It can always purchase
or command a greater or smaller quantity of labor, and somebody can always be
found who is willing to do something in order to obtain it. The quantity of labor,
indeed, which it can purchase is not always equal to what it could maintain, if
managed in the most economical manner, on account of the high wages which are
sometimes given to labor. But it can always purchase such a quantity of labor as it
can maintain, according to the rate at which the sort of labor is commonly
maintained in the neighborhood.
“But land, in almost any situation, produces a greater quantity of food than what is
sufficient to maintain all the labor necessary for bringing it to market [.... ] The
surplus, too, is always more than sufficient to replace the stock which employed
that labor, together with its profits. Something, therefore, always remains for a
rent to the landlord.” (Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 132-33.)
“Food is in this manner not only the original source of rent, but every other part of
the produce of land which afterwards affords rent derives that part of its value
from the improvement of the powers of labor in producing food by means of the
improvement and cultivation of land.” (Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 150.)
“Human food seems to be the only produce of land which always and necessarily
affords some rent to the landlord.” (Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 147.)
“Countries are populous not in proportion to the number of people whom their
produce can clothe and lodge, but in proportion to that of those whom it can feed.”
(Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 149.)
“After food, clothing and lodging are the two great wants of mankind.” They
usually yield a rent, but not inevitably. (Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 147.)
15
Let us now see how the landlord exploits everything from which society benefits.
(1) The rent of land increases with population. (Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 146.)
(2) We have already learnt from Say how the rent of land increases with railways, etc., with the
improvement, safety, and multiplication of the means of communication.
(3) “Every improvement in the circumstances of the society tends either directly
or indirectly to raise the real rent of land, to increase the real wealth of the
landlord, his power of purchasing the labor, or the produce of the labor of other
people.
“The extension of improvement and cultivation tends to raise it directly. The
landlord’s share of the produce necessarily increases with the increase of the
produce.
“That rise in the real price of those parts of the rude produce of land [...] the rise in
the price of cattle, for example, tends too to raise the rent of land directly, and in a
still greater proportion. The real value of the landlord’s share, his real command
of the labor of other people, not only rises with the real value of the produce, but
the proportion of his share to the whole produce rises with it. That produce, after

23

Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. First Manuscript

the rise in its real price, requires no more labor to collect it than before. A smaller
proportion of it will, therefore, be sufficient to replace, with the ordinary profit,
the stock which employs that labor. A greater proportion of it must, consequently,
belong to the landlord.” (Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 228-29.)
The greater demand for raw produce, and therefore the rise in value, may in part result from the
increase of population and from the increase of their needs. But every new invention, every new
application in manufacture of a previously unused or little-used raw material, augments rent.
Thus, for example, there was a tremendous rise in the rent of coal mines with the advent of the
railways, steamships, etc.
Besides this advantage which the landlord derives from manufacture, discoveries, and labor, there
is yet another, as we shall presently see.
(4) “All those improvements in the productive powers of labor, which tend
directly to reduce the real price of manufactures, tend indirectly to raise the real
rent of land. The landlord exchanges that part of his rude produce, which is over
and above his own consumption, or what comes to the same thing, the price of
that part of it, for manufactured produce. Whatever reduces the real price of the
latter, raises that of the former. An equal quantity of the former becomes thereby
equivalent to a greater quantity of the latter; and the landlord is enabled to
purchase a greater quantity of the conveniences, ornaments, or luxuries, which he
has occasion for.” (Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 229)
But it is silly to conclude, as Smith does, that since the landlord exploits every benefit which
comes to society the interest of the landlord is always identical with that of society. (Op. cit., Vol.
I, p. 230.) In the economic system, under the rule of private property, the interest which an
individual has in society is in precisely inverse proportion to the interest society has in him —
just as the interest of the usurer in the spendthrift is by no means identical with the interest of the
spendthrift.
We shall mention only in passing the landlord’s obsession with monopoly directed against the
landed property of foreign countries, from which the Corn Laws16, for instance, originate.
Likewise, we shall here pass over medieval serfdom, the slavery in the colonies, and the
miserable condition of the country folk, the day-laborers, in Great Britain. Let us confine
ourselves to the propositions of political economy itself.
(1) The landlord being interested in the welfare of society means, according to the principles of
political economy, that he is interested in the growth of its population and manufacture, in the
expansion of its needs — in short, in the increase of wealth; and this increase of wealth is, as we
have already seen, identical with the increase of poverty and slavery. The relation between
increasing house rent and increasing poverty is an example of the landlord’s interest in society,
for the ground rent, the interest obtained from the land on which the house stands, goes up with
the rent of the house.
(2) According to the political economists themselves, the landlord’s interest is inimically opposed
to the interest of the tenant farmer-and thus already to a significant section of society.
(3) As the landlord can demand all the more rent from the tenant farmer the less wages the farmer
pays, and as the farmer forces down wages all the lower the more rent the landlord demands, it
follows that the interest of the landlord is just as hostile to that of the farm workers as is that of
the manufacturers to their workers. He likewise forces down wages to the minimum.
(4) Since a real reduction in the price of manufactured products raises the rent of land, the
landowner has a direct interest in lowering the wages of industrial workers, in competition
amongst the capitalists, in over-production, in all the misery associated with industrial
production.
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(5) While, thus, the landlord’s interest, far from being identical with the interest of society, stands
inimically opposed to the interest of tenant farmers, farm laborers, factory workers and capitalists,
on the other hand, the interest of one landlord is not even identical with that of another, on
account of the competition which we will now consider.
In general the relationship of large and small landed property is like that of big and small capital.
But in addition, there are special circumstances which lead inevitably to the accumulation of large
landed property and to the absorption of small property by it.
(1) Nowhere does the relative number of workers and implements decrease more with increases
in the size of the stock than in landed property. Likewise, the possibility of all-round exploitation,
of economizing production costs, and of effective division of labor, increases nowhere more with
the size of the stock than in landed property. However small a field may be, it requires for its
working a certain irreducible minimum of implements (plough, saw, etc.), whilst the size of a
piece of landed property can be reduced far below this minimum.
(2) Big landed property accumulates to itself the interest on the capital which the tenant farmer
has employed to improve the land. Small landed property has to employ its own capital, and
therefore does not get this profit at all.
(3) While every social improvement benefits the big estate, it harms small property, because it
increases its need for ready cash.
(4) Two important laws concerning this competition remain to be considered:
(a) The rent of the cultivated land, of which the produce is human food, regulates
the rent of the greater part of other cultivated land. (Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I,
p. 144.)
Ultimately, only the big estate can produce such food as cattle, etc. Therefore it regulates the rent
of other land and can force it down to a minimum.
The small landed proprietor working on his own land stands then to the big landowner in the
same relation as an artisan possessing his own tool to the factory owner. Small property in land
has become a mere instrument of labor.17 Rent entirely disappears for the small proprietor; there
remains to him at the most the interest on his capital, and his wages. For rent can be driven down
by competition till it is nothing more than the interest on capital not invested by the proprietor.
(b) In addition, we have already learnt that with equal fertility and equally efficient exploitation
of lands, mines and fisheries, the produce is proportionate to the size of the capital. Hence the
victory of the big landowner. Similarly, where equal capitals are employed the product is
proportionate to the fertility. Hence, where capitals are equal, victory goes to the proprietor of the
more fertile soil.
(c) “A mine of any kind may be said to be either fertile or barren, according as the
quantity of mineral which can be brought from it by a certain quantity of labor is
greater or less than what can be brought by an equal quantity from the greater part
of other mines of the same kind.” (Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 151.)
“The most fertile coal-mine, too, regulates the price of coal at all the other mines
in its neighborhood. Both the proprietor and the undertaker of the work find, the
one that he can get a greater rent, the other that he can get a greater profit, by
somewhat underselling all their neighbors. Their neighbors are soon obliged to
sell at the same price, though they cannot so well afford it, and though it always
diminishes, and sometimes takes away altogether both their rent and their profit.
Some works are abandoned altogether; others can afford no rent, and can be
wrought only by the proprietor.” (Adam Smith, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 152-53.)
“After the discovery of the mines of Peru, the silver mines of Europe were, the
greater part of them, abandoned.... This was the case, too, with the mines of Cuba
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and St. Domingo, and even with the ancient mines of Peru, after the discovery of
those of Potosi.” (Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 154.)
What Smith here says of mines applies more or less to landed property generally:
(d) “The ordinary market price of land, it is to be observed, depends everywhere
upon the ordinary market rate of interest.... If the rent of land should fall short of
the interest of money by a greater difference, nobody would buy land, which
would soon reduce its ordinary price. On the contrary, if the advantages should
much more than compensate the difference, everybody would buy land, which
again would soon raise its ordinary price.” (Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 320.)
From this relation of rent of land to interest on money it follows that rent must fall more and
more, so that eventually only the wealthiest people can live on rent. Hence the ever greater
competition between landowners who do not lease their land to tenants. Ruin of some of these;
further accumulation of large landed property.
This competition has the further consequence that a large part of landed property falls into the
hands of the capitalists and that capitalists thus become simultaneously landowners, just as the
smaller landowners are on the whole already nothing more than capitalists. Similarly, a section of
large landowners become at the same time industrialists.
The final consequence is thus the abolition of the distinction between capitalist and landowner, so
that there remain altogether only two classes of the population — the working class and the class
of capitalists. This huckstering with landed property, the transformation of landed property into a
commodity, constitutes the final overthrow of the old and the final establishment of the money
aristocracy.
(1) We will not join in the sentimental tears wept over this by romanticism. Romanticism always
confuses the shamefulness of huckstering the land with the perfectly rational consequence,
inevitable and desirable within the realm of private property, of the huckstering of private
property in land. In the first place, feudal landed property is already by its very nature huckstered
land — the earth which is estranged from man and hence confronts him in the shape of a few
great lords.
The domination of the land as an alien power over men is already inherent in feudal landed
property. The serf is the adjunct of the land. Likewise, the lord of an entailed estate, the first-born
son, belongs to the land. It inherits him. Indeed, the dominion of private property begins with
property in land — that is its basis. But in feudal landed property the lord at least appears as the
king of the estate. Similarly, there still exists the semblance of a more intimate connection
between the proprietor and the land than that of mere material wealth. The estate is individualized
with its lord: it has his rank, is baronial or ducal with him, has his privileges, his jurisdiction, his
political position, etc. It appears as the inorganic body of its lord. Hence the proverb nulle terre
sans maître [There is no land without its master. – Ed.], which expresses the fusion of nobility
and landed property. Similarly, the rule of landed property does not appear directly as the rule of
mere capital. For those belonging to it, the estate is more like their fatherland. It is a constricted
sort of nationality.
In the same way, feudal landed property gives its name to its lord, as does a kingdom to its king.
His family history, the history of his house, etc. — all this individualizes the estate for him and
makes it literally his house, personifies it. Similarly those working on the estate have not the
position of day-laborers; but they are in part themselves his property, as are serfs; and in part they
are bound to him by ties of respect, allegiance, and duty. His relation to them is therefore directly
political, and has likewise a human, intimate side. Customs, character, etc., vary from one estate
to another and seem to be one with the land to which they belong; whereas later, it is only his
purse and not his character, his individuals , which connects a man with an estate. Finally, the
feudal lord does not try to extract the utmost advantage from his land. Rather, he consumes what
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is there and calmly leaves the worry of producing to the serfs and the tenants. Such is nobility’s
relationship to landed property, which casts a romantic glory on its lords.
It is necessary that this appearance be abolished — that landed property, the root of private
property, be dragged completely into the movement of private property and that it become a
commodity; that the rule of the proprietor appear as the undisguised rule of private property, of
capital, freed of all political tincture; that the relationship between proprietor and worker be
reduced to the economic relationship of exploiter and exploited; that all [ ... ] a personal
relationship between the proprietor and his property cease, property becoming merely objective,
material wealth; that the marriage of convenience should take the place of the marriage of honor
with the land; and that the land should likewise sink to the status of a commercial value, like man.
It is essential that that which is the root of landed property — filthy self-interest — make its
appearance, too, in its cynical form. It is essential that the immovable monopoly turn into the
mobile and restless monopoly, into competition; and that the idle enjoyment of the products of
other people’s blood and sweat turn into a bustling commerce in the same commodity. Lastly, it is
essential that in this competition landed property, in the form of capital, manifest its dominion
over both the working class and the proprietors themselves who are either being ruined or raised
by the laws governing the movement of capital. The medieval proverb nulle terre sans seigneur
[There is no land without its lord. – Ed.] is thereby replaced by that other proverb, l’argent n’a
pas de maître [Money knows no master. – Ed.], wherein is expressed the complete domination of
dead matter over man.
(2) Concerning the argument of division or non-division of landed property, the following is to be
observed.
The division of landed property negates the large-scale monopoly of property in land — abolishes
it; but only by generalizing this monopoly. It does not abolish the source of monopoly, private
property. It attacks the existing form, but not the essence, of monopoly. The consequence is that it
falls victim to the laws of private property. For the division of landed property corresponds to the
movement of competition in the sphere of industry. In addition to the economic disadvantages of
such a dividing-up of the instruments of labor, and the dispersal of labor (to be clearly
distinguished from the division of labor: in separated labor the work is not shared out amongst
many, but each carries on the same work by himself, it is a multiplication of the same work), this
division [of land], like that competition [in industry], necessarily turns again into accumulation.
Therefore, where the division of landed property takes place, there remains nothing for it but to
return to monopoly in a still more malignant form, or to negate, to abolish the division of landed
property itself. To do that, however, is not to return to feudal ownership, but to abolish private
property in the soil altogether. The first abolition of monopoly is always its generalization, the
broadening of its existence. The abolition of monopoly, once it has come to exist in its utmost
breadth and inclusiveness, is its total annihilation. Association, applied to land, shares the
economic advantage of large-scale landed property, and first brings to realization the original
tendency inherent in [land] division, namely, equality. In the same way association also reestablishes, now on a rational basis, no longer mediated by serfdom, overlordship and the silly
mysticism of property, the intimate ties of man with the earth, since the earth ceases to be an
object of huckstering, and through free labor and free enjoyment becomes once more a true
personal property of man. A great advantage of the division of landed property is that the masses,
which can no longer resign themselves to servitude, perish through property in a different way
than in industry.
As for large landed property, its defenders have always, sophistically, identified the economic
advantages offered by large-scale agriculture with large-scale landed property, as if it were not
precisely as a result of the abolition of property that this advantage, for one thing, would receive
its greatest possible extension, and, for another, only then would be of social benefit. In the same
way, they have attacked the huckstering spirit of small landed property, as if large landed
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property did not contain huckstering latent within it, even in its feudal form — not to speak of the
modern English form, which combines the landlord’s feudalism with the tenant farmer’s
huckstering and industry.
Just as large landed property can return the reproach of monopoly leveled against it by partitioned
land, since partitioned land is also based on the monopoly of private property, so can partitioned
landed property likewise return to large landed property the reproach of partition, since partition
also prevails there, though in a rigid and frozen form. Indeed, private property rests altogether on
partitioning. Moreover, just as division of the land leads back to large landed property as a form
of capital wealth, so must feudal landed property necessarily lead to partitioning or at least fall
into the hands of the capitalists, turn and twist as it may.
For large landed property, as in England, drives the overwhelming majority of the population into
the arms of industry and reduces its own workers to utter wretchedness. Thus, it engenders and
enlarges the power of its enemy, capital, industry, by throwing poor people and an entire activity
of the country on to the other side. It makes the majority of the people of the country industrial
and thus opponents of large landed property. Where industry has attained to great power, as in
England at the present time, it progressively forces from large landed property its monopoly
against foreign countries and throws it into competition with landed property abroad. For under
the sway of industry landed property could keep its feudal grandeur secure only by means of
monopolies against foreign countries, thereby protecting itself against the general laws of trade,
which are incompatible with its feudal character. Once thrown into competition, landed property
obeys the laws of competition, like every other commodity subjected to competition. It begins
thus to fluctuate, to decrease and to increase, to fly from one hand to another; and no law can
keep it any longer in a few predestined hands. The immediate consequence is the splitting up of
the land amongst many hands, and in any case subjection to the power of industrial capitals.
Finally, large landed property which has been forcibly preserved in this way and which has
begotten by its side a tremendous industry leads to crisis even more quickly than the partitioning
of land, in comparison with which the power of industry remains constantly of second rank.
Large landed property, as we see in England, has already cast off its feudal character and adopted
an industrial character insofar as it is aiming to make as much money as possible. To the owner it
yields the utmost possible rent, to the tenant farmer the utmost possible profit on his capital. The
workers on the land, in consequence, have already been reduced to the minimum, and the class of
tenant farmers already represents within landed property the power of industry and capital. As a
result of foreign competition, rent in most cases can no longer form an independent income. A
large number of landowners are forced to displace tenant farmers, some of whom in this way [ ...]
sink into the proletariat. On the other hand, many tenant farmers will take over landed property;
for the big proprietors, who with their comfortable incomes have mostly given themselves over to
extravagance and for the most part are not competent to conduct large-scale agriculture, often
possess neither the capital nor the ability for the exploitation of the land. Hence a section of this
class, too, is completely ruined. Eventually wages, which have already been reduced to a
minimum, must be reduced yet further, to meet the new competition. This then necessarily leads
to revolution.
Landed property had to develop in each of these two ways so as to experience in both its
necessary downfall, just as industry both in the form of monopoly and in that of competition had
to ruin itself so as to learn to believe in man. |XXI||
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[Estranged Labor]
||XXII| We have proceeded from the premises of political economy. We have accepted its
language and its laws. We presupposed private property, the separation of labor, capital and land,
and of wages, profit of capital and rent of land – likewise division of labor, competition, the
concept of exchange value, etc. On the basis of political economy itself, in its own words, we
have shown that the worker sinks to the level of a commodity and becomes indeed the most
wretched of commodities; that the wretchedness of the worker is in inverse proportion to the
power and magnitude of his production; that the necessary result of competition is the
accumulation of capital in a few hands, and thus the restoration of monopoly in a more terrible
form; and that finally the distinction between capitalist and land rentier, like that between the
tiller of the soil and the factory worker, disappears and that the whole of society must fall apart
into the two classes – property owners and propertyless workers.
Political economy starts with the fact of private property; it does not explain it to us. It expresses
in general, abstract formulas the material process through which private property actually passes,
and these formulas it then takes for laws. It does not comprehend these laws – i.e., it does not
demonstrate how they arise from the very nature of private property. Political economy throws no
light on the cause of the division between labor and capital, and between capital and land. When,
for example, it defines the relationship of wages to profit, it takes the interest of the capitalists to
be the ultimate cause, i.e., it takes for granted what it is supposed to explain. Similarly,
competition comes in everywhere. It is explained from external circumstances. As to how far
these external and apparently accidental circumstances are but the expression of a necessary
course of development, political economy teaches us nothing. We have seen how exchange itself
appears to it as an accidental fact. The only wheels which political economy sets in motion are
greed, and the war amongst the greedy – competition. [After this paragraph the following
sentence is crossed out in the manuscript: “We now have to examine the nature of this material
movement of property.” – Ed.]
Precisely because political economy does not grasp the way the movement is connected, it was
possible to oppose, for instance, the doctrine of competition to the doctrine of monopoly, the
doctrine of the freedom of the crafts to the doctrine of the guild, the doctrine of the division of
landed property to the doctrine of the big estate – for competition, freedom of the crafts and the
division of landed property were explained and comprehended only as accidental, premeditated
and violent consequences of monopoly, of the guild system, and of feudal property, not as their
necessary, inevitable and natural consequences.
Now, therefore, we have to grasp the intrinsic connection between private property, greed, the
separation of labor, capital and landed property; the connection of exchange and competition, of
value and the devaluation of man, of monopoly and competition, etc. – the connection between
this whole estrangement and the money system.
Do not let us go back to a fictitious primordial condition as the political economist does, when he
tries to explain. Such a primordial condition explains nothing; it merely pushes the question away
into a grey nebulous distance. The economist assumes in the form of a fact, of an event, what he
is supposed to deduce – namely, the necessary relationship between two things – between, for
example, division of labor and exchange. Thus the theologian explains the origin of evil by the
fall of man – that is, he assumes as a fact, in historical form, what has to be explained.
We proceed from an actual economic fact.
The worker becomes all the poorer the more wealth he produces, the more his production
increases in power and size. The worker becomes an ever cheaper commodity the more
commodities he creates. The devaluation of the world of men is in direct proportion to the
increasing value of the world of things. Labor produces not only commodities; it produces itself
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and the worker as a commodity – and this at the same rate at which it produces commodities in
general.
This fact expresses merely that the object which labor produces – labor’s product – confronts it as
something alien, as a power independent of the producer. The product of labor is labor which has
been embodied in an object, which has become material: it is the objectification of labor. Labor’s
realization is its objectification. Under these economic conditions this realization of labor appears
as loss of realization for the workers;18 objectification as loss of the object and bondage to it;
appropriation as estrangement, as alienation.19
So much does labor’s realization appear as loss of realization that the worker loses realization to
the point of starving to death. So much does objectification appear as loss of the object that the
worker is robbed of the objects most necessary not only for his life but for his work. Indeed, labor
itself becomes an object which he can obtain only with the greatest effort and with the most
irregular interruptions. So much does the appropriation of the object appear as estrangement that
the more objects the worker produces the less he can possess and the more he falls under the sway
of his product, capital.
All these consequences are implied in the statement that the worker is related to the product of his
labor as to an alien object. For on this premise it is clear that the more the worker spends himself,
the more powerful becomes the alien world of objects which he creates over and against himself,
the poorer he himself – his inner world – becomes, the less belongs to him as his own. It is the
same in religion. The more man puts into God, the less he retains in himself. The worker puts his
life into the object; but now his life no longer belongs to him but to the object. Hence, the greater
this activity, the more the worker lacks objects. Whatever the product of his labor is, he is not.
Therefore, the greater this product, the less is he himself. The alienation of the worker in his
product means not only that his labor becomes an object, an external existence, but that it exists
outside him, independently, as something alien to him, and that it becomes a power on its own
confronting him. It means that the life which he has conferred on the object confronts him as
something hostile and alien.
||XXIII| Let us now look more closely at the objectification, at the production of the worker; and
in it at the estrangement, the loss of the object, of his product.
The worker can create nothing without nature, without the sensuous external world. It is the
material on which his labor is realized, in which it is active, from which, and by means of which
it produces.
But just as nature provides labor with [the] means of life in the sense that labor cannot live
without objects on which to operate, on the other hand, it also provides the means of life in the
more restricted sense, i.e., the means for the physical subsistence of the worker himself.
Thus the more the worker by his labor appropriates the external world, sensuous nature, the more
he deprives himself of means of life in two respects: first, in that the sensuous external world
more and more ceases to be an object belonging to his labor – to be his labor’s means of life; and,
second, in that it more and more ceases to be means of life in the immediate sense, means for the
physical subsistence of the worker.
In both respects, therefore, the worker becomes a servant of his object, first, in that he receives an
object of labor, i.e., in that he receives work, and, secondly, in that he receives means of
subsistence. This enables him to exist, first as a worker; and second, as a physical subject. The
height of this servitude is that it is only as a worker that he can maintain himself as a physical
subject and that it is only as a physical subject that he is a worker.
(According to the economic laws the estrangement of the worker in his object is expressed thus:
the more the worker produces, the less he has to consume; the more values he creates, the more
valueless, the more unworthy he becomes; the better formed his product, the more deformed
becomes the worker; the more civilized his object, the more barbarous becomes the worker; the

30

Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. First Manuscript

more powerful labor becomes, the more powerless becomes the worker; the more ingenious labor
becomes, the less ingenious becomes the worker and the more he becomes nature’s servant.)
Political economy conceals the estrangement inherent in the nature of labor by not considering
the direct relationship between the worker (labor) and production. It is true that labor produces
for the rich wonderful things – but for the worker it produces privation. It produces palaces – but
for the worker, hovels. It produces beauty – but for the worker, deformity. It replaces labor by
machines, but it throws one section of the workers back into barbarous types of labor and it turns
the other section into a machine. It produces intelligence – but for the worker, stupidity,
cretinism.
The direct relationship of labor to its products is the relationship of the worker to the objects of
his production. The relationship of the man of means to the objects of production and to
production itself is only a consequence of this first relationship – and confirms it. We shall
consider this other aspect later. When we ask, then, what is the essential relationship of labor we
are asking about the relationship of the worker to production.
Till now we have been considering the estrangement, the alienation of the worker only in one of
its aspects , i.e., the worker’s relationship to the products of his labor. But the estrangement is
manifested not only in the result but in the act of production, within the producing activity, itself.
How could the worker come to face the product of his activity as a stranger, were it not that in the
very act of production he was estranging himself from himself? The product is after all but the
summary of the activity, of production. If then the product of labor is alienation, production itself
must be active alienation, the alienation of activity, the activity of alienation. In the estrangement
of the object of labor is merely summarized the estrangement, the alienation, in the activity of
labor itself.
What, then, constitutes the alienation of labor?
First, the fact that labor is external to the worker, i.e., it does not belong to his intrinsic nature;
that in his work, therefore, he does not affirm himself but denies himself, does not feel content
but unhappy, does not develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and
ruins his mind. The worker therefore only feels himself outside his work, and in his work feels
outside himself. He feels at home when he is not working, and when he is working he does not
feel at home. His labor is therefore not voluntary, but coerced; it is forced labor. It is therefore
not the satisfaction of a need; it is merely a means to satisfy needs external to it. Its alien
character emerges clearly in the fact that as soon as no physical or other compulsion exists, labor
is shunned like the plague. External labor, labor in which man alienates himself, is a labor of selfsacrifice, of mortification. Lastly, the external character of labor for the worker appears in the fact
that it is not his own, but someone else’s, that it does not belong to him, that in it he belongs, not
to himself, but to another. Just as in religion the spontaneous activity of the human imagination,
of the human brain and the human heart, operates on the individual independently of him – that
is, operates as an alien, divine or diabolical activity – so is the worker’s activity not his
spontaneous activity. It belongs to another; it is the loss of his self.
As a result, therefore, man (the worker) only feels himself freely active in his animal functions –
eating, drinking, procreating, or at most in his dwelling and in dressing-up, etc.; and in his human
functions he no longer feels himself to be anything but an animal. What is animal becomes
human and what is human becomes animal.
Certainly eating, drinking, procreating, etc., are also genuinely human functions. But taken
abstractly, separated from the sphere of all other human activity and turned into sole and ultimate
ends, they are animal functions.
We have considered the act of estranging practical human activity, labor, in two of its aspects. (1)
The relation of the worker to the product of labor as an alien object exercising power over him.
This relation is at the same time the relation to the sensuous external world, to the objects of
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nature, as an alien world inimically opposed to him. (2) The relation of labor to the act of
production within the labor process. This relation is the relation of the worker to his own activity
as an alien activity not belonging to him; it is activity as suffering, strength as weakness,
begetting as emasculating, the worker’s own physical and mental energy, his personal life – for
what is life but activity? – as an activity which is turned against him, independent of him and not
belonging to him. Here we have self-estrangement, as previously we had the estrangement of the
thing.
||XXIV| We have still a third aspect of estranged labor to deduce from the two already
considered.
Man is a species-being,20 not only because in practice and in theory he adopts the species (his
own as well as those of other things) as his object, but – and this is only another way of
expressing it – also because he treats himself as the actual, living species; because he treats
himself as a universal and therefore a free being.
The life of the species, both in man and in animals, consists physically in the fact that man (like
the animal) lives on organic nature; and the more universal man (or the animal) is, the more
universal is the sphere of inorganic nature on which he lives. Just as plants, animals, stones, air,
light, etc., constitute theoretically a part of human consciousness, partly as objects of natural
science, partly as objects of art – his spiritual inorganic nature, spiritual nourishment which he
must first prepare to make palatable and digestible – so also in the realm of practice they
constitute a part of human life and human activity. Physically man lives only on these products of
nature, whether they appear in the form of food, heating, clothes, a dwelling, etc. The universality
of man appears in practice precisely in the universality which makes all nature his inorganic body
– both inasmuch as nature is (1) his direct means of life, and (2) the material, the object, and the
instrument of his life activity. Nature is man’s inorganic body – nature, that is, insofar as it is not
itself human body. Man lives on nature – means that nature is his body, with which he must
remain in continuous interchange if he is not to die. That man’s physical and spiritual life is
linked to nature means simply that nature is linked to itself, for man is a part of nature.
In estranging from man (1) nature, and (2) himself, his own active functions, his life activity,
estranged labor estranges the species from man. It changes for him the life of the species into a
means of individual life. First it estranges the life of the species and individual life, and secondly
it makes individual life in its abstract form the purpose of the life of the species, likewise in its
abstract and estranged form.
For labor, life activity, productive life itself, appears to man in the first place merely as a means of
satisfying a need – the need to maintain physical existence. Yet the productive life is the life of
the species. It is life-engendering life. The whole character of a species, its species-character, is
contained in the character of its life activity; and free, conscious activity is man’s speciescharacter. Life itself appears only as a means to life.
The animal is immediately one with its life activity. It does not distinguish itself from it. It is its
life activity. Man makes his life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness. He
has conscious life activity. It is not a determination with which he directly merges. Conscious life
activity distinguishes man immediately from animal life activity. It is just because of this that he
is a species-being. Or it is only because he is a species-being that he is a conscious being, i.e., that
his own life is an object for him. Only because of that is his activity free activity. Estranged labor
reverses the relationship, so that it is just because man is a conscious being that he makes his life
activity, his essential being, a mere means to his existence.
In creating a world of objects by his personal activity, in his work upon inorganic nature, man
proves himself a conscious species-being, i.e., as a being that treats the species as his own
essential being, or that treats itself as a species-being. Admittedly animals also produce. They
build themselves nests, dwellings, like the bees, beavers, ants, etc. But an animal only produces
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what it immediately needs for itself or its young. It produces one-sidedly, whilst man produces
universally. It produces only under the dominion of immediate physical need, whilst man
produces even when he is free from physical need and only truly produces in freedom therefrom.
An animal produces only itself, whilst man reproduces the whole of nature. An animal’s product
belongs immediately to its physical body, whilst man freely confronts his product. An animal
forms only in accordance with the standard and the need of the species to which it belongs, whilst
man knows how to produce in accordance with the standard of every species, and knows how to
apply everywhere the inherent standard to the object. Man therefore also forms objects in
accordance with the laws of beauty.
It is just in his work upon the objective world, therefore, that man really proves himself to be a
species-being. This production is his active species-life. Through this production, nature appears
as his work and his reality. The object of labor is, therefore, the objectification of man’s specieslife: for he duplicates himself not only, as in consciousness, intellectually, but also actively, in
reality, and therefore he sees himself in a world that he has created. In tearing away from man the
object of his production, therefore, estranged labor tears from him his species-life, his real
objectivity as a member of the species and transforms his advantage over animals into the
disadvantage that his inorganic body, nature, is taken from him.
Similarly, in degrading spontaneous, free activity to a means, estranged labor makes man’s
species-life a means to his physical existence.
The consciousness which man has of his species is thus transformed by estrangement in such a
way that species [-life] becomes for him a means.
Estranged labor turns thus:
(3) Man’s species-being, both nature and his spiritual species-property, into a being alien to him,
into a means of his individual existence. It estranges from man his own body, as well as external
nature and his spiritual aspect, his human aspect.
(4) An immediate consequence of the fact that man is estranged from the product of his labor,
from his life activity, from his species-being, is the estrangement of man from man. When man
confronts himself, he confronts the other man. What applies to a man’s relation to his work, to the
product of his labor and to himself, also holds of a man’s relation to the other man, and to the
other man’s labor and object of labor.
In fact, the proposition that man’s species-nature is estranged from him means that one man is
estranged from the other, as each of them is from man’s essential nature.
The estrangement of man, and in fact every relationship in which man [stands] to himself, is
realized and expressed only in the relationship in which a man stands to other men.
Hence within the relationship of estranged labor each man views the other in accordance with the
standard and the relationship in which he finds himself as a worker.
||XXV| We took our departure from a fact of political economy – the estrangement of the worker
and his production. We have formulated this fact in conceptual terms as estranged, alienated
labor. We have analyzed this concept – hence analyzing merely a fact of political economy.
Let us now see, further, how the concept of estranged, alienated labor must express and present
itself in real life.
If the product of labor is alien to me, if it confronts me as an alien power, to whom, then, does it
belong?
To a being other than myself.
Who is this being?
The gods? To be sure, in the earliest times the principal production (for example, the building of
temples, etc., in Egypt, India and Mexico) appears to be in the service of the gods, and the
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product belongs to the gods. However, the gods on their own were never the lords of labor. No
more was nature. And what a contradiction it would be if, the more man subjugated nature by his
labor and the more the miracles of the gods were rendered superfluous by the miracles of
industry, the more man were to renounce the joy of production and the enjoyment of the product
to please these powers.
The alien being, to whom labor and the product of labor belongs, in whose service labor is done
and for whose benefit the product of labor is provided, can only be man himself.
If the product of labor does not belong to the worker, if it confronts him as an alien power, then
this can only be because it belongs to some other man than the worker. If the worker’s activity is
a torment to him, to another it must give satisfaction and pleasure. Not the gods, not nature, but
only man himself can be this alien power over man.
We must bear in mind the previous proposition that man’s relation to himself becomes for him
objective and actual through his relation to the other man. Thus, if the product of his labor, his
labor objectified, is for him an alien, hostile, powerful object independent of him, then his
position towards it is such that someone else is master of this object, someone who is alien,
hostile, powerful, and independent of him. If he treats his own activity as an unfree activity, then
he treats it as an activity performed in the service, under the dominion, the coercion, and the yoke
of another man.
Every self-estrangement of man, from himself and from nature, appears in the relation in which
he places himself and nature to men other than and differentiated from himself. For this reason
religious self-estrangement necessarily appears in the relationship of the layman to the priest, or
again to a mediator, etc., since we are here dealing with the intellectual world. In the real
practical world self-estrangement can only become manifest through the real practical
relationship to other men. The medium through which estrangement takes place is itself practical.
Thus through estranged labor man not only creates his relationship to the object and to the act of
production as to powers [in the manuscript Menschen (men) instead of Mächte (powers). – Ed.]
that are alien and hostile to him; he also creates the relationship in which other men stand to his
production and to his product, and the relationship in which he stands to these other men. Just as
he creates his own production as the loss of his reality, as his punishment; his own product as a
loss, as a product not belonging to him; so he creates the domination of the person who does not
produce over production and over the product. Just as he estranges his own activity from himself,
so he confers upon the stranger an activity which is not his own.
We have until now considered this relationship only from the standpoint of the worker and later
on we shall be considering it also from the standpoint of the non-worker.
Through estranged, alienated labor, then, the worker produces the relationship to this labor of a
man alien to labor and standing outside it. The relationship of the worker to labor creates the
relationship to it of the capitalist (or whatever one chooses to call the master of labor). Private
property is thus the product, the result, the necessary consequence, of alienated labor, of the
external relation of the worker to nature and to himself.
Private property thus results by analysis from the concept of alienated labor, i.e., of alienated
man, of estranged labor, of estranged life, of estranged man.
True, it is as a result of the movement of private property that we have obtained the concept of
alienated labor (of alienated life) in political economy. But on analysis of this concept it becomes
clear that though private property appears to be the reason, the cause of alienated labor, it is rather
its consequence, just as the gods are originally not the cause but the effect of man’s intellectual
confusion. Later this relationship becomes reciprocal.
Only at the culmination of the development of private property does this, its secret, appear again,
namely, that on the one hand it is the product of alienated labor, and that on the other it is the
means by which labor alienates itself, the realization of this alienation.
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This exposition immediately sheds light on various hitherto unsolved conflicts.
(1) Political economy starts from labor as the real soul of production; yet to labor it gives
nothing, and to private property everything. Confronting this contradiction, Proudhon has decided
in favor of labor against private property21. We understand, however, that this apparent
contradiction is the contradiction of estranged labor with itself, and that political economy has
merely formulated the laws of estranged labor.
We also understand, therefore, that wages and private property are identical. Indeed, where the
product, as the object of labor, pays for labor itself, there the wage is but a necessary consequence
of labor’s estrangement. Likewise, in the wage of labor, labor does not appear as an end in itself
but as the servant of the wage. We shall develop this point later, and meanwhile will only draw
some conclusions. ||XXVI| 22
An enforced increase of wages (disregarding all other difficulties, including the fact that it would
only be by force, too, that such an increase, being an anomaly, could be maintained) would
therefore be nothing but better payment for the slave, and would not win either for the worker or
for labor their human status and dignity.
Indeed, even the equality of wages, as demanded by Proudhon, only transforms the relationship of
the present-day worker to his labor into the relationship of all men to labor. Society is then
conceived as an abstract capitalist.
Wages are a direct consequence of estranged labor, and estranged labor is the direct cause of
private property. The downfall of the one must therefore involve the downfall of the other.
(2) From the relationship of estranged labor to private property it follows further that the
emancipation of society from private property, etc., from servitude, is expressed in the political
form of the emancipation of the workers; not that their emancipation alone is at stake, but
because the emancipation of the workers contains universal human emancipation – and it contains
this because the whole of human servitude is involved in the relation of the worker to production,
and all relations of servitude are but modifications and consequences of this relation.
Just as we have derived the concept of private property from the concept of estranged, alienated
labor by analysis, so we can develop every category of political economy with the help of these
two factors; and we shall find again in each category, e.g., trade, competition, capital, money only
a particular and developed expression of these first elements.
But before considering this phenomenon, however, let us try to solve two other problems.
(1) To define the general nature of private property, as it has arisen as a result of estranged labor,
in its relation to truly human and social property.
(2) We have accepted the estrangement of labor, its alienation, as a fact, and we have analyzed
this fact. How, we now ask, does man come to alienate, to estrange, his labor? How is this
estrangement rooted in the nature of human development? We have already gone a long way to
the solution of this problem by transforming the question of the origin of private property into the
question of the relation of alienated labor to the course of humanity’s development. For when
one speaks of private property, one thinks of dealing with something external to man. When one
speaks of labor, one is directly dealing with man himself. This new formulation of the question
already contains its solution.
As to (1): The general nature of private property and its relation to truly human property.
Alienated labor has resolved itself for us into two components which depend on one another, or
which are but different expressions of one and the same relationship. Appropriation appears as
estrangement, as alienation; and alienation appears as appropriation, estrangement as truly
becoming a citizen.23
We have considered the one side – alienated labor in relation to the worker himself, i.e., the
relation of alienated labor to itself. The product, the necessary outcome of this relationship, as we
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have seen, is the property relation of the non-worker to the worker and to labor. Private property,
as the material, summary expression of alienated labor, embraces both relations – the relation of
the worker to work and to the product of his labor and to the non-worker, and the relation of the
non-worker to the worker and to the product of his labor.
Having seen that in relation to the worker who appropriates nature by means of his labor, this
appropriation appears as estrangement, his own spontaneous activity as activity for another and as
activity of another, vitality as a sacrifice of life, production of the object as loss of the object to an
alien power, to an alien person – we shall now consider the relation to the worker, to labor and its
object of this person who is alien to labor and the worker.
First it has to be noted that everything which appears in the worker as an activity of alienation, of
estrangement, appears in the non-worker as a state of alienation, of estrangement.
Secondly, that the worker’s real, practical attitude in production and to the product (as a state of
mind) appears in the non-worker who confronting him as a theoretical attitude.
||XXVII| Thirdly, the non-worker does everything against the worker which the worker does
against himself; but he does not do against himself what he does against the worker.
Let us look more closely at these three relations. |XXVII||
[First Manuscript breaks off here.]

Second Manuscript
Antithesis of Capital and Labor. Landed Property and Capital
[....] ||XL| forms the interest on his capital. The worker is the subjective manifestation of the fact
that capital is man wholly lost to himself, just as capital is the objective manifestation of the fact
that labor is man lost to himself. But the worker has the misfortune to be a living capital, and
therefore an indigent capital, one which loses its interest, and hence its livelihood, every moment
it is not working. The value of the worker as capital rises according to demand and supply, and
physically too his existence, his life, was and is looked upon as a supply of a commodity like any
other. The worker produces capital, capital produces him – hence he produces himself, and man
as worker, as a commodity, is the product of this entire cycle. To the man who is nothing more
than a worker – and to him as a worker – his human qualities only exist insofar as they exist for
capital alien to him. Because man and capital are alien, foreign to each other, however, and thus
stand in an indifferent, external and accidental relationship to each other, it is inevitable that this
foreignness should also appear as something real. As soon, therefore, as it occurs to capital
(whether from necessity or caprice) no longer to be for the worker, he himself is no longer for
himself: he has no work, hence no wages, and since he has no existence as a human being but
only as a worker, he can go and bury himself, starve to death, etc. The worker exists as a worker
only when he exists for himself as capital; and he exists as capital only when some capital exists
for him. The existence of capital is his existence, his life; as it determines the tenor of his life in a
manner indifferent to him.
Political economy, therefore, does not recognize the unemployed worker, the workingman,
insofar as he happens to be outside this labor relationship. The rascal, swindler, beggar, the
unemployed, the starving, wretched and criminal workingman – these are figures who do not
exist for political economy but only for other eyes, those of the doctor, the judge, the gravedigger, and bum-bailiff, etc.; such figures are specters outside its domain. For it, therefore, the
worker’s needs are but the one need – to maintain him whilst he is working and insofar as may be
necessary to prevent the race of laborers from [dying] out. The wages of labor have thus exactly
the same significance as the maintenance and servicing of any other productive instrument, or as
the consumption of capital in general, required for its reproduction with interest, like the oil
which is applied to wheels to keep them turning. Wages, therefore, belong to capital’s and the
capitalist’s necessary costs, and must not exceed the bounds of this necessity. It was therefore
quite logical for the English factory owners, before the Amendment Bill of 1834, to deduct from
the wages of the worker the public charity which he was receiving out of the Poor Rate and to
consider this to be an integral part of wages.24
Production does not simply produce man as a commodity, the human commodity, man in the role
of commodity; it produces him in keeping with this role as a mentally and physically dehumanized
being. – Immorality, deformity, and dulling of the workers and the capitalists. – Its product is the
self-conscious and self-acting commodity ... the human commodity.... Great advance of Ricardo,
Mill, etc., on Smith and Say, to declare the existence of the human being – the greater or lesser
human productivity of the commodity – to be indifferent and even harmful. Not how many
workers are maintained by a given capital, but rather how much interest it brings in, the sum-total
of the annual savings, is said to be the true purpose of production.
It was likewise a great and consistent advance of modern ||XLI| English political economy, that,
whilst elevating labor to the position of its sole principle, it should at the same time expound with
complete clarity the inverse relation between wages and interest on capital, and the fact that the
capitalist could normally only gain by pressing down wages, and vice versa. Not the defrauding
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of the consumer, but the capitalist and the worker taking advantage of each other, is shown to be
the normal relationship.
The relations of private property contain latent within them the relation of private property as
labor, the relation of private property as capital, and the mutual relation of these two to one
another. There is the production of human activity as labor – that is, as an activity quite alien to
itself, to man and to nature, and therefore to consciousness and the expression of life – the
abstract existence of man as a mere workman who may therefore daily fall from his filled void
into the absolute void – into his social, and therefore actual, non-existence. On the other hand,
there is the production of the object of human activity as capital – in which all the natural and
social characteristic of the object is extinguished; in which private property has lost its natural and
social quality (and therefore every political and social illusion, and is not associated with any
apparently human relations); in which the selfsame capital remains the same in the most diverse
natural and social manifestations, totally indifferent to its real content. This contradiction, driven
to the limit, is of necessity the limit, the culmination, and the downfall of the whole privateproperty relationship.
It is therefore another great achievement of modern English political economy to have declared
rent of land to be the difference in the interest yielded by the worst and the best land under
cultivation; to have [exposed] the landowner’s romantic illusions – his alleged social importance
and the identity of his interest with the interest of society, a view still maintained by Adam Smith
after the Physiocrats; and to [have] anticipated and prepared the movement of the real world
which will transform the landowner into an ordinary, prosaic capitalist, and thus simplify and
sharpen the contradiction [between capital and labor] and hasten its resolution. Land as land, and
rent as rent, have lost their distinction of rank and become insignificant capital and interest – or
rather, capital and interest that signify only money.
The distinction between capital and land, between profit and rent, and between both and wages,
and industry, and agriculture, and immovable and movable private property – this distinction is
not rooted in the nature of things, but is a historical distinction, a fixed historical moment in the
formation and development of the contradiction between capital and labor. In industry, etc., as
opposed to immovable landed property, is only expressed the way in which [industry] came into
being and the contradiction to agriculture in which industry developed. This distinction only
continues to exist as a special sort of work – as an essential, important and life-embracing
distinction – so long as industry (town life) develops over and against landed property
(aristocratic feudal life) and itself continues to bear the feudal character of its opposite in the form
of monopoly, craft, guild, corporation, etc., within which labor still has a seemingly social
significance, still the significance of the real community, and has not yet reached the stage of
indifference to its content, of complete being-for-self 25, i.e., of abstraction from all other being,
and hence has not yet become liberated capital.
||XLII| But liberated industry, industry constituted for itself as such, and liberated capital, are the
necessary development of labor. The power of industry over its opposite is at once revealed in the
emergence of agriculture as a real industry, while previously it left most of the work to the soil
and to the slave of the soil, through whom the land cultivated itself. With the transformation of
the slave into a free worker – i.e., into a hireling – the landlord himself is transformed into a
captain of industry, into a capitalist – a transformation which takes place at first through the
intermediacy of the tenant farmer. The tenant farmer, however, is the landowner’s representative
– the landowner’s revealed secret: it is only through him that the landowner has his economic
existence – his existence as a private proprietor – for the rent of his land only exists due to the
competition between the farmers.
Thus, in the person of the tenant farmer the landlord has already become in essence a common
capitalist. And this must come to pass, too, in actual fact: the capitalist engaged in agriculture –
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the tenant – must become a landlord, or vice versa. The tenant’s industrial hucksterism is the
landowner’s industrial hucksterism, for the being of the former postulates the being of the latter.
But mindful of their contrasting origin, of their line of descent, the landowner knows the capitalist
as his insolent, liberated, enriched slave of yesterday and sees himself as a capitalist who is
threatened by him. The capitalist knows the landowner as the idle, cruel, egotistical master of
yesterday; he knows that he injures him as a capitalist, but that it is to industry that he owes all his
present social significance, his possessions and his pleasures; he sees in him [the landowner] a
contradiction to free industry and to free capital – to capital independent of every natural
limitation. This contradiction [between landowner and capitalist] is extremely bitter, and each
side tells the truth about the other. One need only read the attacks of immovable on movable
property and vice versa to obtain a clear picture of their respective worthlessness. The landowner
lays stress on the noble lineage of his property, on feudal souvenirs or reminiscences, the poetry
of recollection, on his romantic disposition, on his political importance, etc.; and when he talks
economics, it is only agriculture that he holds to be productive. At the same time he depicts his
adversary as a sly, hawking, carping, deceitful, greedy, mercenary, rebellious, heart- and soulless
person who is estranged from the community and freely trades it away, who breeds, nourishes
and cherishes competition, and with it pauperism, crime, and the dissolution of all social bonds,
an extorting, pimping, servile, smooth, flattering, fleecing, dried-up rogue without honor,
principles, poetry, substance, or anything else. (Amongst others see the Physiocrat Bergasse,
whom Camille Desmoulins flays in his journal, Révolutions de France et de Brabant26; see von
Vincke, Lancizolle, Haller, Leo, Kosegarten and also Sismondi.)
[See on the other hand the garrulous, old-Hegelian theologian Funke who tells, after Herr Leo,
with tears in his eyes how a slave had refused, when serfdom was abolished, to cease being the
property of the gentry27. See also the patriotic visions of Justus Möser, which distinguish
themselves by the fact that they never for a moment [...] abandon the respectable, petty-bourgeois
"home-baked", ordinary, narrow horizon of the philistine, and which nevertheless remain pure
fancy. This contradiction has given them such an appeal to the German heart. - Note by Marx.]
Movable property, for its part, points to the miracles of industry and progress. It is the child of
modern times, whose legitimate, native-born son it is. It pities its adversary as a simpleton,
unenlightened about his own nature (and in this it is completely right), who wants to replace
moral capital and free labor by brute, immoral violence and serfdom. It depicts him as a Don
Quixote, who under the guise of bluntness, respectability, the general interest, and stability,
conceals incapacity for progress, greedy self-indulgence, selfishness, sectional interest, and evil
intent. It declares him an artful monopolist; it pours cold water on his reminiscences, his poetry,
and his romanticism by a historical and sarcastic enumeration of the baseness, cruelty,
degradation, prostitution, infamy, anarchy and rebellion, of which romantic castles were the
workshops.
||XLIII| It claims to have obtained political freedom for everybody; to have loosed the chains
which fettered civil society; to have linked together different worlds; to have created trade
promoting friendship between the peoples; to have created pure morality and a pleasant culture;
to have given the people civilized needs in place of their crude wants, and the means of satisfying
them. Meanwhile, it claims, the landowner – this idle, parasitic grain-profiteer – raises the price
of the people’s basic necessities and so forces the capitalist to raise wages without being able to
increase productivity, thus impeding [the growth of] the nation’s annual income, the
accumulation of capital, and therefore the possibility of providing work for the people and wealth
for the country, eventually cancelling it, thus producing a general decline – whilst he parasitically
exploits every advantage of modern civilization without doing the least thing for it, and without
even abating in the slightest his feudal prejudices. Finally, let him – for whom the cultivation of
the land and the land itself exist only as a source of money, which comes to him as a present – let
him just take a look at his tenant farmer and say whether he himself is not a downright, fantastic,
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sly scoundrel who in his heart and in actual fact has for a long time belonged to free industry and
to lovely trade, however much he may protest and prattle about historical memories and ethical or
political goals. Everything which he can really advance to justify himself is true only of the
cultivator of the land (the capitalist and the laborers), of whom the landowner is rather the enemy.
Thus he gives evidence against himself. [Movable property claims that] without capital landed
property is dead, worthless matter; that its civilized victory has discovered and made human labor
the source of wealth in place of the dead thing. (See Paul Louis Courier, Saint-Simon, Ganilh,
Ricardo, Mill, McCulloch and Destutt de Tracy and Michel Chevalier.)
The real course of development (to be inserted at this point) results in the necessary victory of the
capitalist over the landowner – that is to say, of developed over undeveloped, immature private
property – just as in general, movement must triumph over immobility; open, self-conscious
baseness over hidden, unconscious baseness; cupidity over self-indulgence; the avowedly restless,
adroit self-interest of enlightenment over the parochial, worldly-wise, respectable, idle and
fantastic self-interest of superstition; and money over the other forms of private property.
Those states which sense something of the danger attaching to fully developed free industry, to
fully developed pure morality and to fully developed philanthropic trade, try, but in vain, to hold
in check the capitalization of landed property.
Landed property in its distinction from capital is private property – capital – still afflicted with
local and political prejudices; it is capital which has not yet extricated itself from its entanglement
with the world and found the form proper to itself – capital not yet fully developed. It must
achieve its abstract, that is, its pure, expression in the course of its cosmogony.
The character of private property is expressed by labor, capital, and the relations between these
two. The movement through which these constituents have to pass is:
First. Unmediated or mediated unity of the two.
Capital and labor are at first still united. Then, though separated and estranged, they reciprocally
develop and promote each other as positive conditions.
[Second.] The two in opposition, mutually excluding each other. The worker knows the capitalist
as his own non-existence, and vice versa: each tries to rob the other of his existence.
[Third.] Opposition of each to itself. Capital = stored-up labor = labor. As such it splits into
capital itself and its interest, and this latter again into interest and profit. The capitalist is
completely sacrificed. He falls into the working class, whilst the worker (but only exceptionally)
becomes a capitalist. Labor as a moment of capital – its costs. Thus the wages of labor – a
sacrifice of capital.
Splitting of labor into labor itself and the wages of labor. The worker himself a capital, a
commodity.
Clash of mutual contradictions. |XLIII||

Third Manuscript28
[Private Property and Labor. Political Economy as a Product of
the Movement of Private Property]
||I| Re. p. XXXVI. The subjective essence of private property – private property as activity for
itself,29 as subject, as person – is labor. It is therefore evident that only the political economy
which acknowledged labor as its principle – Adam Smith – and which therefore no longer looked
upon private property as a mere condition external to man – that it is this political economy which
has to be regarded on the one hand as a product of the real energy and the real movement of
private property (it is a movement of private property become independent for itself in
consciousness – the modern industry as Self) – as a product of modern industry – and on the other
hand, as a force which has quickened and glorified the energy and development of modern
industry and made it a power in the realm of consciousness.
To this enlightened political economy, which has discovered – within private property – the
subjective essence of wealth, the adherents of the Monetary and Mercantile System, who look
upon private property only as an objective substance confronting men, seem therefore to be
fetishists, Catholics. Engels was therefore right to call Adam Smith the Luther of Political
Economy [See Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy]. Just as Luther recognized religion faith - as the substance of the external world and in consequence stood opposed to Catholic
paganism – just as he superseded external religiosity by making religiosity the inner substance of
man - just as he negated the priests outside the layman because he transplanted the priest into
laymen’s hearts, just so with wealth: wealth as something outside man and independent of him,
and therefore as something to be maintained and asserted only in an external fashion, is done
away with; that is, this external, mindless objectivity of wealth is done away with, with private
property being incorporated in man himself and with man himself being recognized as its
essence. But as a result man is brought within the orbit of private property, just as with Luther he
is brought within the orbit of religion. Under the semblance of recognizing man, the political
economy whose principle is labor rather carries to its logical conclusion the denial of man, since
man himself no longer stands in an external relation of tension to the external substance of private
property, but has himself become this tense essence of private property. What was previously
being external to oneself – man’s actual externalization – has merely become the act of
externalizing – the process of alienating.
This political economy begins by seeming to acknowledge man (his independence, spontaneity,
etc.); then, locating private property in man’s own being, it can no longer be conditioned by the
local, national or other characteristics of private property as of something existing outside itself.
This political economy, consequently, displays a cosmopolitan, universal energy which
overthrows every restriction and bond so as to establish itself instead as the sole politics, the sole
universality, the sole limit and sole bond. Hence it must throw aside this hypocrisy in the course
of its further development and come out in its complete cynicism. And this it does – untroubled
by all the apparent contradictions in which it becomes involved as a result of this theory – by
developing the idea of labor much more one-sidedly, and therefore more sharply and more
consistently, as the sole essence of wealth; by proving the implications of this theory to be antihuman in character, in contrast to the other, original approach. Finally, by dealing the death-blow
to rent – that last, individual, natural mode of private property and source of wealth existing
independently of the movement of labor, that expression of feudal property, an expression which
has already become wholly economic in character and therefore incapable of resisting political
economy. (The Ricardo school.) There is not merely a relative growth in the cynicism of political
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economy from Smith through Say to Ricardo, Mill, etc., inasmuch as the implications of industry
appear more developed and more contradictory in the eyes of the last-named; these later
economists also advance in a positive sense constantly and consciously further than their
predecessors in their estrangement from man. They do so, however, only because their science
develops more consistently and truthfully. Because they make private property in its active form
the subject, thus simultaneously turning man into the essence – and at the same time turning man
as non-essentiality into the essence – the contradiction of reality corresponds completely to the
contradictory being which they accept as their principle. Far from refuting it, the ruptured ||II|
world of industry confirms their self-ruptured principle. Their principle is, after all, the principle
of this rupture.
The Physiocratic doctrine of Dr. Quesnay forms the transition from the Mercantile System to
Adam Smith. Physiocracy represents directly the decomposition of feudal property in economic
terms, but it therefore just as directly represents its economic metamorphosis and restoration, save
that now its language is no longer feudal but economic. All wealth is resolved into land and
cultivation (agriculture). Land is not yet capital: it is still a special mode of its existence, the
validity of which is supposed to lie in, and to derive from, its natural peculiarity. Yet land is a
general natural element, whilst the Mercantile System admits the existence of wealth only in the
form of precious metal. Thus the object of wealth – its matter – has straightway obtained the
highest degree of universality within the bounds of nature, insofar as even as nature, it is
immediate objective wealth. And land only exists for man through labor, through agriculture.
Thus the subjective essence of wealth has already been transferred to labor. But at the same time
agriculture is the only productive labor. Hence, labor is not yet grasped in its generality and
abstraction: it is still bound to a particular natural element as its matter, and it is therefore only
recognized in a particular mode of existence determined by nature. It is therefore still only a
specific, particular alienation of man, just as its product is likewise conceived nearly [as] a
specific form of wealth – due more to nature than to labor itself. The land is here still recognized
as a phenomenon of nature independent of man - not yet as capital, i.e., as an aspect of labor
itself. Labor appears, rather, as an aspect of the land. But since the fetishism of the old external
wealth, of wealth existing only as an object, has been reduced to a very simple natural element,
and since its essence – even if only partially and in a particular form – has been recognized within
its subjective existence, the necessary step forward has been made in revealing the general nature
of wealth and hence in the raising up of labor in its total absoluteness (i.e., its abstraction) as the
principle. It is argued against physiocracy that agriculture, from the economic point of view –
that is to say, from the only valid point of view – does not differ from any other industry; and that
the essence of wealth, therefore, is not a specific form of labor bound to a particular element - a
particular expression of labor – but labor in general.
Physiocracy denies particular, external, merely objective wealth by declaring labor to be the
essence of wealth. But for physiocracy labor is at first only the subjective essence of landed
property. (It takes its departure from the type of property which historically appears as the
dominant and acknowledged type.) It turns only landed property into alienated man. It annuls its
feudal character by declaring industry (agriculture) as its essence. But it disavows the world of
industry and acknowledges the feudal system by declaring agriculture to be the only industry.
It is clear that if the subjective essence of industry is now grasped (of industry in opposition to
landed property, i.e., of industry constituting itself as industry), this essence includes within itself
its opposite. For just as industry incorporates annulled landed property, the subjective essence of
industry at the same time incorporates the subjective essence of landed property.
Just as landed property is the first form of private property, with industry at first confronting it
historically merely as a special kind of property – or, rather, as landed property’s liberated slave –
so this process repeats itself in the scientific analysis of the subjective essence of private property,
labor. Labor appears at first only as agricultural labor, but then asserts itself as labor in general.
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||III| All wealth has become industrial wealth, the wealth of labor, and industry is accomplished
labor, just as the factory system is the perfected essence of industry, that is of labor, and just as
industrial capital is the accomplished objective form of private property.
We can now see how it is only at this point that private property can complete its dominion over
man and become, in its most general form, a world-historical power.

[Private Property and Communism]
Re p. XXXIX. The antithesis between lack of property and property, so long as it is not
comprehended as the antithesis of labor and capital, still remains an indifferent antithesis, not
grasped in its active connection, in its internal relation, not yet grasped as a contradiction. It can
find expression in this first form even without the advanced development of private property (as
in ancient Rome, Turkey, etc.). It does not yet appear as having been established by private
property itself. But labor, the subjective essence of private property as exclusion of property, and
capital, objective labor as exclusion of labor, constitute private property as its developed state of
contradiction – hence a dynamic relationship driving towards resolution.
Re the same page. The transcendence of self-estrangement follows the same course as selfestrangement. Private property is first considered only in its objective aspect – but nevertheless
with labor as its essence. Its form of existence is therefore capital, which is to be annulled “as
such” (Proudhon). Or a particular form of labor – labor leveled down, fragmented, and therefore
unfree – is conceived as the source of private property’s perniciousness and of its existence in
estrangement from men. For instance, Fourier, who, like the Physiocrats, also conceives
agricultural labor to be at least the exemplary type, whilst Saint-Simon declares in contrast that
industrial labor as such is the essence, and accordingly aspires to the exclusive rule of the
industrialists and the improvement of the workers’ condition. Finally, communism is the positive
expression of annulled private property – at first as universal private property.
By embracing this relation as a whole, communism is:
(1) In its first form only a generalization and consummation of it [of this relation]. As such it
appears in a two-fold form: on the one hand, the dominion of material property bulks so large that
it wants to destroy everything which is not capable of being possessed by all as private property.
It wants to disregard talent, etc., in an arbitrary manner. For it the sole purpose of life and
existence is direct, physical possession. The category of the worker is not done away with, but
extended to all men. The relationship of private property persists as the relationship of the
community to the world of things. Finally, this movement of opposing universal private property
to private property finds expression in the brutish form of opposing to marriage (certainly a form
of exclusive private property) the community of women, in which a woman becomes a piece of
communal and common property. It may be said that this idea of the community of women gives
away the secret of this as yet completely crude and thoughtless communism.30 Just as woman
passes from marriage to general prostitution, [Prostitution is only a specific expression of the
general prostitution of the laborer, and since it is a relationship in which falls not the prostitute
alone, but also the one who prostitutes – and the latter’s abomination is still greater – the
capitalist, etc., also comes under this head. – Note by Marx]31 so the entire world of wealth (that
is, of man’s objective substance) passes from the relationship of exclusive marriage with the
owner of private property to a state of universal prostitution with the community. This type of
communism – since it negates the personality of man in every sphere – is but the logical
expression of private property, which is this negation. General envy constituting itself as a power
is the disguise in which greed re-establishes itself and satisfies itself, only in another way. The
thought of every piece of private property as such is at least turned against wealthier private
property in the form of envy and the urge to reduce things to a common level, so that this envy
and urge even constitute the essence of competition. Crude communism [The manuscript has:
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Kommunist. – Ed.] is only the culmination of this envy and of this leveling-down proceeding
from the preconceived minimum. It has a definite, limited standard. How little this annulment of
private property is really an appropriation is in fact proved by the abstract negation of the entire
world of culture and civilization, the regression to the unnatural ||IV| simplicity of the poor and
crude man who has few needs and who has not only failed to go beyond private property, but has
not yet even reached it.
The community is only a community of labor, and of equality of wages paid out by communal
capital – by the community as the universal capitalist. Both sides of the relationship are raised to
an imagined universality – labor as the category in which every person is placed, and capital as
the acknowledged universality and power of the community.
In the approach to woman as the spoil and handmaid of communal lust is expressed the infinite
degradation in which man exists for himself, for the secret of this approach has its unambiguous,
decisive, plain and undisguised expression in the relation of man to woman and in the manner in
which the direct and natural species-relationship is conceived. The direct, natural, and necessary
relation of person to person is the relation of man to woman. In this natural species-relationship
man’s relation to nature is immediately his relation to man, just as his relation to man is
immediately his relation to nature – his own natural destination. In this relationship, therefore, is
sensuously manifested, reduced to an observable fact, the extent to which the human essence has
become nature to man, or to which nature to him has become the human essence of man. From
this relationship one can therefore judge man’s whole level of development. From the character
of this relationship follows how much man as a species-being, as man, has come to be himself
and to comprehend himself; the relation of man to woman is the most natural relation of human
being to human being. It therefore reveals the extent to which man’s natural behavior has become
human, or the extent to which the human essence in him has become a natural essence – the
extent to which his human nature has come to be natural to him. This relationship also reveals
the extent to which man’s need has become a human need; the extent to which, therefore, the
other person as a person has become for him a need – the extent to which he in his individual
existence is at the same time a social being.
The first positive annulment of private property – crude communism – is thus merely one form in
which the vileness of private property, which wants to set itself up as the positive community
system, comes to the surface.
(2) Communism (a) still political in nature – democratic or despotic; (ß) with the abolition of the
state, yet still incomplete, and being still affected by private property, i.e., by the estrangement of
man. In both forms communism already is aware of being reintegration or return of man to
himself, the transcendence of human self-estrangement; but since it has not yet grasped the
positive essence of private property, and just as little the human nature of need, it remains captive
to it and infected by it. It has, indeed, grasped its concept, but not its essence.
(3) Communism as the positive transcendence of private property as human self-estrangement,
and therefore as the real appropriation of the human essence by and for man; communism
therefore as the complete return of man to himself as a social (i.e., human) being – a return
accomplished consciously and embracing the entire wealth of previous development. This
communism, as fully developed naturalism, equals humanism, and as fully developed humanism
equals naturalism; it is the genuine resolution of the conflict between man and nature and
between man and man – the true resolution of the strife between existence and essence, between
objectification and self-confirmation, between freedom and necessity, between the individual and
the species. Communism is the riddle of history solved, and it knows itself to be this solution.
||V| The entire movement of history, just as its actual act of genesis – the birth act of its empirical
existence – is, therefore, for its thinking consciousness the comprehended and known process of
its becoming. Whereas the still immature communism seeks an historical proof for itself – a proof
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in the realm of what already exists – among disconnected historical phenomena opposed to
private property, tearing single phases from the historical process and focusing attention on them
as proofs of its historical pedigree (a hobby-horse ridden hard especially by Cabet, Villegardelle,
etc.). By so doing it simply makes clear that by far the greater part of this process contradicts its
own claim, and that, if it has ever existed, precisely its being in the past refutes its pretension to
reality.
It is easy to see that the entire revolutionary movement necessarily finds both its empirical and its
theoretical basis in the movement of private property – more precisely, in that of the economy.
This material, immediately perceptible private property is the material perceptible expression of
estranged human life. Its movement – production and consumption – is the perceptible revelation
of the movement of all production until now, i.e., the realization or the reality of man. Religion,
family, state, law, morality, science, art, etc., are only particular modes of production, and fall
under its general law. The positive transcendence of private property as the appropriation of
human life, is therefore the positive transcendence of all estrangement – that is to say, the return
of man from religion, family, state, etc., to his human, i.e., social, existence. Religious
estrangement as such occurs only in the realm of consciousness, of man’s inner life, but economic
estrangement is that of real life; its transcendence therefore embraces both aspects. It is evident
that the initial stage of the movement amongst the various peoples depends on whether the true
recognized life of the people manifests itself more in consciousness or in the external world – is
more ideal or real. Communism begins from the outset (Owen) with atheism; but atheism is at
first far from being communism; indeed, that atheism is still mostly an abstraction.
The philanthropy of atheism is therefore at first only philosophical, abstract philanthropy, and
that of communism is at once real and directly bent on action.
We have seen how on the assumption of positively annulled private property man produces man –
himself and the other man; how the object, being the direct manifestation of his individuality, is
simultaneously his own existence for the other man, the existence of the other man, and that
existence for him. Likewise, however, both the material of labor and man as the subject, are the
point of departure as well as the result of the movement (and precisely in this fact, that they must
constitute the point of departure, lies the historical necessity of private property). Thus the social
character is the general character of the whole movement: just as society itself produces man as
man, so is society produced by him. Activity and enjoyment, both in their content and in their
mode of existence, are social: social [This word is crossed out in the manuscript. – Ed.] activity
and social enjoyment. The human aspect of nature exists only for social man; for only then does
nature exist for him as a bond with man – as his existence for the other and the other’s existence
for him – and as the life-element of human reality. Only then does nature exist as the foundation
of his own human existence. Only here has what is to him his natural existence become his
human existence, and nature become man for him. Thus society is the complete unity of man with
nature – the true resurrection of nature – the consistent naturalism of man and the consistent
humanism of nature.
||VI| Social activity and social enjoyment exist by no means only in the form of some directly
communal activity and directly communal enjoyment, although communal activity and communal
enjoyment – i.e., activity and enjoyment which are manifested and directly revealed in real
association with other men – will occur wherever such a direct expression of sociability stems
from the true character of the activity’s content and is appropriate to the nature of the enjoyment.
But also when I am active scientifically, etc. – an activity which I can seldom perform in direct
community with others – then my activity is social, because I perform it as a man. Not only is the
material of my activity given to me as a social product (as is even the language in which the
thinker is active): my own existence is social activity, and therefore that which I make of myself,
I make of myself for society and with the consciousness of myself as a social being.
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My general consciousness is only the theoretical shape of that of which the living shape is the
real community, the social fabric, although at the present day general consciousness is an
abstraction from real life and as such confronts it with hostility. The activity of my general
consciousness, as an activity, is therefore also my theoretical existence as a social being.
Above all we must avoid postulating “society” again as an abstraction vis-à-vis the individual.
The individual is the social being. His manifestations of life – even if they may not appear in the
direct form of communal manifestations of life carried out in association with others – are
therefore an expression and confirmation of social life. Man’s individual and species-life are not
different, however much – and this is inevitable – the mode of existence of the individual is a
more particular or more general mode of the life of the species, or the life of the species is a
more particular or more general individual life.
In his consciousness of species man confirms his real social life and simply repeats his real
existence in thought, just as conversely the being of the species confirms itself in speciesconsciousness and exists for itself in its generality as a thinking being.
Man, much as he may therefore be a particular individual (and it is precisely his particularity
which makes him an individual, and a real individual social being), is just as much the totality –
the ideal totality – the subjective existence of imagined and experienced society for itself; just as
he exists also in the real world both as awareness and real enjoyment of social existence, and as a
totality of human manifestation of life.
Thinking and being are thus certainly distinct, but at the same time they are in unity with each
other.
Death seems to be a harsh victory of the species over the particular individual and to contradict
their unity. But the particular individual is only a particular species-being, and as such mortal.
<(4) [In the manuscript: “5”. – Ed.] Just as private property is only the perceptible expression of
the fact that man becomes objective for himself and at the same time becomes to himself a
strange and inhuman object; just as it expresses the fact that the manifestation of his life is the
alienation of his life, that his realization is his loss of reality, is an alien reality: so, the positive
transcendence of private property – i.e., the perceptible appropriation for and by man of the
human essence and of human life, of objective man, of human achievements – should not be
conceived merely in the sense of immediate, one-sided enjoyment, merely in the sense of
possessing, of having. Man appropriates his total essence in a total manner, that is to say, as a
whole man. Each of his human relations to the world – seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling,
thinking, observing, experiencing, wanting, acting, loving – in short, all the organs of his
individual being, like those organs which are directly social in their form, ||VII| are in their
objective orientation, or in their orientation to the object, the appropriation of the object, the
appropriation of human reality. Their orientation to the object is the manifestation of the human
reality, [For this reason it is just as highly varied as the determinations of human essence and
activities. – Note by Marx.] it is human activity and human suffering, for suffering, humanly
considered, is a kind of self-enjoyment of man.
Private property has made us so stupid and one-sided that an object is only ours when we have it
– when it exists for us as capital, or when it is directly possessed, eaten, drunk, worn, inhabited,
etc., – in short, when it is used by us. Although private property itself again conceives all these
direct realizations of possession only as means of life, and the life which they serve as means is
the life of private property – labor and conversion into capital.
In the place of all physical and mental senses there has therefore come the sheer estrangement of
all these senses, the sense of having. The human being had to be reduced to this absolute poverty
in order that he might yield his inner wealth to the outer world. [On the category of “having”, see
Hess, in the Philosophy of the Deed].
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The transcendence of private property is therefore the complete emancipation of all human senses
and qualities, but it is this emancipation precisely because these senses and attributes have
become, subjectively and objectively, human. The eye has become a human eye, just as its object
has become a social, human object – an object made by man for man. The senses have therefore
become directly in their practice theoreticians. They relate themselves to the thing for the sake of
the thing, but the thing itself is an objective human relation to itself and to man, [In practice I can
relate myself to a thing humanly only if the thing relates itself humanly to the human being. –
Note by Marx.] and vice versa. Need or enjoyment have consequently lost their egotistical nature,
and nature has lost its mere utility by use becoming human use.
In the same way, the senses and enjoyment of other men have become my own appropriation.
Besides these direct organs, therefore, social organs develop in the form of society; thus, for
instance, activity in direct association with others, etc., has become an organ for expressing my
own life, and a mode of appropriating human life.
It is obvious that the human eye enjoys things in a way different from the crude, non-human eye;
the human ear different from the crude ear, etc.
We have seen that man does not lose himself in his object only when the object becomes for him
a human object or objective man. This is possible only when the object becomes for him a social
object, he himself for himself a social being, just as society becomes a being for him in this
object.
On the one hand, therefore, it is only when the objective world becomes everywhere for man in
society the world of man’s essential powers – human reality, and for that reason the reality of his
own essential powers – that all objects become for him the objectification of himself, become
objects which confirm and realize his individuality, become his objects: that is, man himself
becomes the object. The manner in which they become his depends on the nature of the objects
and on the nature of the essential power corresponding to it; for it is precisely the determinate
nature of this relationship which shapes the particular, real mode of affirmation. To the eye an
object comes to be other than it is to the ear, and the object of the eye is another object than the
object of the ear. The specific character of each essential power is precisely its specific essence,
and therefore also the specific mode of its objectification, of its objectively actual, living being.
Thus man is affirmed in the objective world not only in the act of thinking, ||VIII| but with all his
senses.
On the other hand, let us look at this in its subjective aspect. Just as only music awakens in man
the sense of music, and just as the most beautiful music has no sense for the unmusical ear – is
[no] object for it, because my object can only be the confirmation of one of my essential powers,
therefore can only exist for me insofar as my essential power exists for itself as a subjective
capacity because the meaning of an object for me goes only so far as my sense goes (has only a
meaning for a sense corresponding to that object) – for this reason the senses of the social man
differ from those of the non-social man. Only through the objectively unfolded richness of man’s
essential being is the richness of subjective human sensibility (a musical ear, an eye for beauty of
form – in short, senses capable of human gratification, senses affirming themselves as essential
powers of man) either cultivated or brought into being. For not only the five senses but also the
so-called mental senses, the practical senses (will, love, etc.), in a word, human sense, the human
nature of the senses, comes to be by virtue of its object, by virtue of humanized nature. The
forming of the five senses is a labor of the entire history of the world down to the present. The
sense caught up in crude practical need has only a restricted sense.> For the starving man, it is
not the human form of food that exists, but only its abstract existence as food. It could just as well
be there in its crudest form, and it would be impossible to say wherein this feeding activity differs
from that of animals. The care-burdened, poverty-stricken man has no sense for the finest play;
the dealer in minerals sees only the commercial value but not the beauty and the specific
character of the mineral: he has no mineralogical sense. Thus, the objectification of the human
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essence, both in its theoretical and practical aspects, is required to make man’s sense human, as
well as to create the human sense corresponding to the entire wealth of human and natural
substance.
<Just as through the movement of private property, of its wealth as well as its misery– of its
material and spiritual wealth and misery – the budding society finds at hand all the material for
this development, so established society produces man in this entire richness of his being
produces the rich man profoundly endowed with all the senses – as its enduring reality.>
We see how subjectivism and objectivism, spiritualism and materialism, activity and suffering,
only lose their antithetical character, and – thus their existence as such antitheses only within the
framework of society; <we see how the resolution of the theoretical antitheses is only possible in
a practical way, by virtue of the practical energy of man. Their resolution is therefore by no
means merely a problem of understanding, but a real problem of life, which philosophy could not
solve precisely because it conceived this problem as merely a theoretical one.
We see how the history of industry and the established objective existence of industry are the
open book of man’s essential powers, the perceptibly existing human psychology. Hitherto this
was not conceived in its connection with man’s essential being, but only in an external relation of
utility, because, moving in the realm of estrangement, people could only think of man’s general
mode of being – religion or history in its abstract–general character as politics, art, literature, etc.
– ||XI| as the reality of man’s essential powers and man’s species-activity. We have before us the
objectified essential powers of man in the form of sensuous, alien, useful objects, in the form of
estrangement, displayed in ordinary material industry (which can be conceived either as a part of
that general movement, or that movement can be conceived as a particular part of industry, since
all human activity hitherto has been labor – that is, industry – activity estranged from itself).
A psychology for which this, the part of history existing in the most perceptible and accessible
form, remains a closed book, cannot become a genuine, comprehensive and real science.> What
indeed are we to think of a science which airily abstracts from this large part of human labor and
which fails to feel its own incompleteness, while such a wealth of human Endeavour, unfolded
before it, means nothing more to it than, perhaps, what can be expressed in one word – “need”,
“vulgar need”?
The natural sciences have developed an enormous activity and have accumulated an evergrowing mass of material. Philosophy, however, has remained just as alien to them as they remain
to philosophy. Their momentary unity was only a chimerical illusion. The will was there, but the
power was lacking. Historiography itself pays regard to natural science only occasionally, as a
factor of enlightenment, utility, and of some special great discoveries. But natural science has
invaded and transformed human life all the more practically through the medium of industry; and
has prepared human emancipation, although its immediate effect had to be the furthering of the
dehumanization of man. Industry is the actual, historical relationship of nature, and therefore of
natural science, to man. If, therefore, industry is conceived as the exoteric revelation of man’s
essential powers, we also gain an understanding of the human essence of nature or the natural
essence of man. In consequence, natural science will lose its abstractly material – or rather, its
idealistic – tendency, and will become the basis of human science, as it has already become –
albeit in an estranged form – the basis of actual human life, and to assume one basis for life and a
different basis for science is as a matter of course a lie. <The nature which develops in human
history – the genesis of human society – is man’s real nature; hence nature as it develops through
industry, even though in an estranged form, is true anthropological nature.>
Sense-perception (see Feuerbach) must be the basis of all science. Only when it proceeds from
sense-perception in the twofold form of sensuous consciousness and sensuous need – is it true
science. All history is the history of preparing and developing “man” to become the object of
sensuous consciousness, and turning the requirements of “man as man” into his needs. History

48

Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Third Manuscript

itself is a real part of natural history – of nature developing into man. Natural science will in time
incorporate into itself the science of man, just as the science of man will incorporate into itself
natural science: there will be one science.
||X| Man is the immediate object of natural science; for immediate, sensuous nature for man is,
immediately, human sensuousness (the expressions are identical) – presented immediately in the
form of the other man sensuously present for him. Indeed, his own sensuousness first exists as
human sensuousness for himself through the other man. But nature is the immediate object of the
science of man: the first – object of man – man – is nature, sensuousness; and the particular
human sensuous essential powers can only find their self-understanding in the science of the
natural world in general, just as they can find their objective realization only in natural objects.
The element of thought itself – the element of thought’s living expression – language – is of a
sensuous nature. The social reality of nature, and human natural science, or the natural science of
man, are identical terms.
<It will be seen how in place of the wealth and poverty of political economy come the rich
human being and the rich human need. The rich human being is simultaneously the human being
in need of a totality of human manifestations of life – the man in whom his own realization exists
as an inner necessity, as need. Not only wealth, but likewise the poverty of man – under the
assumption of socialism32 – receives in equal measure a human and therefore social significance.
Poverty is the passive bond which causes the human being to experience the need of the greatest
wealth – the other human being. The dominion of the objective being in me, the sensuous
outburst of my life activity, is passion, which thus becomes here the activity of my being.>
(5) A being only considers himself independent when he stands on his own feet; and he only
stands on his own feet when he owes his existence to himself. A man who lives by the grace of
another regards himself as a dependent being. But I live completely by the grace of another if I
owe him not only the maintenance of my life, but if he has, moreover, created my life – if he is
the source of my life. When it is not of my own creation, my life has necessarily a source of this
kind outside of it. The Creation is therefore an idea very difficult to dislodge from popular
consciousness. The fact that nature and man exist on their own account is incomprehensible to it,
because it contradicts everything tangible in practical life.
The creation of the earth has received a mighty blow from geognosy – i.e., from the science
which presents the formation of the earth, the development of the earth, as a process, as a selfgeneration. Generatio aequivoca is the only practical refutation of the theory of creation.33
Now it is certainly easy to say to the single individual what Aristotle has already said: You have
been begotten by your father and your mother; therefore in you the mating of two human beings –
a species-act of human beings – has produced the human being. You see, therefore, that even
physically man owes his existence to man. Therefore you must not only keep sight of the one
aspect – the infinite progression which leads you further to inquire: Who begot my father? Who
his grandfather? etc. You must also hold on to the circular movement sensuously perceptible in
that progress by which man repeats himself in procreation, man thus always remaining the
subject. You will reply, however: I grant you this circular movement; now grant me the progress
which drives me ever further until I ask: Who begot the first man, and nature as a whole? I can
only answer you: Your question is itself a product of abstraction. Ask yourself how you arrived at
that question. Ask yourself whether your question is not posed from a standpoint to which I
cannot reply, because it is wrongly put. Ask yourself whether that progress as such exists for a
reasonable mind. When you ask about the creation of nature and man, you are abstracting, in so
doing, from man and nature. You postulate them as non-existent, and yet you want me to prove
them to you as existing. Now I say to you: Give up your abstraction and you will also give up
your question. Or if you want to hold on to your abstraction, then be consistent, and if you think
of man and nature as non-existent, ||XI| then think of yourself as non-existent, for you too are
surely nature and man. Don’t think, don’t ask me, for as soon as you think and ask, your
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abstraction from the existence of nature and man has no meaning. Or are you such an egotist that
you conceive everything as nothing, and yet want yourself to exist?
You can reply: I do not want to postulate the nothingness of nature, etc. I ask you about its
genesis, just as I ask the anatomist about the formation of bones, etc.
But since for the socialist man the entire so-called history of the world is nothing but the creation
of man through human labor, nothing but the emergence of nature for man, so he has the visible,
irrefutable proof of his birth through himself, of his genesis. Since the real existence of man and
nature has become evident in practice, through sense experience, because man has thus become
evident for man as the being of nature, and nature for man as the being of man, the question about
an alien being, about a being above nature and man – a question which implies the admission of
the unreality of nature and of man – has become impossible in practice. Atheism, as the denial of
this unreality, has no longer any meaning, for atheism is a negation of God, and postulates the
existence of man through this negation; but socialism as socialism no longer stands in any need of
such a mediation. It proceeds from the theoretically and practically sensuous consciousness of
man and of nature as the essence. Socialism is man’s positive self-consciousness, no longer
mediated through the abolition of religion, just as real life is man’s positive reality, no longer
mediated through the abolition of private property, through communism. Communism is the
positive mode as the negation of the negation, and is hence the actual phase necessary for the
next stage of historical development in the process of human emancipation and rehabilitation.
Communism is the necessary form and the dynamic principle of the immediate future, but
communism as such is not the goal of human development, the form of human society. |XI||34

[Human Requirements and Division of Labor Under the Rule
of Private Property and Under Socialism. Division of Labor in
Bourgeois Society]
||XIV| 35 (7) We have seen what significance, given socialism, the wealth of human needs
acquires, and what significance, therefore, both a new mode of production and a new object of
production obtain: a new manifestation of the forces of human nature and a new enrichment of
human nature. Under private property their significance is reversed: every person speculates on
creating a new need in another, so as to drive him to fresh sacrifice, to place him in a new
dependence and to seduce him into a new mode of enjoyment and therefore economic ruin. Each
tries to establish over the other an alien power, so as thereby to find satisfaction of his own selfish
need. The increase in the quantity of objects is therefore accompanied by an extension of the
realm of the alien powers to which man is subjected, and every new product represents a new
potentiality of mutual swindling and mutual plundering. Man becomes ever poorer as man, his
need for money becomes ever greater if he wants to master the hostile power. The power of his
money declines in inverse proportion to the increase in the volume of production: that is, his
neediness grows as the power of money increases.
The need for money is therefore the true need produced by the economic system, and it is the
only need which the latter produces. The quantity of money becomes to an ever greater degree its
sole effective quality. Just as it reduces everything to its abstract form, so it reduces itself in the
course of its own movement to quantitative being. Excess and intemperance come to be its true
norm.
Subjectively, this appears partly in the fact that the extension of products and needs becomes a
contriving and ever-calculating subservience to inhuman, sophisticated, unnatural and imaginary
appetites. Private property does not know how to change crude need into human need. Its
idealism is fantasy, caprice and whim; and no eunuch flatters his despot more basely or uses more
despicable means to stimulate his dulled capacity for pleasure in order to sneak a favor for
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himself than does the industrial eunuch – the producer – in order to sneak for himself a few pieces
of silver, in order to charm the golden birds out of the pockets of his dearly beloved neighbors in
Christ. He puts himself at the service of the other’s most depraved fancies, plays the pimp
between him and his need, excites in him morbid appetites, lies in wait for each of his weaknesses
– all so that he can then demand the cash for this service of love. (Every product is a bait with
which to seduce away the other’s very being, his money; every real and possible need is a
weakness which will lead the fly to the glue-pot. General exploitation of communal human
nature, just as every imperfection in man, is a bond with heaven – an avenue giving the priest
access to his heart; every need is an opportunity to approach one’s neighbor under the guise of the
utmost amiability and to say to him: Dear friend, I give you what you need, but you know the
conditio sine qua non; you know the ink in which you have to sign yourself over to me; in
providing for your pleasure, I fleece you.)
This estrangement manifests itself in part in that the sophistication of needs and of the means [of
their satisfaction] on one side produces a bestial barbarization, a complete, crude, abstract
simplicity of need, on the other; or rather in that it merely reproduces itself in its opposite. Even
the need for fresh air ceases to be a need for the worker. Man returns to a cave dwelling, which is
now, however, contaminated with the pestilential breath of civilization, and which he continues to
occupy only precariously, it being for him an alien habitation which can be withdrawn from him
any day – a place from which, if he does ||XV| not pay, he can be thrown out any day. For this
mortuary he has to pay. A dwelling in the light, which Prometheus in Aeschylus designated as
one of the greatest boons, by means of which he made the savage into a human being, ceases to
exist for the worker. Light, air, etc. – the simplest animal cleanliness – ceases to be a need for
man. Filth, this stagnation and putrefaction of man – the sewage of civilization (speaking quite
literally) – comes to be the element of life for him. Utter, unnatural depravation, putrefied nature,
comes to be his life-element. None of his senses exist any longer, and not only in its human
fashion, but in an inhuman fashion, and therefore not even in an animal fashion. The crudest
methods (and instruments) of human labor are coming back: the treadmill of the Roman slaves,
for instance, is the means of production, the means of existence, of many English workers. It is
not only that man has no human needs – even his animal needs cease to exist. The Irishman no
longer knows any need now but the need to eat, and indeed only the need to eat potatoes – and
scabby potatoes at that, the worst kind of potatoes. But in each of their industrial towns England
and France have already a little Ireland. The savage and the animal have at least the need to hunt,
to roam, etc. – the need of companionship. The simplification of the machine, of labor is used to
make a worker out of the human being still in the making, the completely immature human being,
the child – whilst the worker has become a neglected child. The machine accommodates itself to
the weakness of the human being in order to make the weak human being into a machine.
<How the multiplication of needs and of the means [of their satisfaction] breeds the absence of
needs and of means is demonstrated by the political economist (and the capitalist: in general it is
always empirical businessmen we are talking about when we refer to political economists, who
are their scientific confession and aspect). This he shows:
(1) By reducing the worker’s need to the barest and most miserable level of physical subsistence,
and by reducing his activity to the most abstract mechanical movement; thus he says: Man has no
other need either of activity or of enjoyment. For he call this life, too, human life and existence.
(2) By counting the most meager form of life (existence) as the standard, indeed, as the general
standard – general because it is applicable to the mass of men. He changes the worker into an
insensible being lacking all needs, just as he changes his activity into a pure abstraction from all
activity. To him, therefore, every luxury of the worker seems to be reprehensible, and everything
that goes beyond the most abstract need – be it in the realm of passive enjoyment, or a
manifestation of activity – seems to him a luxury. Political economy, this science of wealth, is
therefore simultaneously the science of renunciation, of want, of saving – and it actually reaches
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the point where it spares man the need of either fresh air or physical exercise. This science of
marvelous industry is simultaneously the science of asceticism, and its true ideal is the ascetic but
extortionate miser and the ascetic but productive slave. Its moral ideal is the worker who takes
part of his wages to the savings-bank, and it has even found ready-made a servile art which
embodies this pet idea: it has been presented, bathed in sentimentality, on the stage. Thus political
economy – despite its worldly and voluptuous appearance – is a true moral science, the most
moral of all the sciences. Self-renunciation, the renunciation of life and of all human needs, is its
principal thesis. The less you eat, drink and buy books; the less you go to the theater, the dance
hall, the public house; the less you think, love, theorize, sing, paint, fence, etc., the more you save
– the greater becomes your treasure which neither moths nor rust will devour – your capital. The
less you are, the less you express your own life, the more you have, i.e., the greater is your
alienated life, the greater is the store of your estranged being. Everything ||XVI| which the
political economist takes from you in life and in humanity, he replaces for you in money and in
wealth; and all the things which you cannot do, your money can do. It can eat and, drink, go to
the dance hall and the theater; it can travel, it can appropriate art, learning, the treasures of the
past, political power – all this it can appropriate for you – it can buy all this: it is true endowment.
Yet being all this, it wants to do nothing but create itself, buy itself; for everything else is after all
its servant, and when I have the master I have the servant and do not need his servant. All
passions and all activity must therefore be submerged in avarice. The worker may only have
enough for him to want to live, and may only want to live in order to have that.>
It is true that a controversy now arises in the field of political economy. The one side
(Lauderdale, Malthus, etc.) recommends luxury and execrates thrift. The other (Say, Ricardo,
etc.) recommends thrift and execrates luxury. But the former admits that it wants luxury in order
to produce labor (i.e., absolute thrift); and the latter admits that it recommends thrift in order to
produce wealth (i.e., luxury). The Lauderdale-Malthus school has the romantic notion that avarice
alone ought not to determine the consumption of the rich, and it contradicts its own laws in
advancing extravagance as a direct means of enrichment. Against it, therefore, the other side very
earnestly and circumstantially proves that I do not increase but reduce my possessions by being
extravagant. The Say-Ricardo school is hypocritical in not admitting that it is precisely whim and
caprice which determine production. It forgets the “refined needs”; it forgets that there would be
no production without consumption; it forgets that as a result of competition production can only
become more extensive and luxurious. It forgets that, according to its views, a thing’s value is
determined by use, and that use is determined by fashion. It wishes to see only “useful things”
produced, but it forgets that production of too many useful things produces too large a useless
population. Both sides forget that extravagance and thrift, luxury and privation, wealth and
poverty are equal.
And you must not only stint the gratification of your immediate senses, as by stinting yourself on
food, etc.: you must also spare yourself all sharing of general interests, all sympathy, all trust,
etc., if you want to be economical, if you do not want to be ruined by illusions.
<You must make everything that is yours saleable, i.e., useful. If I ask the political economist: Do
I obey economic laws if I extract money by offering my body for sale, by surrendering it to
another’s lust? (The factory workers in France call the prostitution of their wives and daughters
the nth working hour, which is literally correct.) – Or am I not acting in keeping with political
economy if I sell my friend to the Moroccans? (And the direct sale of men in the form of a trade
in conscripts, etc., takes place in all civilized countries.) – Then the political economist replies to
me: You do not transgress my laws; but see what Cousin Ethics and Cousin Religion have to say
about it. My political economic ethics and religion have nothing to reproach you with, but – But
whom am I now to believe, political economy or ethics? – The ethics of political economy is
acquisition, work, thrift, sobriety – but political economy promises to satisfy my needs. – The
political economy of ethics is the opulence of a good conscience, of virtue, etc.; but how can I
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live virtuously if I do not live? And how can I have a good conscience if I do not know anything?
It stems from the very nature of estrangement that each sphere applies to me a different and
opposite yardstick – ethics one and political economy another; for each is a specific estrangement
of man and> ||XVII| focuses attention on a particular field of estranged essential activity, and each
stands in an estranged relation to the other. Thus M. Michel Chevalier reproaches Ricardo with
having ignored ethics. But Ricardo is allowing political economy to speak its own language, and
if it does not speak ethically, this is not Ricardo’s fault. M. Chevalier abstracts from political
economy insofar as he moralizes, but he really and necessarily ignores ethics insofar as he
practices political economy. The relationship of political economy to ethics, if it is other than an
arbitrary, contingent and therefore unfounded and unscientific relationship, if it is not being
posited for the sake of appearance but is meant to be essential, can only be the relationship of the
laws of political economy to ethics. If there is no such connection, or if the contrary is rather the
case, can Ricardo help it? Moreover, the opposition between political economy and ethics is only
an apparent opposition and just as much no opposition as it is an opposition. All that happens is
that political economy expresses moral laws in its own way.
<Frugality as the principle of political economy is most brilliantly shown in its theory of
population. There are too many people. Even the existence of men is a pure luxury; and if the
worker is “ethical”, he will be sparing in procreation. (Mill suggests public acclaim for those who
prove themselves continent in their sexual relations, and public rebuke for those who sin against
such barrenness of marriage.... Is this not ethics, the teaching of asceticism?) The production of
people appears as public misery.>
The meaning which production has in relation to the rich is seen revealed in the meaning which it
has for the poor. Looking upwards the manifestation is always refined, veiled, ambiguous –
outward appearance; downwards, it is rough, straightforward, frank – the real thing. The worker’s
crude need is a far greater source of gain than the refined need of the rich. The cellar dwellings in
London bring more to those who let them than do the palaces; that is to say, with reference to the
landlord they constitute greater wealth, and thus (to speak the language of political economy)
greater social wealth.
Industry speculates on the refinement of needs, it speculates however just as much on their
crudeness, but on their artificially produced crudeness, whose true enjoyment, therefore, is selfstupefaction – this illusory satisfaction of need this civilization contained within the crude
barbarism of need. The English gin shops are therefore the symbolical representations of private
property. Their luxury reveals the true relation of industrial luxury and wealth to man. They are
therefore rightly the only Sunday pleasures of the people which the English police treats at least
mildly. |XVII||
||XVIII| 36 We have already seen how the political economist establishes the unity of labor and
capital in a variety of ways: (1) Capital is accumulated labor. (2) The purpose of capital within
production – partly, reproduction of capital with profit, partly, capital as raw material (material of
labor), and partly, as an automatically working instrument (the machine is capital directly equated
with labor) – is productive labor. (3) The worker is a capital. (4) Wages belong to costs of capital.
(5) In relation to the worker, labor is the reproduction of his life-capital. (6) In relation to the
capitalist, labor is an aspect of his capital’s activity.
Finally, (7) the political economist postulates the original unity of capital and labor as the unity of
the capitalist and the worker; this is the original state of paradise. The way in which these two
aspects, ||XIX| as two persons, confront each other is for the political economist an accidental
event, and hence only to be explained by reference to external factors. (See Mill.)
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The nations which are still dazzled by the sensuous glitter of precious metals, and are therefore
still fetish-worshipers of metal money, are not yet fully developed money-nations. Contrast of
France and England.
The extent to which the solution of theoretical riddles is the task of practice and effected through
practice, the extent to which true practice is the condition of a real and positive theory, is shown,
for example, in fetishism. The sensuous consciousness of the fetish-worshipper is different from
that of the Greek, because his sensuous existence is different. The abstract enmity between sense
and spirit is necessary so long as the human feeling for nature, the human sense of nature, and
therefore also the natural sense of man, are not yet produced by man’s own labor.
Equality is nothing but a translation of the German “Ich = Ich”37 into the French, i.e., political
form. Equality as the basis of communism is its political justification, and it is the same as when
the German justifies it by conceiving man as universal self-consciousness. Naturally, the
transcendence of the estrangement always proceeds from that form of the estrangement which is
the dominant power: in Germany, self-consciousness; in France, equality, because it is politics; in
England, real, material, practical need taking only itself as its standard. It is from this standpoint
that Proudhon is to be criticized and appreciated.
If we characterize communism itself because of its character as negation of the negation, as the
appropriation of the human essence through the intermediary of the negation of private property –
as being not yet the true, self-originating position but rather a position originating from private
property [...] in old-German fashion – in the way of Hegel’s phenomenology – [...] finished as a
conquered moment and […] one might be satisfied by it, in his consciousness [...] of the human
being only by real [...] transcendence of his thought now as before […], since with him therefore
the real estrangement of the life of man remains, and remains all the more, the more one is
conscious of it as such, hence it [the negation of this estrangement] can be accomplished solely
by bringing about communism.
In order to abolish the idea of private property, the idea of communism is quite sufficient. It takes
actual communist action to abolish actual private property. History will lead to it; and this
movement, which in theory we already know to be a self-transcending movement, will constitute
in actual fact a very rough and protracted process. But we must regard it as a real advance to have
at the outset gained a consciousness of the limited character as well as of the goal of this
historical movement – and a consciousness which reaches out beyond it.
When communist artisans associate with one another, theory, propaganda, etc., is their first end.
But at the same time, as a result of this association, they acquire a new need – the need for society
– and what appears as a means becomes an end. In this practical process the most splendid results
are to be observed whenever French socialist workers are seen together. Such things as smoking,
drinking, eating, etc., are no longer means of contact or means that bring them together.
Company, association, and conversation, which again has society as its end, are enough for them;
the brotherhood of man is no mere phrase with them, but a fact of life, and the nobility of man
shines upon us from their work-hardened bodies.
||XX| <When political economy claims that demand and supply always balance each other, it
immediately forgets that according to its own claim (theory of population) the supply of people
always exceeds the demand, and that, therefore, in the essential result of the whole production
process – the existence of man – the disparity between demand and supply gets its most striking
expression.
The extent to which money, which appears as a means, constitutes true power and the sole end –
the extent to which in general the means which turns me into a being, which gives me possession
of the alien objective being, is an end in itself ... can be clearly seen from the fact that landed
property, wherever land is the source of life, and horse and sword, wherever these are the true
means of life, are also acknowledged as the true political powers in life. In the Middle Ages a
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social estate is emancipated as soon as it is allowed to carry the sword. Amongst nomadic peoples
it is the horse which makes me a free man and a participant in the life of the community.
We have said above that man is regressing to the cave dwelling, etc. – but he is regressing to it in
an estranged, malignant form. The savage in his cave – a natural element which freely offers itself
for his use and protection – feels himself no more a stranger, or rather feels as much at home as a
fish in water. But the cellar dwelling of the poor man is a hostile element, "a dwelling which
remains an alien power and only gives itself up to him insofar as he gives up to it his own blood
and sweat" – a dwelling which he cannot regard as his own hearth – where he might at last
exclaim: "Here I am at home" – but where instead he finds himself in someone else’s house, in
the house of a stranger who always watches him and throws him out if he does not pay his rent.
He is also aware of the contrast in quality between his dwelling and a human dwelling that stands
in the other world, in the heaven of wealth.
Estrangement is manifested not only in the fact that my means of life belong to someone else, that
my desire is the inaccessible possession of another, but also in the fact that everything is itself
something different from itself – that my activity is something else and that, finally (and this
applies also to the capitalist), all is under [the sway] of inhuman power.
There is a form of inactive, extravagant wealth given over wholly to pleasure, the enjoyer of
which on the one hand behaves as a mere ephemeral individual frantically spending himself to no
purpose, and also regards the slave-labor of others (human sweat and blood) as the prey of his
cupidity. He therefore knows man himself, and hence also his own self, as a sacrificed and futile
being. With such wealth contempt of man makes its appearance, partly as arrogance and as
squandering of what can give sustenance to a hundred human lives, and partly as the infamous
illusion that his own unbridled extravagance and ceaseless, unproductive consumption is the
condition of the other’s labor and therefore of his subsistence. He regards the realization of the
essential powers of man only as the realization of his own excesses, his whims and capricious,
bizarre notions. This wealth which, on the other hand, again knows wealth as a mere means, as
something that is good for nothing but to be annihilated and which is therefore at once slave and
master, at once magnanimous and base, capricious, presumptuous, conceited, refined, cultured
and witty – this wealth has not yet experienced wealth as an utterly alien power over itself: it sees
in it, rather, only its own power, and [not] wealth but enjoyment [is its final] aim.
This [...]38 ||XXI| and the glittering illusion about the nature of wealth, blinded by sensuous
appearances, is confronted by the working, sober, prosaic, economical industrialist who is quite
enlightened about the nature of wealth, and who, while providing a wider sphere for the other’s
self–indulgence and paying fulsome flatteries to him in his products (for his products are just so
many base compliments to the appetites of the spendthrift), knows how to appropriate for himself
in the only useful way the other’s waning power. If, therefore, industrial wealth appears at first to
be the result of extravagant, fantastic wealth, yet its motion, the motion inherent in it, ousts the
latter also in an active way. For the fall in the rate of interest is a necessary consequence and
result of industrial development. The extravagant rentier’s means therefore dwindle day by day in
inverse proportion to the increasing possibilities and pitfalls of pleasure. Consequently, he must
either consume his capital, thus ruining himself, or must become an industrial capitalist.... On the
other hand, there is a direct, constant rise in the rent of land as a result of the course of industrial
development; nevertheless, as we have already seen, there must come a time when landed
property, like every other kind of property, is bound to fall within the category of profitably selfreproducing capital39 – and this in fact results from the same industrial development. Thus the
squandering landowner, too, must either consume his capital, and thus be ruined, or himself
become the farmer of his own estate – an agricultural industrialist.
The diminution in the interest on money, which Proudhon regards as the annulling of capital and
as a tendency to socialize capital, is therefore directly rather only a symptom of the total victory
of working capital over squandering wealth – i.e., the transformation of all private property into
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industrial capital. It is a total victory of private property over all those of its qualities which are
still in appearance human, and the complete subjection of the owner of private property to the
essence of private property – labor. To be sure, the industrial capitalist also takes his pleasures.
He does not by any means return to the unnatural simplicity of need; but his pleasure is only a
side-issue – recreation – something subordinated to production; at the same time it is a calculated
and, therefore, itself an economical pleasure. For he debits it to his capital’s expense account, and
what is squandered on his pleasure must therefore amount to no more than will be replaced with
profit through the reproduction of capital. Pleasure is therefore subsumed under capital, and the
pleasure-taking individual under the capital-accumulating individual, whilst formerly the contrary
was the case. The decrease in the interest rate is therefore a symptom of the annulment of capital
only inasmuch as it is a symptom of the growing domination of capital – of the estrangement
which is growing and therefore hastening to its annulment. This is indeed the only way in which
that which exists affirms its opposite.>
The quarrel between the political economists about luxury and thrift is, therefore, only the quarrel
between that political economy which has achieved clarity about the nature of wealth, and that
political economy which is still afflicted with romantic, anti-industrial memories. Neither side,
however, knows how to reduce the subject of the controversy to its simple terms, and neither
therefore can make short work of the other. |XXI||
||XXXIV| 40 Moreover, rent of land qua rent of land has been overthrown, since, contrary to the
argument of the Physiocrats which maintains that the landowner is the only true producer,
modern political economy has proved that the landowner as such is rather the only completely
unproductive rentier. According to this theory, agriculture is the business of the capitalist, who
invests his capital in it provided he can expect the usual profit. The claim of the Physiocrats – that
landed property, as the sole productive property, should alone pay state taxes and therefore should
alone approve them and participate in the affairs of state – is transformed into the opposite
position that the tax on the rent of land is the only tax on unproductive income, and is therefore
the only tax not detrimental to national production. It goes without saying that from this point of
view also the political privilege of landowners no longer follows from their position as principal
tax-payers.
Everything which Proudhon conceives as a movement of labor against capital is only the
movement of labor in the determination of capital, of industrial capital, against capital not
consumed as capital, i.e., not consumed industrially. And this movement is proceeding along its
triumphant road – the road to the victory of industrial capital. It is clear, therefore, that only when
labor is grasped as the essence of private property, can the economic process as such be analyzed
in its real concreteness.
Society, as it appears to the political economist, is civil society41 in which every individual is a
totality of needs and only ||XXXV| exists for the other person, as the other exists for him, insofar
as each becomes a means for the other. The political economist reduces everything (just as does
politics in its Rights of Man) to man, i.e., to the individual whom he strips of all determinateness
so as to class him as capitalist or worker.
The division of labor is the economic expression of the social character of labor within the
estrangement. Or, since labor is only an expression of human activity within alienation, of the
manifestation of life as the alienation of life, the division of labor, too, is therefore nothing else
but the estranged, alienated positing of human activity as a real activity of the species or as
activity of man as a species-being.
As for the essence of the division of labor – and of course the division of labor had to be
conceived as a major driving force in the production of wealth as soon as labor was recognized as

56

Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Third Manuscript

the essence of private property – i.e., as for the estranged and alienated form of human activity as
an activity of the species – the political economists are very vague and self-contradictory about it.
Adam Smith: “This division of labor [...] is not originally the effect of any human
wisdom [...]. It is the necessary, [...] slow and gradual consequence of [...] the
propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another. [...] This
propensity” to trade is probably a “necessary consequence of the use of reason and
of speech [...]. It is common to all men, and to be found in no other race of
animals.” The animal, when it is grown up, is entirely independent. “Man has
almost constant occasion for the help of others, and it is in vain for him to expect
it from their benevolence only. He will be more likely to prevail if he can appeal
to their personal interest, and show them that it is for their own advantage to do
for him what he requires of them. [...] We address ourselves, not to their humanity
but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their
advantages. [...]
“As it is by treaty, by barter, and by purchase that we obtain from one another the
greater part of those mutual good offices which we stand in need of, so it is this
same trucking disposition which originally gives occasion to the division of labor.
In a tribe of hunters or shepherds a particular person makes bows and arrows, for
example, with more readiness and dexterity than any other. He frequently
exchanges them for cattle or for venison with his companions; and he finds at last
that he can in this manner get more cattle and venison than if he himself went to
the field to catch them. From a regard to his own interest, therefore, the making of
bows, etc., grows to be his chief business [...]
“The difference of natural talents in different men […] is not [...] so much the
cause as the effect of the division of labor.... Without the disposition to truck [...]
and exchange, every man must have procured to himself every necessary and
conveniency of life [....] All must have had [...] the same work to do, and there
could have been no such difference of employment as could alone give occasion to
any great difference of talents.
“As it is this disposition which forms that difference of talents among men so it is
this same disposition which renders that difference useful. Many tribes of animals
[... ] of the same species derive from nature a much more remarkable distinction
of genius, than what, antecedent to custom and education, appears to take place
among men. By nature a philosopher is not in talent and in intelligence half so
different from a street porter, as a mastiff is from a greyhound, or a greyhound
from a spaniel, or this last from a shepherd’s dog. Those different tribes of
animals, however, though all of the same species, are of scarce any use to one
another. The mastiff cannot add to the advantages of his strength ||XXXVI| by
making use of the swiftness of the greyhound, etc. The effects of these different
talents or grades of intelligence, for want of the power or disposition to barter and
exchange, cannot be brought into a common stock, and do not in the least
contribute to the better accommodation and conveniency of the species. Each
animal is still obliged to support and defend itself, separately and independently,
and derives no sort of advantage from that variety of talents with which nature has
distinguished its fellows. Among men, on the contrary, the most dissimilar
geniuses are of use to one another; the different produces of their respective
talents, by the general disposition to truck, barter, and exchange, being brought, as
it were, into a common stock, where every man may purchase whatever part of the
produce of other men’s industry he has occasion for. [...]
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“As it is the power of exchanging that gives occasion to the division of labor, so
the extent of this division must always be limited by the extent of that power, or, in
other words, by the extent of the market. When the market is very small, no person
can have any encouragement to dedicate himself entirely to one employment, for
want of the power to exchange all that surplus part of the produce of his own
labor, which is over and above his own consumption, for such parts of the produce
of other men’s labor as he has occasion for ...”
In an advanced state of society “every man thus lives by exchanging and becomes
in some measure a merchant, and the society itself grows to be what is properly a
commercial society.” (See Destutt de Tracy [, Élémens d’idéologie, Paris, 1826,
pp. 68 and 78]: “Society is a series of reciprocal exchanges; commerce contains
the whole essence of society.”) ... The accumulation of capitals mounts with the
division of labor, and vice versa.”
So much for Adam Smith.
“If every family produced all that it consumed, society could keep going although
no exchange of any sort took place; without being fundamental, exchange is
indispensable in our advanced state of society. The division of labor is a skillful
deployment of man’s powers; it increases society’s production – its power and its
pleasures – but it curtails, reduces the ability of every person taken individually.
Production cannot take place without exchange.”
Thus J. B. Say.
“The powers inherent in man are his intelligence and his physical capacity for
work. Those which arise from the condition of society consist of the capacity to
divide up labor and to distribute different jobs amongst different people ... and the
power to exchange mutual services and the products which constitute these means.
The motive which impels a man to give his services to another is self- interest – he
requires a reward for the services rendered. The right of exclusive private property
is indispensable to the establishment of exchange amongst men.” “Exchange and
division of labor reciprocally condition each other.”
Thus Skarbek.
Mill presents developed exchange – trade – as a consequence of the division of labor.
“The agency of man can be traced to very simple elements. He can, in fact, do
nothing more than produce motion. He can move things towards one another, and
he can separate them from one another: ||XXXVII| the properties of matter
perform all the rest.” “In the employment of labor and machinery, it is often found
that the effects can be increased by skillful distribution, by separating all those
operations which have any tendency to impede one another, and by bringing
together all those operations which can be made in any way to aid one another. As
men in general cannot perform many different operations with the same quickness
and dexterity with which they can by practice learn to perform a few, it is always
an advantage to limit as much as possible the number of operations imposed upon
each. For dividing labor, and distributing the powers of men and machinery, to the
greatest advantage, it is in most cases necessary to operate upon a large scale; in
other words, to produce the commodities in greater masses. It is this advantage
which gives existence to the great manufactories; a few of which, placed in the
most convenient situations, frequently supply not one country, but many
countries, with as much as they desire of the commodity produced.”
Thus Mill.
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The whole of modern political economy agrees, however, that division of labor and wealth of
production, division of labor and accumulation of capital, mutually determine each other; just as
it agrees that only private property which is at liberty to follow its own course can produce the
most useful and comprehensive division of labor.
Adam Smith’s argument can be summarized as follows: Division of labor bestows on labor
infinite productive capacity. It stems from the propensity to exchange and barter, a specifically
human propensity which is probably not accidental, but is conditioned by the use of reason and
speech. The motive of those who engage in exchange is not humanity but egoism. The diversity of
human talents is more the effect than the cause of the division of labor, i.e., of exchange. Besides,
it is only the latter which makes such diversity useful. The particular attributes of the different
breeds within a species of animal are by nature much more marked than the degrees of difference
in human aptitude and activity. But because animals are unable to engage in exchange, no
individual animal benefits from the difference in the attributes of animals of the same species but
of different breeds. Animals are unable to combine the different attributes of their species, and are
unable to contribute anything to the common advantage and comfort of the species. It is otherwise
with men, amongst whom the most dissimilar talents and forms of activity are of use to one
another, because they can bring their different products together into a common stock, from
which each can purchase. As the division of labor springs from the propensity to exchange, so it
grows and is limited by the extent of exchange – by the extent of the market. In advanced
conditions, every man is a merchant, and society is a commercial society.
Say regards exchange as accidental and not fundamental. Society could exist without it. It
becomes indispensable in the advanced state of society. Yet production cannot take place without
it. Division of labor is a convenient, useful means – a skillful deployment of human powers for
social wealth; but it reduces the ability of each person taken individually. The last remark is a step
forward on the part of Say.
Skarbek distinguishes the individual powers inherent in man – intelligence and the physical
capacity for work – from the powers derived from society – exchange and division of labor,
which mutually condition one another. But the necessary premise of exchange is private property.
Skarbek here expresses in an objective form what Smith, Say, Ricardo, etc., say when they
designate egoism and self-interest as the basis of exchange, and buying and selling as the
essential and adequate form of exchange.
Mill presents trade as the consequence of the division of labor. With him human activity is
reduced to mechanical motion. Division of labor and use of machinery promote wealth of
production. Each person must be entrusted with as small a sphere of operations as possible.
Division of labor and use of machinery, in their turn, imply large-scale production of wealth, and
hence of products. This is the reason for large manufactories.
||XXXVIII| The examination of division of labor and exchange is of extreme interest, because
these are perceptibly alienated expressions of human activity and essential power as a speciesactivity and -power.
To assert that division of labor and exchange rest on private property is nothing but asserting that
labor is the essence of private property – an assertion which the political economist cannot prove
and which we wish to prove for him. Precisely in the fact that division of labor and exchange are
aspects of private property lies the twofold proof, on the one hand that human life required
private property for its realization, and on the other hand that it now requires the supersession of
private property.
Division of labor and exchange are the two phenomena which lead the political economist to
boast of the social character of his science, while in the same breath he gives unconscious
expression to the contradiction in his science – the motivation of society by unsocial, particular
interests.
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The factors we have to consider are: Firstly, the propensity to exchange – the basis of which is
found in egoism – is regarded as the cause or reciprocal effect of the division of labor. Say
regards exchange as not fundamental to the nature of society. Wealth – production – is explained
by division of labor and exchange. The impoverishment of individual activity, and its loss of
character as a result of the division of labor, are admitted. Exchange and division of labor are
acknowledged as the sources of the great diversity of human talents – a diversity which in its turn
becomes useful as a result of exchange. Skarbek divides man’s essential powers of production –
or productive powers – into two parts: (1) those which are individual and inherent in him – his
intelligence and his special disposition, or capacity, for work; and (2) those derived from society
and not from the actual individual – division of labor and exchange.
Furthermore, the division of labor is limited by the market. Human labor is simple mechanical
motion: the main work is done by the material properties of the objects. The fewest possible
operations must be apportioned to any one individual. Splitting-up of labor and concentration of
capital; the insignificance of individual production and the production of wealth in large
quantities. Meaning of free private property within the division of labor. |XXXVIII||

[The Power of Money in Bourgeois Society]
42

||XL|
If man’s feelings, passions, etc., are not merely anthropological phenomena in the
[narrower] [This word cannot be clearly deciphered in the manuscript. – Ed.] sense, but truly
ontological43 affirmation of being (of nature), and if they are only really affirmed because their
object exists for them as a sensual object, then it is clear that:
1. They have by no means merely one mode of affirmation, but rather that the distinct character
of their existence, of their life, is constituted by the distinct mode of their affirmation. In what
manner the object exists for them, is the characteristic mode of their gratification.
2. Wherever the sensuous affirmation is the direct annulment of the object in its independent form
(as in eating, drinking, working up of the object, etc.), this is the affirmation of the object.
3. Insofar as man, and hence also his feeling, etc., is human, the affirmation of the object by
another is likewise his own gratification.
4. Only through developed industry – i.e., through the medium of private property – does the
ontological essence of human passion come into being, in its totality as well as in its humanity;
the science of man is therefore itself a product of man’s own practical activity.
5. The meaning of private property – apart from its estrangement – is the existence of essential
objects for man, both as objects of enjoyment and as objects of activity.
By possessing the property of buying everything, by possessing the property of appropriating all
objects, money is thus the object of eminent possession. The universality of its property is the
omnipotence of its being. It is therefore regarded as an omnipotent being. Money is the procurer
between man’s need and the object, between his life and his means of life. But that which
mediates my life for me, also mediates the existence of other people for me. For me it is the other
person.
“What, man! confound it, hands and feet
And head and backside, all are yours!
And what we take while life is sweet,
Is that to be declared not ours?
Six stallions, say, I can afford,
Is not their strength my property?
I tear along, a sporting lord,
As if their legs belonged to me.”
Goethe: Faust (Mephistopheles)
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Shakespeare in Timon of Athens:
“Gold? Yellow, glittering, precious gold? No, Gods,
I am no idle votarist! ... Thus much of this will
make black white, foul fair,
Wrong right, base noble, old young, coward valiant.
... Why, this
Will lug your priests and servants from your sides,
Pluck stout men’s pillows from below their heads:
This yellow slave
Will knit and break religions, bless the accursed;
Make the hoar leprosy adored, place thieves
And give them title, knee and approbation
With senators on the bench: This is it
That makes the wappen’d widow wed again;
She, whom the spital-house and ulcerous sores
Would cast the gorge at, this embalms and spices
To the April day again. Come, damned earth,
Thou common whore of mankind, that putt’s odds
Among the rout of nations.”
And also later:
“O thou sweet king-killer, and dear divorce
Twixt natural son and sire! thou bright defiler
Of Hymen’s purest bed! thou valiant Mars!
Thou ever young, fresh, loved and delicate wooer,
Whose blush doth thaw the consecrated snow
That lies on Dian’s lap! Thou visible God!
That solder’s close impossibilities,
And makest them kiss! That speak’st with every tongue,
||XLII| To every purpose! O thou touch of hearts!
Think, thy slave man rebels, and by thy virtue
Set them into confounding odds, that beasts
May have the world in empire!”
Shakespeare excellently depicts the real nature of money. To understand him, let us begin, first of
all, by expounding the passage from Goethe.
That which is for me through the medium of money – that for which I can pay (i.e., which money
can buy) – that am I myself, the possessor of the money. The extent of the power of money is the
extent of my power. Money’s properties are my – the possessor’s – properties and essential
powers. Thus, what I am and am capable of is by no means determined by my individuality. I am
ugly, but I can buy for myself the most beautiful of women. Therefore I am not ugly, for the
effect of ugliness – its deterrent power – is nullified by money. I, according to my individual
characteristics, am lame, but money furnishes me with twenty-four feet. Therefore I am not lame.
I am bad, dishonest, unscrupulous, stupid; but money is honored, and hence its possessor. Money
is the supreme good, therefore its possessor is good. Money, besides, saves me the trouble of
being dishonest: I am therefore presumed honest. I am brainless, but money is the real brain of
all things and how then should its possessor be brainless? Besides, he can buy clever people for
himself, and is he who has [In the manuscript: “is”. – Ed.] power over the clever not more clever
than the clever? Do not I, who thanks to money am capable of all that the human heart longs for,
possess all human capacities? Does not my money, therefore, transform all my incapacities into
their contrary?
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If money is the bond binding me to human life, binding society to me, connecting me with nature
and man, is not money the bond of all bonds? Can it not dissolve and bind all ties? Is it not,
therefore, also the universal agent of separation? It is the coin that really separates as well as the
real binding agent – the [...] [In the manuscript one word cannot be deciphered. – Ed.] chemical
power of society.
Shakespeare stresses especially two properties of money:
1. It is the visible divinity – the transformation of all human and natural properties into their
contraries, the universal confounding and distorting of things: impossibilities are soldered
together by it.
2. It is the common whore, the common procurer of people and nations.
The distorting and confounding of all human and natural qualities, the fraternization of
impossibilities – the divine power of money – lies in its character as men’s estranged, alienating
and self-disposing species-nature. Money is the alienated ability of mankind.
That which I am unable to do as a man, and of which therefore all my individual essential powers
are incapable, I am able to do by means of money. Money thus turns each of these powers into
something which in itself it is not – turns it, that is, into its contrary.
If I long for a particular dish or want to take the mail-coach because I am not strong enough to go
by foot, money fetches me the dish and the mail-coach: that is, it converts my wishes from
something in the realm of imagination, translates them from their meditated, imagined or desired
existence into their sensuous, actual existence – from imagination to life, from imagined being
into real being. In effecting this mediation, [money] is the truly creative power.
No doubt the demand also exists for him who has no money, but his demand is a mere thing of
the imagination without effect or existence for me, for a third party, for the [others], ||XLIII| and
which therefore remains even for me unreal and objectless. The difference between effective
demand based on money and ineffective demand based on my need, my passion, my wish, etc., is
the difference between being and thinking, between the idea which exists within me merely as an
idea and the idea which exists as a real object outside of me.
If I have no money for travel, I have no need – that is, no real and realizable need – to travel. If I
have the vocation for study but no money for it, I have no vocation for study – that is, no
effective, no true vocation. On the other hand, if I have really no vocation for study but have the
will and the money for it, I have an effective vocation for it. Money as the external, universal
medium and faculty (not springing from man as man or from human society as society) for
turning an image into reality and reality into a mere image, transforms the real essential powers
of man and nature into what are merely abstract notions and therefore imperfections and
tormenting chimeras, just as it transforms real imperfections and chimeras – essential powers
which are really impotent, which exist only in the imagination of the individual – into real
powers and faculties. In the light of this characteristic alone, money is thus the general distorting
of individualities which turns them into their opposite and confers contradictory attributes upon
their attributes.
Money, then, appears as this distorting power both against the individual and against the bonds of
society, etc., which claim to be entities in themselves. It transforms fidelity into infidelity, love
into hate, hate into love, virtue into vice, vice into virtue, servant into master, master into servant,
idiocy into intelligence, and intelligence into idiocy.
Since money, as the existing and active concept of value, confounds and confuses all things, it is
the general confounding and confusing of all things – the world upside-down – the confounding
and confusing of all natural and human qualities.
He who can buy bravery is brave, though he be a coward. As money is not exchanged for any one
specific quality, for any one specific thing, or for any particular human essential power, but for
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the entire objective world of man and nature, from the standpoint of its possessor it therefore
serves to exchange every quality for every other, even contradictory, quality and object: it is the
fraternization of impossibilities. It makes contradictions embrace.
Assume man to be man and his relationship to the world to be a human one: then you can
exchange love only for love, trust for trust, etc. If you want to enjoy art, you must be an
artistically cultivated person; if you want to exercise influence over other people, you must be a
person with a stimulating and encouraging effect on other people. Every one of your relations to
man and to nature must be a specific expression, corresponding to the object of your will, of your
real individual life. If you love without evoking love in return – that is, if your loving as loving
does not produce reciprocal love; if through a living expression of yourself as a loving person you
do not make yourself a beloved one, then your love is impotent – a misfortune. |XLIII||

[Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy as a Whole]
||XI| (6) This is perhaps the place at which, by way of explanation and justification, we might
offer some considerations in regard to the Hegelian dialectic generally and especially its
exposition in the Phänomenologie and Logik and also, lastly, the relation [to it] of the modern
critical movement.44
So powerful was modern German criticism’s preoccupation with the past – so completely was its
development entangled with the subject-matter – that here prevailed a completely uncritical
attitude to the method of criticizing, together with a complete lack of awareness about the
apparently formal, but really vital question: how do we now stand as regards the Hegelian
dialectic? This lack of awareness about the relationship of modern criticism to the Hegelian
philosophy as a whole and especially to the Hegelian dialectic has been so great that critics like
Strauss and Bruno Bauer still remain within the confines of the Hegelian logic; the former
completely so and the latter at least implicitly so in his Synoptiker (where, in opposition to
Strauss, he replaces the substance of “abstract nature” by the “self-consciousness” of abstract
man), and even in Das entdeckte Christenthum. Thus in Das entdeckte Christenthum, for
example, you get:
“As though in positing the world, self-consciousness does not posit that which is
different [from itself] and in what it is creating it does not create itself, since it in
turn annuls the difference between what it has created and itself, since it itself has
being only in creating and in the movement – as though its purpose were not this
movement?” etc.; or again: “They” (the French materialists) “have not yet been
able to see that it is only as the movement of self-consciousness that the
movement of the universe has actually come to be for itself, and achieved unity
with itself.” [Pp. 113, 114-15.]
Such expressions do not even show any verbal divergence from the Hegelian approach, but on the
contrary repeat it word for word.
||XII| How little consciousness there was in relation to the Hegelian dialectic during the act of
criticism (Bauer, the Synoptiker), and how little this consciousness came into being even after the
act of material criticism, is proved by Bauer when, in his Die gute Sache der Freiheit, he
dismisses the brash question put by Herr Gruppe – “What about logic now?” – by referring him to
future critics.45
But even now – now that Feuerbach both in his Thesen in the Anekdota and, in detail, in the
Philosophie der Zukunft has in principle overthrown the old dialectic and philosophy; now that
that school of criticism, on the other hand, which was incapable of accomplishing this, has all the
same seen it accomplished and has proclaimed itself pure, resolute, absolute criticism that has
come into the clear with itself; now that this criticism, in its spiritual pride, has reduced the whole
process of history to the relation between the rest of the world and itself (the rest of the world, in
contrast to itself, falling under the category of “the masses”) and dissolved all dogmatic antitheses
into the single dogmatic antithesis of its own cleverness and the stupidity of the world – the
antithesis of the critical Christ and Mankind, the “rabble”; now that daily and hourly it has
demonstrated its own excellence against the dullness of the masses; now, finally, that it has
proclaimed the critical Last Judgment in the shape of an announcement that the day is
approaching when the whole of decadent humanity will assemble before it and be sorted by it into
groups, each particular mob receiving its testimonium paupertatis; now that it has made known in
print its superiority to human feelings as well as its superiority to the world, over which it sits
enthroned in sublime solitude, only letting fall from time to time from its sarcastic lips the ringing
laughter of the Olympian Gods – even now, after all these delightful antics of idealism (i.e., of
Young Hegelianism) expiring in the guise of criticism – even now it has not expressed the
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suspicion that the time was ripe for a critical settling of accounts with the mother of Young
Hegelianism – the Hegelian dialectic – and even had nothing to say about its critical attitude
towards the Feuerbachian dialectic. This shows a completely uncritical attitude to itself.
Feuerbach is the only one who has a serious, critical attitude to the Hegelian dialectic and who
has made genuine discoveries in this field. He is in fact the true conqueror of the old philosophy.
The extent of his achievement, and the unpretentious simplicity with which he, Feuerbach, gives
it to the world, stand in striking contrast to the opposite attitude (of the others).
Feuerbach’s great achievement is:
(1) The proof that philosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by
thought, i.e., another form and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man;
hence equally to be condemned;
(2) The establishment of true materialism and of real science, by making the social relationship
of “man to man” the basic principle of the theory;
(3) His opposing to the negation of the negation, which claims to be the absolute positive, the
self-supporting positive, positively based on itself.
Feuerbach explains the Hegelian dialectic (and thereby justifies starting out from the positive
facts which we know by the senses) as follows:
Hegel sets out from the estrangement of substance (in logic, from the infinite, abstractly
universal) – from the absolute and fixed abstraction; which means, put popularly, that he sets out
from religion and theology.
Secondly, he annuls the infinite, and posits the actual, sensuous, real, finite, particular
(philosophy, annulment of religion and theology).
Thirdly, he again annuls the positive and restores the abstraction, the infinite – restoration of
religion and theology.
Feuerbach thus conceives the negation of the negation only as a contradiction of philosophy with
itself – as the philosophy which affirms theology (the transcendent, etc.) after having denied it,
and which it therefore affirms in opposition to itself.
The positive position or self-affirmation and self-confirmation contained in the negation of the
negation is taken to be a position which is not yet sure of itself, which is therefore burdened with
its opposite, which is doubtful of itself and therefore in need of proof, and which, therefore, is not
a position demonstrating itself by its existence – not an acknowledged ||XIII| position; hence it is
directly and immediately confronted by the position of sense-certainty based on itself. [Feuerbach
also defines the negation of the negation, the definite concept, as thinking surpassing itself in
thinking and as thinking wanting to be directly awareness, nature, reality. – Note by Marx46]
But because Hegel has conceived the negation of the negation, from the point of view of the
positive relation inherent in it, as the true and only positive, and from the point of view of the
negative relation inherent in it as the only true act and spontaneous activity of all being, he has
only found the abstract, logical, speculative expression for the movement of history, which is not
yet the real history of man as a given subject, but only the act of creation, the history of the origin
of man.
We shall explain both the abstract form of this process and the difference between this process as
it is in Hegel in contrast to modern criticism, in contrast to the same process in Feuerbach’s
Wesen des Christenthums, or rather the critical form of this in Hegel still uncritical process.
Let us take a look at the Hegelian system. One must begin with Hegel’s Phänomenologie, the true
point of origin and the secret of the Hegelian philosophy.
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Phenomenology.
A. Self-consciousness.
I. Consciousness. (α) Certainty at the level of sense-experience; or the “this” and
meaning. (ß) Perception, or the thing with its properties, and deception. (γ) Force
and understanding, appearance and the supersensible world.
II. Self-consciousness. The truth of certainty of self. (a) Independence and
dependence of self-consciousness; mastery and servitude. (b) Freedom of selfconsciousness. Stoicism, skepticism, the unhappy consciousness.
III. Reason. Reason’s certainty and reason’s truth. (a) Observation as a process of
reason. Observation of nature and of self-consciousness. (b) Realization of
rational self-consciousness through its own activity. Pleasure and necessity. The
law of the heart and the insanity of self-conceit. Virtue and the course of the
world. (c) The individuality which is real in and for itself. The spiritual animal
kingdom and the deception or the real fact. Reason as lawgiver. Reason which
tests laws.
B. Mind.
I. True mind, ethics. II. Mind in self-estrangement, culture. III. Mind certain of
itself, morality.
C. Religion. Natural religion; religion of art; revealed religion.
D. Absolute knowledge.
Hegel’s Encyklopädie, beginning as it does with logic, with pure speculative thought, and ending
with absolute knowledge – with the self-conscious, self-comprehending philosophic or absolute
(i.e., superhuman) abstract mind – is in its entirety nothing but the display, the selfobjectification, of the essence of the philosophic mind, and the philosophic mind is nothing but
the estranged mind of the world thinking within its self-estrangement – i.e., comprehending itself
abstractly.
Logic – mind’s coin of the realm, the speculative or mental value of man and nature – its essence
which has grown totally indifferent to all real determinateness, and hence unreal – is alienated
thinking, and therefore thinking which abstracts from nature and from real man: abstract
thinking.
Then: The externality of this abstract thinking ... nature, as it is for this abstract thinking. Nature
is external to it – its self-loss; and it apprehends nature also in an external fashion, as abstract
thought, but as alienated abstract thinking. Finally, mind, this thinking returning home to its own
point of origin – the thinking which as the anthropological, phenomenological, psychological,
ethical, artistic and religious mind is not valid for itself, until ultimately it finds itself, and affirms
itself, as absolute knowledge and hence absolute, i.e., abstract, mind, thus receiving its conscious
embodiment in the mode of existence corresponding to it. For its real mode of existence is
abstraction.
There is a double error in Hegel.
The first emerges most clearly in the Phänomenologie, the birth-place of the Hegelian
philosophy. When, for instance, wealth, state-power, etc., are understood by Hegel as entities
estranged from the human being, this only happens in their form as thoughts ... They are thoughtentities, and therefore merely an estrangement of pure, i.e., abstract, philosophical thinking. The
whole process therefore ends with absolute knowledge. It is precisely abstract thought from
which these objects are estranged and which they confront with their presumption of reality. The
philosopher – who is himself an abstract form of estranged man – takes himself as the criterion of
the estranged world. The whole history of the alienation process [Entäußerungsgeschichte] and
the whole process of the retraction of the alienation is therefore nothing but the history of the
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production of abstract (i.e., absolute) ||XVII| 47 thought – of logical, speculative thought. The
estrangement, [Entfremdung] which therefore forms the real interest of the transcendence
[Aufhebung] of this alienation [Entäußerung], is the opposition of in itself and for itself, of
consciousness and self-consciousness, of object and subject – that is to say, it is the opposition
between abstract thinking and sensuous reality or real sensuousness within thought itself. All
other oppositions and movements of these oppositions are but the semblance, the cloak, the
exoteric shape of these oppositions which alone matter, and which constitute the meaning of these
other, profane oppositions. It is not the fact that the human being objectifies himself inhumanly, in
opposition to himself, but the fact that he objectifies himself [selbst sich vergegenständlicht] in
distinction from and in opposition to abstract thinking, that constitutes the posited essence of the
estrangement [Entfremdung] and the thing to be superseded [aufzuhebende].
||XVIII| The appropriation of man’s essential powers, which have become objects – indeed, alien
objects – is thus in the first place only an appropriation occurring in consciousness, in pure
thought, i.e., in abstraction: it is the appropriation of these objects as thoughts and as movements
of thought. Consequently, despite its thoroughly negative and critical appearance and despite the
genuine criticism contained in it, which often anticipates far later development, there is already
latent in the Phänomenologie as a germ, a potentiality, a secret, the uncritical positivism and the
equally uncritical idealism of Hegel’s later works – that philosophic dissolution and restoration of
the existing empirical world.
In the second place: the vindication of the objective world for man – for example, the realization
that sensuous consciousness is not an abstractly sensuous consciousness but a humanly sensuous
consciousness, that religion, wealth, etc., are but the estranged world of human objectification, of
man’s essential powers put to work and that they are therefore but the path to the true human
world – this appropriation or the insight into this process appears in Hegel therefore in this form,
that sense, religion, state power, etc., are spiritual entities; for only mind is the true essence of
man, and the true form of mind is thinking mind, theological, speculative mind.
The human character of nature and of the nature created by history – man’s products – appears in
the form that they are products of abstract mind and as such, therefore, phases of mind – thoughtentities. The Phänomenologie is, therefore, a hidden, mystifying and still uncertain criticism; but
inasmuch as it depicts man’s estrangement, even though man appears only as mind, there lie
concealed in it all the elements of criticism, already prepared and elaborated in a manner often
rising far above the Hegelian standpoint. The “unhappy consciousness”, the “honest
consciousness”, the struggle of the “noble and base consciousness”, etc., etc. – these separate
sections contain, but still in an estranged form, the critical elements of whole spheres such as
religion, the state, civil life, etc. Just as entities, objects, appear as thought-entities, so the subject
is always consciousness or self-consciousness; or rather the object appears only as abstract
consciousness, man only as self-consciousness: the distinct forms of estrangement which make
their appearance are, therefore, only various forms of consciousness and self-consciousness. Just
as in itself abstract consciousness (the form in which the object is conceived) is merely a moment
of distinction of self-consciousness, what appears as the result of the movement is the identity of
self-consciousness with consciousness – absolute knowledge – the movement of abstract thought
no longer directed outwards but proceeding now only within its own self: that is to say, the
dialectic of pure thought is the result. |XVIII||
||XXIII| 48 The outstanding achievement of Hegel’s Phänomenologie and of its final outcome, the
dialectic of negativity as the moving and generating principle, is thus first that Hegel conceives
the self-creation of man as a process, conceives objectification as loss of the object, as alienation
and as transcendence of this alienation; that he thus grasps the essence of labor and comprehends
objective man – true, because real man – as the outcome of man’s own labor. The real, active
orientation of man to himself as a species-being, or his manifestation as a real species-being (i.e.,
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as a human being), is only possible if he really brings out all his species-powers – something
which in turn is only possible through the cooperative action of all of mankind, only as the result
of history – and treats these powers as objects: and this, to begin with, is again only possible in
the form of estrangement.
We shall now demonstrate in detail Hegel’s one-sidedness – and limitations as they are displayed
in the final chapter of the Phänomenologie, “Absolute Knowledge” – a chapter which contains
the condensed spirit of the Phänomenologie, the relationship of the Phänomenologie to
speculative dialectic, and also Hegel’s consciousness concerning both and their relationship to
one another.
Let us provisionally say just this much in advance: Hegel’s standpoint is that of modern political
economy.49 He grasps labor as the essence of man – as man’s essence which stands the test: he
sees only the positive, not the negative side of labor. Labor is man’s coming-to-be for himself
within alienation, or as alienated man. The only labor which Hegel knows and recognizes is
abstractly mental labor. Therefore, that which constitutes the essence of philosophy – the
alienation of man who knows himself, or alienated science thinking itself - Hegel grasps as its
essence; and in contradistinction to previous philosophy he is therefore able to combine its
separate aspects, and to present his philosophy as the philosophy. What the other philosophers did
– that they grasped separate phases of nature and of human life as phases of self-consciousness,
namely, of abstract self-consciousness – is known to Hegel as the doings of philosophy. Hence his
science is absolute.
Let us now turn to our subject.
“Absolute Knowledge”. The last chapter of the “Phänomenologie”.
The main point is that the object of consciousness is nothing else but self-consciousness, or that
the object is only objectified self-consciousness – self-consciousness as object. (Positing of man =
self-consciousness).
The issue, therefore, is to surmount the object of consciousness. Objectivity as such is regarded as
an estranged human relationship which does not correspond to the essence of man, to selfconsciousness. The reappropriation of the objective essence of man, produced within the orbit of
estrangement as something alien, therefore denotes not only the annulment of estrangement, but
of objectivity as well. Man, that is to say, is regarded as a non-objective, spiritual being.
The movement of surmounting the object of consciousness is now described by Hegel in the
following way:
The object reveals itself not merely as returning into the self – this is according to Hegel the onesided way of apprehending this movement, the grasping of only one side. Man is equated with
self. The self, however, is only the abstractly conceived man – man created by abstraction. Man
is selfish. His eye, his ear, etc., are selfish. In him every one of his essential powers has the
quality of selfhood. But it is quite false to say on that account “self-consciousness has eyes, ears,
essential powers”. Self-consciousness is rather a quality of human nature, of the human eye, etc.;
it is not human nature that is a quality of ||XXIV| self-consciousness.
The self-abstracted entity, fixed for itself, is man as abstract egoist – egoism raised in its pure
abstraction to the level of thought. (We shall return to this point later.)
For Hegel the human being – man – equals self-consciousness. All estrangement of the human
being is therefore nothing but estrangement of self-consciousness. The estrangement of selfconsciousness is not regarded as an expression – reflected in the realm of knowledge and thought
– of the real estrangement of the human being. Instead, the actual estrangement – that which
appears real – is according to its innermost, hidden nature (which is only brought to light by
philosophy) nothing but the manifestation of the estrangement of the real human essence, of selfconsciousness. The science which comprehends this is therefore called phenomenology. All
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reappropriation of the estranged objective essence appears therefore, as incorporation into selfconsciousness: The man who takes hold of his essential being is merely the self-consciousness
which takes hold of objective essences. Return of the object into the self is therefore the
reappropriation of the object.
Expressed in all its aspects, the surmounting of the object of consciousness means:
(1) That the object as such presents itself to consciousness as something vanishing.
(2) That it is the alienation of self-consciousness which posits thinghood.50
(3) That this alienation has, not merely a negative but a positive significance
(4) That it has this meaning not merely for us or intrinsically, but for self-consciousness itself.
(5) For self-consciousness, the negative of the object, or its annulling of itself, has positive
significance – or it knows this futility of the object – because of the fact that it alienates itself, for
in this alienation it posits itself as object, or, for the sake of the indivisible unity of being-foritself, posits the object as itself.
(6) On the other hand, this contains likewise the other moment, that self-consciousness has also
just as much superseded this alienation and objectivity and resumed them into itself, being thus at
home in its other-being as such.
(7) This is the movement of consciousness and this is therefore the totality of its moments.
(8) Consciousness must similarly be related to the object in the totality of its determinations and
have comprehended it in terms of each of them. This totality of its determinations makes the
object intrinsically a spiritual being; and it becomes so in truth for consciousness through the
apprehending of each one of the determinations as self, or through what was called above the
spiritual attitude to them.51
As to (1): That the object as such presents itself to consciousness as something vanishing – this is
the above-mentioned return of the object into the self.
As to (2): The alienation of self-consciousness posits thinghood. Because man equals selfconsciousness, his alienated, objective essence, or thinghood, equals alienated self-consciousness,
and thinghood is thus posited through this alienation (thinghood being that which is an object for
man and an object for him is really only that which is to him an essential object, therefore his
objective essence. And since it is not real man, nor therefore nature – man being human nature –
who as such is made the subject, but only the abstraction of man – self-consciousness, so
thinghood cannot be anything but alienated self-consciousness). It is only to be expected that a
living, natural being equipped and endowed with objective (i.e., material) essential powers should
have real natural objects of his essence; and that his self-alienation should lead to the positing of
a real, objective world, but within the framework of externality, and, therefore, an overwhelming
world not belonging to his own essential being. There is nothing incomprehensible or mysterious
in this. It would be mysterious, rather, if it were otherwise. But it is equally clear that a selfconsciousness by its alienation can posit only thinghood, i.e., only an abstract thing, a thing of
abstraction and not a real thing.52 It is ||XXVI| clear, further, that thinghood is therefore utterly
without any independence, any essentiality vis-à-vis self-consciousness; that on the contrary it is
a mere creature – something posited by self-consciousness. And what is posited, instead of
confirming itself, is but confirmation of the act of positing which for a moment fixes its energy as
the product, and gives it the semblance – but only for a moment – of an independent, real
substance.
Whenever real, corporeal man, man with his feet firmly on the solid ground, man exhaling and
inhaling all the forces of nature, posits his real, objective essential powers as alien objects by his
externalisation, it is not the act of positing which is the subject in this process: it is the
subjectivity of objective essential powers, whose action, therefore, must also be something
objective. An objective being acts objectively, and he would not act objectively if the objective
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did not reside in the very nature of his being. He only creates or posits objects, because he is
posited by objects – because at bottom he is nature. In the act of positing, therefore, this objective
being does not fall from his state of “pure activity” into a creating of the object; on the contrary,
his objective product only confirms his objective activity, his activity as the activity of an
objective, natural being.
Here we see how consistent naturalism or humanism is distinct from both idealism and
materialism, and constitutes at the same time the unifying truth of both. We see also how only
naturalism is capable of comprehending the action of world history.
<Man is directly a natural being. As a natural being and as a living natural being he is on the one
hand endowed with natural powers, vital powers – he is an active natural being. These forces
exist in him as tendencies and abilities – as instincts. On the other hand, as a natural, corporeal,
sensuous objective being he is a suffering, conditioned and limited creature, like animals and
plants. That is to say, the objects of his instincts exist outside him, as objects independent of him;
yet these objects are objects that he needs – essential objects, indispensable to the manifestation
and confirmation of his essential powers. To say that man is a corporeal, living, real, sensuous,
objective being full of natural vigor is to say that he has real, sensuous objects as the object of his
being or of his life, or that he can only express his life in real, sensuous objects. To be objective,
natural and sensuous, and at the same time to have object, nature and sense outside oneself, or
oneself to be object, nature and sense for a third party, is one and the same thing.>
Hunger is a natural need; it therefore needs a nature outside itself, an object outside itself, in
order to satisfy itself, to be stilled. Hunger is an acknowledged need of my body for an object
existing outside it, indispensable to its integration and to the expression of its essential being. The
sun is the object of the plant – an indispensable object to it, confirming its life – just as the plant
is an object of the sun, being an expression of the life-awakening power of the sun, of the sun’s
objective essential power.
A being which does not have its nature outside itself is not a natural being, and plays no part in
the system of nature. A being which has no object outside itself is not an objective being. A being
which is not itself an object for some third being has no being for its object; i.e., it is not
objectively related. Its being is not objective.
||XXVII| A non-objective being is a non-being.
Suppose a being which is neither an object itself, nor has an object. Such a being, in the first
place, would be the unique being: there would exist no being outside it – it would exist solitary
and alone. For as soon as there are objects outside me, as soon as I am not alone, I am another –
another reality than the object outside me. For this third object I am thus a different reality than
itself; that is, I am its object. Thus, to suppose a being which is not the object of another being is
to presuppose that no objective being exists. As soon as I have an object, this object has me for an
object. But a non-objective being is an unreal, non-sensuous thing – a product of mere thought
(i.e., of mere imagination) – an abstraction. To be sensuous, that is, to be really existing, means to
be an object of sense, to be a sensuous object, to have sensuous objects outside oneself – objects
of one’s sensuousness. To be sensuous is to suffer.
Man as an objective, sensuous being is therefore a suffering being – and because he feels that he
suffers, a passionate being. Passion is the essential power of man energetically bent on its object.
<But man is not merely a natural being: he is a human natural being. That is to say, he is a being
for himself. Therefore he is a species-being, and has to confirm and manifest himself as such both
in his being and in his knowing. Therefore, human objects are not natural objects as they
immediately present themselves, and neither is human sense as it immediately is – as it is
objectively – human sensibility, human objectivity. Neither nature objectively nor nature
subjectively is directly given in a form adequate to the human being.> And as everything natural
has to come into being, man too has his act of origin – history – which, however, is for him a
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known history, and hence as an act of origin it is a conscious self-transcending act of origin.
History is the true natural history of man (on which more later).
Thirdly, because this positing of thinghood is itself only an illusion, an act contradicting the
nature of pure activity, it has to be canceled again and thinghood denied.
Re 3, 4, 5 and 6. (3) This externalization [Entäußerung] of consciousness has not merely a
negative but a positive significance, and (4) it has this meaning not merely for us or intrinsically,
but for consciousness itself. For consciousness the negative of the object, its annulling of itself,
has positive significance – i.e., consciousness knows this nullity of the object – because it
alienates itself; for, in this alienation it knows itself as object, or, for the sake of the indivisible
unity of being-for-itself, the object as itself. (6) On the other hand, there is also this other moment
in the process, that consciousness has also just as much superseded this alienation and objectivity
and resumed them into itself, being thus at home in its other-being as such.
As we have already seen, the appropriation of what is estranged and objective, or the annulling
of objectivity in the form of estrangement (which has to advance from indifferent strangeness to
real, antagonistic estrangement), means likewise or even primarily for Hegel that it is objectivity
which is to be annulled, because it is not the determinate character of the object, but rather its
objective character that is offensive and constitutes estrangement for self-consciousness. The
object is therefore something negative, self-annulling – a nullity. This nullity of the object has not
only a negative but a positive meaning for consciousness, since this nullity of the object is
precisely the self-confirmation of the non-objectivity, of the ||XXVIII| abstraction of itself. For
consciousness itself the nullity of the object has a positive meaning because it knows this nullity,
the objective being, as its self-alienation; because it knows that it exists only as a result of its own
self-alienation....
The way in which consciousness is, and in which something is for it, is knowing. Knowing is its
sole act. Something therefore comes to be for consciousness insofar as the latter knows this
something. Knowing is its sole objective relation.
It, consciousness, then, knows the nullity of the object (i.e., knows the non-existence of the
distinction between the object and itself, the non-existence of the object for it) because it knows
the object as its self-alienation; that is, it knows itself – knows knowing as object – because the
object is only the semblance of an object, a piece of mystification, which in its essence, however,
is nothing else but knowing itself, which has confronted itself with itself and hence has
confronted itself with a nullity – a something which has no objectivity outside the knowing. Or:
knowing knows that in relating itself to an object it is only outside itself – that it only externalizes
itself; that it itself only appears to itself as an object – or that that which appears to it as an object
is only itself.
On the other hand, says Hegel, there is here at the same time this other moment, that
consciousness has just as much annulled and reabsorbed this externalisation and objectivity,
being thus at home in its other-being as such.
In this discussion all the illusions of speculation are brought together.
First of all: consciousness, self-consciousness, is at home in its other-being as such. It is therefore
– or if we here abstract from the Hegelian abstraction and put the self-consciousness of man
instead of self-consciousness – it is at home in its other being as such. This implies, for one thing,
that consciousness (knowing as knowing, thinking as thinking) pretends to be directly the other of
itself – to be the world of sense, the real world, life – thought surpassing itself in thought
(Feuerbach).53 This aspect is contained herein, inasmuch as consciousness as mere consciousness
takes offence not at estranged objectivity, but at objectivity as such.
Secondly, this implies that self-conscious man, insofar as he has recognized and superseded the
spiritual world (or his world’s spiritual, general mode of being) as self-alienation, nevertheless
again confirms it in this alienated shape and passes it off as his true mode of being – re-
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establishes it, and pretends to be at home in his other-being as such. Thus, for instance, after
superseding religion, after recognizing religion to be a product of self-alienation he yet finds
confirmation of himself in religion as religion. Here is the root of Hegel’s false positivism, or of
his merely apparent criticism: this is what Feuerbach designated as the positing, negating and reestablishing of religion or theology – but it has to be expressed in more general terms. Thus
reason is at home in unreason as unreason. The man who has recognized that he is leading an
alienated life in law, politics, etc., is leading his true human life in this alienated life as such. Selfaffirmation, self-confirmation in contradiction with itself – in contradiction both with the
knowledge of and with the essential being of the object – is thus true knowledge and life.
There can therefore no longer be any question about an act of accommodation on Hegel’s part
vis-à-vis religion, the state, etc., since this lie is the lie of his principle.
||XXIX| If I know religion as alienated human self-consciousness, then what I know in it as
religion is not my self-consciousness, but my alienated self-consciousness confirmed in it. I
therefore know my self-consciousness that belongs to itself, to its very nature, confirmed not in
religion but rather in annihilated and superseded religion.
In Hegel, therefore, the negation of the negation is not the confirmation of the true essence,
effected precisely through negation of the pseudo-essence. With him the negation of the negation
is the confirmation of the pseudo-essence, or of the self-estranged essence in its denial; or it is the
denial of this pseudo-essence as an objective being dwelling outside man and independent of him,
and its transformation into the subject.
A peculiar role, therefore, is played by the act of superseding in which denial and preservation,
i.e., affirmation, are bound together.
Thus, for example, in Hegel’s philosophy of law, civil law superseded equals morality, morality
superseded equals the family, the family superseded equals civil society, civil society superseded
equals the state, the state superseded equals world history. In the actual world civil law, morality,
the family, civil society, the state, etc., remain in existence, only they have become moments –
states of the existence and being of man – which have no validity in isolation, but dissolve and
engender one another, etc. They have become moments of motion.
In their actual existence this mobile nature of theirs is hidden. It appears and is made manifest
only in thought, in philosophy. Hence my true religious existence is my existence in the
philosophy of religion; my true political existence is my existence in the philosophy of law; my
true natural existence, existence in the philosophy of nature; my true artistic existence, existence
in the philosophy of art; my true human existence, my existence in philosophy. Likewise the true
existence of religion, the state, nature, art, is the philosophy of religion, of nature, of the state and
of art. If, however, the philosophy of religion, etc., is for me the sole true existence of religion
then, too, it is only as a philosopher of religion that I am truly religious, and so I deny real
religious sentiment and the really religious man. But at the same time I assert them, in part within
my own existence or within the alien existence which I oppose to them – for this is only their
philosophic expression – and in part I assert them in their distinct original shape, since for me
they represent merely the apparent other-being, allegories, forms of their own true existence (i.e.,
of my philosophical existence) hidden under sensuous disguises.
In just the same way, quality superseded equals quantity, quantity superseded equals measure,
measure superseded equals essence, essence superseded equals appearance, appearance
superseded equals actuality, actuality superseded equals the concept, the concept superseded
equals objectivity, objectivity superseded equals the absolute idea, the absolute idea superseded
equals nature, nature superseded equals subjective mind, subjective mind superseded equals
ethical objective mind, ethical mind superseded equals art, art superseded equals religion,
religion superseded equals absolute knowledge.54
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On the one hand, this act of superseding is a transcending of a conceptual entity; thus, private
property as a concept is transcended in the concept of morality. And because thought imagines
itself to be directly the other of itself, to be sensuous reality – and therefore takes its own action
for sensuous, real action – this superseding in thought, which leaves its object in existence in the
real world, believes that it has really overcome it. On the other hand, because the object has now
become for it a moment of thought, thought takes it in its reality too to be self-confirmation of
itself – of self-consciousness, of abstraction.
||XXX| From the one point of view the entity which Hegel supersedes in philosophy is therefore
not real religion, the real state, or real nature, but religion itself already as an object of
knowledge, i.e., dogmatics; the same with jurisprudence, political science and natural science.
From the one point of view, therefore, he stands in opposition both to the real thing and to
immediate, unphilosophic science or the unphilosophic conceptions of this thing. He therefore
contradicts their conventional conceptions. [The conventional conception of theology,
jurisprudence, political science, natural science, etc. – Ed.]
On the other hand, the religious, etc., man can find in Hegel his final confirmation.
It is now time to formulate the positive aspects of the Hegelian dialectic within the realm of
estrangement.
(a) Supersession as an objective movement of retracting the alienation into self. This is the
insight, expressed within the estrangement, concerning the appropriation of the objective essence
through the supersession of its estrangement; it is the estranged insight into the real
objectification of man, into the real appropriation of his objective essence through the
annihilation of the estranged character of the objective world, through the supersession of the
objective world in its estranged mode of being. In the same way atheism, being the supersession
of God, is the advent of theoretic humanism, and communism, as the supersession of private
property, is the vindication of real human life as man’s possession and thus the advent of practical
humanism, or atheism is humanism mediated with itself through the supersession of religion,
whilst communism is humanism mediated with itself through the supersession of private
property. Only through the supersession of this mediation – which is itself, however, a necessary
premise – does positively self-deriving humanism, positive humanism, come into being.
But atheism and communism are no flight, no abstraction, no loss of the objective world created
by man – of man’s essential powers born to the realm of objectivity; they are not a returning in
poverty to unnatural, primitive simplicity. On the contrary, they are but the first real emergence,
the actual realization for man of man’s essence and of his essence as something real.
Thus, by grasping the positive meaning of self-referred negation (although again in estranged
fashion) Hegel grasps man’s self-estrangement, the alienation of man’s essence, man’s loss of
objectivity and his loss of realness as self-discovery, manifestation of his nature, objectification
and realization. <In short, within the sphere of abstraction, Hegel conceives labor as man’s act of
self-genesis – conceives man’s relation to himself as an alien being and the manifestation of
himself as an alien being to be the emergence of species-consciousness and species-life.>
(b) However, apart from, or rather in consequence of, the referral already described, this act
appears in Hegel:
First as a merely formal, because abstract, act, because the human being itself is taken to be only
an abstract, thinking being, conceived merely as self-consciousness. And,
Secondly, because the exposition is formal and abstract, the supersession of the alienation
becomes a confirmation of the alienation; or, for Hegel this movement of self-genesis and selfobjectification in the form of self-alienation and self-estrangement is the absolute, and hence
final, expression of human life – of life with itself as its aim, of life at peace with itself, and in
unity with its essence.
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This movement, in its abstract ||XXXI| form as dialectic, is therefore regarded as truly human life,
and because it is nevertheless an abstraction – an estrangement of human life – it is regarded as a
divine process, but as the divine process of man, a process traversed by man’s abstract, pure,
absolute essence that is distinct from himself.
Thirdly, this process must have a bearer, a subject. But the subject only comes into being as a
result. This result – the subject knowing itself as absolute self-consciousness – is therefore God,
absolute Spirit, the self-knowing and self-manifesting idea. Real man and real nature become
mere predicates – symbols of this hidden, unreal man and of this unreal nature. Subject and
predicate are therefore related to each other in absolute reversal – a mystical subject-object or a
subjectivity reaching beyond the object – the absolute subject as a process, as subject alienating
itself and returning from alienation into itself, but at the same time retracting this alienation into
itself, and the subject as this process; a pure, incessant revolving within itself.
First. Formal and abstract conception of man’s act of self-creation or self-objectification.
Hegel having posited man as equivalent to self-consciousness, the estranged object – the
estranged essential reality of man – is nothing but consciousness, the thought of estrangement
merely – estrangement’s abstract and therefore empty and unreal expression, negation. The
supersession of the alienation is therefore likewise nothing but an abstract, empty supersession of
that empty abstraction – the negation of the negation. The rich, living, sensuous, concrete activity
of self-objectification is therefore reduced to its mere abstraction, absolute negativity – an
abstraction which is again fixed as such and considered as an independent activity – as sheer
activity. Because this so-called negativity is nothing but the abstract, empty form of that real
living act, its content can in consequence be merely a formal content produced by abstraction
from all content. As a result therefore one gets general, abstract forms of abstraction pertaining to
every content and on that account indifferent to, and, consequently, valid for, all content – the
thought-forms or logical categories torn from real mind and from real nature. (We shall unfold
the logical content of absolute negativity further on.)
Hegel’s positive achievement here, in his speculative logic, is that the definite concepts, the
universal fixed thought-forms in their independence vis-à-vis nature and mind are a necessary
result of the general estrangement of the human being and therefore also of a human thought, and
that Hegel has therefore brought these together and presented them as moments of the
abstraction-process. For example, superseded being is essence, superseded essence is concept, the
concept superseded is ... absolute idea. But what, then, is the absolute idea? It supersedes its own
self again, if it does not want to traverse once more from the beginning the whole act of
abstraction, and to satisfy itself with being a totality of abstractions or the self-comprehending
abstraction. But abstraction comprehending itself as abstraction knows itself to be nothing: it
must abandon itself – abandon abstraction – and so it arrives at an entity which is its exact
opposite – at nature. Thus, the entire logic is the demonstration that abstract thought is nothing in
itself; that the absolute idea is nothing for itself; that only nature is something.
||XXXII| The absolute idea, the abstract idea, which
“considered with regard to its unity with itself is intuiting (Logic § 244), and
which (loc. cit.) “in its own absolute truth resolves to let the moment of its
particularity or of initial characterization and other-being, the immediate idea, as
its reflection, go forth freely from itself as nature” (loc. cit.),
this whole idea which behaves in such a strange and bizarre way, and which has given the
Hegelians such terrible headaches, is from beginning to end nothing else but abstraction (i.e., the
abstract thinker), which, made wise by experience and enlightened concerning its truth, resolves
under various (false and themselves still abstract) conditions to abandon itself and to replace its
self-absorption, nothingness, generality and indeterminateness by its other-being, the particular,
and the determinate; resolves to let nature, which it held hidden in itself only as an abstraction, as
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a thought-entity, go forth freely from itself; that is to say, this idea resolves to forsake abstraction
and to have a look at nature free of abstraction. The abstract idea, which without mediation
becomes intuiting, is indeed nothing else but abstract thinking that gives itself up and resolves on
intuition. This entire transition from logic to natural philosophy is nothing else but the transition –
so difficult to effect for the abstract thinker, who therefore describes it in such an adventurous
way – from abstracting to intuiting. The mystical feeling which drives the philosopher forward
from abstract thinking to intuiting is boredom – the longing for content.
(The man estranged from himself is also the thinker estranged from his essence – that is, from the
natural and human essence. His thoughts are therefore fixed mental forms dwelling outside nature
and man. Hegel has locked up all these fixed mental forms together in his logic, interpreting each
of them first as negation – that is, as an alienation of human thought – and then as negation of the
negation – that is, as a superseding of this alienation, as a real expression of human thought. But
as this still takes place within the confines of the estrangement, this negation of the negation is in
part the restoring of these fixed forms in their estrangement; in part a stopping at the last act – the
act of self-reference in alienation – as the true mode of being of these fixed mental forms; * –
[* (This means that what Hegel does is to put in place of these fixed abstractions
the act of abstraction which revolves in its own circle. We must therefore give him
the credit for having indicated the source of all these inappropriate concepts which
originally appertained to particular philosophers; for having brought them
together; and for having created the entire compass of abstraction as the object of
criticism, instead of some specific abstraction.) (Why Hegel separates thought
from the subject we shall see later; at this stage it is already clear, however, that
when man is not, his characteristic expression cannot be human either, and so
neither could thought be grasped as an expression of man as a human and natural
subject endowed with eyes, ears, etc., and living in society, in the world, and in
nature.) – Note by Marx]
– and in part, to the extent that this abstraction apprehends itself and experiences an infinite
weariness with itself, there makes its appearance in Hegel, in the form of the resolution to
recognize nature as the essential being and to go over to intuition, the abandonment of abstract
thought – the abandonment of thought revolving solely within the orbit of thought, of thought
sans eyes, sans teeth, sans ears, sans everything.)
||XXXIII| But nature too, taken abstractly, for itself – nature fixed in isolation from man – is
nothing for man. It goes without saying that the abstract thinker who has committed himself to
intuiting, intuits nature abstractly. Just as nature lay enclosed in the thinker in the form of the
absolute idea, in the form of a thought-entity – in a shape which was obscure and enigmatic even
to him – so by letting it emerge from himself he has really let emerge only this abstract nature,
only nature as a thought-entity – but now with the significance that it is the other-being of
thought, that it is real, intuited nature – nature distinguished from abstract thought. Or, to talk in
human language, the abstract thinker learns in his intuition of nature that the entities which he
thought to create from nothing, from pure abstraction – the entities he believed he was producing
in the divine dialectic as pure products of the labor of thought, for ever shuttling back and forth in
itself and never looking outward into reality – are nothing else but abstractions from
characteristics of nature. To him, therefore, the whole of nature merely repeats the logical
abstractions in a sensuous, external form. He once more resolves nature into these abstractions.
Thus, his intuition of nature is only the act of confirming his abstraction from the intuition of
nature [Let us consider for a moment Hegel’s characteristics of nature and the transition from
nature to the mind. Nature has resulted as the idea in the form of the other-being. Since the id .. ]
– is only the conscious repetition by him of the process of creating his abstraction. Thus, for
example, time equals negativity referred to itself (Hegel, Encyclopädie der philosophischen
Wissenschaften im Grundrisse, p. 238). To the superseded becoming as being there corresponds,
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in natural form, superseded movement as matter. Light is reflection-in-itself, the natural form.
Body as moon and comet is the natural form of the antithesis which according to logic is on the
one side the positive resting on itself and on the other side the negative resting on itself. The earth
is the natural form of the logical ground, as the negative unity of the antithesis, etc.
Nature as nature – that is to say, insofar as it is still sensuously distinguished from that secret
sense hidden within it – nature isolated, distinguished from these abstractions is nothing – a
nothing proving itself to be nothing – is devoid of sense, or has only the sense of being an
externality which has to be annulled.
“In the finite-teleological position is to be found the correct premise that nature
does not contain within itself the absolute purpose.” [§ 245.]
Its purpose is the confirmation of abstraction.
“Nature has shown itself to be the idea in the form of other-being. Since the idea
is in this form the negative of itself or external to itself, nature is not just relatively
external vis-à-vis this idea, but externality constitutes the form in which it exists as
nature.” [§ 247.]
Externality here is not to be understood as the world of sense which manifests itself and is
accessible to the light, to the man endowed with senses. It is to be taken here in the sense of
alienation, of a mistake, a defect, which ought not to be. For what is true is still the idea. Nature is
only the form of the idea’s other-being. And since abstract thought is the essence, that which is
external to it is by its essence something merely external. The abstract thinker recognizes at the
same time that sensuousness – externality in contrast to thought shuttling back and forth within
itself – is the essence of nature. But he expresses this contrast in such a way as to make this
externality of nature, its contrast to thought, its defect, so that inasmuch as it is distinguished
from abstraction, nature is something defective.
||XXXIV| An entity which is defective not merely for me or in my eyes but in itself – intrinsically
– has something outside itself which it lacks. That is, its essence is different from it itself. Nature
has therefore to supersede itself for the abstract thinker, for it is already posited by him as a
potentially superseded being.
“For us, mind has nature for its premise, being nature’s truth and for that reason
its absolute prius. In this truth nature has vanished, and mind has resulted as the
idea arrived at being-for-itself, the object of which, as well as the subject, is the
concept. This identity is absolute negativity, for whereas in nature the concept has
its perfect external objectivity, this its alienation has been superseded, and in this
alienation the concept has become identical with itself. But it is this identity
therefore, only in being a return out of nature.” [§ 381.]
“As the abstract idea, revelation is unmediated transition to, the coming-to-be of,
nature; as the revelation of the mind, which is free, it is the positing of nature as
the mind’s world – a positing which, being reflection, is at the same time, a
presupposing of the world as independently existing nature. Revelation in
conception is the creation of nature as the mind’s being, in which the mind
procures the affirmation and the truth of its freedom.” “The absolute is mind. This
is the highest definition of the absolute.” [§ 384.] |XXXIV||

Notes
1. The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 is the first work in which Marx tried to
systematically elaborate problems of political economy from the standpoint of his maturing
dialectical-materialist and communist views and also to synthesize the results of his critical review of
prevailing philosophic and economic theories. Apparently, Marx began to write it in order to clarify
the problems for himself. But in the process of working on it he conceived the idea of publishing a
work analysing the economic system of bourgeois society in his time and its ideological trends.
Towards the end of his stay in Paris, on February 1, 1845, Marx signed a contract with Carl Leske, a
Darmstadt publisher, concerning the publication of his work entitled A Critique of Politics and of
Political Economy. It was to be based on his Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 and
perhaps also on his earlier manuscript Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law. This
plan did not materialize in the 1840s because Marx was busy writing other works and, to some extent,
because the contract with the publisher was cancelled in September 1846, the latter being afraid to
have transactions with such a revolutionary-minded author. However, in the early 1850s Marx
returned to the idea of writing a book on economics. Thus, the manuscripts of 1844 are connected with
the conception of a plan which led many years later to the writing of Capital.
The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts is an unfinished work and in part a rough draft. A
considerable part of the text has not been preserved. What remains comprises three manuscripts, each
of which has its own pagination (in Roman figures). The first manuscript contains 27 pages, of which
pages I-XII and XVII-XXVII are divided by two vertical lines into three columns supplied with
headings written in beforehand: “Wages of Labor,” “Profit of Capital” (this section has also
subheadings supplied by the author) and “Rent of Land.” It is difficult to tell the order in which Marx
filled these columns. All the three columns on p. VII contain the text relating to the section “Wages of
Labor.” Pages XIII to XVI are divided into two columns and contain texts of the sections “Wages of
Labor” (pp. XIII-XV), “Profit of Capital” (pp. XIII-XVI) and “Rent of Land” (p. XVI). On pages
XVII to XXI, only the column headed “Rent of Land” is filled in. From page XXII to page XXVII, on
which the first manuscript breaks off, Marx wrote across the three columns disregarding the headings.
The text of these pages is published as a separate section entitled by the editors according to its
content “Estranged Labor.”
Of the second manuscript only the last four pages have survived (pp. XL-XLIII).
The third manuscript contains 41 pages (not counting blank ones) divided into two columns and
numbered by Marx himself from I to XLIII (in doing so he omitted two numbers, XXII and XXV).
Like the extant part of the second manuscript, the third manuscript has no author’s headings; the text
has been arranged and supplied with the headings by the editors.
Sometimes Marx departed from the subject matter and interrupted his elucidation of one question to
analyze another. Pages XXXIX-XL contain the Preface to the whole work which is given before the
text of the first manuscript. The text of the section dealing with the critical analysis of Hegel’s
dialectic, to which Marx referred in the Preface as the concluding chapter and which was scattered on
various pages, is arranged in one section and put at the end in accordance with Marx’s indications.
In order to give the reader a better visual idea of the structure of the work, the text reproduces in
vertical lines the Roman numbers of the sheets of the manuscripts, and the Arabic numbers of the
columns in the first manuscript. The notes indicate where the text has been rearranged. Passages
crossed out by Marx with a vertical line are enclosed in pointed brackets; separate words or phrases
crossed out by the author are given in footnotes only when they supplement the text. The general title
and the headings of the various parts of the manuscripts enclosed in square brackets are supplied by
the editors on the basis of the author’s formulations. In some places the text has been broken up into
paragraphs by the editors. Quotations from the French sources cited by Marx in French or in his own
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translation into German, are given in English in both cases and the French texts as quoted by Marx are
given in the footnotes. Here and elsewhere Marx’s rendering of the quotations or free translation is
given in small type but without quotation marks. Emphasis in quotations, belonging, as a rule, to
Marx, as well as that of the quoted authors, is indicated everywhere by italics.
The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 was first published by the Institute of MarxismLeninism in Moscow in the language of the original: Marx/Engels, Gesamtausgabe, Abt. 1, Bd. 3,
1932.
In English this work was first published in 1959 by the Foreign Languages Publishing House (now
Progress Publishers), Moscow, translated by Martin Milligan.

2. This refers to Bruno Bauer’s reviews of books, articles and pamphlets on the Jewish question,
including Marx’s article on the subject in the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher, which were
published in the monthly Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung (issue No. 1, December 1843, and issue No.
IV, March 1844) under the title “Von den neuesten Schriften über die Judenfrage.” Most of the
expressions quoted are taken from these reviews. The expressions “utopian phrase” and “compact
mass” can he found in Bruno Bauer’s unsigned article, “Was ist jetzt der Gegenstand der Kritik?”
published in the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung, issue No. VIII, July 1844. A detailed critical appraisal
of this monthly was later on given by Marx and Engels in the book Die heilige Familie, oder Kritik
der kritischen Kritik (see this edition, Vol. 4, The Holy Family, or Critique of Critical Criticism).
3. Marx apparently refers to Weitling’s works: Die Menschheit, wie sie ist und wie sie sein sollte,
1838, and Garantien der Harmonic und Freiheit, Vivis, 1842.
Moses Hess published three articles in the collection Ein-und-zwanzig Bogen aus der Schweiz
(Twenty-One Sheets from Switzerland), Erster Teil (Zürich und Winterthur, 1843), issued by Georg
Herwegh. These articles, entitled “Sozialismus und Kommunismus,” “Philosophie der Tat” and “Die
Eine und die ganze Freiheit,” were published anonymously. The first two of them had a note –
“Written by the author of ‘Europäische Triarchie’.”

4. The term “element” in the Hegelian philosophy means a vital element of thought. It is used to stress
that thought is a process, and that therefore elements in a system of thought are also phases in a
movement. The term “feeling” (Empfindung) denotes relatively low forms of mental life in which no
distinction is made between the subjective and objective.
5. Shortly after writing this Preface Marx fulfilled his intention in The Holy Family, or Critique of
Critical Criticism, written in collaboration with Engels (see Karl Marx and Frederick Engels,
Collected Works, Vol. 4).
6. The expression “common humanity” (in the manuscript in French, “simple humanity”) was
borrowed by Marx from the first volume (Chapter VIII) of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, which he
used in Garnier’s French translation (Recherches sur la nature et les causes de la richesse des nations,
Paris, 1802, t. I, p. 138). All the subsequent references were given by Marx to this publication, the
synopsis of which is contained in his Paris Notebooks with excerpts on political economy. This
edition is reproduced on the MIA and Marx’s citations are linked to the text.
7. Marx uses the German term “Nationalökonomie” to denote both the economic system in the sense
of science or theory, and the economic system itself.
8. Loudon’s work was a translation into French of an English manuscript apparently never published
in the original. The author did publish in English a short pamphlet - The Equilibrium of Population
and Sustenance Demonstrated, Leamington, 1836.
9. Unlike the quotations from a number of other French writers such as Constantin Pecqueur and
Eugéne Buret, which Marx gives in French in this work, the excerpts from J. B. Say’s book are given
in his German translation.
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10. From this page of the manuscript quotations from Adam Smith’s book (in the French translation),
which Marx cited so far sometimes in French and sometimes in German, are, as a rule, given in
German. In this book the corresponding pages of the English edition are substituted for the French by
the editors and Marx’s references are given in square brackets (see Note 6).
11. The text published in small type here and below is not an exact quotation from Smith but a
summary of the corresponding passages from his work. Such passages are subsequently given in small
type but without quotation marks.
12. The preceding page (VII) of the first manuscript does not contain any text relating to the sections
“Profit of Capital” and “Rent of Land” (see Note 1).
13. The whole paragraph, including the quotation from Ricardo’s book in the French translation by
Francisco Solano Constancio: Des principes de l’économie politique, et de 1’impôt, 2-e éd., Paris,
1835, T. II, pp. 194-95 (see the corresponding English edition On the Principles of Political Economy,
and Taxation, London, 1817), and from Sismondi’s Nouveaux principes d’économie politique..., Paris,
1819, T. II., p. 331, is an excerpt from Eugéne Buret’s book De la misère des classes laborieuses en
Angleterre et en France.... Paris, 1840, T. I, pp. 6-7, note.
14. The allusion is to the following passage: “In a perfectly fair lottery, those who draw the prizes
ought to gain all that is lost by those who draw the blanks. In a profession where twenty fail for one
that succeeds, that one ought to gain all that should have been gained by the unsuccessful twenty.”
(Smith, Wealth of Nations, Vol. 1, Bk. 1, p. 94.)
15. See Note 12.
16. The Corn Laws – a series of laws in England (the first of which dated back to the 15th century)
which imposed high duties on imported corn with the aim of maintaining high prices on it in the home
market. In the first third of the 19th century several laws were passed (in 1815, 1822 and so on)
changing the conditions of corn imports, and in 1828 a sliding scale was introduced, which raised
import duties on corn while lowering prices on the home market and, on the contrary, lowered import
duties while raising prices.
In 1838 the Manchester factory owners Cobden and Bright founded the Anti-Corn Law League, which
widely exploited the popular discontent at rising corn prices. While agitating for the abolition of the
corn duties and demanding complete freedom of trade, the League strove to weaken the economic and
political positions of the landed aristocracy and to lower workers’ wages.
The struggle between the industrial bourgeoisie and the landed aristocracy over the Corn Laws ended
in their repeal in 1846.

17. Pages XIII to XV are divided into two columns and not three like the other pages of the first
manuscript; they contain no text relating to the section “Rent of Land.” On page XVI, which also has
two columns, this text is in the first column, while on the following pages it is in the second.
18. Marx, still using Hegel’s terminology and his approach to the unity of the opposites, counterposes
the term “Verwirklichung” (realization) to “Entwirklichung” (loss of realization).
19. In this manuscript Marx frequently uses two similar German terms, “Entäusserung” and
“Entfremdung,” to express the notion of “alienation.” In the present edition the former is generally
translated as “alienation,” the latter as “estrangement,” because in the later economic works (Theories
of Surplus-Value) Marx himself used the word “alienation” as the English equivalent of the term
“Entäusserung.”
20. The term “species-being” (Gattungswesen) is derived from Ludwig Feuerbach’s philosophy
where it is applied to man and mankind as a whole.
21. Apparently Marx refers to Proudhon’s book Qu’est-ce que la propriété?, Paris, 1841.
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22. This passage shows that Marx here uses the category of wages in a broad sense, as an expression
of antagonistic relations between the classes of capitalists and of wage-workers. Under “the wages” he
understands “the wage-labor,” the capitalist system as such. This idea was apparently elaborated in
detail in that part of the manuscript which is now extant.
23. This apparently refers to the conversion of individuals into members of civil society which is
considered as the sphere of property, of material relations that determine all other relations. In this
case Marx refers to the material relations of society based on private property and the antagonism of
different classes.
24. The Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 deprived poor people considered able to work (including
children) of any public relief except a place in the workhouse, where they were compelled to work.
25. In the manuscript “sein für sich selbst,” which is an expression of Hegel’s term “für sich’ (for
itself) as opposed to “an sich” (in itself). In the Hegelian philosophy the former means roughly
explicit, conscious or defined in contrast to “an sich,” a synonym for immature, implicit or
unconscious.
26. This refers to Revolutions de France et de Brabant, par Camille Desmoulins. Second Trimestre,
contenant mars, avril et mai, Paris, l’an 1ier, 1790, N. 16, p. 139 sq.; N. 23, p. 425 sqq.; N. 26, p. 580
sqq.
27. This refers to Georg Ludwig Wilhelm Funke, Die aus der unbeschrdnklen Theilbarkeit des
Grundeigenthums hervorgehenden Nachtheile, Hamburg und Gotha, 1839, p. 56, in which there is a
reference to Heinrich Leo, Studien und Skizzen zu einer Vaturlehre des Slaates, Halle, 1833, p. 102.
28. The third manuscript is a thick notebook the last few pages of which are blank. The pages are
divided into two columns by a vertical line, not for the purpose of dividing the text according to the
headings but for purely technical reasons. The text of the first three sections comprises pp. I-XI, XIVXXI, XXXIV-XXXVIII and was written as a supplement to the missing pages of the second
manuscript. Pages XI-XIII, XVII, XVIII, XXIII, XXIV, XXVI, XXXIV contain the text of the
concluding chapter dealing with the criticism of Hegel’s dialectic (on some pages it is written
alongside the text of other sections). In some places the manuscript contains the author’s remarks
testifying to his intention to unite into a single whole various passages of this section separated from
each other by the text of other sections. Pages XXIX-XL comprise the draft Preface. Finally, the text
on the last pages (XLI-XLIII) is a self-contained essay on the power of money in bourgeois society.
29. The manuscript has “als für sich seiende Tätigkeit.” For the meaning of the terms “für sich” and
“an sich” in Hegel’s philosophy see Note 25.
30. Marx refers to the rise of the primitive, crude equalitarian tendencies among the representatives of
utopian communism at the early stages of its development. Among the medieval religious
communistic communities, in particular, there was current a notion of the common possession of
women as a feature of the future society depicted in the spirit of consumer communism ideals. In
1534-35 the German Anabaptists, who seized power in Münster, tried to introduce polygamy in
accordance with this view. Tommaso Campanella, the author of Civitas Solis (early 17th century),
rejected monogamy in his ideal society. The primitive communistic communities were also
characterized by asceticism and a hostile attitude to science and works of art. Some of these primitive
equalitarian features, the negative attitude to the arts in particular, were inherited by the communist
trends of the first half of the 19th century, for example, by the members of the French secret societies
of the 1830s and 1840s (“worker-egalitarians,” “humanitarians,” and so on) comprising the followers
of Babeuf (for a characterization of these see Engels, “Progress of Social Reform on the Continent”
(Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works, Volume 3, pp. 396-97)).
31. This note is given by Marx on page V of the manuscript where it is separated by a horizontal line
from the main text, but according to its meaning it refers to this sentence.
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32. This part of the manuscript shows clearly the peculiarity of the terminology used by Marx in his
works. At the time he had not worked out terms adequately expressing the conceptions of scientific
communism he was then evolving and was still under the influence of Feuerbach in that respect.
Hence the difference in the use of words in his early and subsequent, mature writings. In the Economic
and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 the word “socialism” is used to denote the stage of society at
which it has carried out a revolutionary transformation, abolished private property, class antagonisms,
alienation and so on. In the same sense Marx used the expression “communism equals humanism.” At
that time he understood the term “communism as such” not as the final goal of revolutionary
transformation but as the process of this transformation, development leading up to that goal, a lower
stage of the process.
33. This expression apparently refers to the theory of the English geologist Sir Charles Lyell who, in
his three-volume work The Principles of Geology (1830-33), proved the evolution of the earth’s crust
and refuted the popular theory of cataclysms. Lyell used the term “historical geology” for his theory.
The term “geognosy” was introduced by the 18th-century German scientist Abraham Werner, a
specialist in mineralogy, and it was used also by Alexander Humboldt.
34. This statement is interpreted differently by researchers. Many of them maintain that Marx here
meant crude equalitarian communism, such as that propounded by Babeuf and his followers. While
recognizing the historic role of that communism, he thought it impossible to ignore its weak points. It
seems more justifiable, however, to interpret this passage proceeding from the peculiarity of terms
used in the manuscript (see Note 32). Marx here used the term “communism” to mean not the higher
phase of classless society (which he at the time denoted as “socialism” or “communism equalling
humanism”) but movement (in various forms, including primitive forms of equalitarian communism at
the early stage) directed at its achievement, a revolutionary transformation process of transition to it.
Marx emphasized that this process should not be considered as an end in itself, but that it is a
necessary, though a transitional, stage in attaining the future social system, which will be
characterized by new features distinct from those proper to this stage.
35. Page XI (in part) and pages XII and XIII are taken up by a text relating to the concluding chapter
(see Note 28).
36. The greater part of this page as well as part of the preceding page (XVII) comprises a text relating
to the concluding chapter (see Note 28).
37. Apparently Marx refers to a formula of the German philosopher Johann Fichte, an adherent of
subjective idealism.
38. A part of this page of the manuscript is ripped off, about three lines are missing. – Ed.
39. See this work, pp. 20-23. – Ed.
40. The preceding pages starting from p. XXI, which is partly taken up by a text relating to this
section, contain the text of the concluding chapter.
41. In some of his early writings Marx already uses the term “bürgerliche Gesellschaft” to mean two
things: (1) in a broader sense, the economic system of society regardless of the historical stage of its
development, the sum total of material relations which determine political institutions and ideology,
and (2) in the narrow sense, the material relations of bourgeois society (later on, that society as a
whole), of capitalism. Hence, the term has been translated according to its concrete meaning in the
context as “civil society” in the first case and “bourgeois society” in the second.
42. The two previous pages of the manuscript contain the draft Preface to the whole work, which is
published on pages 1-2.
43. Ontology – in some philosophic systems a theory about being, about the nature of things.
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44. Originally the section on the Hegelian dialectic was apparently conceived by Marx as a
philosophical digression in the section of the third manuscript which is published under the heading
“Private Property and Communism” and was written together with other sections as an addition to
separate pages of the second manuscript. Therefore Marx marked the beginning of this section (p. XI
in the manuscript) as point 6, considering it to be the continuation of the five points of the preceding
section. He marked as point 7 the beginning of the following section, headed “Human Requirements
and Division of Labor Under the Rule of Private Property,” on page XIV of the manuscript. However,
when dealing with this subject on subsequent pages of his manuscript, Marx decided to collect the
whole material into a separate, concluding chapter and mentioned this in his draft Preface. The
chapter, like a number of other sections of the manuscript, was not finished. While writing it, Marx
made special excerpts from the last chapter (“Absolute Knowledge”) of Hegel’s Phänomenologie des
Geistes, which are in the same notebook as the third manuscript (these excerpts are not reproduced in
this edition).
45. The reference is not quite accurate. On page 193 of the work mentioned, Bruno Bauer polemicises
not against the anti-Hegelian Herr Gruppe but against the Right Hegelian Marheineke.
46. Marx here refers to Feuerbach’s critical observations on Hegel in §§ 29-30 of his Grundsätze der
Philosophie der Zukunft.
This note is given at the bottom of page XIII of the third manuscript without any indication what it
refers to. The asterisk after the sentence to which it seems to refer is given by the editors.

47. Here on page XVII of the third manuscript (part of which comprises a text relating to the section
“Human Requirements and Division of Labor Under the Rule of Private Property”) Marx gave the
note: “see p. XIII,” which proves that this text is the continuation of the section dealing with the
critical analysis of the Hegelian dialectic begun on pp. XI-XII.
48. At the end of page XVIII of the third manuscript there is a note by Marx: “continued on p. XXII.”
However number XXII was omitted by Marx in paging. The text of the given chapter is continued on
the page marked by the author as XXIII, which is also confirmed by his remark on it: “see p. XVIII.”
49. Marx apparently refers here not only to the identity of Hegel’s views on labor and some other
categories of political economy with those of the English classical economists but also to his profound
knowledge of economic writings. In lectures he delivered at Jena University in 1803-04 Hegel cited
Adam Smith’s work. In his Philosophie des Rechts (§ 189) he mentions Smith, Say and Ricardo and
notes the rapid development of economic thought.
50. Hegel uses the term “thinghood” (Dingheit) in his work Phänomenologie des Geistes to denote an
abstract, universal, mediating link in the process of cognition; “thinghood” reveals the generality of
the specific properties of individual things. The synonym for it is “pure essence” (das reine Wesen).
51. These eight points of the “surmounting of the object of consciousness,” expressed “in all its
aspects,” are copied nearly word for word from §§ 1 and 3 of the last chapter (“Absolute Knowledge”)
of Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes.
52. Number XXV was omitted by Marx in paging the third manuscript.
53. Marx refers to § 30 of Feuerbach’s Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft, which says: “Hegel
is a thinker who surpasses himself in thinking.”
54. This enumeration gives the major categories of Hegel’s Encyclopädie der philosophischen
Wissenschaften in the order in which they are examined by Hegel. Similarly, the categories
reproduced by Marx above (on p. 65), from “civil law” to “world history,” are given in the order in
which they appear in Hegel’s Philosophie des Rechts.
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Karl Marx
The German Ideology

Preface
Hitherto men have constantly made up for themselves false conceptions
about themselves, about what they are and what they ought to be. They
have arranged their relationships according to their ideas of God, of
normal man, etc. The phantoms of their brains have got out of their
hands. They, the creators, have bowed down before their creations. Let
us liberate them from the chimeras, the ideas, dogmas, imaginary
beings under the yoke of which they are pining away. Let us revolt
against the rule of thoughts. Let us teach men, says one, to exchange
these imaginations for thoughts which correspond to the essence of
man; says the second, to take up a critical attitude to them; says the
third, to knock them out of their heads; and -- existing reality will
collapse.
These innocent and childlike fancies are the kernel of the modern
Young-Hegelian philosophy, which not only is received by the German
public with horror and awe, but is announced by our philosophic heroes
with the solemn consciousness of its cataclysmic dangerousness and
criminal ruthlessness. The first volume of the present publication has
the aim of uncloaking these sheep, who take themselves and are taken
for wolves; of showing how their bleating merely imitates in a
philosophic form the conceptions of the German middle class; how the
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boasting of these philosophic commentators only mirrors the
wretchedness of the real conditions in Germany. It is its aim to debunk
and discredit the philosophic struggle with the shadows of reality,
which appeals to the dreamy and muddled German nation.
Once upon a time a valiant fellow had the idea that men were drowned
in water only because they were possessed with the idea of gravity. If
they were to knock this notion out of their heads, say by stating it to be
a superstition, a religious concept, they would be sublimely proof
against any danger from water. His whole life long he fought against
the illusion of gravity, of whose harmful results all statistic brought him
new and manifold evidence. This valiant fellow was the type of the new
revolutionary philosophers in Germany.
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The Leipzig Council [37]
I
Source MECW Volume 5, pp 94-116
Written: November 1845 — April 1846;
First published: 1921;
Transcribed by: Andy Blunden.

In the third volume of the Wigand’sche Vierteljahrsschrift for 1845 the
battle of the Huns, prophetically portrayed by Kaulbach,[38] actually
takes place. The spirits of the slain, whose fury is not appeased even in
death, raise a hue and cry, which sounds like the thunder of battles and
war-cries, the clatter of swords, shields and iron waggons. But it is not a
battle over earthly things. The holy war is being waged not over
protective tariffs, the constitution, potato blight, [38] banking affairs and
railways, but in the name of the most sacred interests of the spirit, in the
name of “substance”, “self-consciousness”, “criticism;’, the “unique”
and the “true man”. We are attending a council of church fathers. As
these church fathers are the last specimens of their kind, and as here, it
is to be hoped, the cause of the Most High, alias the Absolute, is being
pleaded for the last time, it is worth while taking a verbatim report of
the proceedings.
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Here, first of all, is Saint Bruno, who is easily recognised by his stick
(“become sensuousness, become a stick”, Wigand, p. 130).’ His head is
crowned with a halo of “pure criticism” and, full of contempt for the
world, he wraps himself in his “self-consciousness”. He has ‘,smashed
religion in its entirety and the state in its manifestations” (p. 138), by
violating the concept of “substance” in the name of the most high selfconsciousness. The ruins of the church and “debris” of the state lie at
his feet, while his glance “strikes clown” the “masses into the dust. He
is like God, he has neither father nor mother, he is “his own creation,
his own product” (p. 136). In short, he is the “Napoleon” of the spirit, in
spirit he is “Napoleon”. His spiritual exercises consist in constantly
“examining himself, and in this self-examination he finds the impulse to
self-determination” (p. 136); as a result of such wearisome selfrecording he has obviously become emaciated. Besides “examining”
himself — from time to time he “examines” also, as we shall see, the
Westphälische Dampfboot.
Opposite him stands Saint Max, whose services to the Kingdom of God
consist in asserting that he has established and proved — on
approximately 600 printed pages [Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum] —
his identity, that he is not just anyone, not some “Tom, Dick or Harry”,
but precisely Saint Max and no other. About his halo and other marks of
distinction only one thing can be said: that they are “his object and
thereby his property”, that they are “unique” and “incomparable” and
that they are “inexpressible” (p. 148).c He is simultaneously the
“phrase” and the “owner of the phrase”, simultaneously Sancho Panza
and Don Quixote. His ascetic exercises consist of sour thoughts about
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thoughtlessness, of considerations throughout many pages about
inconsiderateness and of the sanctification of unholiness. Incidentally,
there is no need for us to elaborate on his virtues, for concerning all the
qualities ascribed to him — even if there were more of them than the.
names of God among the Muslims — he is in the habit of saying: I am
all this and something more, 1 am the all of this nothing and the nothing
of this all. He is favourably distinguished from his gloomy rival in
possessing a certain solemn “light-heartedness” and from time to time
he interrupts his serious ponderings with a “critical hurrah”.
These two grand masters of the Holy Inquisition summon the heretic
Feuerbach, who has to defend himself against the grave charge of
gnosticism. The heretic Feuerbach, “thunders” Saint Bruno, is in
possession of hyle, substance, and refuses to hand it over lest my
infinite self-consciousness be reflected in it. Self-consciousness has to
wander like a ghost until it has taken back into itself all things which
arise from it and flow into it. It has already swallowed the whole world,
except for this hyle, substance, which the gnostic Feuerbach keeps
under lock and key and refuses to hand over.
Saint Max accuses the gnostic of doubting the dogma revealed by the
mouth of Saint Max himself, the dogma that “every goose, every dog,
every horse” is “the perfect, or, if one prefers the superlative degree, the
most perfect, man”. (Wigand, p. 187: “The aforesaid does not lack a
tittle of what makes man a man. Indeed, the same applies also to every
goose, every dog, every, horse.”)
Besides the hearing of these important indictments, sentence is also
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pronounced in the case brought by the two saints against Moses Hess
and in the case brought by Saint Bruno against the authors of Die
Heilige Familie. But as these accused have been busying themselves
with “worldly affairs” and, therefore, have failed to appear before the
Santa Casa, [40] they are sentenced in their absence to eternal
banishment from the realm of the spirit for the term of their natural life.
Finally, the two grand masters are again starting some strange intrigues
among themselves and against each other.

The German Ideology by Marx and Engels

II
Saint Bruno
1. “Campaign” Against Feuerbach
Before turning to the solemn discussion which Bauer’s
selfconsciousness has with itself and the world, we should reveal one
secret. Saint Bruno uttered the battle-cry and kindled the war only
because he had to “safeguard” himself and his stale, soured criticism
against the ungrateful forgetfulness of the public, only because he had
to show that, in the changed conditions of 1845, criticism always
remained itself and unchanged. He wrote the second volume of the
“good cause and his own cause” [Bruno Bauer’s article “Charakteristik
Ludwig Feuerbachs” is here ironically called the second volume of
Bauer’s book Die gute.Sache der Freiheit und meine eigene
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Angelegenheit — The Good Cause of Freedom and My Own Cause]:
he stands his ground, he fights pro aris et focis. [literally: for altars and
hearths, used in the sense of: for house and home — that is, pleading his
own cause] In the true theological manner, however, he conceals this
aim of his by an appearance of wishing to “characterise” Feuerbach.
Poor Bruno was quite forgotten, as was best proved by the polemic
between Feuerbach and Stirner, [Feuerbach, “Ueber das ‘Wesen des
Chrienthums’ in Bezichung auf den ‘Einzigen und sein Eigenthum'"]
which no notice at all was taken of him. For just this reason he seized
on this polemic in order to be able to proclaim himself, as the antithesis
of the antagonists, their higher unity, the Holy Spirit.
Saint Bruno opens his “campaign” with a burst of artillery fire against
Feuerbach, that is to say, with a revised and enlarged reprint of an
article which had already appeared in the Norddeutsche Blätter. [Bruno
Bauer’s article “Ludwig Feuerbach"] Feuerbach is made into a knight
of “substance” in order that Bauer’s self-consciousness” shall stand out
in stronger relief. In this trans-substantiation of Feuerbach, which is
supposed to be proved by all the writings of the latter, our holy man
jumps at once from Feuerbach’s writings on Leibniz and Bayle [The
reference is to the following works of Feuerbach: Geschichte der neuern
Philosophie. Darstellung, Entwirklung und Kritik der Leibnitzischen
Philosophie and Pierre Bayle] to the Wesen des Christenthmus, leaving
out the article against the “positive philosophers”,[41] in the Hallische
Jahrbücher. [Ludwig Feuerbach, “Zur Kritik der ‘positiven
Philosophie'"] This “oversight” is “in place”. For there Feuerbach
revealed the whole wisdom of “selfconsciousness” as against the
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch02.htm (5 of 36) [3/31/2006 4:18:13 PM]

The German Ideology by Marx and Engels

positive representatives of “substance”, at a time when Saint Bruno was
still indulging in speculation on the immaculate conception.
It is hardly necessary to mention that Saint Bruno still continues to
prance about on his old-Hegelian war horse. Listen to the first passage
in his latest revelations from the Kingdom of God:
“Hegel combined into one Spinoza’s substance and Fichte’s ego;
the unity of both, the combination of these opposing spheres, etc.,
constitutes the peculiar interest but, at the same time, the weakness
of Hegel’s philosophy. [... ] This contradiction in which Hegel’s
system was entangled had to be resolved and destroyed. But he
could only do this by making it impossible for all time to put the
question: what is the relation of self-consciousness to the absolute
spirit.... This was possible in two ways. Either self-consciousness
had to be burned again in the flames of substance, i.e., the pure
substantiality relation had to be firmly established and maintained,
or it had to be shown that personality is the creator of its own
attributes and essence, that it belongs to the concept of personality
in general to posit itself” (the “concept” or the personality"?) “as
limited, and again to abolish this limitation which it posits by its
universal essence, for precisely this essence is only the result of its
inner self-distinction of its activity” (Wigand, pp. 86, 87, 88).
[Bruno Bauer, “Charakteristik Ludwig Feuerbachs"]

In Die Heilige Familie (p. 220 ) Hegelian philosophy was represented
as a union of Spinoza and Fichte and at the same time the contradiction
involved in this was emphasised. The specific peculiarity of Saint
Bruno is that, unlike the authors of Die Heilige Familie, he does not
regard the question of the relation of selfconsciousness to substance as
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historic, even an absolute question. This is the sole form in which he is
capable of expressing the conflicts of the present day. He really believes
that the triumph of selfconsciousness over substance has a most
essential influence not only on European equilibrium but also on the
whole future development of the Oregon problem. As to the extent to
which the abolition of the Corn Laws in England depends on it, very
little has so far transpired.[42]
The abstract and nebulous expression into which a real collision is
distorted by Hegel is held by this “critical” mind to be the real collision
itself. Bruno accepts the speculative contradiction and upholds one part
of it against the other. A philosophical phrase about a real question is
for him the real question itself. Consequently, on the one hand, instead
of real people and their real consciousness of their social relations,
which apparently confront them as something independent, he has the
mere abstract expression: self-consciousness, just as, instead of real
production, he has the activity of this self-consciousness, which has
become independent. On the other hand, instead of real nature and the
actually existing social relations, he has the philosophical summing-up
of all the philosophical categories or names of these relations in the
expression: substance; for Bruno, along with all philosophers and
ideologists, erroneously regards thoughts and ideas — the independent
intellectual expression of the existing world — as the basis of this
existing world. It is obvious that with these two abstractions, which
have become senseless and empty, he can perform all kinds of tricks
without knowing anything at all about real people and their relations.
(See, in addition, what is said about substance in connection with
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Feuerbach and concerning “humane liberalism” and the “holy” in
connection with Saint Max.) Hence, he does not forsake the speculative
basis in order to solve the contradictions of speculation; he manoeuvres
while remaining on that basis, and he himself still stands so much on
the specifically Hegelian basis that the relation of “self-consciousness”
to the “absolute spirit” still gives him no peace. In short, we are
confronted with the philosophy of self-consciousness that was
announced in the der Synoptiker, carried out in Das entdenckte
Christenthum and which, unfortunately, was long ago anticipated in
Hegel’s Phänomenologie. This new philosophy of Bauer’s was
completely disposed of in Die Heilige Familie on page 220 et seq. and
on pages 304-07. Here, however, Saint Bruno even contrives to
caricature himself by smuggling in “personality”, in order to be able,
with Stirner, to portray the single individual as “his own product”, and
Stirner as Bruno’s product. This step forward deserves a brief notice.
First of all, let the reader compare this caricature with the original, the
explanation given of self-consciousness in Das entdeckte Christenthum,
page 113, and then let him compare this explanation with its prototype,
with Hegel’s Phänomenologie, pages 575, 583 and so on. (Both these
passages are reproduced in Die Heilige Familie, pages 221, 223, 224.)
But now let us turn to the caricature! “Personality in general"!
“Concept"! “Universal essence"! “To posit itself as limited and again to
abolish the limitation"! “Inner self-distinction"! What tremendous
“results"! “Personality ‘it general” is either nonsense “in general” or the
abstract concept of personality. Therefore, it is part of the “concept” of
the concept of personality to “posit itself as limited”. This limitation,
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which belongs to the “concept” of its concept, personality directly
afterwards posits “by its universal essence”. And after it has again
abolished this limitation, it turns out that “precisely this essence” is “the
result of its inner self-distinction”. The entire grandiose result of this
intricate tautology amounts, therefore, to Hegel’s familiar trick of the
self-distinction of man in thought, a self-distinction which the
unfortunate Bruno stubbornly proclaims to be the sole activity of
“personality in general”. A fairly long time ago it was pointed out to
Saint Bruno that there is nothing to be got from a “personality” whose
activity is restricted to these, by now trivial, logical leaps. At the same
time the passage quoted contains the naive admission that the essence
of Bauer’s “personality” is the concept of a concept, the abstraction of
an abstraction.
Bruno’s criticism of Feuerbach, insofar as It is new, is restricted to
hypocritically representing Stirner’s reproaches against Feuerbach and
Bauer as Bauer’s reproaches against Feuerbach. Thus, for example, the
assertions that the “essence of man is essence in general and something
holy”, that “man is the God of man”, that the human species is “the
Absolute”, that Feuerbach splits man “into an essential and an
inessential ego” (although Bruno always declares that the abstract is the
essential and, in his antithesis of criticism and the mass, conceives this
split as far more monstrous than Feuerbach does), that a struggle must
be waged against the “predicates of God”, etc. On the question of
selfish and selfless love, Bruno, polemising with Feuerbach, copies
Stirner almost word for word for three pages (pp. 133-35) just as he
very clumsily copies Stirner’s phrases: “every man is his own creation”,
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“truth is a ghost”, and so on. In addition, in Bruno the “creation” is
transformed into a “product”. We shall return to this exploitation of
Stirner by Saint Bruno.
Thus, the first thing that we discovered in Saint Bruno was his continual
dependence on Hegel. We shall not, of course, dwell further on the
remarks he has copied from Hegel, but shall only put together a few
more passages which show how firmly he believes in the power of the
philosophers and how he shares their illusion that a modified
consciousness, a new turn given to the interpretation of existing
relations, could overturn the whole hitherto existing world. imbued with
this faith, Saint Bruno also has one of his pupils certify — in issue IV
of Wigand’s quarterly, p. 327 — that his phrases on personality given
above, which were proclaimed by him in issue III, were “worldshattering ideas”. ["Ueber das Recht des Freigesprochenen..."]
Saint Bruno says (Wigand, p. 95) [Bruno Bauer, “Charakteristik
Ludwig Feuerbachs"]
“Philosophy has never been anything but theology reduced to its
most general form and given its most rational expression.”

This passage, aimed against Feuerbach, is copied almost word for word
from Feuerbach’s Philosophie der Zukunft (p. 2):
“Speculative philosophy is true, consistent, rational theology.”

Bruno continues:
“Philosophy, in alliance with religion, has always striven for the
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absolute dependence of the individual and has actually achieved
this by demanding and causing the absorption of the individual life
in universal life, of the accident in substance, of man in the absolute
spirit.”

As if Bruno’s “philosophy”, “in alliance with” Hegel’s, and his still
continuing forbidden association with theology, did not “demand”, if
not “cause”, the “absorption of man” in the idea of one of his
“accidents”, that of self-consciousness, as “substance"! Moreover, one
sees from this whole passage with what joy the church father with his
“pulpit eloquence” continues to proclaim his “world-shattering” faith in
the mysterious power of the holy theologians and philosophers. Of
course, in the interests of the “good cause of freedom and his own
cause”. [ironical allusion to Bauer’s book Die gute Sache der Freiheit
und meine eigene Angelegenheit]
On page 105 our god-fearing man has the insolence to reproach
Feuerbach:
“Feuerbach made of the individual, of the depersonalised man of
Christianity, not a man, not a true” (!) “real” (!!) “personal” (!!!)
“man” (these predicates owe their origin to Die Heilige Familie and
Stirner), “but an emasculated man, a slave” —

and thereby utters, inter alia, the nonsense that he, Saint Bruno, can
make people by means of the mind.
Further on in the same passage he says:
“According to Feuerbach the individual has to subordinate himself
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to the species, serve it. The species of which Feuerbach speaks is
Hegel’s Absolute, and it, too, exists nowhere.”

Here, as in all the other passages, Saint Bruno does not deprive himself
of the glory of making the actual relations of individuals dependent on
the philosophical interpretation of these relations. He has not the
slightest inkling of the correlation which exists between the concepts of
Hegel’s “absolute spirit” and Feuerbach’s “species” on the one hand
and the existing world on the other.
On page 104 the holy father is mightily shocked by the heresy with
which Feuerbach transforms the holy trinity of reason, love and will
into something that “is in individuals and over individuals”, as though,
in our day, every inclination, every impulse, every need did not assert
itself as a force “in the individual and over the individual”, whenever
circumstances hinder their satisfaction. If the holy father Bruno
experiences hunger, for example, without the means of appeasing it,
then even his stomach will become a force “in him and over him”.
Feuerbach’s mistake is not that he stated this fact but that in idealistic
fashion he endowed it with independence instead of regarding it as the
product of a definite and surmountable stage of historical development.
Page 111: “Feuerbach is a slave and his servile nature does not
allow him to fulfil the work of a man, to recognise the essence of
religion” (what a fine “work of a man"!)....... He does not perceive
the essence of religion because he does not know the bridge over
which he can make his way to the source of religion.”

Saint Bruno still seriously believes that religion has its own “essence”.
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As for the “bridge”, “over which” one makes one’s way to the “source
of religion”, this asses’ bridge [a pun in the original: Eselsbrücke —
asses’ bridge — an expedient used by dull or lazy people to understand
a difficult problem] must certainly be an aqueduct. At the same time
Saint Bruno establishes himself as a curiously modernised Charon who
has been retired owing to the building of the bridge, becoming a tollkeeper who demands a halfpenny from every person crossing the bridge
to the spectral realm of religion.
On page 120 the saint remarks:
“How could Feuerbach exist if there were no truth and truth were
only a spectre” (Stirner, help!') “of which hitherto man has been
afraid?”

The “man” who fears the “spectre” of “truth” is no other than the
worthy Bruno himself. Ten pages earlier, on p. 110, he had already let
out the following world-shattering cry of terror at the sight of the
“spectre” of truth:
“Truth which is never of itself encountered as a ready-made object
and which develops itself and reaches unity only in the unfolding of
personality.”

Thus, we have here not only truth, this spectre, transformed into a
person which develops itself and reaches unity, but in addition this trick
is accomplished in a third personality outside it, after the manner of the
tapeworm. Concerning the holy man’s former love affair with truth,
when he was still young and the lusts of the flesh still strong in him —
see Die Heilige Familie, p. 115 et seq.'
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How purified of all fleshly lusts and earthly desires our holy man now
appears is shown by his vehement polemic against Feuerbach’s
sensuousness. Bruno by no means attacks the highly restricted way in
which Feuerbach recognises sensuousness. He regards Feuerbach’s
unsuccessful attempt, since it is an attempt to escape ideology, as — a
sin. Of course! Sensuousness is lust of the eye, lust of the flesh and
arrogance [cf. 1 John 2:16] — horror and abomination [cf. Ezekiel
11:18] in the eyes of the Lord! Do you not know that to be fleshly
minded is death, but to be spiritually minded is life and peace; for to be
fleshly, minded is hostility to criticism, and everything of the flesh is of
this world. And do you not know that it is written: the works of the
flesh are manifest, they are adultery, fornication, uncleanness,
obscenity, idolatry, witchcraft, enmity, strife, envy, anger,
quarrelsomeness, discord, sinful gangs, hatred, murder, drunkenness,
gluttony and the like. [cf. Galatians 5:19-21] I prophesy to you, as I
prophesied before, that those who do such works will not inherit the
kingdom of criticism; but woe to them for in their thirst for delights
they are following the path of Cain and are falling into the error of
Balaam, and will perish in a rebellion, like that of Korah. These lewd
ones feast shamelessly on your alms, and fatten themselves. They are
clouds without water driven by the wind; bare, barren trees, twice dead
and uprooted; wild ocean waves frothing their own shame; errant stars
condemned to the gloom of darkness for ever. [cf. Jude 11-13] For we
have read that in the last days there will be terrible times, people will
appear who think much of themselves, lewd vilifiers who love
voluptuousness [cf. 2 Timothy 3:1-4] more than criticism, makers of
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sinful gangs, in short, slaves of the flesh. Such people are shunned by
Saint Bruno, who is spiritually minded and loathes the stained covering
of the flesh [cf. Jude 23] and for this reason he condemns Feuerbach,
whom he regards as the Korah of the gang, to remain outside together
with the dogs, the magicians, the debauched and the assassins. [cf.
Revelation 22:15] “Sensuousness” — ugh! Not only does it throw the
saintly church father into the most violent convulsions, but it even
makes him sing, and on page 121 he chants the “song of the end and the
end of the song”. Sensuousness — do you know, unfortunate one, what
sensuousness is? Sensuousness is — a “stick” (p. 130). Seized with
convulsions, Saint Bruno even wrestles on one occasion with one of his
own theses, just as Jacob of blessed memory wrestled with God, with
the one difference that God twisted Jacob’s thigh, while our saintly
epileptic twists all the limbs and ties of his own thesis, and so, by a
number of striking examples, makes clear the identity of subject and
object:
“Feuerbach may say what he likes ... all the same he destroys” (!)
“man... for he transforms the word man into a mere phrase ... for he
does not wholly make” and create” (!) “man, but raises the whole of
mankind to the Absolute, for in addition he declares not mankind,
but rather the senses to be the organ of the Absolute, and stamps
the sensuous — the object of the senses, of perception, of sensation
— as the Absolute, the indubitable and the immediately certain.
Whereby Feuerbach — such is Saint Bruno’s opinion — “can
undoubtedly shake layers of the air, but he cannot smash the
phenomena of human essence, because his innermost” (!) “essence
and his vitalising spirit [...] already destroys the external” (!)
“sound and makes it empty and jarring” (p. 121).
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Saint Bruno himself gives us mysterious but decisive disclosures about
the causes of his nonsensical attitude:
“As though my ego does not also possess just this particular sex,
unique, compared with all others, and these particular, unique sex
organs,” (Besides his “unique sex organs”, this noble-minded man
also possesses a special “unique sex"!)

This unique sex is explained on page 121 in the sense that:
“sensuousness, like a vampire, sucks all the marrow and blood from
the life of man; it is the insurmountable barrier against which man
has to deal himself a mortal blow”.

But even the saintliest man is not pure! They are all sinners and lack the
glory that they should have before “self-consciousness”. Saint Bruno,
who in his lonely cell at midnight struggles with “substance”, has his
attention drawn by the frivolous writings of the heretic Feuerbach to
women and female beauty. Suddenly his sight becomes less keen; his
pure self-consciousness is besmirched, and a reprehensible, sensuous
fantasy plays about the frightened critic with lascivious images. The
spirit is willing but the flesh is weak. [cf. Matthew 26:41] Bruno
stumbles, he falls, he forgets that he is the power that “with its strength
binds, frees and dominates the world”, [cf. ibid. 16:19] he forgets that
these products of his imagination are “spirit of his spirit”, he loses all
“self-control” and, intoxicated, stammers a dithyramb to female beauty,
to its “tenderness, softness, womanliness”, to the “full and rounded
limbs” and the “surging, undulating, seething, rushing and hissing,
wave-like structure of the body” of woman. Innocence, however,
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always reveals itself — even where it sins. Who does not know that a
“surging, undulating, wave-like structure of the body” is Something that
no eye has ever seen, or ear heard? Therefore — hush, sweet soul, the
spirit will soon prevail over the rebellious flesh and set an
insurmountable “barrier” to the overflowing, seething lusts, “against
which” they will soon deal themselves a “mortal blow”.
“Feuerbach” — the saint finally arrives at this through a critical
understanding of Die Heilige Familie — “is a materialist tempered
with and corrupted by humanism, i.e., a materialist who is unable to
endure the earth and its being” (Saint Bruno knows the being of the
earth as distinct from the earth itself, and knows how one should
behave in order to “endure the being of the earth"!) “but wants to
spiritualism himself and rise into heaven; and at the same time he is
a humanist who cannot think and build a spiritual world, but one
who is impregnated with materialism”, and so on (p. 123).

Just as for Saint Bruno humanism, according to this, consists in
thinking” and in “building a spiritual world”, so materialism consists in
the following:
“The materialist recognises only the existing, actual being, matter”
(as though man with all his attributes, including thought, were not
an “existing, actual being”), “and recognises it as actively
extending and realising itself in multiplicity, nature” (p. 123).

First, matter is an existing, actual being, but only in itself, concealed;
only when it “actively extends and realises itself in multiplicity” (an
“existing, actual being” “realises itself"!!), only then does it become
nature. First there exists the concept of matter, an abstraction, an idea,
and this latter realises itself in actual nature. Word for word the
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Hegelian theory of the pre-existence of the creative categories. From
this point of view it is understandable that Saint Bruno mistakes the
philosophical phrases of the materialists concerning matter for the
actual kernel and content of their world outlook.
2. Saint Bruno’s Views on the Struggle Between Feuerbach and
Stirner
Having thus admonished Feuerbach with a few weighty words, Saint
Bruno takes a look at the struggle between Feuerbach and the unique.
The first evidence of his interest in this struggle is a methodical, triple
smile.
“The critic pursues his path irresistibly, confident of victory, and
victorious. He is slandered — he smiles. He is called a heretic — he
smiles. The old world starts a crusade against him — he smiles.”

Saint Bruno — this is thus established — pursues his path but he does
not pursue it like other people, he follows a critical course, he
accomplishes this important action with a smile.
“He does smile his face into more lines than are in the new map,
with the augmentation of the Indies. 1 know my lady will strike
him: if she do, he'll smile and take it for a great art, [Shakespeare,
Twelfth Night, Act III, Scene 2. Marx and Engels quote these lines
front the German translation by August Wilhelm von Schlegel. But
they have substituted the word Kunst (art) for the word Gunst
(favour)] — like Shakespeare’s Malvolio.

Saint Bruno himself does not lift a finger to refute his two opponents,
he knows a better way of ridding himself of them, he leaves them —
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divide et impera — to their own quarrel. He confronts Stirner with
Feuerbach’s man (p. 124), and Feuerbach with Stirner’s unique (p. 126
et seq.); he knows that they are as incensed against each other as the
two Kilkenny cats in Ireland, which so completely devoured each other
that finally only their tails remained. [43] And Saint Bruno passes
sentence on these tails, declaring that they are “substance” and,
consequently, condemned to eternal damnation.
In confronting Feuerbach with Stirner he repeats what Hegel said of
Spinoza and Fichte, where, as we know, the punctiform ego is
represented as one, and moreover the most stable, aspect of substance.
However much Bruno formerly raged against egoism, which he even
considered the odor specificus of the masses, on page 129 he accepts
egoism from Stirner — only this should be “not that of Max Stirner”,
but, of course, that of Bruno Bauer. He brands Stirner’s egoism as
having the moral defect “that his ego for the support of its egoism
requires hypocrisy, deception, external violence”. For the rest, be
believes (see p. 124) in the critical miracles of Saint Max and sees in
the latter’s struggle (p. 126) “a real effort to radically destroy
substance”. Instead of dealing with Stirner’s criticism of Bauer’s “pure
criticism”, he asserts on p. 124 that Stirner’s criticism could affect him
just as little as any other, “because he himself is the critic”.
Finally Saint Bruno refutes both of thein, Saint Max and Feuerbach,
applying almost literally to Feuerbach and Stirner the antithesis drawn
by Stirner between the critic Bruno Bauer and the dogmatist.
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Wigand, p. 138: “Feuerbach puts himself in opposition to, and
thereby” (!) “stands in opposition to, the unique. He is a communist
and wants to be one. The unique is an egoist and has to he one; he
is the holy one, the other the profane one, he is the good one, the
other the evil one, he is God, the other is man. Both are
dogmatists.”

The point is, therefore, that he accuses both of dogmatism.
Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum, p. 194: “The critic is afraid of
becoming dogmatic or of putting forward dogmas. Obviously, he
would then become the opposite of a critic, a dogmatist; he who as
a critic was good, would now become evil, or from being unselfish”
(a Communist) “would become an egoist, etc. Not a single dogma!
— that is his dogma.”

3. Saint Bruno Versus the Authors of Die Heilige Familie
Saint Bruno, who has disposed of Feuerbach and Stirner in the manner
indicated and who has “cut the unique off from all progress”, now turns
against the apparent “consequences of Feuerbach”, the German
Communists and, especially, the authors of Die Heilige Familie. The
expression “real humanism”, which he found in the preface to this
polemic treatise, provides the main basis of his hypothesis. He will
recall a passage from the Bible:
“And I, brethren, could not speak unto you as unto spiritual, but as
unto carnal” (in our case it was just the opposite), “even as unto
babes in Christ. I have fed you with milk, and not with meat: for
hitherto ye were not able to bear it” (1 Corinthians, 3: 1-2).

The first impression that Die Heilige Familie made on the worthy
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church father was one of profound distress and serious, respectable
sorrow. The one good side of the book is that it
“showed what Feuerbach had to become, and the position his
philosophy can adopt, if it desires to fight against criticism” (p.
138),

that, consequently, it combined in an easy-going way “desiring” with
“what can be” and “what must he”, but this good side does not outweigh its many distressing sides. Feuerbach’s philosophy, which
strangely enough is presupposed here,
“dare not and cannot understand the critic, dare not and cannot
know and perceive criticism in its development, dare not and
cannot know that, in relation to all that is transcendental, criticism
is a constant struggle and victory, a continual destruction and
creation, the sole” (!) “creative and productive principle. It dare not
and cannot know how the critic has worked, and still works, to
posit and to make” (!) “the transcendental forces, which up to now
have suppressed mankind and not allowed it to breathe and live,
into what they really are, the spirit of the spirit, the innermost of
the innermost, a native thing” (!) “out of and in the native soil,
products and creations of self-consciousness. It dare not and cannot
know that the critic and only the critic has smashed religion in its
entirety, and the state in its various manifestations, etc.” (pp.
138,139).

Is this not an exact copy of the ancient Jehovah, who runs after his
errant people who found greater delight in the cheerful pagan gods, and
cries out:
“Hear me, Israel, and close not your ear, Judah! Am I not the Lord
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your God, who led you out of the land of Egypt into the land
flowing with milk and honey, and behold, from your earliest youth
you have done evil in my sight and angered me with the work of
my hands and turned your back unto me and not your face towards
me, though 1 invariably tutored you; and you have brought
abominations into my house to defile it, and built the high places of
Baal in the valley of the son of Himmon, which 1 did not
command, and it never entered my head that you should do such
abominations; and 1 have sent to you my servant Jeremiah, to
whom I did address my word, beginning with the thirteenth year of
the reign of King Josiah, son of Amon, unto this day — and for
twenty-three years now he has been zealously preaching to you, but
ye have not harkened. Therefore says the Lord God: Who has ever
heard the like of the virgin of Israel doing such an abomination. For
rain water does not disappear so quickly as my people forgets me. 0
earth, earth, earth, hear the word of the Lord!” [cf. Jeremiah 2:6,
32:22, 30, 33-35, 25:3, 19:3, 18:13, 14, 22:29]

Thus, in a lengthy speech on “to dare” and “to be able”, Saint Bruno
asserts that his communist opponents have misunderstood him. The
way in which he describes criticism in this recent speech, the way in
which he transforms the former forces that suppressed ‘,the life of
mankind” into “transcendental forces”, and these transcendental forces
into the “spirit of the spirit”, and the way in which he presents
“criticism” as the sole branch of production proves that the apparent
misconception is nothing but a disagreeable conception. We proved that
Bauer’s criticism is beneath all criticism, owing to which we have
inevitably become dogmatists. He even in all seriousness reproaches us
for our insolent disbelief in his ancient phrases. The whole mythology
of independent concepts, with Zeus the Thunderer — selfconsciousness — at the head, is paraded here once again to the “jingling
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of hackneyed phrases of a whole janissary band of current categories”.
(Literatur-Zeitung, cf. Die Heilige Familie, p. 234). First of all, of
course, the myth of the creation of the world, i.e., of the hard “1abour”
of the critic, which is “the sole creative and productive principle, a
constant struggle and victory, a continual destruction and creation”,
“working” and “having worked”. Indeed, the reverend father even
reproaches Die Heilige Familie for understanding “criticism” in the
same way as he understands it himself in the present rejoinder. After
taking back “substance” “into the land of its birth, self-consciousness,
the criticising and” (since Die Heilige Familie also) “the criticised man,
and discarding it” (self-consciousness here seems to take the place of
an ideological lumber-room), he continues:
“It” (the alleged philosophy of Feuerbach) “dare not know that
criticism and the critics, as long as they have existed” (!)"have
guided and made history, that even their opponents and all the
movements and agitations of the present time are their creation, that
it is they alone who hold power in their hands, because strength is
in their consciousness, and because they derive power from
themselves, from their deeds, from criticism, from’ their opponents,
from their creations; that only by the act of criticism is man freed.
and thereby men also, and man is created” (!) “and thereby
mankind as well”.

Thus, criticism and the critics are first of all two wholly different
subjects, existing and operating apart from each other. The critic is a
subject different from criticism, and criticism is a subject different from
the critic. This personified criticism, criticism as a subject, is precisely
that “ critical criticism” against which Die Heilige Familie was
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directed. “Criticism and the critics, as long as they have existed, have
guided and made history.” It is clear that they could not do so “as long
as they” did not “exist”, and it is equally clear that “as long as they have
existed” they “made history” in their own fashion. Finally, Saint Bruno
goes so far as to “dare and be able” to give us one of the most profound
explanations about the state-shattering power of criticism, namely, that
“criticism and the critics hold power in their hands, because” (a fine
“because"!) “strength is in their consciousness”, and, secondly, that
these great manufacturers of history “hold power in their hands”,
because they “derive power from themselves and from criticism” (i.e.,
again from themselves) — whereby it is still, unfortunately, not proven
that it is possible to “derive” anything at all from there, from
“themselves”, from “criticism”. On the basis of criticism’s own words,
one should at least believe that it must be difficult to “derive” from
there anything more than the category of “substance” “discarded” there.
Finally, criticism also “derives” “from criticism” “power” for a highly
monstrous oracular dictum. For it reveals to us a secret that was hidden
[cf. Colossians 1 :26] from our fathers and unknown to our
grandfathers, the secret that “only by the act of criticism is man created,
and thereby mankind as well” — whereas, up to now, criticism was
erroneously regarded as an act of people who existed prior to it owing
to quite different acts. Hence it seems that Saint Bruno himself came
“into the world, from the world, and to the world” through “criticism”,
i.e., by generatio aequiioca [spontaneous generation]. All this is,
perhaps, merely another interpretation of the following passage from
the Book of Genesis: And Adam knew, i.e., criticised, Eve his wife: and
she conceived, [cf. Genesis 4: 1] etc.
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Thus we see here the whole familiar critical criticism, which was
already sufficiently characterised in Die Heilige Familie, confronting us
again with all its trickery as though nothing had happened. There is no
need to be surprised at this, for the saint himself complains, on page
140, that Die Heilige Familie “cuts criticism off from all progress”.
With the greatest indignation Saint Bruno reproaches the authors of Die
Heilige Familie because, by means of a chemical process, they
evaporated Bauer’s criticism from its “fluid” state into a crystalline”
state.
It follows that “institutions of mendicancy”, the “baptismal certificate
of adulthood”, the “regions of pathos and thunder-like aspects”, the
“Mussulman conceptual affliction” (Die Heilige Familie, pp. 2, 3, 4
according to the critical Literatur-Zeitung) — all this is nonsense only
if it is understood in the “crystalline” manner. And the twenty-eight
historical howlers of which criticism was proved guilty in its excursion
on “Englische Tagesfragen” [article by Julius Faucher] — are they not
errors when looked at from the “fluid” point of view? Does criticism
insist that, from the fluid point of view, it prophesied a priori the
Nauwerck conflict [44] — long after this had taken place before its eyes
— and did not construct it post festum? Does it still insist that the word
marichal could mean “farrier” from the “crystalline” point of view, but
from the “fluid” point of view at any rate must mean marshal"? Or that
although in the “crystalline” conception “un fait physique” may mean
“a physical fact”, the true “fluid” translation should be “a fact of
physics"? Or that “la malveillance de nos bourgeois juste-milieux” [the
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ill will of our middle-of-the-road bourgeois] in the “fluid” state still
means “the care-freeness of our good burghers"? Does it insist that,
from the “fluid” point of view, “a child that does not, in its turn,
become a father or mother is essentially a daughter"? That someone can
have the task “of representing, as it were, the last tear of grief shed by
the past"? That the various concierges, lions, grisettes, marquises,
scoundrels and wooden doors in Paris in their “fluid” form are nothing
but phases of the mystery “in whose concept in general it belongs to
posit itself as limited and again to abolish this limitation which is
posted by its universal essence, for precisely this essence is only the
result of its inner self-distinction, its activity"[Bruno Bauer,
“Charakteristik Ludwig Feuerbachs"]? That critical criticism in the
“fluid” sense “pursues its path irresistibly, victorious and confident of
victory”, when in dealing with a question it first asserts that it has
revealed its “true and general significance” and then admits that it “had
neither the will nor the right to go beyond criticism”, and finally admits
that “it had still to take one step but that step was impossible because —
it was impossible” (Die Heilige Familie, p. 184)? That from the “fluid”
point of view “the future is still the work” of criticism, although “fate
may decide as it will” [B. Bauer, “Neueste Schriften Über die
Judenfrage"]? That from the fluid point of view criticism achieved
nothing superhuman when it “came into contradiction with its true
elements — a contradiction which had already found its solution in
these same elements [ B. Bauer, “Was ist jetzt der Gegenstand der
Kritik?"]?
The authors of Die Heilige Familie have indeed committed the frivolity
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of conceiving these and hundreds of other statements as statements
expressing firm, “crystalline” nonsense — but the synoptic gospels
should be read in a “fluid” way, i.e., according to the sense of their
authors. and on no account in a “crystalline” way, e., according to their
actual nonsense, in order to arrive at true faith and to admire the
harmony of the critical household.
“Engels and Marx, therefore, know only the criticism of the
Literatur-Zeitung” [Bruno Bauer, “Charakteristik Ludwig
Feuerbachs"]

— a deliberate lie, proving how “fluidly” our saint has read a book in
which his latest works are depicted merely as the culmination of all the
“work he has done”. But the church father lacked the calm to read in a
crystalline way, for he fears his opponents as rivals who contest his
canonisation and “want to deprive him of his sanctity, in order to make
themselves sanctified”.
Let us, incidentally, note the fact that, according to Saint Bruno’s
present statement, his Literatur-Zeitung by no means aimed at founding
“social society” or at “representing, as it were, the last tear of grief”
shed by German ideology, nor did it aim at putting mind in the sharpest
opposition to the mass and developing critical criticism in all its purity,
but only — at “depicting the liberalism and radicalism of 1842 and their
echoes in their half-heartedness and phrase-mongering”, hence at
combating the “echoes” of what has long disappeared. Tant de bruit
pour une omelette! [Much ado about an omelette! An exclamation
which Jacques Vallé, Sieur des Barreaux, is supposed to have made
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when a thunderstorm occurred while he was eating an omelette on a fastday] Incidentally, it is just here that the conception of history peculiar to
German theory is again shown in its “purest” light. The year 1842 is
held to be the period of the greatest brilliance of German liberalism,
because at that time philosophy took part in politics. Liberalism
vanishes for the critic with the cessation of the Deutsche Jahrbücher
and the Rheinische Zeitung, the organs of liberal and radical theory.
After that, apparently, there remain only the “echoes” — whereas in
actual fact only now, when the German bourgeoisie feels a real need for
political power, a need produced by economic relations, and is striving
to satisfy has liberalism in Germany an actual existence and thereby 1
the chance of some success.
Saint Bruno’s profound distress over Die Heilige Familie did not allow
him to criticise this work “out of himself, through himself and with
himself”. To be able to master his pain he had first to obtain the work in
a “fluid” form. He found this fluid form in a confused review, teeming
with misunderstandings, in the Westphälische Dampfboot, May issue,
pp. 206-14 All his quotations are taken from passages quoted in the
Westphälische Dampfboot and he quotes nothing that is not quoted
there.
The language of the saintly critic is likewise determined by the
language of the Westphalian critic. In the first place, all the statements
from the Foreword which are quoted by the Westphalian (Dampfboot,
p. 206) are transferred to the Wigand’sche Vierteljahrsschrift (pp. 140,
141). This transference forms the chief part of Bauer’s criticism,
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according to the old principle already recommended by Hegel:
“To trust common sense and, moreover, in order to keep up with
the times and advance with philosophy, to read reviews of
philosophical works, perhaps even their prefaces and introductory
paragraphs; for the latter give the general principles on which
everything turns, while the former give, along with the historical
information, also an appraisal which, because it is an appraisal,
even goes beyond that which is appraised This beaten track can be
followed in one’s dressing-gown; but the elevated feeling of the
eternal, the sacred, the infinite, pursues its path in the vestments of
a high priest, a path” which, as we have seen, Saint Bruno also
knows how to “pursue” while “striking down” (Hegel,
Phänomenologie, p. 54).

The Westphalian critic, after giving a few quotations from the preface,
continues:
“Thus the preface itself leads to the battlefield of the book”, etc. (p.
206).

The saintly critic, having transferred these quotations into the
Wigand’sche Vierteljahrsschrift, makes a more subtle distinction and
says:
“Such is the terrain and the enemy which Engels and Marx have
created for battle.”

From the discussion of the critical proposition: “the worker creates
nothing”, the Westphalian critic gives only the summarising conclusion.
The saintly critic actually believes that this is all that was said about the
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proposition, copies out the Westphalian quotation on page 141 and
rejoices at the discovery that only “assertions” have been put forward in
opposition to criticism.
Of the examination of the critical outpourings about love, the
Westphalian critic on page 209 first writes out the corpus delicti in part
and then a few disconnected sentences from the refutation, which he
desires to use as an authority for his nebulous, sickly-sweet
sentimentality.
On pages 141-42 the saintly critic copies him out word for word,
sentence by sentence, in the same order as his predecessor quotes.
The Westphalian critic exclaims over the corpse of Herr Julius Faucher:
“Such is the fate of the beautiful on earth!”. [Schiller. Wallenstein’s
Tod, Act IV, Scene 12]
The saintly critic cannot finish his “hard work” without appropriating
this exclamation to use irrelevantly on page 142.
The Westphalian critic on page 212 gives a would-be summary of the
arguments which are aimed against Saint Bruno himself in Die Heilige
Familie.
The saintly critic cheerfully and literally copies out all this stuff
together with all the Westphalian exclamations. He has not the slightest
idea that nowhere in the whole of this polemic discourse does anyone
reproach hint for “transforming the problem of political emancipation
into that of human emancipation”, for “wanting to kill the Jews”, for
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“transforming the Jews into theologians”, for “transforming Hegel into
Herr Hinrichs”, etc. Credulously, the saintly critic repeats the
Westphalian critic’s allegation that in Die Heilige Familie Marx
volunteers to provide some sort of little scholastic treatise “in reply to
Bauer’s silly self-apotheosis”. Yet the words “silly self-apotheosis”,
which Saint Bruno gives as a quotation, are nowhere to be found in the
whole of Die Heilige Familie, but they do occur with the Westphalian
critic. Nor is the little treatise offered as a reply to the “self-apology” of
criticism on pages 150-63 of Die Heilige Familie, but only in the
following section on page 165, in connection with the world-historic
question: “Why did Herr Bauer have to engage in politics?”
Finally on page 143 Saint Bruno presents Marx as an “amusing
comedian”, here again following his Westphalian model, who resolved
the “world-historic drama of critical criticism”, on page 213, into a
“most amusing comedy”.
Thus one sees how the opponents of critical criticism “dare and can”
“know how the critic has worked, and still works"!
4. Obituary For “M. Hess”
“What Engels and Marx could not yet do, M. Hess has
accomplished.”

Such is the great, divine transition which — owing to the relative “can”
and “cannot” be done of the evangelists — has taken so firm a hold of
the holy man’s fingers that it has to find a place, relevantly or
irrelevantly, in every article of the church father.
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“What Engels and Marx could not yet do, M. Hess has accomplished.”
But what is this “what” that “Engels and Marx could not yet do"?
Nothing more nor less, indeed, than — to criticise Stirner. And why
was it that Engels and Marx “could not yet” criticise Stirner? For the
sufficient reason that — Stirner’s book had not yet appeared when they
wrote Die Heilige Familie.
This speculative trick — of joining together everything and bringing the
most diverse things into an apparent causal relation — has truly taken
possession not only of the head of our saint but also of his fingers. With
him it has become devoid of any contents and degenerates into a
burlesque manner of uttering tautologies with an important mien. For
example, already in the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung (1, 5) we read:
“The difference between my work and the pages which, for
example, a Philippson covers with writing” (that is, the empty pages
on which, “for example, a Philippson” writes) “must, therefore, be
so constituted as in fact it is"!!! [Bauer, “Neueste Schriften über die
Judenfrage"]

“M. Hess”, for whose writings Engels and Marx take absolutely no
responsibility, seems such a strange phenomenon to the saintly critic
that he is only capable of copying long excerpts from Die letzten
Philosophen and passing the judgment that “on some points this
criticism has not understood Feuerbach or also” (O theology!) “the
vessel wishes to rebel against the potter”. Cf. Epistle to the Romans, 9:
20-21. Having once more performed the “hard work” of quoting, our
saintly critic finally arrives at the conclusion that Hess copies from
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Hegel, since he uses the two words “united” and “development”. Saint
Bruno, of course, had in a round-about way to try to turn against
Feuerbach the proof given in Die Heilige Familie of his own complete
dependence on Hegel.
“See, that is how Bauer had to end! He fought as best he could against
all the Hegelian categories”, with the exception of selfconsciousness —
particularly in the glorious struggle of the Literatur-Zeitung against
Herr Hinrichs. How he fought and conquered them we have already
seen. For good measure, let us quote Wigand, page 110, where he
asserts that
the “true” (1) “solution” (2) “of contradictions” (3) “in nature and
history” (4), the “true unity” (5) “of separate relations” (6), the
“genuine” (7) “basis” (8) “and abyss” (9) “of religion, the truly
infinite” (10), “irresistible, self-creative” (11) “personality” (12)
“has not yet been found”.

These three lines contain not two doubtful Hegelian categories, as in the
case of Hess, but a round dozen of “true, infinite, irresistible” Hegelian
categories which reveal themselves as such by ‘,the true unity of
separate relations” — “see, that is how Bauer had to end"! And if the
holy man thinks that in Hess he has discovered a Christian believer, not
because Hess “hopes” — as Bruno says — but because he does not
hope and because he talks of the “resurrection”, then our great church
father enables us, on the basis of this same page 1 10, to demonstrate
his very pronounced Judaism. He declares there
“that the true, living man in the flesh has not yet been born"!!! (a
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new elucidation about the determination of the “unique sex”) “and
the mongrel produced” (Bruno Bauer?!?) “is not yet a le to master
all dogmatic formulas”, etc.

That is to say, the Messiah is not yet born, the son of man has first to
come into the world and this world, being the world of the Old
Testament, is still under the rod of the law, of “dogmatic formulas”.
Just as Saint Bruno, as shown above, made use of “Engels and Marx”
for a transition to Hess, so now the latter serves him to bring Feuerbach
finally into causal connection with his excursions on Stirner, Die heilige
Familie and Die letzten Philosophen.
“See, that is how Feuerba.ch had to end!” “Philosophy had to end
piously”, etc. (Wigand, p. 145.)

The true causal connection, however, is that this exclamation is an
imitation of a passage from Hess’ Die letzten Philosophen aimed
against Bauer, among others (Preface, p. 4):
“Thus, [... ] and in no other way had the last offspring of the
Christian ascetics to take farewell of the world.”

Saint Bruno ends his speech for the prosecution against Feuerbach and
his alleged accomplices with the reproach to Feuerbach that all he can
do is to “trumpet”, to “blow blasts on a trumpet”, whereas Monsieur B.
Bauer or Madame la critique, the “mongrel produced”, to say nothing of
the continual “destruction”, “drives forth in his triumphal chariot and
gathers new triumphs” (p. 125), “hurls down from the throne” (p. 119),
“slays” (p. 111), “strikes down like thunder” (p. 115), “destroys once
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and for all” (p. 120), “shatters” (p. 121), allows nature merely to
“vegetate” (p. 120), builds “stricter” (!) “prisons” (p. 104) and, finally,
with “crushing” pulpit eloquence expatiates, on p. 105, in a brisk, pious,
cheerful and free ["Brisk, pious, cheerful and free” (“frisch, fromm,
fröhlich und frei”) — the initial words of a students’ saying, which
were turned by Ludwig Jahn into the motto of the sport movement he
initiated] fashion on the “stably-strongly-firmly-existing”, hurling “rocklike matter and rocks” at Feuerbach’s head (p. 110) and, in conclusion,
by a side thrust vanquishes Saint Max as well, by adding “the most
abstract abstractness” and “the hardest hardness” (on p. 124) to “critical
criticism”, “social society” and “rock-like matter and rocks”.
All this Saint Bruno accomplished “through himself, in himself and
with himself”, because he is “He himself”; indeed, he is “himself
always the greatest and can always be the greatest” (is and can be!)
“through himself, in himself and with himself” (p. 136). That’s that.
Saint Bruno would undoubtedly be dangerous to the female sex, for he
is an “irresistible personality”, if “in the same measure on the other
hand” he did not fear “sensuousness as the barrier against which man
has to deal himself a mortal blow”. Therefore, “through himself, in
himself and with himself” he will hardly pluck any flowers but rather
allow them to wither in infinite longing and hysterical yearning for the
“irresistible personality”, who “possesses this unique sex and these
unique, particular sex organs”.
[The following passage is crossed out in the manuscript:]
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5. Saint Bruno in His “Triumphal Chariot”
Before leaving our church father “victorious and confident of victory”,
let us for a moment mingle with the gaping crowd that comes up
running just as eagerly when he “drives forth in his triumphal chariot
and gathers new triumphs” as when General Tom Thumb with his four
ponies provides a diversion. It is not surprising that we hear the
humming of street-songs, for to be welcomed with street-songs
“belongs after all to the concept” of triumph “in general”.
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Karl Marx and Frederick Engels
A Critique of the German Ideology

Abstract of Chapter 3

[Idealist mistakes &
Materialist corrections]
Idealist misconceptions
On Hierachy
On Religion
Consciousness throughout history
An idealist conception of Humans
On Language & Idealism

Individuality according to
Materialism
Individualism created
Individualism in a class perspective
Relation of individual to class interests
The role of will in the desires of an individual
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Needs being the vocation of all human beings
Role of individual will in foundation of the state
Individuals and their relationships
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Alienation due to private property
Relation of the bourgeois to the capitalist state
On Competition

The German ideology was never published in
Marx or Engels lifetime. When the manuscript
was discovered, tattered and worn down, the
full book was published by the Institute of
Marxism in the USSR. Since its publication,
the first chapter received enormous popularity
as an excellent overview of the materialist
conception of history, while at the same time,
the second and third chapter received
unanimous notoriety for being drastically less
helpful to all but the most dedicated scholars
of Marxism.
While Chapters 2 & 3 are easy to neglect,
there are portions of material where Marx and
Engels were explaining their theory instead of
critiquing others. The only criteria used for
selecting material for this collection was simply
that information where Marx and Engels
explained their own theories.
If you would like to read their critique of Saint
Max and Saint Bruno then read the full book;
about a quarter of Chapters 2 & 3 are
dedicated solely to a critique. Nearly the entire
remainder of the book is a repetition of Saint
Max and Saint Bruno's writings, very
meticulously and thoroughly reproduced.
Paragraphs have been introduced to the
selected passages for easier reading, and
section headers have been inserted.
Information abstracted by Brian Basgen, 2000.
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Personal Competition
The monetary crisis

Idealism

" Hierarchy is the domination of thought , the domination of the
spirit.... Hierarchy is the supreme domination of spirit ."

In the foregoing presentation Jacques le bonhomme conceives history
merely as the product of abstract thoughts — or, rather, of his notions
of abstract thoughts — as governed by these notions, which, in the final
analysis, are all resolved into the "holy". This domination of the "holy",
of thought, of the Hegelian absolute idea over the incurable world he
further betrays as a historical relation existing at the present time, as the
domination of the holy ones, the ideologies, over the vulgar world — as
a hierarchy. In this hierarchy, what previously appeared consecutively
exists side-by-side, so that one of the two co-existing forms of
development rules over the other...
The outcome, of course, is bound to be that the domination which the
"world of thoughts" exercises from the outset in history is at the end of
the latter also presented as the real, actually existing domination of the
thinkers — and, as we shall see, in the final analysis, as the domination
of the speculative philosophers — over the world of things, so that
Saint Max has only to fight against thoughts and ideas of the ideologies
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and to overcome them, in order to make himself "possessor of the world
of things in the world of thoughts".
p. 186 [MECW p. 172]

As for the actual hierarchy of the Middle Ages, we shall merely note
here that it did not exist for the people, for the great mass of human
beings. For the great mass only feudalism existed, and hierarchy only
existed insofar as it was itself either feudal or anti-feudal (within the
framework of feudalism). Feudalism itself had entirely empirical
relations as its basis. Hierarchy and struggle against feudalism (the
struggle of the ideologies of a class against the class itself) are only the
ideological expression of feudalism and of the struggles developing
within feudalism itself — which include also the struggles of the
feudally organized nations among themselves. Hierarchy is the ideal
form of feudalism; feudalism is a political form of the medieval
relations of production and intercourse. Consequently, the struggle of
feudalism against hierarchy can only be explained by elucidating these
practical material relations. This elucidation of itself puts an end to the
previous conception of history which took the illusions of the Middle
Ages on trust, in particular those illusions which the Emperor and the
Pope brought to bear in their struggle against each other.
p. 190 [MECW p. 176]

We now come to present-day hierarchy, to the domination of the idea in
ordinary life.... Since the middle class demand love for their kingdom,
their regime, they want, according to Jacques le bonhomme, to
"establish the kingdom of love on earth". (p. 98) Since they demand
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respect for their domination and for the conditions in which it is
exercised, and therefore want to usurp domination over respect, they
demand, according to this worthy man [Jacques le bonhomme], the
domination of respect as such, their attitude towards respect is the same
as towards the holy spirit dwelling within them. (p. 95) Jacques le
bonhomme, with his faith that can move mountains, takes as the actual,
earthly basis of the bourgeois world the distorted form in which the
sanctimonious and hypocritical ideology of the bourgeoisie voices their
particular interests as universal interests. Why this ideological delusion
assumes precisely this form for our Saint, we shall see in connection
with "political liberalism".
p. 193-4 [MECW p. 176]

On Religion
In religion people make their empirical world into an entity that is only
conceived, imagined, that confronts them as something foreign. This
again is by no means to be explained from other concepts, from "selfconsciousness" and similar nonsense, but from the entire hitherto
existing mode of production and intercourse, which is just as
independent of the pure concept as the invention of the self-acting mule
and the use of railways are independent of Hegelian philosophy. If he
wants to speak of an "essence" of religion, i.e., of a material basis of
this inessentiality, then he should look for it neither in the "essence of
man", nor in the predicate of God, but in the material world which each
stage of religious development finds in existence.
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p. 172 [MECW p. 160]

The only reason why Christianity wanted to free us from the
domination of the flesh and "desires as a driving force" was because it
regarded our flesh, our desires as something foreign to us; it wanted to
free us from determination by nature only because it regarded our own
nature as not belonging to us.
For if I myself am not nature, if my natural desires, my whole natural
character, do not belong to myself — and this is the doctrine of
Christianity — then all determination by nature — whether due to my
own natural character or to what is known as external nature — seems
to me a determination by something foreign, a fetter, compulsion used
against me, heteronomy as opposed to autonomy of the spirit .
Incidentally, Christianity has indeed never succeeded in freeing us from
the domination of desires.
p. 272 [MECW p. 254]

Consciousness throughout history
[In ancient times] the ideas and thoughts of people were, of course,
ideas and thoughts about themselves and their relationships, their
consciousness of themselves and of people in general — for it was the
consciousness not merely of a single individual but of the individual in
his interconnection with the whole of society and about the whole of the
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society in which they live.
The conditions, independent of them, in which they produce their life,
the necessary forms of intercourse connected herewith, and the personal
and social relations thereby given, had to take the form — insofar as
they were expressed in thoughts — of ideal conditions and necessary
relations, i.e., they had to be expressed in consciousness as
determinations arising from the concept of man as such , from human
essence, from the nature of man, from man as such . What people were,
what their relations were, appeared in consciousness as ideas of man as
such , of his modes of existence or of his immediate conceptual
determinations.
So, after the ideologists had assumed that ideas and thoughts had
dominated history up to now, that the history of these ideas and
thoughts constitutes all history up to now, after they had imagined that
real conditions had conformed to man as such and his ideal conditions,
i.e., to conceptual determinations, after they had made the history of
people's consciousness of themselves the basis of their actual history,
after all this, nothing was easier than to call the history of
consciousness, of ideas, of the holy, of established concepts — the
history of "man" and to put it in the place of real history.
p. 198 [MECW p. 183]

An idealist conception of Humans
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Sancho raises the important question:
"But how to curb the inhuman being who dwells in each individual?
How can one manage not to set free the inhuman being along with
the human being?.... At the side of the human being there's always
the inhuman being, that egoist, the individual. State, society,
mankind cannot master this devil."

In the form in which Sancho understands it, the question again becomes
sheer nonsense. He imagines that people up to now have always formed
a concept of man, and then won freedom for themselves to the extent
that was necessary to realize this concept; that the measure of freedom
that they achieved was determined each time by their idea of the ideal
of man at the time; it was thus unavoidable that in each individual there
remained a residue which did not correspond to this ideal and, hence,
since it was "inhuman", was either not set free or only freed malgre eux
.
In reality, of course, what happened was that people won freedom for
themselves each time to the extent that was dictated and permitted not
by their ideal of man, but by the existing productive forces. All
emancipation carried through hitherto has been based, however, on
unrestricted productive forces. The production which these productive
forces could provide was insufficient for the whole of society and made
development possible only if some persons satisfied their needs at the
expense of others, and therefore some — the minority — obtained the
monopoly of development, while others — the majority — owing to the
constant struggle to satisfy their most essential needs, were for the time
being (i.e., until the creation of new revolutionary productive forces)
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excluded from any development.
Thus, society has hitherto always developed within the framework of a
contradiction — in antiquity the contradiction between freemen and
slaves, in the Middle Ages that between nobility and serfs, in modern
times that between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. This explains, on
the one hand, the abnormal, "inhuman" way in which the oppressed
class satisfies its needs, and, on the other hand, the narrow limits within
which intercourse, and with it the whole ruling class, develops. And this
restricted character of development consists not only in the exclusion of
one class from development, but also in the narrowmindedness of the
excluding class, and the "inhuman" is to be found also within the ruling
class.
This so-called "inhuman" is just as much a product of present-day
relations as the "human" is; it is their native aspect, the rebellion —
which is not based on any new revolutionary productive force —
against the prevailing relations brought about by the existing productive
forces, and against the way of satisfying needs that correspond to these
relations. The positive expression "human" corresponds to the definite
relations predominate at a certain stage of production in the way of
satisfying needs determined by them, just as the negative expression
"inhuman" corresponds to the attempt to negate these predominate
relations in the way of satisfying needs prevailing under them without
changing the existing mode of production, an attempt that this stage of
production daily engenders afresh.
p. 457 [MECW p. 431]
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On Language & Idealism
One of the most difficult tasks confronting philosophers is to descend
from the world of thought to the actual world. Language is the
immediate actuality of thought. Just as philosophers have given thought
an independent existence, so they were bound to make language into an
independent realm. This is a secret of philosophical language, in which
thoughts in the form of words have their own content. The problem of
descending from the world of thoughts to the actual world is turned into
the problem of descending from language to life.
We have shown [in Chapter 1] that thoughts and ideas acquire an
independent existence in consequence of the personal circumstances
and relations of individuals acquiring independent existence. We have
shown that exclusive, systematic occupation with these thoughts on the
part of ideologists and philosophers, and hence the systemization of
these thoughts, is a consequence of division of labour, and that, in
particular, German philosophy is a consequence of German pettybourgeois conditions. The philosophers have only to dissolve their
language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in
order to recognize it as the distorted language of the actual world and to
realize that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of
their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life.
p. 472-3 MECW p. 446

We have seen that the whole problem of the transition from thought to
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reality, hence from language to life, exists only in philosophical
illusion, i.e., it is justified only for philosophical consciousness, which
cannot possibly be clear about the nature and origin of its apparent
separation from life. This great problem, insofar as it at all entered the
minds of our ideologists, was bound, of course, to result of finely in one
of these knights-errant setting out in search of a word which, as a word ,
formed the transition in question, which, as a word, ceases to be simply
a word, and which, as a word, in a mysterious super linguistic manner,
points from within the language to the actual object it denotes; which,
in short, plays among words the same role as the Redeeming God-Man
plays among people in Christian fantasy. The emptiest, shallowest brain
among the philosophers had to "end" philosophy by proclaiming his
lack of thought to be the end of philosophy and thus the triumphant
entry into "corporal" life. His philosophizing mental vacuity was
already in itself the end of philosophy just as his unspeakable language
was the end of all language.
p. 475 [MECW p. 449]

Individuality
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Critique: "humans create themselves out of nothing"
Far from it being true that "out of nothing" I make myself, for example,
a "[public] speaker", the nothing which forms the basis here is a very
manifold something, the real individual, his speech organs, a definite
stage of physical development, an existing language and dialects, ears
capable of hearing and a human environment from which it is possible
to hear something, etc., etc. therefore, in the development of a property
something is created by something out of something, and by no means
comes, as in Hegel's Logic, from nothing, through nothing to nothing.
[Th. I. Abt. 2 of Hegel]
p. 162 [MECW p. 150]

Individualism in a class perspective
When the narrow-minded bourgeois says to the Communists: by
abolishing property, i.e., my existence as a capitalist, as a landed
proprietor, as a factory owner, and your existence as workers, you
abolished my individuality and your own; by making it impossible for
me to exploit you, the workers, to rake in my profit, interest or rent, you
make it impossible for me to exist as an individual.
When, therefore, the bourgeois tells the Communists: by abolishing my
existence as the bourgeois , you abolish my existence as an individual ;
when thus he identifies himself as a bourgeois with himself as an
individual, one must, at least, recognize his frankness and
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shamelessness. For the bourgeois it is actually the case, he believes
himself to be an individual only in so far as he is a bourgeois.
But when the theoreticians of the bourgeoisie come forward and give a
general expression to this assertion, when they equate the bourgeois's
property with individuality in theory as well and want to give a logical
justification for this equation, then this nonsense begins to become
solemn and holy.
p. 246 [MECW p. 229]

The relation of individual interests to class interests
[Sancho asks:] How is it that personal interests always develop, against
the will of individuals, into class interests, into common interests which
acquire independent existence in relation to the individual persons, and
in their independence assume the form of general interests? How is it
that as such they come into contradiction with the actual individuals and
in this contradiction, by which they are defined as general interests,
they can be conceived by consciousness as ideal and even as religious,
holy interests? How is it that in this process of private interests
acquiring independent existence as class interests the personal behavior
of the individual is bound to be objectified [sich versachlichen],
estranged [sich entfremden], and at the same time exists as a power
independent of him and without him, created by intercourse, and is
transformed into social relations, into a series of powers which
determined and subordinate the individual, in which, therefore, appear
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in the imagination as "holy" powers?
Had Sancho understood the fact that within the framework of definite
modes of production , which, of course, are not dependent on the will,
alien practical forces, which are independent not only of isolated
individuals but even of all of them together, always come to stand
above people — then he could be fairly indifferent as to whether this
fact is preserved in the religious form or distorted in the fancy of the
egoist, above whom everything is placed in imagination, in such a way
that he places nothing above himself. Sancho would then have
descended from the realm of speculation into the realm of reality, from
what people fancy to what they actually are, from what they imagine to
how they act and are bound to act in definite circumstances. What
seems to him a product of thought , he would have understood to be a
product of life . He would not then have arrived at the absurdity worthy
of him — of explaining the division between personal and general
interests by saying that people imagine this division also in a religious
way and seem to themselves to be such and such, which is, however,
only another word for "imagining".
Incidentally, even in the banal, petty-bourgeois German form in which
Sancho perceives contradiction of personal and general interests, he
should realize that individuals have always started out from themselves,
and could not do otherwise, and that therefore the two aspects he noted
are aspects of the personal development of individuals; both are equally
engendered by the empirical conditions under which the individuals
live, both are only expressions of one and the same personal
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development of people and are therefore only in seeming contradiction
to each other.
p. 262-3 [MECW p. 245]

The role of will in the desires of an individual
Whether a desire becomes fixed or not, i.e., whether it obtains exclusive
[power over us] — which, however, does [not] exclude [further
progress] — depends on whether material circumstances, "bad"
mundane conditions permit the normal satisfaction of this desire and, on
the other hand, the development of a totality of desires. This latter
depends, in turn, on whether we live in circumstances that allow allround activity and thereby the full development of all our potentialities.
On the actual conditions, and the possibility of development they give
each individual, depends also whether thoughts become fixed or not —
just as, for example, the fixed ideas of the German philosophers, these
"victims of society", qui nous font pitie [for whom we feel pity], are
inseparable from the German conditions.
An avaricious person is not an owner, but a servant, and he can do
nothing for his own sake without at the same time doing it for the
sake of his master."

No one can do anything without at the same time doing it for the sake
of one or other of his needs and for the sake of the organ of this need —
for Stirner this means that this need and its organ are made into a master
over him, just as earlier he made the means for satisfying a need into a
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master over him. Stirner cannot eat without at the same time eating for
the sake of his stomach. If the worldly conditions prevent him from
satisfying his stomach, then his stomach becomes a master over him,
the desire to eat becomes a fixed desire, and the thought of eating
becomes a fixed idea — which at the same time gives him an example
of the influence of world conditions and fixing his desires and ideas.
Sancho's "revolt" against the fixation of desires and thoughts is thus
reduced to an impotent moral injunction about self-control and provides
new evidence that he merely gives an ideologically high sounding
expression to the most trivial sentiments of the petty-bourgeois.
[The following two paragraphs are crossed out in the manuscript
(brackets are used for words that were illegible)]:
Since they attack the material basis on which the hitherto inevitable
fixedness of desires and ideas depended, the Communists are the only
people through whose historical activity the liquefaction of the fixed
desires and ideas is in fact brought about and ceases to be an impotent
moral injunction, as it was up to now with all moralists "down to"
Stirner. Communist organization has a twofold effect on the desires
produced in the individual by present-day relations; some of these
desires — namely desires which exist under all relations, and only
change their form and direction under different social relations — are
merely altered by the Communist social system, for they are given the
opportunity to develop normally; but others — namely those originating
solely in a particular society, under particular conditions of [production]
and intercourse — are totally deprived of their conditions of existence.
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Which [of the desires] will be merely changed and [which eliminated]
in a Communist [society] can [only occur in a practical] way, by
[changing the real], actual [conditions of production and intercourse.]
A desire is already by its mere existence something "fixed", and it can
occur only to St. Max and his like not to allow his sex instinct, for
instance, to become "fixed"; it is that already and will cease to be fixed
only as a result of castration or impotence. Each need, which forms the
basis of a "desire", is likewise something "fixed", and try as he may St.
Max cannot abolish this "fixedness" and for example contrive to free
himself from the necessity of eating within "fixed" periods of time. The
Communists have no intention of abolishing the fixedness of their
desires and needs, an intention which Stirner, immersed in his world of
fancy, ascribes to them and all other men; they only strive to achieve an
organization of production and intercourse which will make possible
the normal satisfaction of all needs, i.e., a satisfaction which is limited
only by the needs themselves.
p. 272-3 [MECW p 255]

Individuality in thought and desire
It depends not on consciousness , but on being ; not on thought, but on
life; it depends on the individual's empirical development and
manifestation of life, which in turn depends on the conditions existing
in the world.
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If the circumstances in which the individual lives allow him only the
[one]-sided development of one quality at the expense of all the rest,
[if] they give him the material and time to develop only that one quality,
then this individual achieves only a one-sided, crippled development.
No moral preaching avails here. And the manner in which this one,
preeminently favored quality develops depends again, on the one hand,
on the material available for its development and, on the other hand, on
the degree and manner in which the other qualities are suppressed.
Precisely because thought, for example, is the thought of a particular,
definite individual, it remains his definite thought, determined by his
individuality in the conditions in which he lives. The thinking
individual therefore has no need to resort to prolonged reflection about
thought as such in order to declare that his thought is his own thought,
his property; from the outset it is his own, peculiarly determined
thought and it was precisely his peculiarity which [in the case of St.]
Sancho [was found to be] the "opposite" of this, the peculiarity which is
peculiar " as such ".
In the case of an individual, for example, whose life embraces a wide
circle of varied activities and practical relations to the world, and who,
therefore, lives a many-sided life, thought has the same character of
universality as every other manifestation of his life. Consequently, it
neither becomes fixed in the form of abstract thought nor does it need
complicated tricks of reflection when the individual passes from
thought to some other manifestation of life. From the outset it is always
a factor in the total life of the individual, one which disappears and is
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reproduced as required .
In the case of a parochial Berlin schoolmaster or author, however,
whose activity is restricted to arduous work on the one hand and the
pleasure of thought on the other, whose world extends from [the small
confines of their city], whose relations to this world are reduced to a
minimum by his pitiful position in life, when such an individual
experiences the need to think, it is indeed inevitable that his thought
becomes just as abstract as he himself and his life, and that thought
confronts him, who is quite incapable of resistance, in the form of a
fixed power, whose activity offers the individual the possibility of a
momentary escape from his "bad world", of a momentary pleasure.
In the case of such an individual the few remaining desires, which arise
not so much from intercourse with a world as from the constitution of
the human body, expressed themselves only through repercussion , i.e.,
they assume their narrow development the same one-sided and crude
character as does his thought, they appear only along intervals,
stimulated by the excessive development of the predominant desire
(fortified by immediate physical causes, e.g., [stomach] spasm) and are
manifested turbulently and forcibly, with the most brutal suppression of
the ordinary, [natural] desire [— this leads to further] domination over
[thought.] As a matter of course, the schoolmaster's [thinking reflects
on and speculates about] is empirical [fact in a school] masterly fashion.
p. 280-1 [MECW p. 262]
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Needs being the vocation of all human beings
For St. Sancho vocation has a double form; firstly as a vocation which
others choose for me — examples of which we have already had above
in the case of newspapers that are full of politics and the prisons that
our Saint mistook for houses of moral correction. Afterward vocation
appears also as a vocation in which the individual himself believes.
If the ego is divorced from all its empirical conditions of life, it's
activity, the conditions of its existence, if it is separated from the world
that forms its basis and from its own body, then, of course, it has no
other vocation and no other designation than that of representing the
human being of the logical proposition and to assist St. Sancho in
arriving at the equations given above.
In the real world, on the other hand, where individuals have needs, they
thereby already have a vocation and task ; and at the outset it is still
immaterial whether they make this their vocation in their imagination as
well. It is clear, however, that because the individuals possess
consciousness they form an idea of this vocation which their empirical
existence has given them and, thus, furnish St. Sancho with the
opportunity of seizing on the word vocation, that is, on the mental
expression of their actual conditions of life, and of leading out of
account these conditions of life themselves.
The proletarian, for example, who like every human being has the
vocation of satisfying his needs and who is not in a position to satisfy
even the needs that he has in common with all human beings, the
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proletarian whom the necessity to work a 14 hour day debases to the
level of the beast of burden, whom competition degrades to a mere
thing, an article of trade, who from his position as a mere productive
force, the sole position left to him, is squeezed out by other, more
powerful productive forces — this proletarian is, if only for these
reasons, confronted with the real task of revolutionizing his conditions.
He can, of course, imagine this to be his "vocation", he can also, if he
likes to engage in propaganda, express his "vocation" by saying that to
do this or that is the human vocation of the proletarian, the more so
since his position does not even allow him to satisfy the needs arising
directly from his human nature. St. Sancho does not concern himself
with the reality underlining this idea, with the practical name of this
proletarian — he clings to the word "vocation" and declares it to be the
holy, and the proletarian to be a servant of the holy — the easiest way
of considering himself superior and "proceeding further".
Particularly in the relations that have existed hitherto, when one class
always ruled, when the conditions of life of an individual always
coincided with the conditions of life of a class, when, therefore, the
practical task of each newly emerging class was bound to appear to
each of its members as a universal task, and when each class could
actually overthrow its predecessor only by liberating the individuals of
all classes from certain chains which had hitherto fettered them —
under these circumstances it was essential that the task of the individual
members of a class striving for domination should be described as a
universal human task.
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Incidentally, when for example the bourgeois tells the proletarian that
his, the proletarian's, human task is to work 14 hours a day, the
proletarian is quite justified in replying in the same language that, on
the contrary, his task is to overthrow the entire bourgeois system.
p. 305-7 [MECW p. 288]

"Vocation, designation, task, ideal" are either:
1. The idea of the revolutionary tasks laid down for an
oppressed class by the material conditions; or
2. Mere idealistic paraphrases, or also the conscious
expression of the individuals' modes of activity which owing
to the division of labour have assumed independent existence
as various professions; or
3. The conscious expression of the necessity which at every
moment confronts individuals, classes and nations to assert
their position through some quite definite activity; or
4. The conditions of existence of the ruling class (as
determined by the preceding development of production),
ideally expressed in law, morality, etc., to which [conditions]
the ideologists of that class more or less consciously gave a
sort of theoretical independence; they can be conceived by
separate individuals of that class as vocation, etc., and are
held up as a standard of life to the individuals of the
oppressed class, partly as an intelligent or recognition of
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domination, partly as the moral means for this domination. It
is to be noted here, as in general with ideologists, that they
inevitably put a thing upside-down and regard their ideology
both as the creative force and as the aim of all social relations,
whereas it is only an expression and symptom of these
relations.
p. 444 [MECW p. 419]

The role of individual will in the foundation of the state
In actual history, those theoreticians who regarded might as the basis of
right were in direct contradiction to those who looked on will as the
basis of right... If power is taken as the basis of right, as Hobbes, etc.,
do, then right, law, etc., are merely the symptom, the expression of
other relations upon which state power rests.
The material life of individuals, which by no means depends merely on
their "will", their mode of production and form of intercourse, which
mutually determined each other — this is the real basis of the state and
remained so at all the stages at which division of labor and private
property are still necessary, quite independently of the will of
individuals. These actual relations are in no way created by the state
power; on the contrary they are the power creating it.
The individuals who rule in these conditions — leaving aside the fact
that their power must assume the form of the state — have to give their
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will, which is determined by these definite conditions, a universal
expression as the will of the state, as law, an expression whose content
is always determined by the relations of this class, as the civil and
criminal law demonstrates in the clearest possible way. Just as the
weight of their bodies does not depend on there idealistic will or on
their arbitrary decision, so also the fact that they enforce their own will
in the form of law, and at the same time to make it independent of the
personal arbitrariness of each individual among them, does not depend
on there idealistic will.
Their personal rule must at the same time assume the form of average
rule. Their personal power is based on conditions of life which as they
develop are common to many individuals, and the continuance of which
they, as ruling individuals, have to maintain against others and, at the
same time, to maintain that they are holding good for everybody. The
expression of this will, which is determined by their common interests,
is the law.
It is precisely because individuals who are independent of one another
assert themselves and their own will, and because on this basis their
attitude to one another is bound to be egoistical, that self-denial is made
necessary in law and right, self-denial in the exceptional case, in selfassertion of their interests in the average case (which, therefore, not
they , but only the "egoist in agreement with himself" regards as selfdenial). The same applies to the classes which are ruled, whose will
plays just as small a part in determining the existence of law and the
state.
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For example, so long as the productive forces are still insufficiently
developed to make competition superfluous, and therefore would give
rise to competition over and over again, for so long the classes which
are ruled would be wanting to be impossible if they had the "will" to
abolish competition and with it the state and the law. Incidentally, too,
it is only in the imagination of the ideologists that this "will" arises
before relations have developed far enough to make the emergence of
such a will possible. After relations have developed sufficiently to
produce it, the ideologist is able to imagine this will as being purely
arbitrary and therefore as conceivable at all times and under all
circumstances.
Like right, so crime, i.e., the struggle of the isolated individual against
the predominant relations, is not the result of pure arbitrariness. On the
contrary, it depends on the same conditions as that domination. The
same visionaries who see in right and law the domination of some
independently existing general will see in crime the mere violation of
right and along. Hence the state does not exist owing to the dominant
will, but the state, which arises from the material mode of life of
individuals, has also the form of a dominant will. If the latter loses its
domination, it means that not only the will has changed but also the
material existence and life of individuals, and only for that reason has
their will changed. It is possible for rights and laws to be "inherited",
but in that case they are no longer dominant, but nominal, of which
striking examples are furnished by the history of ancient Roman law
and English law.
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We saw earlier how a theory and history of pure thought could arise
among philosophers owning to the separation of ideas from the
individuals and empirical relations which serve as the basis of these
ideas. In the same way, here too one can separate right from its real
basis, whereby one obtains a "dominant will" which in different eras
undergoes various modifications and has its own, independent history in
its creations, the laws. On this account, political and civil history
becomes ideologically merged in a history of the domination of
successive laws.... The most superficial examination of legislation, e.g.,
for laws and all countries, shows how far the rulers got when they
imagined that they could achieve something by means of their
"dominant will" alone, i.e., simply by exercising their will.
p. 348-50 [MECW p. 329]

Individuals and their relationships
Even that which constitutes the advantage of an individual as such over
other individuals, is in our day at the same time a product of society and
in its realization is bound to assert itself as privilege, as we have already
shown Sancho in connection with competition. Further, the individual
as such, regarded by himself, is subordinated to division of labour,
which makes him one-sided, cripples and determines him.
Individuals have always and in all circumstances "proceeded from
themselves ", but since they were not unique in the sense of not needing
any connections with one another, and since their needs , consequently
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their nature, and the method of satisfying their needs, connected them
with one another (relations between the sexes, exchange, division of
labour), they had to enter into relations with one another. Moreover,
since they entered into intercourse with one another not as pure egos,
but as individuals at a definite stage of development of their productive
forces and requirements, and since this intercourse, in its turn,
determined production and needs, it was, therefore, precisely the
personal, individual behavior of individuals, their behavior to one
another as individuals, that created the existing relations and daily
reproduces them anew. They entered into intercourse with one another
as what they were, they proceeded "from themselves", as they were,
irrespective of their "outlook onlife".
This "outlook on life" — even the warped one of the [idealist]
philosophers — could, of course, only be determined by their actual
life. Hence it certainly follows that the development of an individual is
determined by the development of all the others with whom he is
directly or indirectly associative, and that the different generations of
individuals entering into relations with one another are connected with
one another, that the physical existence of the latter generations is
determined by that of their predecessors, and that these later generations
inherit the productive forces and forms of intercourse accumulated by
their predecessors, their own mutual relations being determined thereby.
In short, it is clear that development takes place and that the history of
the single individual cannot possibly be separated from the history of
preceding or contemporary individuals, but is determined by this
history.
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The transformation of the individual relationship into its opposite, a
purely material relationship, the distinction of individuality and fortuity
by the individuals themselves is a historical process, as we have already
shown ( Chapter 1, Part IV, § 6 ), and at different stages of development
it assumes different, ever sharper and more universal forms.
In the present epoch, the domination of material relations over
individuals, and the suppression of individuality by fortuitous
circumstances, has assumed its sharpest and most universal form,
thereby setting existing individuals a very definite task. It has set them
the task of replacing the domination of circumstances and a chance over
individuals by the domination of individuals over chance and
circumstances. It has not, as Sancho imagines, put forward the demand
that "I should develop myself", which up to now every individual has
done without Sancho's good advice; it has on the contrary called for
liberation from a quite definite mode of development. This task,
dictated by present-day relations, coincides with the task of organizing
society in the Communist way.
We have already shown above that the abolition of a state of affairs in
which relations become independent of individuals, in which
individuality is subservient to chance and the personal relations of
individuals are subordinated to general class relations, etc. — that the
abolition of this state of affairs is determined in the final analysis by the
abolition of division of labour. We also shown that the abolition of
division of labour is determined by the development of intercourse and
productive forces to such a degree of universality that private property
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and division of labour becomes fetters on them. We have further shown
that private property can be abolished only on condition of an allaround development of individuals, precisely because the existing form
of intercourse and the existing productive forces are all embracing and
only individuals that are developing in an all-around fashion can
appropriate them, i.e., can turn them into free manifestations of their
lives. We have shown that at the present time individuals must abolish
private property, because the productive forces and forms of intercourse
have developed so far that, under the domination of private property,
they have become destructive forces, and because the contradiction
between the classes has reached its extreme limit. Finally, we have
shown that the abolition of private property in the division of labour is
itself the association of individuals on the basis created by modern
productive forces and world's intercourse. [See Chapter One]
Within Communist society, the only society in which the genuine and
free development of individuals ceases to be a mere phrase, this
development is determined precisely by the connection of individuals, a
connection which consists partly in the economic prerequisites and
partly in the necessary solidarity of the free development of all, and
finally, in the universal character of the activity of individuals on the
basis of the existing productive forces. We are, therefore, here
concerned with individuals at a definite historical stage of development
and by no means merely with individuals chosen at random, even
disregarding the indispensable Communist revolution, which itself is a
general condition for their free development. The individuals'
consciousness of their mutual relations will, of course, likewise be
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completely changed, and, therefore, will no more be the "principal of
love" or devoument than it will be egoism.
p. 463-5 [MECW p. 437]

Miscellaneous

The Family
[In the family] entirely empirical relations dominate. The attitude of the
bourgeois to the institutions of his regime is like that of the Jew to the
law; he evades them whenever it is possible to do so in each individual
case, but he wants everyone else to observe them. If the entire
bourgeoisie, in a mass and at one time, were to evade bourgeois
institutions, it would cease to be bourgeois — a conduct which, of
course, never occurs to the bourgeois and by no means depends on their
willing or running [i.e., it is dictated by historical conditions]. The
dissolute bourgeois evades marriage and secretly commits adultery; the
merchant evades the institution of property by depriving others of
property by speculation, bankruptcy, etc.; the young bourgeois makes
himself independent of his family, if he can by in fact abolishing the
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family as far as he is concerned.
But marriage, property, the family remain untouched in theory, because
they are the practical basis on which the bourgeoisie has directed its
domination, and because in their bourgeois form they are the conditions
which make the bourgeois a bourgeois, just as the constantly evaded
law makes the religious Jew a religious Jew. This attitude of the
bourgeois to the conditions of his existence acquires one of its universal
forms in bourgeois mentality. One cannot speak at all of the family " as
such ". Historically the bourgeois gives the family the character of the
bourgeois family, in which boredom and money are the binding link, in
which also includes the bourgeois dissolution of the family, which does
not prevent the family itself from always continuing to exist. It's dirty
existence as its counterpart in the holy concept of it in official
phraseology and universal hypocrisy.
Where the family is actually abolished, as with the proletariat, just the
opposite of what "Stirner" thinks takes place. Then the concept of the
family does not exist at all, but here and there family affection based on
extremely real relations is certainly to be found.
In the 18th-century the concept of the [feudal] family was abolished by
the philosophers, because the actual family was already in the process
of dissolution at the highest pinnacles of civilization. The internal
family bond, the separate components constituting the concept of the
family were dissolved, for example, obedience, piety, fidelity in
marriage, etc.; but the real body the family, the property relation, the
exclusive attitude in relation to their families, forced cohabitation —
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relations determined by the existence of children, the structure of
modern towns, the formation of capital, etc. — all these were preserved,
along with numerous violations, because the existence of the family is
made necessary by its connection with the mode of production, which
exists independently of the will of bourgeois society.
That it was impossible to do without it was demonstrated in the most
striking way during the French Revolution, when for a moment the
family was as good as legally abolished. The family continues to exist
even in the 19th-century, only the process of its dissolution has become
more general, not on account of the concept, but because of the higher
development of industry and competition; the family still exists
although its dissolution was long ago proclaimed by French and English
Socialists and this has at last penetrated also to the German church
fathers, by way of French novels.[A]
p. 194-5 [MECW p. 180]

The sarcasm of Marx and Engels may not be retained in this
shortened form; this statement is saracastic. Marx and Engels are
[A]

explaining that ideas and novels alone cannot change the fact; only real
changes in the relations of production, i.e. only through the
establishment of communism, will the family actually be abolished.

Consciousness changing with the development of society
The more the normal form of intercourse of society, and with it the
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conditions of the ruling class, develop their contradiction to the
advanced productive forces, and the greater the consequent discord
within the ruling class itself as well as between it and the class ruled by
it, the more fictitious, of course, becomes the consciousness which
originally corresponded to this form of intercourse (i.e., it ceases to be
the consciousness corresponding to this form of intercourse), and the
more do the old traditional ideas of these relations of intercourse, in
which actual private interests, etc., etc., are expressed as universal
interests, descend to the level of mere idealizing phrases, conscious
illusion, deliberate hypocrisy. But the more their falsity is exposed by
life, and the less meaning they have to consciousness itself, the more
resolutely are they asserted, the more hypocritical, moral and holy
becomes the language of this normal society.
p. 310 [MECW p. 293]

Freeing labor
The modern state, the rule of the bourgeoisie, is based on freedom of
labour .... Freedom of Labour is free competition of the workers among
themselves.... Labor is free in all civilized countries; it is not a matter of
freeing labor but of abolishing it.
p. 220-221 [MECW p. 205]

Free activity for the Communists is the creative manifestation of life
arising from the free development of all abilities of the whole person.
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p. 242 [MECW p. 225]

Communists on selfishness and selflessness
Communists do not oppose egoism to selflessness or selflessness to
egoism, nor do they express this contradiction theoretically either in its
sentimental or in its highflown ideological form; they rather
demonstrate its material source, with which it disappears of itself. The
Communists do not preach morality at all.
They do not put to people the moral demand: love one another, do not
be egoists, etc.; on the contrary, they are very well aware that egoism,
just as much selflessness, is in definite circumstances a necessary form
of the self-assertion of individuals. Hence, the Communists by no
means want to do away with the "private individual" for the sake of the
"general", selfless man. That is a statement of the imagination.
Communist theoreticians, the only Communists who have time to
devote to the study of history, are distinguished precisely by the fact
that they alone have discovered that throughout history the "general
interest" is created by individuals who are defined as "private persons".
They know that this contradiction is only a seeming one because one
side of it, what is called the "general interest", is constantly being
produced by the other side, private interest, and in relation to the latter
is by no means an independent force with an independent history — so
that this contradiction is in practice constantly destroyed and
reproduced. Hence it is not a question of the Hegelian "negative unity"
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of two sides of the contradiction, but of the materially determined
destruction of the preceding materially determined mode of life of
individuals, with the disappearance of which this contradiction together
with its unity also disappears.
p. 264-5 [MECW p. 247]

Alienation due to private property
Private property alienates the individuality not only of people but also
of things. Land has nothing to do with rent of land, the machine has
nothing to do with profit. For the landed proprietor, land has the
significance only of rent of land; he leases his plots of land and receives
rent; this is a feature which land can lose without losing a single one of
its inherent features, without, for example, losing any part of its
fertility; it is a feature the extent and even the existence of which
depends on social relations which are created and destroyed without the
assistance of individual landed proprietors. It is the same with
machines. How little connection there is between money, the most
general form of property, and personal peculiarity, how much they are
directly opposed to each other was already known to Shakespeare better
than to our theorizing petty-bourgeois:
Thus much of this will make black, white; foul, fair;
Wrong, right; base, noble; old, young; coward, valiant.
This yellow slave...
Will make the hoar leprosy adored...
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This it is
That makes the wappened widow wed again;
She, whom the spittle-house and ulcerous sores
Would cast the gorge at, this embalms and spices
To th' April day again...
Thou visible god,
That solder'st close impossibilities,
And makest them kiss!
[William Shakespeare, Timon of Athens , Act IV, Scene III.]

In a word, rent of land, profit, etc., these forms of existence of private
property, are social relations corresponding to a definite stage of
production, and they are "individual" only so long as they have not
become fetters on the existing productive forces.
p. 247-8 [MECW p. 231]

The relation of the bourgeois to the capitalist state
With the development and accumulation of bourgeois property, i.e.,
with the development of commerce and industry, individuals grew
richer and richer while the state fell ever more deeply into debt.
It is therefore obvious that as soon as the bourgeoisie has accumulated
money, the state has to beg from the bourgeoisie and in the end it is
actually bought up by the latter. This takes place in the period in which
the bourgeoisie is still confronted by another class, and consequently
the state can retain some appearance of independence in relation to both
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of them. Even after the state has been bought up [by special trusts,
interest groups, lobbying, bribes, etc.], it still needs money and,
therefore, continues to be dependent on the bourgeoisie; nevertheless,
when the interests of the bourgeoisie demanded, the state can have had
its disposal more funds then states which are less developed and,
therefore, less burdened with debts.
p. 382 [MECW p. 361]

On Competition
Those relations brought about by competition: the abolition of local
narrowness, the establishment of means of communication, highly
developed division of Labour, world intercourse, the proletariat,
machinery, the relation between supply and demand, etc. *
As for the proletarians, they — at any rate in the modern form — first
arose out of competition; they have already repeatedly set up collected
enterprises which, however, always perish because they were unable to
compete with the "contending" private bankers, butchers, etc., and
because for proletarians — owing to the frequent opposition of interests
among them arising out of the division of labour — no other
"agreement" is possible than a political one directed against the whole
present system. Where the development of competition enables the
proletarians to "come to an understanding", they reach an understanding
not about public bakeries but about quite different matters [,i.e. the
overthrow of the bourgeois system for a proletarian one.].
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p. 392-3 [MECW p. 371]
* A minor grammatical alteration of the text

Personal Competition
Incidentally, competition certainly began as a "competition of persons"
possessing "personal means". The liberation of the feudal serfs, the first
condition of competition, and the first accumulation of "things" were
purely "personal" acts.
If one person, thanks to good food, careful education and physical
exercise, has acquired well-developed bodily powers and skill, while
another, owing to inadequate and unhealthy food and consequent poor
digestion, and as the result of neglect in childhood and overexertion,
has never been able to acquire the "things" necessary for developing his
muscles — not to mention acquiring mastery over them — within the
"personal power" of the first in relation to the second is a purely
material one. It was not "through personal power" that he gained the
"means that were lacking"; on the contrary, he owes his "personal
power" to the material means already existing.
Incidentally, the transformation of personal means into material means
and of material means into personal means is only an aspect of
competition and quite inseparable from it. The demand that competition
should be conducted not with material means but with personal means
amounts to the moral postulate that competition and the relations on
which it depends should have consequences other than those inevitably
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arising from them.
p. 397-8 [MECW p. 374]

The monetary crisis
The power of money, the fact that the universal means of exchange
becomes independent in relation both to society and to individuals,
reveals most clearly that the relations of production and intercourse as a
whole assume an independent existence....
The material power of money, which is strikingly revealed in monetary
crisis and which, in the form of a prominent scarcity of money,
oppresses the petty-bourgeois who is "inclined to make purchases", is
likewise a highly unpleasant fact for that egoist [a reference to Sancho]
in agreement with himself. He gets rid of the difficulty by reversing the
ordinary idea of the petty-bourgeois, thus making it appear that the
attitude of individuals to the power of money is something that depends
solely on their personal willing or running. This fortunate turn of
thought then gives him the chance of reading a moral lecture, buttressed
by synonymy, etymology and vowel mutation, to the astounded pettybourgeois already disheartening by lack of money, and thus debarring
in advance all inconvenient questions about the causes of the pecuniary
embarrassment.
The monetary crisis consist primarily in the fact that all "wealth"
[vermogen] suddenly becomes depreciated in relation to the means of
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exchange and loses its "power" [vermogen] over money. A crisis is in
existence precisely when one can no longer pay with one's
"wealth"[vermogen], but must pay with money. And this again does not
happen because of a shortage of money, as is imagined by the pettybourgeois who judges the crisis by his personal difficulties, but because
the specific difference becomes fixed between money and as the
universal commodity, the "marketable property and property in
circulation", and all the other, particular commodities, which suddenly
ceased to be marketable property.
p. 419-20 [MECW p. 396]
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Preface to the First German Edition (Marx, 1867)
The work, the first volume of which I now submit to the public, forms the continuation of my Zur
Kritik der Politischen Oekonomie (A Contribution to the Criticism of Political Economy)
published in 1859. The long pause between the first part and the continuation is due to an illness
of many years’ duration that again and again interrupted my work.
The substance of that earlier work is summarised in the first three chapters of this volume. This is
done not merely for the sake of connexion and completeness. The presentation of the subject
matter is improved. As far as circumstances in any way permit, many points only hinted at in the
earlier book are here worked out more fully, whilst, conversely, points worked out fully there are
only touched upon in this volume. The sections on the history of the theories of value and of
money are now, of course, left out altogether. The reader of the earlier work will find, however,
in the notes to the first chapter additional sources of reference relative to the history of those
theories.
Every beginning is difficult, holds in all sciences. To understand the first chapter, especially the
section that contains the analysis of commodities, will, therefore, present the greatest difficulty.
That which concerns more especially the analysis of the substance of value and the magnitude of
value, I have, as much as it was possible, popularised. 1 The value-form, whose fully developed
shape is the money-form, is very elementary and simple. Nevertheless, the human mind has for
more than 2,000 years sought in vain to get to the bottom of it all, whilst on the other hand, to the
successful analysis of much more composite and complex forms, there has been at least an
approximation. Why? Because the body, as an organic whole, is more easy of study than are the
cells of that body. In the analysis of economic forms, moreover, neither microscopes nor
chemical reagents are of use. The force of abstraction must replace both. But in bourgeois society,
the commodity-form of the product of labour – or value-form of the commodity – is the economic
cell-form. To the superficial observer, the analysis of these forms seems to turn upon minutiae. It
does in fact deal with minutiae, but they are of the same order as those dealt with in microscopic
anatomy.
With the exception of the section on value-form, therefore, this volume cannot stand accused on
the score of difficulty. I presuppose, of course, a reader who is willing to learn something new
and therefore to think for himself.
The physicist either observes physical phenomena where they occur in their most typical form
and most free from disturbing influence, or, wherever possible, he makes experiments under
conditions that assure the occurrence of the phenomenon in its normality. In this work I have to
examine the capitalist mode of production, and the conditions of production and exchange
corresponding to that mode. Up to the present time, their classic ground is England. That is the
reason why England is used as the chief illustration in the development of my theoretical ideas. If,
however, the German reader shrugs his shoulders at the condition of the English industrial and
agricultural labourers, or in optimist fashion comforts himself with the thought that in Germany
things are not nearly so bad; I must plainly tell him, “De te fabula narratur!” [It is of you that the
story is told. – Horace]
Intrinsically, it is not a question of the higher or lower degree of development of the social
antagonisms that result from the natural laws of capitalist production. It is a question of these
laws themselves, of these tendencies working with iron necessity towards inevitable results. The
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country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its
own future.
But apart from this. Where capitalist production is fully naturalised among the Germans (for
instance, in the factories proper) the condition of things is much worse than in England, because
the counterpoise of the Factory Acts is wanting. In all other spheres, we, like all the rest of
Continental Western Europe, suffer not only from the development of capitalist production, but
also from the incompleteness of that development. Alongside the modern evils, a whole series of
inherited evils oppress us, arising from the passive survival of antiquated modes of production,
with their inevitable train of social and political anachronisms. We suffer not only from the
living, but from the dead. Le mort saisit le vif! [The dead holds the living in his grasp. – formula
of French common law]
The social statistics of Germany and the rest of Continental Western Europe are, in comparison
with those of England, wretchedly compiled. But they raise the veil just enough to let us catch a
glimpse of the Medusa head behind it. We should be appalled at the state of things at home, if, as
in England, our governments and parliaments appointed periodically commissions of inquiry into
economic conditions; if these commissions were armed with the same plenary powers to get at
the truth; if it was possible to find for this purpose men as competent, as free from partisanship
and respect of persons as are the English factory-inspectors, her medical reporters on public
health, her commissioners of inquiry into the exploitation of women and children, into housing
and food. Perseus wore a magic cap down over his eyes and ears as a make-believe that there are
no monsters.
Let us not deceive ourselves on this. As in the 18th century, the American war of independence
sounded the tocsin for the European middle class, so that in the 19th century, the American Civil
War sounded it for the European working class. In England the process of social disintegration is
palpable. When it has reached a certain point, it must react on the Continent. There it will take a
form more brutal or more humane, according to the degree of development of the working class
itself. Apart from higher motives, therefore, their own most important interests dictate to the
classes that are for the nonce the ruling ones, the removal of all legally removable hindrances to
the free development of the working class. For this reason, as well as others, I have given so large
a space in this volume to the history, the details, and the results of English factory legislation.
One nation can and should learn from others. And even when a society has got upon the right
track for the discovery of the natural laws of its movement – and it is the ultimate aim of this
work, to lay bare the economic law of motion of modern society – it can neither clear by bold
leaps, nor remove by legal enactments, the obstacles offered by the successive phases of its
normal development. But it can shorten and lessen the birth-pangs.
To prevent possible misunderstanding, a word. I paint the capitalist and the landlord in no sense
couleur de rose [i.e., seen through rose-tinted glasses]. But here individuals are dealt with only in
so far as they are the personifications of economic categories, embodiments of particular classrelations and class-interests. My standpoint, from which the evolution of the economic formation
of society is viewed as a process of natural history, can less than any other make the individual
responsible for relations whose creature he socially remains, however much he may subjectively
raise himself above them.
In the domain of Political Economy, free scientific inquiry meets not merely the same enemies as
in all other domains. The peculiar nature of the materials it deals with, summons as foes into the
field of battle the most violent, mean and malignant passions of the human breast, the Furies of
private interest. The English Established Church, e.g., will more readily pardon an attack on 38 of
its 39 articles than on 1/39 of its income. Now-a-days atheism is culpa levis [a relatively slight
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sin, c.f. mortal sin], as compared with criticism of existing property relations. Nevertheless, there
is an unmistakable advance. I refer, e.g., to the Blue book published within the last few weeks:
“Correspondence with Her Majesty’s Missions Abroad, regarding Industrial Questions and
Trades’ Unions.” The representatives of the English Crown in foreign countries there declare in
so many words that in Germany, in France, to be brief, in all the civilised states of the European
Continent, radical change in the existing relations between capital and labour is as evident and
inevitable as in England. At the same time, on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, Mr. Wade,
vice-president of the United States, declared in public meetings that, after the abolition of slavery,
a radical change of the relations of capital and of property in land is next upon the order of the
day. These are signs of the times, not to be hidden by purple mantles or black cassocks. They do
not signify that tomorrow a miracle will happen. They show that, within the ruling classes
themselves, a foreboding is dawning, that the present society is no solid crystal, but an organism
capable of change, and is constantly changing.
The second volume of this book will treat of the process of the circulation of capital (Book II.),
and of the varied forms assumed by capital in the course of its development (Book III.), the third
and last volume (Book IV.), the history of the theory.
Every opinion based on scientific criticism I welcome. As to prejudices of so-called public
opinion, to which I have never made concessions, now as aforetime the maxim of the great
Florentine is mine:
“Segui il tuo corso, e lascia dir le genti.”
[Follow your own course, and let people talk – paraphrased from Dante]
Karl Marx
London
July 25, 1867
1

This is the more necessary, as even the section of Ferdinand Lassalle’s work against SchulzeDelitzsch, in which he professes to give “the intellectual quintessence” of my explanations on these
subjects, contains important mistakes. If Ferdinand Lassalle has borrowed almost literally from my
writings, and without any acknowledgement, all the general theoretical propositions in his economic
works, e.g., those on the historical character of capital, on the connexion between the conditions of
production and the mode of production, &c., &c., even to the terminology created by me, this may
perhaps be due to purposes of propaganda. I am here, of course, not speaking of his detailed working
out and application of these propositions, with which I have nothing to do.

Preface to the French Edition (Marx, 1872)
To the citizen Maurice Lachâtre
Dear Citizen,
I applaud your idea of publishing the translation of “Das Kapital” as a serial. In this form the
book will be more accessible to the working class, a consideration which to me outweighs
everything else.
That is the good side of your suggestion, but here is the reverse of the medal: the method of
analysis which I have employed, and which had not previously been applied to economic
subjects, makes the reading of the first chapters rather arduous, and it is to be feared that the
French public, always impatient to come to a conclusion, eager to know the connexion between
general principles and the immediate questions that have aroused their passions, may be
disheartened because they will be unable to move on at once.
That is a disadvantage I am powerless to overcome, unless it be by forewarning and forearming
those readers who zealously seek the truth. There is no royal road to science, and only those who
do not dread the fatiguing climb of its steep paths have a chance of gaining its luminous summits.
Believe me,
dear citizen,
Your devoted,
Karl Marx
London
March 18, 1872

Afterword to the Second German Edition (1873)
I must start by informing the readers of the first edition about the alterations made in the second
edition. One is struck at once by the clearer arrangement of the book. Additional notes are
everywhere marked as notes to the second edition. The following are the most important points
with regard to the text itself:
In Chapter I, Section 1, the derivation of value from an analysis of the equations by which every
exchange-value is expressed has been carried out with greater scientific strictness; likewise the
connexion between the substance of value and the determination of the magnitude of value by
socially necessary labour-time, which was only alluded to in the first edition, is now expressly
emphasised. Chapter I, Section 3 (the Form of Value), has been completely revised, a task which
was made necessary by the double exposition in the first edition, if nothing else. – Let me remark,
in passing, that that double exposition had been occasioned by my friend, Dr. L Kugelmann in
Hanover. I was visiting him in the spring of 1867 when the first proof-sheets arrived from
Hamburg, and he convinced me that most readers needed a supplementary, more didactic
explanation of the form of value. – The last section of the first chapter, “The Fetishism of
Commodities, etc.,” has largely been altered. Chapter III, Section I (The Measure of Value), has
been carefully revised, because in the first edition this section had been treated negligently, the
reader having been referred to the explanation already given in “Zur Kritik der Politischen
Oekonomie,” Berlin 1859. Chapter VII, particularly Part 2 [Eng. ed., Chapter IX, Section 2], has
been re-written to a great extent.
It would be a waste of time to go into all the partial textual changes, which were often purely
stylistic. They occur throughout the book. Nevertheless I find now, on revising the French
translation appearing in Paris, that several parts of the German original stand in need of rather
thorough remoulding, other parts require rather heavy stylistic editing, and still others painstaking
elimination of occasional slips. But there was no time for that. For I had been informed only in
the autumn of 1871, when in the midst of other urgent work, that the book was sold out and that
the printing of the second edition was to begin in January of 1872.
The appreciation which “Das Kapital” rapidly gained in wide circles of the German working class
is the best reward of my labours. Herr Mayer, a Vienna manufacturer, who in economic matters
represents the bourgeois point of view, in a pamphlet published during the Franco-German War
aptly expounded the idea that the great capacity for theory, which used to be considered a
hereditary German possession, had almost completely disappeared amongst the so-called
educated classes in Germany, but that amongst its working class, on the contrary, that capacity
was celebrating its revival.
To the present moment Political Economy, in Germany, is a foreign science. Gustav von Gulich
in his “Historical description of Commerce, Industry,” &c., 1 especially in the two first volumes
published in 1830, has examined at length the historical circumstances that prevented, in
Germany, the development of the capitalist mode of production, and consequently the
development, in that country, of modern bourgeois society. Thus the soil whence Political
Economy springs was wanting. This “science” had to be imported from England and France as a
ready-made article; its German professors remained schoolboys. The theoretical expression of a
foreign reality was turned, in their hands, into a collection of dogmas, interpreted by them in
terms of the petty trading world around them, and therefore misinterpreted. The feeling of
scientific impotence, a feeling not wholly to be repressed, and the uneasy consciousness of having
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to touch a subject in reality foreign to them, was but imperfectly concealed, either under a parade
of literary and historical erudition, or by an admixture of extraneous material, borrowed from the
so-called “Kameral” sciences, a medley of smatterings, through whose purgatory the hopeful
candidate for the German bureaucracy has to pass.
Since 1848 capitalist production has developed rapidly in Germany, and at the present time it is in
the full bloom of speculation and swindling. But fate is still unpropitious to our professional
economists. At the time when they were able to deal with Political Economy in a straightforward
fashion, modern economic conditions did not actually exist in Germany. And as soon as these
conditions did come into existence, they did so under circumstances that no longer allowed of
their being really and impartially investigated within the bounds of the bourgeois horizon. In so
far as Political Economy remains within that horizon, in so far, i.e., as the capitalist regime is
looked upon as the absolutely final form of social production, instead of as a passing historical
phase of its evolution, Political Economy can remain a science only so long as the class struggle
is latent or manifests itself only in isolated and sporadic phenomena.
Let us take England. Its Political Economy belongs to the period in which the class struggle was
as yet undeveloped. Its last great representative, Ricardo, in the end, consciously makes the
antagonism of class interests, of wages and profits, of profits and rent, the starting point of his
investigations, naively taking this antagonism for a social law of Nature. But by this start the
science of bourgeois economy had reached the limits beyond which it could not pass. Already in
the lifetime of Ricardo, and in opposition to him, it was met by criticism, in the person of
Sismondi. 2
The succeeding period, from 1820 to 1830, was notable in England for scientific activity in the
domain of Political Economy. It was the time as well of the vulgarising and extending of
Ricardo’s theory, as of the contest of that theory with the old school. Splendid tournaments were
held. What was done then, is little known to the Continent generally, because the polemic is for
the most part scattered through articles in reviews, occasional literature and pamphlets. The
unprejudiced character of this polemic – although the theory of Ricardo already serves, in
exceptional cases, as a weapon of attack upon bourgeois economy – is explained by the
circumstances of the time. On the one hand, modern industry itself was only just emerging from
the age of childhood, as is shown by the fact that with the crisis of 1825 it for the first time opens
the periodic cycle of its modern life. On the other hand, the class struggle between capital and
labour is forced into the background, politically by the discord between the governments and the
feudal aristocracy gathered around the Holy Alliance on the one hand, and the popular masses,
led by the bourgeoisie, on the other; economically by the quarrel between industrial capital and
aristocratic landed property - a quarrel that in France was concealed by the opposition between
small and large landed property, and that in England broke out openly after the Corn Laws. The
literature of Political Economy in England at this time calls to mind the stormy forward
movement in France after Dr. Quesnay’s death, but only as a Saint Martin’s summer reminds us
of spring. With the year 1830 came the decisive crisis.
In France and in England the bourgeoisie had conquered political power. Thenceforth, the class
struggle, practically as well as theoretically, took on more and more outspoken and threatening
forms. It sounded the knell of scientific bourgeois economy. It was thenceforth no longer a
question, whether this theorem or that was true, but whether it was useful to capital or harmful,
expedient or inexpedient, politically dangerous or not. In place of disinterested inquirers, there
were hired prize fighters; in place of genuine scientific research, the bad conscience and the evil
intent of apologetic. Still, even the obtrusive pamphlets with which the Anti-Corn Law League,
led by the manufacturers Cobden and Bright, deluged the world, have a historic interest, if no
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scientific one, on account of their polemic against the landed aristocracy. But since then the Free
Trade legislation, inaugurated by Sir Robert Peel, has deprived vulgar economy of this its last
sting.
The Continental revolution of 1848-9 also had its reaction in England. Men who still claimed
some scientific standing and aspired to be something more than mere sophists and sycophants of
the ruling classes tried to harmonise the Political Economy of capital with the claims, no longer to
be ignored, of the proletariat. Hence a shallow syncretism of which John Stuart Mill is the best
representative. It is a declaration of bankruptcy by bourgeois economy, an event on which the
great Russian scholar and critic, N. Tschernyschewsky, has thrown the light of a master mind in
his “Outlines of Political Economy according to Mill.”
In Germany, therefore, the capitalist mode of production came to a head, after its antagonistic
character had already, in France and England, shown itself in a fierce strife of classes. And
meanwhile, moreover, the German proletariat had attained a much more clear class-consciousness
than the German bourgeoisie. Thus, at the very moment when a bourgeois science of Political
Economy seemed at last possible in Germany, it had in reality again become impossible.
Under these circumstances its professors fell into two groups. The one set, prudent, practical
business folk, flocked to the banner of Bastiat, the most superficial and therefore the most
adequate representative of the apologetic of vulgar economy; the other, proud of the professorial
dignity of their science, followed John Stuart Mill in his attempt to reconcile irreconcilables. Just
as in the classical time of bourgeois economy, so also in the time of its decline, the Germans
remained mere schoolboys, imitators and followers, petty retailers and hawkers in the service of
the great foreign wholesale concern.
The peculiar historical development of German society therefore forbids, in that country, all
original work in bourgeois economy; but not the criticism of that economy. So far as such
criticism represents a class, it can only represent the class whose vocation in history is the
overthrow of the capitalist mode of production and the final abolition of all classes – the
proletariat.
The learned and unlearned spokesmen of the German bourgeoisie tried at first to kill “Das
Kapital” by silence, as they had managed to do with my earlier writings. As soon as they found
that these tactics no longer fitted in with the conditions of the time, they wrote, under pretence of
criticising my book, prescriptions “for the tranquillisation of the bourgeois mind.” But they found
in the workers’ press – see, e.g., Joseph Dietzgen’s articles in the – antagonists stronger than
themselves, to whom (down to this very day) they owe a reply. 3
An excellent Russian translation of “Das Kapital” appeared in the spring of 1872. The edition of
3,000 copies is already nearly exhausted. As early as 1871, N. Sieber, Professor of Political
Economy in the University of Kiev, in his work “David Ricardo’s Theory of Value and of
Capital,” referred to my theory of value, of money and of capital, as in its fundamentals a
necessary sequel to the teaching of Smith and Ricardo. That which astonishes the Western
European in the reading of this excellent work, is the author’s consistent and firm grasp of the
purely theoretical position.
That the method employed in “Das Kapital” has been little understood, is shown by the various
conceptions, contradictory one to another, that have been formed of it.
Thus the Paris Revue Positiviste reproaches me in that, on the one hand, I treat economics
metaphysically, and on the other hand – imagine! – confine myself to the mere critical analysis of
actual facts, instead of writing receipts 4 (Comtist ones?) for the cook-shops of the future. In
answer to the reproach in re metaphysics, Professor Sieber has it:
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“In so far as it deals with actual theory, the method of Marx is the deductive
method of the whole English school, a school whose failings and virtues are
common to the best theoretic economists.”
M. Block – “Les Théoriciens du Socialisme en Allemagne. Extrait du Journal des Economistes,
Juillet et Août 1872” – makes the discovery that my method is analytic and says: “Par cet ouvrage
M. Marx se classe parmi les esprits analytiques les plus eminents.” German reviews, of course,
shriek out at “Hegelian sophistics.” The European Messenger of St. Petersburg in an article
dealing exclusively with the method of “Das Kapital” (May number, 1872, pp. 427-436), finds
my method of inquiry severely realistic, but my method of presentation, unfortunately, Germandialectical. It says:
“At first sight, if the judgment is based on the external form of the presentation of
the subject, Marx is the most ideal of ideal philosophers, always in the German,
i.e., the bad sense of the word. But in point of fact he is infinitely more realistic
than all his forerunners in the work of economic criticism. He can in no sense be
called an idealist.”
I cannot answer the writer better than by aid of a few extracts from his own criticism, which may
interest some of my readers to whom the Russian original is inaccessible.
After a quotation from the preface to my “Criticism of Political Economy,” Berlin, 1859, pp. IVVII, where I discuss the materialistic basis of my method, the writer goes on:
“The one thing which is of moment to Marx, is to find the law of the phenomena
with whose investigation he is concerned; and not only is that law of moment to
him, which governs these phenomena, in so far as they have a definite form and
mutual connexion within a given historical period. Of still greater moment to him
is the law of their variation, of their development, i.e., of their transition from one
form into another, from one series of connexions into a different one. This law
once discovered, he investigates in detail the effects in which it manifests itself in
social life. Consequently, Marx only troubles himself about one thing: to show, by
rigid scientific investigation, the necessity of successive determinate orders of
social conditions, and to establish, as impartially as possible, the facts that serve
him for fundamental starting-points. For this it is quite enough, if he proves, at the
same time, both the necessity of the present order of things, and the necessity of
another order into which the first must inevitably pass over; and this all the same,
whether men believe or do not believe it, whether they are conscious or
unconscious of it. Marx treats the social movement as a process of natural history,
governed by laws not only independent of human will, consciousness and
intelligence, but rather, on the contrary, determining that will, consciousness and
intelligence. ... If in the history of civilisation the conscious element plays a part
so subordinate, then it is self-evident that a critical inquiry whose subject-matter is
civilisation, can, less than anything else, have for its basis any form of, or any
result of, consciousness. That is to say, that not the idea, but the material
phenomenon alone can serve as its starting-point. Such an inquiry will confine
itself to the confrontation and the comparison of a fact, not with ideas, but with
another fact. For this inquiry, the one thing of moment is, that both facts be
investigated as accurately as possible, and that they actually form, each with
respect to the other, different momenta of an evolution; but most important of all
is the rigid analysis of the series of successions, of the sequences and
concatenations in which the different stages of such an evolution present
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themselves. But it will be said, the general laws of economic life are one and the
same, no matter whether they are applied to the present or the past. This Marx
directly denies. According to him, such abstract laws do not exist. On the
contrary, in his opinion every historical period has laws of its own. ... As soon as
society has outlived a given period of development, and is passing over from one
given stage to another, it begins to be subject also to other laws. In a word,
economic life offers us a phenomenon analogous to the history of evolution in
other branches of biology. The old economists misunderstood the nature of
economic laws when they likened them to the laws of physics and chemistry. A
more thorough analysis of phenomena shows that social organisms differ among
themselves as fundamentally as plants or animals. Nay, one and the same
phenomenon falls under quite different laws in consequence of the different
structure of those organisms as a whole, of the variations of their individual
organs, of the different conditions in which those organs function, &c. Marx, e.g.,
denies that the law of population is the same at all times and in all places. He
asserts, on the contrary, that every stage of development has its own law of
population. ... With the varying degree of development of productive power,
social conditions and the laws governing them vary too. Whilst Marx sets himself
the task of following and explaining from this point of view the economic system
established by the sway of capital, he is only formulating, in a strictly scientific
manner, the aim that every accurate investigation into economic life must have.
The scientific value of such an inquiry lies in the disclosing of the special laws
that regulate the origin, existence, development, death of a given social organism
and its replacement by another and higher one. And it is this value that, in point of
fact, Marx’s book has.”
Whilst the writer pictures what he takes to be actually my method, in this striking and [as far as
concerns my own application of it] generous way, what else is he picturing but the dialectic
method?
Of course the method of presentation must differ in form from that of inquiry. The latter has to
appropriate the material in detail, to analyse its different forms of development, to trace out their
inner connexion. Only after this work is done, can the actual movement be adequately described.
If this is done successfully, if the life of the subject-matter is ideally reflected as in a mirror, then
it may appear as if we had before us a mere a priori construction.
My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel,
the life process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of “the
Idea,” he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the
real world is only the external, phenomenal form of “the Idea.” With me, on the contrary, the
ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into
forms of thought.
The mystifying side of Hegelian dialectic I criticised nearly thirty years ago, at a time when it was
still the fashion. But just as I was working at the first volume of “Das Kapital,” it was the good
pleasure of the peevish, arrogant, mediocre Επιγονοι [Epigones – Büchner, Dühring and others]
who now talk large in cultured Germany, to treat Hegel in same way as the brave Moses
Mendelssohn in Lessing’s time treated Spinoza, i.e., as a “dead dog.” I therefore openly avowed
myself the pupil of that mighty thinker, and even here and there, in the chapter on the theory of
value, coquetted with the modes of expression peculiar to him. The mystification which dialectic
suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general
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form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It
must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical
shell.
In its mystified form, dialectic became the fashion in Germany, because it seemed to transfigure
and to glorify the existing state of things. In its rational form it is a scandal and abomination to
bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors, because it includes in its comprehension and
affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the
negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it regards every historically
developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature
not less than its momentary existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence
critical and revolutionary.
The contradictions inherent in the movement of capitalist society impress themselves upon the
practical bourgeois most strikingly in the changes of the periodic cycle, through which modern
industry runs, and whose crowning point is the universal crisis. That crisis is once again
approaching, although as yet but in its preliminary stage; and by the universality of its theatre and
the intensity of its action it will drum dialectics even into the heads of the mushroom-upstarts of
the new, holy Prusso-German empire.
Karl Marx
London
January 24, 1873

1

Geschichtliche Darstellung des Handels, der Gewerbe und des Ackerbaus, &c.. von Gustav von
Gülich. 5 vols., Jena. 1830-45.
2
See my work “Zur Kritik, &c.,” p. 39.
3
The mealy-mouthed babblers of German vulgar economy fell foul of the style of my book. No one
can feel the literary shortcomings in “Das Kapital” more strongly than I myself. Yet I will for the
benefit and the enjoyment of these gentlemen and their public quote in this connexion one English and
one Russian notice. The Saturday Review, always hostile to my views, said in its notice of the first
edition: “The presentation of the subject invests the driest economic questions with a certain peculiar
charm.” The “St. Petersburg Journal” (Sankt-Peterburgskie Viedomosti), in its issue of April 8 (20),
1872, says: “The presentation of the subject, with the exception of one or two exceptionally special
parts, is distinguished by its comprehensibility by the general reader, its clearness, and, in spite of the
scientific intricacy of the subject, by an unusual liveliness. In this respect the author in no way
resembles ... the majority of German scholars who ... write their books in a language so dry and
obscure that the heads of ordinary mortals are cracked by it.”
4
Rezepte – translated as “Receipt,” which in the 19th Century, meant “recipe” and Ben Fowkes, for
example translates this as “recipe.” [MIA footnote].

Afterword to the French Edition (1875)
Mr. J. Roy set himself the task of producing a version that would be as exact and even literal as
possible, and has scrupulously fulfilled it. But his very scrupulosity has compelled me to modify
his text, with a view to rendering it more intelligible to the reader. These alterations, introduced
from day to day, as the book was published in parts, were not made with equal care and were
bound to result in a lack of harmony in style.
Having once undertaken this work of revision, I was led to apply it also to the basic original text
(the second German edition), to simplify some arguments, to complete others, to give additional
historical or statistical material, to add critical suggestions, etc. Hence, whatever the literary
defects of this French edition may be, it possesses a scientific value independent of the original
and should be consulted even by readers familiar with German.
Below I give the passages in the Afterword to the second German edition which treat of the
development of Political Economy in Germany and the method employed in the present work.
Karl Marx
London
April 28, 1875

Preface to the Third German Edition (1883)
Marx was not destined to get this, the third, edition ready for press himself. The powerful thinker,
to whose greatness even his opponents now make obeisance, died on March 14, 1883.
Upon me who in Marx lost the best, the truest friend I had – and had for forty years – the friend to
whom I am more indebted than can be expressed in words – upon me now devolved the duty of
attending to the publication of this third edition, as well as of the second volume, which Marx had
left behind in manuscript. I must now account here to the reader for the way in which I
discharged the first part of my duty.
It was Marx's original intention to re-write a great part of the text of Volume I, to formulate many
theoretical points more exactly, insert new ones and bring historical and statistical materials up to
date. But his ailing condition and the urgent need to do the final editing of Volume II induced him
to give up this scheme. Only the most necessary alterations were to be made, only the insertions
which the French edition (“Le Capital.” Par Karl Marx. Paris, Lachâtre 1873) already contained,
were to be put in.
Among the books left by Marx there was a German copy which he himself had corrected here and
there and provided with references to the French edition; also a French copy in which he had
indicated the exact passages to be used. These alterations and additions are confined, with few
exceptions, to the last [Engl. ed.: second last] part of the book: “The Accumulation of Capital.”
Here the previous text followed the original draft more closely than elsewhere, while the
preceding sections had been gone over more thoroughly. The style was therefore more vivacious,
more of a single cast, but also more careless, studded with Anglicisms and in parts unclear; there
were gaps here and there in the presentation of arguments, some important particulars being
merely alluded to.
With regard to the style, Marx had himself thoroughly revised several sub-sections and thereby
had indicated to me here, as well as in numerous oral suggestions, the length to which I could go
in eliminating English technical terms and other Anglicisms. Marx would in any event have gone
over the additions and supplemental texts and have replaced the smooth French with his own
terse German; I had to be satisfied, when transferring them, with bringing them into maximum
harmony with the original text.
Thus not a single word was changed in this third edition without my firm conviction that the
author would have altered it himself. It would never occur to me to introduce into “Das Kapital”
the current jargon in which German economists are wont to express themselves – that gibberish in
which, for instance, one who for cash has others give him their labour is called a labour-giver
(Arbeitgeber) and one whose labour is taken away from him for wages is called a labour-taker
(Arbeitnehmer). In French, too, the word “travail” is used in every-day life in the sense of
“occupation.” But the French would rightly consider any economist crazy should he call the
capitalist a donneur de travail (a labour-giver) or the worker a receveur de travail (a labour-taker).
Nor have I taken the liberty to convert the English coins and moneys, measures and weights used
throughout the text to their new-German equivalents. When the first edition appeared there were
as many kinds of measures and weights in Germany as there are days in the year. Besides there
were two kinds of marks (the Reichsmark existed at the time only in the imagination of Soetbeer,
who had invented it in the late thirties), two kinds of gulden and at least three kinds of taler,
including one called neues Zweidrittel. In the natural sciences the metric system prevailed, in the
world market – English measures and weights. Under such circumstances English units of
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measure were quite natural for a book which had to take its factual proofs almost exclusively
from British industrial relations. The last-named reason is decisive even to-day, especially
because the corresponding relations in the world market have hardly changed and English
weights and measures almost completely control precisely the key industries, iron and cotton.
In conclusion a few words on Marx's art of quotation, which is so little understood. When they
are pure statements of fact or descriptions, the quotations, from the English Blue books, for
example, serve of course as simple documentary proof. But this is not so when the theoretical
views of other economists are cited. Here the quotation is intended merely to state where, when
and by whom an economic idea conceived in the course of development was first clearly
enunciated. Here the only consideration is that the economic conception in question must be of
some significance to the history of science, that it is the more or less adequate theoretical
expression of the economic situation of its time. But whether this conception still possesses any
absolute or relative validity from the standpoint of the author or whether it already has become
wholly past history is quite immaterial. Hence these quotations are only a running commentary to
the text, a commentary borrowed from the history of economic science, and establish the dates
and originators of certain of the more important advances in economic theory. And that was a
very necessary thing in a science whose historians have so far distinguished themselves only by
tendentious ignorance characteristic of careerists. It will now be understandable why Marx, in
consonance with the Afterword to the second edition, only in very exceptional cases had occasion
to quote German economists.
There is hope that the second volume will appear in the course of 1884.
Frederick Engels
London
November 7, 1883

Preface to the English Edition (Engels, 1886)
The publication of an English version of “Das Kapital” needs no apology. On the contrary, an
explanation might be expected why this English version has been delayed until now, seeing that
for some years past the theories advocated in this book have been constantly referred to, attacked
and defended, interpreted and misinterpreted, in the periodical press and the current literature of
both England and America.
When, soon after the author's death in 1883, it became evident that an English edition of the work
was really required, Mr. Samuel Moore, for many years a friend of Marx and of the present
writer, and than whom, perhaps, no one is more conversant with the book itself, consented to
undertake the translation which the literary executors of Marx were anxious to lay before the
public. It was understood that I should compare the MS. with the original work, and suggest such
alterations as I might deem advisable. When, by and by, it was found that Mr. Moore's
professional occupations prevented him from finishing the translation as quickly as we all
desired, we gladly accepted Dr. Aveling's offer to undertake a portion of the work; at the same
time Mrs. Aveling, Marx's youngest daughter, offered to check the quotations and to restore the
original text of the numerous passages taken from English authors and Blue books and translated
by Marx into German. This has been done throughout, with but a few unavoidable exceptions.
The following portions of the book have been translated by Dr. Aveling: (I) Chapters X. (The
Working day), and XI. (Rate and Mass of Surplus-Value); (2) Part VI. (Wages, comprising
Chapters XIX. to XXII.); (3) from Chapter XXIV., Section 4 (Circumstances that &c.) to the end
of the book, comprising the latter part of Chapter XXIV.,. Chapter XXV., and the whole of Part
VIII. (Chapters XXVI. to XXXIII); (4) the two Author's prefaces. All the rest of the book has
been done by Mr. Moore. While, thus, each of the translators is responsible for his share of the
work only, I bear a joint responsibility for the whole.
The third German edition, which has been made the basis of our work throughout, was prepared
by me, in 1883, with the assistance of notes left by the author, indicating the passages of the
second edition to be replaced by designated passages, from the French text published in 1873.1
The alterations thus effected in the text of the second edition generally coincided with changes
prescribed by Marx in a set of MS. instructions for an English translation that was planned, about
ten years ago, in America, but abandoned chiefly for want of a fit and proper translator. This MS.
was placed at our disposal by our old friend Mr. F. A. Sorge of Hoboken N. J. It designates some
further interpolations from the French edition; but, being so many years older than the final
instructions for the third edition, I did not consider myself at liberty to make use of it otherwise
than sparingly, and chiefly in cases where it helped us over difficulties. In the same way, the
French text has been referred to in most of the difficult passages, as an indicator of what the
author himself was prepared to sacrifice wherever something of the full import of the original had
to be sacrificed in the rendering.
There is, however, one difficulty we could not spare the reader: the use of certain terms in a sense
different from what they have, not only in common life, but in ordinary Political Economy. But
this was unavoidable. Every new aspect of a science involves a revolution in the technical terms
of that science. This is best shown by chemistry, where the whole of the terminology is radically
changed about once in twenty years, and where you will hardly find a single organic compound
that has not gone through a whole series of different names. Political Economy has generally been
content to take, just as they were, the terms of commercial and industrial life, and to operate with
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them, entirely failing to see that by so doing, it confined itself within the narrow circle of ideas
expressed by those terms. Thus, though perfectly aware that both profits and rent are but subdivisions, fragments of that unpaid part of the product which the labourer has to supply to his
employer (its first appropriator, though not its ultimate exclusive owner), yet even classical
Political Economy never went beyond the received notions of profits and rents, never examined
this unpaid part of the product (called by Marx surplus-product) in its integrity as a whole, and
therefore never arrived at a clear comprehension, either of its origin and nature, or of the laws that
regulate the subsequent distribution of its value. Similarly all industry, not agricultural or
handicraft, is indiscriminately comprised in the term of manufacture, and thereby the distinction
is obliterated between two great and essentially different periods of economic history: the period
of manufacture proper, based on the division of manual labour, and the period of modern industry
based on machinery. It is, however, self- evident that a theory which views modern capitalist
production as a mere passing stage in the economic history of mankind, must make use of terms
different from those habitual to writers who look upon that form of production as imperishable
and final.
A word respecting the author's method of quoting may not be out of place. In the majority of
cases, the quotations serve, in the usual way, as documentary evidence in support of assertions
made in the text. But in many instances, passages from economic writers are quoted in order to
indicate when, where, and by whom a certain proposition was for the first time clearly
enunciated. This is done in cases where the proposition quoted is of importance as being a more
or less adequate expression of the conditions of social production and exchange prevalent at the
time, and quite irrespective of Marx's recognition, or otherwise, of its general validity. These
quotations, therefore, supplement the text by a running commentary taken from the history of the
science.
Our translation comprises the first book of the work only. But this first book is in a great measure
a whole in itself, and has for twenty years ranked as an independent work. The second book,
edited in German by me, in 1885, is decidedly incomplete without the third, which cannot be
published before the end of 1887. When Book III. has been brought out in the original German, it
will then be soon enough to think about preparing an English edition of both.
“Das Kapital” is often called, on the Continent, “the Bible of the working class.” That the
conclusions arrived at in this work are daily more and more becoming the fundamental principles
of the great working- class movement, not only in Germany and Switzerland, but in France, in
Holland and Belgium, in America, and even in Italy and Spain, that everywhere the working class
more and more recognises, in these conclusions, the most adequate expression of its condition
and of its aspirations, nobody acquainted with that movement will deny. And in England, too, the
theories of Marx, even at this moment, exercise a powerful influence upon the socialist movement
which is spreading in the ranks of “cultured” people no less than in those of the working class.
But that is not all. The time is rapidly approaching when a thorough examination of England's
economic position will impose itself as an irresistible national necessity. The working of the
industrial system of this country, impossible without a constant and rapid extension of
production, and therefore of markets, is coming to a dead stop.
Free Trade has exhausted its resources; even Manchester doubts this its quondam economic
gospel. 2 Foreign industry, rapidly developing, stares English production in the face everywhere,
not only in protected, but also in neutral markets, and even on this side of the Channel. While the
productive power increases in a geometric, the extension of markets proceeds at best in an
arithmetic ratio. The decennial cycle of stagnation, prosperity, over-production and crisis, ever
recurrent from 1825 to 1867, seems indeed to have run its course; but only to land us in the
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slough of despond of a permanent and chronic depression. The sighed for period of prosperity
will not come; as often as we seem to perceive its heralding symptoms, so often do they again
vanish into air. Meanwhile, each succeeding winter brings up afresh the great question, “what to
do with the unemployed"; but while the number of the unemployed keeps swelling from year to
year, there is nobody to answer that question; and we can almost calculate the moment when the
unemployed losing patience will take their own fate into their own hands. Surely, at such a
moment, the voice ought to be heard of a man whose whole theory is the result of a lifelong study
of the economic history and condition of England, and whom that study led to the conclusion that,
at least in Europe, England is the only country where the inevitable social revolution might be
effected entirely by peaceful and legal means. He certainly never forgot to add that he hardly
expected the English ruling classes to submit, without a “pro-slavery rebellion,” to this peaceful
and legal revolution.

1

“Le Capital,” par Karl Marx. Traduction de M. J. Roy, entierement revisée par l'auteur. Paris.
Lachâtre. This translation, especially in the latter part of the book, contains considerable alterations in
and additions to the text of the second German edition.
2
At the quarterly meeting of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, held this afternoon, a warm
discussion took place on the subject of Free Trade. A resolution was moved to the effect that “having
waited in vain 40 years for other nations to follow the Free Trade example of England, this Chamber
thinks the time has now arrived to reconsider that position.” The resolution was rejected by a majority
of one only, the figures being 21 for, and 22 against. – Evening Standard, Nov. 1, 1886.

Preface to the Fourth German Edition
(Engels, 1890)
The fourth edition required that I should establish in final form, as nearly as possible, both text
and footnotes. The following brief explanation will show how I have fulfilled this task.
After again comparing the French edition and Marx’s manuscript remarks I have made some
further additions to the German text from that translation. They will be found on p. 80 (3rd
edition, p. 88) [present edition, pp. 117-18], pp. 458-60 (3rd edition, pp. 509-10) [present edition,
pp. 462-65], 1 pp. 547-51 (3rd edition, p. 600) [present edition, pp. 548-51], pp. 591-93 (3rd
edition, p. 644) [present edition, 587-89] and p. 596 (3rd edition, p. 648) [present edition, p. 591]
in Note 1. I have also followed the example of the French and English editions by putting the
long footnote on the miners into the text (3rd edition, pp. 509-15; 4th edition, pp. 461-67)
[present edition, pp. 465-71]. Other small alterations are of a purely technical nature.
Further, I have added a few more explanatory notes, especially where changed historical
conditions seemed to demand this. All these additional notes are enclosed in square brackets and
marked either with my initials or “D. H.” 2
Meanwhile a complete revision of the numerous quotations had been made necessary by the
publication of the English edition. For this edition Marx’s youngest daughter, Eleanor, undertook
to compare all the quotations with their originals, so that those taken from English sources, which
constitute the vast majority, are given there not as re-translations from the German but in the
original English form. In preparing the fourth edition it was therefore incumbent upon me to
consult this text. The comparison revealed various small inaccuracies. Page numbers wrongly
indicated, due partly to mistakes in copying from notebooks, and partly to the accumulated
misprints of three editions; misplaced quotation or omission marks, which cannot be avoided
when a mass of quotations is copied from note-book extracts; here and there some rather unhappy
translation of a word; particular passages quoted from the old Paris notebooks of 1843-45, when
Marx did not know English and was reading English economists in French translations, so that
the double translation yielded a slightly different shade of meaning, e.g., in the case of Steuart,
Ure, etc., where the English text had now to be used – and other similar instances of trifling
inaccuracy or negligence. But anyone who compares the fourth edition with the previous ones can
convince himself that all this laborious process of emendation has not produced the smallest
change in the book worth speaking of. There was only one quotation which could not be traced –
the one from Richard Jones (4th edition, p. 562, note 47). Marx probably slipped up when writing
down the title of the book. 3 All the other quotations retain their cogency in full, or have enhanced
it due to their present exact form.
Here, however, I am obliged to revert to an old story.
I know of only one case in which the accuracy of a quotation given by Marx has been called in
question. But as the issue dragged beyond his lifetime I cannot well ignore it here.
On March 7, 1872, there appeared in the Berlin Concordia, organ of the German Manufacturers’
Association, an anonymous article entitled: “How Karl Marx Quotes.” It was here asserted, with
an effervescence of moral indignation and unparliamentary language, that the quotation from
Gladstone’s Budget Speech of April 16, 1863 (in the Inaugural Address of the International
Workingmen’s Association, 1864, and repeated in “Capital,” Vol. I, p. 617, 4th edition; p. 671,
3rd edition) [present edition, p. 610], had been falsified; that not a single word of the sentence:
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“this intoxicating augmentation of wealth and power ... is ... entirely confined to classes of
property” was to be found in the (semi-official) stenographic report in Hansard. “But this
sentence is nowhere to be found in Gladstone’s speech. Exactly the opposite is stated there.” (In
bold type): “This sentence, both in form and substance, is a lie inserted by Marx."
Marx, to whom the number of Concordia was sent the following May, answered the anonymous
author in the Volksstaat of June 1st. As he could not recall which newspaper report he had used
for the quotation, he limited himself to citing, first the equivalent quotation from two English
publications, and then the report in The Times, according to which Gladstone says:
“That is the state of the case as regards the wealth of this country. I must say for one, I should
look almost with apprehension and with pain upon this intoxicating augmentation of wealth and
power, if it were my belief that it was confined to classes who are in easy circumstances. This
takes no cognisance at all of the condition of the labouring population. The augmentation I have
described and which is founded, I think, upon accurate returns, is an augmentation entirely
confined to classes possessed of property.”
Thus Gladstone says here that he would be sorry if it were so, but it is so: this intoxicating
augmentation of wealth and power is entirely confined to classes of property. And as to the semiofficial Hansard, Marx goes on to say: “In the version which he afterwards manipulated
[zurechtgestümpert], Mr. Gladstone was astute enough to obliterate [wegzupfuschen] this
passage, which, coming from an English Chancellor of the Exchequer, was certainly
compromising. This, by the way, is a traditional usage in the English parliament and not an
invention gotten up by little Lasker against Bebel.”
The anonymous writer gets angrier and angrier. In his answer in Concordia, July 4th, he sweeps
aside second-hand sources and demurely suggests that it is the “custom” to quote parliamentary
speeches from the stenographic report; adding, however, that The Times report (which includes
the “falsified” sentence) and the Hansard report (which omits it) are “substantially in complete
agreement,” while The Times report likewise contains “the exact opposite to that notorious
passage in the Inaugural Address.” This fellow carefully conceals the fact that The Times report
explicitly includes that self-same “notorious passage,” alongside of its alleged “opposite.”
Despite all this, however, the anonymous one feels that he is stuck fast and that only some new
dodge can save him. Thus, whilst his article bristles, as we have just shown, with “impudent
mendacity” and is interlarded with such edifying terms of abuse as “bad faith,” “dishonesty,”
“lying allegation,” “that spurious quotation,” “impudent mendacity,” “a quotation entirely
falsified,” “this falsification,” “simply infamous,” etc., he finds it necessary to divert the issue to
another domain and therefore promises “to explain in a second article the meaning which we (the
non-mendacious anonymous one) attribute to the content of Gladstone’s words.” As if his
particular opinion, of no decisive value as it is, had anything whatever to do with the matter. This
second article was printed in Concordia on July 11th.
Marx replied again in the Volksstaat of August 7th now giving also the reports of the passage in
question from the Morning Star and the Morning Advertiser of April 17, 1863. According to both
reports Gladstone said that he would look with apprehension, etc., upon this intoxicating
augmentation of wealth and power if he believed it to be confined to “classes in easy
circumstances.” But this augmentation was in fact “entirely confined to classes possessed of
property.” So these reports too reproduced word for word the sentence alleged to have been
“lyingly inserted.” Marx further established once more, by a comparison of The Times and the
Hansard texts, that this sentence, which three newspaper reports of identical content, appearing
independently of one another the next morning, proved to have been really uttered, was missing
from the Hansard report, revised according to the familiar “custom,” and that Gladstone, to use
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Marx’s words, “had afterwards conjured it away.” In conclusion Marx stated that he had no time
for further intercourse with the anonymous one. The latter also seems to have had enough, at any
rate Marx received no further issues of Concordia.
With this the matter appeared to be dead and buried. True, once or twice later on there reached us,
from persons in touch with the University of Cambridge, mysterious rumours of an unspeakable
literary crime which Marx was supposed to have committed in “Capital,” but despite all
investigation nothing more definite could be learned. Then, on November 29, 1883, eight months
after Marx’s death, there appeared in The Times a letter headed Trinity College, Cambridge, and
signed Sedley Taylor, in which this little man, who dabbles in the mildest sort of co-operative
affairs, seizing upon some chance pretext or other, at last enlightened us, not only concerning
those vague Cambridge rumours, but also the anonymous one in Concordia.
“What appears extremely singular,” says the little man from Trinity College, “is that it was
reserved for Professor Brentano (then of the University of Breslau, now of that of Strassburg) to
expose... the bad faith which had manifestly dictated the citation made from Mr. Gladstone’s
speech in the [Inaugural] Address. Herr Karl Marx, who ... attempted to defend the citation, had
the hardihood, in the deadly shifts to which Brentano’s masterly conduct of the attack speedily
reduced him, to assert that Mr. Gladstone had ‘manipulated’ the report of his speech in The Times
of April 17, 1863, before it appeared in Hansard, in order to ‘obliterate’ a passage which ‘was
certainly compromising’ for an English Chancellor of the Exchequer. On Brentano’s showing, by
a detailed comparison of texts, that the reports of The Times and of Hansard agreed in utterly
excluding the meaning which craftily isolated quotation had put upon Mr. Gladstone’s words,
Marx withdrew from further controversy under the plea of ‘want of time.’”
So that was at the bottom of the whole business! And thus was the anonymous campaign of Herr
Brentano in Concordia gloriously reflected in the productively co-operating imagination of
Cambridge. Thus he stood, sword in hand, and thus he battled, in his “masterly conduct of the
attack,” this St. George of the German Manufacturers’ Association, whilst the infernal dragon
Marx, “in deadly shifts,” “speedily” breathed his last at his feet.
All this Ariostian battle scene, however, only serves to conceal the dodges of our St. George.
Here there is no longer talk of “lying insertion” or “falsification,” but of “craftily isolated
quotation.” The whole issue was shifted, and St. George and his Cambridge squire very well
knew why.
Eleanor Marx replied in the monthly journal To-day (February 1884), as The Times refused to
publish her letter. She once more focussed the debate on the sole question at issue: had Marx
“lyingly inserted” that sentence or not? To this Mr. Sedley Taylor answered that “the question
whether a particular sentence did or did not occur in Mr. Gladstone’s speech” had been, in his
opinion, “of very subordinate importance” in the Brentano-Marx controversy, “compared to the
issue whether the quotation in dispute was made with the intention of conveying, or of perverting
Mr. Gladstone’s meaning.” He then admits that The Times report contains “a verbal contrariety";
but, if the context is rightly interpreted, i.e., in the Gladstonian Liberal sense, it shows what Mr.
Gladstone meant to say. (To-day, March, 1884.) The most comic point here is that our little
Cambridge man now insists upon quoting the speech not from Hansard, as, according to the
anonymous Brentano, it is “customary” to do, but from The Times report, which the same
Brentano had characterised as “necessarily bungling.” Naturally so, for in Hansard the vexatious
sentence is missing.
Eleanor Marx had no difficulty (in the same issue of To-day) in dissolving all this argumentation
into thin air. Either Mr. Taylor had read the controversy of 1872, in which case he was now
making not only “lying insertions” but also “lying” suppressions; or he had not read it and ought
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to remain silent. In either case it was certain that he did not dare to maintain for a moment the
accusation of his friend Brentano that Marx had made a “lying” addition. On the contrary, Marx,
it now seems, had not lyingly added but suppressed an important sentence. But this same sentence
is quoted on page 5 of the Inaugural Address, a few lines before the alleged “lying insertion.”
And as to the “contrariety” in Gladstone’s speech, is it not Marx himself, who in “Capital,” p. 618
(3rd edition, p. 672), note 105 [present edition, p. 611, Note 1], refers to “the continual crying
contradictions in Gladstone’s Budget speeches of 1863 and 1864"? Only he does not presume à la
Mr. Sedley Taylor to resolve them into complacent Liberal sentiments. Eleanor Marx, in
concluding her reply, finally sums up as follows:
“Marx has not suppressed anything worth quoting, neither has he ‘lyingly’ added anything. But
he has restored, rescued from oblivion, a particular sentence of one of Mr. Gladstone’s speeches,
a sentence which had indubitably been pronounced, but which somehow or other had found its
way – out of Hansard.”
With that Mr. Sedley Taylor too had had enough, and the result of this whole professorial
cobweb, spun out over two decades and two great countries, is that nobody has since dared to cast
any other aspersion upon Marx’s literary honesty; whilst Mr. Sedley Taylor, no doubt, will
hereafter put as little confidence in the literary war bulletins of Herr Brentano as Herr Brentano
will in the papal infallibility of Hansard.
Frederick Engels
London.
June 25. 1890
1

In the English edition of 1887 this addition was made by Engels himself. – Ed.
In the present edition they are put into square brackets and marked with the initials
3
Marx was not mistaken in the title of the book but in the page. He put down 36 instead of 37. (See
pp. 560-61 of the present edition.) – Ed.
2

Part 1: Commodities and Money
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Chapter 1: Commodities
Section 1: The Two Factors of a Commodity:
Use-Value and Value
(The Substance of Value and the Magnitude of Value)
The wealth of those societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails, presents itself
as “an immense accumulation of commodities,”1 its unit being a single commodity. Our
investigation must therefore begin with the analysis of a commodity.
A commodity is, in the first place, an object outside us, a thing that by its properties satisfies
human wants of some sort or another. The nature of such wants, whether, for instance, they spring
from the stomach or from fancy, makes no difference. 2 Neither are we here concerned to know
how the object satisfies these wants, whether directly as means of subsistence, or indirectly as
means of production.
Every useful thing, as iron, paper, &c., may be looked at from the two points of view of quality
and quantity. It is an assemblage of many properties, and may therefore be of use in various ways.
To discover the various uses of things is the work of history. 3 So also is the establishment of
socially-recognized standards of measure for the quantities of these useful objects. The diversity
of these measures has its origin partly in the diverse nature of the objects to be measured, partly
in convention.
The utility of a thing makes it a use value. 4 But this utility is not a thing of air. Being limited by
the physical properties of the commodity, it has no existence apart from that commodity. A
commodity, such as iron, corn, or a diamond, is therefore, so far as it is a material thing, a use
value, something useful. This property of a commodity is independent of the amount of labour
required to appropriate its useful qualities. When treating of use value, we always assume to be
dealing with definite quantities, such as dozens of watches, yards of linen, or tons of iron. The use
values of commodities furnish the material for a special study, that of the commercial knowledge
of commodities. 5 Use values become a reality only by use or consumption: they also constitute
the substance of all wealth, whatever may be the social form of that wealth. In the form of society
we are about to consider, they are, in addition, the material depositories of exchange value.
Exchange value, at first sight, presents itself as a quantitative relation, as the proportion in which
values in use of one sort are exchanged for those of another sort, 6 a relation constantly changing
with time and place. Hence exchange value appears to be something accidental and purely
relative, and consequently an intrinsic value, i.e., an exchange value that is inseparably connected
with, inherent in commodities, seems a contradiction in terms. 7 Let us consider the matter a little
more closely.
A given commodity, e.g., a quarter of wheat is exchanged for x blacking, y silk, or z gold, &c. –
in short, for other commodities in the most different proportions. Instead of one exchange value,
the wheat has, therefore, a great many. But since x blacking, y silk, or z gold &c., each represents
the exchange value of one quarter of wheat, x blacking, y silk, z gold, &c., must, as exchange
values, be replaceable by each other, or equal to each other. Therefore, first: the valid exchange
values of a given commodity express something equal; secondly, exchange value, generally, is
only the mode of expression, the phenomenal form, of something contained in it, yet
distinguishable from it.
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Let us take two commodities, e.g., corn and iron. The proportions in which they are
exchangeable, whatever those proportions may be, can always be represented by an equation in
which a given quantity of corn is equated to some quantity of iron: e.g., 1 quarter corn = x cwt.
iron. What does this equation tell us? It tells us that in two different things – in 1 quarter of corn
and x cwt. of iron, there exists in equal quantities something common to both. The two things
must therefore be equal to a third, which in itself is neither the one nor the other. Each of them, so
far as it is exchange value, must therefore be reducible to this third.
A simple geometrical illustration will make this clear. In order to calculate and compare the areas
of rectilinear figures, we decompose them into triangles. But the area of the triangle itself is
expressed by something totally different from its visible figure, namely, by half the product of the
base multiplied by the altitude. In the same way the exchange values of commodities must be
capable of being expressed in terms of something common to them all, of which thing they
represent a greater or less quantity.
This common “something” cannot be either a geometrical, a chemical, or any other natural
property of commodities. Such properties claim our attention only in so far as they affect the
utility of those commodities, make them use values. But the exchange of commodities is
evidently an act characterised by a total abstraction from use value. Then one use value is just as
good as another, provided only it be present in sufficient quantity. Or, as old Barbon says,
“one sort of wares are as good as another, if the values be equal. There is no
difference or distinction in things of equal value ... An hundred pounds’ worth of
lead or iron, is of as great value as one hundred pounds’ worth of silver or gold.” 8
As use values, commodities are, above all, of different qualities, but as exchange values they are
merely different quantities, and consequently do not contain an atom of use value.
If then we leave out of consideration the use value of commodities, they have only one common
property left, that of being products of labour. But even the product of labour itself has undergone
a change in our hands. If we make abstraction from its use value, we make abstraction at the same
time from the material elements and shapes that make the product a use value; we see in it no
longer a table, a house, yarn, or any other useful thing. Its existence as a material thing is put out
of sight. Neither can it any longer be regarded as the product of the labour of the joiner, the
mason, the spinner, or of any other definite kind of productive labour. Along with the useful
qualities of the products themselves, we put out of sight both the useful character of the various
kinds of labour embodied in them, and the concrete forms of that labour; there is nothing left but
what is common to them all; all are reduced to one and the same sort of labour, human labour in
the abstract.
Let us now consider the residue of each of these products; it consists of the same unsubstantial
reality in each, a mere congelation of homogeneous human labour, of labour power expended
without regard to the mode of its expenditure. All that these things now tell us is, that human
labour power has been expended in their production, that human labour is embodied in them.
When looked at as crystals of this social substance, common to them all, they are – Values.
We have seen that when commodities are exchanged, their exchange value manifests itself as
something totally independent of their use value. But if we abstract from their use value, there
remains their Value as defined above. Therefore, the common substance that manifests itself in
the exchange value of commodities, whenever they are exchanged, is their value. The progress of
our investigation will show that exchange value is the only form in which the value of
commodities can manifest itself or be expressed. For the present, however, we have to consider
the nature of value independently of this, its form.

29

Chapter 1

A use value, or useful article, therefore, has value only because human labour in the abstract has
been embodied or materialised in it. How, then, is the magnitude of this value to be measured?
Plainly, by the quantity of the value-creating substance, the labour, contained in the article. The
quantity of labour, however, is measured by its duration, and labour time in its turn finds its
standard in weeks, days, and hours.
Some people might think that if the value of a commodity is determined by the quantity of labour
spent on it, the more idle and unskilful the labourer, the more valuable would his commodity be,
because more time would be required in its production. The labour, however, that forms the
substance of value, is homogeneous human labour, expenditure of one uniform labour power. The
total labour power of society, which is embodied in the sum total of the values of all commodities
produced by that society, counts here as one homogeneous mass of human labour power,
composed though it be of innumerable individual units. Each of these units is the same as any
other, so far as it has the character of the average labour power of society, and takes effect as
such; that is, so far as it requires for producing a commodity, no more time than is needed on an
average, no more than is socially necessary. The labour time socially necessary is that required to
produce an article under the normal conditions of production, and with the average degree of skill
and intensity prevalent at the time. The introduction of power-looms into England probably
reduced by one-half the labour required to weave a given quantity of yarn into cloth. The handloom weavers, as a matter of fact, continued to require the same time as before; but for all that,
the product of one hour of their labour represented after the change only half an hour’s social
labour, and consequently fell to one-half its former value.
We see then that that which determines the magnitude of the value of any article is the amount of
labour socially necessary, or the labour time socially necessary for its production.9 Each
individual commodity, in this connexion, is to be considered as an average sample of its class.10
Commodities, therefore, in which equal quantities of labour are embodied, or which can be
produced in the same time, have the same value. The value of one commodity is to the value of
any other, as the labour time necessary for the production of the one is to that necessary for the
production of the other. “As values, all commodities are only definite masses of congealed labour
time.” 11
The value of a commodity would therefore remain constant, if the labour time required for its
production also remained constant. But the latter changes with every variation in the
productiveness of labour. This productiveness is determined by various circumstances, amongst
others, by the average amount of skill of the workmen, the state of science, and the degree of its
practical application, the social organisation of production, the extent and capabilities of the
means of production, and by physical conditions. For example, the same amount of labour in
favourable seasons is embodied in 8 bushels of corn, and in unfavourable, only in four. The same
labour extracts from rich mines more metal than from poor mines. Diamonds are of very rare
occurrence on the earth’s surface, and hence their discovery costs, on an average, a great deal of
labour time. Consequently much labour is represented in a small compass. Jacob doubts whether
gold has ever been paid for at its full value. This applies still more to diamonds. According to
Eschwege, the total produce of the Brazilian diamond mines for the eighty years, ending in 1823,
had not realised the price of one-and-a-half years’ average produce of the sugar and coffee
plantations of the same country, although the diamonds cost much more labour, and therefore
represented more value. With richer mines, the same quantity of labour would embody itself in
more diamonds, and their value would fall. If we could succeed at a small expenditure of labour,
in converting carbon into diamonds, their value might fall below that of bricks. In general, the
greater the productiveness of labour, the less is the labour time required for the production of an
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article, the less is the amount of labour crystallised in that article, and the less is its value; and
vice versâ, the less the productiveness of labour, the greater is the labour time required for the
production of an article, and the greater is its value. The value of a commodity, therefore, varies
directly as the quantity, and inversely as the productiveness, of the labour incorporated in it. *
A thing can be a use value, without having value. This is the case whenever its utility to man is
not due to labour. Such are air, virgin soil, natural meadows, &c. A thing can be useful, and the
product of human labour, without being a commodity. Whoever directly satisfies his wants with
the produce of his own labour, creates, indeed, use values, but not commodities. In order to
produce the latter, he must not only produce use values, but use values for others, social use
values. (And not only for others, without more. The mediaeval peasant produced quit-rent-corn
for his feudal lord and tithe-corn for his parson. But neither the quit-rent-corn nor the tithe-corn
became commodities by reason of the fact that they had been produced for others. To become a
commodity a product must be transferred to another, whom it will serve as a use value, by means
of an exchange.) 12 Lastly nothing can have value, without being an object of utility. If the thing is
useless, so is the labour contained in it; the labour does not count as labour, and therefore creates
no value.

Section 2: The Two-fold Character of the Labour Embodied in
Commodities
At first sight a commodity presented itself to us as a complex of two things – use value and
exchange value. Later on, we saw also that labour, too, possesses the same two-fold nature; for,
so far as it finds expression in value, it does not possess the same characteristics that belong to it
as a creator of use values. I was the first to point out and to examine critically this two-fold nature
of the labour contained in commodities. As this point is the pivot on which a clear comprehension
of political economy turns, we must go more into detail.
Let us take two commodities such as a coat and 10 yards of linen, and let the former be double
the value of the latter, so that, if 10 yards of linen = W, the coat = 2W.
The coat is a use value that satisfies a particular want. Its existence is the result of a special sort of
productive activity, the nature of which is determined by its aim, mode of operation, subject,
means, and result. The labour, whose utility is thus represented by the value in use of its product,
or which manifests itself by making its product a use value, we call useful labour. In this
connection we consider only its useful effect.
As the coat and the linen are two qualitatively different use values, so also are the two forms of
labour that produce them, tailoring and weaving. Were these two objects not qualitatively
different, not produced respectively by labour of different quality, they could not stand to each
other in the relation of commodities. Coats are not exchanged for coats, one use value is not
exchanged for another of the same kind.
To all the different varieties of values in use there correspond as many different kinds of useful
labour, classified according to the order, genus, species, and variety to which they belong in the
social division of labour. This division of labour is a necessary condition for the production of
commodities, but it does not follow, conversely, that the production of commodities is a
*

The following passage occurred only in the first edition. “Now we know the substance of value. It is labour.
We know the measure of its magnitude. It is labour time. The form, which stamps value as exchange-value, remains to
be analysed. But before this we need to develop the characteristics we have already found somewhat more fully.”
Taken from the Penguin edition of “Capital,” translated by Ben Fowkes.
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necessary condition for the division of labour. In the primitive Indian community there is social
division of labour, without production of commodities. Or, to take an example nearer home, in
every factory the labour is divided according to a system, but this division is not brought about by
the operatives mutually exchanging their individual products. Only such products can become
commodities with regard to each other, as result from different kinds of labour, each kind being
carried on independently and for the account of private individuals.
To resume, then: In the use value of each commodity there is contained useful labour, i.e.,
productive activity of a definite kind and exercised with a definite aim. Use values cannot
confront each other as commodities, unless the useful labour embodied in them is qualitatively
different in each of them. In a community, the produce of which in general takes the form of
commodities, i.e., in a community of commodity producers, this qualitative difference between
the useful forms of labour that are carried on independently by individual producers, each on their
own account, develops into a complex system, a social division of labour.
Anyhow, whether the coat be worn by the tailor or by his customer, in either case it operates as a
use value. Nor is the relation between the coat and the labour that produced it altered by the
circumstance that tailoring may have become a special trade, an independent branch of the social
division of labour. Wherever the want of clothing forced them to it, the human race made clothes
for thousands of years, without a single man becoming a tailor. But coats and linen, like every
other element of material wealth that is not the spontaneous produce of Nature, must invariably
owe their existence to a special productive activity, exercised with a definite aim, an activity that
appropriates particular nature-given materials to particular human wants. So far therefore as
labour is a creator of use value, is useful labour, it is a necessary condition, independent of all
forms of society, for the existence of the human race; it is an eternal nature-imposed necessity,
without which there can be no material exchanges between man and Nature, and therefore no life.
The use values, coat, linen, &c., i.e., the bodies of commodities, are combinations of two
elements – matter and labour. If we take away the useful labour expended upon them, a material
substratum is always left, which is furnished by Nature without the help of man. The latter can
work only as Nature does, that is by changing the form of matter.13 Nay more, in this work of
changing the form he is constantly helped by natural forces. We see, then, that labour is not the
only source of material wealth, of use values produced by labour. As William Petty puts it, labour
is its father and the earth its mother.
Let us now pass from the commodity considered as a use value to the value of commodities.
By our assumption, the coat is worth twice as much as the linen. But this is a mere quantitative
difference, which for the present does not concern us. We bear in mind, however, that if the value
of the coat is double that of 10 yds of linen, 20 yds of linen must have the same value as one coat.
So far as they are values, the coat and the linen are things of a like substance, objective
expressions of essentially identical labour. But tailoring and weaving are, qualitatively, different
kinds of labour. There are, however, states of society in which one and the same man does
tailoring and weaving alternately, in which case these two forms of labour are mere modifications
of the labour of the same individual, and not special and fixed functions of different persons, just
as the coat which our tailor makes one day, and the trousers which he makes another day, imply
only a variation in the labour of one and the same individual. Moreover, we see at a glance that,
in our capitalist society, a given portion of human labour is, in accordance with the varying
demand, at one time supplied in the form of tailoring, at another in the form of weaving. This
change may possibly not take place without friction, but take place it must.
Productive activity, if we leave out of sight its special form, viz., the useful character of the
labour, is nothing but the expenditure of human labour power. Tailoring and weaving, though
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qualitatively different productive activities, are each a productive expenditure of human brains,
nerves, and muscles, and in this sense are human labour. They are but two different modes of
expending human labour power. Of course, this labour power, which remains the same under all
its modifications, must have attained a certain pitch of development before it can be expended in
a multiplicity of modes. But the value of a commodity represents human labour in the abstract,
the expenditure of human labour in general. And just as in society, a general or a banker plays a
great part, but mere man, on the other hand, a very shabby part,14 so here with mere human
labour. It is the expenditure of simple labour power, i.e., of the labour power which, on an
average, apart from any special development, exists in the organism of every ordinary individual.
Simple average labour, it is true, varies in character in different countries and at different times,
but in a particular society it is given. Skilled labour counts only as simple labour intensified, or
rather, as multiplied simple labour, a given quantity of skilled being considered equal to a greater
quantity of simple labour. Experience shows that this reduction is constantly being made. A
commodity may be the product of the most skilled labour, but its value, by equating it to the
product of simple unskilled labour, represents a definite quantity of the latter labour alone.15 The
different proportions in which different sorts of labour are reduced to unskilled labour as their
standard, are established by a social process that goes on behind the backs of the producers, and,
consequently, appear to be fixed by custom. For simplicity’s sake we shall henceforth account
every kind of labour to be unskilled, simple labour; by this we do no more than save ourselves the
trouble of making the reduction.
Just as, therefore, in viewing the coat and linen as values, we abstract from their different use
values, so it is with the labour represented by those values: we disregard the difference between
its useful forms, weaving and tailoring. As the use values, coat and linen, are combinations of
special productive activities with cloth and yarn, while the values, coat and linen, are, on the other
hand, mere homogeneous congelations of undifferentiated labour, so the labour embodied in these
latter values does not count by virtue of its productive relation to cloth and yarn, but only as being
expenditure of human labour power. Tailoring and weaving are necessary factors in the creation
of the use values, coat and linen, precisely because these two kinds of labour are of different
qualities; but only in so far as abstraction is made from their special qualities, only in so far as
both possess the same quality of being human labour, do tailoring and weaving form the
substance of the values of the same articles.
Coats and linen, however, are not merely values, but values of definite magnitude, and according
to our assumption, the coat is worth twice as much as the ten yards of linen. Whence this
difference in their values? It is owing to the fact that the linen contains only half as much labour
as the coat, and consequently, that in the production of the latter, labour power must have been
expended during twice the time necessary for the production of the former.
While, therefore, with reference to use value, the labour contained in a commodity counts only
qualitatively, with reference to value it counts only quantitatively, and must first be reduced to
human labour pure and simple. In the former case, it is a question of How and What, in the latter
of How much? How long a time? Since the magnitude of the value of a commodity represents
only the quantity of labour embodied in it, it follows that all commodities, when taken in certain
proportions, must be equal in value.
If the productive power of all the different sorts of useful labour required for the production of a
coat remains unchanged, the sum of the values of the coats produced increases with their number.
If one coat represents x days’ labour, two coats represent 2x days’ labour, and so on. But assume
that the duration of the labour necessary for the production of a coat becomes doubled or halved.
In the first case one coat is worth as much as two coats were before; in the second case, two coats
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are only worth as much as one was before, although in both cases one coat renders the same
service as before, and the useful labour embodied in it remains of the same quality. But the
quantity of labour spent on its production has altered.
An increase in the quantity of use values is an increase of material wealth. With two coats two
men can be clothed, with one coat only one man. Nevertheless, an increased quantity of material
wealth may correspond to a simultaneous fall in the magnitude of its value. This antagonistic
movement has its origin in the two-fold character of labour. Productive power has reference, of
course, only to labour of some useful concrete form, the efficacy of any special productive
activity during a given time being dependent on its productiveness. Useful labour becomes,
therefore, a more or less abundant source of products, in proportion to the rise or fall of its
productiveness. On the other hand, no change in this productiveness affects the labour
represented by value. Since productive power is an attribute of the concrete useful forms of
labour, of course it can no longer have any bearing on that labour, so soon as we make abstraction
from those concrete useful forms. However then productive power may vary, the same labour,
exercised during equal periods of time, always yields equal amounts of value. But it will yield,
during equal periods of time, different quantities of values in use; more, if the productive power
rise, fewer, if it fall. The same change in productive power, which increases the fruitfulness of
labour, and, in consequence, the quantity of use values produced by that labour, will diminish the
total value of this increased quantity of use values, provided such change shorten the total labour
time necessary for their production; and vice versâ.
On the one hand all labour is, speaking physiologically, an expenditure of human labour power,
and in its character of identical abstract human labour, it creates and forms the value of
commodities. On the other hand, all labour is the expenditure of human labour power in a special
form and with a definite aim, and in this, its character of concrete useful labour, it produces use
values. 16

Section 3: The Form of Value or Exchange-Value
Commodities come into the world in the shape of use values, articles, or goods, such as iron,
linen, corn, &c. This is their plain, homely, bodily form. They are, however, commodities, only
because they are something two-fold, both objects of utility, and, at the same time, depositories of
value. They manifest themselves therefore as commodities, or have the form of commodities,
only in so far as they have two forms, a physical or natural form, and a value form.
The reality of the value of commodities differs in this respect from Dame Quickly, that we don’t
know “where to have it.” The value of commodities is the very opposite of the coarse materiality
of their substance, not an atom of matter enters into its composition. Turn and examine a single
commodity, by itself, as we will, yet in so far as it remains an object of value, it seems impossible
to grasp it. If, however, we bear in mind that the value of commodities has a purely social reality,
and that they acquire this reality only in so far as they are expressions or embodiments of one
identical social substance, viz., human labour, it follows as a matter of course, that value can only
manifest itself in the social relation of commodity to commodity. In fact we started from
exchange value, or the exchange relation of commodities, in order to get at the value that lies
hidden behind it. We must now return to this form under which value first appeared to us.
Every one knows, if he knows nothing else, that commodities have a value form common to them
all, and presenting a marked contrast with the varied bodily forms of their use values. I mean their
money form. Here, however, a task is set us, the performance of which has never yet even been
attempted by bourgeois economy, the task of tracing the genesis of this money form, of
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developing the expression of value implied in the value relation of commodities, from its
simplest, almost imperceptible outline, to the dazzling money-form. By doing this we shall, at the
same time, solve the riddle presented by money.
The simplest value-relation is evidently that of one commodity to some one other commodity of a
different kind. Hence the relation between the values of two commodities supplies us with the
simplest expression of the value of a single commodity.

A. Elementary or Accidental Form Of Value
x commodity A = y commodity B, or
x commodity A is worth y commodity B.
20 yards of linen = 1 coat, or
20 Yards of linen are worth 1 coat.

1. The two poles of the expression of value. Relative form and Equivalent
form
The whole mystery of the form of value lies hidden in this elementary form. Its analysis,
therefore, is our real difficulty.
Here two different kinds of commodities (in our example the linen and the coat), evidently play
two different parts. The linen expresses its value in the coat; the coat serves as the material in
which that value is expressed. The former plays an active, the latter a passive, part. The value of
the linen is represented as relative value, or appears in relative form. The coat officiates as
equivalent, or appears in equivalent form.
The relative form and the equivalent form are two intimately connected, mutually dependent and
inseparable elements of the expression of value; but, at the same time, are mutually exclusive,
antagonistic extremes – i.e., poles of the same expression. They are allotted respectively to the
two different commodities brought into relation by that expression. It is not possible to express
the value of linen in linen. 20 yards of linen = 20 yards of linen is no expression of value. On the
contrary, such an equation merely says that 20 yards of linen are nothing else than 20 yards of
linen, a definite quantity of the use value linen. The value of the linen can therefore be expressed
only relatively – i.e., in some other commodity. The relative form of the value of the linen
presupposes, therefore, the presence of some other commodity – here the coat – under the form of
an equivalent. On the other hand, the commodity that figures as the equivalent cannot at the same
time assume the relative form. That second commodity is not the one whose value is expressed.
Its function is merely to serve as the material in which the value of the first commodity is
expressed.
No doubt, the expression 20 yards of linen = 1 coat, or 20 yards of linen are worth 1 coat, implies
the opposite relation. 1 coat = 20 yards of linen, or 1 coat is worth 20 yards of linen. But, in that
case, I must reverse the equation, in order to express the value of the coat relatively; and so soon
as I do that the linen becomes the equivalent instead of the coat. A single commodity cannot,
therefore, simultaneously assume, in the same expression of value, both forms. The very polarity
of these forms makes them mutually exclusive.
Whether, then, a commodity assumes the relative form, or the opposite equivalent form, depends
entirely upon its accidental position in the expression of value – that is, upon whether it is the
commodity whose value is being expressed or the commodity in which value is being expressed.

2. The Relative Form of value
(a.) The nature and import of this form
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In order to discover how the elementary expression of the value of a commodity lies hidden in the
value relation of two commodities, we must, in the first place, consider the latter entirely apart
from its quantitative aspect. The usual mode of procedure is generally the reverse, and in the
value relation nothing is seen but the proportion between definite quantities of two different sorts
of commodities that are considered equal to each other. It is apt to be forgotten that the
magnitudes of different things can be compared quantitatively, only when those magnitudes are
expressed in terms of the same unit. It is only as expressions of such a unit that they are of the
same denomination, and therefore commensurable.17
Whether 20 yards of linen = 1 coat or = 20 coats or = x coats – that is, whether a given quantity of
linen is worth few or many coats, every such statement implies that the linen and coats, as
magnitudes of value, are expressions of the same unit, things of the same kind. Linen = coat is the
basis of the equation.
But the two commodities whose identity of quality is thus assumed, do not play the same part. It
is only the value of the linen that is expressed. And how? By its reference to the coat as its
equivalent, as something that can be exchanged for it. In this relation the coat is the mode of
existence of value, is value embodied, for only as such is it the same as the linen. On the other
hand, the linen’s own value comes to the front, receives independent expression, for it is only as
being value that it is comparable with the coat as a thing of equal value, or exchangeable with the
coat. To borrow an illustration from chemistry, butyric acid is a different substance from propyl
formate. Yet both are made up of the same chemical substances, carbon (C), hydrogen (H), and
oxygen (O), and that, too, in like proportions – namely, C4H8O2. If now we equate butyric acid to
propyl formate, then, in the first place, propyl formate would be, in this relation, merely a form of
existence of C4H8O2; and in the second place, we should be stating that butyric acid also consists
of C4H8O2. Therefore, by thus equating the two substances, expression would be given to their
chemical composition, while their different physical forms would be neglected.
If we say that, as values, commodities are mere congelations of human labour, we reduce them by
our analysis, it is true, to the abstraction, value; but we ascribe to this value no form apart from
their bodily form. It is otherwise in the value relation of one commodity to another. Here, the one
stands forth in its character of value by reason of its relation to the other.
By making the coat the equivalent of the linen, we equate the labour embodied in the former to
that in the latter. Now, it is true that the tailoring, which makes the coat, is concrete labour of a
different sort from the weaving which makes the linen. But the act of equating it to the weaving,
reduces the tailoring to that which is really equal in the two kinds of labour, to their common
character of human labour. In this roundabout way, then, the fact is expressed, that weaving also,
in so far as it weaves value, has nothing to distinguish it from tailoring, and, consequently, is
abstract human labour. It is the expression of equivalence between different sorts of commodities
that alone brings into relief the specific character of value-creating labour, and this it does by
actually reducing the different varieties of labour embodied in the different kinds of commodities
to their common quality of human labour in the abstract.18
There is, however, something else required beyond the expression of the specific character of the
labour of which the value of the linen consists. Human labour power in motion, or human labour,
creates value, but is not itself value. It becomes value only in its congealed state, when embodied
in the form of some object. In order to express the value of the linen as a congelation of human
labour, that value must be expressed as having objective existence, as being a something
materially different from the linen itself, and yet a something common to the linen and all other
commodities. The problem is already solved.
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When occupying the position of equivalent in the equation of value, the coat ranks qualitatively
as the equal of the linen, as something of the same kind, because it is value. In this position it is a
thing in which we see nothing but value, or whose palpable bodily form represents value. Yet the
coat itself, the body of the commodity, coat, is a mere use value. A coat as such no more tells us it
is value, than does the first piece of linen we take hold of. This shows that when placed in valuerelation to the linen, the coat signifies more than when out of that relation, just as many a man
strutting about in a gorgeous uniform counts for more than when in mufti.
In the production of the coat, human labour power, in the shape of tailoring, must have been
actually expended. Human labour is therefore accumulated in it. In this aspect the coat is a
depository of value, but though worn to a thread, it does not let this fact show through. And as
equivalent of the linen in the value equation, it exists under this aspect alone, counts therefore as
embodied value, as a body that is value. A, for instance, cannot be “your majesty” to B, unless at
the same time majesty in B’s eyes assumes the bodily form of A, and, what is more, with every
new father of the people, changes its features, hair, and many other things besides.
Hence, in the value equation, in which the coat is the equivalent of the linen, the coat officiates as
the form of value. The value of the commodity linen is expressed by the bodily form of the
commodity coat, the value of one by the use value of the other. As a use value, the linen is
something palpably different from the coat; as value, it is the same as the coat, and now has the
appearance of a coat. Thus the linen acquires a value form different from its physical form. The
fact that it is value, is made manifest by its equality with the coat, just as the sheep’s nature of a
Christian is shown in his resemblance to the Lamb of God.
We see, then, all that our analysis of the value of commodities has already told us, is told us by
the linen itself, so soon as it comes into communication with another commodity, the coat. Only it
betrays its thoughts in that language with which alone it is familiar, the language of commodities.
In order to tell us that its own value is created by labour in its abstract character of human labour,
it says that the coat, in so far as it is worth as much as the linen, and therefore is value, consists of
the same labour as the linen. In order to inform us that its sublime reality as value is not the same
as its buckram body, it says that value has the appearance of a coat, and consequently that so far
as the linen is value, it and the coat are as like as two peas. We may here remark, that the
language of commodities has, besides Hebrew, many other more or less correct dialects. The
German “Wertsein,” to be worth, for instance, expresses in a less striking manner than the
Romance verbs “valere,” “valer,” “valoir,” that the equating of commodity B to commodity A, is
commodity A’s own mode of expressing its value. Paris vaut bien une messe. [Paris is certainly
worth a mass]
By means, therefore, of the value-relation expressed in our equation, the bodily form of
commodity B becomes the value form of commodity A, or the body of commodity B acts as a
mirror to the value of commodity A. 19 By putting itself in relation with commodity B, as value in
propriâ personâ, as the matter of which human labour is made up, the commodity A converts the
value in use, B, into the substance in which to express its, A’s, own value. The value of A, thus
expressed in the use value of B, has taken the form of relative value.
(b.) Quantitative determination of Relative value
Every commodity, whose value it is intended to express, is a useful object of given quantity, as 15
bushels of corn, or 100 lbs of coffee. And a given quantity of any commodity contains a definite
quantity of human labour. The value form must therefore not only express value generally, but
also value in definite quantity. Therefore, in the value relation of commodity A to commodity B,
of the linen to the coat, not only is the latter, as value in general, made the equal in quality of the
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linen, but a definite quantity of coat (1 coat) is made the equivalent of a definite quantity (20
yards) of linen.
The equation, 20 yards of linen = 1 coat, or 20 yards of linen are worth one coat, implies that the
same quantity of value substance (congealed labour) is embodied in both; that the two
commodities have each cost the same amount of labour of the same quantity of labour time. But
the labour time necessary for the production of 20 yards of linen or 1 coat varies with every
change in the productiveness of weaving or tailoring. We have now to consider the influence of
such changes on the quantitative aspect of the relative expression of value.
I. Let the value of the linen vary, 20 that of the coat remaining constant. If, say in consequence
of the exhaustion of flax-growing soil, the labour time necessary for the production of the linen
be doubled, the value of the linen will also be doubled. Instead of the equation, 20 yards of linen
= 1 coat, we should have 20 yards of linen = 2 coats, since 1 coat would now contain only half the
labour time embodied in 20 yards of linen. If, on the other hand, in consequence, say, of
improved looms, this labour time be reduced by one-half, the value of the linen would fall by
one-half. Consequently, we should have 20 yards of linen = ½ coat. The relative value of
commodity A, i.e., its value expressed in commodity B, rises and falls directly as the value of A,
the value of B being supposed constant.
II. Let the value of the linen remain constant, while the value of the coat varies. If, under
these circumstances, in consequence, for instance, of a poor crop of wool, the labour time
necessary for the production of a coat becomes doubled, we have instead of 20 yards of linen = 1
coat, 20 yards of linen = ½ coat. If, on the other hand, the value of the coat sinks by one-half, then
20 yards of linen = 2 coats. Hence, if the value of commodity A remain constant, its relative value
expressed in commodity B rises and falls inversely as the value of B.
If we compare the different cases in I and II, we see that the same change of magnitude in relative
value may arise from totally opposite causes. Thus, the equation, 20 yards of linen = 1 coat,
becomes 20 yards of linen = 2 coats, either, because the value of the linen has doubled, or
because the value of the coat has fallen by one-half; and it becomes 20 yards of linen = ½ coat,
either, because the value of the linen has fallen by one-half, or because the value of the coat has
doubled.
III. Let the quantities of labour time respectively necessary for the production of the linen and
the coat vary simultaneously in the same direction and in the same proportion. In this case 20
yards of linen continue equal to 1 coat, however much their values may have altered. Their
change of value is seen as soon as they are compared with a third commodity, whose value has
remained constant. If the values of all commodities rose or fell simultaneously, and in the same
proportion, their relative values would remain unaltered. Their real change of value would appear
from the diminished or increased quantity of commodities produced in a given time.
IV. The labour time respectively necessary for the production of the linen and the coat, and
therefore the value of these commodities may simultaneously vary in the same direction, but at
unequal rates or in opposite directions, or in other ways. The effect of all these possible different
variations, on the relative value of a commodity, may be deduced from the results of I, II, and III.
Thus real changes in the magnitude of value are neither unequivocally nor exhaustively reflected
in their relative expression, that is, in the equation expressing the magnitude of relative value. The
relative value of a commodity may vary, although its value remains constant. Its relative value
may remain constant, although its value varies; and finally, simultaneous variations in the
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magnitude of value and in that of its relative expression by no means necessarily correspond in
amount. 21

3. The Equivalent form of value
We have seen that commodity A (the linen), by expressing its value in the use value of a
commodity differing in kind (the coat), at the same time impresses upon the latter a specific form
of value, namely that of the equivalent. The commodity linen manifests its quality of having a
value by the fact that the coat, without having assumed a value form different from its bodily
form, is equated to the linen. The fact that the latter therefore has a value is expressed by saying
that the coat is directly exchangeable with it. Therefore, when we say that a commodity is in the
equivalent form, we express the fact that it is directly exchangeable with other commodities.
When one commodity, such as a coat, serves as the equivalent of another, such as linen, and coats
consequently acquire the characteristic property of being directly exchangeable with linen, we are
far from knowing in what proportion the two are exchangeable. The value of the linen being
given in magnitude, that proportion depends on the value of the coat. Whether the coat serves as
the equivalent and the linen as relative value, or the linen as the equivalent and the coat as relative
value, the magnitude of the coat’s value is determined, independently of its value form, by the
labour time necessary for its production. But whenever the coat assumes in the equation of value,
the position of equivalent, its value acquires no quantitative expression; on the contrary, the
commodity coat now figures only as a definite quantity of some article.
For instance, 40 yards of linen are worth – what? 2 coats. Because the commodity coat here plays
the part of equivalent, because the use-value coat, as opposed to the linen, figures as an
embodiment of value, therefore a definite number of coats suffices to express the definite quantity
of value in the linen. Two coats may therefore express the quantity of value of 40 yards of linen,
but they can never express the quantity of their own value. A superficial observation of this fact,
namely, that in the equation of value, the equivalent figures exclusively as a simple quantity of
some article, of some use value, has misled Bailey, as also many others, both before and after
him, into seeing, in the expression of value, merely a quantitative relation. The truth being, that
when a commodity acts as equivalent, no quantitative determination of its value is expressed.
The first peculiarity that strikes us, in considering the form of the equivalent, is this: use value
becomes the form of manifestation, the phenomenal form of its opposite, value.
The bodily form of the commodity becomes its value form. But, mark well, that this quid pro quo
exists in the case of any commodity B, only when some other commodity A enters into a value
relation with it, and then only within the limits of this relation. Since no commodity can stand in
the relation of equivalent to itself, and thus turn its own bodily shape into the expression of its
own value, every commodity is compelled to choose some other commodity for its equivalent,
and to accept the use value, that is to say, the bodily shape of that other commodity as the form of
its own value.
One of the measures that we apply to commodities as material substances, as use values, will
serve to illustrate this point. A sugar-loaf being a body, is heavy, and therefore has weight: but we
can neither see nor touch this weight. We then take various pieces of iron, whose weight has been
determined beforehand. The iron, as iron, is no more the form of manifestation of weight, than is
the sugar-loaf. Nevertheless, in order to express the sugar-loaf as so much weight, we put it into a
weight-relation with the iron. In this relation, the iron officiates as a body representing nothing
but weight. A certain quantity of iron therefore serves as the measure of the weight of the sugar,
and represents, in relation to the sugar-loaf, weight embodied, the form of manifestation of
weight. This part is played by the iron only within this relation, into which the sugar or any other
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body, whose weight has to be determined, enters with the iron. Were they not both heavy, they
could not enter into this relation, and the one could therefore not serve as the expression of the
weight of the other. When we throw both into the scales, we see in reality, that as weight they are
both the same, and that, therefore, when taken in proper proportions, they have the same weight.
Just as the substance iron, as a measure of weight, represents in relation to the sugar-loaf weight
alone, so, in our expression of value, the material object, coat, in relation to the linen, represents
value alone.
Here, however, the analogy ceases. The iron, in the expression of the weight of the sugar-loaf,
represents a natural property common to both bodies, namely their weight; but the coat, in the
expression of value of the linen, represents a non-natural property of both, something purely
social, namely, their value.
Since the relative form of value of a commodity – the linen, for example – expresses the value of
that commodity, as being something wholly different from its substance and properties, as being,
for instance, coat-like, we see that this expression itself indicates that some social relation lies at
the bottom of it. With the equivalent form it is just the contrary. The very essence of this form is
that the material commodity itself – the coat – just as it is, expresses value, and is endowed with
the form of value by Nature itself. Of course this holds good only so long as the value relation
exists, in which the coat stands in the position of equivalent to the linen.22 Since, however, the
properties of a thing are not the result of its relations to other things, but only manifest themselves
in such relations, the coat seems to be endowed with its equivalent form, its property of being
directly exchangeable, just as much by Nature as it is endowed with the property of being heavy,
or the capacity to keep us warm. Hence the enigmatical character of the equivalent form which
escapes the notice of the bourgeois political economist, until this form, completely developed,
confronts him in the shape of money. He then seeks to explain away the mystical character of
gold and silver, by substituting for them less dazzling commodities, and by reciting, with ever
renewed satisfaction, the catalogue of all possible commodities which at one time or another have
played the part of equivalent. He has not the least suspicion that the most simple expression of
value, such as 20 yds of linen = 1 coat, already propounds the riddle of the equivalent form for
our solution.
The body of the commodity that serves as the equivalent, figures as the materialisation of human
labour in the abstract, and is at the same time the product of some specifically useful concrete
labour. This concrete labour becomes, therefore, the medium for expressing abstract human
labour. If on the one hand the coat ranks as nothing but the embodiment of abstract human labour,
so, on the other hand, the tailoring which is actually embodied in it, counts as nothing but the
form under which that abstract labour is realised. In the expression of value of the linen, the
utility of the tailoring consists, not in making clothes, but in making an object, which we at once
recognise to be Value, and therefore to be a congelation of labour, but of labour indistinguishable
from that realised in the value of the linen. In order to act as such a mirror of value, the labour of
tailoring must reflect nothing besides its own abstract quality of being human labour generally.
In tailoring, as well as in weaving, human labour power is expended. Both, therefore, possess the
general property of being human labour, and may, therefore, in certain cases, such as in the
production of value, have to be considered under this aspect alone. There is nothing mysterious in
this. But in the expression of value there is a complete turn of the tables. For instance, how is the
fact to be expressed that weaving creates the value of the linen, not by virtue of being weaving, as
such, but by reason of its general property of being human labour? Simply by opposing to
weaving that other particular form of concrete labour (in this instance tailoring), which produces
the equivalent of the product of weaving. Just as the coat in its bodily form became a direct
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expression of value, so now does tailoring, a concrete form of labour, appear as the direct and
palpable embodiment of human labour generally.
Hence, the second peculiarity of the equivalent form is, that concrete labour becomes the form
under which its opposite, abstract human labour, manifests itself.
But because this concrete labour, tailoring in our case, ranks as, and is directly identified with,
undifferentiated human labour, it also ranks as identical with any other sort of labour, and
therefore with that embodied in the linen. Consequently, although, like all other commodityproducing labour, it is the labour of private individuals, yet, at the same time, it ranks as labour
directly social in its character. This is the reason why it results in a product directly exchangeable
with other commodities. We have then a third peculiarity of the equivalent form, namely, that the
labour of private individuals takes the form of its opposite, labour directly social in its form.
The two latter peculiarities of the equivalent form will become more intelligible if we go back to
the great thinker who was the first to analyse so many forms, whether of thought, society, or
Nature, and amongst them also the form of value. I mean Aristotle.
In the first place, he clearly enunciates that the money form of commodities is only the further
development of the simple form of value – i.e., of the expression of the value of one commodity
in some other commodity taken at random; for he says:
5 beds = 1 house (χλιναι πεντε αντι οιχιας)
is not to be distinguished from
5 beds = so much money. (χλιναι πεντε αντι ... οσον αι πεντε χλιναι)
He further sees that the value relation which gives rise to this expression makes it necessary that
the house should qualitatively be made the equal of the bed, and that, without such an
equalisation, these two clearly different things could not be compared with each other as
commensurable quantities. “Exchange,” he says, “cannot take place without equality, and
equality not without commensurability". (ουτ ισοτης µη ουσης σνµµετριας). Here, however,
he comes to a stop, and gives up the further analysis of the form of value. “It is, however, in
reality, impossible (τη µεν ουν αληθεια αδυνατον), that such unlike things can be
commensurable” – i.e., qualitatively equal. Such an equalisation can only be something foreign to
their real nature, consequently only “a makeshift for practical purposes.”
Aristotle therefore, himself, tells us what barred the way to his further analysis; it was the absence
of any concept of value. What is that equal something, that common substance, which admits of
the value of the beds being expressed by a house? Such a thing, in truth, cannot exist, says
Aristotle. And why not? Compared with the beds, the house does represent something equal to
them, in so far as it represents what is really equal, both in the beds and the house. And that is –
human labour.
There was, however, an important fact which prevented Aristotle from seeing that, to attribute
value to commodities, is merely a mode of expressing all labour as equal human labour, and
consequently as labour of equal quality. Greek society was founded upon slavery, and had,
therefore, for its natural basis, the inequality of men and of their labour powers. The secret of the
expression of value, namely, that all kinds of labour are equal and equivalent, because, and so far
as they are human labour in general, cannot be deciphered, until the notion of human equality has
already acquired the fixity of a popular prejudice. This, however, is possible only in a society in
which the great mass of the produce of labour takes the form of commodities, in which,
consequently, the dominant relation between man and man, is that of owners of commodities. The
brilliancy of Aristotle’s genius is shown by this alone, that he discovered, in the expression of the
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value of commodities, a relation of equality. The peculiar conditions of the society in which he
lived, alone prevented him from discovering what, “in truth,” was at the bottom of this equality.

4. The Elementary Form of value considered as a whole
The elementary form of value of a commodity is contained in the equation, expressing its value
relation to another commodity of a different kind, or in its exchange relation to the same. The
value of commodity A, is qualitatively expressed, by the fact that commodity B is directly
exchangeable with it. Its value is quantitatively expressed by the fact, that a definite quantity of B
is exchangeable with a definite quantity of A. In other words, the value of a commodity obtains
independent and definite expression, by taking the form of exchange value. When, at the
beginning of this chapter, we said, in common parlance, that a commodity is both a use value and
an exchange value, we were, accurately speaking, wrong. A commodity is a use value or object of
utility, and a value. It manifests itself as this two-fold thing, that it is, as soon as its value assumes
an independent form – viz., the form of exchange value. It never assumes this form when isolated,
but only when placed in a value or exchange relation with another commodity of a different kind.
When once we know this, such a mode of expression does no harm; it simply serves as an
abbreviation.
Our analysis has shown, that the form or expression of the value of a commodity originates in the
nature of value, and not that value and its magnitude originate in the mode of their expression as
exchange value. This, however, is the delusion as well of the mercantilists and their recent
revivers, Ferrier, Ganilh, 23 and others, as also of their antipodes, the modern bagmen of Freetrade, such as Bastiat. The mercantilists lay special stress on the qualitative aspect of the
expression of value, and consequently on the equivalent form of commodities, which attains its
full perfection in money. The modern hawkers of Free-trade, who must get rid of their article at
any price, on the other hand, lay most stress on the quantitative aspect of the relative form of
value. For them there consequently exists neither value, nor magnitude of value, anywhere except
in its expression by means of the exchange relation of commodities, that is, in the daily list of
prices current. Macleod, who has taken upon himself to dress up the confused ideas of Lombard
Street in the most learned finery, is a successful cross between the superstitious mercantilists, and
the enlightened Free-trade bagmen.
A close scrutiny of the expression of the value of A in terms of B, contained in the equation
expressing the value relation of A to B, has shown us that, within that relation, the bodily form of
A figures only as a use value, the bodily form of B only as the form or aspect of value. The
opposition or contrast existing internally in each commodity between use value and value, is,
therefore, made evident externally by two commodities being placed in such relation to each
other, that the commodity whose value it is sought to express, figures directly as a mere use
value, while the commodity in which that value is to be expressed, figures directly as mere
exchange value. Hence the elementary form of value of a commodity is the elementary form in
which the contrast contained in that commodity, between use value and value, becomes apparent.
Every product of labour is, in all states of society, a use value; but it is only at a definite historical
epoch in a society’s development that such a product becomes a commodity, viz., at the epoch
when the labour spent on the production of a useful article becomes expressed as one of the
objective qualities of that article, i.e., as its value. It therefore follows that the elementary value
form is also the primitive form under which a product of labour appears historically as a
commodity, and that the gradual transformation of such products into commodities, proceeds pari
passu with the development of the value form.
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We perceive, at first sight, the deficiencies of the elementary form of value: it is a mere germ,
which must undergo a series of metamorphoses before it can ripen into the price form.
The expression of the value of commodity A in terms of any other commodity B, merely
distinguishes the value from the use value of A, and therefore places A merely in a relation of
exchange with a single different commodity, B; but it is still far from expressing A’s qualitative
equality, and quantitative proportionality, to all commodities. To the elementary relative value
form of a commodity, there corresponds the single equivalent form of one other commodity.
Thus, in the relative expression of value of the linen, the coat assumes the form of equivalent, or
of being directly exchangeable, only in relation to a single commodity, the linen.
Nevertheless, the elementary form of value passes by an easy transition into a more complete
form. It is true that by means of the elementary form, the value of a commodity A, becomes
expressed in terms of one, and only one, other commodity. But that one may be a commodity of
any kind, coat, iron, corn, or anything else. Therefore, according as A is placed in relation with
one or the other, we get for one and the same commodity, different elementary expressions of
value. 24 The number of such possible expressions is limited only by the number of the different
kinds of commodities distinct from it. The isolated expression of A’s value, is therefore
convertible into a series, prolonged to any length, of the different elementary expressions of that
value.

B. Total or Expanded Form of value
z Com. A = u Com. B or = v Com. C or = w Com. D or = Com. E or = &c.
(20 yards of linen = 1 coat or = 10 lbs tea or = 40 lbs. coffee or
= 1 quarter corn or = 2 ounces gold or = ½ ton iron or = &c.)

1. The Expanded Relative form of value
The value of a single commodity, the linen, for example, is now expressed in terms of numberless
other elements of the world of commodities. Every other commodity now becomes a mirror of the
linen’s value. 25 It is thus, that for the first time, this value shows itself in its true light as a
congelation of undifferentiated human labour. For the labour that creates it, now stands expressly
revealed, as labour that ranks equally with every other sort of human labour, no matter what its
form, whether tailoring, ploughing, mining, &c., and no matter, therefore, whether it is realised in
coats, corn, iron, or gold. The linen, by virtue of the form of its value, now stands in a social
relation, no longer with only one other kind of commodity, but with the whole world of
commodities. As a commodity, it is a citizen of that world. At the same time, the interminable
series of value equations implies, that as regards the value of a commodity, it is a matter of
indifference under what particular form, or kind, of use value it appears.
In the first form, 20 yds of linen = 1 coat, it might, for ought that otherwise appears, be pure
accident, that these two commodities are exchangeable in definite quantities. In the second form,
on the contrary, we perceive at once the background that determines, and is essentially different
from, this accidental appearance. The value of the linen remains unaltered in magnitude, whether
expressed in coats, coffee, or iron, or in numberless different commodities, the property of as
many different owners. The accidental relation between two individual commodity-owners
disappears. It becomes plain, that it is not the exchange of commodities which regulates the
magnitude of their value; but, on the contrary, that it is the magnitude of their value which
controls their exchange proportions.
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2. The particular Equivalent form
Each commodity, such as, coat, tea, corn, iron, &c., figures in the expression of value of the linen,
as an equivalent, and, consequently, as a thing that is value. The bodily form of each of these
commodities figures now as a particular equivalent form, one out of many. In the same way the
manifold concrete useful kinds of labour, embodied in these different commodities, rank now as
so many different forms of the realisation, or manifestation, of undifferentiated human labour.

3. Defects of the Total or Expanded form of value
In the first place, the relative expression of value is incomplete because the series representing it
is interminable. The chain of which each equation of value is a link, is liable at any moment to be
lengthened by each new kind of commodity that comes into existence and furnishes the material
for a fresh expression of value. In the second place, it is a many-coloured mosaic of disparate and
independent expressions of value. And lastly, if, as must be the case, the relative value of each
commodity in turn, becomes expressed in this expanded form, we get for each of them a relative
value form, different in every case, and consisting of an interminable series of expressions of
value. The defects of the expanded relative value form are reflected in the corresponding
equivalent form. Since the bodily form of each single commodity is one particular equivalent
form amongst numberless others, we have, on the whole, nothing but fragmentary equivalent
forms, each excluding the others. In the same way, also, the special, concrete, useful kind of
labour embodied in each particular equivalent, is presented only as a particular kind of labour,
and therefore not as an exhaustive representative of human labour generally. The latter, indeed,
gains adequate manifestation in the totality of its manifold, particular, concrete forms. But, in that
case, its expression in an infinite series is ever incomplete and deficient in unity.
The expanded relative value form is, however, nothing but the sum of the elementary relative
expressions or equations of the first kind, such as:
20 yards of linen = 1 coat
20 yards of linen = 10 lbs of tea, etc.
Each of these implies the corresponding inverted equation,
1 coat = 20 yards of linen
10 lbs of tea = 20 yards of linen, etc.
In fact, when a person exchanges his linen for many other commodities, and thus expresses its
value in a series of other commodities, it necessarily follows, that the various owners of the latter
exchange them for the linen, and consequently express the value of their various commodities in
one and the same third commodity, the linen. If then, we reverse the series, 20 yards of linen = 1
coat or = 10 lbs of tea, etc., that is to say, if we give expression to the converse relation already
implied in the series, we get,

C. The General Form of Value
1
10
40
1
2
½
x

coat
lbs of tea
lbs of coffee
quarter of corn
ounces of gold
a ton of iron
Commodity A, etc.

= 20 yards of linen
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1. The altered character of the form of value
All commodities now express their value (1) in an elementary form, because in a single
commodity; (2) with unity, because in one and the same commodity. This form of value is
elementary and the same for all, therefore general.
The forms A and B were fit only to express the value of a commodity as something distinct from
its use value or material form.
The first form, A, furnishes such equations as the following: – 1 coat = 20 yards of linen, 10 lbs
of tea = ½ a ton of iron. The value of the coat is equated to linen, that of the tea to iron. But to be
equated to linen, and again to iron, is to be as different as are linen and iron. This form, it is plain,
occurs practically only in the first beginning, when the products of labour are converted into
commodities by accidental and occasional exchanges.
The second form, B, distinguishes, in a more adequate manner than the first, the value of a
commodity from its use value, for the value of the coat is there placed in contrast under all
possible shapes with the bodily form of the coat; it is equated to linen, to iron, to tea, in short, to
everything else, only not to itself, the coat. On the other hand, any general expression of value
common to all is directly excluded; for, in the equation of value of each commodity, all other
commodities now appear only under the form of equivalents. The expanded form of value comes
into actual existence for the first time so soon as a particular product of labour, such as cattle, is
no longer exceptionally, but habitually, exchanged for various other commodities.
The third and lastly developed form expresses the values of the whole world of commodities in
terms of a single commodity set apart for the purpose, namely, the linen, and thus represents to us
their values by means of their equality with linen. The value of every commodity is now, by
being equated to linen, not only differentiated from its own use value, but from all other use
values generally, and is, by that very fact, expressed as that which is common to all commodities.
By this form, commodities are, for the first time, effectively brought into relation with one
another as values, or made to appear as exchange values.
The two earlier forms either express the value of each commodity in terms of a single commodity
of a different kind, or in a series of many such commodities. In both cases, it is, so to say, the
special business of each single commodity to find an expression for its value, and this it does
without the help of the others. These others, with respect to the former, play the passive parts of
equivalents. The general form of value, C, results from the joint action of the whole world of
commodities, and from that alone. A commodity can acquire a general expression of its value
only by all other commodities, simultaneously with it, expressing their values in the same
equivalent; and every new commodity must follow suit. It thus becomes evident that since the
existence of commodities as values is purely social, this social existence can be expressed by the
totality of their social relations alone, and consequently that the form of their value must be a
socially recognised form.
All commodities being equated to linen now appear not only as qualitatively equal as values
generally, but also as values whose magnitudes are capable of comparison. By expressing the
magnitudes of their values in one and the same material, the linen, those magnitudes are also
compared with each other. For instance, 10 lbs of tea = 20 yards of linen, and 40 lbs of coffee =
20 yards of linen. Therefore, 10 lbs of tea = 40 lbs of coffee. In other words, there is contained in
1 lb of coffee only one-fourth as much substance of value – labour – as is contained in 1 lb of tea.
The general form of relative value, embracing the whole world of commodities, converts the
single commodity that is excluded from the rest, and made to play the part of equivalent – here
the linen – into the universal equivalent. The bodily form of the linen is now the form assumed in
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common by the values of all commodities; it therefore becomes directly exchangeable with all
and every of them. The substance linen becomes the visible incarnation, the social chrysalis state
of every kind of human labour. Weaving, which is the labour of certain private individuals
producing a particular article, linen, acquires in consequence a social character, the character of
equality with all other kinds of labour. The innumerable equations of which the general form of
value is composed, equate in turn the labour embodied in the linen to that embodied in every
other commodity, and they thus convert weaving into the general form of manifestation of
undifferentiated human labour. In this manner the labour realised in the values of commodities is
presented not only under its negative aspect, under which abstraction is made from every concrete
form and useful property of actual work, but its own positive nature is made to reveal itself
expressly. The general value form is the reduction of all kinds of actual labour to their common
character of being human labour generally, of being the expenditure of human labour power.
The general value form, which represents all products of labour as mere congelations of
undifferentiated human labour, shows by its very structure that it is the social resumé of the world
of commodities. That form consequently makes it indisputably evident that in the world of
commodities the character possessed by all labour of being human labour constitutes its specific
social character.

2. The Interdependent Development of the Relative Form of Value, and of
the Equivalent Form
The degree of development of the relative form of value corresponds to that of the equivalent
form. But we must bear in mind that the development of the latter is only the expression and
result of the development of the former.
The primary or isolated relative form of value of one commodity converts some other commodity
into an isolated equivalent. The expanded form of relative value, which is the expression of the
value of one commodity in terms of all other commodities, endows those other commodities with
the character of particular equivalents differing in kind. And lastly, a particular kind of
commodity acquires the character of universal equivalent, because all other commodities make it
the material in which they uniformly express their value.
The antagonism between the relative form of value and the equivalent form, the two poles of the
value form, is developed concurrently with that form itself.
The first form, 20 yds of linen = one coat, already contains this antagonism, without as yet fixing
it. According as we read this equation forwards or backwards, the parts played by the linen and
the coat are different. In the one case the relative value of the linen is expressed in the coat, in the
other case the relative value of the coat is expressed in the linen. In this first form of value,
therefore, it is difficult to grasp the polar contrast.
Form B shows that only one single commodity at a time can completely expand its relative value,
and that it acquires this expanded form only because, and in so far as, all other commodities are,
with respect to it, equivalents. Here we cannot reverse the equation, as we can the equation 20 yds
of linen = 1 coat, without altering its general character, and converting it from the expanded form
of value into the general form of value.
Finally, the form C gives to the world of commodities a general social relative form of value,
because, and in so far as, thereby all commodities, with the exception of one, are excluded from
the equivalent form. A single commodity, the linen, appears therefore to have acquired the
character of direct exchangeability with every other commodity because, and in so far as, this
character is denied to every other commodity. 26
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The commodity that figures as universal equivalent, is, on the other hand, excluded from the
relative value form. If the linen, or any other commodity serving as universal equivalent, were, at
the same time, to share in the relative form of value, it would have to serve as its own equivalent.
We should then have 20 yds of linen = 20 yds of linen; this tautology expresses neither value, nor
magnitude of value. In order to express the relative value of the universal equivalent, we must
rather reverse the form C. This equivalent has no relative form of value in common with other
commodities, but its value is relatively expressed by a never ending series of other commodities.
Thus, the expanded form of relative value, or form B, now shows itself as the specific form of
relative value for the equivalent commodity.

3. Transition from the General form of value to the Money form
The universal equivalent form is a form of value in general. It can, therefore, be assumed by any
commodity. On the other hand, if a commodity be found to have assumed the universal
equivalent form (form C), this is only because and in so far as it has been excluded from the rest
of all other commodities as their equivalent, and that by their own act. And from the moment that
this exclusion becomes finally restricted to one particular commodity, from that moment only, the
general form of relative value of the world of commodities obtains real consistence and general
social validity.
The particular commodity, with whose bodily form the equivalent form is thus socially identified,
now becomes the money commodity, or serves as money. It becomes the special social function
of that commodity, and consequently its social monopoly, to play within the world of
commodities the part of the universal equivalent. Amongst the commodities which, in form B,
figure as particular equivalents of the linen, and, in form C, express in common their relative
values in linen, this foremost place has been attained by one in particular – namely, gold. If, then,
in form C we replace the linen by gold, we get,

D. The Money-Form
20 yards of linen =
1 coat
=
10 lbs of tea
=
40 lbs of coffee
=
= 2 ounces of gold
1 quarter of corn =
2 ounces of gold =
½ a ton of iron
=
x Commodity A =
In passing from form A to form B, and from the latter to form C, the changes are fundamental. On
the other hand, there is no difference between forms C and D, except that, in the latter, gold has
assumed the equivalent form in the place of linen. Gold is in form D, what linen was in form C –
the universal equivalent. The progress consists in this alone, that the character of direct and
universal exchangeability – in other words, that the universal equivalent form – has now, by
social custom, become finally identified with the substance, gold.
Gold is now money with reference to all other commodities only because it was previously, with
reference to them, a simple commodity. Like all other commodities, it was also capable of serving
as an equivalent, either as simple equivalent in isolated exchanges, or as particular equivalent by
the side of others. Gradually it began to serve, within varying limits, as universal equivalent. So
soon as it monopolises this position in the expression of value for the world of commodities, it
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becomes the money commodity, and then, and not till then, does form D become distinct from
form C, and the general form of value become changed into the money form.
The elementary expression of the relative value of a single commodity, such as linen, in terms of
the commodity, such as gold, that plays the part of money, is the price form of that commodity.
The price form of the linen is therefore
20 yards of linen = 2 ounces of gold, or, if 2 ounces of gold when
coined are £2, 20 yards of linen = £2.
The difficulty in forming a concept of the money form, consists in clearly comprehending the
universal equivalent form, and as a necessary corollary, the general form of value, form C. The
latter is deducible from form B, the expanded form of value, the essential component element of
which, we saw, is form A, 20 yards of linen = 1 coat or x commodity A = y commodity B. The
simple commodity form is therefore the germ of the money form.

Section 4: The Fetishism of Commodities and the Secret
Thereof
A commodity appears, at first sight, a very trivial thing, and easily understood. Its analysis shows
that it is, in reality, a very queer thing, abounding in metaphysical subtleties and theological
niceties. So far as it is a value in use, there is nothing mysterious about it, whether we consider it
from the point of view that by its properties it is capable of satisfying human wants, or from the
point that those properties are the product of human labour. It is as clear as noon-day, that man,
by his industry, changes the forms of the materials furnished by Nature, in such a way as to make
them useful to him. The form of wood, for instance, is altered, by making a table out of it. Yet,
for all that, the table continues to be that common, every-day thing, wood. But, so soon as it steps
forth as a commodity, it is changed into something transcendent. It not only stands with its feet on
the ground, but, in relation to all other commodities, it stands on its head, and evolves out of its
wooden brain grotesque ideas, far more wonderful than “table-turning” ever was. 26a
The mystical character of commodities does not originate, therefore, in their use value. Just as
little does it proceed from the nature of the determining factors of value. For, in the first place,
however varied the useful kinds of labour, or productive activities, may be, it is a physiological
fact, that they are functions of the human organism, and that each such function, whatever may be
its nature or form, is essentially the expenditure of human brain, nerves, muscles, &c. Secondly,
with regard to that which forms the ground-work for the quantitative determination of value,
namely, the duration of that expenditure, or the quantity of labour, it is quite clear that there is a
palpable difference between its quantity and quality. In all states of society, the labour time that it
costs to produce the means of subsistence, must necessarily be an object of interest to mankind,
though not of equal interest in different stages of development. 27 And lastly, from the moment
that men in any way work for one another, their labour assumes a social form.
Whence, then, arises the enigmatical character of the product of labour, so soon as it assumes the
form of commodities? Clearly from this form itself. The equality of all sorts of human labour is
expressed objectively by their products all being equally values; the measure of the expenditure
of labour power by the duration of that expenditure, takes the form of the quantity of value of the
products of labour; and finally the mutual relations of the producers, within which the social
character of their labour affirms itself, take the form of a social relation between the products.
A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing, simply because in it the social character of men’s
labour appears to them as an objective character stamped upon the product of that labour; because
the relation of the producers to the sum total of their own labour is presented to them as a social
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relation, existing not between themselves, but between the products of their labour. This is the
reason why the products of labour become commodities, social things whose qualities are at the
same time perceptible and imperceptible by the senses. In the same way the light from an object
is perceived by us not as the subjective excitation of our optic nerve, but as the objective form of
something outside the eye itself. But, in the act of seeing, there is at all events, an actual passage
of light from one thing to another, from the external object to the eye. There is a physical relation
between physical things. But it is different with commodities. There, the existence of the things
quâ commodities, and the value relation between the products of labour which stamps them as
commodities, have absolutely no connection with their physical properties and with the material
relations arising therefrom. There it is a definite social relation between men, that assumes, in
their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things. In order, therefore, to find an analogy,
we must have recourse to the mist-enveloped regions of the religious world. In that world the
productions of the human brain appear as independent beings endowed with life, and entering
into relation both with one another and the human race. So it is in the world of commodities with
the products of men’s hands. This I call the Fetishism which attaches itself to the products of
labour, so soon as they are produced as commodities, and which is therefore inseparable from the
production of commodities.
This Fetishism of commodities has its origin, as the foregoing analysis has already shown, in the
peculiar social character of the labour that produces them.
As a general rule, articles of utility become commodities, only because they are products of the
labour of private individuals or groups of individuals who carry on their work independently of
each other. The sum total of the labour of all these private individuals forms the aggregate labour
of society. Since the producers do not come into social contact with each other until they
exchange their products, the specific social character of each producer’s labour does not show
itself except in the act of exchange. In other words, the labour of the individual asserts itself as a
part of the labour of society, only by means of the relations which the act of exchange establishes
directly between the products, and indirectly, through them, between the producers. To the latter,
therefore, the relations connecting the labour of one individual with that of the rest appear, not as
direct social relations between individuals at work, but as what they really are, material relations
between persons and social relations between things. It is only by being exchanged that the
products of labour acquire, as values, one uniform social status, distinct from their varied forms
of existence as objects of utility. This division of a product into a useful thing and a value
becomes practically important, only when exchange has acquired such an extension that useful
articles are produced for the purpose of being exchanged, and their character as values has
therefore to be taken into account, beforehand, during production. From this moment the labour
of the individual producer acquires socially a two-fold character. On the one hand, it must, as a
definite useful kind of labour, satisfy a definite social want, and thus hold its place as part and
parcel of the collective labour of all, as a branch of a social division of labour that has sprung up
spontaneously. On the other hand, it can satisfy the manifold wants of the individual producer
himself, only in so far as the mutual exchangeability of all kinds of useful private labour is an
established social fact, and therefore the private useful labour of each producer ranks on an
equality with that of all others. The equalisation of the most different kinds of labour can be the
result only of an abstraction from their inequalities, or of reducing them to their common
denominator, viz. expenditure of human labour power or human labour in the abstract. The twofold social character of the labour of the individual appears to him, when reflected in his brain,
only under those forms which are impressed upon that labour in every-day practice by the
exchange of products. In this way, the character that his own labour possesses of being socially
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useful takes the form of the condition, that the product must be not only useful, but useful for
others, and the social character that his particular labour has of being the equal of all other
particular kinds of labour, takes the form that all the physically different articles that are the
products of labour, have one common quality, viz., that of having value.
Hence, when we bring the products of our labour into relation with each other as values, it is not
because we see in these articles the material receptacles of homogeneous human labour. Quite the
contrary: whenever, by an exchange, we equate as values our different products, by that very act,
we also equate, as human labour, the different kinds of labour expended upon them. We are not
aware of this, nevertheless we do it. 28 Value, therefore, does not stalk about with a label
describing what it is. It is value, rather, that converts every product into a social hieroglyphic.
Later on, we try to decipher the hieroglyphic, to get behind the secret of our own social products;
for to stamp an object of utility as a value, is just as much a social product as language. The
recent scientific discovery, that the products of labour, so far as they are values, are but material
expressions of the human labour spent in their production, marks, indeed, an epoch in the history
of the development of the human race, but, by no means, dissipates the mist through which the
social character of labour appears to us to be an objective character of the products themselves.
The fact, that in the particular form of production with which we are dealing, viz., the production
of commodities, the specific social character of private labour carried on independently, consists
in the equality of every kind of that labour, by virtue of its being human labour, which character,
therefore, assumes in the product the form of value – this fact appears to the producers,
notwithstanding the discovery above referred to, to be just as real and final, as the fact, that, after
the discovery by science of the component gases of air, the atmosphere itself remained unaltered.
What, first of all, practically concerns producers when they make an exchange, is the question,
how much of some other product they get for their own? in what proportions the products are
exchangeable? When these proportions have, by custom, attained a certain stability, they appear
to result from the nature of the products, so that, for instance, one ton of iron and two ounces of
gold appear as naturally to be of equal value as a pound of gold and a pound of iron in spite of
their different physical and chemical qualities appear to be of equal weight. The character of
having value, when once impressed upon products, obtains fixity only by reason of their acting
and re-acting upon each other as quantities of value. These quantities vary continually,
independently of the will, foresight and action of the producers. To them, their own social action
takes the form of the action of objects, which rule the producers instead of being ruled by them. It
requires a fully developed production of commodities before, from accumulated experience
alone, the scientific conviction springs up, that all the different kinds of private labour, which are
carried on independently of each other, and yet as spontaneously developed branches of the social
division of labour, are continually being reduced to the quantitative proportions in which society
requires them. And why? Because, in the midst of all the accidental and ever fluctuating
exchange relations between the products, the labour time socially necessary for their production
forcibly asserts itself like an over-riding law of Nature. The law of gravity thus asserts itself when
a house falls about our ears. 29 The determination of the magnitude of value by labour time is
therefore a secret, hidden under the apparent fluctuations in the relative values of commodities.
Its discovery, while removing all appearance of mere accidentality from the determination of the
magnitude of the values of products, yet in no way alters the mode in which that determination
takes place.
Man’s reflections on the forms of social life, and consequently, also, his scientific analysis of
those forms, take a course directly opposite to that of their actual historical development. He
begins, post festum, with the results of the process of development ready to hand before him. The
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characters that stamp products as commodities, and whose establishment is a necessary
preliminary to the circulation of commodities, have already acquired the stability of natural, selfunderstood forms of social life, before man seeks to decipher, not their historical character, for in
his eyes they are immutable, but their meaning. Consequently it was the analysis of the prices of
commodities that alone led to the determination of the magnitude of value, and it was the
common expression of all commodities in money that alone led to the establishment of their
characters as values. It is, however, just this ultimate money form of the world of commodities
that actually conceals, instead of disclosing, the social character of private labour, and the social
relations between the individual producers. When I state that coats or boots stand in a relation to
linen, because it is the universal incarnation of abstract human labour, the absurdity of the
statement is self-evident. Nevertheless, when the producers of coats and boots compare those
articles with linen, or, what is the same thing, with gold or silver, as the universal equivalent, they
express the relation between their own private labour and the collective labour of society in the
same absurd form.
The categories of bourgeois economy consist of such like forms. They are forms of thought
expressing with social validity the conditions and relations of a definite, historically determined
mode of production, viz., the production of commodities. The whole mystery of commodities, all
the magic and necromancy that surrounds the products of labour as long as they take the form of
commodities, vanishes therefore, so soon as we come to other forms of production.
Since Robinson Crusoe’s experiences are a favourite theme with political economists,30 let us
take a look at him on his island. Moderate though he be, yet some few wants he has to satisfy, and
must therefore do a little useful work of various sorts, such as making tools and furniture, taming
goats, fishing and hunting. Of his prayers and the like we take no account, since they are a source
of pleasure to him, and he looks upon them as so much recreation. In spite of the variety of his
work, he knows that his labour, whatever its form, is but the activity of one and the same
Robinson, and consequently, that it consists of nothing but different modes of human labour.
Necessity itself compels him to apportion his time accurately between his different kinds of work.
Whether one kind occupies a greater space in his general activity than another, depends on the
difficulties, greater or less as the case may be, to be overcome in attaining the useful effect aimed
at. This our friend Robinson soon learns by experience, and having rescued a watch, ledger, and
pen and ink from the wreck, commences, like a true-born Briton, to keep a set of books. His
stock-book contains a list of the objects of utility that belong to him, of the operations necessary
for their production; and lastly, of the labour time that definite quantities of those objects have, on
an average, cost him. All the relations between Robinson and the objects that form this wealth of
his own creation, are here so simple and clear as to be intelligible without exertion, even to Mr.
Sedley Taylor. And yet those relations contain all that is essential to the determination of value.
Let us now transport ourselves from Robinson’s island bathed in light to the European middle
ages shrouded in darkness. Here, instead of the independent man, we find everyone dependent,
serfs and lords, vassals and suzerains, laymen and clergy. Personal dependence here characterises
the social relations of production just as much as it does the other spheres of life organised on the
basis of that production. But for the very reason that personal dependence forms the ground-work
of society, there is no necessity for labour and its products to assume a fantastic form different
from their reality. They take the shape, in the transactions of society, of services in kind and
payments in kind. Here the particular and natural form of labour, and not, as in a society based on
production of commodities, its general abstract form is the immediate social form of labour.
Compulsory labour is just as properly measured by time, as commodity-producing labour; but
every serf knows that what he expends in the service of his lord, is a definite quantity of his own
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personal labour power. The tithe to be rendered to the priest is more matter of fact than his
blessing. No matter, then, what we may think of the parts played by the different classes of people
themselves in this society, the social relations between individuals in the performance of their
labour, appear at all events as their own mutual personal relations, and are not disguised under the
shape of social relations between the products of labour.
For an example of labour in common or directly associated labour, we have no occasion to go
back to that spontaneously developed form which we find on the threshold of the history of all
civilised races. 31 We have one close at hand in the patriarchal industries of a peasant family, that
produces corn, cattle, yarn, linen, and clothing for home use. These different articles are, as
regards the family, so many products of its labour, but as between themselves, they are not
commodities. The different kinds of labour, such as tillage, cattle tending, spinning, weaving and
making clothes, which result in the various products, are in themselves, and such as they are,
direct social functions, because functions of the family, which, just as much as a society based on
the production of commodities, possesses a spontaneously developed system of division of
labour. The distribution of the work within the family, and the regulation of the labour time of the
several members, depend as well upon differences of age and sex as upon natural conditions
varying with the seasons. The labour power of each individual, by its very nature, operates in this
case merely as a definite portion of the whole labour power of the family, and therefore, the
measure of the expenditure of individual labour power by its duration, appears here by its very
nature as a social character of their labour.
Let us now picture to ourselves, by way of change, a community of free individuals, carrying on
their work with the means of production in common, in which the labour power of all the
different individuals is consciously applied as the combined labour power of the community. All
the characteristics of Robinson’s labour are here repeated, but with this difference, that they are
social, instead of individual. Everything produced by him was exclusively the result of his own
personal labour, and therefore simply an object of use for himself. The total product of our
community is a social product. One portion serves as fresh means of production and remains
social. But another portion is consumed by the members as means of subsistence. A distribution
of this portion amongst them is consequently necessary. The mode of this distribution will vary
with the productive organisation of the community, and the degree of historical development
attained by the producers. We will assume, but merely for the sake of a parallel with the
production of commodities, that the share of each individual producer in the means of subsistence
is determined by his labour time. Labour time would, in that case, play a double part. Its
apportionment in accordance with a definite social plan maintains the proper proportion between
the different kinds of work to be done and the various wants of the community. On the other
hand, it also serves as a measure of the portion of the common labour borne by each individual,
and of his share in the part of the total product destined for individual consumption. The social
relations of the individual producers, with regard both to their labour and to its products, are in
this case perfectly simple and intelligible, and that with regard not only to production but also to
distribution.
The religious world is but the reflex of the real world. And for a society based upon the
production of commodities, in which the producers in general enter into social relations with one
another by treating their products as commodities and values, whereby they reduce their
individual private labour to the standard of homogeneous human labour – for such a society,
Christianity with its cultus of abstract man, more especially in its bourgeois developments,
Protestantism, Deism, &c., is the most fitting form of religion. In the ancient Asiatic and other
ancient modes of production, we find that the conversion of products into commodities, and
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therefore the conversion of men into producers of commodities, holds a subordinate place, which,
however, increases in importance as the primitive communities approach nearer and nearer to
their dissolution. Trading nations, properly so called, exist in the ancient world only in its
interstices, like the gods of Epicurus in the Intermundia, or like Jews in the pores of Polish
society. Those ancient social organisms of production are, as compared with bourgeois society,
extremely simple and transparent. But they are founded either on the immature development of
man individually, who has not yet severed the umbilical cord that unites him with his fellowmen
in a primitive tribal community, or upon direct relations of subjection. They can arise and exist
only when the development of the productive power of labour has not risen beyond a low stage,
and when, therefore, the social relations within the sphere of material life, between man and man,
and between man and Nature, are correspondingly narrow. This narrowness is reflected in the
ancient worship of Nature, and in the other elements of the popular religions. The religious reflex
of the real world can, in any case, only then finally vanish, when the practical relations of everyday life offer to man none but perfectly intelligible and reasonable relations with regard to his
fellowmen and to Nature.
The life-process of society, which is based on the process of material production, does not strip
off its mystical veil until it is treated as production by freely associated men, and is consciously
regulated by them in accordance with a settled plan. This, however, demands for society a certain
material ground-work or set of conditions of existence which in their turn are the spontaneous
product of a long and painful process of development.
Political Economy has indeed analysed, however incompletely, 32 value and its magnitude, and
has discovered what lies beneath these forms. But it has never once asked the question why
labour is represented by the value of its product and labour time by the magnitude of that value.33
These formulæ, which bear it stamped upon them in unmistakable letters that they belong to a
state of society, in which the process of production has the mastery over man, instead of being
controlled by him, such formulæ appear to the bourgeois intellect to be as much a self-evident
necessity imposed by Nature as productive labour itself. Hence forms of social production that
preceded the bourgeois form, are treated by the bourgeoisie in much the same way as the Fathers
of the Church treated pre-Christian religions. 34
To what extent some economists are misled by the Fetishism inherent in commodities, or by the
objective appearance of the social characteristics of labour, is shown, amongst other ways, by the
dull and tedious quarrel over the part played by Nature in the formation of exchange value. Since
exchange value is a definite social manner of expressing the amount of labour bestowed upon an
object, Nature has no more to do with it, than it has in fixing the course of exchange.
The mode of production in which the product takes the form of a commodity, or is produced
directly for exchange, is the most general and most embryonic form of bourgeois production. It
therefore makes its appearance at an early date in history, though not in the same predominating
and characteristic manner as now-a-days. Hence its Fetish character is comparatively easy to be
seen through. But when we come to more concrete forms, even this appearance of simplicity
vanishes. Whence arose the illusions of the monetary system? To it gold and silver, when serving
as money, did not represent a social relation between producers, but were natural objects with
strange social properties. And modern economy, which looks down with such disdain on the
monetary system, does not its superstition come out as clear as noon-day, whenever it treats of
capital? How long is it since economy discarded the physiocratic illusion, that rents grow out of
the soil and not out of society?
But not to anticipate, we will content ourselves with yet another example relating to the
commodity form. Could commodities themselves speak, they would say: Our use value may be a
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thing that interests men. It is no part of us as objects. What, however, does belong to us as
objects, is our value. Our natural intercourse as commodities proves it. In the eyes of each other
we are nothing but exchange values. Now listen how those commodities speak through the mouth
of the economist.
“Value” – (i.e., exchange value) “is a property of things, riches” – (i.e., use value)
“of man. Value, in this sense, necessarily implies exchanges, riches do not.”35
“Riches” (use value) “are the attribute of men, value is the attribute of
commodities. A man or a community is rich, a pearl or a diamond is valuable...”
A pearl or a diamond is valuable as a pearl or a diamond. 36
So far no chemist has ever discovered exchange value either in a pearl or a diamond. The
economic discoverers of this chemical element, who by-the-bye lay special claim to critical
acumen, find however that the use value of objects belongs to them independently of their
material properties, while their value, on the other hand, forms a part of them as objects. What
confirms them in this view, is the peculiar circumstance that the use value of objects is realised
without exchange, by means of a direct relation between the objects and man, while, on the other
hand, their value is realised only by exchange, that is, by means of a social process. Who fails
here to call to mind our good friend, Dogberry, who informs neighbour Seacoal, that, “To be a
well-favoured man is the gift of fortune; but reading and writing comes by Nature.” 37

1

Karl Marx, “Zur Kritik der Politischen Oekonomie.” Berlin, 1859, p. 3.
“Desire implies want, it is the appetite of the mind, and as natural as hunger to the body... The
greatest number (of things) have their value from supplying the wants of the mind.” Nicholas Barbon:
“A Discourse Concerning Coining the New Money Lighter. In Answer to Mr. Locke’s Considerations,
&c.”, London, 1696, pp. 2, 3.
3
“Things have an intrinsick vertue” (this is Barbon’s special term for value in use) “which in all
places have the same vertue; as the loadstone to attract iron” (l.c., p. 6). The property which the
magnet possesses of attracting iron, became of use only after by means of that property the polarity of
the magnet had been discovered.
4
“The natural worth of anything consists in its fitness to supply the necessities, or serve the
conveniencies of human life.” (John Locke, “Some Considerations on the Consequences of the
Lowering of Interest, 1691,” in Works Edit. Lond., 1777, Vol. II., p. 28.) In English writers of the 17th
century we frequently find “worth” in the sense of value in use, and “value” in the sense of exchange
value. This is quite in accordance with the spirit of a language that likes to use a Teutonic word for the
actual thing, and a Romance word for its reflexion.
5
In bourgeois societies the economic fictio juris prevails, that every one, as a buyer, possesses an
encyclopedic knowledge of commodities.
6
“La valeur consiste dans le rapport d’échange qui se trouve entre telle chose et telle autre entre telle
mesure d’une production et telle mesure d’une autre.” [“Value consists in the exchange relation
between one thing and another, between a given amount of one product and a given amount of
another”] (Le Trosne: “De l’Intérêt Social.” Physiocrates, Ed. Daire. Paris, 1846. p. 889.)
7
“Nothing can have an intrinsick value.” (N. Barbon, l.c., p. 6); or as Butler says – “The value of a
thing is just as much as it will bring.”
8
N. Barbon, l.c., p. 53 and 7.
9
“The value of them (the necessaries of life), when they are exchanged the one for another, is
regulated by the quantity of labour necessarily required, and commonly taken in producing them.”
2
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(“Some Thoughts on the Interest of Money in General, and Particularly in the Publick Funds, &c.”
Lond., p. 36) This remarkable anonymous work written in the last century, bears no date. It is clear,
however, from internal evidence that it appeared in the reign of George II, about 1739 or 1740.
10
“Toutes les productions d’un même genre ne forment proprement qu’une masse, dont le prix se
détermine en général et sans égard aux circonstances particulières.” [“Properly speaking, all products
of the same kind form a single mass, and their price is determined in general and without regard to
particular circumstances”] (Le Trosne, l.c., p. 893.)
11
K. Marx. l.c., p.6
12
I am inserting the parenthesis because its omission has often given rise to the misunderstanding that
every product that is consumed by some one other than its producer is considered in Marx a
commodity. [Engels, 4th German Edition]
13
Tutti i fenomeni dell’universo, sieno essi prodotti della mano dell’uomo, ovvero delle universali
leggi della fisica, non ci danno idea di attuale creazione, ma unicamente di una modificazione della
materia. Accostare e separare sono gli unici elementi che l’ingegno umano ritrova analizzando l’idea
della riproduzione: e tanto e riproduzione di valore (value in use, although Verri in this passage of his
controversy with the Physiocrats is not himself quite certain of the kind of value he is speaking of) e di
ricchezze se la terra, l’aria e l’acqua ne’ campi si trasmutino in grano, come se colla mano dell’uomo
il glutine di un insetto si trasmuti in velluto ovvero alcuni pezzetti di metalio si organizzino a formare
una ripetizione.” [“All the phenomena of the universe, whether produced by the hand of man or
through the universal laws of physics, are not actual new creations, but merely a modification of
matter. Joining together and separating are the only elements which the human mind always finds on
analysing the concept of reproduction and it is just the same with the reproduction of value” (value in
use, although Verri in this passage of his controversy with the Physiocrats is not himself quite certain
of the kind of value he is speaking of) “and of wealth, when earth, air and water in the fields are
transformed into corn, or when the hand of man transforms the secretions of an insect into silk, or
some pieces of metal are arranged to make the mechanism of a watch.”] – Pietro Verri, “Meditazioni
sulla Economia Politica” [first printed in 1773] in Custodi’s edition of the Italian Economists, Parte
Moderna, t. XV., p. 22.
14
Comp. Hegel, “Philosophie des Rechts.” Berlin, 1840. p. 250.
15
The reader must note that we are not speaking here of the wages or value that the labourer gets for a
given labour time, but of the value of the commodity in which that labour time is materialised. Wages
is a category that, as yet, has no existence at the present stage of our investigation.
16
In order to prove that labour alone is that all-sufficient and real measure, by which at all times the
value of all commodities can be estimated and compared, Adam Smith says, “Equal quantities of
labour must at all times and in all places have the same value for the labourer. In his normal state of
health, strength, and activity, and with the average degree of skill that he may possess, he must always
give up the same portion of his rest, his freedom, and his happiness.” (“Wealth of Nations,” b. I. ch.
V.) On the one hand Adam Smith here (but not everywhere) confuses the determination of value by
means of the quantity of labour expended in the production of commodities, with the determination of
the values of commodities by means of the value of labour, and seeks in consequence to prove that
equal quantities of labour have always the same value. On the other hand he has a presentiment, that
labour, so far as it manifests itself in the value of commodities, counts only as expenditure of labour
power, but he treats this expenditure as the mere sacrifice of rest, freedom, and happiness, not as at the
same time the normal activity of living beings. But then, he has the modern wage-labourer in his eye.
Much more aptly, the anonymous predecessor of Adam Smith, quoted above in note 9, this chapter,
says “one man has employed himself a week in providing this necessary of life ... and he that gives
him some other in exchange cannot make a better estimate of what is a proper equivalent, than by
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computing what cost him just as much labour and time; which in effect is no more than exchanging
one man’s labour in one thing for a time certain, for another man’s labour in another thing for the
same time.” (l.c., p. 39.) [The English language has the advantage of possessing different words for
the two aspects of labour here considered. The labour which creates use value, and counts
qualitatively, is Work, as distinguished from Labour, that which creates Value and counts
quantitatively, is Labour as distinguished from Work - Engels]
17
The few economists, amongst whom is S. Bailey, who have occupied themselves with the analysis
of the form of value, have been unable to arrive at any result, first, because they confuse the form of
value with value itself; and second, because, under the coarse influence of the practical bourgeois,
they exclusively give their attention to the quantitative aspect of the question. “The command of
quantity ... constitutes value.” (“Money and its Vicissitudes.” London, 1837, p. 11. By S. Bailey.)
18
The celebrated Franklin, one of the first economists, after Wm. Petty, who saw through the nature of
value, says: “Trade in general being nothing else but the exchange of labour for labour, the value of all
things is ... most justly measured by labour.” (“The works of B. Franklin, &c.,” edited by Sparks.
Boston, 1836, Vol. II., p. 267.) Franklin is unconscious that by estimating the value of everything in
labour, he makes abstraction from any difference in the sorts of labour exchanged, and thus reduces
them all to equal human labour. But although ignorant of this, yet he says it. He speaks first of “the
one labour,” then of “the other labour,” and finally of “labour,” without further qualification, as the
substance of the value of everything.
19
In a sort of way, it is with man as with commodities. Since he comes into the world neither with a
looking glass in his hand, nor as a Fichtian philosopher, to whom “I am I” is sufficient, man first sees
and recognises himself in other men. Peter only establishes his own identity as a man by first
comparing himself with Paul as being of like kind. And thereby Paul, just as he stands in his Pauline
personality, becomes to Peter the type of the genus homo.
20
Value is here, as occasionally in the preceding pages, used in sense of value determined as to
quantity, or of magnitude of value.
21
This incongruity between the magnitude of value and its relative expression has, with customary
ingenuity, been exploited by vulgar economists. For example – “Once admit that A falls, because B,
with which it is exchanged, rises, while no less labour is bestowed in the meantime on A, and your
general principle of value falls to the ground... If he [Ricardo] allowed that when A rises in value
relatively to B, B falls in value relatively to A, he cut away the ground on which he rested his grand
proposition, that the value of a commodity is ever determined by the labour embodied in it, for if a
change in the cost of A alters not only its own value in relation to B, for which it is exchanged, but
also the value of B relatively to that of A, though no change has taken place in the quantity of labour
to produce B, then not only the doctrine falls to the ground which asserts that the quantity of labour
bestowed on an article regulates its value, but also that which affirms the cost of an article to regulate
its value’ (J. Broadhurst: “Political Economy,” London, 1842, pp. 11 and 14.) Mr. Broadhurst might
just as well say: consider the fractions 10/20, 10/50, 10/100, &c., the number 10 remains unchanged,
and yet its proportional magnitude, its magnitude relatively to the numbers 20, 50, 100 &c.,
continually diminishes. Therefore the great principle that the magnitude of a whole number, such as
10, is “regulated” by the number of times unity is contained in it, falls to the ground. [The author
explains in section 4 of this chapter, pp. 80-81, note 2 (note 33 of this document), what he understands
by “Vulgar Economy.” – Engels]
22
Such expressions of relations in general, called by Hegel reflex categories, form a very curious
class. For instance, one man is king only because other men stand in the relation of subjects to him.
They, on the contrary, imagine that they are subjects because he is king.
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F. L. A. Ferrier, sous-inspecteur des douanes, “Du gouvernement considéré dans ses rapports avec
le commerce,” Paris, 1805; and Charles Ganilh, “Des Systèmes d’Economie Politique, – 2nd ed.,
Paris, 1821.
24
In Homer, for instance, the value of an article is expressed in a series of different things II. VII. 472475.
25
For this reason, we can speak of the coat value of the linen when its value is expressed in coats, or
of its corn value when expressed in corn, and so on. Every such expression tells us, that what appears
in the use values, coat, corn, &c., is the value of the linen. “The value of any commodity denoting its
relation in exchange, we may speak of it as ... corn value, cloth value, according to the commodity
with which it is compared; and hence there are a thousand different kinds of value, as many kinds of
value as there are commodities in existence, and all are equally real and equally nominal.” (“A Critical
Dissertation on the Nature, Measures and Causes of Value: chiefly in reference to the writings of Mr.
Ricardo and his followers.” By the author of “Essays on the Formation, &c., of Opinions.” London,
1825, p. 39.) S. Bailey, the author of this anonymous work, a work which in its day created much stir
in England, fancied that, by thus pointing out the various relative expressions of one and the same
value, he had proved the impossibility of any determination of the concept of value. However narrow
his own views may have been, yet, that he laid his finger on some serious defects in the Ricardian
Theory, is proved by the animosity with which he was attacked by Ricardo’s followers. See the
Westminster Review for example.
26
It is by no means self-evident that this character of direct and universal exchangeability is, so to
speak, a polar one, and as intimately connected with its opposite pole, the absence of direct
exchangeability, as the positive pole of the magnet is with its negative counterpart. It may therefore be
imagined that all commodities can simultaneously have this character impressed upon them, just as it
can be imagined that all Catholics can be popes together. It is, of course, highly desirable in the eyes
of the petit bourgeois, for whom the production of commodities is the nec plus ultra of human
freedom and individual independence, that the inconveniences resulting from this character of
commodities not being directly exchangeable, should be removed. Proudhon’s socialism is a working
out of this Philistine Utopia, a form of socialism which, as I have elsewhere shown, does not possess
even the merit of originality. Long before his time, the task was attempted with much better success
by Gray, Bray, and others. But, for all that, wisdom of this kind flourishes even now in certain circles
under the name of “science.” Never has any school played more tricks with the word science, than that
of Proudhon, for “wo Begriffe fehlen, Da stellt zur rechten Zeit ein Wort sich ein.” [“Where thoughts
are absent, Words are brought in as convenient replacements,” Goethe’s, Faust, See Proudhon’s
Philosophy of Poverty]
26a
In the German edition, there is the following footnote here: “One may recall that China and the
tables began to dance when the rest of the world appeared to be standing still – pour encourager les
autres [to encourage the others].” The defeat of the 1848-49 revolutions was followed by a period of
dismal political reaction in Europe. At that time, spiritualism, especially table-turning, became the
rage among the European aristocracy. In 1850-64, China was swept by an anti-feudal liberation
movement in the form of a large-scale peasant war, the Taiping Revolt. – Note by editors of MECW.
27
Among the ancient Germans the unit for measuring land was what could be harvested in a day, and
was called Tagwerk, Tagwanne (jurnale, or terra jurnalis, or diornalis), Mannsmaad, &c. (See G. L.
von Maurer, “Einleitung zur Geschichte der Mark, &c. Verfassung,” Munchen, 1854, p. 129 sq.)
28
When, therefore, Galiani says: Value is a relation between persons – “La Ricchezza e una ragione
tra due persone,” – he ought to have added: a relation between persons expressed as a relation between
things. (Galiani: Della Moneta, p. 221, V. III. of Custodi’s collection of “Scrittori Classici Italiani di
Economia Politica.” Parte Moderna, Milano 1803.)
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“What are we to think of a law that asserts itself only by periodical revolutions? It is just nothing
but a law of Nature, founded on the want of knowledge of those whose action is the subject of it.”
(Friedrich Engels: “Umrisse zu einer Kritik der Nationalökonomie,” in the “Deutsch-Französische
Jahrbücher,” edited by Arnold Ruge and Karl Marx. Paris. 1844.)
30
Even Ricardo has his stories à la Robinson. “He makes the primitive hunter and the primitive fisher
straightway, as owners of commodities, exchange fish and game in the proportion in which labour
time is incorporated in these exchange values. On this occasion he commits the anachronism of
making these men apply to the calculation, so far as their implements have to be taken into account,
the annuity tables in current use on the London Exchange in the year 1817. The parallelograms of Mr.
Owen appear to be the only form of society, besides the bourgeois form, with which he was
acquainted.” (Karl Marx: “Zur Kritik, &c..” pp. 38, 39)
31
A ridiculous presumption has latterly got abroad that common property in its primitive form is
specifically a Slavonian, or even exclusively Russian form. It is the primitive form that we can prove
to have existed amongst Romans, Teutons, and Celts, and even to this day we find numerous
examples, ruins though they be, in India. A more exhaustive study of Asiatic, and especially of Indian
forms of common property, would show how from the different forms of primitive common property,
different forms of its dissolution have been developed. Thus, for instance, the various original types of
Roman and Teutonic private property are deducible from different forms of Indian common property.”
(Karl Marx, “Zur Kritik, &c.,” p. 10.)
32
The insufficiency of Ricardo’s analysis of the magnitude of value, and his analysis is by far the best,
will appear from the 3rd and 4th books of this work. As regards value in general, it is the weak point
of the classical school of Political Economy that it nowhere expressly and with full consciousness,
distinguishes between labour, as it appears in the value of a product, and the same labour, as it appears
in the use value of that product. Of course the distinction is practically made, since this school treats
labour, at one time under its quantitative aspect, at another under its qualitative aspect. But it has not
the least idea, that when the difference between various kinds of labour is treated as purely
quantitative, their qualitative unity or equality, and therefore their reduction to abstract human labour,
is implied. For instance, Ricardo declares that he agrees with Destutt de Tracy in this proposition: “As
it is certain that our physical and moral faculties are alone our original riches, the employment of
those faculties, labour of some kind, is our only original treasure, and it is always from this
employment that all those things are created which we call riches... It is certain, too, that all those
things only represent the labour which has created them, and if they have a value, or even two distinct
values, they can only derive them from that (the value) of the labour from which they emanate.”
(Ricardo, “The Principles of Pol. Econ.,” 3 Ed. Lond. 1821, p. 334.) We would here only point out,
that Ricardo puts his own more profound interpretation upon the words of Destutt. What the latter
really says is, that on the one hand all things which constitute wealth represent the labour that creates
them, but that on the other hand, they acquire their “two different values” (use value and exchange
value) from “the value of labour.” He thus falls into the commonplace error of the vulgar economists,
who assume the value of one commodity (in this case labour) in order to determine the values of the
rest. But Ricardo reads him as if he had said, that labour (not the value of labour) is embodied both in
use value and exchange value. Nevertheless, Ricardo himself pays so little attention to the two-fold
character of the labour which has a two-fold embodiment, that he devotes the whole of his chapter on
“Value and Riches, Their Distinctive Properties,” to a laborious examination of the trivialities of a J.B.
Say. And at the finish he is quite astonished to find that Destutt on the one hand agrees with him as to
labour being the source of value, and on the other hand with J. B. Say as to the notion of value.
33
It is one of the chief failings of classical economy that it has never succeeded, by means of its
analysis of commodities, and, in particular, of their value, in discovering that form under which value
becomes exchange value. Even Adam Smith and Ricardo, the best representatives of the school, treat
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the form of value as a thing of no importance, as having no connection with the inherent nature of
commodities. The reason for this is not solely because their attention is entirely absorbed in the
analysis of the magnitude of value. It lies deeper. The value form of the product of labour is not only
the most abstract, but is also the most universal form, taken by the product in bourgeois production,
and stamps that production as a particular species of social production, and thereby gives it its special
historical character. If then we treat this mode of production as one eternally fixed by Nature for every
state of society, we necessarily overlook that which is the differentia specifica of the value form, and
consequently of the commodity form, and of its further developments, money form, capital form, &c.
We consequently find that economists, who are thoroughly agreed as to labour time being the measure
of the magnitude of value, have the most strange and contradictory ideas of money, the perfected form
of the general equivalent. This is seen in a striking manner when they treat of banking, where the
commonplace definitions of money will no longer hold water. This led to the rise of a restored
mercantile system (Ganilh, &c.), which sees in value nothing but a social form, or rather the
unsubstantial ghost of that form. Once for all I may here state, that by classical Political Economy, I
understand that economy which, since the time of W. Petty, has investigated the real relations of
production in bourgeois society in contradistinction to vulgar economy, which deals with appearances
only, ruminates without ceasing on the materials long since provided by scientific economy, and there
seeks plausible explanations of the most obtrusive phenomena, for bourgeois daily use, but for the
rest, confines itself to systematising in a pedantic way, and proclaiming for everlasting truths, the trite
ideas held by the self-complacent bourgeoisie with regard to their own world, to them the best of all
possible worlds.
34
“Les économistes ont une singulière manière de procéder. Il n’y a pour eux que deux sortes
d’institutions, celles de l’art et celles de la nature. Les institutions de la féodalité sont des institutions
artificielles celles de la bourgeoisie sont des institutions naturelles. Ils ressemblent en ceci aux
théologiens, qui eux aussi établissent deux sortes de religions. Toute religion qui n’est pas la leur, est
une invention des hommes tandis que leur propre religion est une émanation de Dieu ‒ Ainsi il y a eu
de l’histoire, mais il n’y en a plus.” [“Economists have a singular method of procedure. There are only
two kinds of institutions for them, artificial and natural. The institutions of feudalism are artificial
institutions, those of the bourgeoisie are natural institutions. In this they resemble the theologians, who
likewise establish two kinds of religion. Every religion which is not theirs is an invention of men,
while their own is an emanation from God. ... Thus there has been history, but there is no longer any”]
(Karl Marx. Misère de la Philosophie. Réponse a la Philosophie de la Misère par M. Proudhon, 1847,
p. 113.) Truly comical is M. Bastiat, who imagines that the ancient Greeks and Romans lived by
plunder alone. But when people plunder for centuries, there must always be something at hand for
them to seize; the objects of plunder must be continually reproduced. It would thus appear that even
Greeks and Romans had some process of production, consequently, an economy, which just as much
constituted the material basis of their world, as bourgeois economy constitutes that of our modern
world. Or perhaps Bastiat means, that a mode of production based on slavery is based on a system of
plunder. In that case he treads on dangerous ground. If a giant thinker like Aristotle erred in his
appreciation of slave labour, why should a dwarf economist like Bastiat be right in his appreciation of
wage labour? I seize this opportunity of shortly answering an objection taken by a German paper in
America, to my work, “Zur Kritik der Pol. Oekonomie, 1859.” In the estimation of that paper, my
view that each special mode of production and the social relations corresponding to it, in short, that
the economic structure of society, is the real basis on which the juridical and political superstructure is
raised and to which definite social forms of thought correspond; that the mode of production
determines the character of the social, political, and intellectual life generally, all this is very true for
our own times, in which material interests preponderate, but not for the middle ages, in which
Catholicism, nor for Athens and Rome, where politics, reigned supreme. In the first place it strikes
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one as an odd thing for any one to suppose that these well-worn phrases about the middle ages and the
ancient world are unknown to anyone else. This much, however, is clear, that the middle ages could
not live on Catholicism, nor the ancient world on politics. On the contrary, it is the mode in which
they gained a livelihood that explains why here politics, and there Catholicism, played the chief part.
For the rest, it requires but a slight acquaintance with the history of the Roman republic, for example,
to be aware that its secret history is the history of its landed property. On the other hand, Don Quixote
long ago paid the penalty for wrongly imagining that knight errantry was compatible with all
economic forms of society.
35
“Observations on certain verbal disputes in Pol. Econ., particularly relating to value and to demand
and supply” Lond., 1821, p. 16.
36
S. Bailey, l.c., p. 165.
37
The author of “Observations” and S. Bailey accuse Ricardo of converting exchange value from
something relative into something absolute. The opposite is the fact. He has explained the apparent
relation between objects, such as diamonds and pearls, in which relation they appear as exchange
values, and disclosed the true relation hidden behind the appearances, namely, their relation to each
other as mere expressions of human labour. If the followers of Ricardo answer Bailey somewhat
rudely, and by no means convincingly, the reason is to be sought in this, that they were unable to find
in Ricardo’s own works any key to the hidden relations existing between value and its form, exchange
value.

Chapter 2: Exchange
It is plain that commodities cannot go to market and make exchanges of their own account. We
must, therefore, have recourse to their guardians, who are also their owners. Commodities are
things, and therefore without power of resistance against man. If they are wanting in docility he
can use force; in other words, he can take possession of them. 1 In order that these objects may
enter into relation with each other as commodities, their guardians must place themselves in
relation to one another, as persons whose will resides in those objects, and must behave in such a
way that each does not appropriate the commodity of the other, and part with his own, except by
means of an act done by mutual consent. They must therefore, mutually recognise in each other
the rights of private proprietors. This juridical relation, which thus expresses itself in a contract,
whether such contract be part of a developed legal system or not, is a relation between two wills,
and is but the reflex of the real economic relation between the two. It is this economic relation
that determines the subject-matter comprised in each such juridical act.2
The persons exist for one another merely as representatives of, and, therefore. as owners of,
commodities. In the course of our investigation we shall find, in general, that the characters who
appear on the economic stage are but the personifications of the economic relations that exist
between them.
What chiefly distinguishes a commodity from its owner is the fact, that it looks upon every other
commodity as but the form of appearance of its own value. A born leveller and a cynic, it is
always ready to exchange not only soul, but body, with any and every other commodity, be the
same more repulsive than Maritornes herself. The owner makes up for this lack in the commodity
of a sense of the concrete, by his own five and more senses. His commodity possesses for himself
no immediate use-value. Otherwise, he would not bring it to the market. It has use-value for
others; but for himself its only direct use-value is that of being a depository of exchange-value,
and, consequently, a means of exchange. 3 Therefore, he makes up his mind to part with it for
commodities whose value in use is of service to him. All commodities are non-use-values for
their owners, and use-values for their non-owners. Consequently, they must all change hands. But
this change of hands is what constitutes their exchange, and the latter puts them in relation with
each other as values, and realises them as values. Hence commodities must be realised as values
before they can be realised as use-values.
On the other hand, they must show that they are use-values before they can be realised as values.
For the labour spent upon them counts effectively, only in so far as it is spent in a form that is
useful for others. Whether that labour is useful for others, and its product consequently capable of
satisfying the wants of others, can be proved only by the act of exchange.
Every owner of a commodity wishes to part with it in exchange only for those commodities
whose use-value satisfies some want of his. Looked at in this way, exchange is for him simply a
private transaction. On the other hand, he desires to realise the value of his commodity, to convert
it into any other suitable commodity of equal value, irrespective of whether his own commodity
has or has not any use-value for the owner of the other. From this point of view, exchange is for
him a social transaction of a general character. But one and the same set of transactions cannot be
simultaneously for all owners of commodities both exclusively private and exclusively social and
general.
Let us look at the matter a little closer. To the owner of a commodity, every other commodity is,
in regard to his own, a particular equivalent, and consequently his own commodity is the
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universal equivalent for all the others. But since this applies to every owner, there is, in fact, no
commodity acting as universal equivalent, and the relative value of commodities possesses no
general form under which they can be equated as values and have the magnitude of their values
compared. So far, therefore, they do not confront each other as commodities, but only as products
or use-values. In their difficulties our commodity owners think like Faust: “Im Anfang war die
Tat.” [“In the beginning was the deed.” – Goethe, Faust.] They therefore acted and transacted
before they thought. Instinctively they conform to the laws imposed by the nature of
commodities. They cannot bring their commodities into relation as values, and therefore as
commodities, except by comparing them with some one other commodity as the universal
equivalent. That we saw from the analysis of a commodity. But a particular commodity cannot
become the universal equivalent except by a social act. The social action therefore of all other
commodities, sets apart the particular commodity in which they all represent their values.
Thereby the bodily form of this commodity becomes the form of the socially recognised universal
equivalent. To be the universal equivalent, becomes, by this social process, the specific function
of the commodity thus excluded by the rest. Thus it becomes – money. “Illi unum consilium
habent et virtutem et potestatem suam bestiae tradunt. Et ne quis possit emere aut vendere, nisi
qui habet characterem aut nomen bestiae aut numerum nominis ejus.” [“These have one mind,
and shall give their power and strength unto the beast.” Revelations, 17:13; “And that no man
might buy or sell, save he that had the mark, or the name of the beast, or the number of his
name.” Revelations, 13:17.] (Apocalypse.)
Money is a crystal formed of necessity in the course of the exchanges, whereby different products
of labour are practically equated to one another and thus by practice converted into commodities.
The historical progress and extension of exchanges develops the contrast, latent in commodities,
between use-value and value. The necessity for giving an external expression to this contrast for
the purposes of commercial intercourse, urges on the establishment of an independent form of
value, and finds no rest until it is once for all satisfied by the differentiation of commodities into
commodities and money. At the same rate, then, as the conversion of products into commodities
is being accomplished, so also is the conversion of one special commodity into money. 4
The direct barter of products attains the elementary form of the relative expression of value in one
respect, but not in another. That form is x Commodity A = y Commodity B. The form of direct
barter is x use-value A = y use-value B. 5 The articles A and B in this case are not as yet
commodities, but become so only by the act of barter. The first step made by an object of utility
towards acquiring exchange-value is when it forms a non-use-value for its owner, and that
happens when it forms a superfluous portion of some article required for his immediate wants.
Objects in themselves are external to man, and consequently alienable by him. In order that this
alienation may be reciprocal, it is only necessary for men, by a tacit understanding, to treat each
other as private owners of those alienable objects, and by implication as independent individuals.
But such a state of reciprocal independence has no existence in a primitive society based on
property in common, whether such a society takes the form of a patriarchal family, an ancient
Indian community, or a Peruvian Inca State. The exchange of commodities, therefore, first begins
on the boundaries of such communities, at their points of contact with other similar communities,
or with members of the latter. So soon, however, as products once become commodities in the
external relations of a community, they also, by reaction, become so in its internal intercourse.
The proportions in which they are exchangeable are at first quite a matter of chance. What makes
them exchangeable is the mutual desire of their owners to alienate them. Meantime the need for
foreign objects of utility gradually establishes itself. The constant repetition of exchange makes it
a normal social act. In the course of time, therefore, some portion at least of the products of
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labour must be produced with a special view to exchange. From that moment the distinction
becomes firmly established between the utility of an object for the purposes of consumption, and
its utility for the purposes of exchange. Its use-value becomes distinguished from its exchangevalue. On the other hand, the quantitative proportion in which the articles are exchangeable,
becomes dependent on their production itself. Custom stamps them as values with definite
magnitudes.
In the direct barter of products, each commodity is directly a means of exchange to its owner, and
to all other persons an equivalent, but that only in so far as it has use-value for them. At this
stage, therefore, the articles exchanged do not acquire a value-form independent of their own usevalue, or of the individual needs of the exchangers. The necessity for a value-form grows with the
increasing number and variety of the commodities exchanged. The problem and the means of
solution arise simultaneously. Commodity-owners never equate their own commodities to those
of others, and exchange them on a large scale, without different kinds of commodities belonging
to different owners being exchangeable for, and equated as values to, one and the same special
article. Such last-mentioned article, by becoming the equivalent of various other commodities,
acquires at once, though within narrow limits, the character of a general social equivalent. This
character comes and goes with the momentary social acts that called it into life. In turns and
transiently it attaches itself first to this and then to that commodity. But with the development of
exchange it fixes itself firmly and exclusively to particular sorts of commodities, and becomes
crystallised by assuming the money-form. The particular kind of commodity to which it sticks is
at first a matter of accident. Nevertheless there are two circumstances whose influence is decisive.
The money-form attaches itself either to the most important articles of exchange from outside,
and these in fact are primitive and natural forms in which the exchange-value of home products
finds expression; or else it attaches itself to the object of utility that forms, like cattle, the chief
portion of indigenous alienable wealth. Nomad races are the first to develop the money-form,
because all their worldly goods consist of moveable objects and are therefore directly alienable;
and because their mode of life, by continually bringing them into contact with foreign
communities, solicits the exchange of products. Man has often made man himself, under the form
of slaves, serve as the primitive material of money, but has never used land for that purpose. Such
an idea could only spring up in a bourgeois society already well developed. It dates from the last
third of the 17th century, and the first attempt to put it in practice on a national scale was made a
century afterwards, during the French bourgeois revolution.
In proportion as exchange bursts its local bonds, and the value of commodities more and more
expands into an embodiment of human labour in the abstract, in the same proportion the character
of money attaches itself to commodities that are by Nature fitted to perform the social function of
a universal equivalent. Those commodities are the precious metals.
The truth of the proposition that, “although gold and silver are not by Nature money, money is by
Nature gold and silver,” 6 is shown by the fitness of the physical properties of these metals for the
functions of money. 7 Up to this point, however, we are acquainted only with one function of
money, namely, to serve as the form of manifestation of the value of commodities, or as the
material in which the magnitudes of their values are socially expressed. An adequate form of
manifestation of value, a fit embodiment of abstract, undifferentiated, and therefore equal human
labour, that material alone can be whose every sample exhibits the same uniform qualities. On the
other hand, since the difference between the magnitudes of value is purely quantitative, the
money commodity must be susceptible of merely quantitative differences, must therefore be
divisible at will, and equally capable of being reunited. Gold and silver possess these properties
by Nature.

63

Chapter 2

The use-value of the money-commodity becomes two-fold. In addition to its special use-value as
a commodity (gold, for instance, serving to stop teeth, to form the raw material of articles of
luxury, &c.), it acquires a formal use-value, originating in its specific social function.
Since all commodities are merely particular equivalents of money, the latter being their universal
equivalent, they, with regard to the latter as the universal commodity, play the parts of particular
commodities. 8
We have seen that the money-form is but the reflex, thrown upon one single commodity, of the
value relations between all the rest. That money is a commodity9 is therefore a new discovery
only for those who, when they analyse it, start from its fully developed shape. The act of
exchange gives to the commodity converted into money, not its value, but its specific value-form.
By confounding these two distinct things some writers have been led to hold that the value of
gold and silver is imaginary. 10 The fact that money can, in certain functions, be replaced by mere
symbols of itself, gave rise to that other mistaken notion, that it is itself a mere symbol.
Nevertheless under this error lurked a presentiment that the money-form of an object is not an
inseparable part of that object, but is simply the form under which certain social relations
manifest themselves. In this sense every commodity is a symbol, since, in so far as it is value, it is
only the material envelope of the human labour spent upon it.11 But if it be declared that the
social characters assumed by objects, or the material forms assumed by the social qualities of
labour under the régime of a definite mode of production, are mere symbols, it is in the same
breath also declared that these characteristics are arbitrary fictions sanctioned by the so-called
universal consent of mankind. This suited the mode of explanation in favour during the 18th
century. Unable to account for the origin of the puzzling forms assumed by social relations
between man and man, people sought to denude them of their strange appearance by ascribing to
them a conventional origin.
It has already been remarked above that the equivalent form of a commodity does not imply the
determination of the magnitude of its value. Therefore, although we may be aware that gold is
money, and consequently directly exchangeable for all other commodities, yet that fact by no
means tells how much 10 lbs., for instance, of gold is worth. Money, like every other commodity,
cannot express the magnitude of its value except relatively in other commodities. This value is
determined by the labour-time required for its production, and is expressed by the quantity of any
other commodity that costs the same amount of labour-time. 12 Such quantitative determination of
its relative value takes place at the source of its production by means of barter. When it steps into
circulation as money, its value is already given. In the last decades of the 17th century it had
already been shown that money is a commodity, but this step marks only the infancy of the
analysis. The difficulty lies, not in comprehending that money is a commodity, but in discovering
how, why, and by what means a commodity becomes money. 13
We have already seen, from the most elementary expression of value, x commodity A = y
commodity B, that the object in which the magnitude of the value of another object is
represented, appears to have the equivalent form independently of this relation, as a social
property given to it by Nature. We followed up this false appearance to its final establishment,
which is complete so soon as the universal equivalent form becomes identified with the bodily
form of a particular commodity, and thus crystallised into the money-form. What appears to
happen is, not that gold becomes money, in consequence of all other commodities expressing
their values in it, but, on the contrary, that all other commodities universally express their values
in gold, because it is money. The intermediate steps of the process vanish in the result and leave
no trace behind. Commodities find their own value already completely represented, without any
initiative on their part, in another commodity existing in company with them. These objects, gold

64

Chapter 2

and silver, just as they come out of the bowels of the earth, are forthwith the direct incarnation of
all human labour. Hence the magic of money. In the form of society now under consideration, the
behaviour of men in the social process of production is purely atomic. Hence their relations to
each other in production assume a material character independent of their control and conscious
individual action. These facts manifest themselves at first by products as a general rule taking the
form of commodities. We have seen how the progressive development of a society of
commodity-producers stamps one privileged commodity with the character of money. Hence the
riddle presented by money is but the riddle presented by commodities; only it now strikes us in its
most
glaring
form.
1

In the 12th century, so renowned for its piety, they included amongst commodities some very
delicate things. Thus a French poet of the period enumerates amongst the goods to be found in the
market of Landit, not only clothing, shoes, leather, agricultural implements, &c., but also “femmes
folles de leur corps.”
2
Proudhon begins by taking his ideal of Justice, of “justice éternelle,” from the juridical relations that
correspond to the production of commodities: thereby, it may be noted, he proves, to the consolation
of all good citizens, that the production of commodities is a form of production as everlasting as
justice. Then he turns round and seeks to reform the actual production of commodities, and the actual
legal system corresponding thereto, in accordance with this ideal. What opinion should we have of a
chemist, who, instead of studying the actual laws of the molecular changes in the composition and
decomposition of matter, and on that foundation solving definite problems, claimed to regulate the
composition and decomposition of matter by means of the “eternal ideas,” of “naturalité” and
“affinité”? Do we really know any more about “usury,” when we say it contradicts “justice éternelle,”
“équité éternelle,” “mutualité éternelle,” and other “vérités éternelles” than the fathers of the church
did when they said it was incompatible with “grâce éternelle,” “foi éternelle,” and “la volonté éternelle
de Dieu”?
3
For two-fold is the use of every object.... The one is peculiar to the object as such, the other is not, as
a sandal which may be worn, and is also exchangeable. Both are uses of the sandal, for even he who
exchanges the sandal for the money or food he is in want of, makes use of the sandal as a sandal. But
not in its natural way. For it has not been made for the sake of being exchanged.” (Aristoteles, “De
Rep.” l. i. c. 9.)
4
From this we may form an estimate of the shrewdness of the petit-bourgeois socialism, which, while
perpetuating the production of commodities, aims at abolishing the “antagonism” between money and
commodities, and consequently, since money exists only by virtue of this antagonism, at abolishing
money itself. We might just as well try to retain Catholicism without the Pope. For more on this point
see my work, “Zur Kritik der Pol. Oekon.,” p. 61, sq.
5
So long as, instead of two distinct use-values being exchanged, a chaotic mass of articles are offered
as the equivalent of a single article, which is often the case with savages, even the direct barter of
products is in its first infancy.
6
Karl Marx, l.c., p. 135. “I metalli ... naturalmente moneta.” [“The metals ... are by their nature
money.”] (Galiani, “Della moneta” in Custodi’s Collection: Parte Moderna t. iii.)
7
For further details on this subject see in my work cited above, the chapter on “The precious metals.”
8
“Il danaro è la merce universale"(Verri, l.c., p. 16).
9
“Silver and gold themselves (which we may call by the general name of bullion) are ... commodities
... rising and falling in ... value ... Bullion, then, may be reckoned to be of higher value where the
smaller weight will purchase the greater quantity of the product or manufacture of the countrey,” &c.
(“A Discourse of the General Notions of Money, Trade, and Exchanges, as They Stand in Relation

65

Chapter 2

each to other.” By a Merchant. Lond., 1695, p. 7.) “Silver and gold, coined or uncoined, though they
are used for a measure of all other things, are no less a commodity than wine, oil, tobacco, cloth, or
stuffs.” (“A Discourse concerning Trade, and that in particular of the East Indies,” &c. London, 1689,
p. 2.) “The stock and riches of the kingdom cannot properly be confined to money, nor ought gold and
silver to be excluded from being merchandise.” ("The East-India Trade a Most Profitable Trade.”
London, 1677, p. 4.)
10
L’oro e l’argento hanno valore come metalli anteriore all’esser moneta.” [“Gold and silver have
value as metals before they are money”] (Galiani, l.c.) Locke says, “The universal consent of mankind
gave to silver, on account of its qualities which made it suitable for money, an imaginary value.” Law,
on the other hand. “How could different nations give an imaginary value to any single thing... or how
could this imaginary value have maintained itself?” But the following shows how little he himself
understood about the matter: “Silver was exchanged in proportion to the value in use it possessed,
consequently in proportion to its real value. By its adoption as money it received an additional value
(une valeur additionnelle).” (Jean Law: “Considérations sur le numéraire et le commerce” in E.
Daire’s Edit. of “Economistes Financiers du XVIII siècle,” p. 470.)
11
“L’Argent en (des denrées) est le signe.” [“Money is their (the commodities’) symbol”] (V. de
Forbonnais: “Eléments du Commerce, Nouv. Edit. Leyde, 1766,” t. II., p. 143.) “Comme signe il est
attiré par les denrées.” [“As a symbol it is attracted by the commodities”] (l.c., p. 155.) “L’argent est
un signe d’une chose et la représente.” [“Money is a symbol of a thing and represents it.”]
(Montesquieu: “Esprit des Lois,” (Oeuvres, Lond. 1767, t. II, p. 2.) “L’argent n’est pas simple signe,
car il est lui-même richesse, il ne représente pas les valeurs, il les équivaut.” [“Money is not a mere
symbol, for it is itself wealth; it does not represent the values, it is their equivalents”] (Le Trosne, l.c.,
p. 910.) “The notion of value contemplates the valuable article as a mere symbol - the article counts
not for what it is, but for what it is worth.” (Hegel, l.c., p. 100.) Lawyers started long before
economists the idea that money is a mere symbol, and that the value of the precious metals is purely
imaginary. This they did in the sycophantic service of the crowned heads, supporting the right of the
latter to debase the coinage, during the whole of the middle ages, by the traditions of the Roman
Empire and the conceptions of money to be found in the Pandects. “Qu’aucun puisse ni doive faire
doute,” [“Let no one call into question,”] says an apt scholar of theirs, Philip of Valois, in a decree of
1346, “que à nous et à notre majesté royale n’appartiennent seulement ... le mestier, le fait, l’état, la
provision et toute l’ordonnance des monnaies, de donner tel cours, et pour tel prix comme il nous plait
et bon nous semble.” [“that the trade, the composition, the supply and the power of issuing ordinances
on the currency ... belongs exclusively to us and to our royal majesty, to fix such a rate and at such
price as it shall please us and seem good to us”] It was a maxim of the Roman Law that the value of
money was fixed by decree of the emperor. It was expressly forbidden to treat money as a commodity.
“Pecunias vero nulli emere fas erit, nam in usu publico constitutas oportet non esse mercem.”
[“However, it shall not be lawful to anyone to buy money, for, as it was created for public use, it is not
permissible for it to be a commodity”] Some good work on this question has been done by G. F.
Pagnini: “Saggio sopra il giusto pregio delle cose, 1751"; Custodi “Parte Moderna,” t. II. In the second
part of his work Pagnini directs his polemics especially against the lawyers.
12
“If a man can bring to London an ounce of Silver out of the Earth in Peru, in the same time that he
can produce a bushel of Corn, then the one is the natural price of the other; now, if by reason of new
or more easier mines a man can procure two ounces of silver as easily as he formerly did one, the corn
will be as cheap at ten shillings the bushel as it was before at five shillings, caeteris paribus.” William
Petty. “A Treatise of Taxes and Contributions.” Lond., 1667, p. 32.
13
The learned Professor Roscher, after first informing us that “the false definitions of money may be
divided into two main groups: those which make it more, and those which make it less, than a
commodity,” gives us a long and very mixed catalogue of works on the nature of money, from which
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it appears that he has not the remotest idea of the real history of the theory; and then he moralises thus:
“For the rest, it is not to be denied that most of the later economists do not bear sufficiently in mind
the peculiarities that distinguish money from other commodities” (it is then, after all, either more or
less than a commodity!)... “So far, the semi-mercantilist reaction of Ganilh is not altogether without
foundation.” (Wilhelm Roscher: “Die Grundlagen der Nationaloekonomie,” 3rd Edn. 1858, pp. 207210.) More! less! not sufficiently! so far! not altogether! What clearness and precision of ideas and
language! And such eclectic professorial twaddle is modestly baptised by Mr. Roscher, “the
anatomico-physiological method” of Political Economy! One discovery however, he must have credit
for, namely, that money is “a pleasant commodity.”

Chapter 3: Money, Or the Circulation of
Commodities
Section 1: The Measure of Values
Throughout this work, I assume, for the sake of simplicity, gold as the money-commodity.
The first chief function of money is to supply commodities with the material for the expression of
their values, or to represent their values as magnitudes of the same denomination, qualitatively
equal, and quantitatively comparable. It thus serves as a universal measure of value. And only by
virtue of this function does gold, the equivalent commodity par excellence, become money.
It is not money that renders commodities commensurable. Just the contrary. It is because all
commodities, as values, are realised human labour, and therefore commensurable, that their
values can be measured by one and the same special commodity, and the latter be converted into
the common measure of their values, i.e., into money. Money as a measure of value, is the
phenomenal form that must of necessity be assumed by that measure of value which is immanent
in commodities, labour-time. 1
The expression of the value of a commodity in gold – x commodity A = y money-commodity – is
its money-form or price. A single equation, such as 1 ton of iron = 2 ounces of gold, now suffices
to express the value of the iron in a socially valid manner. There is no longer any need for this
equation to figure as a link in the chain of equations that express the values of all other
commodities, because the equivalent commodity, gold, now has the character of money. The
general form of relative value has resumed its original shape of simple or isolated relative value.
On the other hand, the expanded expression of relative value, the endless series of equations, has
now become the form peculiar to the relative value of the money-commodity. The series itself,
too, is now given, and has social recognition in the prices of actual commodities. We have only to
read the quotations of a price-list backwards, to find the magnitude of the value of money
expressed in all sorts of commodities. But money itself has no price. In order to put it on an equal
footing with all other commodities in this respect, we should be obliged to equate it to itself as its
own equivalent.
The price or money-form of commodities is, like their form of value generally, a form quite
distinct from their palpable bodily form; it is, therefore, a purely ideal or mental form. Although
invisible, the value of iron, linen and corn has actual existence in these very articles: it is ideally
made perceptible by their equality with gold, a relation that, so to say, exists only in their own
heads. Their owner must, therefore, lend them his tongue, or hang a ticket on them, before their
prices can be communicated to the outside world.2 Since the expression of the value of
commodities in gold is a merely ideal act, we may use for this purpose imaginary or ideal money.
Every trader knows, that he is far from having turned his goods into money, when he has
expressed their value in a price or in imaginary money, and that it does not require the least bit of
real gold, to estimate in that metal millions of pounds’ worth of goods. When, therefore, money
serves as a measure of value, it is employed only as imaginary or ideal money. This circumstance
has given rise to the wildest theories. 3 But, although the money that performs the functions of a
measure of value is only ideal money, price depends entirely upon the actual substance that is
money. The value, or in other words, the quantity of human labour contained in a ton of iron, is
expressed in imagination by such a quantity of the money-commodity as contains the same
amount of labour as the iron. According, therefore, as the measure of value is gold, silver, or

68

Chapter 3

copper, the value of the ton of iron will be expressed by very different prices, or will be
represented by very different quantities of those metals respectively.
If, therefore, two different commodities, such as gold and silver, are simultaneously measures of
value, all commodities have two prices – one a gold-price, the other a silver-price. These exist
quietly side by side, so long as the ratio of the value of silver to that of gold remains unchanged,
say, at 15:1. Every change in their ratio disturbs the ratio which exists between the gold-prices
and the silver-prices of commodities, and thus proves, by facts, that a double standard of value is
inconsistent with the functions of a standard. 4
Commodities with definite prices present themselves under the form: a commodity A = x gold; b
commodity B = z gold; c commodity C = y gold, &c., where a, b, c, represent definite quantities
of the commodities A, B, C and x, z, y, definite quantities of gold. The values of these
commodities are, therefore, changed in imagination into so many different quantities of gold.
Hence, in spite of the confusing variety of the commodities themselves, their values become
magnitudes of the same denomination, gold-magnitudes. They are now capable of being
compared with each other and measured, and the want becomes technically felt of comparing
them with some fixed quantity of gold as a unit measure. This unit, by subsequent division into
aliquot parts, becomes itself the standard or scale. Before they become money, gold, silver, and
copper already possess such standard measures in their standards of weight, so that, for example,
a pound weight, while serving as the unit, is, on the one hand, divisible into ounces, and, on the
other, may be combined to make up hundredweights. 5 It is owing to this that, in all metallic
currencies, the names given to the standards of money or of price were originally taken from the
pre-existing names of the standards of weight.
As measure of Value, and as standard of price, money has two entirely distinct functions to
perform. It is the measure of value inasmuch as it is the socially recognised incarnation of human
labour; it is the standard of price inasmuch as it is a fixed weight of metal. As the measure of
value it serves to convert the values of all the manifold commodities into prices, into imaginary
quantities of gold; as the standard of price it measures those quantities of gold. The measure of
values measures commodities considered as values; the standard of price measures, on the
contrary, quantities of gold by a unit quantity of gold, not the value of one quantity of gold by the
weight of another. In order to make gold a standard of price, a certain weight must be fixed upon
as the unit. In this case, as in all cases of measuring quantities of the same denomination, the
establishment of an unvarying unit of measure is all-important. Hence, the less the unit is subject
to variation, so much the better does the standard of price fulfil its office. But only in so far as it
is itself a product of labour, and, therefore, potentially variable in value, can gold serve as a
measure of value. 6
It is, in the first place, quite clear that a change in the value of gold does not, in any way, affect its
function as a standard of price. No matter how this value varies, the proportions between the
values of different quantities of the metal remain constant. However great the fall in its value, 12
ounces of gold still have 12 times the value of 1 ounce; and in prices, the only thing considered is
the relation between different quantities of gold. Since, on the other hand, no rise or fall in the
value of an ounce of gold can alter its weight, no alteration can take place in the weight of its
aliquot parts. Thus gold always renders the same service as an invariable standard of price,
however much its value may vary.
In the second place, a change in the value of gold does not interfere with its functions as a
measure of value. The change affects all commodities simultaneously, and, therefore, caeteris
paribus, leaves their relative values inter se, unaltered, although those values are now expressed
in higher or lower gold-prices.
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Just as when we estimate the value of any commodity by a definite quantity of the use-value of
some other commodity, so in estimating the value of the former in gold, we assume nothing more
than that the production of a given quantity of gold costs, at the given period, a given amount of
labour. As regards the fluctuations of prices generally, they are subject to the laws of elementary
relative value investigated in a former chapter.
A general rise in the prices of commodities can result only, either from a rise in their values – the
value of money remaining constant – or from a fall in the value of money, the values of
commodities remaining constant. On the other hand, a general fall in prices can result only, either
from a fall in the values of commodities – the value of money remaining constant – or from a rise
in the value of money, the values of commodities remaining constant. It therefore by no means
follows, that a rise in the value of money necessarily implies a proportional fall in the prices of
commodities; or that a fall in the value of money implies a proportional rise in prices. Such
change of price holds good only in the case of commodities whose value remains constant. With
those, for example, whose value rises, simultaneously with, and proportionally to, that of money,
there is no alteration in price. And if their value rise either slower or faster than that of money, the
fall or rise in their prices will be determined by the difference between the change in their value
and that of money; and so on.
Let us now go back to the consideration of the price-form.
By degrees there arises a discrepancy between the current money-names of the various weights of
the precious metal figuring as money, and the actual weights which those names originally
represented. This discrepancy is the result of historical causes, among which the chief are: – (1)
The importation of foreign money into an imperfectly developed community. This happened in
Rome in its early days, where gold and silver coins circulated at first as foreign commodities. The
names of these foreign coins never coincide with those of the indigenous weights. (2) As wealth
increases, the less precious metal is thrust out by the more precious from its place as a measure of
value, copper by silver, silver by gold, however much this order of sequence may be in
contradiction with poetical chronology. 7The word pound, for instance, was the money-name
given to an actual pound weight of silver. When gold replaced silver as a measure of value, the
same name was applied according to the ratio between the values of silver and gold, to perhaps 115th of a pound of gold. The word pound, as a money-name, thus becomes differentiated from the
same word as a weight-name. 8 (3) The debasing of money carried on for centuries by kings and
princes to such an extent that, of the original weights of the coins, nothing in fact remained but
the names. 9
These historical causes convert the separation of the money-name from the weight-name into an
established habit with the community. Since the standard of money is on the one hand purely
conventional, and must on the other hand find general acceptance, it is in the end regulated by
law. A given weight of one of the precious metals, an ounce of gold, for instance, becomes
officially divided into aliquot parts, with legally bestowed names, such as pound, dollar, &c.
These aliquot parts, which thenceforth serve as units of money, are then subdivided into other
aliquot parts with legal names, such as shilling, penny, &c. 10 But, both before and after these
divisions are made, a definite weight of metal is the standard of metallic money. The sole
alteration consists in the subdivision and denomination.
The prices, or quantities of gold, into which the values of commodities are ideally changed, are
therefore now expressed in the names of coins, or in the legally valid names of the subdivisions of
the gold standard. Hence, instead of saying: A quarter of wheat is worth an ounce of gold; we say,
it is worth £3 17s. 10 1/2d. In this way commodities express by their prices how much they are
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worth, and money serves as money of account whenever it is a question of fixing the value of an
article in its money-form. 11
The name of a thing is something distinct from the qualities of that thing. I know nothing of a
man, by knowing that his name is Jacob. In the same way with regard to money, every trace of a
value-relation disappears in the names pound, dollar, franc, ducat, &c. The confusion caused by
attributing a hidden meaning to these cabalistic signs is all the greater, because these moneynames express both the values of commodities, and, at the same time, aliquot parts of the weight
of the metal that is the standard of money. 12 On the other hand, it is absolutely necessary that
value, in order that it may be distinguished from the varied bodily forms of commodities, should
assume this material and unmeaning, but, at the same time, purely social form. 13
Price is the money-name of the labour realised in a commodity. Hence the expression of the
equivalence of a commodity with the sum of money constituting its price, is a tautology14, just as
in general the expression of the relative value of a commodity is a statement of the equivalence of
two commodities. But although price, being the exponent of the magnitude of a commodity’s
value, is the exponent of its exchange-ratio with money, it does not follow that the exponent of
this exchange-ratio is necessarily the exponent of the magnitude of the commodity’s value.
Suppose two equal quantities of socially necessary labour to be respectively represented by 1
quarter of wheat and £2 (nearly 1/2 oz. of gold), £2 is the expression in money of the magnitude
of the value of the quarter of wheat, or is its price. If now circumstances allow of this price being
raised to £3, or compel it to be reduced to £1, then although £1 and £3 may be too small or too
great properly to express the magnitude of the wheat’s value; nevertheless they are its prices, for
they are, in the first place, the form under which its value appears, i.e., money; and in the second
place, the exponents of its exchange-ratio with money. If the conditions of production, in other
words, if the productive power of labour remain constant, the same amount of social labour-time
must, both before and after the change in price, be expended in the reproduction of a quarter of
wheat. This circumstance depends, neither on the will of the wheat producer, nor on that of the
owners of other commodities.
Magnitude of value expresses a relation of social production, it expresses the connexion that
necessarily exists between a certain article and the portion of the total labour-time of society
required to produce it. As soon as magnitude of value is converted into price, the above necessary
relation takes the shape of a more or less accidental exchange-ratio between a single commodity
and another, the money-commodity. But this exchange-ratio may express either the real
magnitude of that commodity’s value, or the quantity of gold deviating from that value, for
which, according to circumstances, it may be parted with. The possibility, therefore, of
quantitative incongruity between price and magnitude of value, or the deviation of the former
from the latter, is inherent in the price-form itself. This is no defect, but, on the contrary,
admirably adapts the price-form to a mode of production whose inherent laws impose themselves
only as the mean of apparently lawless irregularities that compensate one another.
The price-form, however, is not only compatible with the possibility of a quantitative incongruity
between magnitude of value and price, i.e., between the former and its expression in money, but it
may also conceal a qualitative inconsistency, so much so, that, although money is nothing but the
value-form of commodities, price ceases altogether to express value. Objects that in themselves
are no commodities, such as conscience, honour, &c., are capable of being offered for sale by
their holders, and of thus acquiring, through their price, the form of commodities. Hence an
object may have a price without having value. The price in that case is imaginary, like certain
quantities in mathematics. On the other hand, the imaginary price-form may sometimes conceal
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either a direct or indirect real value-relation; for instance, the price of uncultivated land, which is
without value, because no human labour has been incorporated in it.
Price, like relative value in general, expresses the value of a commodity (e.g., a ton of iron), by
stating that a given quantity of the equivalent (e.g., an ounce of gold), is directly exchangeable for
iron. But it by no means states the converse, that iron is directly exchangeable for gold. In order,
therefore, that a commodity may in practice act effectively as exchange-value, it must quit its
bodily shape, must transform itself from mere imaginary into real gold, although to the
commodity such transubstantiation may be more difficult than to the Hegelian “concept,” the
transition from “necessity” to “freedom,” or to a lobster the casting of his shell, or to Saint
Jerome the putting off of the old Adam. 15 Though a commodity may, side by side with its actual
form (iron, for instance), take in our imagination the form of gold, yet it cannot at one and the
same time actually be both iron and gold. To fix its price, it suffices to equate it to gold in
imagination. But to enable it to render to its owner the service of a universal equivalent, it must
be actually replaced by gold. If the owner of the iron were to go to the owner of some other
commodity offered for exchange, and were to refer him to the price of the iron as proof that it was
already money, he would get the same answer as St. Peter gave in heaven to Dante, when the
latter recited the creed –
“Assad bene e trascorsa
D’esta moneta gia la lega e’l peso,
Ma dimmi se tu l’hai nella tua borsa.”
A price therefore implies both that a commodity is exchangeable for money, and also that it must
be so exchanged. On the other hand, gold serves as an ideal measure of value, only because it has
already, in the process of exchange, established itself as the money-commodity. Under the ideal
measure of values there lurks the hard cash.

Section 2: The Medium of Circulation
A. The Metamorphosis of Commodities
We saw in a former chapter that the exchange of commodities implies contradictory and mutually
exclusive conditions. The differentiation of commodities into commodities and money does not
sweep away these inconsistencies, but develops a modus vivendi, a form in which they can exist
side by side. This is generally the way in which real contradictions are reconciled. For instance, it
is a contradiction to depict one body as constantly falling towards another, and as, at the same
time, constantly flying away from it. The ellipse is a form of motion which, while allowing this
contradiction to go on, at the same time reconciles it.
In so far as exchange is a process, by which commodities are transferred from hands in which
they are non-use-values, to hands in which they become use-values, it is a social circulation of
matter. The product of one form of useful labour replaces that of another. When once a
commodity has found a resting-place, where it can serve as a use-value, it falls out of the sphere
of exchange into that of consumption. But the former sphere alone interests us at present. We
have, therefore, now to consider exchange from a formal point of view; to investigate the change
of form or metamorphosis of commodities which effectuates the social circulation of matter.
The comprehension of this change of form is, as a rule, very imperfect. The cause of this
imperfection is, apart from indistinct notions of value itself, that every change of form in a
commodity results from the exchange of two commodities, an ordinary one and the moneycommodity. If we keep in view the material fact alone that a commodity has been exchanged for
gold, we overlook the very thing that we ought to observe – namely, what has happened to the
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form of the commodity. We overlook the facts that gold, when a mere commodity, is not money,
and that when other commodities express their prices in gold, this gold is but the money-form of
those commodities themselves.
Commodities, first of all, enter into the process of exchange just as they are. The process then
differentiates them into commodities and money, and thus produces an external opposition
corresponding to the internal opposition inherent in them, as being at once use-values and values.
Commodities as use-values now stand opposed to money as exchange-value. On the other hand,
both opposing sides are commodities, unities of use-value and value. But this unity of differences
manifests itself at two opposite poles, and at each pole in an opposite way. Being poles they are
as necessarily opposite as they are connected. On the one side of the equation we have an
ordinary commodity, which is in reality a use-value. Its value is expressed only ideally in its
price, by which it is equated to its opponent, the gold, as to the real embodiment of its value. On
the other hand, the gold, in its metallic reality, ranks as the embodiment of value, as money. Gold,
as gold, is exchange-value itself. As to its use-value, that has only an ideal existence, represented
by the series of expressions of relative value in which it stands face to face with all other
commodities, the sum of whose uses makes up the sum of the various uses of gold. These
antagonistic forms of commodities are the real forms in which the process of their exchange
moves and takes place.
Let us now accompany the owner of some commodity – say, our old friend the weaver of linen –
to the scene of action, the market. His 20 yards of linen has a definite price, £2. He exchanges it
for the £2, and then, like a man of the good old stamp that he is, he parts with the £2 for a family
Bible of the same price. The linen, which in his eyes is a mere commodity, a depository of value,
he alienates in exchange for gold, which is the linen’s value-form, and this form he again parts
with for another commodity, the Bible, which is destined to enter his house as an object of utility
and of edification to its inmates. The exchange becomes an accomplished fact by two
metamorphoses of opposite yet supplementary character – the conversion of the commodity into
money, and the re-conversion of the money into a commodity. 16 The two phases of this
metamorphosis are both of them distinct transactions of the weaver – selling, or the exchange of
the commodity for money; buying, or the exchange of the money for a commodity; and, the unity
of the two acts, selling in order to buy.
The result of the whole transaction, as regards the weaver, is this, that instead of being in
possession of the linen, he now has the Bible; instead of his original commodity, he now
possesses another of the same value but of different utility. In like manner he procures his other
means of subsistence and means of production. From his point of view, the whole process
effectuates nothing more than the exchange of the product of his labour for the product of some
one else’s, nothing more than an exchange of products.
The exchange of commodities is therefore accompanied by the following changes in their form.
Commodity – Money – Commodity.
C–––––– M ––––––C.
The result of the whole process is, so far as concerns the objects themselves, C – C, the exchange
of one commodity for another, the circulation of materialised social labour. When this result is
attained, the process is at an end.

C – M. First metamorphosis, or sale
The leap taken by value from the body of the commodity, into the body of the gold, is, as I have
elsewhere called it, the salto mortale of the commodity. If it falls short, then, although the
commodity itself is not harmed, its owner decidedly is. The social division of labour causes his
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labour to be as one-sided as his wants are many-sided. This is precisely the reason why the
product of his labour serves him solely as exchange-value. But it cannot acquire the properties of
a socially recognised universal equivalent, except by being converted into money. That money,
however, is in some one else’s pocket. In order to entice the money out of that pocket, our
friend’s commodity must, above all things, be a use-value to the owner of the money. For this, it
is necessary that the labour expended upon it, be of a kind that is socially useful, of a kind that
constitutes a branch of the social division of labour. But division of labour is a system of
production which has grown up spontaneously and continues to grow behind the backs of the
producers. The commodity to be exchanged may possibly be the product of some new kind of
labour, that pretends to satisfy newly arisen requirements, or even to give rise itself to new
requirements. A particular operation, though yesterday, perhaps, forming one out of the many
operations conducted by one producer in creating a given commodity, may to-day separate itself
from this connexion, may establish itself as an independent branch of labour and send its
incomplete product to market as an independent commodity. The circumstances may or may not
be ripe for such a separation. To-day the product satisfies a social want. Tomorrow the article
may, either altogether or partially, be superseded by some other appropriate product. Moreover,
although our weaver’s labour may be a recognised branch of the social division of labour, yet that
fact is by no means sufficient to guarantee the utility of his 20 yards of linen. If the community’s
want of linen, and such a want has a limit like every other want, should already be saturated by
the products of rival weavers, our friend’s product is superfluous, redundant, and consequently
useless. Although people do not look a gift-horse in the mouth, our friend does not frequent the
market for the purpose of making presents. But suppose his product turn out a real use-value, and
thereby attracts money? The question arises, how much will it attract? No doubt the answer is
already anticipated in the price of the article, in the exponent of the magnitude of its value. We
leave out of consideration here any accidental miscalculation of value by our friend, a mistake
that is soon rectified in the market. We suppose him to have spent on his product only that
amount of labour-time that is on an average socially necessary. The price then, is merely the
money-name of the quantity of social labour realised in his commodity. But without the leave,
and behind the back, of our weaver, the old-fashioned mode of weaving undergoes a change. The
labour-time that yesterday was without doubt socially necessary to the production of a yard of
linen, ceases to be so to-day, a fact which the owner of the money is only too eager to prove from
the prices quoted by our friend’s competitors. Unluckily for him, weavers are not few and far
between. Lastly, suppose that every piece of linen in the market contains no more labour-time
than is socially necessary. In spite of this, all these pieces taken as a whole, may have had
superfluous labour-time spent upon them. If the market cannot stomach the whole quantity at the
normal price of 2 shillings a yard, this proves that too great a portion of the total labour of the
community has been expended in the form of weaving. The effect is the same as if each
individual weaver had expended more labour-time upon his particular product than is socially
necessary. Here we may say, with the German proverb: caught together, hung together. All the
linen in the market counts but as one article of commerce, of which each piece is only an aliquot
part. And as a matter of fact, the value also of each single yard is but the materialised form of the
same definite and socially fixed quantity of homogeneous human labour. 17
We see then, commodities are in love with money, but “the course of true love never did run
smooth.” The quantitative division of labour is brought about in exactly the same spontaneous
and accidental manner as its qualitative division. The owners of commodities therefore find out,
that the same division of labour that turns them into independent private producers, also frees the
social process of production and the relations of the individual producers to each other within that
process, from all dependence on the will of those producers, and that the seeming mutual
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independence of the individuals is supplemented by a system of general and mutual dependence
through or by means of the products.
The division of labour converts the product of labour into a commodity, and thereby makes
necessary its further conversion into money. At the same time it also makes the accomplishment
of this transubstantiation quite accidental. Here, however, we are only concerned with the
phenomenon in its integrity, and we therefore assume its progress to be normal. Moreover, if the
conversion take place at all, that is, if the commodity be not absolutely unsaleable, its
metamorphosis does take place although the price realised may be abnormally above or below the
value.
The seller has his commodity replaced by gold, the buyer has his gold replaced by a commodity.
The fact which here stares us in the face is, that a commodity and gold, 20 yards of linen and £2,
have changed hands and places, in other words, that they have been exchanged. But for what is
the commodity exchanged? For the shape assumed by its own value, for the universal equivalent.
And for what is the gold exchanged? For a particular form of its own use-value. Why does gold
take the form of money face to face with the linen? Because the linen’s price of £2, its
denomination in money, has already equated the linen to gold in its character of money. A
commodity strips off its original commodity-form on being alienated, i.e., on the instant its usevalue actually attracts the gold, that before existed only ideally in its price. The realisation of a
commodity’s price, or of its ideal value-form, is therefore at the same time the realisation of the
ideal use-value of money; the conversion of a commodity into money, is the simultaneous
conversion of money into a commodity. The apparently single process is in reality a double one.
From the pole of the commodity-owner it is a sale, from the opposite pole of the money-owner, it
is a purchase. In other words, a sale is a purchase, C–M is also M–C. 18
Up to this point we have considered men in only one economic capacity, that of owners of
commodities, a capacity in which they appropriate the produce of the labour of others, by
alienating that of their own labour. Hence, for one commodity-owner to meet with another who
has money, it is necessary, either, that the product of the labour of the latter person, the buyer,
should be in itself money, should be gold, the material of which money consists, or that his
product should already have changed its skin and have stripped off its original form of a useful
object. In order that it may play the part of money, gold must of course enter the market at some
point or other. This point is to be found at the source of production of the metal, at which place
gold is bartered, as the immediate product of labour, for some other product of equal value. From
that moment it always represents the realised price of some commodity. 19 Apart from its
exchange for other commodities at the source of its production, gold, in whose-so-ever hands it
may be, is the transformed shape of some commodity alienated by its owner; it is the product of a
sale or of the first metamorphosis C–M. 20 Gold, as we saw, became ideal money, or a measure of
values, in consequence of all commodities measuring their values by it, and thus contrasting it
ideally with their natural shape as useful objects, and making it the shape of their value. It became
real money, by the general alienation of commodities, by actually changing places with their
natural forms as useful objects, and thus becoming in reality the embodiment of their values.
When they assume this money-shape, commodities strip off every trace of their natural use-value,
and of the particular kind of labour to which they owe their creation, in order to transform
themselves into the uniform, socially recognised incarnation of homogeneous human labour. We
cannot tell from the mere look of a piece of money, for what particular commodity it has been
exchanged. Under their money-form all commodities look alike. Hence, money may be dirt,
although dirt is not money. We will assume that the two gold pieces, in consideration of which
our weaver has parted with his linen, are the metamorphosed shape of a quarter of wheat. The

75

Chapter 3

sale of the linen, C–M, is at the same time its purchase, M–C. But the sale is the first act of a
process that ends with a transaction of an opposite nature, namely, the purchase of a Bible; the
purchase of the linen, on the other hand, ends a movement that began with a transaction of an
opposite nature, namely, with the sale of the wheat. C–M (linen–money), which is the first phase
of C–M–C (linen–money–Bible), is also M–C (money–linen), the last phase of another movement
C–M–C (wheat–money–linen). The first metamorphosis of one commodity, its transformation
from a commodity into money, is therefore also invariably the second metamorphosis of some
other commodity, the retransformation of the latter from money into a commodity. 21

M–C, or purchase.
The second and concluding metamorphosis of a commodity
Because money is the metamorphosed shape of all other commodities, the result of their general
alienation, for this reason it is alienable itself without restriction or condition. It reads all prices
backwards, and thus, so to say, depicts itself in the bodies of all other commodities, which offer
to it the material for the realisation of its own use-value. At the same time the prices, wooing
glances cast at money by commodities, define the limits of its convertibility, by pointing to its
quantity. Since every commodity, on becoming money, disappears as a commodity, it is
impossible to tell from the money itself, how it got into the hands of its possessor, or what article
has been changed into it. Non olet, from whatever source it may come. Representing on the one
hand a sold commodity, it represents on the other a commodity to be bought.22
M–C, a purchase, is, at the same time, C–M, a sale; the concluding metamorphosis of one
commodity is the first metamorphosis of another. With regard to our weaver, the life of his
commodity ends with the Bible, into which he has reconverted his £2. But suppose the seller of
the Bible turns the £2 set free by the weaver into brandy M–C, the concluding phase of C–M–C
(linen–money–Bible), is also C–M, the first phase of C–M–C (Bible–money–brandy). The
producer of a particular commodity has that one article alone to offer; this he sells very often in
large quantities, but his many and various wants compel him to split up the price realised, the sum
of money set free, into numerous purchases. Hence a sale leads to many purchases of various
articles. The concluding metamorphosis of a commodity thus constitutes an aggregation of first
metamorphoses of various other commodities.
If we now consider the completed metamorphosis of a commodity, as a whole, it appears in the
first place, that it is made up of two opposite and complementary movements, C–M and M–C.
These two antithetical transmutations of a commodity are brought about by two antithetical social
acts on the part of the owner, and these acts in their turn stamp the character of the economic
parts played by him. As the person who makes a sale, he is a seller; as the person who makes a
purchase, he is a buyer. But just as, upon every such transmutation of a commodity, its two forms,
commodity-form and money-form, exist simultaneously but at opposite poles, so every seller has
a buyer opposed to him, and every buyer a seller. While one particular commodity is going
through its two transmutations in succession, from a commodity into money and from money into
another commodity, the owner of the commodity changes in succession his part from that of
seller to that of buyer. These characters of seller and buyer are therefore not permanent, but attach
themselves in turns to the various persons engaged in the circulation of commodities.
The complete metamorphosis of a commodity, in its simplest form, implies four extremes, and
three dramatic personae. First, a commodity comes face to face with money; the latter is the form
taken by the value of the former, and exists in all its hard reality, in the pocket of the buyer. A
commodity-owner is thus brought into contact with a possessor of money. So soon, now, as the
commodity has been changed into money, the money becomes its transient equivalent-form, the
use-value of which equivalent-form is to be found in the bodies of other commodities. Money, the
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final term of the first transmutation, is at the same time the starting-point for the second. The
person who is a seller in the first transaction thus becomes a buyer in the second, in which a third
commodity-owner appears on the scene as a seller.23
The two phases, each inverse to the other, that make up the metamorphosis of a commodity
constitute together a circular movement, a circuit: commodity-form, stripping off of this form,
and return to the commodity-form. No doubt, the commodity appears here under two different
aspects. At the starting-point it is not a use-value to its owner; at the finishing point it is. So, too,
the money appears in the first phase as a solid crystal of value, a crystal into which the
commodity eagerly solidifies, and in the second, dissolves into the mere transient equivalent-form
destined to be replaced by a use-value.
The two metamorphoses constituting the circuit are at the same time two inverse partial
metamorphoses of two other commodities. One and the same commodity, the linen, opens the
series of its own metamorphoses, and completes the metamorphosis of another (the wheat). In the
first phase or sale, the linen plays these two parts in its own person. But, then, changed into gold,
it completes its own second and final metamorphosis, and helps at the same time to accomplish
the first metamorphosis of a third commodity. Hence the circuit made by one commodity in the
course of its metamorphoses is inextricably mixed up with the circuits of other commodities. The
total of all the different circuits constitutes the circulation of commodities.
The circulation of commodities differs from the direct exchange of products (barter), not only in
form, but in substance. Only consider the course of events. The weaver has, as a matter of fact,
exchanged his linen for a Bible, his own commodity for that of some one else. But this is true
only so far as he himself is concerned. The seller of the Bible, who prefers something to warm his
inside, no more thought of exchanging his Bible for linen than our weaver knew that wheat had
been exchanged for his linen. B’s commodity replaces that of A, but A and B do not mutually
exchange those commodities. It may, of course, happen that A and B make simultaneous
purchases, the one from the other; but such exceptional transactions are by no means the
necessary result of the general conditions of the circulation of commodities. We see here, on the
one hand, how the exchange of commodities breaks through all local and personal bounds
inseparable from direct barter, and develops the circulation of the products of social labour; and
on the other hand, how it develops a whole network of social relations spontaneous in their
growth and entirely beyond the control of the actors. It is only because the farmer has sold his
wheat that the weaver is enabled to sell his linen, only because the weaver has sold his linen that
our Hotspur is enabled to sell his Bible, and only because the latter has sold the water of
everlasting life that the distiller is enabled to sell his eau-de-vie, and so on.
The process of circulation, therefore, does not, like direct barter of products, become extinguished
upon the use-values changing places and hands. The money does not vanish on dropping out of
the circuit of the metamorphosis of a given commodity. It is constantly being precipitated into
new places in the arena of circulation vacated by other commodities. In the complete
metamorphosis of the linen, for example, linen – money – Bible, the linen first falls out of
circulation, and money steps into its place. Then the Bible falls out of circulation, and again
money takes its place. When one commodity replaces another, the money-commodity always
sticks to the hands of some third person. 24 Circulation sweats money from every pore.
Nothing can be more childish than the dogma, that because every sale is a purchase, and every
purchase a sale, therefore the circulation of commodities necessarily implies an equilibrium of
sales and purchases. If this means that the number of actual sales is equal to the number of
purchases, it is mere tautology. But its real purport is to prove that every seller brings his buyer to
market with him. Nothing of the kind. The sale and the purchase constitute one identical act, an
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exchange between a commodity-owner and an owner of money, between two persons as opposed
to each other as the two poles of a magnet. They form two distinct acts, of polar and opposite
characters, when performed by one single person. Hence the identity of sale and purchase implies
that the commodity is useless, if, on being thrown into the alchemistical retort of circulation, it
does not come out again in the shape of money; if, in other words, it cannot be sold by its owner,
and therefore be bought by the owner of the money. That identity further implies that the
exchange, if it does take place, constitutes a period of rest, an interval, long or short, in the life of
the commodity. Since the first metamorphosis of a commodity is at once a sale and a purchase, it
is also an independent process in itself. The purchaser has the commodity, the seller has the
money, i.e., a commodity ready to go into circulation at any time. No one can sell unless some
one else purchases. But no one is forthwith bound to purchase, because he has just sold.
Circulation bursts through all restrictions as to time, place, and individuals, imposed by direct
barter, and this it effects by splitting up, into the antithesis of a sale and a purchase, the direct
identity that in barter does exist between the alienation of one’s own and the acquisition of some
other man’s product. To say that these two independent and antithetical acts have an intrinsic
unity, are essentially one, is the same as to say that this intrinsic oneness expresses itself in an
external antithesis. If the interval in time between the two complementary phases of the complete
metamorphosis of a commodity become too great, if the split between the sale and the purchase
become too pronounced, the intimate connexion between them, their oneness, asserts itself by
producing – a crisis. The antithesis, use-value and value; the contradictions that private labour is
bound to manifest itself as direct social labour, that a particularised concrete kind of labour has to
pass for abstract human labour; the contradiction between the personification of objects and the
representation of persons by things; all these antitheses and contradictions, which are immanent
in commodities, assert themselves, and develop their modes of motion, in the antithetical phases
of the metamorphosis of a commodity. These modes therefore imply the possibility, and no more
than the possibility, of crises. The conversion of this mere possibility into a reality is the result of
a long series of relations, that, from our present standpoint of simple circulation, have as yet no
existence. 25

B. The currency 26 of money
The change of form, C–M–C, by which the circulation of the material products of labour is
brought about, requires that a given value in the shape of a commodity shall begin the process,
and shall, also in the shape of a commodity, end it. The movement of the commodity is therefore
a circuit. On the other hand, the form of this movement precludes a circuit from being made by
the money. The result is not the return of the money, but its continued removal further and further
away from its starting-point. So long as the seller sticks fast to his money, which is the
transformed shape of his commodity, that commodity is still in the first phase of its
metamorphosis, and has completed only half its course. But so soon as he completes the process,
so soon as he supplements his sale by a purchase, the money again leaves the hands of its
possessor. It is true that if the weaver, after buying the Bible, sell more linen, money comes back
into his hands. But this return is not owing to the circulation of the first 20 yards of linen; that
circulation resulted in the money getting into the hands of the seller of the Bible. The return of
money into the hands of the weaver is brought about only by the renewal or repetition of the
process of circulation with a fresh commodity, which renewed process ends with the same result
as its predecessor did. Hence the movement directly imparted to money by the circulation of
commodities takes the form of a constant motion away from its starting-point, of a course from
the hands of one commodity-owner into those of another. This course constitutes its currency
(cours de la monnaie).
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The currency of money is the constant and monotonous repetition of the same process. The
commodity is always in the hands of the seller; the money, as a means of purchase, always in the
hands of the buyer. And money serves as a means of purchase by realising the price of the
commodity. This realisation transfers the commodity from the seller to the buyer and removes the
money from the hands of the buyer into those of the seller, where it again goes through the same
process with another commodity. That this one-sided character of the money’s motion arises out
of the two-sided character of the commodity’s motion, is a circumstance that is veiled over. The
very nature of the circulation of commodities begets the opposite appearance. The first
metamorphosis of a commodity is visibly, not only the money’s movement, but also that of the
commodity itself; in the second metamorphosis, on the contrary, the movement appears to us as
the movement of the money alone. In the first phase of its circulation the commodity changes
place with the money. Thereupon the commodity, under its aspect of a useful object, falls out of
circulation into consumption. 27 In its stead we have its value-shape – the money. It then goes
through the second phase of its circulation, not under its own natural shape, but under the shape
of money. The continuity of the movement is therefore kept up by the money alone, and the same
movement that as regards the commodity consists of two processes of an antithetical character, is,
when considered as the movement of the money, always one and the same process, a continued
change of places with ever fresh commodities. Hence the result brought about by the circulation
of commodities, namely, the replacing of one commodity by another, takes the appearance of
having been effected not by means of the change of form of the commodities but rather by the
money acting as a medium of circulation, by an action that circulates commodities, to all
appearance motionless in themselves, and transfers them from hands in which they are non-usevalues, to hands in which they are use-values; and that in a direction constantly opposed to the
direction of the money. The latter is continually withdrawing commodities from circulation and
stepping into their places, and in thus way continually moving further and further from its
starting-point. Hence although the movement of the money is merely the expression of the
circulation of commodities, yet the contrary appears to be the actual fact, and the circulation of
commodities seems to be the result of the movement of the money. 28
Again, money functions as a means of circulation only because in it the values of commodities
have independent reality. Hence its movement, as the medium of circulation, is, in fact, merely
the movement of commodities while changing their forms. This fact must therefore make itself
plainly visible in the currency of money. Thus the linen for instance, first of all changes its
commodity-form into its money-form. The second term of its first metamorphosis, C–M, the
money form, then becomes the first term of its final metamorphosis, M–C, its re-conversion into
the Bible. But each of these two changes of form is accomplished by an exchange between
commodity and money, by their reciprocal displacement. The same pieces of coin come into the
seller’s hand as the alienated form of the commodity and leave it as the absolutely alienable form
of the commodity. They are displaced twice. The first metamorphosis of the linen puts these coins
into the weaver’s pocket, the second draws them out of it. The two inverse changes undergone by
the same commodity are reflected in the displacement, twice repeated, but in opposite directions,
of the same pieces of coin.
If, on the contrary, only one phase of the metamorphosis is gone through, if there are only sales or
only purchases, then a given piece of money changes its place only once. Its second change of
place always expresses the second metamorphosis of the commodity, its re-conversion from
money. The frequent repetition of the displacement of the same coins reflects not only the series
of metamorphoses that a single commodity has gone through, but also the intertwining of the
innumerable metamorphoses in the world of commodities in general. It is a matter of course, that
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all this is applicable to the simple circulation of commodities alone, the only form that we are
now considering.
Every commodity, when it first steps into circulation, and undergoes its first change of form, does
so only to fall out of circulation again and to be replaced by other commodities. Money, on the
contrary, as the medium of circulation, keeps continually within the sphere of circulation, and
moves about in it. The question therefore arises, how much money this sphere constantly
absorbs?
In a given country there take place every day at the same time, but in different localities,
numerous one-sided metamorphoses of commodities, or, in other words, numerous sales and
numerous purchases. The commodities are equated beforehand in imagination, by their prices, to
definite quantities of money. And since, in the form of circulation now under consideration,
money and commodities always come bodily face to face, one at the positive pole of purchase,
the other at the negative pole of sale, it is clear that the amount of the means of circulation
required, is determined beforehand by the sum of the prices of all these commodities. As a matter
of fact, the money in reality represents the quantity or sum of gold ideally expressed beforehand
by the sum of the prices of the commodities. The equality of these two sums is therefore selfevident. We know, however, that, the values of commodities remaining constant, their prices vary
with the value of gold (the material of money), rising in proportion as it falls, and falling in
proportion as it rises. Now if, in consequence of such a rise or fall in the value of gold, the sum of
the prices of commodities fall or rise, the quantity of money in currency must fall or rise to the
same extent. The change in the quantity of the circulating medium is, in this case, it is true,
caused by the money itself, yet not in virtue of its function as a medium of circulation, but of its
function as a measure of value. First, the price of the commodities varies inversely as the value of
the money, and then the quantity of the medium of circulation varies directly as the price of the
commodities. Exactly the same thing would happen if, for instance, instead of the value of gold
falling, gold were replaced by silver as the measure of value, or if, instead of the value of silver
rising, gold were to thrust silver out from being the measure of value. In the one case, more silver
would be current than gold was before; in the other case, less gold would be current than silver
was before. In each case the value of the material of money, i.e., the value of the commodity that
serves as the measure of value, would have undergone a change, and therefore so, too, would the
prices of commodities which express their values in money, and so, too, would the quantity of
money current whose function it is to realise those prices. We have already seen, that the sphere
of circulation has an opening through which gold (or the material of money generally) enters into
it as a commodity with a given value. Hence, when money enters on its functions as a measure of
value, when it expresses prices, its value is already determined. If now its value fall, this fact is
first evidenced by a change in the prices of those commodities that are directly bartered for the
precious metals at the sources of their production. The greater part of all other commodities,
especially in the imperfectly developed stages of civil society, will continue for a long time to be
estimated by the former antiquated and illusory value of the measure of value. Nevertheless, one
commodity infects another through their common value-relation, so that their prices, expressed in
gold or in silver, gradually settle down into the proportions determined by their comparative
values, until finally the values of all commodities are estimated in terms of the new value of the
metal that constitutes money. This process is accompanied by the continued increase in the
quantity of the precious metals, an increase caused by their streaming in to replace the articles
directly bartered for them at their sources of production. In proportion therefore as commodities
in general acquire their true prices, in proportion as their values become estimated according to
the fallen value of the precious metal, in the same proportion the quantity of that metal necessary
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for realising those new prices is provided beforehand. A one-sided observation of the results that
followed upon the discovery of fresh supplies of gold and silver, led some economists in the 17th,
and particularly in the 18th century, to the false conclusion, that the prices of commodities had
gone up in consequence of the increased quantity of gold and silver serving as means of
circulation. Henceforth we shall consider the value of gold to be given, as, in fact, it is
momentarily, whenever we estimate the price of a commodity.
On this supposition then, the quantity of the medium of circulation is determined by the sum of
the prices that have to be realised. If now we further suppose the price of each commodity to be
given, the sum of the prices clearly depends on the mass of commodities in circulation. It requires
but little racking of brains to comprehend that if one quarter of wheat costs £2,100 quarters will
cost £200, 200 quarters £400, and so on, that consequently the quantity of money that changes
place with the wheat, when sold, must increase with the quantity of that wheat.
If the mass of commodities remain constant, the quantity of circulating money varies with the
fluctuations in the prices of those commodities. It increases and diminishes because the sum of
the prices increases or diminishes in consequence of the change of price. To produce this effect, it
is by no means requisite that the prices of all commodities should rise or fall simultaneously. A
rise or a fall in the prices of a number of leading articles, is sufficient in the one case to increase,
in the other to diminish, the sum of the prices of all commodities, and, therefore, to put more or
less money in circulation. Whether the change in the price correspond to an actual change of
value in the commodities, or whether it be the result of mere fluctuations in market-prices, the
effect on the quantity of the medium of circulation remains the same. Suppose the following
articles to be sold or partially metamorphosed simultaneously in different localities: say, one
quarter of wheat, 20 yards of linen, one Bible, and 4 gallons of brandy. If the price of each article
be £2, and the sum of the prices to be realised be consequently £8, it follows that £8 in money
must go into circulation. If, on the other hand, these same articles are links in the following chain
of metamorphoses: 1 quarter of wheat – £2 – 20 yards of linen – £2 – 1 Bible – £2 – 4 gallons of
brandy – £2, a chain that is already well known to us, in that case the £2 cause the different
commodities to circulate one after the other, and after realising their prices successively, and
therefore the sum of those prices, £8, they come to rest at last in the pocket of the distiller. The £2
thus make four moves. This repeated change of place of the same pieces of money corresponds to
the double change in form of the commodities, to their motion in opposite directions through two
stages of circulation. and to the interlacing of the metamorphoses of different commodities.29
These antithetic and complementary phases, of which the process of metamorphosis consists, are
gone through, not simultaneously, but successively. Time is therefore required for the completion
of the series. Hence the velocity of the currency of money is measured by the number of moves
made by a given piece of money in a given time. Suppose the circulation of the 4 articles takes a
day. The sum of the prices to be realised in the day is £8, the number of moves of the two pieces
of money is four, and the quantity of money circulating is £2. Hence, for a given interval of time
during the process of circulation, we have the following relation: the quantity of money
functioning as the circulating medium is equal to the sum of the prices of the commodities
divided by the number of moves made by coins of the same denomination. This law holds
generally.
The total circulation of commodities in a given country during a given period is made up on the
one hand of numerous isolated and simultaneous partial metamorphoses, sales which are at the
same time purchases, in which each coin changes its place only once, or makes only one move;
on the other hand, of numerous distinct series of metamorphoses partly running side by side, and
partly coalescing with each other, in each of which series each coin makes a number of moves,
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the number being greater or less according to circumstances. The total number of moves made by
all the circulating coins of one denomination being given, we can arrive at the average number of
moves made by a single coin of that denomination, or at the average velocity of the currency of
money. The quantity of money thrown into the circulation at the beginning of each day is of
course determined by the sum of the prices of all the commodities circulating simultaneously side
by side. But once in circulation, coins are, so to say, made responsible for one another. If the one
increase its velocity, the other either retards its own, or altogether falls out of circulation; for the
circulation can absorb only such a quantity of gold as when multiplied by the mean number of
moves made by one single coin or element, is equal to the sum of the prices to be realised. Hence
if the number of moves made by the separate pieces increase, the total number of those pieces in
circulation diminishes. If the number of the moves diminish, the total number of pieces increases.
Since the quantity of money capable of being absorbed by the circulation is given for a given
mean velocity of currency, all that is necessary in order to abstract a given number of sovereigns
from the circulation is to throw the same number of one-pound notes into it, a trick well known to
all bankers.
Just as the currency of money, generally considered, is but a reflex of the circulation of
commodities, or of the antithetical metamorphoses they undergo, so, too, the velocity of that
currency reflects the rapidity with which commodities change their forms, the continued
interlacing of one series of metamorphoses with another, the hurried social interchange of matter,
the rapid disappearance of commodities from the sphere of circulation, and the equally rapid
substitution of fresh ones in their places. Hence, in the velocity of the currency we have the fluent
unity of the antithetical and complementary phases, the unity of the conversion of the useful
aspect of commodities into their value-aspect, and their re-conversion from the latter aspect to the
former, or the unity of the two processes of sale and purchase. On the other hand, the retardation
of the currency reflects the separation of these two processes into isolated antithetical phases,
reflects the stagnation in the change of form, and therefore, in the social interchange of matter.
The circulation itself, of course, gives no clue to the origin of this stagnation; it merely puts in
evidence the phenomenon itself. The general public, who, simultaneously with the retardation of
the currency, see money appear and disappear less frequently at the periphery of circulation,
naturally attribute this retardation to a quantitative deficiency in the circulating medium. 30
The total quantity of money functioning during a given period as the circulating medium, is
determined, on the one hand, by the sum of the prices of the circulating commodities, and on the
other hand, by the rapidity with which the antithetical phases of the metamorphoses follow one
another. On this rapidity depends what proportion of the sum of the prices can, on the average, be
realised by each single coin. But the sum of the prices of the circulating commodities depends on
the quantity, as well as on the prices, of the commodities. These three factors, however, state of
prices, quantity of circulating commodities, and velocity of money-currency, are all variable.
Hence, the sum of the prices to be realised, and consequently the quantity of the circulating
medium depending on that sum, will vary with the numerous variations of these three factors in
combination. Of these variations we shall consider those alone that have been the most important
in the history of prices.
While prices remain constant, the quantity of the circulating medium may increase owing to the
number of circulating commodities increasing, or to the velocity of currency decreasing, or to a
combination of the two. On the other hand the quantity of the circulating medium may decrease
with a decreasing number of commodities, or with an increasing rapidity of their circulation.
With a general rise in the prices of commodities, the quantity of the circulating medium will
remain constant, provided the number of commodities in circulation decrease proportionally to
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the increase in their prices, or provided the velocity of currency increase at the same rate as prices
rise, the number of commodities in circulation remaining constant. The quantity of the circulating
medium may decrease, owing to the number of commodities decreasing more rapidly; or to the
velocity of currency increasing more rapidly, than prices rise.
With a general fall in the prices of commodities, the quantity of the circulating medium will
remain constant, provided the number of commodities increase proportionally to their fall in
price, or provided the velocity of currency decrease in the same proportion. The quantity of the
circulating medium will increase, provided the number of commodities increase quicker, or the
rapidity of circulation decrease quicker, than the prices fall.
The variations of the different factors may mutually compensate each other, so that
notwithstanding their continued instability, the sum of the prices to be realised and the quantity of
money in circulation remain constant; consequently, we find, especially if we take long periods
into consideration, that the deviations from the average level, of the quantity of money current in
any country, are much smaller than we should at first sight expect, apart of course from excessive
perturbations periodically arising from industrial and commercial crises, or less frequently, from
fluctuations in the value of money.
The law, that the quantity of the circulating medium is determined by the sum of the prices of the
commodities circulating, and the average velocity of currency31 may also be stated as follows:
given the sum of the values of commodities, and the average rapidity of their metamorphoses, the
quantity of precious metal current as money depends on the value of that precious metal. The
erroneous opinion that it is, on the contrary, prices that are determined by the quantity of the
circulating medium, and that the latter depends on the quantity of the precious metals in a
country; 32 this opinion was based by those who first held it, on the absurd hypothesis that
commodities are without a price, and money without a value, when they first enter into
circulation, and that, once in the circulation, an aliquot part of the medley of commodities is
exchanged for an aliquot part of the heap of precious metals.33

C. Coin and symbols of value
That money takes the shape of coin, springs from its function as the circulating medium. The
weight of gold represented in imagination by the prices or money-names of commodities, must
confront those commodities, within the circulation, in the shape of coins or pieces of gold of a
given denomination. Coining, like the establishment of a standard of prices, is the business of the
State. The different national uniforms worn at home by gold and silver as coins, and doffed again
in the market of the world, indicate the separation between the internal or national spheres of the
circulation of commodities, and their universal sphere.
The only difference, therefore, between coin and bullion, is one of shape, and gold can at any
time pass from one form to the other. 34But no sooner does coin leave the mint, than it
immediately finds itself on the high-road to the melting pot. During their currency, coins wear
away, some more, others less. Name and substance, nominal weight and real weight, begin their
process of separation. Coins of the same denomination become different in value, because they
are different in weight. The weight of gold fixed upon as the standard of prices, deviates from the
weight that serves as the circulating medium, and the latter thereby ceases any longer to be a real
equivalent of the commodities whose prices it realises. The history of coinage during the middle
ages and down into the 18th century, records the ever renewed confusion arising from this cause.
The natural tendency of circulation to convert coins into a mere semblance of what they profess
to be, into a symbol of the weight of metal they are officially supposed to contain, is recognised
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by modern legislation, which fixes the loss of weight sufficient to demonetise a gold coin, or to
make it no longer legal tender.
The fact that the currency of coins itself effects a separation between their nominal and their real
weight, creating a distinction between them as mere pieces of metal on the one hand, and as coins
with a definite function on the other – this fact implies the latent possibility of replacing metallic
coins by tokens of some other material, by symbols serving the same purposes as coins. The
practical difficulties in the way of coining extremely minute quantities of gold or silver, and the
circumstance that at first the less precious metal is used as a measure of value instead of the-more
precious, copper instead of silver, silver instead of gold, and that the less precious circulates as
money until dethroned by the more precious – all these facts explain the parts historically played
by silver and copper tokens as substitutes for gold coins. Silver and copper tokens take the place
of gold in those regions of the circulation where coins pass from hand to hand most rapidly, and
are subject to the maximum amount of wear and tear. This occurs where sales and purchases on a
very small scale are continually happening. In order to prevent these satellites from establishing
themselves permanently in the place of gold, positive enactments determine the extent to which
they must be compulsorily received as payment instead of gold. The particular tracks pursued by
the different species of coin in currency, run naturally into each other. The tokens keep company
with gold, to pay fractional parts of the smallest gold coin; gold is, on the one hand, constantly
pouring into retail circulation, and on the other hand is as constantly being thrown out again by
being changed into tokens. 35
The weight of metal in the silver and copper tokens is arbitrarily fixed by law. When in currency,
they wear away even more rapidly than gold coins. Hence their functions are totally independent
of their weight, and consequently of all value. The function of gold as coin becomes completely
independent of the metallic value of that gold. Therefore things that are relatively without value,
such as paper notes, can serve as coins in its place. This purely symbolic character is to a certain
extent masked in metal tokens. In paper money it stands out plainly. In fact, ce n’est que le
premier pas qui coûte.
We allude here only to inconvertible paper money issued by the State and having compulsory
circulation. It has its immediate origin in the metallic currency. Money based upon credit implies
on the other hand conditions, which, from our standpoint of the simple circulation of
commodities, are as yet totally unknown to us. But we may affirm this much, that just as true
paper money takes its rise in the function of money as the circulating medium, so money based
upon credit takes root spontaneously in the function of money as the means of payment. 36
The State puts in circulation bits of paper on which their various denominations, say £1, £5, &c.,
are printed. In so far as they actually take the place of gold to the same amount, their movement is
subject to the laws that regulate the currency of money itself. A law peculiar to the circulation of
paper money can spring up only from the proportion in which that paper money represents gold.
Such a law exists; stated simply, it is as follows: the issue of paper money must not exceed in
amount the gold (or silver as the case may be) which would actually circulate if not replaced by
symbols. Now the quantity of gold which the circulation can absorb, constantly fluctuates about a
given level. Still, the mass of the circulating medium in a given country never sinks below a
certain minimum easily ascertained by actual experience. The fact that this minimum mass
continually undergoes changes in its constituent parts, or that the pieces of gold of which it
consists are being constantly replaced by fresh ones, causes of course no change either in its
amount or in the continuity of its circulation. It can therefore be replaced by paper symbols. If, on
the other hand, all the conduits of circulation were to-day filled with paper money to the full
extent of their capacity for absorbing money, they might to-morrow be overflowing in

84

Chapter 3

consequence of a fluctuation in the circulation of commodities. There would no longer be any
standard. If the paper money exceed its proper limit, which is the amount in gold coins of the like
denomination that can actually be current, it would, apart from the danger of falling into general
disrepute, represent only that quantity of gold, which, in accordance with the laws of the
circulation of commodities, is required, and is alone capable of being represented by paper. If the
quantity of paper money issued be double what it ought to be, then, as a matter of fact, £1 would
be the money-name not of 1/4 of an ounce, but of 1/8 of an ounce of gold. The effect would be
the same as if an alteration had taken place in the function of gold as a standard of prices. Those
values that were previously expressed by the price of £1 would now be expressed by the price of
£2.
Paper money is a token representing gold or money. The relation between it and the values of
commodities is this, that the latter are ideally expressed in the same quantities of gold that are
symbolically represented by the paper. Only in so far as paper money represents gold, which like
all other commodities has value, is it a symbol of value. 37
Finally, some one may ask why gold is capable of being replaced by tokens that have no value?
But, as we have already seen, it is capable of being so replaced only in so far as it functions
exclusively as coin, or as the circulating medium, and as nothing else. Now, money has other
functions besides this one, and the isolated function of serving as the mere circulating medium is
not necessarily the only one attached to gold coin, although this is the case with those abraded
coins that continue to circulate. Each piece of money is a mere coin, or means of circulation, only
so long as it actually circulates. But this is just the case with that minimum mass of gold, which is
capable of being replaced by paper money. That mass remains constantly within the sphere of
circulation, continually functions as a circulating medium, and exists exclusively for that purpose.
Its movement therefore represents nothing but the continued alternation of the inverse phases of
the metamorphosis C–M–C, phases in which commodities confront their value-forms, only to
disappear again immediately. The independent existence of the exchange-value of a commodity is
here a transient apparition, by means of which the commodity is immediately replaced by another
commodity. Hence, in this process which continually makes money pass from hand to hand, the
mere symbolical existence of money suffices. Its functional existence absorbs, so to say, its
material existence. Being a transient and objective reflex of the prices of commodities, it serves
only as a symbol of itself, and is therefore capable of being replaced by a token.38 One thing is,
however, requisite; this token must have an objective social validity of its own, and this the paper
symbol acquires by its forced currency. This compulsory action of the State can take effect only
within that inner sphere of circulation which is coterminous with the territories of the community,
but it is also only within that sphere that money completely responds to its function of being the
circulating medium, or becomes coin.

Section 3: Money
The commodity that functions as a measure of value, and, either in its own person or by a
representative, as the medium of circulation, is money. Gold (or silver) is therefore money. It
functions as money, on the one hand, when it has to be present in its own golden person. It is then
the money-commodity, neither merely ideal, as in its function of a measure of value, nor capable
of being represented, as in its function of circulating medium. On the other hand, it also functions
as money, when by virtue of its function, whether that function be performed in person or by
representative, it congeals into the sole form of value, the only adequate form of existence of
exchange-value, in opposition to use-value, represented by all other commodities.
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A. Hoarding
The continual movement in circuits of the two antithetical metamorphoses of commodities, or the
never ceasing alternation of sale and purchase, is reflected in the restless currency of money, or in
the function that money performs of a perpetuum mobile of circulation. But so soon as the series
of metamorphoses is interrupted, so soon as sales are not supplemented by subsequent purchases,
money ceases to be mobilised; it is transformed, as Boisguillebert says, from “meuble” into
“immeuble,” from movable into immovable, from coin into money.
With the very earliest development of the circulation of commodities, there is also developed the
necessity, and the passionate desire, to hold fast the product of the first metamorphosis. This
product is the transformed shape of the commodity, or its gold-chrysalis. 39 Commodities are thus
sold not for the purpose of buying others, but in order to replace their commodity-form by their
money-form. From being the mere means of effecting the circulation of commodities, this change
of form becomes the end and aim. The changed form of the commodity is thus prevented from
functioning as its unconditionally alienable form, or as its merely transient money-form. The
money becomes petrified into a hoard, and the seller becomes a hoarder of money.
In the early stages of the circulation of commodities, it is the surplus use-values alone that are
converted into money. Gold and silver thus become of themselves social expressions for
superfluity or wealth. This naive form of hoarding becomes perpetuated in those communities in
which the traditional mode of production is carried on for the supply of a fixed and limited circle
of home wants. It is thus with the people of Asia, and particularly of the East Indies. Vanderlint,
who fancies that the prices of commodities in a country are determined by the quantity of gold
and silver to be found in it, asks himself why Indian commodities are so cheap. Answer: Because
the Hindus bury their money. From 1602 to 1734, he remarks, they buried 150 millions of pounds
sterling of silver, which originally came from America to Europe.40 In the 10 years from 1856 to
1866, England exported to India and China £120,000,000 in silver, which had been received in
exchange for Australian gold. Most of the silver exported to China makes its way to India.
As the production of commodities further develops, every producer of commodities is compelled
to make sure of the nexus rerum or the social pledge. 41 His wants are constantly making
themselves felt, and necessitate the continual purchase of other people’s commodities, while the
production and sale of his own goods require time, and depend upon circumstances. In order then
to be able to buy without selling, he must have sold previously without buying. This operation,
conducted on a general scale, appears to imply a contradiction. But the precious metals at the
sources of their production are directly exchanged for other commodities. And here we have sales
(by the owners of commodities) without purchases (by the owners of gold or silver). 42And
subsequent sales, by other producers, unfollowed by purchases, merely bring about the
distribution of the newly produced precious metals among all the owners of commodities. In this
way, all along the line of exchange, hoards of gold and silver of varied extent are accumulated.
With the possibility of holding and storing up exchange-value in the shape of a particular
commodity, arises also the greed for gold. Along with the extension of circulation, increases the
power of money, that absolutely social form of wealth ever ready for use. “Gold is a wonderful
thing! Whoever possesses it is lord of all he wants. By means of gold one can even get souls into
Paradise.” (Columbus in his letter from Jamaica, 1503.) Since gold does not disclose what has
been transformed into it, everything, commodity or not, is convertible into gold. Everything
becomes saleable and buyable. The circulation becomes the great social retort into which
everything is thrown, to come out again as a gold-crystal. Not even are the bones of saints, and
still less are more delicate res sacrosanctae, extra commercium hominum able to withstand this
alchemy. 43 Just as every qualitative difference between commodities is extinguished in money,
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so money, on its side, like the radical leveller that it is, does away with all distinctions.43a But
money itself is a commodity, an external object, capable of becoming the private property of any
individual. Thus social power becomes the private power of private persons. The ancients
therefore denounced money as subversive of the economic and moral order of things. 43b Modern
society, which, soon after its birth, pulled Plutus by the hair of his head from the bowels of the
earth, 44 greets gold as its Holy Grail, as the glittering incarnation of the very principle of its own
life.
A commodity, in its capacity of a use-value, satisfies a particular want, and is a particular element
of material wealth. But the value of a commodity measures the degree of its attraction for all
other elements of material wealth, and therefore measures the social wealth of its owner. To a
barbarian owner of commodities, and even to a West-European peasant, value is the same as
value-form, and therefore, to him the increase in his hoard of gold and silver is an increase in
value. It is true that the value of money varies, at one time in consequence of a variation in its
own value, at another, in consequence of a change in the values of commodities. But this, on the
one hand, does not prevent 200 ounces of gold from still containing more value than 100 ounces,
nor, on the other hand, does it hinder the actual metallic form of this article from continuing to be
the universal equivalent form of all other commodities, and the immediate social incarnation of
all human labour. The desire after hoarding is in its very nature unsatiable. In its qualitative
aspect, or formally considered, money has no bounds to its efficacy, i.e., it is the universal
representative of material wealth, because it is directly convertible into any other commodity.
But, at the same time, every actual sum of money is limited in amount, and, therefore, as a means
of purchasing, has only a limited efficacy. This antagonism between the quantitative limits of
money and its qualitative boundlessness, continually acts as a spur to the hoarder in his Sisyphuslike labour of accumulating. It is with him as it is with a conqueror who sees in every new
country annexed, only a new boundary.
In order that gold may be held as money, and made to form a hoard, it must be prevented from
circulating, or from transforming itself into a means of enjoyment. The hoarder, therefore, makes
a sacrifice of the lusts of the flesh to his gold fetish. He acts in earnest up to the Gospel of
abstention. On the other hand, he can withdraw from circulation no more than what he has thrown
into it in the shape of commodities. The more he produces, the more he is able to sell. Hard work,
saving, and avarice are, therefore, his three cardinal virtues, and to sell much and buy little the
sum of his political economy. 45
By the side of the gross form of a hoard, we find also its aesthetic form in the possession of gold
and silver articles. This grows with the wealth of civil society. “Soyons riches ou paraissons
riches” (Diderot).
In this way there is created, on the one hand, a constantly extending market for gold and silver,
unconnected with their functions as money, and, on the other hand, a latent source of supply, to
which recourse is had principally in times of crisis and social disturbance.
Hoarding serves various purposes in the economy of the metallic circulation. Its first function
arises out of the conditions to which the currency of gold and silver coins is subject. We have
seen how, along with the continual fluctuations in the extent and rapidity of the circulation of
commodities and in their prices, the quantity of money current unceasingly ebbs and flows. This
mass must, therefore, be capable of expansion and contraction. At one time money must be
attracted in order to act as circulating coin, at another, circulating coin must be repelled in order
to act again as more or less stagnant money. In order that the mass of money, actually current,
may constantly saturate the absorbing power of the circulation, it is necessary that the quantity of
gold and silver in a country be greater than the quantity required to function as coin. This
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condition is fulfilled by money taking the form of hoards. These reserves serve as conduits for the
supply or withdrawal of money to or from the circulation, which in this way never overflows its
banks. 46

B. Means of Payment
In the simple form of the circulation of commodities hitherto considered, we found a given value
always presented to us in a double shape, as a commodity at one pole, as money at the opposite
pole. The owners of commodities came therefore into contact as the respective representatives of
what were already equivalents. But with the development of circulation, conditions arise under
which the alienation of commodities becomes separated, by an interval of time, from the
realisation of their prices. It will be sufficient to indicate the most simple of these conditions. One
sort of article requires a longer, another a shorter time for its production. Again, the production of
different commodities depends on different seasons of the year. One sort of commodity may be
born on its own market place, another has to make a long journey to market. Commodity-owner
No. 1, may therefore be ready to sell, before No. 2 is ready to buy. When the same transactions
are continually repeated between the same persons, the conditions of sale are regulated in
accordance with the conditions of production. On the other hand, the use of a given commodity,
of a house, for instance, is sold (in common parlance, let) for a definite period. Here, it is only at
the end of the term that the buyer has actually received the use-value of the commodity. He
therefore buys it before he pays for it. The vendor sells an existing commodity, the purchaser
buys as the mere representative of money, or rather of future money. The vendor becomes a
creditor, the purchaser becomes a debtor. Since the metamorphosis of commodities, or the
development of their value-form, appears here under a new aspect, money also acquires a fresh
function; it becomes the means of payment.
The character of creditor, or of debtor, results here from the simple circulation. The change in the
form of that circulation stamps buyer and seller with this new die. At first, therefore, these new
parts are just as transient and alternating as those of seller and buyer, and are in turns played by
the same actors. But the opposition is not nearly so pleasant, and is far more capable of
crystallisation. 47 The same characters can, however, be assumed independently of the circulation
of commodities. The class-struggles of the ancient world took the form chiefly of a contest
between debtors and creditors, which in Rome ended in the ruin of the plebeian debtors. They
were displaced by slaves. In the middle ages the contest ended with the ruin of the feudal debtors,
who lost their political power together with the economic basis on which it was established.
Nevertheless, the money relation of debtor and creditor that existed at these two periods reflected
only the deeper-lying antagonism between the general economic conditions of existence of the
classes in question.
Let us return to the circulation of commodities. The appearance of the two equivalents,
commodities and money, at the two poles of the process of sale, has ceased to be simultaneous.
The money functions now, first as a measure of value in the determination of the price of the
commodity sold; the price fixed by the contract measures the obligation of the debtor, or the sum
of money that he has to pay at a fixed date. Secondly, it serves as an ideal means of purchase.
Although existing only in the promise of the buyer to pay, it causes the commodity to change
hands. It is not before the day fixed for payment that the means of payment actually steps into
circulation, leaves the hand of the buyer for that of the seller. The circulating medium was
transformed into a hoard, because the process stopped short after the first phase, because the
converted shape of the commodity, viz., the money, was withdrawn from circulation. The means
of payment enters the circulation, but only after the commodity has left it. The money is no
longer the means that brings about the process. It only brings it to a close, by stepping in as the
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absolute form of existence of exchange-value, or as the universal commodity. The seller turned
his commodity into money, in order thereby to satisfy some want, the hoarder did the same in
order to keep his commodity in its money-shape, and the debtor in order to be able to pay; if he
do not pay, his goods will be sold by the sheriff. The value-form of commodities, money, is
therefore now the end and aim of a sale, and that owing to a social necessity springing out of the
process of circulation itself.
The buyer converts money back into commodities before he has turned commodities into money:
in other words, he achieves the second metamorphosis of commodities before the first. The
seller’s commodity circulates, and realises its price, but only in the shape of a legal claim upon
money. It is converted into a use-value before it has been converted into money. The completion
of its first metamorphosis follows only at a later period. 48
The obligations falling due within a given period, represent the sum of the prices of the
commodities, the sale of which gave rise to those obligations. The quantity of gold necessary to
realise this sum, depends, in the first instance, on the rapidity of currency of the means of
payment. That quantity is conditioned by two circumstances: first the relations between debtors
and creditors form a sort of chain, in such a way that A, when he receives money from his debtor
B, straightway hands it over to C his creditor, and so on; the second circumstance is the length of
the intervals between the different due-days of the obligations. The continuous chain of
payments, or retarded first metamorphoses, is essentially different from that interlacing of the
series of metamorphoses which we considered on a former page. By the currency of the
circulating medium, the connexion between buyers and sellers, is not merely expressed. This
connexion is originated by, and exists in, the circulation alone. Contrariwise, the movement of the
means of payment expresses a social relation that was in existence long before.
The fact that a number of sales take place simultaneously, and side by side, limits the extent to
which coin can be replaced by the rapidity of currency. On the other hand, this fact is a new lever
in economising the means of payment. In proportion as payments are concentrated at one spot,
special institutions and methods are developed for their liquidation. Such in the middle ages were
the virements at Lyons. The debts due to A from B, to B from C, to C from A, and so on, have
only to be confronted with each other, in order to annul each other to a certain extent like positive
and negative quantities. There thus remains only a single balance to pay. The greater the amount
of the payments concentrated, the less is this balance relatively to that amount, and the less is the
mass of the means of payment in circulation.
The function of money as the means of payment implies a contradiction without a terminus
medius. In so far as the payments balance one another, money functions only ideally as money of
account, as a measure of value. In so far as actual payments have to be made, money does not
serve as a circulating medium, as a mere transient agent in the interchange of products, but as the
individual incarnation of social labour, as the independent form of existence of exchange-value,
as the universal commodity. This contradiction comes to a head in those phases of industrial and
commercial crises which are known as monetary crises. 49 Such a crisis occurs only where the
ever-lengthening chain of payments, and an artificial system of settling them, has been fully
developed. Whenever there is a general and extensive disturbance of this mechanism, no matter
what its cause, money becomes suddenly and immediately transformed, from its merely ideal
shape of money of account, into hard cash. Profane commodities can no longer replace it. The
use-value of commodities becomes valueless, and their value vanishes in the presence of its own
independent form. On the eve of the crisis, the bourgeois, with the self-sufficiency that springs
from intoxicating prosperity, declares money to be a vain imagination. Commodities alone are
money. But now the cry is everywhere: money alone is a commodity! As the hart pants after fresh
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water, so pants his soul after money, the only wealth. In a crisis, the antithesis between
commodities and their value-form, money, becomes heightened into an absolute contradiction.
Hence, in such events, the form under which money appears is of no importance. The money
famine continues, whether payments have to be made in gold or in credit money such as banknotes. 51
If we now consider the sum total of the money current during a given period, we shall find that,
given the rapidity of currency of the circulating medium and of the means of payment, it is equal
to the sum of the prices to be realised, plus the sum of the payments falling due, minus the
payments that balance each other, minus finally the number of circuits in which the same piece of
coin serves in turn as means of circulation and of payment. Hence, even when prices, rapidity of
currency, and the extent of the economy in payments, are given, the quantity of money current
and the mass of commodities circulating during a given period, such as a day, no longer
correspond. Money that represents commodities long withdrawn from circulation, continues to be
current. Commodities circulate, whose equivalent in money will not appear on the scene till some
future day. Moreover, the debts contracted each day, and the payments falling due on the same
day, are quite incommensurable quantities.52
Credit-money springs directly out of the function of money as a means of payment. Certificates of
the debts owing for the purchased commodities circulate for the purpose of transferring those
debts to others. On the other hand, to the same extent as the system of credit is extended, so is the
function of money as a means of payment. In that character it takes various forms peculiar to
itself under which it makes itself at home in the sphere of great commercial transactions. Gold
and silver coin, on the other hand, are mostly relegated to the sphere of retail trade.53
When the production of commodities has sufficiently extended itself, money begins to serve as
the means of payment beyond the sphere of the circulation of commodities. It becomes the
commodity that is the universal subject-matter of all contracts.54 Rents, taxes, and such like
payments are transformed from payments in kind into money payments. To what extent this
transformation depends upon the general conditions of production, is shown, to take one example,
by the fact that the Roman Empire twice failed in its attempt to levy all contributions in money.
The unspeakable misery of the French agricultural population under Louis XIV., a misery so
eloquently denounced by Boisguillebert, Marshal Vauban, and others, was due not only to the
weight of the taxes, but also to the conversion of taxes in kind into money taxes.55 In Asia, on the
other hand, the fact that state taxes are chiefly composed of rents payable in kind, depends on
conditions of production that are reproduced with the regularity of natural phenomena. And this
mode of payment tends in its turn to maintain the ancient form of production. It is one of the
secrets of the conservation of the Ottoman Empire. If the foreign trade, forced upon Japan by
Europeans, should lead to the substitution of money rents for rents in kind, it will be all up with
the exemplary agriculture of that country. The narrow economic conditions under which that
agriculture is carried on, will be swept away.
In every country, certain days of the year become by habit recognised settling days for various
large and recurrent payments. These dates depend, apart from other revolutions in the wheel of
reproduction, on conditions closely connected with the seasons. They also regulate the dates for
payments that have no direct connexion with the circulation of commodities such as taxes, rents,
and so on. The quantity of money requisite to make the payments, falling due on those dates all
over the country, causes periodical, though merely superficial, perturbations in the economy of
the medium of payment. 56
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From the law of the rapidity of currency of the means of payment, it follows that the quantity of
the means of payment required for all periodical payments, whatever their source, is in inverse
57
proportion to the length of their periods.58
The development of money into a medium of payment makes it necessary to accumulate money
against the dates fixed for the payment of the sums owing. While hoarding, as a distinct mode of
acquiring riches, vanishes with the progress of civil society, the formation of reserves of the
means of payment grows with that progress.

C. Universal Money
When money leaves the home sphere of circulation, it strips off the local garbs which it there
assumes, of a standard of prices, of coin, of tokens, and of a symbol of value, and returns to its
original form of bullion. In the trade between the markets of the world, the value of commodities
is expressed so as to be universally recognised. Hence their independent value-form also, in these
cases, confronts them under the shape of universal money. It is only in the markets of the world
that money acquires to the full extent the character of the commodity whose bodily form is also
the immediate social incarnation of human labour in the abstract. Its real mode of existence in this
sphere adequately corresponds to its ideal concept.
Within the sphere of home circulation, there can be but one commodity which, by serving as a
measure of value, becomes money. In the markets of the world a double measure of value holds
sway, gold and silver. 59
Money of the world serves as the universal medium of payment, as the universal means of
purchasing, and as the universally recognised embodiment of all wealth. Its function as a means
of payment in the settling of international balances is its chief one. Hence the watchword of the
mercantilists, balance of trade.60 Gold and silver serve as international means of purchasing
chiefly and necessarily in those periods when the customary equilibrium in the interchange of
products between different nations is suddenly disturbed. And lastly, it serves as the universally
recognised embodiment of social wealth, whenever the question is not of buying or paying, but of
transferring wealth from one country to another, and whenever this transference in the form of
commodities is rendered impossible, either by special conjunctures in the markets or by the
purpose itself that is intended.61
Just as every country needs a reserve of money for its home circulation so, too, it requires one for
external circulation in the markets of the world. The functions of hoards, therefore, arise in part
out of the function of money, as the medium of the home circulation and home payments, and in
part out of its function of money of the world. 62 For this latter function, the genuine moneycommodity, actual gold and silver, is necessary. On that account, Sir James Steuart, in order to
distinguish them from their purely local substitutes, calls gold and silver “money of the world.”
The current of the stream of gold and silver is a double one. On the one hand, it spreads itself
from its sources over all the markets of the world, in order to become absorbed, to various
extents, into the different national spheres of circulation, to fill the conduits of currency, to
replace abraded gold and silver coins, to supply the material of articles of luxury, and to petrify
into hoards. 63 This first current is started by the countries that exchange their labour, realised in
commodities, for the labour embodied in the precious metals by gold and silver-producing
countries. On the other hand, there is a continual flowing backwards and forwards of gold and
silver between the different national spheres of circulation, a current whose motion depends on
the ceaseless fluctuations in the course of exchange.64
Countries in which the bourgeois form of production is developed to a certain extent, limit the
hoards concentrated in the strong rooms of the banks to the minimum required for the proper
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performance of their peculiar functions. Whenever these hoards are strikingly above their
average level, it is, with some exceptions, an indication of stagnation in the circulation of
commodities, of an interruption in the even flow of their metamorphoses. 66

1

The question — Why does not money directly represent labour-time, so that a piece of paper may
represent, for instance, x hours’ labour, is at bottom the same as the question why, given the
production of commodities, must products take the form of commodities? This is evident, since their
taking the form of commodities implies their differentiation into commodities and money. Or, why
cannot private labour — labour for the account of private individuals — be treated as its opposite,
immediate social labour? I have elsewhere examined thoroughly the Utopian idea of “labour-money”
in a society founded on the production of commodities (l. c., p. 61, seq.). On this point I will only say
further, that Owen’s “labour-money,” for instance, is no more “money” than a ticket for the theatre.
Owen pre-supposes directly associated labour, a form of production that is entirely inconsistent with
the production of commodities. The certificate of labour is merely evidence of the part taken by the
individual in the common labour, and of his right to a certain portion of the common produce destined
for consumption. But it never enters into Owen’s head to pre-suppose the production of commodities,
and at the same time, by juggling with money, to try to evade the necessary conditions of that
production.
2
Savages and half-civilised races use the tongue differently. Captain Parry says of the inhabitants on
the west coast of Baffin’s Bay: “In this case (he refers to barter) they licked it (the thing represented to
them) twice to their tongues, after which they seemed to consider the bargain satisfactorily
concluded.” In the same way, the Eastern Esquimaux licked the articles they received in exchange. If
the tongue is thus used in the North as the organ of appropriation, no wonder that, in the South, the
stomach serves as the organ of accumulated property, and that a Kaffir estimates the wealth of a man
by the size of his belly. That the Kaffirs know what they are about is shown by the following: at the
same time that the official British Health Report of 1864 disclosed the deficiency of fat-forming food
among a large part of the working-class, a certain Dr. Harvey (not, however, the celebrated discoverer
of the circulation of the blood), made a good thing by advertising recipes for reducing the superfluous
fat of the bourgeoisie and aristocracy.
3
See Karl Marx: “Zur Kritik, &c.” “Theorien von der Masseinheit des Geldes,” p. 53, seq.
4
“Wherever gold and silver have by law been made to perform the function of money or of a measure
of value side by side, it has always been tried, but in vain, to treat them as one and the same material.
To assume that there is an invariable ratio between the quantities of gold and silver in which a given
quantity of labour-time is incorporated, is to assume in fact, that gold and silver are of one and the
same material, and that a given mass of the less valuable metal, silver, is a constant fraction of a given
mass of gold. From the reign of Edward III. to the time of George II., the history of money in England
consists of one long series of perturbations caused by the clashing of the legally fixed ratio between
the values of gold and silver, with the fluctuations in their real values. At one time gold was too high,
at another, silver. The metal that for the time being was estimated below its value, was withdrawn
from circulation, mated and exported. The ratio between the two metals was then again altered by law,
but the new nominal ratio soon came into conflict again with the real one. In our own times, the slight
and transient fall in the value of gold compared with silver, which was a consequence of the IndoChinese demand for silver, produced on a far more extended scale in France the same phenomena,
export of silver, and its expulsion from circulation by gold. During the years 1855, 1856 and 1857, the
excess in France of gold-imports over gold-exports amounted to £41,580,000, while the excess of
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silver-exports over silver-imports was £14,704,000. In fact, in those countries in which both metals
are legally measures of value, and therefore both legal tender, so that everyone has the option of
paying in either metal, the metal that rises in value is at a premium, and, like every other commodity,
measures its price in the over-estimated metal which alone serves in reality as the standard of value.
The result of all experience and history with regard to this equation is simply that, where two
commodities perform by law the functions of a measure of value, in practice one alone maintains that
position.” (Karl Marx, l.c., pp. 52, 53.)
5
The peculiar circumstance, that while the ounce of gold serves in England as the unit of the standard
of money, the pound sterling does not form an aliquot part of it, has been explained as follows: “Our
coinage was originally adapted to the employment of silver only, hence, an ounce of silver can always
be divided into a certain adequate number of pieces of coin, but as gold was introduced at a later
period into a coinage adapted only to silver, an ounce of gold cannot be coined into an aliquot number
of pieces.” Maclaren, “A Sketch of the History of the Currency.” London, 1858, p. 16.
6
With English writers the confusion between measure of value and standard of price (standard of
value) is indescribable. Their functions, as well as their names, are constantly interchanged.
7
Moreover, it has not general historical validity.
8
It is thus that the pound sterling in English denotes less than one-third of its original weight; the
pound Scot, before the union, only 1-36th; the French livre, 1-74th; the Spanish maravedi, less than 11,000th; and the Portuguese rei a still smaller fraction.
9
“Le monete le quali oggi sono ideal, sono le piû antiche d’ogni nazione, e tutte furono un tempo real,
e perche erano reali con esse si contava” [“The coins which today are ideal are the oldest coins of
every nation, and all of them were once real, and precisely because they were real they were used for
calculation”] (Galiani: Della moneta, l.c., p. 153.)
10
David Urquhart remarks in his “Familiar Words” on the monstrosity (!) that now-a-days a pound
(sterling), which is the unit of the English standard of money, is equal to about a quarter of an ounce
of gold. “This is falsifying a measure, not establishing a standard.” He sees in this “false
denomination” of the weight of gold, as in everything else, the falsifying hand of civilisation.
11
When Anacharsis was asked for what purposes the Greeks used money, he replied, “For reckoning.”
(Ashen. Deipn. 1. iv. 49 v. 2. ed. Schweighauser, 1802.)
12
“Owing to the fact that money, when serving as the standard of price, appears under the same
reckoning names as do the prices of commodities, and that therefore the sum of £3 17s. 10 1/2d. may
signify on the one hand an ounce weight of gold, and on the other, the value of a ton of iron, this
reckoning name of money has been called its mint-price. Hence there sprang up the extraordinary
notion, that the value of gold is estimated in its own material, and that, in contradistinction to all other
commodities, its price is fixed by the State. It was erroneously thought that the giving of reckoning
names to definite weights of gold, is the same thing as fixing the value of those weights.” (Karl Marx,
l.c., p. 52.)
13
See “Theorien von der Masseinheit des Geldes” in “Zur Kritik der Pol Oekon. &c.,” p. 53, seq. The
fantastic notions about raising or lowering the mint-price of money by transferring to greater or
smaller weights of gold or silver, the names already legally appropriated to fixed weights of those
metals; such notions, at least in those cases in which they aim, not at clumsy financial operations
against creditors, both public and private but at economic quack remedies, have been so exhaustively
treated by Wm. Petty in his “Quantulumcunque concerning money: To the Lord Marquis of Halifax,
1682,” that even his immediate followers, Sir Dudley North and John Locke, not to mention later
ones, could only dilute him. “If the wealth of a nation” he remarks, “could be decupled by a
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proclamation, it were strange that such proclamations have not long since been made by our
Governors.” (l.c., p. 36.)
14
“Ou bien, il faut consentir à dire qu’une valeur d’un million en argent vaut plus qu’une valeur égale
en marchandises.” [“Or indeed it must be admitted that a million in money is worth more than an
equal value in commodities”] (Le Trosne, l.c., p. 919), which amounts to saying “qu’une valeur vaut
plus qu’une valeur égale.” [“that one value is worth more than another value which is equal to it.”]
15
Jerome had to wrestle hard, not only in his youth with the bodily flesh, as is shown by his fight in
the desert with the handsome women of his imagination, but also in his old age with the spiritual flesh.
“I thought,” he says, “I was in the spirit before the Judge of the Universe.” “Who art thou?” asked a
voice. “I am a Christian.” “Thou liest,” thundered back the great Judge, “thou art nought but a
Ciceronian.”
16

“εχ σε του ... πυροσ τ’ανταµεειβεσθαι παντα, ϕησιν δ’Ηραχλειτοσ, χαι πυρ απαντων, ωο
περ χρυσου χρηµατα χαι χρηµατων χρυσοσ.” [“As Heraclitus says, all things are exchanged
for fire and fire for all things, as wares are exchanged for gold and gold for wares.”] (F. Lassalle:
“Die Philosophie Herakleitos des Dunkeln.” Berlin, 1858, Vol. I, p. 222.) Lassalle in his note on
this passage, p. 224, n. 3., erroneously makes gold a mere symbol of value.
1\7
Note by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism in the Russian edition. — In his letter of November 28,
1878, to N. F. Danielson (Nikolai-on) Marx proposed that this sentence be corrected to read as
follows: “And, as a matter of fact, the value of each single yard is but the materialised form of a part
of the social labour expended on the whole number of yards.” An analogous correction was made in a
copy of the second German edition of the first volume of “Capital” belonging to Marx; however, not
in his handwriting.
18
“Toute vente est achat.” [“Every sale is a purchase.”] (Dr. Quesnay: “Dialogues sur le Commerce et
les Travaux des Artisans.” Physiocrates ed. Daire I. Partie, Paris, 1846, p. 170), or as Quesnay in his
“Maximes générales” puts it, “Vendre est acheter.” [“To sell is to buy.”]
19
“Le prix d’une marchandise ne pouvant être payé que par le prix d’une autre marchandise”
(Mercier de la Rivière: “L’Ordre naturel et essentiel des sociétés politiques.” [“The price of one
commodity can only be paid by the price of another commodity”] Physiocrates, ed. Daire II.
Partie, p. 554.)
20
“Pour avoir cet argent, il faut avoir vendu,” [“In order to have this money, one must have made a
sale,”] l.c., p. 543.
21
As before remarked, the actual producer of gold or silver forms an exception. He exchanges his
product directly for another commodity, without having first sold it.
22
“Si l’argent représente, dans nos mains, les choses que nous pouvons désirer d’acheter, il y
représente aussi les choses que nous avons vendues pour cet argent.” [“If money represents, in our
hands, the things we can wish to buy, it also represents the things we have sold to obtain that money”]
(Mercier de la Rivière, l.c., p. 586.)
23
“Il y a donc ... quatre termes et trois contractants, dont l’un intervient deux fois” [“There are
therefore ... four terms and three contracting parties, one of whom intervenes twice”] (Le Trosne, l.c.,
p. 909.)
24
Self-evident as this may be, it is nevertheless for the most part unobserved by political economists,
and especially by the “Free-trader Vulgaris.”
25
See my observations on James Mill in “Zur Kritik, &c.,” pp. 74-76. With regard to this subject, we
may notice two methods characteristic of apologetic economy. The first is the identification of the
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circulation of commodities with the direct barter of products, by simple abstraction from their points
of difference; the second is, the attempt to explain away the contradictions of capitalist production, by
reducing the relations between the persons engaged in that mode of production, to the simple relations
arising out of the circulation of commodities. The production and circulation of commodities are
however, phenomena that occur to a greater or less extent in modes of production the most diverse. If
we are acquainted with nothing but the abstract categories of circulation, which are common to all
these modes of production, we cannot possibly know anything of the specific points of difference of
those modes, nor pronounce any judgment upon them. In no science is such a big fuss made with
commonplace truisms as in Political Economy. For instance, J. B. Say sets himself up as a judge of
crises, because, forsooth, he knows that a commodity is a product.
26
Translator’s note. — This word is here used in its original signification of the course or track
pursued by money as it changes from hand to hand, a course which essentially differs from
circulation.
27
Even when the commodity is sold over and over again, a phenomenon that at present has no
existence for us, it falls, when definitely sold for the last time, out of the sphere of circulation into that
of consumption, where it serves either as means of subsistence or means of production.
28
“Il (l’argent) n’a d’autre mouvement que celui qui lui est imprimé par les productions.” [“It”
(money) “has no other motion than that imparted to it by the products”] (Le Trosne, l.c., p. 885.)
29
“Ce sont les productions qui le (l’argent) mettent en mouvement et le font circuler ... La célérité de
son mouvement (c. de l’argent) supplée à sa quantité. Lorsqu’il en est besoin il ne fait que glisser
d’une main dans l’autre sans s’arrêter un instant.” [“It is products which set it” (money) “in motion
and make it circulate ... The velocity of its” (money’s) “motion supplements its quantity. When
necessary, it does nothing but slide from hand to hand, without stopping for a moment”] (Le Trosne,
l.c.. pp. 915, 916.)
30
“Money being ... the common measure of buying and selling, everybody who hath anything to sell,
and cannot procure chapmen for it, is presently apt to think, that want of money in the kingdom, or
country, is the cause why his goods do not go off; and so, want of money is the common cry; which is
a great mistake... What do these people want, who cry out for money? ... The farmer complains ... he
thinks that were more money in the country; he should have a price for his goods. Then it seems
money is not his want, but a price for his corn and cattel, which he would sell, but cannot... Why
cannot he get a price? ... (1) Either there is too much corn and cattel in the country, so that most who
come to market have need of selling, as he hath, and few of buying; or (2) There wants the usual vent
abroad by transportation..., or (3) The consumption fails, as when men, by reason of poverty, do not
spend so much in their houses as formerly they did; wherefore it is not the increase of specific money,
which would at all advance the farmer’s goods, but the removal of any of these three causes, which do
truly keep down the market... The merchant and shopkeeper want money in the same manner, that is,
they want a vent for the goods they deal in, by reason that the markets fail” ... [A nation] “never
thrives better, than when riches are tost from hand to hand.” (Sir Dudley North: “Discourses upon
Trade,” Lond. 1691, pp. 11-15, passim.) Herrenschwand’s fanciful notions amount merely to this, that
the antagonism, which has its origin in the nature of commodities, and is reproduced in their
circulation, can be removed by increasing the circulating medium. But if, on the one hand, it is a
popular delusion to ascribe stagnation in production and circulation to insufficiency of the circulating
medium, it by no means follows, on the other hand, that an actual paucity of the medium in
consequence, e.g., of bungling legislative interference with the regulation of currency, may not give
rise to such stagnation.
31
“There is a certain measure and proportion of money requisite to drive the trade of a nation, more or
less than which would prejudice the same. Just as there is a certain proportion of farthings necessary
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in a small retail trade, to change silver money, and to even such reckonings as cannot be adjusted with
the smallest silver pieces.... Now, as the proportion of the number of farthings requisite in commerce
is to be taken from the number of people, the frequency of their exchanges: as also, and principally,
from the value of the smallest silver pieces of money; so in like manner, the proportion of money
[gold and silver specie] requisite in our trade, is to be likewise taken from the frequency of
commutations, and from the bigness of the payments.” (William Petty, “A Treatise of Taxes and
Contributions.” Lond. 1667, p. 17.) The Theory of Hume was defended against the attacks of J.
Steuart and others, by A. Young, in his “Political Arithmetic,” Lond. 1774, in which work there is a
special chapter entitled “Prices depend on quantity of money, at p. 112, sqq. I have stated in “Zur
Kritik, &c.,” p. 149: “He (Adam Smith) passes over without remark the question as to the quantity of
coin in circulation, and treats money quite wrongly as a mere commodity.” This statement applies
only in so far as Adam Smith, ex officio, treats of money. Now and then, however, as in his criticism
of the earlier systems of Political Economy, he takes the right view. “The quantity of coin in every
country is regulated by the value of the commodities which are to be circulated by it.... The value of
the goods annually bought and sold in any country requires a certain quantity of money to circulate
and distribute them to their proper consumers, and can give employment to no more. The channel of
circulation necessarily draws to itself a sum sufficient to fill it, and never admits any more.” (“Wealth
of Nations.” Bk. IV., ch. 1.) In like manner, ex officio, he opens his work with an apotheosis on the
division of labour. Afterwards, in the last book which treats of the sources of public revenue, he
occasionally repeats the denunciations of the division of labour made by his teacher, A. Ferguson.
32
“The prices of things will certainly rise in every nation, as the gold and silver increase amongst the
people, and consequently, where the gold and silver decrease in any nation, the prices of all things
must fall proportionately to such decrease of money.” (Jacob Vanderlint: “Money Answers all
Things.” Lond. 1734, p. 5.) A careful comparison of this book with Hume’s “Essays,” proves to my
mind without doubt that Hume was acquainted with and made use of Vanderlint’s work, which is
certainly an important one. The opinion that prices are determined by the quantity of the circulating
medium, was also held by Barbon and other much earlier writers. “No inconvenience,” says
Vanderlint, “can arise by an unrestrained trade, but very great advantage; since, if the cash of the
nation be decreased by it, which prohibitions are designed to prevent, those nations that get the cash
will certainly find everything advance in price, as the cash increases amongst them. And ... our
manufactures, and everything else, will soon become so moderate as to turn the balance of trade in our
favour, and thereby fetch the money back again.” (l.c.. pp. 43, 44.)
33
That the price of each single kind of commodity forms a part of the sum of the prices of all the
commodities in circulation, is a self-evident proposition. But how use-values which are
incommensurable with regard to each other, are to be exchanged, en masse for the total sum of gold
and silver in a country, is quite incomprehensible. If we start from the notion that all commodities
together form one single commodity, of which each is but an aliquot part, we get the following
beautiful result: The total commodity = x cwt. of gold; commodity A = an aliquot part of the total
commodity = the same aliquot part of x cwt. of gold. This is stated in all seriousness by Montesquieu:
“Si l’on compare la masse de l’or et de l’argent qui est dans le monde avec la somme des
marchandises qui s’y vend il est certain que chaque denrée ou marchandise, en particulier, pourra être
comparée à une certaine portion de la masse entière. Supposons qu’il n’y ait qu’une seule denrée ou
marchandise dans le monde, ou qu’il n’y ait qu’une seule qui s’achète, et qu’elle se divise comme
l’argent: Cette partie de cette marchandise répondra à une partie de la masse de l’argent; la moitié du
total de l’une à la moitié du total de l’autre, &c.... L’établissement du prix des choses dépend toujours
fondamentalement de la raison du total des choses au total des signes.” [“If one compares the amount
of gold and silver in the world with the sum of the commodities available, it is certain that each
product or commodity, taken in isolation, could be compared with a certain portion of the total amount
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of money. Let us suppose that there is only one product, or commodity, in the world, or only one that
can be purchased, and that it can be divided in the same way as money: a certain part of this
commodity would then correspond to a part of the total amount of money; half the total of the one
would correspond to half the total of the other &c. ... the determination of the prices of things always
depends, fundamentally, on the relation between the total amount of things and the total amount of
their monetary symbols”] (Montesquieu, l.c. t. III, pp. 12, 13.) As to the further development of this
theory by Ricardo and his disciples, James Mill, Lord Overstone, and others, see “Zur Kritik, &c.,”
pp. 140-146, and p. 150, sqq. John Stuart Mill, with his usual eclectic logic, understands how to hold
at the same time the view of his father, James Mill, and the opposite view. On a comparison of the text
of his compendium, “Principles of Pol. Econ.,” with his preface to the first edition, in which preface
he announces himself as the Adam Smith of his day — we do not know whether to admire more the
simplicity of the man, or that of the public, who took him, in good faith, for the Adam Smith he
announced himself to be, although he bears about as much resemblance to Adam Smith as say General
Williams, of Kars, to the Duke of Wellington. The original researches of Mr. J. S. Mill which are
neither extensive nor profound, in the domain of Political Economy, will be found mustered in rank
and file in his little work, “Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy,” which appeared in 1844.
Locke asserts point blank the connexion between the absence of value in gold and silver, and the
determination of their values by quantity alone. “Mankind having consented to put an imaginary value
upon gold and silver ... the intrinsic value, regarded in these metals, is nothing but the quantity."
(“Some Considerations,” &c., 1691, Works Ed. 1777, Vol. II., p. 15.)
34
It lies of course, entirely beyond my purpose to take into consideration such details as the s
eigniorage on minting. I will, however, cite for the benefit of the romantic sycophant, Adam Muller,
who admires the “generous liberality” with which the English Government coins gratuitously, the
following opinion of Sir Dudley North: “Silver and gold, like other commodities, have their ebbings
and flowings. Upon the arrival of quantities from Spain ... it is carried into the Tower, and coined. Not
long after there will come a demand for bullion to be exported again. If there is none, but all happens
to be in coin, what then? Melt it down again; there’s no loss in it, for the coining costs the owner
nothing. Thus the nation has been abused, and made to pay for the twisting of straw for asses to eat. If
the merchant were made to pay the price of the coinage, he would not have sent his silver to the Tower
without consideration, and coined money would always keep a value above uncoined silver.” (North,
l.c., p. 18.) North was himself one of the foremost merchants in the reign of Charles II.
35
“If silver never exceed what is wanted for the smaller payments it cannot be collected in sufficient
quantities for the larger payments ... the use of gold in the main payments necessarily implies also its
use in the retail trade: those who have gold coin offering them for small purchases, and receiving with
the commodity purchased a balance of silver in return; by which means the surplus of silver that
would otherwise encumber the retail dealer, is drawn off and dispersed into general circulation. But if
there is as much silver as will transact the small payments independent of gold, the retail trader must
then receive silver for small purchases; and it must of necessity accumulate in his hands.” (David
Buchanan; “Inquiry into the Taxation and Commercial Policy of Great Britain.” Edinburgh, 1844, pp.
248, 249.)
36
The mandarin Wan-mao-in, the Chinese Chancellor of the Exchequer, took it into his head one day
to lay before the Son of Heaven a proposal that secretly aimed at converting the assignats of the
empire into convertible bank-notes. The assignats Committee, in its report of April, 1854, gives him a
severe snubbing. Whether he also received the traditional drubbing with bamboos is not stated. The
concluding part of the report is as follows: — “The Committee has carefully examined his proposal
and finds that it is entirely in favour of the merchants, and that no advantage will result to the crown.”
(“Arbeiten der Kaiserlich Russischen Gesandtschaft zu Peking über China.” Aus dem Russischen von
Dr. K. Abel und F. A. Mecklenburg. Erster Band. Berlin, 1858, p. 47 sq.) In his evidence before the
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Committee of the House of Lords on the Bank Acts, a governor of the Bank of England says, with
regard to the abrasion of gold coins during currency: “Every year a fresh class of sovereigns becomes
too light. The class which one year passes with full weight, loses enough by wear and tear to draw the
scales next year against it.” (House of Lords’ Committee, 1848, n. 429.)
37
The following passage from Fullarton shows the want of clearness on the part of even the best
writers on money, in their comprehension of its various functions: “That, as far as concerns our
domestic exchanges, all the monetary functions which are usually performed by gold and silver coins,
may be performed as effectually by a circulation of inconvertible notes paying no value but that
factitious and conventional value they derive from the law is a fact which admits, I conceive, of no
denial. Value of this description may be made to answer all the purposes of intrinsic value, and
supersede even the necessity for a standard, provided only the quantity of issues be kept under due
limitation.” (Fullerton: “Regulation of Currencies,” London, 1845, p. 21.) Because the commodity that
serves as money is capable of being replaced in circulation by mere symbols of value, therefore its
functions as a measure of value and a standard of prices are declared to be superfluous!
38
From the fact that gold and silver, so far as they are coins, or exclusively serve as the medium of
circulation, become mere tokens of themselves, Nicholas Barbon deduces the right of Governments
“to raise money,” that is, to give to the weight of silver that is called a shilling the name of a greater
weight, such as a crown; and so to pay creditors shillings, instead of crowns. “Money does wear and
grow lighter by often telling over... It is the denomination and currency of the money that men regard
in bargaining, and not the quantity of silver...’Tis the public authority upon the metal that makes it
money.” (N. Barbon, l.c., pp. 29, 30, 25.)
39
“Une richesse en argent n’est que ... richesse en productions, converties en argent.” [“Monetary
wealth is nothing but ... wealth in products, transformed into money”] (Mercier de la Rivière, l.c.)
“Une valeur en productions n’a fait que changer de forme.” [“A value in the form of products, which
has merely changed its form.”] (Id., p. 486.)
40
“’Tis by this practice’ they keep all their goods and manufactures at such low rates.” (Vanderlint,
l.c., pp. 95, 96.)
41
“Money ... is a pledge.” (John Bellers: “Essays about the Poor, Manufactures, Trade, Plantations,
and Immorality,” Lond., 1699, p. 13.)
42
A purchase, in a “categorical” sense, implies that gold and silver are already the converted form of
commodities, or the product of a sale.
43
Henry III., most Christian king of France, robbed cloisters of their relics, and turned them into
money. It is well known what part the despoiling of the Delphic Temple, by the Phocians, played in
the history of Greece. Temples with the ancients served as the dwellings of the gods of commodities.
They were “sacred banks.” With the Phoenicians, a trading people par excellence, money was the
transmuted shape of everything. It was, therefore, quite in order that the virgins, who, at the feast of
the Goddess of Love, gave themselves up to strangers, should offer to the goddess the piece of money
they received.
43a
“Gold, yellow, glittering, precious gold!
Thus much of this, will make black white; foul, fair;
Wrong, right; base, noble; old, young; coward, valiant.
... What this, you gods? Why, this
Will lug your priests and servants from your sides;
Pluck stout men’s pillows from below their heads;
This yellow slave
Will knit and break religions; bless the accurs’d;
Make the hoar leprosy ador’d; place thieves,

98

Chapter 3

And give them title, knee and approbation,
With senators on the bench; this is it,
That makes the wappen’d widow wed again:
... Come damned earth,
Though common whore of mankind.”
(Shakespeare: Timon of Athens.)
43b
“Money! Nothing worse
in our lives, so current, rampant, so corrupting.
Money — you demolish cities, root men from their homes,
you train and twist good minds and set them on
to the most atrocious schemes. No limit,
you make them adept at every kind of outrage,
every godless crimes — money!”
(Sophocles, Antigone.)
44
“The desire of avarice to draw Pluto himself out of the bowels of the earth.” (The Deipnosophists,
VI, 23, Athenaeus)
45
“Accrescere quanto più si può il numero de’venditori d’ogni merce, diminuere quanto più si puo il
numero dei compratori, questi sono i cardini sui quali si raggirano tutte le operazioni di economia
politica.” [“These are the pivots around which all the measures of political economy turn: the
maximum possible increase in the number of sellers of each commodity, and the maximum possible
decrease in the number of buyers”] (Verri, l.c., p. 52.)
46
“There is required for carrying on the trade of the nation a determinate sum of specifick money
which varies, and is sometimes more, sometimes less, as the circumstances we are in require.... This
ebbing and flowing of money supplies and accommodates itself, without any aid of Politicians.... The
buckets work alternately; when money is scarce, bullion is coined; when bullion is scarce, money is
melted.” (Sir D. North, l.c., Postscript, p. 3.) John Stuart Mill, who for a long time was an official of
the East India Company, confirms the fact that in India silver ornaments still continue to perform
directly the functions of a hoard. The silver ornaments are brought out and coined when there is a high
rate of interest, and go back again when the rate of interest falls. (J. S. Mill’s Evidence “Reports on
Bank Acts,” 1857, 2084.) According to a Parliamentary document of 1864 on the gold and silver
import and export of India, the import of gold and silver in 1863 exceeded the export by £19,367,764.
During the 8 years immediately preceding 1864, the excess of imports over exports of the precious
metals amounted to £109,652,917. During this century far more than £200,000,000 has been coined in
India.
47
The following shows the debtor and creditor relations existing between English traders at the
beginning of the 18th century. “Such a spirit of crudity reigns here in England among the men of
trade, that is not to be met with in any other society of men, nor in any other kingdom of the world.”
(“An Essay on Credit and the Bankrupt Act,” Lond., 1707, p. 2.)
48
It will be seen from the following quotation from my book which appeared in 1859, why I take no
notice in the text of an opposite form: “Contrariwise, in the process in M—C, the money can be
alienated as a real means of purchase, and in that way, the price of the commodity can be realised
before the use-value of the money is realised and the commodity actually delivered. This occurs
constantly under the every-day form of prepayments. And it is under this form, that the English
government purchases opium from the ryots of India.... In these cases, however, the money always
acts as a means of purchase.... Of course capital also is advanced in the shape of money.... This point
of view, however, does not fall within the horizon of simple circulation.” (“Zur Kritik, &c.,” pp. 119,
120.)
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49

The monetary crisis referred to in the text, being a phase of every crisis, must be clearly
distinguished from that particular form of crisis, which also is called a monetary crisis, but which may
be produced by itself as an independent phenomenon in such a way as to react only indirectly on
industry and commerce. The pivot of these crises is to be found in moneyed capital, and their sphere
of direct action is therefore the sphere of that capital, viz., banking, the stock exchange, and finance.
50
“The sudden reversion from a system of credit to a system of hard cash heaps theoretical fright on
top of the practical panic; and the dealers by whose agency circulation is affected, shudder before the
impenetrable mystery in which their own economic relations are involved” (Karl Marx, l.c., p. 126.)
“The poor stand still, because the rich have no money to employ them, though they have the same
land and hands to provide victuals and clothes, as ever they had; ...which is the true riches of a nation,
and not the money.” John Bellers, Proposals for Raising a College of Industry, London, 1696, p3.
51
he following shows how such times are exploited by the “amis du commerce.” “On one occasion
(1839) an old grasping banker (in the city) in his private room raised the lid of the desk he sat over,
and displayed to a friend rolls of bank-notes, saying with intense glee there were £600,000 of them,
they were held to make money tight, and would all be let out after three o’clock on the same day.”
(“The Theory of Exchanges. The Bank Charter Act of 1844.” Lond. 1864, p. 81). The Observer, a
semi-official government organ, contained the following paragraph on 24th April, 1864: “Some very
curious rumours are current of the means which have been resorted to in order to create a scarcity of
banknotes.... Questionable as it would seem, to suppose that any trick of the kind would be adopted,
the report has been so universal that it really deserves mention.”
52
“The amount of purchases or contracts entered upon during the course of any given day, will not
affect the quantity of money afloat on that particular day, but, in the vast majority of cases, will
resolve themselves into multifarious drafts upon the quantity of money which may be afloat at
subsequent dates more or less distant.... The bills granted or credits opened, to-day, need have no
resemblance whatever, either in quantity, amount or duration, to those granted or entered upon tomorrow or next day, nay, many of today’s bills, and credits, when due, fall in with a mass of liabilities
whose origins traverse a range of antecedent dates altogether indefinite, bills at 12, 6, 3 months or 1
often aggregating together to swell the common liabilities of one particular day....” (“The Currency
Theory Reviewed; in a Letter to the Scottish People.” By a Banker in England. Edinburgh, 1845, pp.
29, 30 passim.)
53
As an example of how little ready money is required in true commercial operations, I give below a
statement by one of the largest London houses of its yearly receipts and payments. Its transactions
during the year 1856, extending to many millions of pounds sterling, are here reduced to the scale of
one million.

Receipts.
Bankers’ and Merchants’
Cheques on Bankers, &c.
payable on demand
Country Notes

Payments.
£533,596 Bills payable after £302,674
date
357,715 Cheques on
London Bankers

663,672

9,627 Bank of England
Notes

22,743

Bank of England Notes

68,554 Gold

9,427

Gold

28,089 Silver and Copper

1,484
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Silver and Copper

1,486

Post Office Orders

933
Total £1,000,000

Total £1,000,000

“Report from the Select Committee on the Bank Acts, July, 1858,” p.
lxxi.
.
54

“The course of trade being thus turned, from exchanging of goods for goods, or delivering and
taking, to selling and paying, all the bargains ... are now stated upon the foot of a Price in money.”
(“An Essay upon Publick Credit.” 3rd Ed. Lond., 1710, p. 8.)
55
“L’argent ... est devenu le bourreau de toutes choses.” Finance is the “alambic, qui a fait évaporer
une quantité effroyable de biens et de denrées pour faire ce fatal précis.” “L’argent déclare la guerre à
tout le genre humain.” [“Money ... has become the executioner of all things.” Finance is the “alembic
that evaporates a frightful quantity of goods and commodities in order to obtain this fatal extract.”
“Money [...] declares war [...] on the whole human race”] (Boisguillebert: “Dissertation sur la nature
des richesses, de l’argent et des tributs.” Edit. Daire. Economistes financiers. Paris, 1843, t. i., pp. 413,
419, 417.)
56
“On Whitsuntide, 1824,” says Mr. Craig before the Commons’ Committee of 1826, “there was such
an immense demand for notes upon the banks of Edinburgh, that by 11 o’clock they had not a note left
in their custody. They sent round to all the different banks to borrow, but could not get them, and
many of the transactions were adjusted by slips of paper only; yet by three o’clock the whole of the
notes were returned into the banks from which they had issued! It was a mere transfer from hand to
hand. “Although the average effective circulation of bank-notes in Scotland is less than three millions
sterling, yet on certain pay days in the year, every single note in the possession of the bankers,
amounting in the whole to about £7,000,000, is called into activity. On these occasions the notes have
a single and specific function to perform, and so soon as they have performed it, they flow back into
the various banks from which they issued. (See John Fullarton, “Regulation of Currencies.” Lond.
1845, p. 86, note.) In explanation it should be stated, that in Scotland, at the date of Fullarton’s work,
notes and not cheques were used to withdraw deposits.
57
Note by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism in the Russian edition: Apparently a slip of the pen.
When writing inverse the author evidently meant direct.
58
To the question, “If there were occasion to raise 40 millions p. a., whether the same 6 millions
(gold) ... would suffice for such revolutions and circulations thereof, as trade requires,” Petty replies in
his usual masterly manner, “I answer yes: for the expense being 40 millions, if the revolutions were in
such short circles, viz., weekly, as happens among poor artisans and labourers, who receive and pay
every Saturday, then 40/52 parts of 1 million of money would answer these ends, but if the circles be
quarterly, according to our custom of paying rent, and gathering taxes, then 10 millions were requisite.
Wherefore, supposing payments in general to be of a mixed circle between one week and 13, then add
10 millions to 40/52, the half of which will be 5½, so as if we have 5½ millions we have enough.”
(William Petty: “Political Anatomy of Ireland.” 1672, Edit.: Lond. 1691, pp. 13, 14.)
59
Hence the absurdity of every law prescribing that the banks of a country shall form reserves of that
precious metal alone which circulates at home. The “pleasant difficulties” thus self-created by the
Bank of England, are well known. On the subject of the great epochs in the history of the changes in
the relative value of gold and silver, see Karl Marx, l.c., p. 136 sq. Sir Robert Peel, by his Bank Act of
1844, sought to tide over the difficulty, by allowing the Bank of England to issue notes against silver
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bullion, on condition that the reserve of silver should never exceed more than one-fourth of the reserve
of gold. The value of silver being for that purpose estimated at its price in the London market.
Added in the 4th German edition. — [We find ourselves once more in a period of serious change in the
relative values of gold and silver. About 25 years ago the ratio expressing the relative value of gold
and silver was 15-1/2:1; now it is approximately 22:1, and silver is still constantly falling as against
gold. This is essentially the result of a revolution in the mode of production of both metals. Formerly
gold was obtained almost exclusively by washing it out from gold-bearing alluvial deposits, products
of the weathering of auriferous rocks. Now this method has become inadequate and has been forced
into the background by the processing of the quartz lodes themselves, a way of extraction which
formerly was only of secondary importance, although well known to the ancients (Diodorus, III, 1214) (Diodor’s v. Sicilien “Historische Bibliothek,” book III, 12-14. Stuttgart 1828, pp. 258-261).
Moreover, not only were new huge silver deposits discovered in North America, in the Western part
of the Rocky Mountains, but these and the Mexican silver mines were really opened up by the laying
of railways, which made possible the shipment of modern machinery and fuel and in consequence the
mining of silver on a very large scale at a low cost. However there is a great difference in the way the
two metals occur in the quartz lodes. The gold is mostly native, but disseminated throughout the
quartz in minute quantities. The whole mass of the vein must therefore be crushed and the gold either
washed out or extracted by means of mercury. Often 1,000,000 grammes of quartz barely yield 1-3
and very seldom 30-60 grammes of gold. Silver is seldom found native, however it occurs in special
quartz that is separated from the lode with comparative ease and contains mostly 40-90% silver; or it
is contained, in smaller quantities, in copper, lead and other ores which in themselves are worthwhile
working. From this alone it is apparent that the labour expended on the production of gold is rather
increasing while that expended on silver production has decidedly decreased, which quite naturally
explains the drop in the value of the latter. This fall in value would express itself in a still greater fall
in price if the price of silver were not pegged even to-day by artificial means. But America’s rich
silver deposits have so far barely been tapped, and thus the prospects are that the value of this metal
will keep on dropping for rather a long time to come. A still greater contributing factor here is the
relative decrease in the requirement of silver for articles of general use and for luxuries, that is its
replacement by plated goods, aluminium, etc. One may thus gauge the utopianism of the bimetallist
idea that compulsory international quotation will raise silver again to the old value ratio of 1:15-1/2. It
is more likely that silver will forfeit its money function more and more in the markets of the world. —
F E.]
60
The opponents, themselves, of the mercantile system, a system which considered the settlement of
surplus trade balances in gold and silver as the aim of international trade, entirely misconceived the
functions of money of the world. I have shown by the example of Ricardo in what way their false
conception of the laws that regulate the quantity of the circulating medium, is reflected in their equally
false conception of the international movement of the precious metals (l.c., pp. 150 sq.). His erroneous
dogma: “An unfavourable balance of trade never arises but from a redundant currency.... The
exportation of the coin is caused by its cheapness, and is not the effect, but the cause of an
unfavourable balance,” already occurs in Barbon: “The Balance of Trade, if there be one, is not the
cause of sending away the money out of a nation; but that proceeds from the difference of the value of
bullion in every country.” (N. Barbon; l.c., pp. 59, 60.) MacCulloch in “The Literature of Political
Economy, a classified catalogue, Lond. 1845,” praises Barbon for this anticipation, but prudently
passes over the naive forms, in which Barbon clothes the absurd supposition on which the “currency
principle” is based. The absence of real criticism and even of honesty, in that catalogue culminates in
the sections devoted to the history of the theory of money; the reason is that MacCulloch in this part of
the work is flattering Lord Overstone whom he calls “facile princeps argentanorum.”
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For instance, in subsidies, money loans for carrying on wars or for enabling banks to resume cash
payments, &c., it is the money-form, and no other, of value that may be wanted.
62
“I would desire, indeed, no more convincing evidence of the competency of the machinery of the
hoards in specie-paying countries to perform every necessary office of international adjustment,
without any sensible aid from the general circulation, than the facility with which France, when but
just recovering from the shock of a destructive foreign invasion, completed within the space of 27
months the payment of her forced contribution of nearly 20 millions to the allied powers, and a
considerable proportion of the sum in specie, without any perceptible contraction or derangement of
her domestic currency, or even any alarming fluctuation of her exchanges.” (Fullerton, l.c., p. 141.)
[Added in the 4th German edition. — We have a still more striking example in the facility with which
the same France was able in 1871-73 to pay off within 30 months a forced contribution more than ten
times as great, a considerable part of it likewise in specie. — F. E.]
63
“L’argent se partage entre les nations relativement au besoin qu’elles en ont ... étant toujours attiré
par les productions.” [“Money is shared among the nations in accordance with their need for it ... as it
is always attracted by the products”] (Le Trosne, l.c., p. 916.) “The mines which are continually
giving gold and silver, do give sufficient to supply such a needful balance to every nation.” (J.
Vanderlint, l.c., p. 40.)
64
“Exchanges rise and fall every week, and at some particular times in the year run high against a
nation, and at other times run as high on the contrary.” (N. Barbon, l.c., p. 39)
65
These various functions are liable to come into dangerous conflict with one another whenever gold
and silver have also to serve as a fund for the conversion of bank-notes.
66
“What money is more than of absolute necessity for a Home Trade, is dead stock ... and brings no
profit to that country it’s kept in, but as it is transported in trade, as well as imported.” (John Bellers,
“Essays,” p. 13.) “What if we have too much coin? We may melt down the heaviest and turn it into the
splendour of plate, vessels or utensils of gold or silver, or send it out as a commodity, where the same
is wanted or desired; or let it out at interest, where interest is high.” (W. Petty: “Quantulumcunque,” p.
39.) “Money is but the fat of the Body Politick, whereof too much doth as often hinder its agility, as
too little makes it sick ... as fat lubricates the motion of the muscles, feeds in want of victuals, fills up
the uneven cavities, and beautifies the body; so doth money in the state quicken its action, feeds from
abroad in time of dearth at home, evens accounts ... and beautifies the whole; altho more especially the
particular persons that have it in plenty.” (W. Petty, “Political Anatomy of Ireland,” p. 14.)

Part 2: Transformation of Money
into Capital
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Chapter 4: The General Formula for Capital
The circulation of commodities is the starting-point of capital. The production of commodities,
their circulation, and that more developed form of their circulation called commerce, these form
the historical ground-work from which it rises. The modern history of capital dates from the
creation in the 16th century of a world-embracing commerce and a world-embracing market.
If we abstract from the material substance of the circulation of commodities, that is, from the
exchange of the various use-values, and consider only the economic forms produced by this
process of circulation, we find its final result to be money: this final product of the circulation of
commodities is the first form in which capital appears.
As a matter of history, capital, as opposed to landed property, invariably takes the form at first of
money; it appears as moneyed wealth, as the capital of the merchant and of the usurer.1 But we
have no need to refer to the origin of capital in order to discover that the first form of appearance
of capital is money. We can see it daily under our very eyes. All new capital, to commence with,
comes on the stage, that is, on the market, whether of commodities, labour, or money, even in our
days, in the shape of money that by a definite process has to be transformed into capital.
The first distinction we notice between money that is money only, and money that is capital, is
nothing more than a difference in their form of circulation.
The simplest form of the circulation of commodities is C-M-C, the transformation of
commodities into money, and the change of the money back again into commodities; or selling in
order to buy. But alongside of this form we find another specifically different form: M-C-M, the
transformation of money into commodities, and the change of commodities back again into
money; or buying in order to sell. Money that circulates in the latter manner is thereby
transformed into, becomes capital, and is already potentially capital.
Now let us examine the circuit M-C-M a little closer. It consists, like the other, of two antithetical
phases. In the first phase, M-C, or the purchase, the money is changed into a commodity. In the
second phase, C-M, or the sale, the commodity is changed back again into money. The
combination of these two phases constitutes the single movement whereby money is exchanged
for a commodity, and the same commodity is again exchanged for money; whereby a commodity
is bought in order to be sold, or, neglecting the distinction in form between buying and selling,
whereby a commodity is bought with money, and then money is bought with a commodity. 2 The
result, in which the phases of the process vanish, is the exchange of money for money, M-M. If I
purchase 2,000 lbs. of cotton for £100, and resell the 2,000 lbs. of cotton for £110, I have, in fact,
exchanged £100 for £110, money for money.
Now it is evident that the circuit M-C-M would be absurd and without meaning if the intention
were to exchange by this means two equal sums of money, £100 for £100. The miser’s plan
would be far simpler and surer; he sticks to his £100 instead of exposing it to the dangers of
circulation. And yet, whether the merchant who has paid £100 for his cotton sells it for £110, or
lets it go for £100, or even £50, his money has, at all events, gone through a characteristic and
original movement, quite different in kind from that which it goes through in the hands of the
peasant who sells corn, and with the money thus set free buys clothes. We have therefore to
examine first the distinguishing characteristics of the forms of the circuits M-C-M and C-M-C,
and in doing this the real difference that underlies the mere difference of form will reveal itself.
Let us see, in the first place, what the two forms have in common.

105

Chapter 4

Both circuits are resolvable into the same two antithetical phases, C-M, a sale, and M-C, a
purchase. In each of these phases the same material elements - a commodity, and money, and the
same economic dramatis personae, a buyer and a seller - confront one another. Each circuit is the
unity of the same two antithetical phases, and in each case this unity is brought about by the
intervention of three contracting parties, of whom one only sells, another only buys, while the
third both buys and sells.
What, however, first and foremost distinguishes the circuit C-M-C from the circuit M-C-M, is the
inverted order of succession of the two phases. The simple circulation of commodities begins
with a sale and ends with a purchase, while the circulation of money as capital begins with a
purchase and ends with a sale. In the one case both the starting-point and the goal are
commodities, in the other they are money. In the first form the movement is brought about by the
intervention of money, in the second by that of a commodity.
In the circulation C-M-C, the money is in the end converted into a commodity, that serves as a
use-value; it is spent once for all. In the inverted form, M-C-M, on the contrary, the buyer lays
out money in order that, as a seller, he may recover money. By the purchase of his commodity he
throws money into circulation, in order to withdraw it again by the sale of the same commodity.
He lets the money go, but only with the sly intention of getting it back again. The money,
therefore, is not spent, it is merely advanced. 3
In the circuit C-M-C, the same piece of money changes its place twice. The seller gets it from the
buyer and pays it away to another seller. The complete circulation, which begins with the receipt,
concludes with the payment, of money for commodities. It is the very contrary in the circuit M-CM. Here it is not the piece of money that changes its place twice, but the commodity. The buyer
takes it from the hands of the seller and passes it into the hands of another buyer. Just as in the
simple circulation of commodities the double change of place of the same piece of money effects
its passage from one hand into another, so here the double change of place of the same
commodity brings about the reflux of the money to its point of departure.
Such reflux is not dependent on the commodity being sold for more than was paid for it. This
circumstance influences only the amount of the money that comes back. The reflux itself takes
place, so soon as the purchased commodity is resold, in other words, so soon as the circuit M-CM is completed. We have here, therefore, a palpable difference between the circulation of money
as capital, and its circulation as mere money.
The circuit C-M-C comes completely to an end, so soon as the money brought in by the sale of
one commodity is abstracted again by the purchase of another.
If, nevertheless, there follows a reflux of money to its starting-point, this can only happen through
a renewal or repetition of the operation. If I sell a quarter of corn for £3, and with this £3 buy
clothes, the money, so far as I am concerned, is spent and done with. It belongs to the clothes
merchant. If I now sell a second quarter of corn, money indeed flows back to me, not however as
a sequel to the first transaction, but in consequence of its repetition. The money again leaves me,
so soon as I complete this second transaction by a fresh purchase. Therefore, in the circuit C-MC, the expenditure of money has nothing to do with its reflux. On the other hand, in M-C-M, the
reflux of the money is conditioned by the very mode of its expenditure. Without this reflux, the
operation fails, or the process is interrupted and incomplete, owing to the absence of its
complementary and final phase, the sale.
The circuit C-M-C starts with one commodity, and finishes with another, which falls out of
circulation and into consumption. Consumption, the satisfaction of wants, in one word, use-value,

106

Chapter 4

is its end and aim. The circuit M-C-M, on the contrary, commences with money and ends with
money. Its leading motive, and the goal that attracts it, is therefore mere exchange-value.
In the simple circulation of commodities, the two extremes of the circuit have the same economic
form. They are both commodities, and commodities of equal value. But they are also use-values
differing in their qualities, as, for example, corn and clothes. The exchange of products, of the
different materials in which the labour of society is embodied, forms here the basis of the
movement. It is otherwise in the circulation M-C-M, which at first sight appears purposeless,
because tautological. Both extremes have the same economic form. They are both money, and
therefore are not qualitatively different use-values; for money is but the converted form of
commodities, in which their particular use-values vanish. To exchange £100 for cotton, and then
this same cotton again for £100, is merely a roundabout way of exchanging money for money, the
same for the same, and appears to be an operation just as purposeless as it is absurd. 4 One sum of
money is distinguishable from another only by its amount. The character and tendency of the
process M-C-M, is therefore not due to any qualitative difference between its extremes, both
being money, but solely to their quantitative difference. More money is withdrawn from
circulation at the finish than was thrown into it at the start. The cotton that was bought for £100 is
perhaps resold for £100 + £10 or £110. The exact form of this process is therefore M-C-M', where
M' = M + D M = the original sum advanced, plus an increment. This increment or excess over the
original value I call “surplus-value.” The value originally advanced, therefore, not only remains
intact while in circulation, but adds to itself a surplus-value or expands itself. It is this movement
that converts it into capital.
Of course, it is also possible, that in C-M-C, the two extremes C-C, say corn and clothes, may
represent different quantities of value. The farmer may sell his corn above its value, or may buy
the clothes at less than their value. He may, on the other hand, “be done” by the clothes merchant.
Yet, in the form of circulation now under consideration, such differences in value are purely
accidental. The fact that the corn and the clothes are equivalents, does not deprive the process of
all meaning, as it does in M-C-M. The equivalence of their values is rather a necessary condition
to its normal course.
The repetition or renewal of the act of selling in order to buy, is kept within bounds by the very
object it aims at, namely, consumption or the satisfaction of definite wants, an aim that lies
altogether outside the sphere of circulation. But when we buy in order to sell, we, on the contrary,
begin and end with the same thing, money, exchange-value; and thereby the movement becomes
interminable. No doubt, M becomes M + D M, £100 become £110. But when viewed in their
qualitative aspect alone, £110 are the same as £100, namely money; and considered
quantitatively, £110 is, like £100, a sum of definite and limited value. If now, the £110 be spent
as money, they cease to play their part. They are no longer capital. Withdrawn from circulation,
they become petrified into a hoard, and though they remained in that state till doomsday, not a
single farthing would accrue to them. If, then, the expansion of value is once aimed at, there is
just the same inducement to augment the value of the £110 as that of the £100; for both are but
limited expressions for exchange-value, and therefore both have the same vocation to approach,
by quantitative increase, as near as possible to absolute wealth. Momentarily, indeed, the value
originally advanced, the £100 is distinguishable from the surplus-value of £10 that is annexed to
it during circulation; but the distinction vanishes immediately. At the end of the process, we do
not receive with one hand the original £100, and with the other, the surplus-value of £10. We
simply get a value of £110, which is in exactly the same condition and fitness for commencing
the expanding process, as the original £100 was. Money ends the movement only to begin it
again. 5 Therefore, the final result of every separate circuit, in which a purchase and consequent
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sale are completed, forms of itself the starting-point of a new circuit. The simple circulation of
commodities - selling in order to buy - is a means of carrying out a purpose unconnected with
circulation, namely, the appropriation of use-values, the satisfaction of wants. The circulation of
money as capital is, on the contrary, an end in itself, for the expansion of value takes place only
within this constantly renewed movement. The circulation of capital has therefore no limits.6
As the conscious representative of this movement, the possessor of money becomes a capitalist.
His person, or rather his pocket, is the point from which the money starts and to which it returns.
The expansion of value, which is the objective basis or main-spring of the circulation M-C-M,
becomes his subjective aim, and it is only in so far as the appropriation of ever more and more
wealth in the abstract becomes the sole motive of his operations, that he functions as a capitalist,
that is, as capital personified and endowed with consciousness and a will. Use-values must
therefore never be looked upon as the real aim of the capitalist; 7 neither must the profit on any
single transaction. The restless never-ending process of profit-making alone is what he aims at. 8
This boundless greed after riches, this passionate chase after exchange-value 9, is common to the
capitalist and the miser; but while the miser is merely a capitalist gone mad, the capitalist is a
rational miser. The never-ending augmentation of exchange-value, which the miser strives after,
by seeking to save 10 his money from circulation, is attained by the more acute capitalist, by
constantly throwing it afresh into circulation.11
The independent form, i.e., the money-form, which the value of commodities assumes in the case
of simple circulation, serves only one purpose, namely, their exchange, and vanishes in the final
result of the movement. On the other hand, in the circulation M-C-M, both the money and the
commodity represent only different modes of existence of value itself, the money its general
mode, and the commodity its particular, or, so to say, disguised mode. 12 It is constantly changing
from one form to the other without thereby becoming lost, and thus assumes an automatically
active character. If now we take in turn each of the two different forms which self-expanding
value successively assumes in the course of its life, we then arrive at these two propositions:
Capital is money: Capital is commodities.13 In truth, however, value is here the active factor in a
process, in which, while constantly assuming the form in turn of money and commodities, it at
the same time changes in magnitude, differentiates itself by throwing off surplus-value from
itself; the original value, in other words, expands spontaneously. For the movement, in the course
of which it adds surplus-value, is its own movement, its expansion, therefore, is automatic
expansion. Because it is value, it has acquired the occult quality of being able to add value to
itself. It brings forth living offspring, or, at the least, lays golden eggs.
Value, therefore, being the active factor in such a process, and assuming at one time the form of
money, at another that of commodities, but through all these changes preserving itself and
expanding, it requires some independent form, by means of which its identity may at any time be
established. And this form it possesses only in the shape of money. It is under the form of money
that value begins and ends, and begins again, every act of its own spontaneous generation. It
began by being £100, it is now £110, and so on. But the money itself is only one of the two forms
of value. Unless it takes the form of some commodity, it does not become capital. There is here
no antagonism, as in the case of hoarding, between the money and commodities. The capitalist
knows that all commodities, however scurvy they may look, or however badly they may smell,
are in faith and in truth money, inwardly circumcised Jews, and what is more, a wonderful means
whereby out of money to make more money.
In simple circulation, C-M-C, the value of commodities attained at the most a form independent
of their use-values, i.e., the form of money; but that same value now in the circulation M-C-M, or
the circulation of capital, suddenly presents itself as an independent substance, endowed with a
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motion of its own, passing through a life-process of its own, in which money and commodities
are mere forms which it assumes and casts off in turn. Nay, more: instead of simply representing
the relations of commodities, it enters now, so to say, into private relations with itself. It
differentiates itself as original value from itself as surplus-value; as the father differentiates
himself from himself qua the son, yet both are one and of one age: for only by the surplus-value
of £10 does the £100 originally advanced become capital, and so soon as this takes place, so soon
as the son, and by the son, the father, is begotten, so soon does their difference vanish, and they
again become one, £110.
Value therefore now becomes value in process, money in process, and, as such, capital. It comes
out of circulation, enters into it again, preserves and multiplies itself within its circuit, comes back
out of it with expanded bulk, and begins the same round ever afresh.14 M-M', money which
begets money, such is the description of Capital from the mouths of its first interpreters, the
Mercantilists.
Buying in order to sell, or, more accurately, buying in order to sell dearer, M-C-M', appears
certainly to be a form peculiar to one kind of capital alone, namely, merchants’ capital. But
industrial capital too is money, that is changed into commodities, and by the sale of these
commodities, is re-converted into more money. The events that take place outside the sphere of
circulation, in the interval between the buying and selling, do not affect the form of this
movement. Lastly, in the case of interest-bearing capital, the circulation M-C-M' appears
abridged. We have its result without the intermediate stage, in the form M-M', “en style lapidaire”
so to say, money that is worth more money, value that is greater than itself.
M-C-M' is therefore in reality the general formula of capital as it appears prima facie within the
sphere of circulation.
1

The contrast between the power, based on the personal relations of dominion and servitude, that is
conferred by landed property, and the impersonal power that is given by money, is well expressed by
the two French proverbs, “Nulle terre sans seigneur,” and “L’argent n’a pas de maître,” – “No land
without its lord,” and “Money has no master.”
2
“Avec de l’argent on achète des marchandises et avec des marchandises on achète de l’argent.”
[“With money one buys commodities, and with commodities one buys money”] (Mercier de la
Rivière: “L’ordre naturel et essentiel des sociétés politiques,” p. 543.)
3
“When a thing is bought in order to be sold again, the sum employed is called money advanced;
when it is bought not to be sold, it may be said to be expended.” — (James Steuart: “Works,” &c.
Edited by Gen. Sir James Steuart, his son. Lond., 1805, V. I., p. 274.)
4
“On n’échange pas de l’argent contre de l’argent,” [“One does not exchange money for money,”]
says Mercier de la Rivière to the Mercantilists (l.c., p. 486.) In a work, which, ex professo treats of
“trade” and “speculation,” occurs the following: “All trade consists in the exchange of things of
different kinds; and the advantage” (to the merchant?) “arises out of this difference. To exchange a
pound of bread against a pound of bread ... would be attended with no advantage; ... Hence trade is
advantageously contrasted with gambling, which consists in a mere exchange of money for money.”
(Th. Corbet, “An Inquiry into the Causes and Modes of the Wealth of Individuals; or the Principles of
Trade and Speculation Explained.” London, 1841, p. 5.) Although Corbet does not see that M-M, the
exchange of money for money, is the characteristic form of circulation, not only of merchants’ capital
but of all capital, yet at least he acknowledges that this form is common to gambling and to one
species of trade, viz., speculation: but then comes MacCulloch and makes out, that to buy in order to
sell, is to speculate, and thus the difference between Speculation and Trade vanishes. “Every
transaction in which an individual buys produce in order to sell it again, is, in fact, a speculation.”
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(MacCulloch: “A Dictionary Practical, &c., of Commerce.” Lond., 1847, p. 1009.) With much more
naiveté, Pinto, the Pindar of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, remarks, “Le commerce est un jeu:
(taken from Locke) et ce n’est pas avec des gueux qu’on peut gagner. Si l’on gagnait longtemps en
tout avec tous, il faudrait rendre de bon accord les plus grandes parties du profit pour recommencer le
jeu.” [“Trade is a game, and nothing can be won from beggars. If one won everything from everybody
all the time, it would be necessary to give back the greater part of the profit voluntarily, in order to
begin the game again”] (Pinto: “Traité de la Circulation et du Crédit.” Amsterdam, 1771. p. 231,)
5
“Capital is divisible ... into the original capital and the profit, the increment to the capital ... although
in practice this profit is immediately turned into capital, and set in motion with the original.” (F.
Engels, “Umrisse zu einer Kritik der Nationalökonomie, in: Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher,
herausgegeben von Arnold Ruge und Karl Marx.” Paris, 1844, p. 99.)
6
Aristotle opposes Oeconomic to Chrematistic. He starts from the former. So far as it is the art of
gaining a livelihood, it is limited to procuring those articles that are necessary to existence, and
useful either to a household or the state. “True wealth (o aleqinos ploutos) consists of such values
in use; for the quantity of possessions of this kind, capable of making life pleasant, is not
unlimited. There is, however, a second mode of acquiring things, to which we may by preference
and with correctness give the name of Chrematistic, and in this case there appear to be no limits
to riches and possessions. Trade (e kapelike is literally retail trade, and Aristotle takes this kind
because in it values in use predominate) does not in its nature belong to Chrematistic, for here the
exchange has reference only to what is necessary to themselves (the buyer or seller).” Therefore,
as he goes on to show, the original form of trade was barter, but with the extension of the latter,
there arose the necessity for money. On the discovery of money, barter of necessity developed
into kapelike, into trading in commodities, and this again, in opposition to its original tendency,
grew into Chrematistic, into the art of making money. Now Chrematistic is distinguishable from
Oeconomic in this way, that “in the case of Chrematistic circulation is the source of riches
poietike crematon ... dia chrematon diaboles. And it appears to revolve about money, for money
is the beginning and end of this kind of exchange (to nomisma stoiceion tes allages estin).
Therefore also riches, such as Chrematistic strives for, are unlimited. Just as every art that is not a
means to an end, but an end in itself, has no limit to its aims, because it seeks constantly to
approach nearer and nearer to that end, while those arts that pursue means to an end, are not
boundless, since the goal itself imposes a limit upon them, so with Chrematistic, there are no
bounds to its aims, these aims being absolute wealth. Oeconomic not Chrematistic has a limit ...
the object of the former is something different from money, of the latter the augmentation of
money.... By confounding these two forms, which overlap each other, some people have been led
to look upon the preservation and increase of money ad infinitum as the end and aim of
Oeconomic.” (Aristoteles, De Rep. edit. Bekker, lib. l.c. 8, 9. passim.)
7
“Commodities (here used in the sense of use-values) are not the terminating object of the trading
capitalist, money is his terminating object.” (Th. Chalmers, On Pol. Econ. &c., 2nd Ed., Glasgow,
1832, pp. 165, 166.)
8
“Il mercante non conta quasi per niente il lucro fatto, ma mira sempre al futuro.” [“The merchant
counts the money he has made as almost nothing; he always looks to the future.”] (A. Genovesi,
Lezioni di Economia Civile (1765), Custodi’s edit. of Italian Economists. Parte Moderna t. viii, p.
139.)
9
“The inextinguishable passion for gain, the auri sacra fames, will always lead capitalists.”
(MacCulloch: “The Principles of Polit. Econ.” London, 1830, p. 179.) This view, of course, does not
prevent the same MacCulloch and others of his kidney, when in theoretical difficulties, such, for
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example, as the question of over-production, from transforming the same capitalist into a moral
citizen, whose sole concern is for use-values, and who even develops an insatiable hunger for boots,
hats, eggs, calico, and other extremely familiar sorts of use-values.
10
Sozein is a characteristic Greek expression for hoarding. So in English to save has the same
two meanings: sauver and épargner.
11
“Questo infinito che le cose non hanno in progresso, hanno in giro.” [“That infinity which things do
not possess, they possess in circulation.”] (Galiani.)
12
“Ce n’est pas la matière qui fait le capital, mais la valeur de ces matières.” [“It is not matter which
makes capital, but the value of that matter.”] (J. B. Say: “Traité d’Econ. Polit.” 3ème éd. Paris, 1817,
t. II., p. 429.)
13
“Currency (!) employed in producing articles... is capital.” (Macleod: “The Theory and Practice of
Banking.” London, 1855, v. 1, ch. i, p. 55.) “Capital is commodities.” (James Mill: “Elements of Pol.
Econ.” Lond., 1821, p. 74.)
14
Capital: “portion fructifiante de la richesse accumulée... valeur permanente, multipliante.”
(Sismondi: “Nouveaux Principes d’Econ. Polit.,” t. i., p. 88, 89.)

Chapter 5: Contradictions in the General
Formula of Capital
The form which circulation takes when money becomes capital, is opposed to all the laws we
have hitherto investigated bearing on the nature of commodities, value and money, and even of
circulation itself. What distinguishes this form from that of the simple circulation of commodities,
is the inverted order of succession of the two antithetical processes, sale and purchase. How can
this purely formal distinction between these processes change their character as it were by magic?
But that is not all. This inversion has no existence for two out of the three persons who transact
business together. As capitalist, I buy commodities from A and sell them again to B, but as a
simple owner of commodities, I sell them to B and then purchase fresh ones from A. A and B see
no difference between the two sets of transactions. They are merely buyers or sellers. And I on
each occasion meet them as a mere owner of either money or commodities, as a buyer or a seller,
and, what is more, in both sets of transactions, I am opposed to A only as a buyer and to B only as
a seller, to the one only as money, to the other only as commodities, and to neither of them as
capital or a capitalist, or as representative of anything that is more than money or commodities, or
that can produce any effect beyond what money and commodities can. For me the purchase from
A and the sale to B are part of a series. But the connexion between the two acts exists for me
alone. A does not trouble himself about my transaction with B, nor does B about my business
with A. And if I offered to explain to them the meritorious nature of my action in inverting the
order of succession, they would probably point out to me that I was mistaken as to that order of
succession, and that the whole transaction, instead of beginning with a purchase and ending with
a sale, began, on the contrary, with a sale and was concluded with a purchase. In truth, my first
act, the purchase, was from the standpoint of A, a sale, and my second act, the sale, was from the
standpoint of B, a purchase. Not content with that, A and B would declare that the whole series
was superfluous and nothing but Hokus Pokus; that for the future A would buy direct from B, and
B sell direct to A. Thus the whole transaction would be reduced to a single act forming an
isolated, non-complemented phase in the ordinary circulation of commodities, a mere sale from
A’s point of view, and from B’s, a mere purchase. The inversion, therefore, of the order of
succession, does not take us outside the sphere of the simple circulation of commodities, and we
must rather look, whether there is in this simple circulation anything permitting an expansion of
the value that enters into circulation, and, consequently, a creation of surplus-value.
Let us take the process of circulation in a form under which it presents itself as a simple and
direct exchange of commodities. This is always the case when two owners of commodities buy
from each other, and on the settling day the amounts mutually owing are equal and cancel each
other. The money in this case is money of account and serves to express the value of the
commodities by their prices, but is not, itself, in the shape of hard cash, confronted with them. So
far as regards use-values, it is clear that both parties may gain some advantage. Both part with
goods that, as use-values, are of no service to them, and receive others that they can make use of.
And there may also be a further gain. A, who sells wine and buys corn, possibly produces more
wine, with given labour-time, than farmer B could, and B on the other hand, more corn than
wine-grower A could. A, therefore, may get, for the same exchange-value, more corn, and B
more wine, than each would respectively get without any exchange by producing his own corn
and wine. With reference, therefore, to use-value, there is good ground for saying that “exchange
is a transaction by which both sides gain.” 1 It is otherwise with exchange-value. “A man who has
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plenty of wine and no corn treats with a man who has plenty of corn and no wine; an exchange
takes place between them of corn to the value of 50, for wine of the same value. This act
produces no increase of exchange-value either for the one or the other; for each of them already
possessed, before the exchange, a value equal to that which he acquired by means of that
operation.” 2 The result is not altered by introducing money, as a medium of circulation, between
the commodities, and making the sale and the purchase two distinct acts.3 The value of a
commodity is expressed in its price before it goes into circulation, and is therefore a precedent
condition of circulation, not its result.4
Abstractedly considered, that is, apart from circumstances not immediately flowing from the laws
of the simple circulation of commodities, there is in an exchange nothing (if we except the
replacing of one use-value by another) but a metamorphosis, a mere change in the form of the
commodity. The same exchange-value, i.e., the same quantity of incorporated social labour,
remains throughout in the hands of the owner of the commodity, first in the shape of his own
commodity, then in the form of the money for which he exchanged it, and lastly, in the shape of
the commodity he buys with that money. This change of form does not imply a change in the
magnitude of the value. But the change, which the value of the commodity undergoes in this
process, is limited to a change in its money-form. This form exists first as the price of the
commodity offered for sale, then as an actual sum of money, which, however, was already
expressed in the price, and lastly, as the price of an equivalent commodity. This change of form
no more implies, taken alone, a change in the quantity of value, than does the change of a £5 note
into sovereigns, half sovereigns and shillings. So far therefore as the circulation of commodities
effects a change in the form alone of their values, and is free from disturbing influences, it must
be the exchange of equivalents. Little as Vulgar-Economy knows about the nature of value, yet
whenever it wishes to consider the phenomena of circulation in their purity, it assumes that
supply and demand are equal, which amounts to this, that their effect is nil. If therefore, as
regards the use-values exchanged, both buyer and seller may possibly gain something, this is not
the case as regards the exchange-values. Here we must rather say, “Where equality exists there
can be no gain.” 5 It is true, commodities may be sold at prices deviating from their values, but
these deviations are to be considered as infractions of the laws of the exchange of commodities6,
which in its normal state is an exchange of equivalents, consequently, no method for increasing
value. 7
Hence, we see that behind all attempts to represent the circulation of commodities as a source of
surplus-value, there lurks a quid pro quo, a mixing up of use-value and exchange-value. For
instance, Condillac says: “It is not true that on an exchange of commodities we give value for
value. On the contrary, each of the two contracting parties in every case, gives a less for a greater
value. ... If we really exchanged equal values, neither party could make a profit. And yet, they
both gain, or ought to gain. Why? The value of a thing consists solely in its relation to our wants.
What is more to the one is less to the other, and vice versâ. ... It is not to be assumed that we offer
for sale articles required for our own consumption. ... We wish to part with a useless thing, in
order to get one that we need; we want to give less for more. ... It was natural to think that, in an
exchange, value was given for value, whenever each of the articles exchanged was of equal value
with the same quantity of gold. ... But there is another point to be considered in our calculation.
The question is, whether we both exchange something superfluous for something necessary.” 8
We see in this passage, how Condillac not only confuses use-value with exchange-value, but in a
really childish manner assumes, that in a society, in which the production of commodities is well
developed, each producer produces his own means of subsistence, and throws into circulation
only the excess over his own requirements 9 Still, Condillac’s argument is frequently used by
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modern economists, more especially when the point is to show, that the exchange of commodities
in its developed form, commerce, is productive of surplus-value. For instance, “Commerce ...
adds value to products, for the same products in the hands of consumers, are worth more than in
the hands of producers, and it may strictly be considered an act of production.” 10 But
commodities are not paid for twice over, once on account of their use-value, and again on account
of their value. And though the use-value of a commodity is more serviceable to the buyer than to
the seller, its money-form is more serviceable to the seller. Would he otherwise sell it? We might
therefore just as well say that the buyer performs “strictly an act of production,” by converting
stockings, for example, into money.
If commodities, or commodities and money, of equal exchange-value, and consequently
equivalents, are exchanged, it is plain that no one abstracts more value from, than he throws into,
circulation. There is no creation of surplus-value. And, in its normal form, the circulation of
commodities demands the exchange of equivalents. But in actual practice, the process does not
retain its normal form. Let us, therefore, assume an exchange of non-equivalents.
In any case the market for commodities is only frequented by owners of commodities, and the
power which these persons exercise over each other, is no other than the power of their
commodities. The material variety of these commodities is the material incentive to the act of
exchange, and makes buyers and sellers mutually dependent, because none of them possesses the
object of his own wants, and each holds in his hand the object of another’s wants. Besides these
material differences of their use-values, there is only one other difference between commodities,
namely, that between their bodily form and the form into which they are converted by sale, the
difference between commodities and money. And consequently the owners of commodities are
distinguishable only as sellers, those who own commodities, and buyers, those who own money.
Suppose then, that by some inexplicable privilege, the seller is enabled to sell his commodities
above their value, what is worth 100 for 110, in which case the price is nominally raised 10%.
The seller therefore pockets a surplus-value of 10. But after he has sold he becomes a buyer. A
third owner of commodities comes to him now as seller, who in this capacity also enjoys the
privilege of selling his commodities 10% too dear. Our friend gained 10 as a seller only to lose it
again as a buyer. 11 The net result is, that all owners of commodities sell their goods to one
another at 10% above their value, which comes precisely to the same as if they sold them at their
true value. Such a general and nominal rise of prices has the same effect as if the values had been
expressed in weight of silver instead of in weight of gold. The nominal prices of commodities
would rise, but the real relation between their values would remain unchanged.
Let us make the opposite assumption, that the buyer has the privilege of purchasing commodities
under their value. In this case it is no longer necessary to bear in mind that he in his turn will
become a seller. He was so before he became buyer; he had already lost 10% in selling before he
gained 10% as buyer. 12 Everything is just as it was.
The creation of surplus-value, and therefore the conversion of money into capital, can
consequently be explained neither on the assumption that commodities are sold above their value,
nor that they are bought below their value.13
The problem is in no way simplified by introducing irrelevant matters after the manner of Col.
Torrens: “Effectual demand consists in the power and inclination (!), on the part of consumers, to
give for commodities, either by immediate or circuitous barter, some greater portion of ... capital
than their production costs.” 14 In relation to circulation, producers and consumers meet only as
buyers and sellers. To assert that the surplus-value acquired by the producer has its origin in the
fact that consumers pay for commodities more than their value, is only to say in other words: The
owner of commodities possesses, as a seller, the privilege of selling too dear. The seller has
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himself produced the commodities or represents their producer, but the buyer has to no less extent
produced the commodities represented by his money, or represents their producer. The distinction
between them is, that one buys and the other sells. The fact that the owner of the commodities,
under the designation of producer, sells them over their value, and under the designation of
consumer, pays too much for them, does not carry us a single step further.15
To be consistent therefore, the upholders of the delusion that surplus-value has its origin in a
nominal rise of prices or in the privilege which the seller has of selling too dear, must assume the
existence of a class that only buys and does not sell, i.e., only consumes and does not produce.
The existence of such a class is inexplicable from the standpoint we have so far reached, viz., that
of simple circulation. But let us anticipate. The money with which such a class is constantly
making purchases, must constantly flow into their pockets, without any exchange, gratis, by
might or right, from the pockets of the commodity-owners themselves. To sell commodities
above their value to such a class, is only to crib back again a part of the money previously given
to it. 16 The towns of Asia Minor thus paid a yearly money tribute to ancient Rome. With this
money Rome purchased from them commodities, and purchased them too dear. The provincials
cheated the Romans, and thus got back from their conquerors, in the course of trade, a portion of
the tribute. Yet, for all that, the conquered were the really cheated. Their goods were still paid for
with their own money. That is not the way to get rich or to create surplus-value.
Let us therefore keep within the bounds of exchange where sellers are also buyers, and buyers,
sellers. Our difficulty may perhaps have arisen from treating the actors as personifications instead
of as individuals.
A may be clever enough to get the advantage of B or C without their being able to retaliate. A
sells wine worth £40 to B, and obtains from him in exchange corn to the value of £50. A has
converted his £40 into £50, has made more money out of less, and has converted his commodities
into capital. Let us examine this a little more closely. Before the exchange we had £40 worth of
wine in the hands of A, and £50 worth of corn in those of B, a total value of £90. After the
exchange we have still the same total value of £90. The value in circulation has not increased by
one iota, it is only distributed differently between A and B. What is a loss of value to B is surplusvalue to A; what is “minus” to one is “plus” to the other. The same change would have taken
place, if A, without the formality of an exchange, had directly stolen the £10 from B. The sum of
the values in circulation can clearly not be augmented by any change in their distribution, any
more than the quantity of the precious metals in a country by a Jew selling a Queen Anne’s
farthing for a guinea. The capitalist class, as a whole, in any country, cannot over-reach
themselves. 17
Turn and twist then as we may, the fact remains unaltered. If equivalents are exchanged, no
surplus-value results, and if non-equivalents are exchanged, still no surplus-value. 18 Circulation,
or the exchange of commodities, begets no value.19
The reason is now therefore plain why, in analysing the standard form of capital, the form under
which it determines the economic organisation of modern society, we entirely left out of
consideration its most popular, and, so to say, antediluvian forms, merchants’ capital and moneylenders’ capital.
The circuit M-C-M, buying in order to sell dearer, is seen most clearly in genuine merchants’
capital. But the movement takes place entirely within the sphere of circulation. Since, however, it
is impossible, by circulation alone, to account for the conversion of money into capital, for the
formation of surplus-value, it would appear, that merchants’ capital is an impossibility, so long as
equivalents are exchanged; 20 that, therefore, it can only have its origin in the two-fold advantage
gained, over both the selling and the buying producers, by the merchant who parasitically shoves
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himself in between them. It is in this sense that Franklin says, “war is robbery, commerce is
generally cheating.” 21 If the transformation of merchants’ money into capital is to be explained
otherwise than by the producers being simply cheated, a long series of intermediate steps would
be necessary, which, at present, when the simple circulation of commodities forms our only
assumption, are entirely wanting.
What we have said with reference to merchants’ capital, applies still more to
money-lenders’ capital. In merchants’ capital, the two extremes, the money that is
thrown upon the market, and the augmented money that is withdrawn from the
market, are at least connected by a purchase and a sale, in other words by the
movement of the circulation. In money-lenders’ capital the form M-C-M is
reduced to the two extremes without a mean, M-M , money exchanged for more
money, a form that is incompatible with the nature of money, and therefore
remains inexplicable from the standpoint of the circulation of commodities. Hence
Aristotle: “since chrematistic is a double science, one part belonging to
commerce, the other to economic, the latter being necessary and praiseworthy, the
former based on circulation and with justice disapproved (for it is not based on
Nature, but on mutual cheating), therefore the usurer is most rightly hated,
because money itself is the source of his gain, and is not used for the purposes for
which it was invented. For it originated for the exchange of commodities, but
interest makes out of money, more money. Hence its name (τοκος interest and
offspring). For the begotten are like those who beget them. But interest is money
of money, so that of all modes of making a living, this is the most contrary to
Nature.” 22
In the course of our investigation, we shall find that both merchants’ capital and interest-bearing
capital are derivative forms, and at the same time it will become clear, why these two forms
appear in the course of history before the modern standard form of capital.
We have shown that surplus-value cannot be created by circulation, and, therefore, that in its
formation, something must take place in the background, which is not apparent in the circulation
itself. 23 But can surplus-value possibly originate anywhere else than in circulation, which is the
sum total of all the mutual relations of commodity-owners, as far as they are determined by their
commodities? Apart from circulation, the commodity-owner is in relation only with his own
commodity. So far as regards value, that relation is limited to this, that the commodity contains a
quantity of his own labour, that quantity being measured by a definite social standard. This
quantity is expressed by the value of the commodity, and since the value is reckoned in money of
account, this quantity is also expressed by the price, which we will suppose to be £10. But his
labour is not represented both by the value of the commodity, and by a surplus over that value,
not by a price of 10 that is also a price of 11, not by a value that is greater than itself. The
commodity owner can, by his labour, create value, but not self-expanding value. He can increase
the value of his commodity, by adding fresh labour, and therefore more value to the value in
hand, by making, for instance, leather into boots. The same material has now more value, because
it contains a greater quantity of labour. The boots have therefore more value than the leather, but
the value of the leather remains what it was; it has not expanded itself, has not, during the making
of the boots, annexed surplus-value. It is therefore impossible that outside the sphere of
circulation, a producer of commodities can, without coming into contact with other commodityowners, expand value, and consequently convert money or commodities into capital.
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It is therefore impossible for capital to be produced by circulation, and it is equally impossible for
it to originate apart from circulation. It must have its origin both in circulation and yet not in
circulation.
We have, therefore, got a double result.
The conversion of money into capital has to be explained on the basis of the laws that regulate the
exchange of commodities, in such a way that the starting-point is the exchange of equivalents. 24
Our friend, Moneybags, who as yet is only an embryo capitalist, must buy his commodities at
their value, must sell them at their value, and yet at the end of the process must withdraw more
value from circulation than he threw into it at starting. His development into a full-grown
capitalist must take place, both within the sphere of circulation and without it. These are the
conditions of the problem. Hic Rhodus, hic salta! 25
1

“L’échange est une transaction admirable dans laquelle les deux contractants gagnent - toujours (!)”
[“Exchange is a transaction in which the two contracting parties always gain, both of them (!)”]
(Destutt de Tracy: “Traité de la Volonté et de ses effets.” Paris, 1826, p. 68.) This work appeared
afterwards as “Traité d’Econ. Polit.”
2
“Mercier de la Rivière,” l. c., p. 544.
3
“Que l’une de ces deux valeurs soit argent, ou qu’elles soient toutes deux marchandises usuelles, rien
de plus indifférent en soi.” [“Whether one of those two values is money, or they are both ordinary
commodities, is in itself a matter of complete indifference.”] (“Mercier de la Rivière,” l.c., p. 543.)
4
“Ce ne sont pas les contractants qui prononcent sur la valeur; elle est décidée avant la convention.”
[“It is not the parties to a contract who decide on the value; that has been decided before the
contract.”] (Le Trosne, p. 906.)
5
“Dove è egualità non è lucro.” (Galiani, “Della Moneta in Custodi, Parte Moderna,” t. iv., p. 244.)
6
“L’échange devient désavantageux pour l’une des parties, lorsque quelque chose étrangère vient
diminuer ou exagérer le prix; alors l’égalité est blessée, mais la lésion procède de cette cause et non de
l’échange.” [“The exchange becomes unfavourable for one of the parties when some external
circumstance comes to lessen or increase the price; then equality is infringed, but this infringement
arises from that cause and not from the exchange itself.”] (Le Trosne, l.c., p. 904.)
7
“L’échange est de sa nature un contrat d’égalité qui se fait de valeur pour valeur égale. Il n’est donc
pas un moyen de s’enrichir, puisque l’on donne autant que l’on reçoit.” [“Exchange is by its nature a
contract which rests on equality, i.e., it takes place between two equal values, and it is not a means of
self-enrichment, since as much is given as is received.”] (Le Trosne, l.c., p. 903.)
8
Condillac: “Le Commerce et le Gouvernement” (1776). Edit. Daire et Molinari in the “Mélanges
d’Econ. Polit.” Paris, 1847, pp. 267, 291.
9
Le Trosne, therefore, answers his friend Condillac with justice as follows: “Dans une ... société
formée il n’y a pas de surabondant en aucun genre.” [“In a developed society absolutely nothing is
superfluous.”] At the same time, in a bantering way, he remarks: “If both the persons who exchange
receive more to an equal amount, and part with less to an equal amount, they both get the same.” It is
because Condillac has not the remotest idea of the nature of exchange-value that he has been chosen
by Herr Professor Wilhelm Roscher as a proper person to answer for the soundness of his own
childish notions. See Roscher’s “Die Grundlagen der Nationalökonomie, Dritte Auflage,” 1858.
10
S. P. Newman: “Elements of Polit. Econ.” Andover and New York, 1835, p. 175.
11
“By the augmentation of the nominal value of the produce... sellers not enriched... since what they
gain as sellers, they precisely expend in the quality of buyers.” (“The Essential Principles of the
Wealth of Nations.” &c., London, 1797, p. 66.)

117
12

Chapter 5

“Si l’on est forcé de donner pour 18 livres une quantité de telle production qui en valait 24,
lorsqu’on employera ce même argent à acheter, on aura également pour 18 l. ce que l’on payait 24.”
[“If one is compelled to sell a quantity of a certain product for 18 livres when it has a value of 24
livres, when one employs the same amount of money in buying, one will receive for 18 livres the
same quantity of the product as 24 livres would have bought otherwise.”] (Le Trosne, I. c., p. 897.)
13
“Chaque vendeur ne peut donc parvenir à renchérir habituellement ses marchandises, qu’en se
soumettant aussi à payer habituellement plus cher les marchandises des autres vendeurs; et par la
même raison, chaque consommateur ne peut payer habituellement moins cher ce qu’il achète, qu’en se
soumettant aussi à une diminution semblable sur le prix des choses qu’il vend.” [“A seller can
normally only succeed in raising the prices of his commodities if he agrees to pay, by and large, more
for the commodities of the other sellers; and for the same reason a consumer can normally only pay
less for his purchases if he submits to a similar reduction in the prices of the things he sells.”] (Mercier
de la Rivière, l.c., p. 555.)
14
Torrens. “An Essay on the Production of Wealth.” London, 1821, p. 349.
15
“The idea of profits being paid by the consumers, is, assuredly, very absurd. Who are the
consumers?” (G. Ramsay: “An Essay on the Distribution of Wealth.” Edinburgh, 1836, p. 183.)
16
“When a man is in want of a demand, does Mr. Malthus recommend him to pay some other person
to take off his goods?” is a question put by an angry disciple of Ricardo to Malthus, who, like his
disciple, Parson Chalmers, economically glorifies this class of simple buyers or consumers. (See “An
Inquiry into those Principles Respecting the Nature of Demand and the Necessity of Consumption,
lately advocated by Mr. Malthus,” &c. Lond., 1821, p. 55.)
17
Destutt de Tracy, although, or perhaps because, he was a member of the Institute, held the opposite
view. He says, industrial capitalists make profits because “they all sell for more than it has cost to
produce. And to whom do they sell? In the first instance to one another.” (I. c., p. 239.)
18
“L’échange qui se fait de deux valeurs égales n’augmente ni ne diminue la masse des valeurs
subsistantes dans la société. L’échange de deux valeurs inégales ... ne change rien non plus à la
somme des valeurs sociales, bien qu’il ajoute à la fortune de l’un ce qu’il ôte de la fortune de l’autre.”
[“The exchange of two equal values neither increases nor diminishes the amount of the values
available in society. Nor does the exchange of two unequal values ... change anything in the sum of
social values, although it adds to the wealth of one person what it removes from the wealth of
another.”] (J. B. Say, l.c., t. II, pp. 443, 444.) Say, not in the least troubled as to the consequences of
this statement, borrows it, almost word for word, from the Physiocrats. The following example will
show how Monsieur Say turned to account the writings of the Physiocrats, in his day quite forgotten,
for the purpose of expanding the “value” of his own. His most celebrated saying, “On n’achète des
produits qu’avec des produits” [“Products can only be bought with products.”](l.c., t. II. p. 441.) runs
as follows in the original physiocratic work: “Les productions ne se paient qu’avec des productions.”
[“Products can only be paid for with products.”] (Le Trosne, l.c., p. 899.)
19
“Exchange confers no value at all upon products.” (F. Wayland: “The Elements of Political
Economy.” Boston, 1843, p. 169.)
20
Under the rule of invariable equivalents commerce would be impossible. (G. Opdyke: “A Treatise
on Polit. Economy.” New York, 1851, pp. 66-69.) “The difference between real value and exchangevalue is based upon this fact, namely, that the value of a thing is different from the so-called
equivalent given for it in trade, i.e., that this equivalent is no equivalent.” (F. Engels, l.c., p. 96).
21
Benjamin Franklin: Works, Vol. II, edit. Sparks in “Positions to be examined concerning National
Wealth,” p. 376.
22
Aristotle, I. c., c. 10.
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“Profit, in the usual condition of the market, is not made by exchanging. Had it not existed before,
neither could it after that transaction.” (Ramsay, l.c., p. 184.)
24
From the foregoing investigation, the reader will see that this statement only means that the
formation of capital must be possible even though the price and value of a commodity be the same; for
its formation cannot be attributed to any deviation of the one from the other. If prices actually differ
from values, we must, first of all, reduce the former to the latter, in other words, treat the difference as
accidental in order that the phenomena may be observed in their purity, and our observations not
interfered with by disturbing circumstances that have nothing to do with the process in question. We
know, moreover, that this reduction is no mere scientific process. The continual oscillations in prices,
their rising and falling, compensate each other, and reduce themselves to an average price, which is
their hidden regulator. It forms the guiding star of the merchant or the manufacturer in every
undertaking that requires time. He knows that when a long period of time is taken, commodities are
sold neither over nor under, but at their average price. If therefore he thought about the matter at all,
he would formulate the problem of the formation of capital as follows: How can we account for the
origin of capital on the supposition that prices are regulated by the average price, i. e., ultimately by
the value of the commodities? I say “ultimately,” because average prices do not directly coincide with
the values of commodities, as Adam Smith, Ricardo, and others believe.
25
“Hic Rhodus, hic saltus!” – Latin, usually translated: “Rhodes is here, here is where you jump!”
Originates from the traditional Latin translation of the punch line from Aesop’s fable The Boastful
Athlete which has been the subject of some mistranslations. In Greek, the maxim reads:
“ιδού η ρόδος,
ιδού και το πήδημα”
The story is that an athlete boasts that when in Rhodes, he performed a stupendous jump, and that
there were witnesses who could back up his story. A bystander then remarked, ‘Alright! Let’s say this
is Rhodes, demonstrate the jump here and now.’ The fable shows that people must be known by their
deeds, not by their own claims for themselves. In the context in which Hegel used it in the Philosophy
of Right, this could be taken to mean that the philosophy of right must have to do with the actuality of
modern society, not the theories and ideals that societies create for themselves, nor, as Hegel goes on
to say, to “teach the world what it ought to be.”
The epigram is given by Hegel first in Greek, then in Latin (in the form “Hic Rhodus, hic saltus”), and
he then says: “With little change, the above saying would read (in German): “Hier ist die Rose, hier
tanze”: “Here is the rose, dance here”
This is taken to be an allusion to the ‘rose in the cross’ of the Rosicrucians (who claimed to possess
esoteric knowledge with which they could transform social life), implying that the material for
understanding and changing society is given in society itself, not in some other-worldly theory,
punning first on the Greek (Rhodos = Rhodes, rhodon = rose), then on the Latin (saltus = jump
[noun], salta = dance [imperative]). [MIA Editors.]

Chapter 6: The Buying and Selling of LabourPower
The change of value that occurs in the case of money intended to be converted into capital, cannot
take place in the money itself, since in its function of means of purchase and of payment, it does
no more than realise the price of the commodity it buys or pays for; and, as hard cash, it is value
petrified, never varying. 1 Just as little can it originate in the second act of circulation, the re-sale
of the commodity, which does no more than transform the article from its bodily form back again
into its money-form. The change must, therefore, take place in the commodity bought by the first
act, M-C, but not in its value, for equivalents are exchanged, and the commodity is paid for at its
full value. We are, therefore, forced to the conclusion that the change originates in the use-value,
as such, of the commodity, i.e., in its consumption. In order to be able to extract value from the
consumption of a commodity, our friend, Moneybags, must be so lucky as to find, within the
sphere of circulation, in the market, a commodity, whose use-value possesses the peculiar
property of being a source of value, whose actual consumption, therefore, is itself an embodiment
of labour, and, consequently, a creation of value. The possessor of money does find on the market
such a special commodity in capacity for labour or labour-power.
By labour-power or capacity for labour is to be understood the aggregate of those mental and
physical capabilities existing in a human being, which he exercises whenever he produces a usevalue of any description.
But in order that our owner of money may be able to find labour-power offered for sale as a
commodity, various conditions must first be fulfilled. The exchange of commodities of itself
implies no other relations of dependence than those which result from its own nature. On this
assumption, labour-power can appear upon the market as a commodity, only if, and so far as, its
possessor, the individual whose labour-power it is, offers it for sale, or sells it, as a commodity. In
order that he may be able to do this, he must have it at his disposal, must be the untrammelled
owner of his capacity for labour, i.e., of his person. 2 He and the owner of money meet in the
market, and deal with each other as on the basis of equal rights, with this difference alone, that
one is buyer, the other seller; both, therefore, equal in the eyes of the law. The continuance of this
relation demands that the owner of the labour-power should sell it only for a definite period, for if
he were to sell it rump and stump, once for all, he would be selling himself, converting himself
from a free man into a slave, from an owner of a commodity into a commodity. He must
constantly look upon his labour-power as his own property, his own commodity, and this he can
only do by placing it at the disposal of the buyer temporarily, for a definite period of time. By this
means alone can he avoid renouncing his rights of ownership over it. 3
The second essential condition to the owner of money finding labour-power in the market as a
commodity is this – that the labourer instead of being in the position to sell commodities in which
his labour is incorporated, must be obliged to offer for sale as a commodity that very labourpower, which exists only in his living self.
In order that a man may be able to sell commodities other than labour-power, he must of course
have the means of production, as raw material, implements, &c. No boots can be made without
leather. He requires also the means of subsistence. Nobody – not even “a musician of the future”
– can live upon future products, or upon use-values in an unfinished state; and ever since the first
moment of his appearance on the world’s stage, man always has been, and must still be a
consumer, both before and while he is producing. In a society where all products assume the form
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of commodities, these commodities must be sold after they have been produced, it is only after
their sale that they can serve in satisfying the requirements of their producer. The time necessary
for their sale is superadded to that necessary for their production.
For the conversion of his money into capital, therefore, the owner of money must meet in the
market with the free labourer, free in the double sense, that as a free man he can dispose of his
labour-power as his own commodity, and that on the other hand he has no other commodity for
sale, is short of everything necessary for the realisation of his labour-power.
The question why this free labourer confronts him in the market, has no interest for the owner of
money, who regards the labour-market as a branch of the general market for commodities. And
for the present it interests us just as little. We cling to the fact theoretically, as he does practically.
One thing, however, is clear – Nature does not produce on the one side owners of money or
commodities, and on the other men possessing nothing but their own labour-power. This relation
has no natural basis, neither is its social basis one that is common to all historical periods. It is
clearly the result of a past historical development, the product of many economic revolutions, of
the extinction of a whole series of older forms of social production.
So, too, the economic categories, already discussed by us, bear the stamp of history. Definite
historical conditions are necessary that a product may become a commodity. It must not be
produced as the immediate means of subsistence of the producer himself. Had we gone further,
and inquired under what circumstances all, or even the majority of products take the form of
commodities, we should have found that this can only happen with production of a very specific
kind, capitalist production. Such an inquiry, however, would have been foreign to the analysis of
commodities. Production and circulation of commodities can take place, although the great mass
of the objects produced are intended for the immediate requirements of their producers, are not
turned into commodities, and consequently social production is not yet by a long way dominated
in its length and breadth by exchange-value. The appearance of products as commodities presupposes such a development of the social division of labour, that the separation of use-value
from exchange-value, a separation which first begins with barter, must already have been
completed. But such a degree of development is common to many forms of society, which in
other respects present the most varying historical features. On the other hand, if we consider
money, its existence implies a definite stage in the exchange of commodities. The particular
functions of money which it performs, either as the mere equivalent of commodities, or as means
of circulation, or means of payment, as hoard or as universal money, point, according to the
extent and relative preponderance of the one function or the other, to very different stages in the
process of social production. Yet we know by experience that a circulation of commodities
relatively primitive, suffices for the production of all these forms. Otherwise with capital. The
historical conditions of its existence are by no means given with the mere circulation of money
and commodities. It can spring into life, only when the owner of the means of production and
subsistence meets in the market with the free labourer selling his labour-power. And this one
historical condition comprises a world’s history. Capital, therefore, announces from its first
appearance a new epoch in the process of social production.4
We must now examine more closely this peculiar commodity, labour-power. Like all others it has
a value. 5 How is that value determined?
The value of labour-power is determined, as in the case of every other commodity, by the labourtime necessary for the production, and consequently also the reproduction, of this special article.
So far as it has value, it represents no more than a definite quantity of the average labour of
society incorporated in it. Labour-power exists only as a capacity, or power of the living
individual. Its production consequently pre-supposes his existence. Given the individual, the
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production of labour-power consists in his reproduction of himself or his maintenance. For his
maintenance he requires a given quantity of the means of subsistence. Therefore the labour-time
requisite for the production of labour-power reduces itself to that necessary for the production of
those means of subsistence; in other words, the value of labour-power is the value of the means of
subsistence necessary for the maintenance of the labourer. Labour-power, however, becomes a
reality only by its exercise; it sets itself in action only by working. But thereby a definite quantity
of human muscle, nerve, brain, &c., is wasted, and these require to be restored. This increased
expenditure demands a larger income. 6 If the owner of labour-power works to-day, to-morrow he
must again be able to repeat the same process in the same conditions as regards health and
strength. His means of subsistence must therefore be sufficient to maintain him in his normal state
as a labouring individual. His natural wants, such as food, clothing, fuel, and housing, vary
according to the climatic and other physical conditions of his country. On the other hand, the
number and extent of his so-called necessary wants, as also the modes of satisfying them, are
themselves the product of historical development, and depend therefore to a great extent on the
degree of civilisation of a country, more particularly on the conditions under which, and
consequently on the habits and degree of comfort in which, the class of free labourers has been
formed. 7 In contradistinction therefore to the case of other commodities, there enters into the
determination of the value of labour-power a historical and moral element. Nevertheless, in a
given country, at a given period, the average quantity of the means of subsistence necessary for
the labourer is practically known.
The owner of labour-power is mortal. If then his appearance in the market is to be continuous,
and the continuous conversion of money into capital assumes this, the seller of labour-power
must perpetuate himself, “in the way that every living individual perpetuates himself, by
procreation.” 8 The labour-power withdrawn from the market by wear and tear and death, must be
continually replaced by, at the very least, an equal amount of fresh labour-power. Hence the sum
of the means of subsistence necessary for the production of labour-power must include the means
necessary for the labourer’s substitutes, i.e., his children, in order that this race of peculiar
commodity-owners may perpetuate its appearance in the market. 9
In order to modify the human organism, so that it may acquire skill and handiness in a given
branch of industry, and become labour-power of a special kind, a special education or training is
requisite, and this, on its part, costs an equivalent in commodities of a greater or less amount.
This amount varies according to the more or less complicated character of the labour-power. The
expenses of this education (excessively small in the case of ordinary labour-power), enter pro
tanto into the total value spent in its production.
The value of labour-power resolves itself into the value of a definite quantity of the means of
subsistence. It therefore varies with the value of these means or with the quantity of labour
requisite for their production.
Some of the means of subsistence, such as food and fuel, are consumed daily, and a fresh supply
must be provided daily. Others such as clothes and furniture last for longer periods and require to
be replaced only at longer intervals. One article must be bought or paid for daily, another weekly,
another quarterly, and so on. But in whatever way the sum total of these outlays may be spread
over the year, they must be covered by the average income, taking one day with another. If the
total of the commodities required daily for the production of labour-power = A, and those
required weekly = B, and those required quarterly = C, and so on, the daily average of these
commodities = (365A + 52B + 4C + &c) / 365. Suppose that in this mass of commodities
requisite for the average day there are embodied 6 hours of social labour, then there is
incorporated daily in labour-power half a day’s average social labour, in other words, half a day’s
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labour is requisite for the daily production of labour-power. This quantity of labour forms the
value of a day’s labour-power or the value of the labour-power daily reproduced. If half a day’s
average social labour is incorporated in three shillings, then three shillings is the price
corresponding to the value of a day’s labour-power. If its owner therefore offers it for sale at three
shillings a day, its selling price is equal to its value, and according to our supposition, our friend
Moneybags, who is intent upon converting his three shillings into capital, pays this value.
The minimum limit of the value of labour-power is determined by the value of the commodities,
without the daily supply of which the labourer cannot renew his vital energy, consequently by the
value of those means of subsistence that are physically indispensable. If the price of labour-power
fall to this minimum, it falls below its value, since under such circumstances it can be maintained
and developed only in a crippled state. But the value of every commodity is determined by the
labour-time requisite to turn it out so as to be of normal quality.
It is a very cheap sort of sentimentality which declares this method of determining the value of
labour-power, a method prescribed by the very nature of the case, to be a brutal method, and
which wails with Rossi that, “To comprehend capacity for labour (puissance de travail) at the
same time that we make abstraction from the means of subsistence of the labourers during the
process of production, is to comprehend a phantom (être de raison). When we speak of labour, or
capacity for labour, we speak at the same time of the labourer and his means of subsistence, of
labourer and wages.” 10 When we speak of capacity for labour, we do not speak of labour, any
more than when we speak of capacity for digestion, we speak of digestion. The latter process
requires something more than a good stomach. When we speak of capacity for labour, we do not
abstract from the necessary means of subsistence. On the contrary, their value is expressed in its
value. If his capacity for labour remains unsold, the labourer derives no benefit from it, but rather
he will feel it to be a cruel nature-imposed necessity that this capacity has cost for its production a
definite amount of the means of subsistence and that it will continue to do so for its reproduction.
He will then agree with Sismondi: “that capacity for labour ... is nothing unless it is sold.” 11
One consequence of the peculiar nature of labour-power as a commodity is, that its use-value
does not, on the conclusion of the contract between the buyer and seller, immediately pass into
the hands of the former. Its value, like that of every other commodity, is already fixed before it
goes into circulation, since a definite quantity of social labour has been spent upon it; but its usevalue consists in the subsequent exercise of its force. The alienation of labour-power and its
actual appropriation by the buyer, its employment as a use-value, are separated by an interval of
time. But in those cases in which the formal alienation by sale of the use-value of a commodity, is
not simultaneous with its actual delivery to the buyer, the money of the latter usually functions as
means of payment. 12 In every country in which the capitalist mode of production reigns, it is the
custom not to pay for labour-power before it has been exercised for the period fixed by the
contract, as for example, the end of each week. In all cases, therefore, the use-value of the labourpower is advanced to the capitalist: the labourer allows the buyer to consume it before he receives
payment of the price; he everywhere gives credit to the capitalist. That this credit is no mere
fiction, is shown not only by the occasional loss of wages on the bankruptcy of the capitalist,13
but also by a series of more enduring consequences.14 Nevertheless, whether money serves as a
means of purchase or as a means of payment, this makes no alteration in the nature of the
exchange of commodities. The price of the labour-power is fixed by the contract, although it is
not realised till later, like the rent of a house. The labour-power is sold, although it is only paid
for at a later period. It will, therefore, be useful, for a clear comprehension of the relation of the
parties, to assume provisionally, that the possessor of labour-power, on the occasion of each sale,
immediately receives the price stipulated to be paid for it.
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We now know how the value paid by the purchaser to the possessor of this peculiar commodity,
labour-power, is determined. The use-value which the former gets in exchange, manifests itself
only in the actual utilisation, in the consumption of the labour-power. The money-owner buys
everything necessary for this purpose, such as raw material, in the market, and pays for it at its
full value. The consumption of labour-power is at one and the same time the production of
commodities and of surplus-value. The consumption of labour-power is completed, as in the case
of every other commodity, outside the limits of the market or of the sphere of circulation.
Accompanied by Mr. Moneybags and by the possessor of labour-power, we therefore take leave
for a time of this noisy sphere, where everything takes place on the surface and in view of all
men, and follow them both into the hidden abode of production, on whose threshold there stares
us in the face “No admittance except on business.” Here we shall see, not only how capital
produces, but how capital is produced. We shall at last force the secret of profit making.
This sphere that we are deserting, within whose boundaries the sale and purchase of labour-power
goes on, is in fact a very Eden of the innate rights of man. There alone rule Freedom, Equality,
Property and Bentham. Freedom, because both buyer and seller of a commodity, say of labourpower, are constrained only by their own free will. They contract as free agents, and the
agreement they come to, is but the form in which they give legal expression to their common will.
Equality, because each enters into relation with the other, as with a simple owner of commodities,
and they exchange equivalent for equivalent. Property, because each disposes only of what is his
own. And Bentham, because each looks only to himself. The only force that brings them together
and puts them in relation with each other, is the selfishness, the gain and the private interests of
each. Each looks to himself only, and no one troubles himself about the rest, and just because
they do so, do they all, in accordance with the pre-established harmony of things, or under the
auspices of an all-shrewd providence, work together to their mutual advantage, for the common
weal and in the interest of all.
On leaving this sphere of simple circulation or of exchange of commodities, which furnishes the
“Free-trader Vulgaris” with his views and ideas, and with the standard by which he judges a
society based on capital and wages, we think we can perceive a change in the physiognomy of our
dramatis personae. He, who before was the money-owner, now strides in front as capitalist; the
possessor of labour-power follows as his labourer. The one with an air of importance, smirking,
intent on business; the other, timid and holding back, like one who is bringing his own hide to
market and has nothing to expect but – a hiding.

1

“In the form of money ... capital is productive of no profit.” (Ricardo: “Princ. of Pol. Econ.,” p. 267.)
In encyclopaedias of classical antiquities we find such nonsense as this — that in the ancient world
capital was fully developed, “except that the free labourer and a system of credit was wanting.”
Mommsen also, in his “History of Rome,” commits, in this respect, one blunder after another.
3
Hence legislation in various countries fixes a maximum for labour-contracts. Wherever free labour is
the rule, the laws regulate the mode of terminating this contract. In some States, particularly in Mexico
(before the American Civil War, also in the territories taken from Mexico, and also, as a matter of
fact, in the Danubian provinces till the revolution effected by Kusa), slavery is hidden under the form
of peonage. By means of advances, repayable in labour, which are handed down from generation to
generation, not only the individual labourer, but his family, become, de facto, the property of other
persons and their families. Juarez abolished peonage. The so-called Emperor Maximilian reestablished it by a decree, which, in the House of Representatives at Washington, was aptly
denounced as a decree for the re-introduction of slavery into Mexico. “I may make over to another the
2
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use, for a limited time, of my particular bodily and mental aptitudes and capabilities; because in
consequence of this restriction, they are impressed with a character of alienation with regard to me as
a whole. But by the alienation of all my labour-time and the whole of my work, I should be converting
the substance itself, in other words, my general activity and reality, my person, into the property of
another.” (Hegel, “Philosophie des Rechts.” Berlin, 1840, p. 104, § 67.)
4
The capitalist epoch is therefore characterised by this, that labour-power takes in the eyes of the
labourer himself the form of a commodity which is his property; his labour consequently becomes
wage-labour. On the other hand, it is only from this moment that the produce of labour universally
becomes a commodity.
5
“The value or worth of a man, is as of all other things his price — that is to say, so much as would be
given for the use of his power.” (Th. Hobbes: “Leviathan” in Works, Ed. Molesworth. Lond. 1839-44,
v. iii. p. 76.)
6
Hence the Roman Villicus, as overlooker of the agricultural slaves, received “more meagre fare than
working slaves, because his work was lighter.” (Th. Mommsen, Röm. Geschichte, 1856, p. 810.)
7
Compare W. Th. Thornton: “Over-population and its Remedy,” Lond., 1846.
8
Petty.
9
“Its (labour’s) natural price ... consists in such a quantity of necessaries and comforts of life, as, from
the nature of the climate, and the habits of the country, are necessary to support the labourer, and to
enable him to rear such a family as may preserve, in the market, an undiminished supply of labour.”
(R. Torrens: “An Essay on the External Corn Trade.” Lond. 1815, p. 62.) The word labour is here
wrongly used for labour-power.
10
Rossi: “Cours d’Econ. Polit.,” Bruxelles, 1842, p. 370.
11
Sismondi: “Nouv. Princ. etc.,” t. I, p. 112.
12
“All labour is paid after it has ceased.” (“An Inquiry into those Principles Respecting the Nature of
Demand,” &c., p. 104.) Le crédit commercial a dû commencer au moment où l’ouvrier, premier
artisan de la production, a pu, au moyen de ses économies, attendre le salaire de son travail jusqu’à la
fin de la semaine, de la quinzaine, du mois, du trimestre, &c.” [“The system of commercial credit had
to start at the moment when the labourer, the prime creator of products, could, thanks to his savings,
wait for his wages until the end of the week.”] (Ch. Ganilh: “Des Systèmes d’Econ. Polit.” 2éme édit.
Paris, 1821, t. II, p. 150.)
13
“L’ouvrier prête son industrie,” but adds Storch slyly: he “risks nothing” except “de perdre son
salaire ... l’ouvrier ne transmet rien de matériel.” [“The labourer lends his industry ... the loss of his
wages ... the labourer does not hand over anything of a material nature.”] (Storch: “Cours d’Econ.
Polit.” Pétersbourg, 1815, t. II., p. 37.)
14
One example. In London there are two sorts of bakers, the “full priced,” who sell bread at its full
value, and the “undersellers,” who sell it under its value. The latter class comprises more than threefourths of the total number of bakers. (p. xxxii in the Report of H. S. Tremenheere, commissioner to
examine into “the grievances complained of by the journeymen bakers,” &c., Lond. 1862.) The
undersellers, almost without exception, sell bread adulterated with alum, soap, pearl ashes, chalk,
Derbyshire stone-dust, and such like agreeable nourishing and wholesome ingredients. (See the above
cited Blue book, as also the report of “the committee of 1855 on the adulteration of bread,” and Dr.
Hassall’s “Adulterations Detected,” 2nd Ed. Lond. 1861.) Sir John Gordon stated before the
committee of 1855, that “in consequence of these adulterations, the poor man, who lives on two
pounds of bread a day, does not now get one fourth part of nourishing matter, let alone the deleterious
effects on his health.” Tremenheere states (l.c., p. xlviii), as the reason, why a very large part of the
working-class, although well aware of this adulteration, nevertheless accept the alum, stone-dust, &c.,
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as part of their purchase: that it is for them “a matter of necessity to take from their baker or from the
chandler’s shop, such bread as they choose to supply.” As they are not paid their wages before the end
of the week, they in their turn are unable “to pay for the bread consumed by their families, during the
week, before the end of the week,” and Tremenheere adds on the evidence of witnesses, “it is
notorious that bread composed of those mixtures, is made expressly for sale in this manner.” In many
English and still more Scotch agricultural districts, wages are paid fortnightly and even monthly; with
such long intervals between the payments, the agricultural labourer is obliged to buy on credit.... He
must pay higher prices, and is in fact tied to the shop which gives him credit. Thus at Horningham in
Wilts, for example, where the wages are monthly, the same flour that he could buy elsewhere at 1s
10d per stone, costs him 2s 4d per stone. (“Sixth Report” on “Public Health” by “The Medical Officer
of the Privy Council, &c., 1864,” p.264.) “The block printers of Paisley and Kilmarnock enforced, by
a strike, fortnightly, instead of monthly payment of wages.” (“Reports of the Inspectors of Factories
for 31st Oct., 1853,” p. 34.) As a further pretty result of the credit given by the workmen to the
capitalist, we may refer to the method current in many English coal mines, where the labourer is not
paid till the end of the month, and in the meantime, receives sums on account from the capitalist, often
in goods for which the miner is obliged to pay more than the market price (Truck-system). “It is a
common practice with the coal masters to pay once a month, and advance cash to their workmen at the
end of each intermediate week. The cash is given in the shop” (i.e., the Tommy shop which belongs to
the master); “the men take it on one side and lay it out on the other.” (“Children’s Employment
Commission, III. Report,” Lond. 1864, p. 38, n. 192.)

Part 3: The Production of Absolute
Surplus-Value
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Chapter 7: The Labour-Process and the Process
of Producing Surplus-Value
Section 1: The Labour-Process or the Production of Use-Values
The capitalist buys labour-power in order to use it; and labour-power in use is labour itself. The
purchaser of labour-power consumes it by setting the seller of it to work. By working, the latter
becomes actually, what before he only was potentially, labour-power in action, a labourer. In
order that his labour may re-appear in a commodity, he must, before all things, expend it on
something useful, on something capable of satisfying a want of some sort. Hence, what the
capitalist sets the labourer to produce, is a particular use-value, a specified article. The fact that
the production of use-values, or goods, is carried on under the control of a capitalist and on his
behalf, does not alter the general character of that production. We shall, therefore, in the first
place, have to consider the labour-process independently of the particular form it assumes under
given social conditions.
Labour is, in the first place, a process in which both man and Nature participate, and in which
man of his own accord starts, regulates, and controls the material re-actions between himself and
Nature. He opposes himself to Nature as one of her own forces, setting in motion arms and legs,
head and hands, the natural forces of his body, in order to appropriate Nature’s productions in a
form adapted to his own wants. By thus acting on the external world and changing it, he at the
same time changes his own nature. He develops his slumbering powers and compels them to act
in obedience to his sway. We are not now dealing with those primitive instinctive forms of labour
that remind us of the mere animal. An immeasurable interval of time separates the state of things
in which a man brings his labour-power to market for sale as a commodity, from that state in
which human labour was still in its first instinctive stage. We pre-suppose labour in a form that
stamps it as exclusively human. A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver,
and a bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells. But what distinguishes
the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in
imagination before he erects it in reality. At the end of every labour-process, we get a result that
already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its commencement. He not only effects a
change of form in the material on which he works, but he also realises a purpose of his own that
gives the law to his modus operandi, and to which he must subordinate his will. And this
subordination is no mere momentary act. Besides the exertion of the bodily organs, the process
demands that, during the whole operation, the workman’s will be steadily in consonance with his
purpose. This means close attention. The less he is attracted by the nature of the work, and the
mode in which it is carried on, and the less, therefore, he enjoys it as something which gives play
to his bodily and mental powers, the more close his attention is forced to be.
The elementary factors of the labour-process are 1, the personal activity of man, i.e., work itself,
2, the subject of that work, and 3, its instruments.
The soil (and this, economically speaking, includes water) in the virgin state in which it supplies 1
man with necessaries or the means of subsistence ready to hand, exists independently of him, and
is the universal subject of human labour. All those things which labour merely separates from
immediate connexion with their environment, are subjects of labour spontaneously provided by
Nature. Such are fish which we catch and take from their element, water, timber which we fell in
the virgin forest, and ores which we extract from their veins. If, on the other hand, the subject of
labour has, so to say, been filtered through previous labour, we call it raw material; such is ore
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already extracted and ready for washing. All raw material is the subject of labour, but not every
subject of labour is raw material: it can only become so, after it has undergone some alteration by
means of labour.
An instrument of labour is a thing, or a complex of things, which the labourer interposes between
himself and the subject of his labour, and which serves as the conductor of his activity. He makes
use of the mechanical, physical, and chemical properties of some substances in order to make
other substances subservient to his aims. 2 Leaving out of consideration such ready-made means
of subsistence as fruits, in gathering which a man’s own limbs serve as the instruments of his
labour, the first thing of which the labourer possesses himself is not the subject of labour but its
instrument. Thus Nature becomes one of the organs of his activity, one that he annexes to his own
bodily organs, adding stature to himself in spite of the Bible. As the earth is his original larder, so
too it is his original tool house. It supplies him, for instance, with stones for throwing, grinding,
pressing, cutting, &c. The earth itself is an instrument of labour, but when used as such in
agriculture implies a whole series of other instruments and a comparatively high development of
labour. 3 No sooner does labour undergo the least development, than it requires specially prepared
instruments. Thus in the oldest caves we find stone implements and weapons. In the earliest
period of human history domesticated animals, i.e., animals which have been bred for the
purpose, and have undergone modifications by means of labour, play the chief part as instruments
of labour along with specially prepared stones, wood, bones, and shells.4 The use and fabrication
of instruments of labour, although existing in the germ among certain species of animals, is
specifically characteristic of the human labour-process, and Franklin therefore defines man as a
tool-making animal. Relics of bygone instruments of labour possess the same importance for the
investigation of extinct economic forms of society, as do fossil bones for the determination of
extinct species of animals. It is not the articles made, but how they are made, and by what
instruments, that enables us to distinguish different economic epochs. 5 Instruments of labour not
only supply a standard of the degree of development to which human labour has attained, but they
are also indicators of the social conditions under which that labour is carried on. Among the
instruments of labour, those of a mechanical nature, which, taken as a whole, we may call the
bone and muscles of production, offer much more decided characteristics of a given epoch of
production, than those which, like pipes, tubs, baskets, jars, &c., serve only to hold the materials
for labour, which latter class, we may in a general way, call the vascular system of production.
The latter first begins to play an important part in the chemical industries.
In a wider sense we may include among the instruments of labour, in addition to those things that
are used for directly transferring labour to its subject, and which therefore, in one way or another,
serve as conductors of activity, all such objects as are necessary for carrying on the labourprocess. These do not enter directly into the process, but without them it is either impossible for it
to take place at all, or possible only to a partial extent. Once more we find the earth to be a
universal instrument of this sort, for it furnishes a locus standi to the labourer and a field of
employment for his activity. Among instruments that are the result of previous labour and also
belong to this class, we find workshops, canals, roads, and so forth.
In the labour-process, therefore, man’s activity, with the help of the instruments of labour, effects
an alteration, designed from the commencement, in the material worked upon. The process
disappears in the product, the latter is a use-value, Nature’s material adapted by a change of form
to the wants of man. Labour has incorporated itself with its subject: the former is materialised, the
latter transformed. That which in the labourer appeared as movement, now appears in the product
as a fixed quality without motion. The blacksmith forges and the product is a forging.
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If we examine the whole process from the point of view of its result, the product, it is plain that
both the instruments and the subject of labour, are means of production,6 and that the labour itself
is productive labour. 7
Though a use-value, in the form of a product, issues from the labour-process, yet other usevalues, products of previous labour, enter into it as means of production. The same use-value is
both the product of a previous process, and a means of production in a later process. Products are
therefore not only results, but also essential conditions of labour.
With the exception of the extractive industries, in which the material for labour is provided
immediately by Nature, such as mining, hunting, fishing, and agriculture (so far as the latter is
confined to breaking up virgin soil), all branches of industry manipulate raw material, objects
already filtered through labour, already products of labour. Such is seed in agriculture. Animals
and plants, which we are accustomed to consider as products of Nature, are in their present form,
not only products of, say last year’s labour, but the result of a gradual transformation, continued
through many generations, under man’s superintendence, and by means of his labour. But in the
great majority of cases, instruments of labour show even to the most superficial observer, traces
of the labour of past ages.
Raw material may either form the principal substance of a product, or it may enter into its
formation only as an accessory. An accessory may be consumed by the instruments of labour, as
coal under a boiler, oil by a wheel, hay by draft-horses, or it may be mixed with the raw material
in order to produce some modification thereof, as chlorine into unbleached linen, coal with iron,
dye-stuff with wool, or again, it may help to carry on the work itself, as in the case of the
materials used for heating and lighting workshops. The distinction between principal substance
and accessory vanishes in the true chemical industries, because there none of the raw material reappears, in its original composition, in the substance of the product.8
Every object possesses various properties, and is thus capable of being applied to different uses.
One and the same product may therefore serve as raw material in very different processes. Corn,
for example, is a raw material for millers, starch-manufacturers, distillers, and cattlebreeders. It
also enters as raw material into its own production in the shape of seed; coal, too, is at the same
time the product of, and a means of production in, coal-mining.
Again, a particular product may be used in one and the same process, both as an instrument of
labour and as raw material. Take, for instance, the fattening of cattle, where the animal is the raw
material, and at the same time an instrument for the production of manure.
A product, though ready for immediate consumption, may yet serve as raw material for a further
product, as grapes when they become the raw material for wine. On the other hand, labour may
give us its product in such a form, that we can use it only as raw material, as is the case with
cotton, thread, and yarn. Such a raw material, though itself a product, may have to go through a
whole series of different processes: in each of these in turn, it serves, with constantly varying
form, as raw material, until the last process of the series leaves it a perfect product, ready for
individual consumption, or for use as an instrument of labour.
Hence we see, that whether a use-value is to be regarded as raw material, as instrument of labour,
or as product, this is determined entirely by its function in the labour-process, by the position it
there occupies: as this varies, so does its character.
Whenever therefore a product enters as a means of production into a new labour-process, it
thereby loses its character of product, and becomes a mere factor in the process. A spinner treats
spindles only as implements for spinning, and flax only as the material that he spins. Of course it
is impossible to spin without material and spindles; and therefore the existence of these things as
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products, at the commencement of the spinning operation, must be presumed: but in the process
itself, the fact that they are products of previous labour, is a matter of utter indifference; just as in
the digestive process, it is of no importance whatever, that bread is the produce of the previous
labour of the farmer, the miller, and the baker. On the contrary, it is generally by their
imperfections as products, that the means of production in any process assert themselves in their
character of products. A blunt knife or weak thread forcibly remind us of Mr. A., the cutler, or
Mr. B., the spinner. In the finished product the labour by means of which it has acquired its useful
qualities is not palpable, has apparently vanished.
A machine which does not serve the purposes of labour, is useless. In addition, it falls a prey to
the destructive influence of natural forces. Iron rusts and wood rots. Yarn with which we neither
weave nor knit, is cotton wasted. Living labour must seize upon these things and rouse them from
their death-sleep, change them from mere possible use-values into real and effective ones. Bathed
in the fire of labour, appropriated as part and parcel of labour’s organism, and, as it were, made
alive for the performance of their functions in the process, they are in truth consumed, but
consumed with a purpose, as elementary constituents of new use-values, of new products, ever
ready as means of subsistence for individual consumption, or as means of production for some
new labour-process.
If then, on the one hand, finished products are not only results, but also necessary conditions, of
the labour-process, on the other hand, their assumption into that process, their contact with living
labour, is the sole means by which they can be made to retain their character of use-values, and be
utilised.
Labour uses up its material factors, its subject and its instruments, consumes them, and is
therefore a process of consumption. Such productive consumption is distinguished from
individual consumption by this, that the latter uses up products, as means of subsistence for the
living individual; the former, as means whereby alone, labour, the labour-power of the living
individual, is enabled to act. The product, therefore, of individual consumption, is the consumer
himself; the result of productive consumption, is a product distinct from the consumer.
In so far then, as its instruments and subjects are themselves products, labour consumes products
in order to create products, or in other words, consumes one set of products by turning them into
means of production for another set. But, just as in the beginning, the only participators in the
labour-process were man and the earth, which latter exists independently of man, so even now we
still employ in the process many means of production, provided directly by Nature, that do not
represent any combination of natural substances with human labour.
The labour-process, resolved as above into its simple elementary factors, is human action with a
view to the production of use-values, appropriation of natural substances to human requirements;
it is the necessary condition for effecting exchange of matter between man and Nature; it is the
everlasting Nature-imposed condition of human existence, and therefore is independent of every
social phase of that existence, or rather, is common to every such phase. It was, therefore, not
necessary to represent our labourer in connexion with other labourers; man and his labour on one
side, Nature and its materials on the other, sufficed. As the taste of the porridge does not tell you
who grew the oats, no more does this simple process tell you of itself what are the social
conditions under which it is taking place, whether under the slave-owner’s brutal lash, or the
anxious eye of the capitalist, whether Cincinnatus carries it on in tilling his modest farm or a
savage in killing wild animals with stones. 9
Let us now return to our would-be capitalist. We left him just after he had purchased, in the open
market, all the necessary factors of the labour process; its objective factors, the means of
production, as well as its subjective factor, labour-power. With the keen eye of an expert, he has
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selected the means of production and the kind of labour-power best adapted to his particular
trade, be it spinning, bootmaking, or any other kind. He then proceeds to consume the
commodity, the labour-power that he has just bought, by causing the labourer, the impersonation
of that labour-power, to consume the means of production by his labour. The general character of
the labour-process is evidently not changed by the fact, that the labourer works for the capitalist
instead of for himself; moreover, the particular methods and operations employed in bootmaking
or spinning are not immediately changed by the intervention of the capitalist. He must begin by
taking the labour-power as he finds it in the market, and consequently be satisfied with labour of
such a kind as would be found in the period immediately preceding the rise of capitalists.
Changes in the methods of production by the subordination of labour to capital, can take place
only at a later period, and therefore will have to be treated of in a later chapter.
The labour-process, turned into the process by which the capitalist consumes labour-power,
exhibits two characteristic phenomena. First, the labourer works under the control of the capitalist
to whom his labour belongs; the capitalist taking good care that the work is done in a proper
manner, and that the means of production are used with intelligence, so that there is no
unnecessary waste of raw material, and no wear and tear of the implements beyond what is
necessarily caused by the work.
Secondly, the product is the property of the capitalist and not that of the labourer, its immediate
producer. Suppose that a capitalist pays for a day’s labour-power at its value; then the right to use
that power for a day belongs to him, just as much as the right to use any other commodity, such as
a horse that he has hired for the day. To the purchaser of a commodity belongs its use, and the
seller of labour-power, by giving his labour, does no more, in reality, than part with the use-value
that he has sold. From the instant he steps into the workshop, the use-value of his labour-power,
and therefore also its use, which is labour, belongs to the capitalist. By the purchase of labourpower, the capitalist incorporates labour, as a living ferment, with the lifeless constituents of the
product. From his point of view, the labour-process is nothing more than the consumption of the
commodity purchased, i. e., of labour-power; but this consumption cannot be effected except by
supplying the labour-power with the means of production. The labour-process is a process
between things that the capitalist has purchased, things that have become his property. The
product of this process belongs, therefore, to him, just as much as does the wine which is the
product of a process of fermentation completed in his cellar. 10

Section 2: The Production of Surplus-Value
The product appropriated by the capitalist is a use-value, as yarn, for example, or boots. But,
although boots are, in one sense, the basis of all social progress, and our capitalist is a decided
“progressist,” yet he does not manufacture boots for their own sake. Use-value is, by no means,
the thing “qu’on aime pour lui-même” in the production of commodities. Use-values are only
produced by capitalists, because, and in so far as, they are the material substratum, the
depositories of exchange-value. Our capitalist has two objects in view: in the first place, he wants
to produce a use-value that has a value in exchange, that is to say, an article destined to be sold, a
commodity; and secondly, he desires to produce a commodity whose value shall be greater than
the sum of the values of the commodities used in its production, that is, of the means of
production and the labour-power, that he purchased with his good money in the open market. His
aim is to produce not only a use-value, but a commodity also; not only use-value, but value; not
only value, but at the same time surplus-value.
It must be borne in mind, that we are now dealing with the production of commodities, and that,
up to this point, we have only considered one aspect of the process. Just as commodities are, at
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the same time, use-values and values, so the process of producing them must be a labour-process,
and at the same time, a process of creating value. 11
Let us now examine production as a creation of value.
We know that the value of each commodity is determined by the quantity of labour expended on
and materialised in it, by the working-time necessary, under given social conditions, for its
production. This rule also holds good in the case of the product that accrued to our capitalist, as
the result of the labour-process carried on for him. Assuming this product to be 10 lbs. of yarn,
our first step is to calculate the quantity of labour realised in it.
For spinning the yarn, raw material is required; suppose in this case 10 lbs. of cotton. We have no
need at present to investigate the value of this cotton, for our capitalist has, we will assume,
bought it at its full value, say of ten shillings. In this price the labour required for the production
of the cotton is already expressed in terms of the average labour of society. We will further
assume that the wear and tear of the spindle, which, for our present purpose, may represent all
other instruments of labour employed, amounts to the value of 2s. If, then, twenty-four hours’
labour, or two working days, are required to produce the quantity of gold represented by twelve
shillings, we have here, to begin with, two days’ labour already incorporated in the yarn.
We must not let ourselves be misled by the circumstance that the cotton has taken a new shape
while the substance of the spindle has to a certain extent been used up. By the general law of
value, if the value of 40 lbs. of yarn = the value of 40 lbs. of cotton + the value of a whole
spindle, i. e., if the same working-time is required to produce the commodities on either side of
this equation, then 10 lbs. of yarn are an equivalent for 10 lbs. of cotton, together with one-fourth
of a spindle. In the case we are considering the same working-time is materialised in the 10 lbs. of
yarn on the one hand, and in the 10 lbs. of cotton and the fraction of a spindle on the other.
Therefore, whether value appears in cotton, in a spindle, or in yarn, makes no difference in the
amount of that value. The spindle and cotton, instead of resting quietly side by side, join together
in the process, their forms are altered, and they are turned into yarn; but their value is no more
affected by this fact than it would be if they had been simply exchanged for their equivalent in
yarn.
The labour required for the production of the cotton, the raw material of the yarn, is part of the
labour necessary to produce the yarn, and is therefore contained in the yarn. The same applies to
the labour embodied in the spindle, without whose wear and tear the cotton could not be spun.
Hence, in determining the value of the yarn, or the labour-time required for its production, all the
special processes carried on at various times and in different places, which were necessary, first
to produce the cotton and the wasted portion of the spindle, and then with the cotton and spindle
to spin the yarn, may together be looked on as different and successive phases of one and the
same process. The whole of the labour in the yarn is past labour; and it is a matter of no
importance that the operations necessary for the production of its constituent elements were
carried on at times which, referred to the present, are more remote than the final operation of
spinning. If a definite quantity of labour, say thirty days, is requisite to build a house, the total
amount of labour incorporated in it is not altered by the fact that the work of the last day is done
twenty-nine days later than that of the first. Therefore the labour contained in the raw material
and the instruments of labour can be treated just as if it were labour expended in an earlier stage
of the spinning process, before the labour of actual spinning commenced.
The values of the means of production, i. e., the cotton and the spindle, which values are
expressed in the price of twelve shillings, are therefore constituent parts of the value of the yarn,
or, in other words, of the value of the product.
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Two conditions must nevertheless be fulfilled. First, the cotton and spindle must concur in the
production of a use-value; they must in the present case become yarn. Value is independent of the
particular use-value by which it is borne, but it must be embodied in a use-value of some kind.
Secondly, the time occupied in the labour of production must not exceed the time really necessary
under the given social conditions of the case. Therefore, if no more than 1 lb. of cotton be
requisite to spin 1 lb. of yarn, care must be taken that no more than this weight of cotton is
consumed in the production of 1 lb. of yarn; and similarly with regard to the spindle. Though the
capitalist have a hobby, and use a gold instead of a steel spindle, yet the only labour that counts
for anything in the value of the yarn is that which would be required to produce a steel spindle,
because no more is necessary under the given social conditions.
We now know what portion of the value of the yarn is owing to the cotton and the spindle. It
amounts to twelve shillings or the value of two days’ work. The next point for our consideration
is, what portion of the value of the yarn is added to the cotton by the labour of the spinner.
We have now to consider this labour under a very different aspect from that which it had during
the labour-process; there, we viewed it solely as that particular kind of human activity which
changes cotton into yarn; there, the more the labour was suited to the work, the better the yarn,
other circumstances remaining the same. The labour of the spinner was then viewed as
specifically different from other kinds of productive labour, different on the one hand in its
special aim, viz., spinning, different, on the other hand, in the special character of its operations,
in the special nature of its means of production and in the special use-value of its product. For the
operation of spinning, cotton and spindles are a necessity, but for making rifled cannon they
would be of no use whatever. Here, on the contrary, where we consider the labour of the spinner
only so far as it is value-creating, i.e., a source of value, his labour differs in no respect from the
labour of the man who bores cannon, or (what here more nearly concerns us), from the labour of
the cotton-planter and spindle-maker incorporated in the means of production. It is solely by
reason of this identity, that cotton planting, spindle making and spinning, are capable of forming
the component parts differing only quantitatively from each other, of one whole, namely, the
value of the yarn. Here, we have nothing more to do with the quality, the nature and the specific
character of the labour, but merely with its quantity. And this simply requires to be calculated.
We proceed upon the assumption that spinning is simple, unskilled labour, the average labour of a
given state of society. Hereafter we shall see that the contrary assumption would make no
difference.
While the labourer is at work, his labour constantly undergoes a transformation: from being
motion, it becomes an object without motion; from being the labourer working, it becomes the
thing produced. At the end of one hour’s spinning, that act is represented by a definite quantity of
yarn; in other words, a definite quantity of labour, namely that of one hour, has become embodied
in the cotton. We say labour, i.e., the expenditure of his vital force by the spinner, and not
spinning labour, because the special work of spinning counts here, only so far as it is the
expenditure of labour-power in general, and not in so far as it is the specific work of the spinner.
In the process we are now considering it is of extreme importance, that no more time be
consumed in the work of transforming the cotton into yarn than is necessary under the given
social conditions. If under normal, i.e., average social conditions of production, a pounds of
cotton ought to be made into b pounds of yarn by one hour’s labour, then a day’s labour does not
count as 12 hours’ labour unless 12 a pounds of cotton have been made into 12 b pounds of yarn;
for in the creation of value, the time that is socially necessary alone counts.
Not only the labour, but also the raw material and the product now appear in quite a new light,
very different from that in which we viewed them in the labour-process pure and simple. The raw
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material serves now merely as an absorbent of a definite quantity of labour. By this absorption it
is in fact changed into yarn, because it is spun, because labour-power in the form of spinning is
added to it; but the product, the yarn, is now nothing more than a measure of the labour absorbed
by the cotton. If in one hour 1 2/3 lbs. of cotton can be spun into 1 2/3 lbs. of yarn, then 10 lbs. of
yarn indicate the absorption of 6 hours’ labour. Definite quantities of product, these quantities
being determined by experience, now represent nothing but definite quantities of labour, definite
masses of crystallised labour-time. They are nothing more than the materialisation of so many
hours or so many days of social labour.
We are here no more concerned about the facts, that the labour is the specific work of spinning,
that its subject is cotton and its product yarn, than we are about the fact that the subject itself is
already a product and therefore raw material. If the spinner, instead of spinning, were working in
a coal mine, the subject of his labour, the coal, would be supplied by Nature; nevertheless, a
definite quantity of extracted coal, a hundredweight for example, would represent a definite
quantity of absorbed labour.
We assumed, on the occasion of its sale, that the value of a day’s labour-power is three shillings,
and that six hours’ labour is incorporated in that sum; and consequently that this amount of labour
is requisite to produce the necessaries of life daily required on an average by the labourer. If now
our spinner by working for one hour, can convert 1 2/3 lbs. of cotton into 1 2/3 lbs. of yarn, 12it
follows that in six hours he will convert 10 lbs. of cotton into 10 lbs. of yarn. Hence, during the
spinning process, the cotton absorbs six hours’ labour. The same quantity of labour is also
embodied in a piece of gold of the value of three shillings. Consequently by the mere labour of
spinning, a value of three shillings is added to the cotton.
Let us now consider the total value of the product, the 10 lbs. of yarn. Two and a half days’
labour has been embodied in it, of which two days were contained in the cotton and in the
substance of the spindle worn away, and half a day was absorbed during the process of spinning.
This two and a half days’ labour is also represented by a piece of gold of the value of fifteen
shillings. Hence, fifteen shillings is an adequate price for the 10 lbs. of yarn, or the price of one
pound is eighteenpence.
Our capitalist stares in astonishment. The value of the product is exactly equal to the value of the
capital advanced. The value so advanced has not expanded, no surplus-value has been created,
and consequently money has not been converted into capital. The price of the yarn is fifteen
shillings, and fifteen shillings were spent in the open market upon the constituent elements of the
product, or, what amounts to the same thing, upon the factors of the labour-process; ten shillings
were paid for the cotton, two shillings for the substance of the spindle worn away, and three
shillings for the labour-power. The swollen value of the yarn is of no avail, for it is merely the
sum of the values formerly existing in the cotton, the spindle, and the labour-power: out of such a
simple addition of existing values, no surplus-value can possibly arise. 13 These separate values
are now all concentrated in one thing; but so they were also in the sum of fifteen shillings, before
it was split up into three parts, by the purchase of the commodities.
There is in reality nothing very strange in this result. The value of one pound of yarn being
eighteenpence, if our capitalist buys 10 lbs. of yarn in the market, he must pay fifteen shillings for
them. It is clear that, whether a man buys his house ready built, or gets it built for him, in neither
case will the mode of acquisition increase the amount of money laid out on the house.
Our capitalist, who is at home in his vulgar economy, exclaims: “Oh! but I advanced my money
for the express purpose of making more money.” The way to Hell is paved with good intentions,
and he might just as easily have intended to make money, without producing at all. 14 He threatens
all sorts of things. He won’t be caught napping again. In future he will buy the commodities in the
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market, instead of manufacturing them himself. But if all his brother capitalists were to do the
same, where would he find his commodities in the market? And his money he cannot eat. He tries
persuasion. “Consider my abstinence; I might have played ducks and drakes with the 15 shillings;
but instead of that I consumed it productively, and made yarn with it.” Very well, and by way of
reward he is now in possession of good yarn instead of a bad conscience; and as for playing the
part of a miser, it would never do for him to relapse into such bad ways as that; we have seen
before to what results such asceticism leads. Besides, where nothing is, the king has lost his
rights; whatever may be the merit of his abstinence, there is nothing wherewith specially to
remunerate it, because the value of the product is merely the sum of the values of the
commodities that were thrown into the process of production. Let him therefore console himself
with the reflection that virtue is its own reward. But no, he becomes importunate. He says: “The
yarn is of no use to me: I produced it for sale.” In that case let him sell it, or, still better, let him
for the future produce only things for satisfying his personal wants, a remedy that his physician
MacCulloch has already prescribed as infallible against an epidemic of over-production. He now
gets obstinate. “Can the labourer,” he asks, “merely with his arms and legs, produce commodities
out of nothing? Did I not supply him with the materials, by means of which, and in which alone,
his labour could be embodied? And as the greater part of society consists of such ne’er-do-wells,
have I not rendered society incalculable service by my instruments of production, my cotton and
my spindle, and not only society, but the labourer also, whom in addition I have provided with the
necessaries of life? And am I to be allowed nothing in return for all this service?” Well, but has
not the labourer rendered him the equivalent service of changing his cotton and spindle into yarn?
Moreover, there is here no question of service. 15 A service is nothing more than the useful effect
of a use-value, be it of a commodity, or be it of labour. 16 But here we are dealing with exchangevalue. The capitalist paid to the labourer a value of 3 shillings, and the labourer gave him back an
exact equivalent in the value of 3 shillings, added by him to the cotton: he gave him value for
value. Our friend, up to this time so purse-proud, suddenly assumes the modest demeanour of his
own workman, and exclaims: “Have I myself not worked? Have I not performed the labour of
superintendence and of overlooking the spinner? And does not this labour, too, create value?” His
overlooker and his manager try to hide their smiles. Meanwhile, after a hearty laugh, he reassumes his usual mien. Though he chanted to us the whole creed of the economists, in reality, he
says, he would not give a brass farthing for it. He leaves this and all such like subterfuges and
juggling tricks to the professors of Political Economy, who are paid for it. He himself is a
practical man; and though he does not always consider what he says outside his business, yet in
his business he knows what he is about.
Let us examine the matter more closely. The value of a day’s labour-power amounts to 3
shillings, because on our assumption half a day’s labour is embodied in that quantity of labourpower, i.e., because the means of subsistence that are daily required for the production of labourpower, cost half a day’s labour. But the past labour that is embodied in the labour-power, and the
living labour that it can call into action; the daily cost of maintaining it, and its daily expenditure
in work, are two totally different things. The former determines the exchange-value of the labourpower, the latter is its use-value. The fact that half a day’s labour is necessary to keep the labourer
alive during 24 hours, does not in any way prevent him from working a whole day. Therefore, the
value of labour-power, and the value which that labour-power creates in the labour-process, are
two entirely different magnitudes; and this difference of the two values was what the capitalist
had in view, when he was purchasing the labour-power. The useful qualities that labour-power
possesses, and by virtue of which it makes yarn or boots, were to him nothing more than a
conditio sine qua non; for in order to create value, labour must be expended in a useful manner.
What really influenced him was the specific use-value which this commodity possesses of being a
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source not only of value, but of more value than it has itself. This is the special service that the
capitalist expects from labour-power, and in this transaction he acts in accordance with the
“eternal laws” of the exchange of commodities. The seller of labour-power, like the seller of any
other commodity, realises its exchange-value, and parts with its use-value. He cannot take the one
without giving the other. The use-value of labour-power, or in other words, labour, belongs just
as little to its seller, as the use-value of oil after it has been sold belongs to the dealer who has
sold it. The owner of the money has paid the value of a day’s labour-power; his, therefore, is the
use of it for a day; a day’s labour belongs to him. The circumstance, that on the one hand the
daily sustenance of labour-power costs only half a day’s labour, while on the other hand the very
same labour-power can work during a whole day, that consequently the value which its use
during one day creates, is double what he pays for that use, this circumstance is, without doubt, a
piece of good luck for the buyer, but by no means an injury to the seller.
Our capitalist foresaw this state of things, and that was the cause of his laughter. The labourer
therefore finds, in the workshop, the means of production necessary for working, not only during
six, but during twelve hours. Just as during the six hours’ process our 10 lbs. of cotton absorbed
six hours’ labour, and became 10 lbs. of yarn, so now, 20 lbs. of cotton will absorb 12 hours’
labour and be changed into 20 lbs. of yarn. Let us now examine the product of this prolonged
process. There is now materialised in this 20 lbs. of yarn the labour of five days, of which four
days are due to the cotton and the lost steel of the spindle, the remaining day having been
absorbed by the cotton during the spinning process. Expressed in gold, the labour of five days is
thirty shillings. This is therefore the price of the 20 lbs. of yarn, giving, as before, eighteenpence
as the price of a pound. But the sum of the values of the commodities that entered into the process
amounts to 27 shillings. The value of the yarn is 30 shillings. Therefore the value of the product is
1/9 greater than the value advanced for its production; 27 shillings have been transformed into 30
shillings; a surplus-value of 3 shillings has been created. The trick has at last succeeded; money
has been converted into capital.
Every condition of the problem is satisfied, while the laws that regulate the exchange of
commodities, have been in no way violated. Equivalent has been exchanged for equivalent. For
the capitalist as buyer paid for each commodity, for the cotton, the spindle and the labour-power,
its full value. He then did what is done by every purchaser of commodities; he consumed their
use-value. The consumption of the labour-power, which was also the process of producing
commodities, resulted in 20 lbs. of yarn, having a value of 30 shillings. The capitalist, formerly a
buyer, now returns to market as a seller, of commodities. He sells his yarn at eighteenpence a
pound, which is its exact value. Yet for all that he withdraws 3 shillings more from circulation
than he originally threw into it. This metamorphosis, this conversion of money into capital, takes
place both within the sphere of circulation and also outside it; within the circulation, because
conditioned by the purchase of the labour-power in the market; outside the circulation, because
what is done within it is only a stepping-stone to the production of surplus-value, a process which
is entirely confined to the sphere of production. Thus “tout est pour le mieux dans le meilleur des
mondes possibles.” [“Everything is for the best in the best of all possible worlds.” – Voltaire,
Candide]
By turning his money into commodities that serve as the material elements of a new product, and
as factors in the labour-process, by incorporating living labour with their dead substance, the
capitalist at the same time converts value, i.e., past, materialised, and dead labour into capital,
into value big with value, a live monster that is fruitful and multiplies.
If we now compare the two processes of producing value and of creating surplus-value, we see
that the latter is nothing but the continuation of the former beyond a definite point. If on the one
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hand the process be not carried beyond the point, where the value paid by the capitalist for the
labour-power is replaced by an exact equivalent, it is simply a process of producing value; if, on
the other hand, it be continued beyond that point, it becomes a process of creating surplus-value.
If we proceed further, and compare the process of producing value with the labour-process, pure
and simple, we find that the latter consists of the useful labour, the work, that produces usevalues. Here we contemplate the labour as producing a particular article; we view it under its
qualitative aspect alone, with regard to its end and aim. But viewed as a value-creating process,
the same labour-process presents itself under its quantitative aspect alone. Here it is a question
merely of the time occupied by the labourer in doing the work; of the period during which the
labour-power is usefully expended. Here, the commodities that take part in the process, do not
count any longer as necessary adjuncts of labour-power in the production of a definite, useful
object. They count merely as depositories of so much absorbed or materialised labour; that
labour, whether previously embodied in the means of production, or incorporated in them for the
first time during the process by the action of labour-power, counts in either case only according to
its duration; it amounts to so many hours or days as the case may be.
Moreover, only so much of the time spent in the production of any article is counted, as, under
the given social conditions, is necessary. The consequences of this are various. In the first place,
it becomes necessary that the labour should be carried on under normal conditions. If a self-acting
mule is the implement in general use for spinning, it would be absurd to supply the spinner with a
distaff and spinning wheel. The cotton too must not be such rubbish as to cause extra waste in
being worked, but must be of suitable quality. Otherwise the spinner would be found to spend
more time in producing a pound of yarn than is socially necessary, in which case the excess of
time would create neither value nor money. But whether the material factors of the process are of
normal quality or not, depends not upon the labourer, but entirely upon the capitalist. Then again,
the labour-power itself must be of average efficacy. In the trade in which it is being employed, it
must possess the average skill, handiness and quickness prevalent in that trade, and our capitalist
took good care to buy labour-power of such normal goodness. This power must be applied with
the average amount of exertion and with the usual degree of intensity; and the capitalist is as
careful to see that this is done, as that his workmen are not idle for a single moment. He has
bought the use of the labour-power for a definite period, and he insists upon his rights. He has no
intention of being robbed. Lastly, and for this purpose our friend has a penal code of his own, all
wasteful consumption of raw material or instruments of labour is strictly forbidden, because what
is so wasted, represents labour superfluously expended, labour that does not count in the product
or enter into its value. 17
We now see, that the difference between labour, considered on the one hand as producing
utilities, and on the other hand, as creating value, a difference which we discovered by our
analysis of a commodity, resolves itself into a distinction between two aspects of the process of
production.
The process of production, considered on the one hand as the unity of the labour-process and the
process of creating value, is production of commodities; considered on the other hand as the unity
of the labour-process and the process of producing surplus-value, it is the capitalist process of
production, or capitalist production of commodities.
We stated, on a previous page, that in the creation of surplus-value it does not in the least matter,
whether the labour appropriated by the capitalist be simple unskilled labour of average quality or
more complicated skilled labour. All labour of a higher or more complicated character than
average labour is expenditure of labour-power of a more costly kind, labour-power whose
production has cost more time and labour, and which therefore has a higher value, than unskilled
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or simple labour-power. This power being higher-value, its consumption is labour of a higher
class, labour that creates in equal times proportionally higher values than unskilled labour does.
Whatever difference in skill there may be between the labour of a spinner and that of a jeweller,
the portion of his labour by which the jeweller merely replaces the value of his own labourpower, does not in any way differ in quality from the additional portion by which he creates
surplus-value. In the making of jewellery, just as in spinning, the surplus-value results only from
a quantitative excess of labour, from a lengthening-out of one and the same labour-process, in the
one case, of the process of making jewels, in the other of the process of making yarn. 18
But on the other hand, in every process of creating value, the reduction of skilled labour to
average social labour, e.g., one day of skilled to six days of unskilled labour, is unavoidable.
19
We therefore save ourselves a superfluous operation, and simplify our analysis, by the
assumption, that the labour of the workman employed by the capitalist is unskilled average
labour.
1

“The earth’s spontaneous productions being in small quantity, and quite independent of man, appear,
as it were, to be furnished by Nature, in the same way as a small sum is given to a young man, in order
to put him in a way of industry, and of making his fortune.” (James Steuart: “Principles of Polit.
Econ.” edit. Dublin, 1770, v. I, p.116.)
2
“Reason is just as cunning as she is powerful. Her cunning consists principally in her mediating
activity, which, by causing objects to act and re-act on each other in accordance with their own nature,
in this way, without any direct interference in the process, carries out reason’s intentions.” (Hegel:
“Enzyklopädie, Erster Theil, Die Logik,” Berlin, 1840, p. 382.)
3
In his otherwise miserable work (“Théorie de l’Econ. Polit.” Paris, 1815), Ganilh enumerates in a
striking manner in opposition to the “Physiocrats” the long series of previous processes necessary
before agriculture properly so called can commence.
4
Turgot in his “Réflexions sur la Formation et la Distribution des Richesses” (1766) brings well into
prominence the importance of domesticated animals to early civilisation.
5
The least important commodities of all for the technological comparison of different epochs of
production are articles of luxury, in the strict meaning of the term. However little our written histories
up to this time notice the development of material production, which is the basis of all social life, and
therefore of all real history, yet prehistoric times have been classified in accordance with the results,
not of so-called historical, but of materialistic investigations. These periods have been divided, to
correspond with the materials from which their implements and weapons were made, viz., into the
stone, the bronze, and the iron ages.
6
It appears paradoxical to assert, that uncaught fish, for instance, are a means of production in the
fishing industry. But hitherto no one has discovered the art of catching fish in waters that contain
none.
7
This method of determining, from the standpoint of the labour-process alone, what is productive
labour, is by no means directly applicable to the case of the capitalist process of production.
8
Storch calls true raw materials “matières,” and accessory material “matériaux.” Cherbuliez describes
accessories as “matières instrumentales.”
9
By a wonderful feat of logical acumen, Colonel Torrens has discovered, in this stone of the savage
the origin of capital. “In the first stone which he [the savage] flings at the wild animal he pursues, in
the first stick that he seizes to strike down the fruit which hangs above his reach, we see the
appropriation of one article for the purpose of aiding in the acquisition of another, and thus discover
the origin of capital.” (R. Torrens: “An Essay on the Production of Wealth,” &c., pp. 70-71.)
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“Products are appropriated before they are converted into capital; this conversion does not secure
them from such appropriation.” (Cheibuliez: “Richesse ou Pauvreté,” edit. Paris, 1841, p. 54.) “The
Proletarian, by selling his labour for a definite quantity of the necessaries of life, renounces all claim
to a share in the product. The mode of appropriation of the products remains the same as before; it is
in no way altered by the bargain we have mentioned. The product belongs exclusively to the capitalist,
who supplied the raw material and the necessaries of life; and this is a rigorous consequence of the
law of appropriation, a law whose fundamental principle was the very opposite, namely, that every
labourer has an exclusive right to the ownership of what he produces.” (l.c., p. 58.) “When the
labourers receive wages for their labour ... the capitalist is then the owner not of the capital only” (he
means the means of production) “but of the labour also. If what is paid as wages is included, as it
commonly is, in the term capital, it is absurd to talk of labour separately from capital. The word
capital as thus employed includes labour and capital both.” (James Mill: “Elements of Pol. Econ.,”
&c., Ed. 1821, pp. 70, 71.)
11
As has been stated in a previous note, the English language has two different expressions for these
two different aspects of labour: in the Simple Labour-process, the process of producing Use-Values, it
is Work; in the process of creation of Value, it is Labour, taking the term in its strictly economic
sense. — F. E.
12
These figures are quite arbitrary.
13
This is the fundamental proposition on which is based the doctrine of the Physiocrats as to the
unproductiveness of all labour that is not agriculture: it is irrefutable for the orthodox economist.
“Cette façon d’imputer à une seule chose la valeur de plusieurs autres” (par exemple au lin la
consommation du tisserand), “d’appliquer, pour ainsi dire, couche sur couche, plusieurs valeurs sur
une seule, fait que celle-ci grossit d’autant.... Le terme d’addition peint trés bien la maniere dont se
forme le prix des ouvrages de main d’oeuvre; ce prix n’est qu’un total de plusieurs valeurs
consommées et additionnées ensemble; or, additionner n’est pas multiplier.” [“This method of adding
to one particular object the value of a number of others,” (for example, adding the living costs of the
weaver to the flax), “of as it were heaping up various values in layers on top of one single value, has
the result that this value grows to the same extent ... The expression ‘addition’ gives a very clear
picture of the way in which the price of a manufactured product is formed; this price is only the sum
of a number of values which have been consumed, and it is arrived at by adding them together;
however, addition is not the same as multiplication.”] (“Mercier de la Rivière,” l.c., p. 599.)
14
Thus from 1844-47 he withdrew part of his capital from productive employment, in order to throw
it away in railway speculations; and so also, during the American Civil War, he closed his factory, and
turned his work-people into the streets, in order to gamble on the Liverpool cotton exchange.
15
“Extol thyself, put on finery and adorn thyself ... but whoever takes more or better than he gives,
that is usury, and is not service, but wrong done to his neighbour, as when one steals and robs. All is
not service and benefit to a neighbour that is called service and benefit. For an adulteress and adulterer
do one another great service and pleasure. A horseman does an incendiary a great service, by helping
him to rob on the highway, and pillage land and houses. The papists do ours a great service, in that
they don’t drown, burn, murder all of them, or let them all rot in prison; but let some live, and only
drive them out, or take from them what they have. The devil himself does his servants inestimable
service.... To sum up, the world is full of great, excellent, and daily service and benefit.” (Martin
Luther: “An die Pfarrherrn wider den Wucher zu predigen,” Wittenberg, 1540.)
16
In “Zur Kritik der Pol. Oek.,” p. 14, I make the following remark on this point — “It is not difficult
to understand what ‘service’ the category ‘service’ must render to a class of economists like J. B. Say
and F. Bastiat.”
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This is one of the circumstances that makes production by slave labour such a costly process. The
labourer here is, to use a striking expression of the ancients, distinguishable only as instrumentum
vocale, from an animal as instrumentum semi-vocale, and from an implement as instrumentum
mutum. But he himself takes care to let both beast and implement feel that he is none of them, but is a
man. He convinces himself with immense satisfaction, that he is a different being, by treating the one
unmercifully and damaging the other con amore. Hence the principle, universally applied in this
method of production, only to employ the rudest and heaviest implements and such as are difficult to
damage owing to their sheer clumsiness. In the slave-states bordering on the Gulf of Mexico, down to
the date of the civil war, ploughs constructed on old Chinese models, which turned up the soil like a
hog or a mole, instead of making furrows, were alone to be found. Conf. J. E. Cairnes. “The Slave
Power,” London, 1862, p. 46 sqq. In his “Sea Board Slave States,” Olmsted tells us: “I am here shown
tools that no man in his senses, with us, would allow a labourcr, for whom he was paying wages, to be
encumbered with; and the excessive weight and clumsiness of which, I would judge, would make
work at least ten per cent greater than with those ordinarily used with us. And I am assured that, in the
careless and clumsy way they must be used by the slaves, anything lighter or less rude could not be
furnished them with good economy, and that such tools as we constantly give our labourers and find
our profit in giving them, would not last out a day in a Virginia cornfield – much lighter and more free
from stones though it be than ours. So, too, when I ask why mules are so universally substituted for
horses on the farm, the first reason given, and confessedly the most conclusive one, is that horses
cannot bear the treatment that they always must get from negroes; horses are always soon foundered
or crippled by them, while mules will bear cudgelling, or lose a meal or two now and then, and not be
materially injured, and they do not take cold or get sick, if neglected or overworked. But I do not need
to go further than to the window of the room in which I am writing, to see at almost any time,
treatment of cattle that would ensure the immediate discharge of the driver by almost any farmer
owning them in the North.”
18
The distinction between skilled and unskilled labour rests in part on pure illusion, or, to say the
least, on distinctions that have long since ceased to be real, and that survive only by virtue of a
traditional convention; in part on the helpless condition of some groups of the working-class, a
condition that prevents them from exacting equally with the rest the value of their labour-power.
Accidental circumstances here play so great a part, that these two forms of labour sometimes change
places. Where, for instance, the physique of the working-class has deteriorated, and is, relatively
speaking, exhausted, which is the case in all countries with a well developed capitalist production, the
lower forms of labour, which demand great expenditure of muscle, are in general considered as
skilled, compared with much more delicate forms of labour; the latter sink down to the level of
unskilled labour. Take as an example the labour of a bricklayer, which in England occupies a much
higher level than that of a damask-weaver. Again, although the labour of a fustian cutter demands
great bodily exertion, and is at the same time unhealthy, yet it counts only as unskilled labour. And
then, we must not forget, that the so-called skilled labour does not occupy a large space in the field of
national labour. Laing estimates that in England (and Wales) the livelihood of 11,300,000 people
depends on unskilled labour. If from the total population of 18,000,000 living at the time when he
wrote, we deduct 1,000,000 for the “genteel population,” and 1,500,000 for paupers, vagrants,
criminals, prostitutes, &c., and 4,650,000 who compose the middle-class, there remain the above
mentioned 11,000,000. But in his middle-class he includes people that live on the interest of small
investments, officials, men of letters, artists, schoolmasters and the like, and in order to swell the
number he also includes in these 4,650,000 the better paid portion of the factory operatives! The
bricklayers, too, figure amongst them. (S. Laing: “National Distress,” &c., London, 1844). “The great
class who have nothing to give for food but ordinary labour, are the great bulk of the people.” (James
Mill, in art.: “Colony,” Supplement to the Encyclop. Brit., 1831.)
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“Where reference is made to labour as a measure of value, it necessarily implies labour of one
particular kind ... the proportion which the other kinds bear to it being easily ascertained.” (“Outlines
of Pol. Econ.,” Lond., 1832, pp. 22 and 23.)

Chapter 8: Constant Capital and Variable
Capital
The various factors of the labour-process play different parts in forming the value of the product.
The labourer adds fresh value to the subject of his labour by expending upon it a given amount of
additional labour, no matter what the specific character and utility of that labour may be. On the
other hand, the values of the means of production used up in the process are preserved, and
present themselves afresh as constituent parts of the value of the product; the values of the cotton
and the spindle, for instance, re-appear again in the value of the yarn. The value of the means of
production is therefore preserved, by being transferred to the product. This transfer takes place
during the conversion of those means into a product, or in other words, during the labour-process.
It is brought about by labour; but how?
The labourer does not perform two operations at once, one in order to add value to the cotton, the
other in order to preserve the value of the means of production, or, what amounts to the same
thing, to transfer to the yarn, to the product, the value of the cotton on which he works, and part
of the value of the spindle with which he works. But, by the very act of adding new value, he
preserves their former values. Since, however, the addition of new value to the subject of his
labour, and the preservation of its former value, are two entirely distinct results, produced
simultaneously by the labourer, during one operation, it is plain that this two-fold nature of the
result can be explained only by the two-fold nature of his labour; at one and the same time, it
must in one character create value, and in another character preserve or transfer value.
Now, in what manner does every labourer add new labour and consequently new value?
Evidently, only by labouring productively in a particular way; the spinner by spinning, the weaver
by weaving, the smith by forging. But, while thus incorporating labour generally, that is value, it
is by the particular form alone of the labour, by the spinning, the weaving and the forging
respectively, that the means of production, the cotton and spindle, the yarn and loom, and the iron
and anvil become constituent elements of the product, of a new use-value. 1 Each use-value
disappears, but only to re-appear under a new form in a new use-value. Now, we saw, when we
were considering the process of creating value, that, if a use-value be effectively consumed in the
production of a new use-value, the quantity of labour expended in the production of the consumed
article, forms a portion of the quantity of labour necessary to produce the new use-value; this
portion is therefore labour transferred from the means of production to the new product. Hence,
the labourer preserves the values of the consumed means of production, or transfers them as
portions of its value to the product, not by virtue of his additional labour, abstractedly considered,
but by virtue of the particular useful character of that labour, by virtue of its special productive
form. In so far then as labour is such specific productive activity, in so far as it is spinning,
weaving, or forging, it raises, by mere contact, the means of production from the dead, makes
them living factors of the labour-process, and combines with them to form the new products.
If the special productive labour of the workman were not spinning, he could not convert the
cotton into yarn, and therefore could not transfer the values of the cotton and spindle to the yarn.
Suppose the same workman were to change his occupation to that of a joiner, he would still by a
day’s labour add value to the material he works upon. Consequently, we see, first, that the
addition of new value takes place not by virtue of his labour being spinning in particular, or
joinering in particular, but because it is labour in the abstract, a portion of the total labour of
society; and we see next, that the value added is of a given definite amount, not because his
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labour has a special utility, but because it is exerted for a definite time. On the one hand, then, it
is by virtue of its general character, as being expenditure of human labour-power in the abstract,
that spinning adds new value to the values of the cotton and the spindle; and on the other hand, it
is by virtue of its special character, as being a concrete, useful process, that the same labour of
spinning both transfers the values of the means of production to the product, and preserves them
in the product. Hence at one and the same time there is produced a two-fold result.
By the simple addition of a certain quantity of labour, new value is added, and by the quality of
this added labour, the original values of the means of production are preserved in the product.
This two-fold effect, resulting from the two-fold character of labour, may be traced in various
phenomena.
Let us assume, that some invention enables the spinner to spin as much cotton in 6 hours as he
was able to spin before in 36 hours. His labour is now six times as effective as it was, for the
purposes of useful production. The product of 6 hours’ work has increased six-fold, from 6 lbs. to
36 lbs. But now the 36 lbs. of cotton absorb only the same amount of labour as formerly did the 6
lbs. One-sixth as much new labour is absorbed by each pound of cotton, and consequently, the
value added by the labour to each pound is only one-sixth of what it formerly was. On the other
hand, in the product, in the 36 lbs. of yarn, the value transferred from the cotton is six times as
great as before. By the 6 hours’ spinning, the value of the raw material preserved and transferred
to the product is six times as great as before, although the new value added by the labour of the
spinner to each pound of the very same raw material is one-sixth what it was formerly. This
shows that the two properties of labour, by virtue of which it is enabled in one case to preserve
value, and in the other to create value, are essentially different. On the one hand, the longer the
time necessary to spin a given weight of cotton into yarn, the greater is the new value added to the
material; on the other hand, the greater the weight of the cotton spun in a given time, the greater
is the value preserved, by being transferred from it to the product.
Let us now assume, that the productiveness of the spinner’s labour, instead of varying, remains
constant, that he therefore requires the same time as he formerly did, to convert one pound of
cotton into yarn, but that the exchange-value of the cotton varies, either by rising to six times its
former value or falling to one-sixth of that value. In both these cases, the spinner puts the same
quantity of labour into a pound of cotton, and therefore adds as much value, as he did before the
change in the value: he also produces a given weight of yarn in the same time as he did before.
Nevertheless, the value that he transfers from the cotton to the yarn is either one-sixth of what it
was before the variation, or, as the case may be, six times as much as before. The same result
occurs when the value of the instruments of labour rises or falls, while their useful efficacy in the
process remains unaltered.
Again, if the technical conditions of the spinning process remain unchanged, and no change of
value takes place in the means of production, the spinner continues to consume in equal workingtimes equal quantities of raw material, and equal quantities of machinery of unvarying value. The
value that he preserves in the product is directly proportional to the new value that he adds to the
product. In two weeks he incorporates twice as much labour, and therefore twice as much value,
as in one week, and during the same time he consumes twice as much material, and wears out
twice as much machinery, of double the value in each case: he therefore preserves, in the product
of two weeks, twice as much value as in the product of one week. So long as the conditions of
production remain the same, the more value the labourer adds by fresh labour, the more value he
transfers and preserves; but he does so merely because this addition of new value takes place
under conditions that have not varied and are independent of his own labour. Of course, it may be
said in one sense, that the labourer preserves old value always in proportion to the quantity of
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new value that he adds. Whether the value of cotton rise from one shilling to two shillings, or fall
to sixpence, the workman invariably preserves in the product of one hour only one half as much
value as he preserves in two hours. In like manner, if the productiveness of his own labour varies
by rising or falling, he will in one hour spin either more or less cotton, as the case may be, than he
did before, and will consequently preserve in the product of one hour, more or less value of
cotton; but, all the same, he will preserve by two hours’ labour twice as much value as he will by
one.
Value exists only in articles of utility, in objects: we leave out of consideration its purely
symbolical representation by tokens. (Man himself, viewed as the impersonation of labour-power,
is a natural object, a thing, although a living conscious thing, and labour is the manifestation of
this power residing in him.) If therefore an article loses its utility, it also loses its value. The
reason why means of production do not lose their value, at the same time that they lose their usevalue, is this: they lose in the labour-process the original form of their use-value, only to assume
in the product the form of a new use-value. But, however important it may be to value, that it
should have some object of utility to embody itself in, yet it is a matter of complete indifference
what particular object serves this purpose; this we saw when treating of the metamorphosis of
commodities. Hence it follows that in the labour-process the means of production transfer their
value to the product only so far as along with their use-value they lose also their exchange-value.
They give up to the product that value alone which they themselves lose as means of production.
But in this respect the material factors of the labour-process do not all behave alike.
The coal burnt under the boiler vanishes without leaving a trace; so, too, the tallow with which
the axles of wheels are greased. Dye stuffs and other auxiliary substances also vanish but reappear as properties of the product. Raw material forms the substance of the product, but only
after it has changed its form. Hence raw material and auxiliary substances lose the characteristic
form with which they are clothed on entering the labour-process. It is otherwise with the
instruments of labour. Tools, machines, workshops, and vessels, are of use in the labour-process,
only so long as they retain their original shape, and are ready each morning to renew the process
with their shape unchanged. And just as during their lifetime, that is to say, during the continued
labour-process in which they serve, they retain their shape independent of the product, so, too,
they do after their death. The corpses of machines, tools, workshops, &c., are always separate and
distinct from the product they helped to turn out. If we now consider the case of any instrument of
labour during the whole period of its service, from the day of its entry into the workshop, till the
day of its banishment into the lumber room, we find that during this period its use-value has been
completely consumed, and therefore its exchange-value completely transferred to the product. For
instance, if a spinning machine lasts for 10 years, it is plain that during that working period its
total value is gradually transferred to the product of the 10 years. The lifetime of an instrument of
labour, therefore, is spent in the repetition of a greater or less number of similar operations. Its
life may be compared with that of a human being. Every day brings a man 24 hours nearer to his
grave: but how many days he has still to travel on that road, no man can tell accurately by merely
looking at him. This difficulty, however, does not prevent life insurance offices from drawing, by
means of the theory of averages, very accurate, and at the same time very profitable conclusions.
So it is with the instruments of labour. It is known by experience how long on the average a
machine of a particular kind will last. Suppose its use-value in the labour-process to last only six
days. Then, on the average, it loses each day one-sixth of its use-value, and therefore parts with
one-sixth of its value to the daily product. The wear and tear of all instruments, their daily loss of
use-value, and the corresponding quantity of value they part with to the product, are accordingly
calculated upon this basis.
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It is thus strikingly clear, that means of production never transfer more value to the product than
they themselves lose during the labour-process by the destruction of their own use-value. If such
an instrument has no value to lose, if, in other words, it is not the product of human labour, it
transfers no value to the product. It helps to create use-value without contributing to the formation
of exchange-value. In this class are included all means of production supplied by Nature without
human assistance, such as land, wind, water, metals in situ, and timber in virgin forests.
Yet another interesting phenomenon here presents itself. Suppose a machine to be worth £1,000,
and to wear out in 1,000 days. Then one thousandth part of the value of the machine is daily
transferred to the day’s product. At the same time, though with diminishing vitality, the machine
as a whole continues to take part in the labour-process. Thus it appears, that one factor of the
labour-process, a means of production, continually enters as a whole into that process, while it
enters into the process of the formation of value by fractions only. The difference between the
two processes is here reflected in their material factors, by the same instrument of production
taking part as a whole in the labour-process, while at the same time as an element in the
formation of value, it enters only by fractions.2
On the other hand, a means of production may take part as a whole in the formation of value,
while into the labour-process it enters only bit by bit. Suppose that in spinning cotton, the waste
for every 115 lbs. used amounts to 15 lbs., which is converted, not into yarn, but into “devil’s
dust.” Now, although this 15 lbs. of cotton never becomes a constituent element of the yarn, yet
assuming this amount of waste to be normal and inevitable under average conditions of spinning,
its value is just as surely transferred to the value of the yarn, as is the value of the 100 lbs. that
form the substance of the yarn. The use-value of 15 lbs. of cotton must vanish into dust, before
100 lbs. of yarn can be made. The destruction of this cotton is therefore a necessary condition in
the production of the yarn. And because it is a necessary condition, and for no other reason, the
value of that cotton is transferred to the product. The same holds good for every kind of refuse
resulting from a labour-process, so far at least as such refuse cannot be further employed as a
means in the production of new and independent use-values. Such an employment of refuse may
be seen in the large machine works at Manchester, where mountains of iron turnings are carted
away to the foundry in the evening, in order the next morning to re-appear in the workshops as
solid masses of iron.
We have seen that the means of production transfer value to the new product, so far only as
during the labour-process they lose value in the shape of their old use-value. The maximum loss
of value that they can suffer in the process, is plainly limited by the amount of the original value
with which they came into the process, or in other words, by the labour-time necessary for their
production. Therefore, the means of production can never add more value to the product than they
themselves possess independently of the process in which they assist. However useful a given
kind of raw material, or a machine, or other means of production may be, though it may cost
£150, or, say, 500 days’ labour, yet it cannot, under any circumstances, add to the value of the
product more than £150. Its value is determined not by the labour-process into which it enters as a
means of production, but by that out of which it has issued as a product. In the labour-process it
only serves as a mere use-value, a thing with useful properties, and could not, therefore, transfer
any value to the product, unless it possessed such value previously. 3
While productive labour is changing the means of production into constituent elements of a new
product, their value undergoes a metempsychosis. It deserts the consumed body, to occupy the
newly created one. But this transmigration takes place, as it were, behind the back of the labourer.
He is unable to add new labour, to create new value, without at the same time preserving old
values, and this, because the labour he adds must be of a specific useful kind; and he cannot do

146

Chapter 8

work of a useful kind, without employing products as the means of production of a new product,
and thereby transferring their value to the new product. The property therefore which labourpower in action, living labour, possesses of preserving value, at the same time that it adds it, is a
gift of Nature which costs the labourer nothing, but which is very advantageous to the capitalist
inasmuch as it preserves the existing value of his capital.4 So long as trade is good, the capitalist
is too much absorbed in money-grubbing to take notice of this gratuitous gift of labour. A violent
interruption of the labour-process by a crisis, makes him sensitively aware of it. 5
As regards the means of production, what is really consumed is their use-value, and the
consumption of this use-value by labour results in the product. There is no consumption of their
value, 6and it would therefore be inaccurate to say that it is reproduced. It is rather preserved; not
by reason of any operation it undergoes itself in the process; but because the article in which it
originally exists, vanishes, it is true, but vanishes into some other article. Hence, in the value of
the product, there is a reappearance of the value of the means of production, but there is, strictly
speaking, no reproduction of that value. That which is produced is a new use-value in which the
old exchange-value reappears. 7
It is otherwise with the subjective factor of the labour-process, with labour-power in action.
While the labourer, by virtue of his labour being of a specialised kind that has a special object,
preserves and transfers to the product the value of the means of production, he at the same time,
by the mere act of working, creates each instant an additional or new value. Suppose the process
of production to be stopped just when the workman has produced an equivalent for the value of
his own labour-power, when, for example, by six hours’ labour, he has added a value of three
shillings. This value is the surplus, of the total value of the product, over the portion of its value
that is due to the means of production. It is the only original bit of value formed during this
process, the only portion of the value of the product created by this process. Of course, we do not
forget that this new value only replaces the money advanced by the capitalist in the purchase of
the labour-power, and spent by the labourer on the necessaries of life. With regard to the money
spent, the new value is merely a reproduction; but, nevertheless, it is an actual, and not, as in the
case of the value of the means of production, only an apparent, reproduction. The substitution of
one value for another, is here effected by the creation of new value.
We know, however, from what has gone before, that the labour-process may continue beyond the
time necessary to reproduce and incorporate in the product a mere equivalent for the value of the
labour-power. Instead of the six hours that are sufficient for the latter purpose, the process may
continue for twelve hours. The action of labour-power, therefore, not only reproduces its own
value, but produces value over and above it. This surplus-value is the difference between the
value of the product and the value of the elements consumed in the formation of that product, in
other words, of the means of production and the labour-power.
By our explanation of the different parts played by the various factors of the labour-process in the
formation of the product’s value, we have, in fact, disclosed the characters of the different
functions allotted to the different elements of capital in the process of expanding its own value.
The surplus of the total value of the product, over the sum of the values of its constituent factors,
is the surplus of the expanded capital over the capital originally advanced. The means of
production on the one hand, labour-power on the other, are merely the different modes of
existence which the value of the original capital assumed when from being money it was
transformed into the various factors of the labour-process. That part of capital then, which is
represented by the means of production, by the raw material, auxiliary material and the
instruments of labour does not, in the process of production, undergo any quantitative alteration
of value. I therefore call it the constant part of capital, or, more shortly, constant capital.
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On the other hand, that part of capital, represented by labour-power, does, in the process of
production, undergo an alteration of value. It both reproduces the equivalent of its own value, and
also produces an excess, a surplus-value, which may itself vary, may be more or less according to
circumstances. This part of capital is continually being transformed from a constant into a
variable magnitude. I therefore call it the variable part of capital, or, shortly, variable capital. The
same elements of capital which, from the point of view of the labour-process, present themselves
respectively as the objective and subjective factors, as means of production and labour-power,
present themselves, from the point of view of the process of creating surplus-value, as constant
and variable capital.
The definition of constant capital given above by no means excludes the possibility of a change of
value in its elements. Suppose the price of cotton to be one day sixpence a pound, and the next
day, in consequence of a failure of the cotton crop, a shilling a pound. Each pound of the cotton
bought at sixpence, and worked up after the rise in value, transfers to the product a value of one
shilling; and the cotton already spun before the rise, and perhaps circulating in the market as yarn,
likewise transfers to the product twice its original value. It is plain, however, that these changes
of value are independent of the increment or surplus-value added to the value of the cotton by the
spinning itself. If the old cotton had never been spun, it could, after the rise, be resold at a shilling
a pound instead of at sixpence. Further, the fewer the processes the cotton has gone through, the
more certain is this result. We therefore find that speculators make it a rule when such sudden
changes in value occur, to speculate in that material on which the least possible quantity of labour
has been spent: to speculate, therefore, in yarn rather than in cloth, in cotton itself, rather than in
yarn. The change of value in the case we have been considering, originates, not in the process in
which the cotton plays the part of a means of production, and in which it therefore functions as
constant capital, but in the process in which the cotton itself is produced. The value of a
commodity, it is true, is determined by the quantity of labour contained in it, but this quantity is
itself limited by social conditions. If the time socially necessary for the production of any
commodity alters – and a given weight of cotton represents, after a bad harvest, more labour than
after a good one – all previously existing commodities of the same class are affected, because
they are, as it were, only individuals of the species, 8 and their value at any given time is measured
by the labour socially necessary, i.e., by the labour necessary for their production under the then
existing social conditions.
As the value of the raw material may change, so, too, may that of the instruments of labour, of the
machinery, &c., employed in the process; and consequently that portion of the value of the
product transferred to it from them, may also change. If in consequence of a new invention,
machinery of a particular kind can be produced by a diminished expenditure of labour, the old
machinery becomes depreciated more or less, and consequently transfers so much less value to
the product. But here again, the change in value originates outside the process in which the
machine is acting as a means of production. Once engaged in this process, the machine cannot
transfer more value than it possesses apart from the process.
Just as a change in the value of the means of production, even after they have commenced to take
a part in the labour-process, does not alter their character as constant capital, so, too, a change in
the proportion of constant to variable capital does not affect the respective functions of these two
kinds of capital. The technical conditions of the labour-process may be revolutionised to such an
extent, that where formerly ten men using ten implements of small value worked up a relatively
small quantity of raw material, one man may now, with the aid of one expensive machine, work
up one hundred times as much raw material. In the latter case we have an enormous increase in
the constant capital, that is represented by the total value of the means of production used, and at
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the same time a great reduction in the variable capital, invested in labour-power. Such a
revolution, however, alters only the quantitative relation between the constant and the variable
capital, or the proportions in which the total capital is split up into its constant and variable
constituents; it has not in the least degree affected the essential difference between the two.
1

“Labour gives a new creation for one extinguished.” (“An Essay on the Polit. Econ. of Nations,”
London, 1821, p. 13.)
2
The subject of repairs of the implements of labour does not concern us here. A machine that is
undergoing repair, no longer plays the part of an instrument, but that of a subject of labour. Work is no
longer done with it, but upon it. It is quite permissible for our purpose to assume, that the labour
expended on the repairs of instruments is included in the labour necessary for their original
production. But in the text we deal with that wear and tear, which no doctor can cure, and which little
by little brings about death, with “that kind of wear which cannot be repaired from time to time, and
which, in the case of a knife, would ultimately reduce it to a state in which the cutler would say of it, it
is not worth a new blade.” We have shewn in the text, that a machine takes part in every labourprocess as an integral machine, but that into the simultaneous process of creating value it enters only
bit by bit. How great then is the confusion of ideas exhibited in the following extract! “Mr. Ricardo
says a portion of the labour of the engineer in making [stocking] machines” is contained for example
in the value of a pair of stockings. “Yet the total labour, that produced each single pair of stockings ...
includes the whole labour of the engineer, not a portion; for one machine makes many pairs, and none
of those pairs could have been done without any part of the machine.” “Obs. on Certain Verbal
Disputes in Pol. Econ., Particularly Relating to Value,” p. 54. The author, an uncommonly selfsatisfied wiseacre, is right in his confusion and therefore in his contention, to this extent only, that
neither Ricardo nor any other economist, before or since him, has accurately distinguished the two
aspects of labour, and still less, therefore, the part played by it under each of these aspects in the
formation of value.
3
From this we may judge of the absurdity of J. B. Say, who pretends to account for surplus-value
(Interest, Profit, Rent), by the “services productifs” which the means of production, soil, instruments,
and raw material, render in the labour-process by means of their use-values. Mr. Wm. Roscher who
seldom loses an occasion of registering, in black and white, ingenious apologetic fancies, records the
following specimen: - “J. B. Say (Traité, t. 1, ch. 4) very truly remarks: the value produced by an oil
mill, after deduction of all costs, is something new, something quite different from the labour by
which the oil mill itself was erected.” (l.c., p. 82, note.) Very true, Mr. Professor! the oil produced by
the oil mill is indeed something very different from the labour expended in constructing the mill! By
value, Mr. Roscher understands such stuff as “oil,” because oil has value, notwithstanding that
“Nature” produces petroleum, though relatively “in small quantities,” a fact to which he seems to refer
in his further observation: “It (Nature) produces scarcely any exchange-value.” Mr. Roscher’s
“Nature” and the exchange-value it produces are rather like the foolish virgin who admitted indeed
that she had had a child, but “it was such a little one.” This “savant sérieux” in continuation remarks:
“Ricardo’s school is in the habit of including capital as accumulated labour under the head of labour.
This is unskilful work, because, indeed, the owner of capital, after all, does something more than the
merely creating and preserving of the same: namely, the abstention from the enjoyment of it, for
which he demands, e.g., interest.” (l.c.) How very “skilful” is this “anatomico-physiological method”
of Political Economy, which, “indeed,” converts a mere desire “after all” into a source of value.
4
“Of all the instruments of the farmers’ trade, the labour of man ... is that on which he is most to rely
for the repayment of his capital. The other two ... the working stock of the cattle and the ... carts,
ploughs, spades, and so forth, without a given portion of the first, are nothing at all.” (Edmund Burke:
“Thoughts and Details on Scarcity, originally presented to the Right Hon. W. Pitt, in the month of
November 1795,” Edit. London, 1800, p. 10.)
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In The Times of 26th November, 1862, a manufacturer, whose mill employed 800 hands, and
consumed, on the average, 150 bales of East Indian, or 130 bales of American cotton, complains, in
doleful manner, of the standing expenses of his factory when not working. He estimates them at
£6,000 a year. Among them are a number of items that do not concern us here, such as rent, rates, and
taxes, insurance, salaries of the manager, book-keeper, engineer, and others. Then he reckons £150 for
coal used to heat the mill occasionally, and run the engine now and then. Besides this, he includes the
wages of the people employed at odd times to keep the machinery in working order. Lastly, he puts
down £1,200 for depreciation of machinery, because “the weather and the natural principle of decay
do not suspend their operations because the steam-engine ceases to revolve.” He says, emphatically,
he does not estimate his depreciation at more than the small sum of £1,200, because his machinery is
already nearly worn out.
6
“Productive consumption ... where the consumption of a commodity is a part of the process of
production. ... In these instances there is no consumption of value.” (S. P. Newman, l.c., p. 296.)
7
In an American compendium that has gone through, perhaps, 20 editions, this passage occurs: “It
matters not in what form capital re-appears;” then after a lengthy enumeration of all the possible
ingredients of production whose value re-appears in the product, the passage concludes thus: “The
various kinds of food, clothing, and shelter, necessary for the existence and comfort of the human
being, are also changed. They are consumed from time to time, and their value re-appears in that new
vigour imparted to his body and mind, forming fresh capital, to be employed again in the work of
production.” (F. Wayland, l.c., pp. 31, 32.) Without noticing any other oddities, it suffices to observe,
that what re-appears in the fresh vigour, is not the bread’s price, but its bloodforming substances.
What, on the other hand, re-appears in the value of that vigour, is not the means of subsistence, but
their value. The same necessaries of life, at half the price, would form just as much muscle and bone,
just as much vigour, but not vigour of the same value. This confusion of “value” and “vigour” coupled
with our author’s pharisaical indefiniteness, mark an attempt, futile for all that, to thrash out an
explanation of surplus-value from a mere re-appearance of pre-existing values.
8
“Toutes les productions d’un même genre ne forment proprement qu’une masse, dont le prix se
détermine en général et sans égard aux circonstances particulières.” (Le Trosne, l.c., p. 893.)
[“Properly speaking, all products of the same kind form a single mass, and their price is determined in
general and without regard to particular circumstances.”]

Chapter 9: The Rate of Surplus-Value
Section 1: The Degree of Exploitation of Labour-Power
The surplus-value generated in the process of production by C, the capital advanced, or in other
words, the self-expansion of the value of the capital C, presents itself for our consideration, in the
first place, as a surplus, as the amount by which the value of the product exceeds the value of its
constituent elements.
The capital C is made up of two components, one, the sum of money c laid out upon the means of
production, and the other, the sum of money v expended upon the labour-power; c represents the
portion that has become constant capital, and v the portion that has become variable capital. At
first then, C = c + v: for example, if £500 is the capital advanced, its components may be such
that the £500 = £410 const. + £90 var. When the process of production is finished, we get a
commodity whose value = (c + v) + s, where s is the surplus-value; or taking our former figures,
the value of this commodity may be (£410 const. + £90 var.) + £90 surpl. The original capital has
now changed from C to C', from £500 to £590. The difference is s or a surplus-value of £90.
Since the value of the constituent elements of the product is equal to the value of the advanced
capital, it is mere tautology to say, that the excess of the value of the product over the value of its
constituent elements, is equal to the expansion of the capital advanced or to the surplus-value
produced.
Nevertheless, we must examine this tautology a little more closely. The two things compared are,
the value of the product and the value of its constituents consumed in the process of production.
Now we have seen how that portion of the constant capital which consists of the instruments of
labour, transfers to the production only a fraction of its value, while the remainder of that value
continues to reside in those instruments. Since this remainder plays no part in the formation of
value, we may at present leave it on one side. To introduce it into the calculation would make no
difference. For instance, taking our former example, c = £410: suppose this sum to consist of
£312 value of raw material, £44 value of auxiliary material, and £54 value of the machinery worn
away in the process; and suppose that the total value of the machinery employed is £1,054. Out of
this latter sum, then, we reckon as advanced for the purpose of turning out the product, the sum of
£54 alone, which the machinery loses by wear and tear in the process; for this is all it parts with
to the product. Now if we also reckon the remaining £1,000, which still continues in the
machinery, as transferred to the product, we ought also to reckon it as part of the value advanced,
and thus make it appear on both sides of our calculation. 1 We should, in this way, get £1,500 on
one side and £1,590 on the other. The difference of these two sums, or the surplus-value, would
still be £90. Throughout this Book therefore, by constant capital advanced for the production of
value, we always mean, unless the context is repugnant thereto, the value of the means of
production actually consumed in the process, and that value alone.
This being so, let us return to the formula C = c + v, which we saw was transformed into C' = (c +
v) + s, C becoming C'. We know that the value of the constant capital is transferred to, and
merely re-appears in the product. The new value actually created in the process, the value
produced, or value-product, is therefore not the same as the value of the product; it is not, as it
would at first sight appear (c + v) + s or £410 const. + £90 var. + £90 surpl.; but v + s or £90 var.
+ £90 surpl., not £590 but £180. If c = 0, or in other words, if there were branches of industry in
which the capitalist could dispense with all means of production made by previous labour,
whether they be raw material, auxiliary material, or instruments of labour, employing only
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labour-power and materials supplied by Nature, in that case, there would be no constant capital to
transfer to the product. This component of the value of the product, i.e., the £410 in our example,
would be eliminated, but the sum of £180, the amount of new value created, or the value
produced, which contains £90 of surplus-value, would remain just as great as if c represented the
highest value imaginable. We should have C = (0 + v) = v or C' the expanded capital = v + s and
therefore C' - C = s as before. On the other hand, if s = 0, or in other words, if the labour-power,
whose value is advanced in the form of variable capital, were to produce only its equivalent, we
should have C = c + v or C' the value of the product = (c + v) + 0 or C = C'. The capital advanced
would, in this case, not have expanded its value.
From what has gone before, we know that surplus-value is purely the result of a variation in the
value of v, of that portion of the capital which is transformed into labour-power; consequently, v
+ s = v + v', or v plus an increment of v. But the fact that it is v alone that varies, and the
conditions of that variation, are obscured by the circumstance that in consequence of the increase
in the variable component of the capital, there is also an increase in the sum total of the advanced
capital. It was originally £500 and becomes £590. Therefore in order that our investigation may
lead to accurate results, we must make abstraction from that portion of the value of the product, in
which constant capital alone appears, and consequently must equate the constant capital to zero or
make c = 0. This is merely an application of a mathematical rule, employed whenever we operate
with constant and variable magnitudes, related to each other by the symbols of addition and
subtraction only.
A further difficulty is caused by the original form of the variable capital. In our example, C' =
£410 const. + £90 var. + £90 surpl.; but £90 is a given and therefore a constant quantity; hence it
appears absurd to treat it as variable. But in fact, the term £90 var. is here merely a symbol to
show that this value undergoes a process. The portion of the capital invested in the purchase of
labour-power is a definite quantity of materialised labour, a constant value like the value of the
labour-power purchased. But in the process of production the place of the £90 is taken by the
labour-power in action, dead labour is replaced by living labour, something stagnant by
something flowing, a constant by a variable. The result is the reproduction of v plus an increment
of v. From the point of view then of capitalist production, the whole process appears as the
spontaneous variation of the originally constant value, which is transformed into labour-power.
Both the process and its result, appear to be owing to this value. If, therefore, such expressions as
“£90 variable capital,” or “so much self-expanding value,” appear contradictory, this is only
because they bring to the surface a contradiction immanent in capitalist production.
At first sight it appears a strange proceeding, to equate the constant capital to zero. Yet it is what
we do every day. If, for example, we wish to calculate the amount of England’s profits from the
cotton industry, we first of all deduct the sums paid for cotton to the United States, India, Egypt
and other countries; in other words, the value of the capital that merely re-appears in the value of
the product, is put = 0.
Of course the ratio of surplus-value not only to that portion of the capital from which it
immediately springs, and whose change of value it represents, but also to the sum total of the
capital advanced is economically of very great importance. We shall, therefore, in the third book,
treat of this ratio exhaustively. In order to enable one portion of a capital to expand its value by
being converted into labour-power, it is necessary that another portion be converted into means of
production. In order that variable capital may perform its function, constant capital must be
advanced in proper proportion, a proportion given by the special technical conditions of each
labour-process. The circumstance, however, that retorts and other vessels, are necessary to a
chemical process, does not compel the chemist to notice them in the result of his analysis. If we
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look at the means of production, in their relation to the creation of value, and to the variation in
the quantity of value, apart from anything else, they appear simply as the material in which
labour-power, the value-creator, incorporates itself. Neither the nature, nor the value of this
material is of any importance. The only requisite is that there be a sufficient supply to absorb the
labour expended in the process of production. That supply once given, the material may rise or
fall in value, or even be, as land and the sea, without any value in itself; but this will have no
influence on the creation of value or on the variation in the quantity of value.2
In the first place then we equate the constant capital to zero. The capital advanced is consequently
reduced from c + v to v, and instead of the value of the product (c + v) + s we have now the value
produced (v + s). Given the new value produced = £180, which sum consequently represents the
whole labour expended during the process, then subtracting from it £90 the value of the variable
capital, we have remaining £90, the amount of the surplus-value. This sum of £90 or s expresses
the absolute quantity of surplus-value produced. The relative quantity produced, or the increase
per cent of the variable capital, is determined, it is plain, by the ratio of the surplus-value to the
variable capital, or is expressed by s/v. In our example this ratio is 90/90, which gives an increase
of 100%. This relative increase in the value of the variable capital, or the relative magnitude of
the surplus-value, I call, “The rate of surplus-value.” 3
We have seen that the labourer, during one portion of the labour-process, produces only the value
of his labour-power, that is, the value of his means of subsistence. Now since his work forms part
of a system, based on the social division of labour, he does not directly produce the actual
necessaries which he himself consumes; he produces instead a particular commodity, yarn for
example, whose value is equal to the value of those necessaries or of the money with which they
can be bought. The portion of his day’s labour devoted to this purpose, will be greater or less, in
proportion to the value of the necessaries that he daily requires on an average, or, what amounts
to the same thing, in proportion to the labour-time required on an average to produce them. If the
value of those necessaries represent on an average the expenditure of six hours’ labour, the
workman must on an average work for six hours to produce that value. If instead of working for
the capitalist, he worked independently on his own account, he would, other things being equal,
still be obliged to labour for the same number of hours, in order to produce the value of his
labour-power, and thereby to gain the means of subsistence necessary for his conservation or
continued reproduction. But as we have seen, during that portion of his day’s labour in which he
produces the value of his labour-power, say three shillings, he produces only an equivalent for the
value of his labour-power already advanced 4 by the capitalist; the new value created only replaces
the variable capital advanced. It is owing to this fact, that the production of the new value of three
shillings takes the semblance of a mere reproduction. That portion of the working day, then,
during which this reproduction takes place, I call “necessary” labour time, and the labour
expended during that time I call “necessary” labour.5 Necessary, as regards the labourer, because
independent of the particular social form of his labour; necessary, as regards capital, and the
world of capitalists, because on the continued existence of the labourer depends their existence
also.
During the second period of the labour-process, that in which his labour is no longer necessary
labour, the workman, it is true, labours, expends labour-power; but his labour, being no longer
necessary labour, he creates no value for himself. He creates surplus-value which, for the
capitalist, has all the charms of a creation out of nothing. This portion of the working day, I name
surplus labour-time, and to the labour expended during that time, I give the name of surplus
labour. It is every bit as important, for a correct understanding of surplus-value, to conceive it as a
mere congelation of surplus labour-time, as nothing but materialised surplus labour, as it is, for a
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proper comprehension of value, to conceive it as a mere congelation of so many hours of labour,
as nothing but materialised labour. The essential difference between the various economic forms
of society, between, for instance, a society based on slave-labour, and one based on wage-labour,
lies only in the mode in which this surplus labour is in each case extracted from the actual
producer, the labourer. 6
Since, on the one hand, the values of the variable capital and of the labour-power purchased by
that capital are equal, and the value of this labour-power determines the necessary portion of the
working day; and since, on the other hand, the surplus-value is determined by the surplus portion
of the working day, it follows that surplus-value bears the same ratio to variable capital, that
surplus labour does to necessary labour, or in other words, the rate of surplus-value, s/v = (surplus
labour)/(necessary labour). Both ratios, s/v and (surplus labour)/(necessary labour), express the
same thing in different ways; in the one case by reference to materialised, incorporated labour, in
the other by reference to living, fluent labour.
The rate of surplus-value is therefore an exact expression for the degree of exploitation of labourpower by capital, or of the labourer by the capitalist.7
We assumed in our example, that the value of the product = £410 const. + £90 var. + £90 surpl.,
and that the capital advanced = £500. Since the surplus-value = £90, and the advanced capital =
£500, we should, according to the usual way of reckoning, get as the rate of surplus-value
(generally confounded with rate of profits) 18%, a rate so low as possibly to cause a pleasant
surprise to Mr. Carey and other harmonisers. But in truth, the rate of surplus-value is not equal to
s/C or s/(c+v), but to s/v: thus it is not 90/500 but 90/90 or 100%, which is more than five times
the apparent degree of exploitation. Although, in the case we have supposed, we are ignorant of
the actual length of the working day, and of the duration in days or weeks of the labour-process,
as also of the number of labourers employed, yet the rate of surplus-value s/v accurately discloses
to us, by means of its equivalent expression, surplus labour/necessary labour the relation between
the two parts of the working day. This relation is here one of equality, the rate being 100%.
Hence, it is plain, the labourer, in our example, works one half of the day for himself, the other
half for the capitalist.
The method of calculating the rate of surplus-value is therefore, shortly, as follows. We take the
total value of the product and put the constant capital which merely re-appears in it, equal to zero.
What remains, is the only value that has, in the process of producing the commodity, been
actually created. If the amount of surplus-value be given, we have only to deduct it from this
remainder, to find the variable capital. And vice versâ, if the latter be given, and we require to
find the surplus-value. If both be given, we have only to perform the concluding operation, viz.,
to calculate s/v, the ratio of the surplus-value to the variable capital.
Though the method is so simple, yet it may not be amiss, by means of a few examples, to exercise
the reader in the application of the novel principles underlying it.
First we will take the case of a spinning mill containing 10,000 mule spindles, spinning No. 32
yarn from American cotton, and producing 1 lb. of yarn weekly per spindle. We assume the waste
to be 6%: under these circumstances 10,600 lbs. of cotton are consumed weekly, of which 600
lbs. go to waste. The price of the cotton in April, 1871, was 7¾d. per lb.; the raw material
therefore costs in round numbers £342. The 10,000 spindles, including preparation-machinery,
and motive power, cost, we will assume, £1 per spindle, amounting to a total of £10,000. The
wear and tear we put at 10%, or £1,000 yearly = £20 weekly. The rent of the building we suppose
to be £300 a year, or £6 a week. Coal consumed (for 100 horse-power indicated, at 4 lbs. of coal
per horse-power per hour during 60 hours, and inclusive of that consumed in heating the mill), 11
tons a week at 8s. 6d. a ton, amounts to about £4½ a week: gas, £1 a week, oil, &c., £4½ a week.
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Total cost of the above auxiliary materials, £10 weekly. Therefore the constant portion of the
value of the week’s product is £378. Wages amount to £52 a week. The price of the yarn is 12¼d.
per. lb. which gives for the value of 10,000 lbs. the sum of £510. The surplus-value is therefore in
this case £510 - £430 = £80. We put the constant part of the value of the product = 0, as it plays
no part in the creation of value. There remains £132 as the weekly value created, which = £52
var. + £80 surpl. The rate of surplus-value is therefore 80/52 = 153 11/13%. In a working day of
10 hours with average labour the result is: necessary labour = 3 31/33 hours, and surplus labour =
6 2/33. 8
One more example. Jacob gives the following calculation for the year 1815. Owing to the
previous adjustment of several items it is very imperfect; nevertheless for our purpose it is
sufficient. In it he assumes the price of wheat to be 8s. a quarter, and the average yield per acre to
be 22 bushels.
VALUE PRODUCED PER ACRE
Seed
£1 9s. 0d.
Tithes, Rates,
and taxes,
Manure
£2 10s. 0d.
Rent
Wages
£3 10s. 0d.
Farmer’s Profit
and Interest
TOTAL £7 9s. 0d.
TOTAL

£1 1s. 0d.
£1 8s. 0d.
£1 2s. 0d.
£3 11s 0d.

Assuming that the price of the product is the same as its value, we here find the surplus-value
distributed under the various heads of profit, interest, rent, &c. We have nothing to do with these
in detail; we simply add them together, and the sum is a surplus-value of £3 11s. 0d. The sum of
£3 19s. 0d., paid for seed and manure, is constant capital, and we put it equal to zero. There is left
the sum of £3 10s. 0d., which is the variable capital advanced: and we see that a new value of £3
10s. 0d + £3 11s. 0d. has been produced in its place. Therefore s/v = £3 11s. 0d. / £3 10s. 0d.,
giving a rate of surplus-value of more than 100%. The labourer employs more than one half of his
working day in producing the surplus-value, which different persons, under different pretexts,
share amongst themselves. 9

Section 2: The Representation of the Components of the Value
of the Product by Corresponding Proportional Parts of the
Product Itself
Let us now return to the example by which we were shown how the capitalist converts money
into capital.
The product of a working day of 12 hours is 20 lbs. of yarn, having a value of 30s. No less than
8/10ths of this value, or 24s., is due to mere re-appearance in it, of the value of the means of
production (20 lbs. of cotton, value 20s., and spindle worn away, 4s.): it is therefore constant
capital. The remaining 2/10ths or 6s. is the new value created during the spinning process: of this
one half replaces the value of the day’s labour-power, or the variable capital, the remaining half
constitutes a surplus-value of 3s. The total value then of the 20 lbs. of yarn is made up as follows:
30s. value of yarn = 24s. const. + 3s. var. + 3s. surpl.
Since the whole of this value is contained in the 20 lbs. of yarn produced, it follows that the
various component parts of this value, can be represented as being contained respectively in
corresponding parts of the product.
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If the value of 30s. is contained in 20 lbs. of yarn, then 8/10ths of this value, or the 24s. that form
its constant part, is contained in 8/10ths of the product or in 16 lbs. of yarn. Of the latter 13 1/3
lbs. represent the value of the raw material, the 20s. worth of cotton spun, and 2 2/3 lbs. represent
the 4s. worth of spindle, &c., worn away in the process.
Hence the whole of the cotton used up in spinning the 20 lbs. of yarn, is represented by 13 1/3
lbs. of yarn. This latter weight of yarn contains, it is true, by weight, no more than 13 1/3 lbs. of
cotton, worth 13 1/3 shillings; but the 6 2/3 shillings additional value contained in it, are the
equivalent for the cotton consumed in spinning the remaining 6 2/3 lbs. of yarn. The effect is the
same as if these 6 2/3 lbs. of yarn contained no cotton at all, and the whole 20 lbs. of cotton were
concentrated in the 13 1/3 lbs. of yarn. The latter weight, on the other hand, does not contain an
atom either of the value of the auxiliary materials and implements, or of the value newly created
in the process.
In the same way, the 2 2/3 lbs. of yarn, in which the 4s., the remainder of the constant capital, is
embodied, represents nothing but the value of the auxiliary materials and instruments of labour
consumed in producing the 20 lbs. of yarn.
We have, therefore, arrived at this result: although eight-tenths of the product, or 16 lbs. of yarn,
is, in its character of an article of utility, just as much the fabric of the spinner’s labour, as the
remainder of the same product, yet when viewed in this connexion, it does not contain, and has
not absorbed any labour expended during the process of spinning. It is just as if the cotton had
converted itself into yarn, without help; as if the shape it had assumed was mere trickery and
deceit: for so soon as our capitalist sells it for 24s., and with the money replaces his means of
production, it becomes evident that this 16 lbs. of yarn is nothing more than so much cotton and
spindle-waste in disguise.
On the other hand, the remaining 2/10ths of the product, or 4 lbs of yarn, represent nothing but
the new value of 6s., created during the 12 hours’ spinning process. All the value transferred to
those 4 lbs, from the raw material and instruments of labour consumed, was, so to say, intercepted
in order to be incorporated in the 16 lbs. first spun. In this case, it is as if the spinner had spun 4
lbs. of yarn out of air, or, as if he had spun them with the aid of cotton and spindles, that, being
the spontaneous gift of Nature, transferred no value to the product.
Of this 4 lbs. of yarn, in which the whole of the value newly created during the process, is
condensed, one half represents the equivalent for the value of the labour consumed, or the 3s.
variable capital, the other half represents the 3s. surplus-value.
Since 12 working-hours of the spinner are embodied in 6s., it follows that in yarn of the value of
30s., there must be embodied 60 working-hours. And this quantity of labour-time does in fact
exist in the 20 lbs of yarn; for in 8/10ths or 16 lbs there are materialised the 48 hours of labour
expended, before the commencement of the spinning process, on the means of production; and in
the remaining 2/10ths or 4 lbs there are materialised the 12 hours’ work done during the process
itself.
On a former page we saw that the value of the yarn is equal to the sum of the new value created
during the production of that yarn plus the value previously existing in the means of production.
It has now been shown how the various component parts of the value of the product, parts that
differ functionally from each other, may be represented by corresponding proportional parts of
the product itself.
To split up in this manner the product into different parts, of which one represents only the labour
previously spent on the means of production, or the constant capital, another, only the necessary
labour spent during the process of production, or the variable capital, and another and last part,
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only the surplus labour expended during the same process, or the surplus-value; to do this, is, as
will be seen later on from its application to complicated and hitherto unsolved problems, no less
important than it is simple.
In the preceding investigation we have treated the total product as the final result, ready for use,
of a working day of 12 hours. We can however follow this total product through all the stages of
its production; and in this way we shall arrive at the same result as before, if we represent the
partial products, given off at the different stages, as functionally different parts of the final or total
product.
The spinner produces in 12 hours 20 lbs. of yarn, or in 1 hour 1⅔ lbs; consequently he produces
in 8 hours 13⅔ lbs., or a partial product equal in value to all the cotton that is spun in a whole
day. In like manner the partial product of the next period of 1 hour and 36 minutes, is 2⅔ lbs. of
yarn: this represents the value of the instruments of labour that are consumed in 12 hours. In the
following hour and 12 minutes, the spinner produces 2 lbs. of yarn worth 3 shillings, a value
equal to the whole value he creates in his 6 hours’ necessary labour. Finally, in the last hour and
12 minutes he produces another 2 lbs. of yarn, whose value is equal to the surplus-value, created
by his surplus labour during half a day. This method of calculation serves the English
manufacturer for every-day use; it shows, he will say, that in the first 8 hours, or ⅔ of the
working day, he gets back the value of his cotton; and so on for the remaining hours. It is also a
perfectly correct method: being in fact the first method given above with this difference, that
instead of being applied to space, in which the different parts of the completed product lie side by
side, it deals with time, in which those parts are successively produced. But it can also be
accompanied by very barbarian notions, more especially in the heads of those who are as much
interested, practically, in the process of making value beget value, as they are in
misunderstanding that process theoretically. Such people may get the notion into their heads, that
our spinner, for example, produces or replaces in the first 8 hours of his working day the value of
the cotton; in the following hour and 36 minutes the value of the instruments of labour worn
away; in the next hour and 12 minutes the value of the wages; and that he devotes to the
production of surplus-value for the manufacturer, only that well known “last hour.” In this way
the poor spinner is made to perform the two-fold miracle not only of producing cotton, spindles,
steam-engine, coal, oil, &c., at the same time that he spins with them, but also of turning one
working day into five; for, in the example we are considering, the production of the raw material
and instruments of labour demands four working days of twelve hours each, and their conversion
into yarn requires another such day. That the love of lucre induces an easy belief in such miracles,
and that sycophant doctrinaires are never wanting to prove them, is vouched for by the following
incident of historical celebrity.

Section 3: Senior’s “Last Hour”
One fine morning, in the year 1836, Nassau W. Senior, who may be called the bel-esprit of
English economists, well known, alike for his economic “science,” and for his beautiful style, was
summoned from Oxford to Manchester, to learn in the latter place, the Political Economy that he
taught in the former. The manufacturers elected him as their champion, not only against the
newly passed Factory Act, but against the still more menacing Ten-hours’ agitation. With their
usual practical acuteness, they had found out that the learned Professor “wanted a good deal of
finishing;” it was this discovery that caused them to write for him. On his side the Professor has
embodied the lecture he received from the Manchester manufacturers, in a pamphlet, entitled:
“Letters on the Factory Act, as it affects the cotton manufacture.” London, 1837. Here we find,
amongst others, the following edifying passage:
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“Under the present law, no mill in which persons under 18 years of age are
employed, ... can be worked more than 11½ hours a day, that is, 12 hours for 5
days in the week, and nine on Saturday.
“Now the following analysis (!) will show that in a mill so worked, the whole net
profit is derived from the last hour. I will suppose a manufacturer to invest
£100,000: – £80,000 in his mill and machinery, and £20,000 in raw material and
wages. The annual return of that mill, supposing the capital to be turned once a
year, and gross profits to be 15 per cent., ought to be goods worth £115,000.... Of
this £115,000, each of the twenty-three half-hours of work produces 5-115ths or
one twenty-third. Of these 23-23rds (constituting the whole £115,000) twenty, that
is to say £100,000 out of the £115,000, simply replace the capital; – one twentythird (or £5,000 out of the £115,000) makes up for the deterioration of the mill
and machinery. The remaining 2-23rds, that is, the last two of the twenty-three
half-hours of every day, produce the net profit of 10 per cent. If, therefore (prices
remaining the same), the factory could be kept at work thirteen hours instead of
eleven and a half, with an addition of about £2,600 to the circulating capital, the
net profit would be more than doubled. On the other hand, if the hours of working
were reduced by one hour per day (prices remaining the same), the net profit
would be destroyed – if they were reduced by one hour and a half, even the gross
profit would be destroyed.” 10
And the Professor calls this an “analysis!” If, giving credence to the out-cries of the
manufacturers, he believed that the workmen spend the best part of the day in the production, i.e.,
the reproduction or replacement of the value of the buildings, machinery, cotton, coal, &c., then
his analysis was superfluous. His answer would simply have been: – Gentlemen! if you work
your mills for 10 hours instead of 11½, then, other things being equal, the daily consumption of
cotton, machinery, &c., will decrease in proportion. You gain just as much as you lose. Your
work-people will in future spend one hour and a half less time in reproducing or replacing the
capital that has been advanced. – If, on the other hand, he did not believe them without further
inquiry, but, as being an expert in such matters, deemed an analysis necessary, then he ought, in a
question that is concerned exclusively with the relations of net profit to the length of the working
day, before all things to have asked the manufacturers, to be careful not to lump together
machinery, workshops, raw material, and labour, but to be good enough to place the constant
capital, invested in buildings, machinery, raw material, &c., on one side of the account, and the
capital advanced in wages on the other side. If the Professor then found, that in accordance with
the calculation of the manufacturers, the workman reproduced or replaced his wages in 2 halfhours, in that case, he should have continued his analysis thus:
According to your figures, the workman in the last hour but one produces his wages, and in the
last hour your surplus-value or net profit. Now, since in equal periods he produces equal values,
the produce of the last hour but one, must have the same value as that of the last hour. Further, it
is only while he labours that he produces any value at all, and the amount of his labour is
measured by his labour-time. This you say, amounts to 11½ hours a day. He employs one portion
of these 11½ hours, in producing or replacing his wages, and the remaining portion in producing
your net profit. Beyond this he does absolutely nothing. But since, on your assumption, his
wages, and the surplus-value he yields, are of equal value, it is clear that he produces his wages in
5¾ hours, and your net profit in the other 5¾ hours. Again, since the value of the yarn produced
in 2 hours, is equal to the sum of the values of his wages and of your net profit, the measure of the
value of this yarn must be 11½ working-hours, of which 5¾ hours measure the value of the yarn
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produced in the last hour but one, and 5¾, the value of the yarn produced in the last hour. We
now come to a ticklish point; therefore, attention! The last working-hour but one is, like the first,
an ordinary working-hour, neither more nor less. How then can the spinner produce in one hour,
in the shape of yarn, a value that embodies 5¾ hours’ labour? The truth is that he performs no
such miracle. The use-value produced by him in one hour, is a definite quantity of yarn. The
value of this yarn is measured by 5¾ working-hours, of which 4¾ were, without any assistance
from him, previously embodied in the means of production, in the cotton, the machinery, and so
on; the remaining one hour alone is added by him. Therefore since his wages are produced in 5¾
hours, and the yarn produced in one hour also contains 5¾ hours’ work, there is no witchcraft in
the result, that the value created by his 5¾ hours’ spinning, is equal to the value of the product
spun in one hour. You are altogether on the wrong track, if you think that he loses a single
moment of his working day, in reproducing or replacing the values of the cotton, the machinery,
and so on. On the contrary, it is because his labour converts the cotton and spindles into yarn,
because he spins, that the values of the cotton and spindles go over to the yarn of their own
accord. This result is owing to the quality of his labour, not to its quantity. It is true, he will in one
hour transfer to the yarn more value, in the shape of cotton, than he will in half an hour; but that
is only because in one hour he spins up more cotton than in half an hour. You see then, your
assertion, that the workman produces, in the last hour but one, the value of his wages, and in the
last hour your net profit, amounts to no more than this, that in the yarn produced by him in 2
working-hours, whether they are the 2 first or the 2 last hours of the working day, in that yarn,
there are incorporated 11½ working-hours, or just a whole day’s work, i.e., two hours of his own
work and 9½ hours of other people’s. And my assertion that, in the first 5¾ hours, he produces
his wages, and in the last 5¾ hours your net profit, amounts only to this, that you pay him for the
former, but not for the latter. In speaking of payment of labour, instead of payment of labourpower, I only talk your own slang. Now, gentlemen, if you compare the working-time you pay
for, with that which you do not pay for, you will find that they are to one another, as half a day is
to half a day; this gives a rate of 100%, and a very pretty percentage it is. Further, there is not the
least doubt, that if you make your “hands” toil for 13 hours, instead of 11½, and, as may be
expected from you, treat the work done in that extra one hour and a half, as pure surplus labour,
then the latter will be increased from 5¾ hours’ labour to 7¼ hours’ labour, and the rate of
surplus-value from 100% to 126 2/23%. So that you are altogether too sanguine, in expecting that
by such an addition of 1½ hours to the working day, the rate will rise from 100% to 200% and
more, in other words that it will be “more than doubled.” On the other hand ‒ man’s heart is a
wonderful thing, especially when carried in the purse – you take too pessimist a view, when you
fear, that with a reduction of the hours of labour from 11½ to 10, the whole of your net profit will
go to the dogs. Not at all. All other conditions remaining the same, the surplus labour will fall
from 5¾ hours to 4¾ hours, a period that still gives a very profitable rate of surplus-value,
namely 82 14/23%. But this dreadful “last hour,” about which you have invented more stories
than have the millenarians about the day of judgment, is “all bosh.” If it goes, it will cost neither
you, your net profit, nor the boys and girls whom you employ, their “purity of mind.” 11
Whenever your “last hour” strikes in earnest, think of the Oxford Professor. And now, gentlemen,
“farewell, and may we meet again in yonder better world, but not before.”
Senior invented the battle cry of the “last hour” in 1836. 12 In the London Economist of the 15th
April, 1848, the same cry was again raised by James Wilson, an economic mandarin of high
standing: this time in opposition to the 10 hours’ bill.
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Section 4: Surplus-Produce
The portion of the product that represents the surplus-value, (one tenth of the 20 lbs., or 2 lbs. of
yarn, in the example given in Sec. 2) we call “surplus-produce.” Just as the rate of surplus-value
is determined by its relation, not to the sum total of the capital, but to its variable part; in like
manner, the relative quantity of surplus-produce is determined by the ratio that this produce bears,
not to the remaining part of the total product, but to that part of it in which is incorporated the
necessary labour. Since the production of surplus-value is the chief end and aim of capitalist
production, it is clear, that the greatness of a man’s or a nation’s wealth should be measured, not
by the absolute quantity produced, but by the relative magnitude of the surplus-produce. 13
The sum of the necessary labour and the surplus labour, i.e., of the periods of time during which
the workman replaces the value of his labour-power, and produces the surplus-value, this sum
constitutes the actual time during which he works, i.e., the working day.
1

“If we reckon the value of the fixed capital employed as a part of the advances, we must reckon the
remaining value of such capital at the end of the year as a part of the annual returns.” (Malthus,
“Princ. of Pol. Econ.” 2nd. ed., Lond., 1836, p. 269.)
2
What Lucretius says is self-evident; “nil posse creari de nihilo,” out of nothing, nothing can be
created. Creation of value is transformation of labour-power into labour. Labour-power itself is energy
transferred to a human organism by means of nourishing matter.
3
In the same way that the English use the terms “rate of profit,” “rate of interest.” We shall see, in
Book III, that the rate of profit is no mystery, so soon as we know the laws of surplus-value. If we
reverse the process, we cannot comprehend either the one or the other.
4
Note added in the 3rd German edition. — The author resorts here to the economic language in
current use. It will be remembered that on p. 182 (present edition, p. 174) it was shown that in reality
the labourer “advances” to the capitalist and not the capitalist to the labourer. — F. E.
5
In this work, we have, up to now, employed the term “necessary labour-time,” to designate the time
necessary under given social conditions for the production of any commodity. Henceforward we use it
to designate also the time necessary for the production of the particular commodity labour-power. The
use of one and the same technical term in different senses is inconvenient, but in no science can it be
altogether avoided. Compare, for instance, the higher with the lower branches of mathematics.
6
Herr Wilhelm Thucydides Roscher has found a mare’s nest. He has made the important discovery
that if, on the one hand, the formation of surplus-value, or surplus-produce, and the consequent
accumulation of capital, is now-a-days due to the thrift of the capitalist, on the other hand, in the
lowest stages of civilisation it is the strong who compel the weak to economise. (l.c., p. 78.) To
economise what? Labour? Or superfluous wealth that does not exist? What is it that makes such men
as Roscher account for the origin of surplus-value, by a mere rechauffé of the more of less plausible
excuses by the capitalist, for his appropriation of surplus-value? It is, besides their real ignorance,
their apologetic dread of a scientific analysis of value and surplus-value, and of obtaining a result,
possibly not altogether palatable to the powers that be.
7
Although the rate of surplus-value is an exact expression for the degree of exploitation of labourpower, it is, in no sense, an expression for the absolute amount of exploitation. For example, if the
necessary labour = 5 hours and the surplus labour = 5 hours, the degree of exploitation is 100%. The
amount of exploitation is here measured by 5 hours. If, on the other hand, the necessary labour = 6
hours and the surplus labour = 6 hours, the degree of exploitation remains, as before, 100%, while the
actual amount of exploitation has increased 20%, namely from five hours to six.
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The above data, which may be relied upon, were given me by a Manchester spinner. In England the
horse-power of an engine was formerly calculated from the diameter of its cylinder, now the actual
horse-power shown by the indicator is taken.
9
The calculations given in the text are intended merely as illustrations. We have in fact. assumed that
prices = values. We shall, however, see, in Book III., that even in the case of average prices the
assumption cannot be made in this very simple manner.
10
Senior, l.c., pp. 12, 13. We let pass such extraordinary notions as are of no importance for our
purpose; for instance, the assertion, that manufacturers reckon as part of their profit, gross or net, the
amount required to make good wear and tear of machinery, or in other words, to replace a part of the
capital. So, too, we pass over any question as to the accuracy of his figures. Leonard Horner has
shown in “A Letter to Mr. Senior,” &c., London, 1837, that they are worth no more than so-called
“Analysis.” Leonard Horner was one of the Factory Inquiry Commissioners in 1833, and Inspector, or
rather Censor of Factories till 1859. He rendered undying service to the English working-class. He
carried on a life-long contest, not only with the embittered manufacturers, but also with the Cabinet, to
whom the number of votes given by the masters in the Lower House, was a matter of far greater
importance than the number of hours worked by the “hands” in the mills.
Apart from efforts in principle, Senior’s statement is confused. What he really intended to say was
this: The manufacturer employs the workman for 11½ hours or for 23 half-hours daily. As the
working day, so, too, the working year, may be conceived to consist of 11½ hours or 23 half-hours,
but each multiplied by the number of working days in the year. On this supposition, the 23 half-hours
yield an annual product of £115,000; one half-hour yields 1/23 × £115,000; 20 half-hours yield 20/23
× £115,000 = £100,000, i.e., they replace no more than the capital advanced. There remain 3 halfhours, which yield 1/23 × £115,000 = £5,000 or the gross profit. Of these 3 half-hours, one yields 1/23
× £115,000 = £5,000; i.e., it makes up for the wear and tear of the machinery; the remaining 2 halfhours, i.e., the last hour, yield 2/23 × £115,000 = £10,000 or the net profit. In the text Senior converts
the last 2/23 of the product into portions of the working day itself.
11
If, on the one hand, Senior proved that the net profit of the manufacturer, the existence of he
English cotton industry, and England’s command of the markets of the world, depend on “the last
working-hour,” on the other hand, Dr. Andrew Ure showed, that if children and young persons under
18 years of age, instead of being kept the full 12 hours in the warm and pure moral atmosphere of the
factory, are turned out an hour sooner into the heartless and frivolous outer world, they will be
deprived, by idleness and vice, of all hope of salvation for their souls. Since 1848, the factory
inspectors have never tired of twitting the masters with this “last,” this “fatal hour.” Thus Mr. Hovell
in his report of the 21st May, 1855: “Had the following ingenious calculation (he quotes Senior) been
correct, every cotton factory in the United Kingdom would have been working at a loss since the year
1850.” (Reports of the Insp. of Fact., for the half-year, ending 30th April, 1855, pp. 19, 20.) In the
year 1848, after the passing of the 10 hours’ bill, the masters of some flax spinning mills, scattered,
few and far between, over the country on the borders of Dorset and Somerset, foisted a petition against
the bill on to the shoulders of a few of their work-people. One of the clauses of this petition is as
follows: “Your petitioners, as parents, conceive that an additional hour of leisure will tend more to
demoralise the children than otherwise, believing that idleness is the parent of vice.” On this the
factory report of 31st Oct., 1848, says: The atmosphere of the flax mills, in which the children of these
virtuous and tender parents work, is so loaded with dust and fibre from the raw material, that it is
exceptionally unpleasant to stand even 10 minutes in the spinning rooms: for you are unable to do so
without the most painful sensation, owing to the eyes, the ears, the nostrils, and mouth, being
immediately filled by the clouds of flax dust from which there is no escape. The labour itself, owing to
the feverish haste of the machinery, demands unceasing application of skill and movement, under the
control of a watchfulness that never tires, and it seems somewhat hard, to let parents apply the term

161

Chapter 9

“idling” to their own children, who, after allowing for meal-times, are fettered for 10 whole hours to
such an occupation, in such an atmosphere.... These children work longer than the labourers in the
neighbouring villages.... Such cruel talk about “idleness and vice” ought to be branded as the purest
cant, and the most shameless hypocrisy.... That portion of the public, who, about 12 years ago, were
struck by the assurance with which, under the sanction of high authority, it was publicly and most
earnestly proclaimed, that the whole net profit of the manufacturer flows from the labour of the last
hour, and that, therefore, the reduction of the working day by one hour, would destroy his net profit,
that portion of the public, we say, will hardly believe its own eyes, when it now finds, that the original
discovery of the virtues of “the last hour” has since been so far improved, as to include morals as well
as profit; so that, if the duration of the labour of children, is reduced to a full 10 hours, their morals,
together with the net profits of their employers, will vanish, both being dependent on this last, this
fatal hour. (See Repts., Insp. of Fact., for 31st Oct., 1848, p. 101.) The same report then gives some
examples of the morality and virtue of these same pure-minded manufacturers, of the tricks, the
artifices, the cajoling, the threats, and the falsifications, they made use of, in order, first, to compel a
few defenceless workmen to sign petitions of such a kind, and then to impose them upon Parliament
as the petitions of a whole branch of industry, or a whole country. It is highly characteristic of the
present status of so-called economic science, that neither Senior himself, who, at a later period, to his
honour be it said, energetically supported the factory legislation, nor his opponents, from first to last,
have ever been able to explain the false conclusions of the “original discovery.” They appeal to actual
experience, but the why and wherefore remains a mystery.
12
Nevertheless, the learned professor was not without some benefit from his journey to Manchester.
In the “Letters on the Factory Act,” he makes the whole net gains including “profit” and “interests”
and even “something more,” depend upon a single unpaid hour’s work of the labourer. One year
previously, in his “Outlines of Political Economy,” written for the instruction of Oxford students and
cultivated Philistines, he had also “discovered, in opposition to Ricardo’s determination of value by
labour, that profit is derived from the labour of the capitalist, and interest from his asceticism, in other
words, from his abstinence.” The dodge was an old one, but the word “abstinence” was new. Herr
Roscher translates it rightly by “Enthaltung.” Some of his countrymen, the Browns, Jones, and
Robinsons, of Germany, not so well versed in Latin as he, have, monk-like, rendered it by
“Entsagung” (renunciation).
13
“To an individual with a capital of £20,000, whose profits were £2,000 per annum, it would be a
matter quite indifferent whether his capital would employ a 100 or 1,000 men, whether the commodity
produced sold for £10,000 or £20,000, provided, in all cases, his profit were not diminished below
£2,000. Is not the real interest of the nation similar? Provided its net real income, its rent and profits,
be the same, it is of no importance whether the nation consists of 10 or of 12 millions of inhabitants.”
(Ric. l.c.,.p. 416.) Long before Ricardo, Arthur Young, a fanatical upholder of surplus-produce, for the
rest, a rambling, uncritical writer, whose reputation is in the inverse ratio of his merit, says, “Of what
use, in a modem kingdom, would be a whole province thus divided [in the old Roman manner, by
small independent peasants], however well cultivated, except for the mere purpose of breeding men,
which taken singly is a most useless purpose?” (Arthur Young: “Political Arithmetic, &c.” London,
1774, p. 47.)
Very curious is “the strong inclination... to represent net wealth as beneficial to the labouring class...
though it is evidently not on account of being net.” (Th . Hopkins, “On Rent of Land, &c.” London,
1828, p. 126.)

Chapter 10: The Working day
Section 1: The Limits of the Working day
We started with the supposition that labour-power is bought and sold at its value. Its value, like
that of all other commodities, is determined by the working-time necessary to its production. If
the production of the average daily means of subsistence of the labourer takes up 6 hours, he must
work, on the average, 6 hours every day, to produce his daily labour-power, or to reproduce the
value received as the result of its sale. The necessary part of his working day amounts to 6 hours,
and is, therefore, caeteris paribus [other things being equal], a given quantity. But with this, the
extent of the working day itself is not yet given.
Let us assume that the line A–––B represents the length of the necessary working-time, say 6
hours. If the labour be prolonged 1, 3, or 6 hours beyond A––B, we have 3 other lines:
Working day I. Working day II.
Working day III.
A–––B–C.
A–––B––C.
A–––B–––C.
representing 3 different working days of 7, 9, and 12 hours. The extension B––C of the line A––B
represents the length of the surplus labour. As the working day is A––B + B––C or A––C, it
varies with the variable quantity B––C. Since A––B is constant, the ratio of B––C to A––B can
always be calculated. In working day I, it is 1/6, in working day II, 3/6, in working day III 6/6 of
A––B. Since further the ratio (surplus working-time)/(necessary working-time), determines the
rate of the surplus-value, the latter is given by the ratio of B–-C to A–-B. It amounts in the 3
different working days respectively to 16 2/3, 50 and 100 per cent. On the other hand, the rate of
surplus-value alone would not give us the extent of the working day. If this rate, e.g., were 100
per cent., the working day might be of 8, 10, 12, or more hours. It would indicate that the 2
constituent parts of the working day, necessary-labour and surplus labour time, were equal in
extent, but not how long each of these two constituent parts was.
The working day is thus not a constant, but a variable quantity. One of its parts, certainly, is
determined by the working-time required for the reproduction of the labour-power of the labourer
himself. But its total amount varies with the duration of the surplus labour. The working day is,
therefore, determinable, but is, per se, indeterminate. 1
Although the working day is not a fixed, but a fluent quantity, it can, on the other hand, only vary
within certain limits. The minimum limit is, however, not determinable; of course, if we make the
extension line B–-C or the surplus labour = 0, we have a minimum limit, i.e., the part of the day
which the labourer must necessarily work for his own maintenance. On the basis of capitalist
production, however, this necessary labour can form a part only of the working day; the working
day itself can never be reduced to this minimum. On the other hand, the working day has a
maximum limit. It cannot be prolonged beyond a certain point. This maximum limit is
conditioned by two things. First, by the physical bounds of labour-power. Within the 24 hours of
the natural day a man can expend only a definite quantity of his vital force. A horse, in like
manner, can only work from day to day, 8 hours. During part of the day this force must rest,
sleep; during another part the man has to satisfy other physical needs, to feed, wash, and clothe
himself. Besides these purely physical limitations, the extension of the working day encounters
moral ones. The labourer needs time for satisfying his intellectual and social wants, the extent and
number of which are conditioned by the general state of social advancement. The variation of the
working day fluctuates, therefore, within physical and social bounds. But both these limiting
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conditions are of a very elastic nature, and allow the greatest latitude. So we find working days of
8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18 hours, i.e., of the most different lengths.
The capitalist has bought the labour-power at its day-rate. To him its use-value belongs during
one working day. He has thus acquired the right to make the labourer work for him during one
day. But, what is a working day? 2
At all events, less than a natural day. By how much? The capitalist has his own views of this
ultima Thule [the outermost limit], the necessary limit of the working day. As capitalist, he is
only capital personified. His soul is the soul of capital. But capital has one single life impulse, the
tendency to create value and surplus-value, to make its constant factor, the means of production,
absorb the greatest possible amount of surplus labour.3
Capital is dead labour, that, vampire-like, only lives by sucking living labour, and lives the more,
the more labour it sucks. The time during which the labourer works, is the time during which the
capitalist consumes the labour-power he has purchased of him. 4
If the labourer consumes his disposable time for himself, he robs the capitalist. 5
The capitalist then takes his stand on the law of the exchange of commodities. He, like all other
buyers, seeks to get the greatest possible benefit out of the use-value of his commodity. Suddenly
the voice of the labourer, which had been stifled in the storm and stress of the process of
production, rises:
The commodity that I have sold to you differs from the crowd of other commodities, in that its
use creates value, and a value greater than its own. That is why you bought it. That which on your
side appears a spontaneous expansion of capital, is on mine extra expenditure of labour-power.
You and I know on the market only one law, that of the exchange of commodities. And the
consumption of the commodity belongs not to the seller who parts with it, but to the buyer, who
acquires it. To you, therefore, belongs the use of my daily labour-power. But by means of the
price that you pay for it each day, I must be able to reproduce it daily, and to sell it again. Apart
from natural exhaustion through age, &c., I must be able on the morrow to work with the same
normal amount of force, health and freshness as to-day. You preach to me constantly the gospel
of “saving” and “abstinence.” Good! I will, like a sensible saving owner, husband my sole wealth,
labour-power, and abstain from all foolish waste of it. I will each day spend, set in motion, put
into action only as much of it as is compatible with its normal duration, and healthy development.
By an unlimited extension of the working day, you may in one day use up a quantity of labourpower greater than I can restore in three. What you gain in labour I lose in substance. The use of
my labour-power and the spoliation of it are quite different things. If the average time that (doing
a reasonable amount of work) an average labourer can live, is 30 years, the value of my labourpower, which you pay me from day to day is 1/(365×30) or 1/10950 of its total value. But if you
consume it in 10 years, you pay me daily 1/10950 instead of 1/3650 of its total value, i.e., only
1/3 of its daily value, and you rob me, therefore, every day of 2/3 of the value of my commodity.
You pay me for one day’s labour-power, whilst you use that of 3 days. That is against our
contract and the law of exchanges. I demand, therefore, a working day of normal length, and I
demand it without any appeal to your heart, for in money matters sentiment is out of place. You
may be a model citizen, perhaps a member of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals, and in the odour of sanctity to boot; but the thing that you represent face to face with me
has no heart in its breast. That which seems to throb there is my own heart-beating. I demand the
normal working day because I, like every other seller, demand the value of my commodity. 6
We see then, that, apart from extremely elastic bounds, the nature of the exchange of
commodities itself imposes no limit to the working day, no limit to surplus labour. The capitalist
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maintains his rights as a purchaser when he tries to make the working day as long as possible, and
to make, whenever possible, two working days out of one. On the other hand, the peculiar nature
of the commodity sold implies a limit to its consumption by the purchaser, and the labourer
maintains his right as seller when he wishes to reduce the working day to one of definite normal
duration. There is here, therefore, an antinomy, right against right, both equally bearing the seal
of the law of exchanges. Between equal rights force decides. Hence is it that in the history of
capitalist production, the determination of what is a working day, presents itself as the result of a
struggle, a struggle between collective capital, i.e., the class of capitalists, and collective labour,
i.e., the working-class.

Section 2: The Greed for Surplus-Labour. Manufacturer and
Boyard
Capital has not invented surplus labour. Wherever a part of society possesses the monopoly of the
means of production, the labourer, free or not free, must add to the working-time necessary for
his own maintenance an extra working-time in order to produce the means of subsistence for the
owners of the means of production 7, whether this proprietor be the Athenian χαλος γαχαθος
[well-to-do man], Etruscan theocrat, civis Romanus [Roman citizen], Norman baron, American
slave-owner, Wallachian Boyard, modern landlord or capitalist.8 It is, however, clear that in any
given economic formation of society, where not the exchange-value but the use-value of the
product predominates, surplus labour will be limited by a given set of wants which may be
greater or less, and that here no boundless thirst for surplus labour arises from the nature of the
production itself. Hence in antiquity over-work becomes horrible only when the object is to
obtain exchange-value in its specific independent money-form; in the production of gold and
silver. Compulsory working to death is here the recognised form of over-work. Only read
Diodorus Siculus. 9 Still these are exceptions in antiquity. But as soon as people, whose
production still moves within the lower forms of slave-labour, corvée-labour, &c., are drawn into
the whirlpool of an international market dominated by the capitalistic mode of production, the
sale of their products for export becoming their principal interest, the civilised horrors of overwork are grafted on the barbaric horrors of slavery, serfdom, &c. Hence the negro labour in the
Southern States of the American Union preserved something of a patriarchal character, so long as
production was chiefly directed to immediate local consumption. But in proportion, as the export
of cotton became of vital interest to these states, the over-working of the negro and sometimes the
using up of his life in 7 years of labour became a factor in a calculated and calculating system. It
was no longer a question of obtaining from him a certain quantity of useful products. It was now
a question of production of surplus labour itself: So was it also with the corvée, e.g., in the
Danubian Principalities (now Roumania).
The comparison of the greed for surplus labour in the Danubian Principalities with the same
greed in English factories has a special interest, because surplus labour in the corvée has an
independent and palpable form.
Suppose the working day consists of 6 hours of necessary labour, and 6 hours of surplus labour.
Then the free labourer gives the capitalist every week 6 x 6 or 36 hours of surplus labour. It is the
same as if he worked 3 days in the week for himself, and 3 days in the week gratis for the
capitalist. But this is not evident on the surface. Surplus labour and necessary labour glide one
into the other. I can, therefore, express the same relationship by saying, e.g., that the labourer in
every minute works 30 seconds for himself, and 30 for the capitalist, etc. It is otherwise with the
corvée. The necessary labour which the Wallachian peasant does for his own maintenance is
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distinctly marked off from his surplus labour on behalf of the Boyard. The one he does on his
own field, the other on the seignorial estate. Both parts of the labour-time exist, therefore,
independently, side by side one with the other. In the corvée the surplus labour is accurately
marked off from the necessary labour. This, however, can make no difference with regard to the
quantitative relation of surplus labour to necessary labour. Three days’ surplus labour in the week
remain three days that yield no equivalent to the labourer himself, whether it be called corvée or
wage-labour. But in the capitalist the greed for surplus labour appears in the straining after an
unlimited extension of the working day, in the Boyard more simply in a direct hunting after days
of corvée. 10
In the Danubian Principalities the corvée was mixed up with rents in kind and other
appurtenances of bondage, but it formed the most important tribute paid to the ruling class.
Where this was the case, the corvée rarely arose from serfdom; serfdom much more frequently on
the other hand took origin from the corvée. 11 This is what took place in the Roumanian provinces.
Their original mode of production was based on community of the soil, but not in the Slavonic or
Indian form. Part of the land was cultivated in severalty as freehold by the members of the
community, another part – ager publicus – was cultivated by them in common. The products of
this common labour served partly as a reserve fund against bad harvests and other accidents,
partly as a public store for providing the costs of war, religion, and other common expenses. In
course of time military and clerical dignitaries usurped, along with the common land, the labour
spent upon it. The labour of the free peasants on their common land was transformed into corvée
for the thieves of the common land. This corvée soon developed into a servile relationship
existing in point of fact, not in point of law, until Russia, the liberator of the world, made it legal
under presence of abolishing serfdom. The code of the corvée, which the Russian General
Kisseleff proclaimed in 1831, was of course dictated by the Boyards themselves. Thus Russia
conquered with one blow the magnates of the Danubian provinces, and the applause of liberal
cretins throughout Europe.
According to the “Règlement organique,” as this code of the corvée is called, every Wallachian
peasant owes to the so-called landlord, besides a mass of detailed payments in kind: (1), 12 days
of general labour; (2), one day of field labour; (3), one day of wood carrying. In all, 14 days in the
year. With deep insight into Political Economy, however, the working day is not taken in its
ordinary sense, but as the working day necessary to the production of an average daily product;
and that average daily product is determined in so crafty a way that no Cyclops would be done
with it in 24 hours. In dry words, the Réglement itself declares with true Russian irony that by 12
working days one must understand the product of the manual labour of 36 days, by 1 day of field
labour 3 days, and by 1 day of wood carrying in like manner three times as much. In all, 42
corvée days. To this had to be added the so-called jobagie, service due to the lord for
extraordinary occasions. In proportion to the size of its population, every village has to furnish
annually a definite contingent to the jobagie. This additional corvée is estimated at 14 days for
each Wallachian peasant. Thus the prescribed corvée amounts to 56 working days yearly. But the
agricultural year in Wallachia numbers in consequence of the severe climate only 210 days, of
which 40 for Sundays and holidays, 30 on an average for bad weather, together 70 days, do not
count. 140 working days remain. The ratio of the corvée to the necessary labour 56/84 or 66 2/3
% gives a much smaller rate of surplus-value than that which regulates the labour of the English
agricultural or factory labourer. This is, however, only the legally prescribed corvée. And in a
spirit yet more “liberal” than the English Factory Acts, the “Règlement organique” has known
how to facilitate its own evasion. After it has made 56 days out of 12, the nominal day’s work of
each of the 56 corvée days is again so arranged that a portion of it must fall on the ensuing day. In
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one day, e.g., must be weeded an extent of land, which, for this work, especially in maize
plantations, needs twice as much time. The legal day’s work for some kinds of agricultural labour
is interpretable in such a way that the day begins in May and ends in October. In Moldavia
conditions are still harder.
“The 12 corvée days of the ‘Règlement organique’ cried a Boyard drunk with victory, amount to
365 days in the year.” 12
If the Règlement organique of the Danubian provinces was a positive expression of the greed for
surplus labour which every paragraph legalised, the English Factory Acts are the negative
expression of the same greed. These acts curb the passion of capital for a limitless draining of
labour-power, by forcibly limiting the working day by state regulations, made by a state that is
ruled by capitalist-and landlord. Apart from the working-class movement that daily grew more
threatening, the limiting of factory labour was dictated by the same necessity which spread guano
over the English fields. The same blind eagerness for plunder that in the one case exhausted the
soil, had, in the other, torn up by the roots the living force of the nation. Periodical epidemics
speak on this point as clearly as the diminishing military standard in Germany and France.13
The Factory Act of 1850 now in force (1867) allows for the average working day 10 hours, i.e.,
for the first 5 days 12 hours from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m., including ½ an hour for breakfast, and an hour
for dinner, and thus leaving 10½ working-hours, and 8 hours for Saturday, from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m.,
of which ½ an hour is subtracted for breakfast. 60 working-hours are left, 10½ for each of the first
5 days, 7½ for the last. 14
Certain guardians of these laws are appointed, Factory Inspectors, directly under the Home
Secretary, whose reports are published half-yearly, by order of Parliament. They give regular and
official statistics of the capitalistic greed for surplus labour.
Let us listen, for a moment, to the Factory Inspectors.15
“The fraudulent mill-owner begins work a quarter of an hour (sometimes more,
sometimes less) before 6 a.m., and leaves off a quarter of an hour (sometimes
more, sometimes less) after 6 p.m. He takes 5 minutes from the beginning and
from the end of the half hour nominally allowed for breakfast, and 10 minutes at
the beginning and end of the hour nominally allowed for dinner. He works for a
quarter of an hour (sometimes more, sometimes less) after 2 p.m. on Saturday.
Thus his gain is –
Before 6 a.m.,
15 minutes.
After 6 p.m.,
15 "
At breakfast time,
10 "
At dinner time,
20 "
Five days – 300 minutes,
60 "
On Saturday before 6 a.m.,
15 minutes.
At breakfast time,
10 "
After 2 p.m.,
15 "
40 minutes.
Total weekly,
340 minutes.
Or 5 hours and 40 minutes weekly, which multiplied by 50 working weeks in the
year (allowing two for holidays and occasional stoppages) is equal to 27 working
days.” 16
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“Five minutes a day’s increased work, multiplied by weeks, are equal to two and a
half days of produce in the year.” 17
“An additional hour a day gained by small instalments before 6 a.m., after 6 p.m.,
and at the beginning and end of the times nominally fixed for meals, is nearly
equivalent to working 13 months in the year.” 18
Crises during which production is interrupted and the factories work “short time,” i.e., for only a
part of the week, naturally do not affect the tendency to extend the working day. The less
business there is, the more profit has to be made on the business done. The less time spent in
work, the more of that time has to be turned into surplus labour-time.
Thus the Factory Inspector’s report on the period of the crisis from 1857 to 1858:
“It may seem inconsistent that there should be any overworking at a time when
trade is so bad; but that very badness leads to the transgression by unscrupulous
men, they get the extra profit of it. ... In the last half year, says Leonard Horner,
122 mills in my district have been given up; 143 were found standing,” yet, overwork is continued beyond the legal hours.” 19
“For a great part of the time,” says Mr. Howell, “owing to the depression of trade,
many factories were altogether closed, and a still greater number were working
short time. I continue, however, to receive about the usual number of complaints
that half, or three-quarters of an hour in the day, are snatched from the workers by
encroaching upon the times professedly allowed for rest and refreshment.” 20
The same phenomenon was reproduced on a smaller scale during the frightful cotton-crises from
1861 to 1865. 21
“It is sometimes advanced by way of excuse, when persons are found at work in a
factory, either at a meal hour, or at some illegal time, that they will not leave the
mill at the appointed hour, and that compulsion is necessary to force them to cease
work [cleaning their machinery, &c.], especially on Saturday afternoons. But, if
the hands remain in a factory after the machinery has ceased to revolve ... they
would not have been so employed if sufficient time had been set apart specially
for cleaning, &c., either before 6 a.m. [sic.!] or before 2 p.m. on Saturday
afternoons.” 22
“The profit to be gained by it (over-working in violation of the Act) appears to be,
to many, a greater temptation than they can resist; they calculate upon the chance
of not being found out; and when they see the small amount of penalty and costs,
which those who have been convicted have had to pay, they find that if they
should be detected there will still be a considerable balance of gain.... 23 In cases
where the additional time is gained by a multiplication of small thefts in the
course of the day, there are insuperable difficulties to the inspectors making out a
case.” 24
These “small thefts” of capital from the labourer’s meal and recreation time, the factory
inspectors also designate as “petty pilferings of minutes,” 25“snatching a few minutes,” 26 or, as
the labourers technically called them, “nibbling and cribbling at meal-times.” 27
It is evident that in this atmosphere the formation of surplus-value by surplus labour, is no secret.
“If you allow me,” said a highly respectable master to me, “to work only ten
minutes in the day over-time, you put one thousand a year in my pocket.” 28
“Moments are the elements of profit.” 29
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Nothing is from this point of view more characteristic than the designation of the workers who
work full time as “full-timers,” and the children under 13 who are only allowed to work 6 hours
as “half-timers.” The worker is here nothing more than personified labour-time. All individual
distinctions are merged in those of “full-timers” and “half-timers” 30

Section 3: Branches of English Industry Without Legal Limits
to Exploitation
We have hitherto considered the tendency to the extension of the working day, the were-wolf’s
hunger for surplus labour in a department where the monstrous exactions, not surpassed, says an
English bourgeois economist, by the cruelties of the Spaniards to the American red-skins 31,
caused capital at last to be bound by the chains of legal regulations. Now, let us cast a glance at
certain branches of production in which the exploitation of labour is either free from fetters to this
day, or was so yesterday.
Mr. Broughton Charlton, county magistrate, declared, as chairman of a meeting
held at the Assembly Rooms, Nottingham, on the 14th January, 1860, “that there
was an amount of privation and suffering among that portion of the population
connected with the lace trade, unknown in other parts of the kingdom, indeed, in
the civilised world .... Children of nine or ten years are dragged from their squalid
beds at two, three, or four o’clock in the morning and compelled to work for a
bare subsistence until ten, eleven, or twelve at night, their limbs wearing away,
their frames dwindling, their faces whitening, and their humanity absolutely
sinking into a stone-like torpor, utterly horrible to contemplate.... We are not
surprised that Mr. Mallett, or any other manufacturer, should stand forward and
protest against discussion.... The system, as the Rev. Montagu Valpy describes it,
is one of unmitigated slavery, socially, physically, morally, and spiritually....
What can be thought of a town which holds a public meeting to petition that the
period of labour for men shall be diminished to eighteen hours a day? .... We
declaim against the Virginian and Carolinian cotton-planters. Is their blackmarket, their lash, and their barter of human flesh more detestable than this slow
sacrifice of humanity which takes place in order that veils and collars may be
fabricated for the benefit of capitalists?”32
The potteries of Staffordshire have, during the last 22 years, been the subject of three
parliamentary inquiries. The result is embodied in Mr. Scriven’s Report of 1841 to the
“Children’s Employment Commissioners,” in the report of Dr. Greenhow of 1860 published by
order of the medical officer of the Privy Council (Public Health, 3rd Report, 112-113), lastly, in
the report of Mr. Longe of 1862 in the “First Report of the Children’s Employment Commission,
of the 13th June, 1863.” For my purpose it is enough to take, from the reports of 1860 and 1863,
some depositions of the exploited children themselves. From the children we may form an
opinion as to the adults, especially the girls and women, and that in a branch of industry by the
side of which cotton-spinning appears an agreeable and healthful occupation. 33
William Wood, 9 years old, was 7 years and 10 months when he began to work. He “ran moulds”
(carried ready-moulded articles into the drying-room, afterwards bringing back the empty mould)
from the beginning. He came to work every day in the week at 6 a.m., and left off about 9 p.m. “I
work till 9 o’clock at night six days in the week. I have done so seven or eight weeks.”
Fifteen hours of labour for a child 7 years old! J. Murray, 12 years of age, says: “I
turn jigger, and run moulds. I come at 6. Sometimes I come at 4. I worked all
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night last night, till 6 o’clock this morning. I have not been in bed since the night
before last. There were eight or nine other boys working last night. All but one
have come this morning. I get 3 shillings and sixpence. I do not get any more for
working at night. I worked two nights last week.”
Fernyhough, a boy of ten:
“I have not always an hour (for dinner). I have only half an hour sometimes; on
Thursday, Friday, and Saturday.” 34
Dr. Greenhow states that the average duration of life in the pottery districts of Stoke-on-Trent,
and Wolstanton is extraordinarily short. Although in the district of Stoke, only 36.6% and in
Wolstanton only 30.4% of the adult male population above 20 are employed in the potteries,
among the men of that age in the first district more than half, in the second, nearly 2/5 of the
whole deaths are the result of pulmonary diseases among the potters. Dr. Boothroyd, a medical
practitioner at Hanley, says:
“Each successive generation of potters is more dwarfed and less robust than the preceding one.”
In like manner another doctor, Mr. M’Bean:
“Since he began to practice among the potters 25 years ago, he had observed a
marked degeneration especially shown in diminution of stature and breadth.”
These statements are taken from the report of Dr. Greenhow in 1860. 35
From the report of the Commissioners in 1863, the following: Dr. J. T. Arledge, senior physician
of the North Staffordshire Infirmary, says:
“The potters as a class, both men and women, represent a degenerated population,
both physically and morally. They are, as a rule, stunted in growth, ill-shaped, and
frequently ill-formed in the chest; they become prematurely old, and are certainly
short-lived; they are phlegmatic and bloodless, and exhibit their debility of
constitution by obstinate attacks of dyspepsia, and disorders of the liver and
kidneys, and by rheumatism. But of all diseases they are especially prone to chestdisease, to pneumonia, phthisis, bronchitis, and asthma. One form would appear
peculiar to them, and is known as potter’s asthma, or potter’s consumption.
Scrofula attacking the glands, or bones, or other parts of the body, is a disease of
two-thirds or more of the potters .... That the ‘degenerescence’ of the population
of this district is not even greater than it is, is due to the constant recruiting from
the adjacent country, and intermarriages with more healthy races.”36
Mr. Charles Parsons, late house surgeon of the same institution, writes in a letter to
Commissioner Longe, amongst other things:
“I can only speak from personal observation and not from statistical data, but I do
not hesitate to assert that my indignation has been aroused again and again at the
sight of poor children whose health has been sacrificed to gratify the avarice of
either parents or employers.” He enumerates the causes of the diseases of the
potters, and sums them up in the phrase, “long hours.” The report of the
Commission trusts that “a manufacture which has assumed so prominent a place
in the whole world, will not long be subject to the remark that its great success is
accompanied with the physical deterioration, widespread bodily suffering, and
early death of the workpeople ... by whose labour and skill such great results have
been achieved.” 37
And all that holds of the potteries in England is true of those in Scotland.38
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The manufacture of lucifer matches dates from 1833, from the discovery of the method of
applying phosphorus to the match itself. Since 1845 this manufacture has rapidly developed in
England, and has extended especially amongst the thickly populated parts of London as well as in
Manchester, Birmingham, Liverpool, Bristol, Norwich, Newcastle and Glasgow. With it has
spread the form of lockjaw, which a Vienna physician in 1845 discovered to be a disease peculiar
to lucifer-matchmakers. Half the workers are children under thirteen, and young persons under
eighteen. The manufacture is on account of its unhealthiness and unpleasantness in such bad
odour that only the most miserable part of the labouring class, half-starved widows and so forth,
deliver up their children to it, “the ragged, half-starved, untaught children.” 39
Of the witnesses that Commissioner White examined (1863), 270 were under 18, 50 under 10, 10
only 8, and 5 only 6 years old. A range of the working day from 12 to 14 or 15 hours, nightlabour, irregular meal-times, meals for the most part taken in the very workrooms that are
pestilent with phosphorus. Dante would have found the worst horrors of his Inferno surpassed in
this manufacture.
In the manufacture of paper-hangings the coarser sorts are printed by machine; the finer by hand
(block-printing). The most active business months are from the beginning of October to the end
of April. During this time the work goes on fast and furious without intermission from 6 a.m. to
10 p.m. or further into the night.
J. Leach deposes:
“Last winter six out of nineteen girls were away from ill-health at one time from
over-work. I have to bawl at them to keep them awake.” W. Duffy: “I have seen
when the children could none of them keep their eyes open for the work; indeed,
none of us could.” J. Lightbourne: “Am 13 ... We worked last winter till 9
(evening), and the winter before till 10. I used to cry with sore feet every night last
winter.” G. Apsden: “That boy of mine when he was 7 years old I used to carry
him on my back to and fro through the snow, and he used to have 16 hours a day
... I have often knelt down to feed him as he stood by the machine, for he could
not leave it or stop.” Smith, the managing partner of a Manchester factory: “We
(he means his “hands” who work for “us”) work on with no stoppage for meals, so
that day’s work of 10½ hours is finished by 4.30 p.m., and all after that is overtime.” 40 (Does this Mr. Smith take no meals himself during 10½ hours?) “We (this
same Smith) seldom leave off working before 6 p.m. (he means leave off the
consumption of “our” labour-power machines), so that we (iterum Crispinus) are
really working over-time the whole year round. For all these, children and adults
alike (152 children and young persons and 140 adults), the average work for the
last 18 months has been at the very least 7 days, 5 hours, or 78 1/2 hours a week.
For the six weeks ending May 2nd this year (1862), the average was higher – 8
days or 84 hours a week.”
Still this same Mr. Smith, who is so extremely devoted to the pluralis majestatis [the Royal “we,”
i.e., speaking on behalf of his subjects], adds with a smile, "Machine-work is not great.” So the
employers in the block-printing say: “Hand labour is more healthy than machine work.” On the
whole, manufacturers declare with indignation against the proposal “to stop the machines at least
during meal-times.”
“A clause,” says Mr. Otley, manager of a wall-paper factory in the Borough,
“which allowed work between, say 6 a.m. and 9 p.m. in would suit us (!) very
well, but the factory hours, 6 a.m. to 6 p.m., are not suitable. Our machine is
always stopped for dinner. (What generosity!) There is no waste of paper and
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colour to speak of. But,” he adds sympathetically, “I can understand the loss of
time not being liked.”
The report of the Commission opines with naïveté that the fear of some “leading firms” of losing
time, i.e., the time for appropriating the labour of others, and thence losing profit is not a
sufficient reason for allowing children under 13, and young persons under 18, working 12 to 16
hours per day, to lose their dinner, nor for giving it to them as coal and water are supplied to the
steam-engine, soap to wool, oil to the wheel – as merely auxiliary material to the instruments of
labour, during the process of production itself.41
No branch of industry in England (we do not take into account the making of bread by machinery
recently introduced) has preserved up to the present day a method of production so archaic, so –
as we see from the poets of the Roman Empire – pre-christian, as baking. But capital, as was said
earlier, is at first indifferent as to the technical character of the labour-process; it begins by taking
it just as it finds it.
The incredible adulteration of bread, especially in London, was first revealed by the House of
Commons Committee “on the adulteration of articles of food” (1855-56), and Dr. Hassall’s work,
“Adulterations detected.” 42 The consequence of these revelations was the Act of August 6th,
1860, “for preventing the adulteration of articles of food and drink,” an inoperative law, as it
naturally shows the tenderest consideration for every Free-trader who determines by the buying
or selling of adulterated commodities “to turn an honest penny.” 43The Committee itself
formulated more or less naïvely its conviction that Free-trade meant essentially trade with
adulterated, or as the English ingeniously put it, “sophisticated” goods. In fact this kind of
sophistry knows better than Protagoras how to make white black, and black white, and better than
the Eleatics how to demonstrate ad oculos [before your own eyes] that everything is only
appearance. 44
At all events the Committee had directed the attention of the public to its “daily bread,” and
therefore to the baking trade. At the same time in public meetings and in petitions to Parliament
rose the cry of the London journeymen bakers against their over-work, &c. The cry was so urgent
that Mr. H. S. Tremenheere, also a member of the Commission of 1863 several times mentioned,
was appointed Royal Commissioner of Inquiry. His report, 45 together with the evidence given,
roused not the heart of the public but its stomach. Englishmen, always well up in the Bible, knew
well enough that man, unless by elective grace a capitalist, or landlord, or sinecurist, is
commanded to eat his bread in the sweat of his brow, but they did not know that he had to eat
daily in his bread a certain quantity of human perspiration mixed with the discharge of abscesses,
cobwebs, dead black-beetles, and putrid German yeast, without counting alum, sand, and other
agreeable mineral ingredients. Without any regard to his holiness, Free-trade, the free bakingtrade was therefore placed under the supervision of the State inspectors (Close of the
Parliamentary session of 1863), and by the same Act of Parliament, work from 9 in the evening to
5 in the morning was forbidden for journeymen bakers under 18. The last clause speaks volumes
as to the over-work in this old-fashioned, homely line of business.
“The work of a London journeyman baker begins, as a rule, at about eleven at
night. At that hour he ‘makes the dough,’ – a laborious process, which lasts from
half an hour to three quarters of an hour, according to the size of the batch or the
labour bestowed upon it. He then lies down upon the kneading-board, which is
also the covering of the trough in which the dough is ‘made’; and with a sack
under him, and another rolled up as a pillow, he sleeps for about a couple of
hours. He is then engaged in a rapid and continuous labour for about five hours –
throwing out the dough, ‘scaling it off,’ moulding it, putting it into the oven,
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preparing and baking rolls and fancy bread, taking the batch bread out of the oven,
and up into the shop, &c., &c. The temperature of a bakehouse ranges from about
75 to upwards of 90 degrees, and in the smaller bakehouses approximates usually
to the higher rather than to the lower degree of heat. When the business of making
the bread, rolls, &c., is over, that of its distribution begins, and a considerable
proportion of the journeymen in the trade, after working hard in the manner
described during the night, are upon their legs for many hours during the day,
carrying baskets, or wheeling hand-carts, and sometimes again in the bakehouse,
leaving off work at various hours between 1 and 6 p.m. according to the season of
the year, or the amount and nature of their master’s business; while others are
again engaged in the bakehouse in ‘bringing out’ more batches until late in the
afternoon. 46... During what is called ‘the London season,’ the operatives
belonging to the ‘full-priced’ bakers at the West End of the town, generally begin
work at 11 p.m., and are engaged in making the bread, with one or two short
(sometimes very short) intervals of rest, up to 8 o’clock the next morning. They
are then engaged all day long, up to 4, 5, 6, and as late as 7 o’clock in the evening
carrying out bread, or sometimes in the afternoon in the bakehouse again,
assisting in the biscuit-baking. They may have, after they have done their work,
sometimes five or six, sometimes only four or five hours’ sleep before they begin
again. On Fridays they always begin sooner, some about ten o’clock, and continue
in some cases, at work, either in making or delivering the bread up to 8 p.m. on
Saturday night, but more generally up to 4 or 5 o’clock, Sunday morning. On
Sundays the men must attend twice or three times during the day for an hour or
two to make preparations for the next day’s bread.... The men employed by the
underselling masters (who sell their bread under the ‘full price,’ and who, as
already pointed out, comprise three-fourths of the London bakers) have not only
to work on the average longer hours, but their work is almost entirely confined to
the bakehouse. The underselling masters generally sell their bread... in the shop. If
they send it out, which is not common, except as supplying chandlers’ shops, they
usually employ other hands for that purpose. It is not their practice to deliver
bread from house to house. Towards the end of the week ... the men begin on
Thursday night at 10 o’clock, and continue on with only slight intermission until
late on Saturday evening.” 47
Even the bourgeois intellect understands the position of the “underselling” masters. “The unpaid
labour of the men was made the source whereby the competition was carried on.” 48 And the
“full-priced” baker denounces his underselling competitors to the Commission of Inquiry as
thieves of foreign labour and adulterators.
“They only exist now by first defrauding the public, and next getting 18 hours’
work out of their men for 12 hours’ wages.” 49
The adulteration of bread and the formation of a class of bakers that sells the bread below the full
price, date from the beginning of the 18th century, from the time when the corporate character of
the trade was lost, and the capitalist in the form of the miller or flour-factor, rises behind the
nominal master baker. 50 Thus was laid the foundation of capitalistic production in this trade, of
the unlimited extension of the working day and of night-labour, although the latter only since
1824 gained a serious footing, even in London. 51
After what has just been said, it will be understood that the Report of the Commission classes
journeymen bakers among the short-lived labourers, who, having by good luck escaped the
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normal decimation of the children of the working-class, rarely reach the age of 42. Nevertheless,
the baking trade is always overwhelmed with applicants. The sources of the supply of these
labour-powers to London are Scotland, the western agricultural districts of England, and
Germany.
In the years 1858-60, the journeymen bakers in Ireland organised at their own expense great
meetings to agitate against night and Sunday work. The public – e.g., at the Dublin meeting in
May, 1860 – took their part with Irish warmth. As a result of this movement, day-labour alone
was successfully established in Wexford, Kilkenny, Clonmel, Waterford, &c.
“In Limerick, where the grievances of the journeymen are demonstrated to be
excessive, the movement has been defeated by the opposition of the master
bakers, the miller bakers being the greatest opponents. The example of Limerick
led to a retrogression in Ennis and Tipperary. In Cork, where the strongest
possible demonstration of feeling took place, the masters, by exercising their
power of turning the men out of employment, have defeated the movement. In
Dublin, the master bakers have offered the most determined opposition to the
movement, and by discountenancing as much as possible the journeymen
promoting it, have succeeded in leading the men into acquiescence in Sunday
work and night-work, contrary to the convictions of the men.” 52
The Committee of the English Government, which Government, in Ireland, is armed to the teeth,
and generally knows how to show it, remonstrates in mild, though funereal, tones with the
implacable master bakers of Dublin, Limerick, Cork, &c.:
“The Committee believe that the hours of labour are limited by natural laws,
which cannot be violated with impunity. That for master bakers to induce their
workmen, by the fear of losing employment, to violate their religious convictions
and their better feelings, to disobey the laws of the land, and to disregard public
opinion (this all refers to Sunday labour), is calculated to provoke ill-feeling
between workmen and masters, ... and affords an example dangerous to religion,
morality, and social order.... The Committee believe that any constant work
beyond 12 hours a-day encroaches on the domestic and private life of the
working-man, and so leads to disastrous moral results, interfering with each man’s
home, and the discharge of his family duties as a son, a brother, a husband, a
father. That work beyond 12 hours has a tendency to undermine the health of the
workingman, and so leads to premature old age and death, to the great injury of
families of working-men, thus deprived of the care and support of the head of the
family when most required.” 53
So far, we have dealt with Ireland. On the other side of the channel, in Scotland, the agricultural
labourer, the ploughman, protests against his 13-14 hours’ work in the most inclement climate,
with 4 hours’ additional work on Sunday (in this land of Sabbatarians!), 54 whilst, at the same
time, three railway men are standing before a London coroner’s jury – a guard, an engine-driver,
a signalman. A tremendous railway accident has hurried hundreds of passengers into another
world. The negligence of the employee is the cause of the misfortune. They declare with one
voice before the jury that ten or twelve years before, their labour only lasted eight hours a-day.
During the last five or six years it had been screwed up to 14, 18, and 20 hours, and under a
specially severe pressure of holiday-makers, at times of excursion trains, it often lasted for 40 or
50 hours without a break. They were ordinary men, not Cyclops. At a certain point their labourpower failed. Torpor seized them. Their brain ceased to think, their eyes to see. The thoroughly
“respectable” British jurymen answered by a verdict that sent them to the next assizes on a charge
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of manslaughter, and, in a gentle “rider” to their verdict, expressed the pious hope that the
capitalistic magnates of the railways would, in future, be more extravagant in the purchase of a
sufficient quantity of labour-power, and more “abstemious,” more “self-denying,” more “thrifty,”
in the draining of paid labour-power. 55
From the motley crowd of labourers of all callings, ages, sexes, that press on us more busily than
the souls of the slain on Ulysses, on whom – without referring to the Blue books under their arms
– we see at a glance the mark of over-work, let us take two more figures whose striking contrast
proves that before capital all men are alike – a milliner and a blacksmith.
In the last week of June, 1863, all the London daily papers published a paragraph with the
“sensational” heading, “Death from simple over-work.” It dealt with the death of the milliner,
Mary Anne Walkley, 20 years of age, employed in a highly-respectable dressmaking
establishment, exploited by a lady with the pleasant name of Elise. The old, often-told story, 56
was once more recounted. This girl worked, on an average, 16½ hours, during the season often 30
hours, without a break, whilst her failing labour-power was revived by occasional supplies of
sherry, port, or coffee. It was just now the height of the season. It was necessary to conjure up in
the twinkling of an eye the gorgeous dresses for the noble ladies bidden to the ball in honour of
the newly-imported Princess of Wales. Mary Anne Walkley had worked without intermission for
26½ hours, with 60 other girls, 30 in one room, that only afforded 1/3 of the cubic feet of air
required for them. At night, they slept in pairs in one of the stifling holes into which the bedroom
was divided by partitions of board. 57 And this was one of the best millinery establishments in
London. Mary Anne Walkley fell ill on the Friday, died on Sunday, without, to the astonishment
of Madame Elise, having previously completed the work in hand. The doctor, Mr. Keys, called
too late to the death-bed, duly bore witness before the coroner’s jury that
“Mary Anne Walkley had died from long hours of work in an over-crowded workroom, and a too small and badly ventilated bedroom.”
In order to give the doctor a lesson in good manners, the coroner’s jury thereupon brought in a
verdict that
“the deceased had died of apoplexy, but there was reason to fear that her death
had been accelerated by over-work in an over-crowded workroom, &c.”
“Our white slaves,” cried the Morning Star, the organ of the Free-traders, Cobden and Bright,
“our white slaves, who are toiled into the grave, for the most part silently pine and die.” 58
“It is not in dressmakers’ rooms that working to death is the order of the day, but
in a thousand other places; in every place I had almost said, where ‘a thriving
business’ has to be done.... We will take the blacksmith as a type. If the poets
were true, there is no man so hearty, so merry, as the blacksmith; he rises early
and strikes his sparks before the sun; he eats and drinks and sleeps as no other
man. Working in moderation, he is, in fact, in one of the best of human positions,
physically speaking. But we follow him into the city or town, and we see the
stress of work on that strong man, and what then is his position in the death-rate of
his country. In Marylebone, blacksmiths die at the rate of 31 per thousand per
annum, or 11 above the mean of the male adults of the country in its entirety. The
occupation, instinctive almost as a portion of human art, unobjectionable as a
branch of human industry, is made by mere excess of work, the destroyer of the
man. He can strike so many blows per day, walk so many steps, breathe so many
breaths, produce so much work, and live an average, say of fifty years; he is made
to strike so many more blows, to walk so many more steps, to breathe so many
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more breaths per day, and to increase altogether a fourth of his life. He meets the
effort; the result is, that producing for a limited time a fourth more work, he dies
at 37 for 50.” 59

Section 4: Day and Night Work. The Relay System
Constant capital, the means of production, considered from the standpoint of the creation of
surplus-value, only exist to absorb labour, and with every drop of labour a proportional quantity
of surplus labour. While they fail to do this, their mere existence causes a relative loss to the
capitalist, for they represent during the time they lie fallow, a useless advance of capital. And this
loss becomes positive and absolute as soon as the intermission of their employment necessitates
additional outlay at the recommencement of work. The prolongation of the working day beyond
the limits of the natural day, into the night, only acts as a palliative. It quenches only in a slight
degree the vampire thirst for the living blood of labour. To appropriate labour during all the 24
hours of the day is, therefore, the inherent tendency of capitalist production. But as it is physically
impossible to exploit the same individual labour-power constantly during the night as well as the
day, to overcome this physical hindrance, an alternation becomes necessary between the
workpeople whose powers are exhausted by day, and those who are used up by night. This
alternation may be effected in various ways; e.g., it may be so arranged that part of the workers
are one week employed on day-work, the next week on night-work. It is well known that this
relay system, this alternation of two sets of workers, held full sway in the full-blooded youth-time
of the English cotton manufacture, and that at the present time it still flourishes, among others, in
the cotton spinning of the Moscow district. This 24 hours’ process of production exists to-day as
a system in many of the branches of industry of Great Britain that are still “free,” in the blastfurnaces, forges, plate-rolling mills, and other metallurgical establishments in England, Wales,
and Scotland. The working-time here includes, besides the 24 hours of the 6 working days, a
great part also of the 24 hours of Sunday. The workers consist of men and women, adults and
children of both sexes. The ages of the children and young persons run through all intermediate
grades, from 8 (in some cases from 6) to 18. 60
In some branches of industry, the girls and women work through the night together with the
males. 61
Placing on one side the generally injurious influence of night-labour, 62 the duration of the process
of production, unbroken during the 24 hours, offers very welcome opportunities of exceeding the
limits of the normal working day, e.g., in the branches of industry already mentioned, which are
of an exceedingly fatiguing nature; the official working day means for each worker usually 12
hours by night or day. But the over-work beyond this amount is in many cases, to use the words
of the English official report, “truly fearful.” 63
“It is impossible,” the report continues, “for any mind to realise the amount of
work described in the following passages as being performed by boys of from 9 to
12 years of age ... without coming irresistibly to the conclusion that such abuses of
the power of parents and of employers can no longer be allowed to exist.” 64
"The practice of boys working at all by day and night turns either in the usual
course of things, or at pressing times, seems inevitably to open the door to their
not unfrequently working unduly long hours. These hours are, indeed, in some
cases, not only cruelly but even incredibly long for children. Amongst a number
of boys it will, of course, not unfrequently happen that one or more are from some
cause absent. When this happens, their place is made up by one or more boys,
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who work in the other turn. That this is a well understood system is plain ... from
the answer of the manager of some large rolling-mills, who, when I asked him
how the place of the boys absent from their turn was made up, ‘I daresay, sir, you
know that as well as I do,’ and admitted the fact.” 65
“At a rolling-mill where the proper hours were from 6 a.m. to 5½ p.m., a boy
worked about four nights every week till 8½ p.m. at least ... and this for six
months. Another, at 9 years old, sometimes made three 12-hour shifts running,
and, when 10, has made two days and two nights running.” A third, “now 10 ...
worked from 6 a.m. till 12 p.m. three nights, and till 9 p.m. the other nights.”
“Another, now 13, ... worked from 6 p.m. till 12 noon next day, for a week
together, and sometimes for three shifts together, e.g., from Monday morning till
Tuesday night.” “Another, now 12, has worked in an iron foundry at Stavely from
6 a.m. till 12 p.m. for a fortnight on end; could not do it any more.” “George
Allinsworth, age 9, came here as cellar-boy last Friday; next morning we had to
begin at 3, so I stopped here all night. Live five miles off. Slept on the floor of the
furnace, over head, with an apron under me, and a bit of a jacket over me. The two
other days I have been here at 6 a.m. Aye! it is hot in here. Before I came here I
was nearly a year at the same work at some works in the country. Began there,
too, at 3 on Saturday morning – always did, but was very gain [near] home, and
could sleep at home. Other days I began at 6 in the morning, and gi’en over at 6 or
7 in the evening,” &c. 66
Let us now hear how capital itself regards this 24 hours’ system. The extreme forms of the
system, its abuse in the “cruel and incredible” extension of the working day are naturally passed
over in silence. Capital only speaks of the system in its “normal” form.
Messrs. Naylor & Vickers, steel manufacturers, who employ between 600 and 700 persons,
among whom only 10 per cent are under 18, and of those, only 20 boys under 18 work in night
sets, thus express themselves:
“The boys do not suffer from the heat. The temperature is probably from 86° to
90°.... At the forges and in the rolling mills the hands work night and day, in
relays, but all the other parts of the work are day-work, i.e., from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m.
In the forge the hours are from 12 to 12. Some of the hands always work in the
night, without any alternation of day and night work.... We do not find any
difference in the health of those who work regularly by night and those who work
by day, and probably people can sleep better if they have the same period of rest
than if it is changed.... About 20 of the boys under the age of 18 work in the night
sets.... We could not well do without lads under 18 working by night. The
objection would be the increase in the cost of production.... Skilled hands and the
heads in every department are difficult to get, but of lads we could get any
number.... But from the small proportion of boys that we employ, the subject (i.e.,
of restrictions on night-work) is of little importance or interest to us.” 67
Mr. J. Ellis, one of the firm of Messrs. John Brown & Co., steel and iron works, employing about
3,000 men and boys, part of whose operations, namely, iron and heavier steel work, goes on night
and day by relays, states “that in the heavier steel work one or two boys are employed to a score
or two men.” Their concern employs upwards of 500 boys under 18, of whom about 1/3 or 170
are under the age of 13. With reference to the proposed alteration of the law, Mr. Ellis says:
“I do not think it would be very objectionable to require that no person under the
age of 18 should work more than 12 hours in the 24. But we do not think that any
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line could be drawn over the age of 12, at which boys could be dispensed with for
night-work. But we would sooner be prevented from employing boys under the
age of 13, or even so high as 14, at all, than not be allowed to employ boys that
we do have at night. Those boys who work in the day sets must take their turn in
the night sets also, because the men could not work in the night sets only; it would
ruin their health.... We think, however, that night-work in alternate weeks is no
harm.”
(Messrs. Naylor & Vickers, on the other hand, in conformity with the interest of their business,
considered that periodically changed night-labour might possibly do more harm than continual
night-labour.)
“We find the men who do it, as well as the others who do other work only by
day.... Our objections to not allowing boys under 18 to work at night, would be on
account of the increase of expense, but this is the only reason.”
(What cynical naïveté!) “We think that the increase would be more than the trade,
with due regard to its being successfully carried out, could fairly bear. (What
mealy-mouthed phraseology!) Labour is scarce here, and might fall short if there
were such a regulation.” (i.e., Ellis Brown & Co. might fall into the fatal
perplexity of being obliged to pay labour-power its full value.) 68
The “Cyclops Steel and Iron Works,” of Messrs. Cammell & Co., are concocted on the same
large scale as those of the above-mentioned John Brown & Co. The managing director had
handed in his evidence to the Government Commissioner, Mr. White, in writing. Later he found it
convenient to suppress the MS. when it had been returned to him for revision. Mr. White,
however, has a good memory. He remembered quite clearly that for the Messrs. Cyclops the
forbidding of the night-labour of children and young persons “would be impossible, it would be
tantamount to stopping their works,” and yet their business employs little more than 6% of boys
under 18, and less than 1% under 13. 69
On the same subject Mr. E. F. Sanderson, of the firm of Sanderson, Bros., & Co., steel rollingmills and forges, Attercliffe, says:
“Great difficulty would be caused by preventing boys under 18 from working at
night. The chief would be the increase of cost from employing men instead of
boys. I cannot say what this would be, but probably it would not be enough to
enable the manufacturers to raise the price of steel, and consequently it would fall
on them, as of course the men (what queer-headed folk!) would refuse to pay it.”
Mr. Sanderson does not know how much he pays the children, but
“perhaps the younger boys get from 4s. to 5s. a week.... The boys’ work is of a
kind for which the strength of the boys is generally (‘generally,’ of course not
always) quite sufficient, and consequently there would be no gain in the greater
strength of the men to counterbalance the loss, or it would be only in the few cases
in which the metal is heavy. The men would not like so well not to have boys
under them, as men would be less obedient. Besides, boys must begin young to
learn the trade. Leaving day-work alone open to boys would not answer this
purpose.”
And why not? Why could not boys learn their handicraft in the day-time? Your reason?
“Owing to the men working days and nights in alternate weeks, the men would be
separated half the time from their boys, and would lose half the profit which they
make from them. The training which they give to an apprentice is considered as

178

Chapter 10

part of the return for the boys’ labour, and thus enables the man to get it at a
cheaper rate. Each man would want half of this profit.”
In other words, Messrs. Sanderson would have to pay part of the wages of the adult men out of
their own pockets instead of by the night-work of the boys. Messrs. Sanderson’s profit would thus
fall to some extent, and this is the good Sandersonian reason why boys cannot learn their
handicraft in the day. 70 In addition to this, it would throw night-labour on those who worked
instead of the boys, which they would not be able to stand. The difficulties in fact would be so
great that they would very likely lead to the giving up of night-work altogether, and “as far as the
work itself is concerned,” says E. F. Sanderson, “this would suit as well, but –” But Messrs.
Sanderson have something else to make besides steel. Steel-making is simply a pretext for
surplus-value making. The smelting furnaces, rolling-mills, &c., the buildings, machinery, iron,
coal, &c., have something more to do than transform themselves into steel. They are there to
absorb surplus labour, and naturally absorb more in 24 hours than in 12. In fact they give, by
grace of God and law, the Sandersons a cheque on the working-time of a certain number of hands
for all the 24 hours of the day, and they lose their character as capital, are therefore a pure loss for
the Sandersons, as soon as their function of absorbing labour is interrupted.
“But then there would be the loss from so much expensive machinery, lying idle
half the time, and to get through the amount of work which we are able to do on
the present system, we should have to double our premises and plant, which
would double the outlay.”
But why should these Sandersons pretend to a privilege not enjoyed by the other capitalists who
only work during the day, and whose buildings, machinery, raw material, therefore lie “idle”
during the night? E. F. Sanderson answers in the name of all the Sandersons:
“It is true that there is this loss from machinery lying idle in those manufactories
in which work only goes on by day. But the use of furnaces would involve a
further loss in our case. If they were kept up there would be a waste of fuel
(instead of, as now, a waste of the living substance of the workers), and if they
were not, there would be loss of time in laying the fires and getting the heat up
(whilst the loss of sleeping time, even to children of 8 is a gain of working-time
for the Sanderson tribe), and the furnaces themselves would suffer from the
changes of temperature.” (Whilst those same furnaces suffer nothing from the day
and night change of labour.) 71

Section 5: The Struggle for a Normal Working Day.
Compulsory Laws for the Extension of the Working Day
from the Middle of the 14th to the End of the 17th
Century
“What is a working day? What is the length of time during which capital may consume the
labour-power whose daily value it buys? How far may the working day be extended beyond the
working-time necessary for the reproduction of labour-power itself?” It has been seen that to
these questions capital replies: the working day contains the full 24 hours, with the deduction of
the few hours of repose without which labour-power absolutely refuses its services again. Hence
it is self-evident that the labourer is nothing else, his whole life through, than labour-power, that
therefore all his disposable time is by nature and law labour-time, to be devoted to the selfexpansion of capital. Time for education, for intellectual development, for the fulfilling of social
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functions and for social intercourse, for the free-play of his bodily and mental activity, even the
rest time of Sunday (and that in a country of Sabbatarians!) 72 – moonshine! But in its blind
unrestrainable passion, its were-wolf hunger for surplus labour, capital oversteps not only the
moral, but even the merely physical maximum bounds of the working day. It usurps the time for
growth, development, and healthy maintenance of the body. It steals the time required for the
consumption of fresh air and sunlight. It higgles over a meal-time, incorporating it where possible
with the process of production itself, so that food is given to the labourer as to a mere means of
production, as coal is supplied to the boiler, grease and oil to the machinery. It reduces the sound
sleep needed for the restoration, reparation, refreshment of the bodily powers to just so many
hours of torpor as the revival of an organism, absolutely exhausted, renders essential. It is not the
normal maintenance of the labour-power which is to determine the limits of the working day; it is
the greatest possible daily expenditure of labour-power, no matter how diseased, compulsory, and
painful it may be, which is to determine the limits of the labourers’ period of repose. Capital cares
nothing for the length of life of labour-power. All that concerns it is simply and solely the
maximum of labour-power, that can be rendered fluent in a working day. It attains this end by
shortening the extent of the labourer’s life, as a greedy farmer snatches increased produce from
the soil by robbing it of its fertility.
The capitalistic mode of production (essentially the production of surplus-value, the absorption of
surplus labour), produces thus, with the extension of the working day, not only the deterioration
of human labour-power by robbing it of its normal, moral and physical, conditions of
development and function. It produces also the premature exhaustion and death of this labourpower itself. 73 It extends the labourer’s time of production during a given period by shortening
his actual life-time.
But the value of the labour-power includes the value of the commodities necessary for the
reproduction of the worker, or for the keeping up of the working-class. If then the unnatural
extension of the working day, that capital necessarily strives after in its unmeasured passion for
self-expansion, shortens the length of life of the individual labourer, and therefore the duration of
his labour-power, the forces used up have to be replaced at a more rapid rate and the sum of the
expenses for the reproduction of labour-power will be greater; just as in a machine the part of its
value to be reproduced every day is greater the more rapidly the machine is worn out. It would
seem therefore that the interest of capital itself points in the direction of a normal working day.
The slave-owner buys his labourer as he buys his horse. If he loses his slave, he loses capital that
can only be restored by new outlay in the slave-mart.
But “the rice-grounds of Georgia, or the swamps of the Mississippi may be fatally
injurious to the human constitution; but the waste of human life which the
cultivation of these districts necessitates, is not so great that it cannot be repaired
from the teeming preserves of Virginia and Kentucky. Considerations of
economy, moreover, which, under a natural system, afford some security for
humane treatment by identifying the master’s interest with the slave’s
preservation, when once trading in slaves is practiced, become reasons for racking
to the uttermost the toil of the slave; for, when his place can at once be supplied
from foreign preserves, the duration of his life becomes a matter of less moment
than its productiveness while it lasts. It is accordingly a maxim of slave
management, in slave-importing countries, that the most effective economy is that
which takes out of the human chattel in the shortest space of time the utmost
amount of exertion it is capable of putting forth. It is in tropical culture, where
annual profits often equal the whole capital of plantations, that negro life is most
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recklessly sacrificed. It is the agriculture of the West Indies, which has been for
centuries prolific of fabulous wealth, that has engulfed millions of the African
race. It is in Cuba, at this day, whose revenues are reckoned by millions, and
whose planters are princes, that we see in the servile class, the coarsest fare, the
most exhausting and unremitting toil, and even the absolute destruction of a
portion of its numbers every year.” 74
Mutato nomine de te fabula narratur [It is of you that the story is told – Horace]. For slave-trade
read labour-market, for Kentucky and Virginia, Ireland and the agricultural districts of England,
Scotland, and Wales, for Africa, Germany. We heard how over-work thinned the ranks of the
bakers in London. Nevertheless, the London labour-market is always over-stocked with German
and other candidates for death in the bakeries. Pottery, as we saw, is one of the shortest-lived
industries. Is there any want therefore of potters? Josiah Wedgwood, the inventor of modern
pottery, himself originally a common workman, said in 1785 before the House of Commons that
the whole trade employed from 15,000 to 20,000 people. 75 In the year 1861 the population alone
of the town centres of this industry in Great Britain numbered 101,302.
“The cotton trade has existed for ninety years.... It has existed for three
generations of the English race, and I believe I may safely say that during that
period it has destroyed nine generations of factory operatives.” 76
No doubt in certain epochs of feverish activity the labour-market shows significant gaps. In 1834,
e.g. But then the manufacturers proposed to the Poor Law Commissioners that they should send
the “surplus-population” of the agricultural districts to the north, with the explanation “that the
manufacturers would absorb and use it up.” 77
Agents were appointed with the consent of the Poor Law Commissioners. ... An
office was set up in Manchester, to which lists were sent of those workpeople in
the agricultural districts wanting employment, and their names were registered in
books. The manufacturers attended at these offices, and selected such persons as
they chose; when they had selected such persons as their ‘wants required’, they
gave instructions to have them forwarded to Manchester, and they were sent,
ticketed like bales of goods, by canals, or with carriers, others tramping on the
road, and many of them were found on the way lost and half-starved. This system
had grown up unto a regular trade. This House will hardly believe it, but I tell
them, that this traffic in human flesh was as well kept up, they were in effect as
regularly sold to these [Manchester] manufacturers as slaves are sold to the
cotton-grower in the United States.... In 1860, ‘the cotton trade was at its zenith.’
... The manufacturers again found that they were short of hands.... They applied to
the ‘flesh agents, as they are called. Those agents sent to the southern downs of
England, to the pastures of Dorsetshire, to the glades of Devonshire, to the people
tending kine in Wiltshire, but they sought in vain. The surplus-population was
‘absorbed.’”
The Bury Guardian said, on the completion of the French treaty, that “10,000 additional hands
could be absorbed by Lancashire, and that 30,000 or 40,000 will be needed.” After the “flesh
agents and sub-agents” had in vain sought through the agricultural districts,
“a deputation came up to London, and waited on the right hon. gentleman [Mr.
Villiers, President of the Poor Law Board] with a view of obtaining poor children
from certain union houses for the mills of Lancashire.” 78
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What experience shows to the capitalist generally is a constant excess of population, i.e., an
excess in relation to the momentary requirements of surplus labour-absorbing capital, although
this excess is made up of generations of human beings stunted, short-lived, swiftly replacing each
other, plucked, so to say, before maturity. 79 And, indeed, experience shows to the intelligent
observer with what swiftness and grip the capitalist mode of production, dating, historically
speaking, only from yesterday, has seized the vital power of the people by the very root – shows
how the degeneration of the industrial population is only retarded by the constant absorption of
primitive and physically uncorrupted elements from the country – shows how even the country
labourers, in spite of fresh air and the principle of natural selection, that works so powerfully
amongst them, and only permits the survival of the strongest, are already beginning to die off. 80
Capital that has such good reasons for denying the sufferings of the legions of workers that
surround it, is in practice moved as much and as little by the sight of the coming degradation and
final depopulation of the human race, as by the probable fall of the earth into the sun. In every
stockjobbing swindle every one knows that some time or other the crash must come, but every
one hopes that it may fall on the head of his neighbour, after he himself has caught the shower of
gold and placed it in safety. Après moi le déluge! [After me, the flood] is the watchword of every
capitalist and of every capitalist nation. Hence Capital is reckless of the health or length of life of
the labourer, unless under compulsion from society. 81 To the out-cry as to the physical and mental
degradation, the premature death, the torture of over-work, it answers: Ought these to trouble us
since they increase our profits? But looking at things as a whole, all this does not, indeed, depend
on the good or ill will of the individual capitalist. Free competition brings out the inherent laws of
capitalist production, in the shape of external coercive laws having power over every individual
capitalist.82
The establishment of a normal working day is the result of centuries of struggle between capitalist
and labourer. The history of this struggle shows two opposed tendencies. Compare, e.g., the
English factory legislation of our time with the English labour Statutes from the 14th century to
well into the middle of the 18th.83 Whilst the modern Factory Acts compulsorily shortened the
working day, the earlier statutes tried to lengthen it by compulsion. Of course the pretensions of
capital in embryo – when, beginning to grow, it secures the right of absorbing a quantum sufficit
[sufficient quantity] of surplus labour, not merely by the force of economic relations, but by the
help of the State – appear very modest when put face to face with the concessions that, growling
and struggling, it has to make in its adult condition. It takes centuries ere the “free” labourer,
thanks to the development of capitalistic production, agrees, i.e., is compelled by social
conditions, to sell the whole of his active life. his very capacity for work, for the price of the
necessaries of life, his birth-right for a mess of pottage. Hence it is natural that the lengthening of
the working day, which capital, from the middle of the 14th to the end of the 17th century, tries to
impose by State-measures on adult labourers, approximately coincides with the shortening of the
working day which, in the second half of the 19th century, has here and there been effected by the
State to prevent the coining of children’s blood into capital. That which to-day, e.g., in the State
of Massachusetts, until recently the freest State of the North-American Republic, has been
proclaimed as the statutory limit of the labour of children under 12, was in England, even in the
middle of the 17th century, the normal working day of able-bodied artisans, robust labourers,
athletic blacksmiths. 84
The first “Statute of Labourers” (23 Edward III., 1349) found its immediate pretext (not its cause,
for legislation of this kind lasts centuries after the pretext for it has disappeared) in the great
plague that decimated the people, so that, as a Tory writer says, “The difficulty of getting men to
work on reasonable terms (i.e., at a price that left their employers a reasonable quantity of surplus
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labour) grew to such a height as to be quite intolerable.” Reasonable wages were, therefore,
fixed by law as well as the limits of the working day. The latter point, the only one that here
interests us, is repeated in the Statute of 1496 (Henry VII.). The working day for all artificers and
field labourers from March to September ought, according to this statute (which, however, could
not be enforced), to last from 5 in the morning to between 7 and 8 in the evening. But the mealtimes consist of 1 hour for breakfast, 1½ hours for dinner, and ½ an hour for “noon-meate,” i.e.,
exactly twice as much as under the factory acts now in force.86 In winter, work was to last from 5
in the morning until dark, with the same intervals. A statute of Elizabeth of 1562 leaves the length
of the working day for all labourers “hired for daily or weekly wage” untouched, but aims at
limiting the intervals to 2½ hours in the summer, or to 2 in the winter. Dinner is only to last 1
hour, and the “afternoon-sleep of half an hour” is only allowed between the middle of May and
the middle of August. For every hour of absence 1d. is to be subtracted from the wage. In
practice, however, the conditions were much more favourable to the labourers than in the statutebook. William Petty, the father of Political Economy, and to some extent the founder of Statistics,
says in a work that he published in the last third of the 17th century:
“Labouring-men (then meaning field-labourers) work 10 hours per diem, and
make 20 meals per week, viz., 3 a day for working days, and 2 on Sundays;
whereby it is plain, that if they could fast on Friday nights, and dine in one hour
and an half, whereas they take two, from eleven to one; thereby thus working 1/20
more, and spending 1/20 less, the above-mentioned (tax) might be raised.” 87
Was not Dr. Andrew Ure right in crying down the 12 hours’ bill of 1833 as a retrogression to the
times of the dark ages? It is true these regulations contained in the statute mentioned by Petty,
apply also to apprentices. But the condition of child-labour, even at the end of the 17th century, is
seen from the following complaint:
“’Tis not their practice (in Germany) as with us in this kingdom, to bind an
apprentice for seven years; three or four is their common standard: and the reason
is, because they are educated from their cradle to something of employment,
which renders them the more apt and docile, and consequently the more capable
of attaining to a ripeness and quicker proficiency in business. Whereas our youth,
here in England, being bred to nothing before they come to be apprentices, make a
very slow progress and require much longer time wherein to reach the perfection
of accomplished artists.” 88
Still, during the greater part of the 18th century, up to the epoch of Modern Industry and
machinism, capital in England had not succeeded in seizing for itself, by the payment of the
weekly value of labour-power, the whole week of the labourer, with the exception, however, of
the agricultural labourers. The fact that they could live for a whole week on the wage of four
days, did not appear to the labourers a sufficient reason that they should work the other two days
for the capitalist. One party of English economists, in the interest of capital, denounces this
obstinacy in the most violent manner, another party defends the labourers. Let us listen, e.g., to
the contest between Postlethwayt whose Dictionary of Trade then had the same reputation as the
kindred works of MacCulloch and MacGregor to-day, and the author (already quoted) of the
“Essay on Trade and Commerce.” 89
Postlethwayt says among other things:
“We cannot put an end to those few observations, without noticing that trite
remark in the mouth of too many; that if the industrious poor can obtain enough to
maintain themselves in five days, they will not work the whole six. Whence they
infer the necessity of even the necessaries of life being made dear by taxes, or any
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other means, to compel the working artisan and manufacturer to labour the whole
six days in the week, without ceasing. I must beg leave to differ in sentiment from
those great politicians, who contend for the perpetual slavery of the working
people of this kingdom; they forget the vulgar adage, all work and no play. Have
not the English boasted of the ingenuity and dexterity of her working artists and
manufacturers which have heretofore given credit and reputation to British wares
in general? What has this been owing to? To nothing more probably than the
relaxation of the working people in their own way. Were they obliged to toil the
year round, the whole six days in the week, in a repetition of the same work,
might it not blunt their ingenuity, and render them stupid instead of alert and
dexterous; and might not our workmen lose their reputation instead of maintaining
it by such eternal slavery? ... And what sort of workmanship could we expect from
such hard-driven animals? ... Many of them will execute as much work in four
days as a Frenchman will in five or six. But if Englishmen are to be eternal
drudges, ‘tis to be feared they will degenerate below the Frenchmen. As our
people are famed for bravery in war, do we not say that it is owing to good
English roast beef and pudding in their bellies, as well as their constitutional spirit
of liberty? And why may not the superior ingenuity and dexterity of, our artists
and manufacturers, be owing to that freedom and liberty to direct themselves in
their own way, and I hope we shall never have them deprived of such privileges
and that good living from whence their ingenuity no less than their courage may
proceed.” 90
Thereupon the author of the “Essay on Trade and Commerce” replies:
“If the making of every seventh day an holiday is supposed to be of divine
institution, as it implies the appropriating the other six days to labour” (he means
capital as we shall soon see) “surely it will not be thought cruel to enforce it ....
That mankind in general, are naturally inclined to ease and indolence, we fatally
experience to be true, from the conduct of our manufacturing populace, who do
not labour, upon an average, above four days in a week, unless provisions happen
to be very dear.... Put all the necessaries of the poor under one denomination; for
instance, call them all wheat, or suppose that ... the bushel of wheat shall cost five
shillings and that he (a manufacturer) earns a shilling by his labour, he then would
be obliged to work five days only in a week. If the bushel of wheat should cost but
four shillings, he would be obliged to work but four days; but as wages in this
kingdom are much higher in proportion to the price of necessaries ... the
manufacturer, who labours four days, has a surplus of money to live idle with the
rest of the week . ... I hope I have said enough to make it appear that the moderate
labour of six days in a week is no slavery. Our labouring people do this, and to all
appearance are the happiest of all our labouring poor,91 but the Dutch do this in
manufactures, and appear to be a very happy people. The French do so, when
holidays do not intervene. 92 But our populace have adopted a notion, that as
Englishmen they enjoy a birthright privilege of being more free and independent
than in any country in Europe. Now this idea, as far as it may affect the bravery of
our troops, may be of some use; but the less the manufacturing poor have of it,
certainly the better for themselves and for the State. The labouring people should
never think themselves independent of their superiors.... It is extremely dangerous
to encourage mobs in a commercial state like ours, where, perhaps, seven parts
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out of eight of the whole, are people with little or no property. The cure will not
be perfect, till our manufacturing poor are contented to labour six days for the
same sum which they now earn in four days.” 93
To this end, and for “extirpating idleness debauchery and excess,” promoting a spirit of industry,
“lowering the price of labour in our manufactories, and easing the lands of the heavy burden of
poor’s rates,” our “faithful Eckart” of capital proposes this approved device: to shut up such
labourers as become dependent on public support, in a word, paupers, in “an ideal workhouse.”
Such ideal workhouse must be made a “House of Terror,” and not an asylum for the poor, “where
they are to be plentifully fed, warmly and decently clothed, and where they do but little work.” 94
In this “House of Terror,” this “ideal workhouse, the poor shall work 14 hours in a day, allowing
proper time for meals, in such manner that there shall remain 12 hours of neat-labour.” 95
Twelve working-hours daily in the Ideal Workhouse, in the “House of Terror” of 1770! 63 years
later, in 1833, when the English Parliament reduced the working day for children of 13 to 18, in
four branches of industry to 12 full hours, the judgment day of English Industry had dawned! In
1852, when Louis Bonaparte sought to secure his position with the bourgeoisie by tampering with
the legal working day, the French working people cried out with one voice “the law that limits the
working day to 12 hours is the one good that has remained to us of the legislation of the
Republic!” 96 At Zürich the work of children over 10, is limited to 12 hours; in Aargau in 1862,
the work of children between 13 and 16, was reduced from 12½ to 12 hours; in Austria in 1860,
for children between 14 and 16, the same reduction was made. 97 “What a progress,” since 1770!
Macaulay would shout with exultation!
The “House of Terror” for paupers of which the capitalistic soul of 1770 only dreamed, was
realised a few years later in the shape of a gigantic “Workhouse” for the industrial worker
himself. It is called the Factory. And the ideal this time fades before the reality.

Section 6: The Struggle for a Normal Working Day.
Compulsory Limitation by Law of the Working-Time.
English Factory Acts, 1833
After capital had taken centuries in extending the working day to its normal maximum limit, and
then beyond this to the limit of the natural day of 12 hours,98 there followed on the birth of
machinism and modern industry in the last third of the 18th century, a violent encroachment like
that of an avalanche in its intensity and extent. All bounds of morals and nature, age and sex, day
and night, were broken down. Even the ideas of day and night, of rustic simplicity in the old
statutes, became so confused that an English judge, as late as 1860, needed a quite Talmudic
sagacity to explain “judicially” what was day and what was night.99 Capital celebrated its orgies.
As soon as the working-class, stunned at first by the noise and turmoil of the new system of
production, recovered, in some measure, its senses, its resistance began, and first in the native
land of machinism, in England. For 30 years, however, the concessions conquered by the
workpeople were purely nominal. Parliament passed 5 labour Laws between 1802 and 1833, but
was shrewd enough not to vote a penny for their carrying out, for the requisite officials, &c. 100
They remained a dead letter. “The fact is, that prior to the Act of 1833, young
persons and children were worked all night, all day, or both ad libitum.” 101
A normal working day for modern industry only dates from the Factory Act of 1833, which
included cotton, wool, flax, and silk factories. Nothing is more characteristic of the spirit of
capital than the history of the English Factory Acts from 1833 to 1864.
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The Act of 1833 declares the ordinary factory working day to be from half-past five in the
morning to half-past eight in the evening and within these limits, a period of 15 hours, it is lawful
to employ young persons (i.e., persons between 13 and 18 years of age), at any time of the day,
provided no one individual young person should work more than 12 hours in any one day, except
in certain cases especially provided for. The 6th section of the Act provided. “That there shall be
allowed in the course of every day not less than one and a half hours for meals to every such
person restricted as hereinbefore provided.” The employment of children under 9, with exceptions
mentioned later was forbidden; the work of children between 9 and 13 was limited to 8 hours a
day, night-work, i.e., according to this Act, work between 8:30 p.m. and 5:30 a.m., was forbidden
for all persons between 9 and 18.
The law-makers were so far from wishing to trench on the freedom of capital to exploit adult
labour-power, or, as they called it, “the freedom of labour,” that they created a special system in
order to prevent the Factory Acts from having a consequence so outrageous.
“The great evil of the factory system as at present conducted,” says the first report
of the Central Board of the Commission of June 28th 1833, “has appeared to us to
be that it entails the necessity of continuing the labour of children to the utmost
length of that of the adults. The only remedy for this evil, short of the limitation of
the labour of adults which would, in our opinion, create an evil greater than that
which is sought to be remedied, appears to be the plan of working double sets of
children.”
... Under the name of System of Relays, this “plan” was therefore carried out, so that, e.g., from
5.30 a.m. until 1.30 in the afternoon, one set of children between 9 and 13, and from 1.30 p.m. to
8.30 in the evening another set were “put to,” &c.
In order to reward the manufacturers for having, in the most barefaced way, ignored all the Acts
as to children’s labour passed during the last twenty-two years, the pill was yet further gilded for
them. Parliament decreed that after March 1st, 1834, no child under 11, after March 1st 1835, no
child under 12, and after March 1st, 1836, no child under 13 was to work more than eight hours in
a factory. This “liberalism,” so full of consideration for “capital,” was the more noteworthy as Dr.
Farre, Sir A. Carlisle, Sir B. Brodie, Sir C. Bell, Mr. Guthrie, &c., in a word, the most
distinguished physicians and surgeons in London, had declared in their evidence before the House
of Commons, that there was danger in delay. Dr. Farre expressed himself still more coarsely.
“Legislation is necessary for the prevention of death, in any form in which it can
be prematurely inflicted, and certainly this (i.e., the factory method) must be
viewed as a most cruel mode of inflicting it.”
That same “reformed” Parliament, which in its delicate consideration for the manufacturers,
condemned children under 13, for years to come, to 72 hours of work per week in the Factory
Hell, on the other hand, in the Emancipation Act, which also administered freedom drop by drop,
forbade the planters, from the outset, to work any negro slave more than 45 hours a week.
But in no wise conciliated, capital now began a noisy agitation that went on for several years. It
turned chiefly on the age of those who, under the name of children, were limited to 8 hours’
work, and were subject to a certain amount of compulsory education. According to capitalistic
anthropology, the age of childhood ended at 10, or at the outside, at 11. The more nearly the time
approached for the coming into full force of the Factory Act, the fatal year 1836, the more wildly
raged the mob of manufacturers. They managed, in fact, to intimidate the government to such an
extent that in 1835 it proposed to lower the limit of the age of childhood from 13 to 12. In the
meantime the pressure from without grew more threatening. Courage failed the House of
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Commons. It refused to throw children of 13 under the Juggernaut Car of capital for more than 8
hours a day, and the Act of 1833 came into full operation. It remained unaltered until June, 1844.
In the ten years during which it regulated factory work, first in part, and then entirely, the official
reports of the factory inspectors teem with complaints as to the impossibility of putting the Act
into force. As the law of 1833 left it optional with the lords of capital during the 15 hours, from
5.30 a.m. to 8.30 p.m., to make every “young person,” and every “child” begin, break off,
resume, or end his 12 or 8 hours at any moment they liked, and also permitted them to assign to
different persons, different times for meals, these gentlemen soon discovered a new “system of
relays,” by which the labour-horses were not changed at fixed stations, but were constantly reharnessed at changing stations. We do not pause longer on the beauty of this system, as we shall
have to return to it later. But this much is clear at the first glance: that this system annulled the
whole Factory Act, not only in the spirit, but in the letter. How could factory inspectors, with this
complex bookkeeping in respect to each individual child or young person, enforce the legally
determined work-time and the granting of the legal mealtimes? In a great many of the factories,
the old brutalities soon blossomed out again unpunished. In an interview with the Home Secretary
(1844), the factory inspectors demonstrated the impossibility of any control under the newly
invented relay system. 102 In the meantime, however, circumstances had greatly changed. The
factory hands, especially since 1838, had made the Ten Hours’ Bill their economic, as they had
made the Charter their political, election-cry. Some of the manufacturers, even, who had managed
their factories in conformity with the Act of 1833, overwhelmed Parliament with memorials on
the immoral competition of their false brethren whom greater impudence, or more fortunate local
circumstances, enabled to break the law. Moreover, however much the individual manufacturer
might give the rein to his old lust for gain, the spokesmen and political leaders of the
manufacturing class ordered a change of front and of speech towards the workpeople. They had
entered upon the contest for the repeal of the Corn Laws, and needed the workers to help them to
victory. They promised therefore, not only a double-sized loaf of bread, but the enactment of the
Ten Hours’ Bill in the Free-trade millennium. 103 Thus they still less dared to oppose a measure
intended only to make the law of 1833 a reality. Threatened in their holiest interest, the rent of
land, the Tories thundered with philanthropic indignation against the “nefarious practices”104 of
their foes.
This was the origin of the additional Factory Act of June 7th, 1844. It came into effect on
September 10th, 1844. It places under protection a new category of workers, viz., the women over
18. They were placed in every respect on the same footing as the young persons, their work time
limited to twelve hours, their night-labour forbidden, &c. For the first time, legislation saw itself
compelled to control directly and officially the labour of adults. In the Factory Report of 18441845, it is said with irony:
“No instances have come to my knowledge of adult women having expressed any
regret at their rights being thus far interfered with.” 105 The working-time of
children under 13 was reduced to 6½, and in certain circumstances to 7 hours aday. 106
To get rid of the abuses of the “spurious relay system,” the law established besides others the
following important regulations: –
“That the hours of work of children and young persons shall be reckoned from the
time when any child or young person shall begin to work in the morning.”
So that if A, e.g., begins work at 8 in the morning, and B at 10, B’s work-day must nevertheless
end at the same hour as A’s. “The time shall be regulated by a public clock,” for example, the
nearest railway clock, by which the factory clock is to be set. The occupier is to hang up a
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“legible” printed notice stating the hours for the beginning and ending of work and the times
allowed for the several meals. Children beginning work before 12 noon may not be again
employed after 1 p.m. The afternoon shift must therefore consist of other children than those
employed in the morning. Of the hour and a half for meal-times,
“one hour thereof at the least shall be given before three of the clock in the
afternoon ... and at the same period of the day. No child or young person shall be
employed more than five hours before 1 p.m. without an interval for meal-time of
at least 30 minutes. No child or young person [or female] shall be employed or
allowed to remain in any room in which any manufacturing process is then [i.e., at
mealtimes] carried on,” &c.
It has been seen that these minutiae, which, with military uniformity, regulate by stroke of the
clock the times, limits, pauses of the work were not at all the products of Parliamentary fancy.
They developed gradually out of circumstances as natural laws of the modern mode of
production. Their formulation, official recognition, and proclamation by the State, were the result
of a long struggle of classes. One of their first consequences was that in practice the working day
of the adult males in factories became subject to the same limitations, since in most processes of
production the co-operation of the children. young persons, and women is indispensable. On the
whole, therefore, during the period from 1844 to 1847, the 12 hours’ working day became general
and uniform in all branches of industry under the Factory Act.
The manufacturers, however, did not allow this “progress” without a compensating
“retrogression.” At their instigation the House of Commons reduced the minimum age for
exploitable children from 9 to 8, in order to assure that additional supply of factory children
which is due to capitalists, according to divine and human law. 107
The years 1846-47 are epoch-making in the economic history of England. The Repeal of the Corn
Laws, and of the duties on cotton and other raw material; Free-trade proclaimed as the guiding
star of legislation; in a word, the arrival of the millennium. On the other hand, in the same years,
the Chartist movement and the 10 hours’ agitation reached their highest point. They found allies
in the Tories panting for revenge. Despite the fanatical opposition of the army of perjured Freetraders, with Bright and Cobden at their head, the Ten Hours’ Bill, struggled for so long, went
through Parliament.
The new Factory Act of June 8th, 1847, enacted that on July 1st, 1847, there should be a
preliminary shortening of the working day for “young persons” (from 13 to 18), and all females
to 11 hours, but that on May 1st, 1848, there should be a definite limitation of the working day to
10 hours. In other respects, the Act only amended and completed the Acts of 1833 and 1844.
Capital now entered upon a preliminary campaign in order to hinder the Act from coming into
full force on May 1st, 1848. And the workers themselves, under the presence that they had been
taught by experience, were to help in the destruction of their own work. The moment was cleverly
chosen.
“It must be remembered, too, that there has been more than two years of great
suffering (in consequence of the terrible crisis of 1846-47) among the factory
operatives, from many mills having worked short time, and many being altogether
closed. A considerable number of the operatives must therefore be in very narrow
circumstances many, it is to be feared, in debt; so that it might fairly have been
presumed that at the present time they would prefer working the longer time, in
order to make up for past losses, perhaps to pay off debts, or get their furniture out
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of pawn, or replace that sold, or to get a new supply of clothes for themselves and
their families.” 108
The manufacturers tried to aggravate the natural effect of these circumstances by a general
reduction of wages by 10%. This was done so to say, to celebrate the inauguration of the new
Free-trade era. Then followed a further reduction of 8 1/3% as soon as the working day was
shortened to 11, and a reduction of double that amount as soon as it was finally shortened to 10
hours. Wherever, therefore, circumstances allowed it, a reduction of wages of at least 25% took
place. 109 Under such favourably prepared conditions the agitation among the factory workers for
the repeal of the Act of 1847 was begun. Neither lies, bribery, nor threats were spared in this
attempt. But all was in vain. Concerning the half-dozen petitions in which workpeople were made
to complain of “their oppression by the Act,” the petitioners themselves declared under oral
examination, that their signatures had been extorted from them. “They felt themselves oppressed,
but not exactly by the Factory Act.”110 But if the manufacturers did not succeed in making the
workpeople speak as they wished, they themselves shrieked all the louder in press and Parliament
in the name of the workpeople. They denounced the Factory Inspectors as a kind of revolutionary
commissioners like those of the French National Convention ruthlessly sacrificing the unhappy
factory workers to their humanitarian crotchet. This manoeuvre also failed. Factory Inspector
Leonard Horner conducted in his own person, and through his sub-inspectors, many examinations
of witnesses in the factories of Lancashire. About 70% of the workpeople examined declared in
favour of 10 hours, a much smaller percentage in favour of 11, and an altogether insignificant
minority for the old 12 hours. 111
Another “friendly” dodge was to make the adult males work 12 to 15 hours, and then to blazon
abroad this fact as the best proof of what the proletariat desired in its heart of hearts. But the
“ruthless” Factory Inspector Leonard Horner was again to the fore. The majority of the “overtimes” declared:
“They would much prefer working ten hours for less wages, but that they had no
choice; that so many were out of employment (so many spinners getting very low
wages by having to work as piecers, being unable to do better), that if they refused
to work the longer time, others would immediately get their places, so that it was a
question with them of agreeing to work the longer time, or of being thrown out of
employment altogether.” 112
The preliminary campaign of capital thus came to grief, and the Ten Hours’ Act came into force
May 1st, 1848. But meanwhile the fiasco of the Chartist party whose leaders were imprisoned,
and whose organisation was dismembered, had shaken the confidence of the English workingclass in its own strength. Soon after this the June insurrection in Paris and its bloody suppression
united, in England as on the Continent, all fractions of the ruling classes, landlords and capitalists,
stock-exchange wolves and shop-keepers, Protectionists and Freetraders, government and
opposition, priests and freethinkers, young whores and old nuns, under the common cry for the
salvation of Property, Religion, the Family and Society. The working-class was everywhere
proclaimed, placed under a ban, under a virtual law of suspects. The manufacturers had no need
any longer to restrain themselves. They broke out in open revolt not only against the Ten Hours’
Act, but against the whole of the legislation that since 1833 had aimed at restricting in some
measure the “free” exploitation of labour-power. It was a pro-slavery rebellion in miniature,
carried on for over two years with a cynical recklessness, a terrorist energy all the cheaper
because the rebel capitalist risked nothing except the skin of his “hands.”
To understand that which follows we must remember that the Factory Acts of 1833, 1844, and
1847 were all three in force so far as the one did not amend the other: that not one of these limited

189

Chapter 10

the working day of the male worker over 18, and that since 1833 the 15 hours from 5.30 a.m. to
8.30 p.m. had remained the legal “day,” within the limits of which at first the 12, and later the 10
hours’ labour of young persons and women had to be performed under the prescribed conditions.
The manufacturers began by here and there discharging a part of, in many cases half of the young
persons and women employed by them, and then, for the adult males, restoring the almost
obsolete night-work. The Ten Hours’ Act, they cried, leaves no other alternative.113
Their second step dealt with the legal pauses for meals. Let us hear the Factory Inspectors.
“Since the restriction of the hours of work to ten, the factory occupiers maintain,
although they have not yet practically gone the whole length, that supposing the
hours of work to be from 9 a.m. to 7 p.m. they fulfil the provisions of the statutes
by allowing an hour before 9 a.m. and half an hour after 7 p.m. [for meals]. In
some cases they now allow an hour, or half an hour for dinner, insisting at the
same time, that they are not bound to allow any part of the hour and a half in the
course of the factory working day.” 114 The manufacturers maintained therefore
that the scrupulously strict provisions of the Act of 1844 with regard to mealtimes only gave the operatives permission to eat and drink before coming into,
and after leaving the factory – i.e., at home. And why should not the workpeople
eat their dinner before 9 in the morning? The crown lawyers, however, decided
that the prescribed meal-times
“must be in the interval during the working-hours, and that it will not be lawful to
work for 10 hours continuously, from 9 a.m. to 7 p.m., without any interval.” 115
After these pleasant demonstrations, Capital preluded its revolt by a step which agreed with the
letter of the law of 1844, and was therefore legal.
The Act of 1844 certainly prohibited the employment after 1 p.m. of such children, from 8 to 13,
as had been employed before noon. But it did not regulate in any way the 6½ hours’ work of the
children whose work-time began at 12 midday or later. Children of 8 might, if they began work at
noon, be employed from 12 to 1, 1 hour; from 2 to 4 in the afternoon, 2 hours; from 5 to 8.30 in
the evening, 3½ hours; in all, the legal 6½ hours. Or better still. In order to make their work
coincide with that of the adult male labourers up to 8.30 p.m., the manufacturers only had to give
them no work till 2 in the afternoon, they could then keep them in the factory without
intermission till 8.30 in the evening.
“And it is now expressly admitted that the practice exists in England from the
desire of mill-owners to have their machinery at work for more than 10 hours aday, to keep the children at work with male adults after all the young persons and
women have left, and until 8.30 p.m. if the factory-owners choose.” 116
Workmen and factory inspectors protested on hygienic and moral grounds, but Capital answered:
“My deeds upon my head! I crave the law,
The penalty and forfeit of my bond.”
In fact, according to statistics laid before the House of Commons on July 26th, 1850, in spite of
all protests, on July 15th, 1850, 3,742 children were subjected to this “practice” in 257
factories. 117 Still, this was not enough. The Lynx eye of Capital discovered that the Act of 1844
did not allow 5 hours’ work before mid-day without a pause of at least 30 minutes for
refreshment, but prescribed nothing of the kind for work after mid-day. Therefore, it claimed and
obtained the enjoyment not only of making children of 8 drudge without intermission from 2 to
8.30 p.m., but also of making them hunger during that time.
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“Ay, his breast.
So says the bond.”
This Shylock-clinging 118 to the letter of the law of 1844, so far as it regulated children’s labour,
was but to lead up to an open revolt against the same law, so far as it regulated the labour of
“young persons and women.” It will be remembered that the abolition of the “false relay system”
was the chief aim and object of that law. The masters began their revolt with the simple
declaration that the sections of the Act of 1844 which prohibited the ad libitum use of young
persons and women in such short fractions of the day of 15 hours as the employer chose, were
“comparatively harmless” so long as the work-time was fixed at 12 hours. But under the Ten
Hours’ Act they were a “grievous hardship.” 119 They informed the inspectors in the coolest
manner that they should place themselves above the letter of the law, and re-introduce the old
system on their own account. 120 They were acting in the interests of the ill-advised operatives
themselves, “in order to be able to pay them higher wages.”
"This was the only possible plan by which to maintain, under the Ten Hours’ Act,
the industrial supremacy of Great Britain.” “Perhaps it may be a little difficult to
detect irregularities under the relay system; but what of that? Is the great
manufacturing interest of this country to be treated as a secondary matter in order
to save some little trouble to Inspectors and Sub-Inspectors of Factories?” 121
All these shifts naturally were of no avail. The Factory Inspectors appealed to the Law Courts.
But soon such a cloud of dust in the way of petitions from the masters overwhelmed the Home
Secretary, Sir George Grey, that in a circular of August 5th, 1848, he recommends the inspectors
not
“to lay informations against mill-owners for a breach of the letter of the Act, or
for employment of young persons by relays in cases in which there is no reason to
believe that such young persons have been actually employed for a longer period
than that sanctioned by law.” Hereupon, Factory Inspector J. Stuart allowed the
so-called relay system during the 15 hours of the factory day throughout Scotland,
where it soon flourished again as of old. The English Factory Inspectors, on the
other hand, declared that the Home Secretary had no power dictatorially to
suspend the law, and continued their legal proceedings against the pro-slavery
rebellion.
But what was the good of summoning the capitalists when the Courts in this case the country
magistrates – Cobbett’s “Great Unpaid” – acquitted them? In these tribunals, the masters sat in
judgment on themselves An example. One Eskrigge, cotton-spinner, of the firm of Kershaw,
Leese, & Co., had laid before the Factory Inspector of his district the scheme of a relay system
intended for his mill. Receiving a refusal, he at first kept quiet. A few months later, an individual
named Robinson, also a cotton-spinner, and if not his Man Friday, at all events related to
Eskrigge, appeared before the borough magistrates of Stockport on a charge of introducing the
identical plan of relays invented by Eskrigge. Four Justices sat, among them three cottonspinners,
at their head this same inevitable Eskrigge. Eskrigge acquitted Robinson, and now was of opinion
that what was right for Robinson was fair for Eskrigge. Supported by his own legal decision, he
introduced the system at once into his own factory. 122 Of course, the composition of this tribunal
was in itself a violation of the law.123
These judicial farces, exclaims Inspector Howell, “urgently call for a remedy –
either that the law should be so altered as to be made to conform to these
decisions, or that it should be administered by a less fallible tribunal, whose
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decisions would conform to the law ... when these cases are brought forward. I
long for a stipendiary magistrate.” 124
The crown lawyers declared the masters’ interpretation of the Act of 1848 absurd. But the
Saviours of Society would not allow themselves to be turned from their purpose. Leonard Horner
reports,
“Having endeavoured to enforce the Act ... by ten prosecutions in seven
magisterial divisions, and having been supported by the magistrates in one case
only ... I considered it useless to prosecute more for this evasion of the law. That
part of the Act of 1848 which was framed for securing uniformity in the hours of
work, ... is thus no longer in force in my district (Lancashire). Neither have the
sub-inspectors or myself any means of satisfying ourselves, when we inspect a
mill working by shifts, that the young persons and women are not working more
than 10 hours a-day.... In a return of the 30th April, ... of millowners working by
shifts, the number amounts to 114, and has been for some time rapidly increasing.
In general, the time of working the mill is extended to 13½ hours’ from 6 a.m. to
7½ p.m., .... in some instances it amounts to 15 hours, from 5½ a.m. to 8½
p.m.” 125
Already, in December, 1848, Leonard Horner had a list of 65 manufacturers and 29 overlookers
who unanimously declared that no system of supervision could, under this relay system, prevent
enormous over-work. 126 Now, the same children and young persons were shifted from the
spinning-room to the weaving-room, now, during 15 hours, from one factory to another. 127 How
was it possible to control a system which,
“under the guise of relays, is some one of the many plans for shuffling ‘the hands’
about in endless variety, and shifting the hours of work and of rest for different
individuals throughout the day, so that you may never have one complete set of
hands working together in the same room at the same time.” 128
But altogether independently of actual over-work, this so-called relay system was an offspring of
capitalistic fantasy, such as Fourier, in his humorous sketches of “Courses Seances,” has never
surpassed, except that the “attraction of labour” was changed into the attraction of capital. Look,
for example, at those schemes of the masters which the “respectable” press praised as models of
“what a reasonable degree of care and method can accomplish.” The personnel of the workpeople
was sometimes divided into from 12 to 14 categories, which themselves constantly changed and
recharged their constituent parts. During the 15 hours of the factory day, capital dragged in the
labourer now for 30 minutes, now for an hour, and then pushed him out again, to drag him into
the factory and to thrust him out afresh, hounding him hither and thither, in scattered shreds of
time, without ever losing hold of him until the full 10 hours’ work was done. As on the stage, the
same persons had to appear in turns in the different scenes of the different acts. But as an actor
during the whole course of the play belongs to the stage, so the operatives, during 15 hours,
belonged to the factory, without reckoning the time for going and coming. Thus the hours of rest
were turned into hours of enforced idleness, which drove the youths to the pot-house, and the
girls to the brothel. At every new trick that the capitalist, from day to day, hit upon for keeping
his machinery going 12 or 15 hours without increasing the number of his hands, the worker had to
swallow his meals now in this fragment of time, now in that. At the time of the 10 hours’
agitation, the masters cried out that the working mob petitioned in the hope of obtaining 12 hours’
wages for 10 hours’ work. Now they reversed the medal. They paid 10 hours’ wages for 12 or 15
hours’ lordship over labour-power. 129 This was the gist of the matter, this the masters’
interpretation of the 10 hours’ law! These were the same unctuous Free-traders, perspiring with
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the love of humanity, who for full 10 years, during the Anti-Corn Law agitation, had preached to
the operatives, by a reckoning of pounds, shillings, and pence, that with free importation of corn,
and with the means possessed by English industry, 10 hours’ labour would be quite enough to
enrich the capitalists. 130 This revolt of capital, after two years was at last crowned with victory by
a decision of one of the four highest Courts of Justice in England, the Court of Exchequer, which
in a case brought before it on February 8th, 1850, decided that the manufacturers were certainly
acting against the sense of the Act of 1844, but that this Act itself contained certain words that
rendered it meaningless. “By this decision, the Ten Hours’ Act was abolished.” 131 A crowd of
masters, who until then had been afraid of using the relay system for young persons and women,
now took it up heart and soul. 132
But on this apparently decisive victory of capital, followed at once a revulsion. The workpeople
had hitherto offered a passive, although inflexible and unremitting resistance. They now protested
in Lancashire and Yorkshire in threatening meetings. The pretended Ten Hours’ Act was thus
simple humbug, parliamentary cheating, had never existed! The Factory Inspectors urgently
warned the Government that the antagonism of classes had arrived at an incredible tension. Some
of the masters themselves murmured:
“On account of the contradictory decisions of the magistrates, a condition of
things altogether abnormal and anarchical obtains. One law holds in Yorkshire,
another in Lancashire, one law in one parish of Lancashire, another in its
immediate neighbourhood. The manufacturer in large towns could evade the law,
the manufacturer in country districts could not find the people necessary for the
relay system, still less for the shifting of hands from one factory to another,” &c.
And the first birthright of capital is equal exploitation of labour-power by all capitalists.
Under these circumstances a compromise between masters and men was effected that received
the seal of Parliament in the additional Factory Act of August 5th, 1850. The working day for
“young persons and women,” was raised from 10 to 10½ hours for the first five days of the week,
and shortened to 7½ on the Saturday. The work was to go on between 6 a.m. and 6 p.m. 133, with
pauses of not less than 1½ hours for meal-times, these meal-times to be allowed at one and the
same time for all, and conformably to the conditions of 1844. By this an end was put to the relay
system once for all. 134 For children’s labour, the Act of 1844 remained in force.
One set of masters, this time as before, secured to itself special seigneurial rights over the
children of the proletariat. These were the silk manufacturers. In 1833 they had howled out in
threatening fashion, “if the liberty of working children of any age for 10 hours a day were taken
away, it would stop their works.” 135 It would be impossible for them to buy a sufficient number of
children over 13. They extorted the privilege they desired. The pretext was shown on subsequent
investigation to be a deliberate lie.136 It did not, however, prevent them, during 10 years, from
spinning silk 10 hours a day out of the blood of little children who had to be placed upon stools
for the performance of their work. 137 The Act of 1844 certainly “robbed” them of the “liberty” of
employing children under 11 longer than 6½ hours a day. But it secured to them, on the other
hand, the privilege of working children between 11 and 13, 10 hours a day, and of annulling in
their case the education made compulsory for all other factory children. This time the pretext was
“the delicate texture of the fabric in which they were employed, requiring a
lightness of touch, only to be acquired by their early introduction to these
factories.” 138
The children were slaughtered out-and-out for the sake of their delicate fingers, as in Southern
Russia the horned cattle for the sake of their hide and tallow. At length, in 1850, the privilege
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granted in 1844, was limited to the departments of silk-twisting and silk-winding. But here, to
make amends to capital bereft of its “freedom,” the work-time for children from 11 to 13 was
raised from 10 to 10½ hours. Pretext: “Labour in silk mills was lighter than in mills for other
fabrics, and less likely in other respects also to be prejudicial to health.”139 Official medical
inquiries proved afterwards that, on the contrary,
“the average death-rate is exceedingly high in the silk districts and amongst the
female part of the population is higher even than it is in the cotton districts of
Lancashire.” 140
Despite the protests of the Factory Inspector, renewed every 6 months, the mischief continues to
this hour. 141
The Act of 1850 changed the 15 hours’ time from 6 a.m. to 8.30 p.m., into the 12 hours from 6
a.m. to 6 p.m. for “young persons and women” only. It did not, therefore, affect children who
could always be employed for half an hour before and 2½ hours after this period, provided the
whole of their labour did not exceed 6½ hours. Whilst the bill was under discussion, the Factory
Inspectors laid before Parliament statistics of the infamous abuses due to this anomaly. To no
purpose. In the background lurked the intention of screwing up, during prosperous years, the
working day of adult males to 15 hours by the aid of the children. The experience of the three
following years showed that such an attempt must come to grief against the resistance of the adult
male operatives. The Act of 1850 was therefore finally completed in 1853 by forbidding the
“employment of children in the morning before and in the evening after young persons and
women.” Henceforth with a few exceptions the Factory Act of 1850 regulated the working day of
all workers in the branches of industry that come under it.142 Since the passing of the first
Factory Act half a century had elapsed. 143
Factory legislation for the first time went beyond its original sphere in the “Printworks’ Act of
1845.” The displeasure with which capital received this new “extravagance” speaks through
every line of the Act. It limits the working day for children from 8 to 13, and for women to 16
hours, between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m., without any legal pause for meal-times. It allows males over
13 to be worked at will day and night. 144 It is a Parliamentary abortion.145
However, the principle had triumphed with its victory in those great branches of industry which
form the most characteristic creation of the modern mode of production. Their wonderful
development from 1853 to 1860, hand-in-hand with the physical and moral regeneration of the
factory workers, struck the most purblind. The masters from whom the legal limitation and
regulation had been wrung step by step after a civil war of half a century, themselves referred
ostentatiously to the contrast with the branches of exploitation still “free.” 146 The Pharisees of
“Political Economy” now proclaimed the discernment of the necessity of a legally fixed working
day as a characteristic new discovery of their “science.”147 It will be easily understood that after
the factory magnates had resigned themselves and become reconciled to the inevitable, the power
of resistance of capital gradually weakened, whilst at the same time the power of attack of the
working-class grew with the number of its allies in the classes of society not immediately
interested in the question. Hence the comparatively rapid advance since 1860.
The dye-works and bleach-works all came under the Factory Act of 1850 in 1860; 148 lace and
stocking manufactures in 1861.
In consequence of the first report of the Commission on the employment of children (1863) the
same fate was shared by the manufacturers of all earthenwares (not merely pottery), Lucifermatches, percussion caps, cartridges, carpets, fustian-cutting, and many processes included under
the name of “finishing.” In the year 1863 bleaching in the open air 149 and baking were placed
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under special Acts, by which, in the former, the labour of young persons and women during the
night-time (from 8 in the evening to 6 in the morning), and in the latter, the employment of
journeymen bakers under 18, between 9 in the evening and 5 in the morning were forbidden. We
shall return to the later proposals of the same Commission, which threatened to deprive of their
“freedom” all the important branches of English Industry, with the exception of agriculture,
mines, and the means of transport. 150

Section 7: The Struggle for a Normal Working Day. Reaction
of the English Factory Acts on Other Countries
The reader will bear in mind that the production of surplus-value, or the extraction of surplus
labour, is the specific end and aim, the sum and substance, of capitalist production, quite apart
from any changes in the mode of production, which may arise from the subordination of labour to
capital. He will remember that as far as we have at present gone only the independent labourer,
and therefore only the labourer legally qualified to act for himself, enters as a vendor of a
commodity into a contract with the capitalist. If, therefore, in our historical sketch, on the one
hand, modern industry, on the other, the labour of those who are physically and legally minors,
play important parts, the former was to us only a special department, and the latter only a
specially striking example of labour exploitation. Without, however, anticipating the subsequent
development of our inquiry, from the mere connexion of the historic facts before us it follows:
First. The passion of capital for an unlimited and reckless extension of the working day, is first
gratified in the industries earliest revolutionised by water-power, steam, and machinery, in those
first creations of the modern mode of production, cotton, wool, flax, and silk spinning, and
weaving. The changes in the material mode of production, and the corresponding changes in the
social relations of the producers 151 gave rise first to an extravagance beyond all bounds, and then
in opposition to this, called forth a control on the part of Society which legally limits, regulates,
and makes uniform the working day and its pauses. This control appears, therefore, during the
first half of the nineteenth century simply as exceptional legislation.152 As soon as this primitive
dominion of the new mode of production was conquered, it was found that, in the meantime, not
only had many other branches of production been made to adopt the same factory system, but that
manufactures with more or less obsolete methods, such as potteries, glass-making, &c., that oldfashioned handicrafts, like baking, and, finally, even that the so-called domestic industries, such
as nail-making, 153 had long since fallen as completely under capitalist exploitation as the factories
themselves. Legislation was, therefore, compelled to gradually get rid of its exceptional character,
or where, as in England, it proceeds after the manner of the Roman Casuists, to declare any house
in which work was done to be a factory. 154
Second. The history of the regulation of the working day in certain branches of production, and
the struggle still going on in others in regard to this regulation, prove conclusively that the
isolated labourer, the labourer as “free” vendor of his labour-power, when capitalist production
has once attained a certain stage, succumbs without any power of resistance. The creation of a
normal working day is, therefore, the product of a protracted civil war, more or less dissembled,
between the capitalist class and the working-class. As the contest takes place in the arena of
modern industry, it first breaks out in the home of that industry – England. 155 The English factory
workers were the champions, not only of the English, but of the modern working-class generally,
as their theorists were the first to throw down the gauntlet to the theory of capital.156 Hence, the
philosopher of the Factory, Ure, denounces as an ineffable disgrace to the English working-class

195

Chapter 10

that they inscribed “the slavery of the Factory Acts” on the banner which they bore against
capital, manfully striving for “perfect freedom of labour.”157
France limps slowly behind England. The February revolution was necessary to bring into the
world the 12 hours’ law, 158 which is much more deficient than its English original. For all that,
the French revolutionary method has its special advantages. It once for all commands the same
limit to the working day in all shops and factories without distinction, whilst English legislation
reluctantly yields to the pressure of circumstances, now on this point, now on that, and is getting
lost in a hopelessly bewildering tangle of contradictory enactments.159 On the other hand, the
French law proclaims as a principle that which in England was only won in the name of children,
minors, and women, and has been only recently for the first time claimed as a general right.160
In the United States of North America, every independent movement of the workers was
paralysed so long as slavery disfigured a part of the Republic. Labour cannot emancipate itself in
the white skin where in the black it is branded. But out of the death of slavery a new life at once
arose. The first fruit of the Civil War was the eight hours’ agitation, that ran with the sevenleagued boots of the locomotive from the Atlantic to the Pacific, from New England to California.
The General Congress of labour at Baltimore (August 16th, 1866) declared:
“The first and great necessity of the present, to free the labour of this country from
capitalistic slavery, is the passing of a law by which eight hours shall be the
normal working day in all States of the American Union. We are resolved to put
forth all our strength until this glorious result is attained.” 161
At the same time, the Congress of the International Working Men’s Association at Geneva, on the
proposition of the London General Council, resolved that “the limitation of the working day is a
preliminary condition without which all further attempts at improvement and emancipation must
prove abortive... the Congress proposes eight hours as the legal limit of the working day.”
Thus the movement of the working-class on both sides of the Atlantic, that had grown
instinctively out of the conditions of production themselves, endorsed the words of the English
Factory Inspector, R. J. Saunders
“Further steps towards a reformation of society can never be carried out with any
hope of success, unless the hours of labour be limited, and the prescribed limit
strictly enforced.” 162
It must be acknowledged that our labourer comes out of the process of production other than he
entered. In the market he stood as owner of the commodity “labour-power” face to face with
other owners of commodities, dealer against dealer. The contract by which he sold to the
capitalist his labour-power proved, so to say, in black and white that he disposed of himself
freely. The bargain concluded, it is discovered that he was no “free agent,” that the time for which
he is free to sell his labour-power is the time for which he is forced to sell it,163 that in fact the
vampire will not lose its hold on him “so long as there is a muscle, a nerve, a drop of blood to be
exploited.” 164 For “protection” against “the serpent of their agonies,” the labourers must put their
heads together, and, as a class, compel the passing of a law, an all-powerful social barrier that
shall prevent the very workers from selling. by voluntary contract with capital, themselves and
their families into slavery and death.165 In place of the pompous catalogue of the “inalienable
rights of man” comes the modest Magna Charta of a legally limited working day, which shall
make clear “when the time which the worker sells is ended, and when his own begins.” Quantum
mutatus ab illo! [What a great change from that time! – Virgil] 166
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“A day’s labour is vague, it may be long or short.” (“An Essay on Trade and Commerce, Containing
Observations on Taxes, &c.” London. 1770, p. 73.)
2
This question is far more important than the celebrated question of Sir Robert Peel to the
Birmingham Chamber of Commerce: What is a pound? A question that could only have been
proposed, because Peel was as much in the dark as to the nature of money as the “little shilling men”
of Birmingham.
3
“It is the aim of the capitalist to obtain with his expended capital the greatest possible quantity of
labour (d’obtenir du capital dépense la plus forte somme de travail possible).” J. G. Courcelle-Seneuil.
“Traité théorique et pratique des entreprises industrielles.” 2nd ed. Paris, 1857, p. 63.
4
“An hour’s labour lost in a day is a prodigious injury to a commercial State.... There is a very great
consumption of luxuries among the labouring poor of this kingdom: particularly among the
manufacturing populace, by which they also consume their time, the most fatal of consumptions.” “An
Essay on Trade and Commerce, &c.,” p. 47, and 15
5
“Si le manouvrier libre prend un instant de repos, l’économie sordide qui le suit des yeux avec
inquiétude, prétend qu’il la vole.” [If the free labourer allows himself an instant of rest, the base and
petty management, which follows him with wary eyes, claims he is stealing from it.] N. Linguet,
“Théorie des Lois Civiles. &c.” London, 1767, t. II., p. 466.
6
During the great strike of the London builders, 1860-61, for the reduction of the working day to 9
hours, their Committee published a manifesto that contained, to some extent, the plea of our worker.
The manifesto alludes, not without irony, to the fact, that the greatest profit-monger amongst the
building masters, a certain Sir M. Peto, was in the odour of sanctity (This same Peto, after 1867, came
to an end a la Strousberg.)
7
“Those who labour ... in reality feed both the pensioners ... [called the rich] and themselves.”
(Edmund Burke, l.c., p. 2.)
8
Niebuhr in his “Roman History” says very naively: “It is evident that works like the Etruscan, which
in their ruins astound us, pre-suppose in little (!) states lords and vassals.” Sismondi says far more to
the purpose that “Brussels lace” pre-supposes wage-lords and wage-slaves.
9
“One cannot see these unfortunates (in the gold mines between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Arabia) who
cannot even have their bodies clean, or their nakedness clothed, without pitying their miserable lot.
There is no indulgence, no forbearance for the sick, the feeble, the aged, for woman’s weakness. All
must, forced by blows, work on until death puts an end to their sufferings and their distress.” (“Diod.
Sic. Bibl. Hist.,” lib. 2, c. 13.)
10
That which follows refers to the situation in the Rumanian provinces before the change effected
since the Crimean war.
11
This holds likewise for Germany, and especially for Prussia east of the Elbe. In the 15th century the
German peasant was nearly everywhere a man, who, whilst subject to certain rents paid in produce
and labour was otherwise at least practically free. The German colonists in Brandenburg, Pomerania,
Silesia, and Eastern Prussia, were even legally acknowledged as free men. The victory of the nobility
in the peasants’ war put an end to that. Not only were the conquered South German peasants again
enslaved. From the middle of the 16th century the peasants of Eastern Prussia, Brandenburg,
Pomerania, and Silesia, and soon after the free peasants of Schleswig-Holstein were degraded to the
condition of serfs. (Maurer, Fronhöfe iv. vol., — Meitzen, “Der Boden des preussischen Staats” —
Hanssen, “Leibeigenschaft in Schleswig-Holstein.” — F. E.)
12
Further details are to be found in E. Regnault’s “Histoire politique et sociale des Principautés
Danubiennes,” Paris, 1855.
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“In general and within certain limits, exceeding the medium size of their kind, is evidence of the
prosperity of organic beings. As to man, his bodily height lessens if his due growth is interfered with,
either by physical or local conditions. In all European countries in which the conscription holds, since
its introduction, the medium height of adult men, and generally their fitness for military service, has
diminished. Before the revolution (1789), the minimum for the infantry in France was 165
centimetres; in 1818 (law of March 10th), 157; by the law of March 21, 1832, 156 cm.; on the average
in France more than half are rejected on account of deficient height or bodily weakness. The military
standard in Saxony was in 1780, 178 cm. It is now 155. In Prussia it is 157. According to the
statement of Dr. Meyer in the Bavarian Gazette, May 9th, 1862, the result of an average of 9 years is,
that in Prussia out of 1,000 conscripts 716 were unfit for military service, 317 because of deficiency in
height, and 399 because of bodily defects.... Berlin in 1858 could not provide its contingent of
recruits, it was 156 men short.” J. von Liebig: “Die Chemie in ihrer Anwendung auf Agrikultur und
Physiologie. 1862,” 7th Ed., vol. 1, pp. 117, 118.
14
The history of the Factory Act of 1850 will be found in the course of this chapter.
15
I only touch here and there on the period from the beginning of modern industry in England to
1845. For this period I refer the reader to “Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England,” [Condition of
the Working Class in England] von Friedrich Engels, Leipzig, 1845. How completely Engels
understood the nature of the capitalist mode of production is shown by the Factory Reports, Reports
on Mines, &c., that have appeared since 1845, and how wonderfully he painted the circumstances in
detail is seen on the most superficial comparison of his work with the official reports of the Children’s
Employment Commission, published 18 to 20 years later (1863-1867). These deal especially with the
branches of industry in which the Factory Acts had not, up to 1862, been introduced, in fact are not
yet introduced. Here, then, little or no alteration had been enforced, by authority, in the conditions
painted by Engels. I borrow my examples chiefly from the Free-trade period after 1848, that age of
paradise, of which the commercial travellers for the great firm of Free-trade, blatant as ignorant, tell
such fabulous tales. For the rest England figures here in the foreground because she is the classic
representative of capitalist production, and she alone has a continuous set of official statistics of the
things we are considering.
16
“Suggestions, &c. by Mr. L. Horner, Inspector of Factories,” in Factories Regulation Acts. Ordered
by the House of Commons to be printed, 9th August, 1859, pp. 4, 5.
17
Reports of the Inspector of Factories for the half year. October, 1856, p. 35.
18
Reports, &c., 30th April, 1858, p. 9.
19
Reports, &c., l.c., p. 10.
20
Reports &c., l.c., p. 25.
21
Reports &c., for the half year ending 30th April, 1861. See Appendix No. 2; Reports, &c., 31st
October, 1862, pp. 7, 52, 53. The violations of the Acts became more numerous during the last half
year 1863. Cf Reports, &c., ending 31st October, 1863, p. 7.
22
Reports, &c., October 31st, 1860, p. 23. With what fanaticism, according to the evidence of
manufacturers given in courts of law, their hands set themselves against every interruption in factory
labour, the following curious circumstance shows. In the beginning of June, 1836, information
reached the magistrates of Dewsbury (Yorkshire) that the owners of 8 large mills in the
neighbourhood of Batley had violated the Factory Acts. Some of these gentlemen were accused of
having kept at work 5 boys between 12 and 15 years of age, from 6 a.m. on Friday to 4 p.m. on the
following Saturday, not allowing them any respite except for meals and one hour for sleep at
midnight. And these children had to do this ceaseless labour of 30 hours in the “shoddyhole,” as the
hole is called, in which the woollen rags are pulled in pieces, and where a dense atmosphere of dust,
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shreds, &c., forces even the adult workman to cover his mouth continually with handkerchiefs for the
protection of his lungs! The accused gentlemen affirm in lieu of taking an oath — as quakers they
were too scrupulously religious to take an oath — that they had, in their great compassion for the
unhappy children, allowed them four hours for sleep, but the obstinate children absolutely would not
go to bed. The quaker gentlemen were mulcted in £20. Dryden anticipated these gentry:
Fox full fraught in seeming sanctity,
That feared an oath, but like the devil would lie,
That look’d like Lent, and had the holy leer,
And durst not sin! before he said his prayer!”
23
Rep., 31st Oct., 1856, p. 34.
24
l.c., p. 35.
25
l.c., p. 48.
26
l.c., p. 48.
27
l.c., p. 48.
28
l.c., p. 48.
29
Report of the Insp. &c., 30th April 1860, p. 56.
30
This is the official expression both in the factories and in the reports.
31
“The cupidity of mill-owners whose cruelties in the pursuit of gain have hardly been exceeded by
those perpetrated by the Spaniards on the conquest of America in the pursuit of gold.” John Wade,
“History of the Middle and Working Classes,” 3rd Ed. London, 1835, p. 114. The theoretical part of
this book, a kind of hand-book of Political Economy, is, considering the time of its publication,
original in some parts, e.g., on commercial crises. The historical part is, to a great extent, a shameless
plagiarism of Sir F. M. Eden’s “The State of the Poor,” London, 1797.
32
Daily Telegraph, 17th January, 1860.
33
Cf. F. Engels “Lage, etc.” pp. 249-51.
34
Children’s Employment Commission. First report., etc., 1863. Evidence. pp. 16, 19, 18.
35
Public Health, 3rd report, etc., pp. 102, 104, 105.
36
Child. Empl. Comm. I. Report, p. 24.
37
Children’s Employment Commission, p. 22, and xi.
38
l.c., p. xlviii.
39
l.c., p. liv.
40
This is not to be taken in the same sense as our surplus labour time. These gentlemen consider 10½
hours of labour as the normal working day, which includes of course the normal surplus labour. After
this begins “overtime” which is paid a little better. It will be seen later that the labour expended during
the so-called normal day is paid below its value, so that the overtime is simply a capitalist trick in
order to extort more surplus labour, which it would still be, even if the labour-power expended during
the normal working day were properly paid.
41
l.c., Evidence, pp. 123, 124, 125, 140, and 54.
42
Alum finely powdered, or mixed with salt, is a normal article of commerce bearing the significant
name of “bakers’ stuff.”
43
Soot is a well-known and very energetic form of carbon, and forms a manure that capitalistic
chimney-sweeps sell to English farmers. Now in 1862 the British juryman had in a law-suit to decide
whether soot, with which, unknown to the buyer, 90% of dust and sand are mixed, is genuine soot in
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the commercial sense or adulterated soot in the legal sense. The “amis du commerce” [friends of
commerce] decided it to be genuine commercial soot, and non-suited the plaintiff farmer, who had in
addition to pay the costs of the suit.
44
The French chemist, Chevallier, in his treatise on the “sophistications” of commodities, enumerates
for many of the 600 or more articles which he passes in review, 10, 20, 30 different methods of
adulteration. He adds that he does not know all the methods and does not mention all that he knows.
He gives 6 kinds of adulteration of sugar, 9 of olive oil, 10 of butter, 12 of salt, 19 of milk, 20 of
bread, 23 of brandy, 24 of meal, 28 of chocolate, 30 of wine, 32 of coffee, etc. Even God Almighty
does not escape this fate. See Rouard de Card, “On the Falsifications of the materials of the
Sacrament.” (“De la falsification des substances sacramentelles,” Paris, 1856.)
45
“Report, &c., relative to the grievances complained of by the journeymen bakers, &c., London,
1862,” and “Second Report, &c., London, 1863.”
46
l.c., First Report, &c., p. vi.
47
l.c., p. Ixxi.
48
George Read, “The History of Baking,” London, 1848, p. 16.
49
Report (First) &c. Evidence of the “full-priced” baker Cheeseman, p. 108.
50
George Read, l.c. At the end of the 17th and the beginning of the 18th centuries the factors (agents)
that crowded into every possible trade were still denounced as “public nuisances.” Thus the Grand
Jury at the quarter session of the Justices of the Peace for the County of Somerset, addressed a
presentment to the Lower House which, among other things, states, “that these factors of Blackwell
Hall are a Public Nuisance and Prejudice to the Clothing Trade, and ought to be put down as a
Nuisance.” “The Case of our English Wool., &c.,” London, 1685, pp. 6, 7.
51
First Report, &c.
52
Report of Committee on the Baking Trade in Ireland for 1861.
53
l.c.
54
Public meeting of agricultural labourers at Lasswade, near Edinburgh, January 5th, 1866. (See
Workman’s Advocate, January 13th, 1866.) The formation since the close of 1865 of a Trades’ Union
among the agricultural labourers at first in Scotland is a historic event. In one of the most oppressed
agricultural districts of England, Buckinghamshire, the labourers, in March, 1867, made a great strike
for the raising of their weekly wage from 9-10 shillings to 12 shillings. (It will be seen from the
preceding passage that the movement of the English agricultural proletariat, entirely crushed since the
suppression of its violent manifestations after 1830, and especially since the introduction of the new
Poor Laws, begins again in the sixties, until it becomes finally epoch-making in 1872. I return to this
in the 2nd volume, as well as to the Blue books that have appeared since 1867 on the position of the
English land labourers. Addendum to the 3rd ed.)
55
Reynolds’ Newspaper, January, 1866. — Every week this same paper has, under the sensational
headings, “Fearful and fatal accidents,” “Appalling tragedies,” &c., a whole list of fresh railway
catastrophes. On these an employee on the North Staffordshire line comments: “Everyone knows the
consequences that may occur if the driver and fireman of a locomotive engine are not continually on
the look-out. How can that be expected from a man who has been at such work for 29 or 30 hours,
exposed to the weather, and without rest. The following is an example which is of very frequent
occurrence: — One fireman commenced work on the Monday morning at a very early hour. When he
had finished what is called a day’s work, he had been on duty 14 hours 50 minutes. Before he had
time to get his tea, he was again called on for duty.... The next time he finished he had been on duty 14
hours 25 minutes, making a total of 29 hours 15 minutes without intermission. The rest of the week’s
work was made up as follows: — Wednesday, 15 hours; Thursday, 15 hours 35 minutes; Friday, 14½
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hours; Saturday, 14 hours 10 minutes, making a total for the week of 88 hours 30 minutes. Now, sir,
fancy his astonishment on being paid 6 1/4 days for the whole. Thinking it was a mistake, he applied
to the time-keeper,... and inquired what they considered a day’s work, and was told 13 hours for a
goods man (i.e., 78 hours).... He then asked for what he had made over and above the 78 hours per
week, but was refused. However, he was at last told they would give him another quarter, i.e., 10d.,”
l.c., 4th February. 1866.
56
Cf F. Engels, l.c., pp. 253, 254.
57
Dr. Letheby, Consulting Physician of the Board of Health, declared: “The minimum of air for each
adult ought to be in a sleeping room 300, and in a dwelling room 500 cubic feet.” Dr. Richardson,
Senior Physician to one of the London Hospitals: “With needlewomen of all kinds, including
milliners, dressmakers, and ordinary seamstresses, there are three miseries — over-work, deficient air,
and either deficient food or deficient digestion.... Needlework, in the main, ... is infinitely better
adapted to women than to men. But the mischiefs of the trade, in the metropolis especially, are that it
is monopolised by some twenty-six capitalists, who, under the advantages that spring from capital, can
bring in capital to force economy out of labour. This power tells throughout the whole class. If a
dressmaker can get a little circle of customers, such is the competition that, in her home, she must
work to the death to hold together, and this same over-work she must of necessity inflict on any who
may assist her. If she fail, or do not try independently, she must join an establishment, where her
labour is not less, but where her money is safe. Placed thus, she becomes a mere slave, tossed about
with the variations of society. Now at home, in one room, starving, or near to it, then engaged 15, 16,
aye, even 18 hours out of the 24, in an air that is scarcely tolerable, and on food which, even if it be
good, cannot be digested in the absence of pure air. On these victims, consumption, which is purely a
disease of bad air, feeds.” Dr. Richardson: “Work and Over-work,” in “Social Science Review,” 18th
July, 1863.
58
Morning Star, 23rd June, 1863. — The Times made use of the circumstance to defend the American
slave-owners against Bright, &c. “Very many of us think,” says a leader of July 2nd, 1863, “that,
while we work our own young women to death, using the scourge of starvation, instead of the crack of
the whip, as the instrument of compulsion, we have scarcely a right to hound on fire and slaughter
against families who were born slave-owners, and who, at least, feed their slaves well, and work them
lightly.” In the same manner, the Standard, a Tory organ, fell foul of the Rev. Newman Hall: “He
excommunicated the slave-owners, but prays with the fine folk who, without remorse, make the
omnibus drivers and conductors of London, &c., work 16 hours a-day for the wages of a dog.”
Finally, spake the oracle, Thomas Carlyle, of whom I wrote, in 1850, “Zum Teufel ist der Genius, der
Kultus ist geblieben.” [“In the cult of genius ... The cult remains,” paraphrasing Schiller] In a short
parable, he reduces the one great event of contemporary history, the American Civil War, to this level,
that the Peter of the North wants to break the head of the Paul of the South with all his might, because
the Peter of the North hires his labour by the day, and the Paul of the South hires his by the life.
(Macmillan’s Magazine. Ilias Americana in nuce. August, 1863.) Thus, the bubble of Tory sympathy
for the urban workers — by no means for the rural — has burst at last. The sum of all is — slavery!
59
Dr. Richardson, l.c.
60
Children’s Employment Commission. Third Report. London, 1864, pp. iv., v., vi.
61
“Both in Staffordshire and in South Wales young girls and women are employed on the pit banks
and on the coke heaps, not only by day but also by night. This practice has been often noticed in
Reports presented to Parliament, as being attended with great and notorious evils. These females
employed with the men, hardly distinguished from them in their dress, and begrimed with dirt and
smoke, are exposed to the deterioration of character, arising from the loss of self-respect, which can
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hardly fail to follow from their unfeminine occupation.” (l. c., 194, p. xxvi. Cf. Fourth Report (1865),
61, p. xiii.) It is the same in glass-works.
62
A steel manufacturer who employs children in night-labour remarked: “It seems but natural that
boys who work at night cannot sleep and get proper rest by day, but will be running about.” (l.c.,
Fourth Report, 63, p. xiii.) On the importance of sunlight for the maintenance and growth of the body,
a physician writes: “Light also acts upon the tissues of the body directly in hardening them and
supporting their elasticity. The muscles of animals, when they are deprived of a proper amount of
light, become soft and inelastic, the nervous power loses its tone from defective stimulation, and the
elaboration of all growth seems to be perverted.... In the case of children, constant access to plenty of
light during the day, and to the direct rays of the sun for a part of it, is most essential to health. Light
assists in the elaboration of good plastic blood, and hardens the fibre after it has been laid down. It
also acts as a stimulus upon the organs of sight, and by this means brings about more activity in the
various cerebral functions.” Dr. W. Strange, Senior Physician of the Worcester General Hospital, from
whose work on “Health” (1864) this passage is taken, writes in a letter to Mr. White, one of the
commissioners: “I have had opportunities formerly, when in Lancashire, of observing the effects of
nightwork upon children, and I have no hesitation in saying, contrary to what some employers were
fond of asserting, those children who were subjected to it soon suffered in their health.” (l.c., 284., p.
55.) That such a question should furnish the material of serious controversy, shows plainly how
capitalist production acts on the brain-functions of capitalists and their retainers.
63
l.c., 57, p. xii.
64
l.c.. Fourth Report (1865). 58. p. xii.
65
l.c.
66
l.c., p. xiii. The degree of culture of these “labour-powers” must naturally be such as appears in the
following dialogues with one of the commissioners: Jeremiah Haynes, age 12 — “Four times four is 8;
4 fours are 16. A king is him that has all the money and gold. We have a king (told it is a Queen), they
call her the Princess Alexandra. Told that she married the Queen’s son. The Queen’s son is the
Princess Alexandra. A Princess is a man.” William Turner, age 12 — “Don’t live in England. Think it
is a country, but didn’t know before.” John Morris, age 14 — “Have heard say that God made the
world, and that all the people was drownded but one, heard say that one was a little bird.” William
Smith age 15 — “God made man, man made woman.” Edward Taylor, age 15 — “Do not know of
London.” Henry Matthewman, age 17 — “Had been to chapel, but missed a good many times lately.
One name that they preached about was Jesus Christ, but I cannot say any others, and I cannot tell
anything about him. He was not killed, but died like other people. He was not the same as other people
in some ways, because he was religious in some ways and others isn’t.” (l.c., p. xv.) “The devil is a
good person. I don’t know where he lives.” “Christ was a wicked man.” “This girl spelt God as dog,
and did not know the name of the queen.” (“Ch. Employment Comm. V. Report, 1866” p. 55, n. 278.)
The same system obtains in the glass and paper works as in the metallurgical, already cited. In the
paper factories, where the paper is made by machinery, night-work is the rule for all processes, except
rag-sorting. In some cases night-work, by relays, is carried on incessantly through the whole week,
usually from Sunday night until midnight of the following Saturday. Those who are on day-work work
5 days of 12, and 1 day of 18 hours; those on night-work 5 nights of 12, and 1 of 6 hours in each
week. In other cases each set works 24 hours consecutively on alternate days, one set working 6 hours
on Monday, and 18 on Saturday to make up the 24 hours. In other cases an intermediate system
prevails, by which all employed on the paper-making machinery work 15 or 16 hours every day in the
week. This system, says Commissioner Lord, “seems to combine all the evils of both the 12 hours’
and the 24 hours’ relays.” Children under 13, young persons under 18, and women, work under this
night system. Sometimes under the 12 hours’ system they are obliged, on account of the non-
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appearance of those that ought to relieve them, to work a double turn of 24 hours. The evidence
proves that boys and girls very often work overtime, which, not unfrequently, extends to 24 or even 36
hours of uninterrupted toil. In the continuous and unvarying process of glazing are found girls of 12
who work the whole month 14 hours a day, “without any regular relief or cessation beyond 2 or, at
most, 3 breaks of half an hour each for meals.” In some mills, where regular night-work has been
entirely given up, over-work goes on to a terrible extent, “and that often in the dirtiest, and in the
hottest, and in the most monotonous of the various processes.” (“Ch. Employment Comm. Report IV.,
1865,” p. xxxviii, and xxxix.)
67
Fourth Report, &c.. 1865, 79, p. xvi.
68
l.c., 80. p. xvi.
69
l.c., 82. p. xvii.
70
In our reflecting and reasoning age a man is not worth much who cannot give a good reason for
everything, no matter how bad or how crazy. Everything in the world that has been done wrong has
been done wrong for the very best of reasons. (Hegel, l.c., p. 249 )
71
l.c., 85, p. xvii. To similar tender scruples of the glass manufacturers that regular meal-times for the
children are impossible because as a consequence a certain quantity of heat, radiated by the furnaces,
would be “a pure loss” or “wasted,” Commissioner White makes answer. His answer is unlike that of
Ure, Senior, &c., and their puny German plagiarists à la Roscher who are touched by the “abstinence,”
“self-denial,” “saving,” of the capitalists in the expenditure of their gold, and by their TimurTamerlanish prodigality of human life! “A certain amount of heat beyond what is usual at present
might also be going to waste, if meal-times were secured in these cases, but it seems likely not equal
in money-value to the waste of animal power now going on in glass-houses throughout the kingdom
from growing boys not having enough quiet time to eat their meals at ease, with a little rest afterwards
for digestion.” (l.c., p. xiv.) And this in the year of progress 1865! Without considering the
expenditure of strength in lifting and carrying, such a child, in the sheds where bottle and flint glass
are made, walks during the performance of his work 15-20 miles in every 6 hours! And the work often
lasts 14 or 15 hours! In many of these glass works, as in the Moscow spinning mills, the system of 6
hours’ relays is in force. “During the working part of the week six hours is the utmost unbroken period
ever attained at any one time for rest, and out of this has to come the time spent in coming and going
to and from work, washing, dressing, and meals, leaving a very short period indeed for rest, and none
for fresh air and play, unless at the expense of the sleep necessary for young boys, especially at such
hot and fatiguing work.... Even the short sleep is obviously liable to be broken by a boy having to
wake himself if it is night, or by the noise, if it is day.” Mr. White gives cases where a boy worked 36
consecutive hours; others where boys of 12 drudged on until 2 in the morning, and then slept in the
works till 5 a.m. (3 hours!) only to resume their work. “The amount of work,” say Tremenheere and
Tufnell, who drafted the general report, “done by boys, youths, girls, and women, in the course of
their daily or nightly spell of labour, is certainly extraordinary.” (l.c., xliii. and xliv.) Meanwhile, late
by night, self-denying Mr. Glass-Capital, primed with port-wine, reels out of his club homeward
droning out idiotically. “Britons never, never shall be slaves!”
72
In England even now occasionally in rural districts a labourer is condemned to imprisonment for
desecrating the Sabbath, by working in his front garden. The same labourer is punished for breach of
contract if he remains away from his metal, paper, or glass works on the Sunday, even if it be from a
religious whim. The orthodox Parliament will hear nothing of Sabbath-breaking if it occurs in the
process of expanding capital. A memorial (August 1863), in which the London day-labourers in fish
and poultry shops asked for the abolition of Sunday labour, states that their work lasts for the first 6
days of the week on an average 15 hours a-day, and on Sunday 8-10 hours. From this same memorial
we learn also that the delicate gourmands among the aristocratic hypocrites of Exeter Hall, especially
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encourage this “Sunday labour.” These “holy ones,” so zealous in cute curanda [in attending to their
bodily pleasures], show their Christianity by the humility with which they bear the overwork, the
privations, and the hunger of others. Obsequium ventris istis (the labourers) perniciosius est [Gluttony
is more ruinous to their stomachs – paraphrase of Horace].
73
“We have given in our previous reports the statements of several experienced manufacturers to the
effect that over-hours ... certainly tend prematurely to exhaust the working power of the men.” (l.c.,
64. p. xiii.)
74
Cairnes, “The Slave Power,” pp. 110. 111.
75
John Ward: “The Borough of Stoke-upon-Trent,” London, 1843, p. 42.
76
Ferrand’s Speech in the House of Commons, 27th April, 1863.
77
“Those were the very words used by the cotton manufacturers.” l.c.
78
l.c. Mr. Villiers, despite the best of intentions on his part, was “legally” obliged to refuse the
requests of the manufacturers. These gentlemen, however, attained their end through the obliging
nature of the local poor law boards. Mr. A. Redgrave, Inspector of Factories, asserts that this time the
system under which orphans and pauper children were treated “legally” as apprentices “was not
accompanied with the old abuses” (on these “abuses” see Engels, l.c.), although in one case there
certainly was “abuse of this system in respect to a number of girls and young women brought from the
agricultural districts of Scotland into Lancashire and Cheshire.” Under this system the manufacturer
entered into a contract with the workhouse authorities for a certain period. He fed, clothed and lodged
the children, and gave them a small allowance of money. A remark of Mr. Redgrave to be quoted
directly seems strange, especially if we consider that even among the years of prosperity of the
English cotton trade, the year 1860 stands unparalleled, and that, besides, wages were exceptionally
high. For this extraordinary demand for work had to contend with the depopulation of Ireland, with
unexampled emigration from the English and Scotch agricultural districts to Australia and America,
with an actual diminution of the population in some of the English agricultural districts, in
consequence partly of an actual breakdown of the vital force of the labourers, partly of the already
effected dispersion of the disposable population through the dealers in human flesh. Despite all this
Mr. Redgrave says: “This kind of labour, however, would only be sought after when none other could
be procured, for it is a high-priced labour. The ordinary wages of a boy of 13 would be about 4s. per
week, but to lodge, to clothe, to feed, and to provide medical attendance and proper superintendence
for 50 or 100 of these boys, and to set aside some remuneration for them, could not be accomplished
for 4s. a-head per week.” (Report of the Inspector of Factories for 30th April, 1860, p. 27.) Mr.
Redgrave forgets to tell us how the labourer himself can do all this for his children out of their 4s. aweek wages, when the manufacturer cannot do it for the 50 or 100 children lodged, boarded,
superintended all together. To guard against false conclusions from the text, I ought here to remark
that the English cotton industry, since it was placed under the Factory Act of 1850 with its regulations
of labour-time, &c., must be regarded as the model industry of England. The English cotton operative
is in every respect better off than his Continental companion in misery. “The Prussian factory
operative labours at least ten hours per week more than his English competitor, and if employed at his
own loom in his own house, his labour is not restricted to even those additional hours. (“Rep. of Insp.
of Fact.,” 31st October, 1855, p. 103.) Redgrave, the Factory Inspector mentioned above, after the
Industrial Exhibition in 1851, travelled on the Continent, especially in France and Germany, for the
purpose of inquiring into the conditions of the factories. Of the Prussian operative he says: “He
receives a remuneration sufficient to procure the simple fare, and to supply the slender comforts to
which he has been accustomed ... he lives upon his coarse fare, and works hard, wherein his position is
subordinate to that of the English operative.” (“Rep. of Insp. of Fact.” 31st Oct., 1855, p. 85.)
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The over-worked “die off with strange rapidity; but the places of those who perish are instantly
filled, and a frequent change of persons makes no alteration in the scene.” (“England and America.”
London, 1833, vol. I, p. 55. By E. G. Wakefield.)
80
See “Public Health. Sixth Report of the Medical Officer of the Privy Council, 1863.” Published in
London 1864. This report deals especially with the agricultural labourers. “Sutherland ... is commonly
represented as a highly improved county ... but ... recent inquiry has discovered that even there, in
districts once famous for fine men and gallant soldiers, the inhabitants have degenerated into a meagre
and stunted race. In the healthiest situations, on hill sides fronting the sea, the faces of their famished
children are as pale as they could be in the foul atmosphere of a London alley.” (W. Th. Thornton.
“Overpopulation and its Remedy.” l.c., pp. 74, 75.) They resemble in fact the 30,000 “gallant
Highlanders” whom Glasgow pigs together in its wynds and closes, with prostitutes and thieves.
81
“But though the health of a population is so important a fact of the national capital, we are afraid it
must be said that the class of employers of labour have not been the most forward to guard and cherish
this treasure.... The consideration of the health of the operatives was forced upon the mill-owners.”
(Times, November 5th, 1861.) “The men of the West Riding became the clothiers of mankind ... the
health of the workpeople was sacrificed, and the race in a few generations must have degenerated. But
a reaction set in. Lord Shaftesbury’s Bill limited the hours of children’s labour,” &c. (“Report of the
Registrar-General,” for October 1861.)
82
We, therefore, find, e.g., that in the beginning of 1863, 26 firms owning extensive potteries in
Staffordshire, amongst others, Josiah Wedgwood, & Sons, petition in a memorial for “some legislative
enactment.” Competition with other capitalists permits them no voluntary limitation of working-time
for children, &c. “Much as we deplore the evils before mentioned, it would not be possible to prevent
them by any scheme of agreement between the manufacturers. ... Taking all these points into
consideration, we have come to the conviction that some legislative enactment is wanted.”
(“Children’s Employment Comm.” Rep. I, 1863, p. 322.) Most recently a much more striking example
offers. The rise in the price of cotton during a period of feverish activity, had induced the
manufacturers in Blackburn to shorten, by mutual consent, the working-time in their mills during a
certain fixed period. This period terminated about the end of November, 1871. Meanwhile, the
wealthier manufacturers, who combined spinning with weaving, used the diminution of production
resulting from this agreement, to extend their own business and thus to make great profits at the
expense of the small employers. The latter thereupon turned in their extremity to the operatives, urged
them earnestly to agitate for the 9 hours’ system, and promised contributions in money to this end.
83
The labour Statutes, the like of which were enacted at the same time in France, the Netherlands, and
elsewhere, were first formally repealed in England in 1813, long after the changes in methods of
production had rendered them obsolete.
84
“No child under 12 years of age shall be employed in any manufacturing establishment more than
10 hours in one day.” General Statutes of Massachusetts, 63, ch. 12. (The various Statutes were passed
between 1836 and 1858.) “Labour performed during a period of 10 hours on any day in all cotton,
woollen, silk, paper, glass, and flax factories, or in manufactories of iron and brass, shall be
considered a legal day’s labour. And be it enacted, that hereafter no minor engaged in any factory
shall be holden or required to work more than 10 hours in any day,or 60 hours in any week; and that
hereafter no minor shall be admitted as a worker under the age of 10 years in any factory within this
State.” State of New Jersey. An Act to limit the hours of labour, &c., § 1 and 2. (Law of 18th March,
1851.) “No minor who has attained the age of 12 years, and is under the age of 15 years, shall be
employed in any manufacturing establishment more than 11 hours in any one day, nor before 5
o’clock in the morning, nor after 7.30 in the evening.” (“Revised Statutes of the State of Rhode
Island,” &c., ch. 139, § 23, 1st July, 1857.)
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“Sophisms of Free Trade.” 7th Ed. London, 1850, p. 205, 9th Ed., p. 253. This same Tory,
moreover, admits that “Acts of Parliament regulating wages, but against the labourer and in favour of
the master, lasted for the long period of 464 years. Population grew. These laws were then found, and
really became, unnecessary and burdensome.” (l.c., p. 206.)
86
In reference to this statute, J. Wade with truth remarks: “From the statement above (i.e., with regard
to the statute) it appears that in 1496 the diet was considered equivalent to one-third of the income of
an artificer and one-half the income of a labourer, which indicates a greater degree of independence
among the working-classes than prevails at present; for the board, both of labourers and artificers,
would now be reckoned at a much higher proportion of their wages.” (J. Wade, “History of the Middle
and Working Classes,” pp. 24, 25, and 577.) The opinion that this difference is due to the difference in
the price-relations between food and clothing then and now is refuted by the most cursory glance at
“Chronicon Preciosum, &c.” By Bishop Fleetwood. 1st Ed., London, 1707; 2nd Ed., London, 1745.
87
W. Petty. “Political Anatomy of Ireland, Verbum Sapienti,” 1672, Ed. 1691, p. 10.
88
“A Discourse on the necessity of encouraging Mechanick Industry,” London, 1690, p. 13.
Macaulay, who has falsified English history in the interests of the Whigs and the bourgeoisie, declares
as follows: “The practice of setting children prematurely to work ... prevailed in the 17th century to an
extent which, when compared with the extent of the manufacturing system, seems almost incredible.
At Norwich, the chief seat of the clothing trade, a little creature of six years old was thought fit for
labour. Several writers of that time, and among them some who were considered as eminently
benevolent, mention with exultation the fact that in that single city, boys and girls of very tender age
create wealth exceeding what was necessary for their own subsistence by twelve thousand pounds a
year. The more carefully we examine the history of the past, the more reason shall we find to dissent
from those who imagine that our age has been fruitful of new social evils.... That which is new is the
intelligence and the humanity which remedies them.” (“History of England,” vol. 1., p. 417.)
Macaulay might have reported further that “extremely well-disposed” amis du commerce in the 17th
century, narrate with “exultation” how in a poorhouse in Holland a child of four was employed, and
that this example of “vertu mise en pratique” [applied virtue] passes muster in all the humanitarian
works, à la Macaulay, to the time of Adam Smith. It is true that with the substitution of manufacture
for handicrafts, traces of the exploitation of children begin to appear. This exploitation existed always
to a certain extent among peasants, and was the more developed, the heavier the yoke pressing on the
husbandman. The tendency of capital is there unmistakably; but the facts themselves are still as
isolated as the phenomena of two-headed children. Hence they were noted “with exultation” as
especially worthy of remark and as wonders by the far-seeing “amis du commerce,” and recommended
as models for their own time and for posterity. This same Scotch sycophant and fine talker, Macaulay,
says: “We hear to-day only of retrogression and see only progress.” What eyes, and especially what
ears!
89
Among the accusers of the workpeople, the most angry is the anonymous author quoted in the text
of “An Essay on Trade and Commerce, containing Observations on Taxes, &c.,” London, 1770. He
had already dealt with this subject in his earlier work: “Considerations on Taxes.” London, 1765. On
the same side follows Polonius Arthur Young, the unutterable statistical prattler. Among the defenders
of the working-classes the foremost are: Jacob Vanderlint, in: “Money Answers all Things.” London,
1734, the Rev. Nathaniel Forster, D. D., in “An Enquiry into the Causes of the Present High Price of
Provisions,” London, 1767; Dr. Price, and especially Postlethwayt, as well in the supplement to his
“Universal Dictionary of Trade and Commerce,” as in his “Great Britain’s Commercial Interest
explained and improved.” 2nd Edition, 1755. The facts themselves are confirmed by many other
writers of the time, among others by Josiah Tucker.
90
Postlethwayt, l.c., “First Preliminary Discourse,” p. 14.
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“An Essay,” &c. He himself relates on p. 96 wherein the “happiness” of the English agricultural
labourer already in 1770 consisted. “Their powers are always upon the stretch, they cannot live
cheaper than they do, nor work harder.”
92
Protestantism, by changing almost all the traditional holidays into workdays, plays an important part
in the genesis of capital.
93
“An Essay,” 4c., pp. 15, 41, 96, 97, 55, 57, 69. — Jacob Vanderlint, as early as 1734, declared that
the secret of the out-cry of the capitalists as to the laziness of the working people was simply that they
claimed for the same wages 6 days’ labour instead of 4.
94
l.c., p. 242.
95
l.c. “The French,” he says, “laugh at our enthusiastic ideas of liberty.” l.c., p. 78.
96
“They especially objected to work beyond the 12 hours per day, because the law which fixed those
hours, is the only good which remains to them of the legislation of the Republic.” (“Rep. of Insp. of
Fact.”, 31 st October, 1856, p. 80.) The French Twelve Hours’ Bill of September 5th, 1850, a
bourgeois edition of the decree of the Provisional Government of March 2nd, 1848, holds in all
workshops without exceptions. Before this law the working day in France was without definite limit.
It lasted in the factories 14, 15, or more hours. See “Des classes ouvrières en France, pendant l’année
1848. Par M. Blanqui.” M. Blanqui the economist, not the Revolutionist, had been entrusted by the
Government with an inquiry into the condition of the working-class.
97
Belgium is the model bourgeois state in regard to the regulation of the working day. Lord Howard
of Welden, English Plenipotentiary at Brussels, reports to the Foreign Office May 12th, 1862: “M.
Rogier, the minister, informed me that children’s labour is limited neither by a general law nor by any
local regulations; that the Government, during the last three years, intended in every session to
propose a bill on the subject, but always found an insuperable obstacle in the jealous opposition to any
legislation in contradiction with the principle of perfect freedom of labour.”
98
“It is certainly much to be regretted that any class of persons should toil 12 hours a day, which,
including the time for their meals and for going to and returning from their work, amounts, in fact, to
14 of the 24 hours.... Without entering into the question of health, no one will hesitate, I think, to
admit that, in a moral point of view, so entire an absorption of the time of the working-classes, without
intermission, from the early age of 13, and in trades not subject to restriction, much younger, must be
extremely prejudicial, and is an evil greatly to be deplored.... For the sake, therefore, of public morals,
of bringing up an orderly population, and of giving the great body of the people a reasonable
enjoyment of life, it is much to be desired that in all trades some portion of every working day should
be reserved for rest and leisure.” (Leonard Horner in “Reports of Insp. of Fact. for 31st Dec., 1841.”)
99
See “Judgment of Mr. J. H. Otway, Belfast. Hilary Sessions, County Antrim, 1860.”
100
It is very characteristic of the regime of Louis Philippe, the bourgeois king, that the one Factory
Act passed during his reign, that of March 22nd, 1841, was never put in force. And this law only dealt
with child-labour. It fixed 8 hours a day for children between 8 and 12, 12 hours for children between
12 and 16, &c., with many exceptions which allow night-work even for children 8 years old. The
supervision and enforcement of this law are, in a country where every mouse is under police
administration, left to the good-will of the amis du commerce. Only since 1853, in one single
department — the Departement du Nord — has a paid government inspector been appointed. Not less
characteristic of the development of French society, generally, is the fact, that Louis Philippe’s law
stood solitary among the all-embracing mass of French laws, till the Revolution of 1848.
101
“Report of Insp. of Fact.” 30th April, 1860, p. 50.
102
“Rept. of Insp. of Fact.,” 31st October, 1849, p. 6
103
“Rept. of Insp. of Fact.,” 31st October, 1848, p. 98.
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Leonard Horner uses the expression “nefarious practices” in his official reports. (“Report of Insp.
of Fact.,” 31st October, 1859, p. 7.)
105
“Rept.,” &c., 30th Sept., 1844, p. 15.
106
The Act allows children to be employed for 10 hours if they do not work day after day, but only on
alternate days. In the main, this clause remained inoperative.
107
“As a reduction in their hours of work would cause a larger number (of children) to be employed, it
was thought that the additional supply of children from 8 to 9 years of age would meet the increased
demand” (l.c., p. 13 ).
108
Rep. of Insp. of Fact.,” 31st Oct., 1848, p. 16.
109
“I found that men who had been getting 10s. a week, had had 1s. taken off for a reduction in the
rate of 10 per cent, and 1s. 6d. off the remaining 9s. for the reduction in time, together 2s. 6d.. and
notwithstanding this, many of them said they would rather work 10 hours.” l.c.
110
“‘Though I signed it [the petition], I said at the time I was putting my hand to a wrong thing.’
‘Then why did you put your hand to it?’ ‘Because I should have been turned off if I had refused.’
Whence it would appear that this petitioner felt himself ‘oppressed,’ but not exactly by the Factory
Act.” l.c., p. 102.
111
p. 17, l.c. In Mr. Horner’s district 10,270 adult male labourers were thus examined in 181 factories.
Their evidence is to be found in the appendix to the Factory Reports for the half-year ending October
1848. These examinations furnish valuable material in other connexions also.
112
l.c. See the evidence collected by Leonard Horner himself, Nos. 69, 70, 71, 72, 92, 93, and that
collected by Sub-lnspector A., Nos. 51, 52, 58, 59, 62, 70, of the Appendix. One manufacturer, too,
tells the plain truth. See No. 14, and No. 265, l.c.
113
Reports, &c., for 31st October, 1848, pp. 133, 134.
114
Reports, &c., for 30th April, 1848, p. 47.
115
Reports, &c., for 31st October, 1848, p. 130.
116
Reports, &c., l.c., p. 142.
117
Reports &c., for 31st October, 1850, pp. 5, 6.
118
The nature of capital remains the same in its developed as in its undeveloped form. In the code
which the influence of the slave-owners, shortly before the outbreak of the American Civil War,
imposed on the territory of New Mexico, it is said that the labourer, in as much as the capitalist has
bought his labour-power, “is his (the capitalist’s) money.” The same view was current among the
Roman patricians. The money they had advanced to the plebeian debtor had been transformed via the
means of subsistence into the flesh and blood of the debtor. This “flesh and blood” were, therefore,
“their money.” Hence, the Shylock-law of the Ten Tables. Linguet’s hypothesis that the patrician
creditors from time to time prepared, beyond the Tiber, banquets of debtors’ flesh, may remain as
undecided as that of Daumer on the Christian Eucharist.
119
Reports, &c.. for 30th April, 1848, p. 28.
120
Thus, among others, Philanthropist Ashworth to Leonard Horner, in a disgusting Quaker letter.
(Reports, &c., April, 1849, p. 4.)
121
l.c., p. 140.
122
Reports, &c., for 30th April, 1849, pp. 21, 22. Cf like examples ibid., pp. 4, 5.
123
By I. and II. Will. IV., ch. 24, s. 10, known as Sir John Hobhouse’s Factory Act, it was forbidden
to any owner of a cotton-spinning or weaving mill, or the father, son, or brother of such owner, to act
as Justice of the Peace in any inquiries that concerned the Factory Act.
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124

l.c.
Reports, &c., for 30th April, 1849, p. 5.
126
Reports, &c., for 31st October, 1849, p. 6.
127
Reports, &c., for 30th April, 1849, p. 21.
128
Reports, &c., for 31st October, 1848, p. 95.
129
See Reports, &c., for 30th April, 1849, p. 6, and the detailed explanation of the “shifting system,”
by Factory Inspectors Howell and Saunders, in “Reports, &c., for 31st October, 1848.” See also the
petition to the Queen from the clergy of Ashton and vicinity, in the spring of 1849, against the “shift
system.”
130
Cf. for example, “The Factory Question and the Ten Hours’ Bill.”, By R. H. Greg, 1837.
131
F. Engels: “The English Ten Hours’ Bill.” (In the “Neue Rheinische Zeitung. Politischoekonomische Revue.” Edited by K. Marx. April number, 1850, p. 13.) The same “high” Court of
Justice discovered, during the American Civil War, a verbal ambiguity which exactly reversed the
meaning of the law against the arming of pirate ships.
132
Rep., &c., for 30th April, 1850.
133
In winter, from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m. may be substituted.
134
“The present law (of 1850) was a compromise whereby the employed surrendered the benefit of
the Ten Hours’ Act for the advantage of one uniform period for the commencement and termination of
the labour of those whose labour is restricted.” (Reports, &c., for 30th April, 1852, p. 14.)
135
Reports, &c., for Sept., 1844, p. 13.
136
l.c.
137
l.c.
138
“Reports, &c., for 31st Oct., 1846,” p. 20.
139
Reports, &c., for 31st Oct., 1861, p. 26.
140
l.c.,p. 27. On the whole the working population, subject to the Factory Act, has greatly improved
physically. All medical testimony agrees on this point, and personal observation at different times has
convinced me of it. Nevertheless, and exclusive of the terrible death-rate of children in the first years
of their life, the official reports of Dr. Greenhow show the unfavourable health condition of the
manufacturing districts as compared with “agricultural districts of normal health.” As evidence, take
the following table from his 1861 report: —
125

Pecentage of
Adult
Males
Engaged
in
Manufactures

14.9

42.6

37.3

41.9

31.0 14.9

36.6

30.4

—

Death-rate
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Pulmonary
Affections
per 100,000
Males

598

708

547

611

691 588

721

726

305
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Wigan Blackburn Halifax Bradford Maccles- Leek

Stoke- Woolstanton
upon-Trent

field

Eight
healthy
agricultural
districts

Death-rate
from
Pulmonary
Affections
per 100,000
Females

644

734

564

603

804 705

665

727

340
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Females
Engaged
in
Manufactures

18.0

34.9

20.4

30.0

26.0 17.2

19.3

13.9

—

Do. Worsted

Do.

Silk Do. Earthenware

Do.

—

Kind of
Female
Occupation
141

Cotton

It is well known with what reluctance the English “Free-traders” gave up the protective duty on the
silk manufacture. Instead of the protection against French importation, the absence of protection to
English factory children now serves their turn.
142
During 1859 and 1860, the zenith years of the English cotton industry, some manufacturers tried,
by the decoy bait of higher wages for over-time, to reconcile the adult male operatives to an extension
of the working day. The hand-mule spinners and self-actor mincers put an end to the experiment by a
petition to their employers in which they say, “Plainly speaking, our lives are to us a burthen; and,
while we are confined to the mills nearly two days a week more than the other operatives of the
country, we feel like helots in the land, and that we are perpetuating a system injurious to ourselves
and future generations.... This, therefore, is to give you most respectful notice that when we
commence work again after the Christmas and New Year’s holidays, we shall work 60 hours per
week, and no more, or from six to six, with one hour and a half out.” (Reports, &c., for 30th April,
1860, p. 30.)
143
On the means that the wording of this Act afforded for its violation of the Parliamentary Return
“Factories Regulation Act” (6th August, 1859), and in it Leonard Horner’s “Suggestions for amending
the Factory Acts to enable the Inspectors to prevent illegal working, now becoming very prevalent.”
144
Children of the age of 8 years and upwards, have, indeed, been employed from 6 a.m. to 9 p.m.
during the last half year in my district.” (Reports, &c., for 31st October, 1857, p. 39.)
145
“The Printworks’ Act is admitted to be a failure both with reference to its educational and
protective provisions.” (Reports, &c., for 31st October, 1862, p. 52.)
146
Thus, e.g., E. Potter in a letter to the Times of March 24th, 1863. The Times reminded him of the
maoufacturers’ revolt against the Ten Hours’ Bill.
147
Thus, among others, Mr. W. Newmarch, collaborator and editor of Tooke’s “History of Prices.” Is
it a scientific advance to make cowardly concessions to public opinion?
148
The Act passed in 1860, determined that, in regard to dye and bleachworks, the working day
should be fixed on August 1st, 1861, provisionally at 12 hours, and definitely on August 1st, 1862, at
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10 hours, i.e., at 10½ hours for ordinary days, and 7½ for Saturday. Now, when the fatal year, 1862,
came, the old farce was repeated. Besides, the manufacturers petitioned Parliament to allow the
employment of young persons and women for 12 hours during one year longer. “In the existing
condition of the trade (the time of the cotton famine), it was greatly to the advantage of the operatives
to work 12 hours per day, and make wages when they could.” A bill to this effect had been brought in,
“and it was mainly due to the action of the operative bleachers in Scotland that the bill was
abandoned.” (Reports, &c., for 31st October, 1862, pp. 14-15.) Thus defeated by the very workpeople,
in whose name it pretended to speak, Capital discovered, with the help of lawyer spectacles, that the
Act of 1860, drawn up, like all the Acts of Parliament for the “protection of labour,” in equivocal
phrases, gave them a pretext to exclude from its working the calenderers and finishers. English
jurisprudence, ever the faithful servant of capital, sanctioned in the Court of Common Pleas this piece
of pettifogging. “The operatives have been greatly disappointed ... they have complained of overwork, and it is greatly to be regretted that the clear intention of the legislature should have failed by
reason of a faulty definition.” (l.c., p. 18.)
149
The “open-air bleachers” had evaded the law of 1860, by means of the lie that no women worked at
it in the night. The lie was exposed by the Factory Inspectors, and at the same time Parliament was, by
petitions from the operatives, bereft of its notions as to the cool meadow-fragrance, in which
bleaching in the open-air was reported to take place. In this aerial bleaching, drying-rooms were used
at temperatures of from 90° to 100° Fahrenheit, in which the work was done for the most part by girls.
“Cooling” is the technical expression for their occasional escape from the drying-rooms into the fresh
air. “Fifteen girls in stoves. Heat from 80° to 90° for linens, and 100° and upwards for cambrics.
Twelve girls ironing and doing-up in a small room about 10 feet square, in the centre of which is a
close stove. The girls stand round the stove, which throws out a terrific heat, and dries the cambrics
rapidly for the ironers. The hours of work for these hands are unlimited. If busy, they work till 9 or 12
at night for successive nights.” (Reports, &c., for 31st October, 1862, p. 56.) A medical man states:
“No special hours are allowed for cooling, but if the temperature gets too high, or the workers’ hands
get soiled from perspiration, they are allowed to go out for a few minutes.... My experience, which is
considerable, in treating the diseases of stove workers, compels me to express the opinion that their
sanitary condition is by no means so high as that of the operatives in a spinning factory (and Capital,
in its memorials to Parliament, had painted them as floridly healthy after the manner of Rubens.) The
diseases most observable amongst them are phthisis, bronchitis, irregularity of uterine functions,
hysteria in its most aggravated forms, and rheumatism. All of these, I believe, are either directly or
indirectly induced by the impure, overheated air of the apartments in which the hands are employed
and the want of sufficient comfortable clothing to protect them from the cold, damp atmosphere, in
winter, when going to their homes.” (l.c., pp. 56-57.) The Factory Inspectors remarked on the
supplementary law of 1860, torn from these open-air bleachers: “The Act has not only failed to afford
that protection to the workers which it appears to offer, but contains a clause ... apparently so worded
that, unless persons are detected working after 8 o’clock at night they appear to come under no
protective provisions at all, and if they do so work the mode of proof is so doubtful that a conviction
can scarcely follow.” (l.c., p. 52.) “To all intents and purposes, therefore, as an Act for any benevolent
or educational purpose, it is a failure; since it can scarcely be called benevolent to permit, which is
tantamount to compelling, women and children to work 14 hours a day with or without meals, as the
case may be, and perhaps for longer hours than these, without limit as to age, without reference to sex,
and without regard to the social habits of the families of the neighbourhood, in which such works
(bleaching and dyeing) are situated.” (Reports, &c., for 30th April, 1863, p. 40.)
150
Note to the 2nd Ed. Since 1866, when I wrote the above passages, a reaction has again set in.
151
“The conduct of each of these classes (capitalists and workmen) has been the result of the relative
situation in which they have been placed.” (Reports, &c., for 31st October, 1848, p. 113.)
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“The employments, placed under restriction, were connected with the manufacture of textile fabrics
by the aid of steam or water-power. There were two conditions to which an employment must be
subject to cause it to be inspected, viz., the use of steam or waterpower, and the manufacture of certain
specified fibre.” (Reports, &c., for 31st October, 1864, p. 8.)
153
On the condition of so-called domestic industries, specially valuable materials are to be found in
the latest reports of the Children’s Employment Commission.
154
“The Acts of last Session (1864) ... embrace a diversity of occupations, the customs in which differ
greatly, and the use of mechanical power to give motion to machinery is no longer one of the elements
necessary, as formerly, to constitute, in legal phrase, a ‘Factory.’” (Reports, &c., for 31st Octaber,
1864, p. 8.)
155
Belgium, the paradise of Continental Liberalism, shows no trace of this movement. Even in the
coal and metal mines labourers of both sexes, and all ages, are consumed, in perfect “freedom” at any
period and through any length of time. Of every 1,000 persons employed there, 733 are men, 88
women, 135 boys, and 44 girls under 16; in the blast furnaces, &c., of every 1,000, 668 are men, 149
women, 98 boys, and 85 girls under 16. Add to this the low wages for the enormous exploitation of
mature and immature labour-power. The average daily pay for a man is 2s. 8d., for a woman, 1s. 8d.,
for a boy, 1s. 2½d. As a result, Belgium had in 1863, as compared with 1850, nearly doubled both the
amount and the value of its exports of coal, iron, &c.
156
Robert Owen, soon after 1810, not only maintained the necessity of a limitation of the working day
in theory, but actually introduced the 10 hours’ day into his factory at New Lanark. This was laughed
at as a communistic Utopia; so were his “Combination of children’s education with productive labour
and the Co-operative Societies of Workingmen”, first called into being by him. To-day, the first
Utopia is a Factory Act, the second figures as an official phrase in all Factory Acts, the third is already
being used as a cloak for reactionary humbug.
157
Ure: “French translation, Philosophie des Manufactures.” Paris, 1836, Vol. II, pp. 39, 40, 67, 77,
&c.
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In the Compte Rendu of the International Statistical Congress at Paris, 1855, it is stated: “The
French law, which limits the length of daily labour in factories and workshops to 12 hours, does not
confine this work to definite fixed hours. For children’s labour only the work-time is prescribed as
between 5 a.m. and 9 p.m. Therefore, some of the masters use the right which this fatal silence gives
them to keep their works going, without intermission, day in, day out, possibly with the exception of
Sunday. For this purpose they use two different sets of workers, of whom neither is in the workshop
more than 12 hours at a time, but the work of the establishment lasts day and night. The law is
satisfied, but is humanity?” Besides “the destructive influence of night-labour on the human
organism,” stress is also laid upon “the fatal influence of the association of the two sexes by night in
the same badly-lighted workshops.”
159
“For instance, there is within my district one occupier who, within the same curtilage, is at the
same time a bleacher and dyer under the Bleaching and Dyeing Works Act, a printer under the Print
Works Act, and a finisher under the Factory Act.” (Report of Mr. Baker, in Reports, lic., for October
31st, 1861, p. 20.) After enumerating the different provisions of these Acts, and the complications
arising from them, Mr. Baker says: “It will hence appear that it must be very difficult to secure the
execution of these three Acts of Parliament where the occupier chooses to evade the law.” But what is
assured to the lawyers by this is law-suits.
160
Thus the Factory Inspectors at last venture to say: “These objections (of capital to the legal
limitation of the working day) must succumb before the broad principle of the rights of labour....
There is a time when the master’s right in his workman’s labour ceases, and his time becomes his
own, even if there were no exhaustion in the question.” (Reports, &c., for 31 st Oct., 1862, p. 54.)
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“We, the workers of Dunkirk, declare that the length of time of labour required under the present
system is too great, and that, far from leaving the worker time for rest and education, it plunges him
into a condition of servitude but little better than slavery. That is why we decide that 8 hours are
enough for a working day, and ought to be legally recognised as enough; why we call to our help that
powerful lever, the press; ... and why we shall consider all those that refuse us this help as enemies of
the reform of labour and of the rights of the labourer.” (Resolution of the Working Men of Dunkirk,
New York State, 1866.)
162
Reports, &c., for Oct., 1848, p. 112.
163
“The proceedings (the manoeuvres of capital, e.g., from 1848-50) have afforded, moreover,
incontrovertible proof of the fallacy of the assertion so often advanced, that operatives need no
protection, but may be considered as free agents in the disposal of the only property which they
possess — the labour of their hands and the sweat of their brows.” (Reports, &c., for April 30th, 1850,
p. 45.) “Free labour (if so it may be termed) even in a free country, requires the strong arm of the law
to protect it.” (Reports, &c., for October 31st, 1864, p. 34.) “To permit, which is tantamount to
compelling ... to work 14 hours a day with or without meals,” &c. (Repts., &c., for April 30th, 1863,
p. 40.)
164
Friedrich Engels, l.c., p. 5.
165
The 10 Hours’ Act has, in the branches of industry that come under it, “put an end to the premature
decrepitude of the former long-hour workers.” (Reports, &c., for 31st Oct., 1859, p. 47.) “Capital (in
factories) can never be employed in keeping the machinery in motion beyond a limited time, without
certain injury to the health and morals of the labourers employed; and they are not in a position to
protect themselves.” (l.c., p. 8)
166
“A still greater boon is the distinction at last made clear between the worker’s own time and his
master’s. The worker knows now when that which he sells is ended, and when his own begins; and by
possessing a sure foreknowledge of this, is enabled to prearrange his own minutes for his own
purposes.” (l.c., p. 52.) “By making them masters of their own time (the Factory Acts) have given
them a moral energy which is directing them to the eventual possession of political power” (l.c., p.
47). With suppressed irony, and in very well weighed words, the Factory Inspectors hint that the
actual law also frees the capitalist from some of the brutality natural to a man who is a mere
embodiment of capital, and that it has given him time for a little “culture.” “Formerly the master had
no time for anything but money; the servant had no time for anything but labour” (l.c., p. 48).

Chapter 11: Rate and Mass of Surplus-Value
In this chapter, as hitherto, the value of labour-power, and therefore the part of the working day
necessary for the reproduction or maintenance of that labour-power, are supposed to be given,
constant magnitudes.
This premised, with the rate, the mass is at the same time given of the surplus-value that the
individual labourer furnishes to the capitalist in a definite period of time. If, e.g., the necessary
labour amounts to 6 hours daily, expressed in a quantum of gold = 3 shillings, then 3s. is the daily
value of one labour-power or the value of the capital advanced in the buying of one labour-power.
If, further, the rate of surplus-value be = 100%, this variable capital of 3s. produces a mass of
surplus-value of 3s., or the labourer supplies daily a mass of surplus labour equal to 6 hours.
But the variable capital of a capitalist is the expression in money of the total value of all the
labour-powers that he employs simultaneously. Its value is, therefore, equal to the average value
of one labour-power, multiplied by the number of labour-powers employed. With a given value of
labour-power, therefore, the magnitude of the variable capital varies directly as the number of
labourers employed simultaneously. If the daily value of one labour-power = 3s., then a capital of
300s. must be advanced in order to exploit daily 100 labour-powers, of n times 3s., in order to
exploit daily n labour-powers.
In the same way, if a variable capital of 3s., being the daily value of one labour-power, produce a
daily surplus-value of 3s., a variable capital of 300s. will produce a daily surplus-value of 300s.,
and one of n times 3s. a daily surplus-value of n × 3s. The mass of the surplus-value produced is
therefore equal to the surplus-value which the working day of one labourer supplies multiplied by
the number of labourers employed. But as further the mass of surplus-value which a single
labourer produces, the value of labour-power being given, is determined by the rate of the
surplus-value, this law follows: the mass of the surplus-value produced is equal to the amount of
the variable capital advanced, multiplied by the rate of surplus-value, in other words: it is
determined by the compound ratio between the number of labour-powers exploited
simultaneously by the same capitalist and the degree of exploitation of each individual labourpower.
Let the mass of the surplus-value be S, the surplus-value supplied by the individual labourer in
the average day s the variable capital daily advanced in the purchase of one individual labourpower v, the sum total of the variable capital V, the value of an average labour-power P, its
degree of exploitation (a'/a) (surplus labour/necessary-labour) and the number of labourers
employed n; we would have:

S=

{

(s/v) × V
P × (a'/a) × n

It is always supposed, not only that the value of an average labour-power is constant, but that the
labourers employed by a capitalist are reduced to average labourers. There are exceptional cases
in which the surplus-value produced does not increase in proportion to the number of labourers
exploited, but then the value of the labour-power does not remain constant.
In the production of a definite mass of surplus-value, therefore the decrease of one factor may be
compensated by the increase of the other. If the variable capital diminishes, and at the same time
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the rate of surplus-value increases in the same ratio, the mass of surplus-value produced remains
unaltered. If on our earlier assumption the capitalist must advance 300s., in order to exploit 100
labourers a day, and if the rate of surplus-value amounts to 50%, this variable capital of 300s.
yields a surplus-value of 150s. or of 100 × 3 working hours. If the rate of surplus-value doubles,
or the working day, instead of being extended from 6 to 9, is extended from 6 to 12 hours and at
the same time variable capital is lessened by half, and reduced to 150s., it yields also a surplusvalue of 150s. or 50 × 6 working hours. Diminution of the variable capital may therefore be
compensated by a proportionate rise in the degree of exploitation of labour-power, or the decrease
in the number of the labourers employed by a proportionate extension of the working day. Within
certain limits therefore the supply of labour exploitable by capital is independent of the supply of
labourers. 1 On the contrary, a fall in the rate of surplus-value leaves unaltered the mass of the
surplus-value produced, if the amount of the variable capital, or number of the labourers
employed, increases in the same proportion.
Nevertheless, the compensation of a decrease in the number of labourers employed, or of the
amount of variable capital advanced by a rise in the rate of surplus-value, or by the lengthening of
the working day, has impassable limits. Whatever the value of labour-power may be, whether the
working time necessary for the maintenance of the labourer is 2 or 10 hours, the total value that a
labourer can produce, day in, day out, is always less than the value in which 24 hours of labour
are embodied, less than 12s., if 12s. is the money expression for 24 hours of realised labour. In
our former assumption, according to which 6 working hours are daily necessary in order to
reproduce the labour-power itself or to replace the value of the capital advanced in its purchase, a
variable capital of 1,500s., that employs 500 labourers at a rate of surplus-value of 100% with a
12 hours’ working day, produces daily a surplus-value of 1,500s. or of 6 × 500 working hours. A
capital of 300s. that employs 100 labourers a day with a rate of surplus-value of 200% or with a
working day of 18 hours, produces only a mass of surplus-value of 600s. or 12 × 100 working
hours; and its total value-product, the equivalent of the variable capital advanced plus the surplusvalue, can, day in, day out, never reach the sum of 1,200s. or 24 × 100 working hours. The
absolute limit of the average working day – this being by nature always less than 24 hours – sets
an absolute limit to the compensation of a reduction of variable capital by a higher rate of
surplus-value, or of the decrease of the number of labourers exploited by a higher degree of
exploitation of labour-power. This palpable law is of importance for the clearing up of many
phenomena, arising from a tendency (to be worked out later on) of capital to reduce as much as
possible the number of labourers employed by it, or its variable constituent transformed into
labour-power, in contradiction to its other tendency to produce the greatest possible mass of
surplus-value. On the other hand, if the mass of labour-power employed, or the amount of
variable capital, increases, but not in proportion to the fall in the rate of surplus-value, the mass of
the surplus-value produced, falls.
A third law results from the determination, of the mass of the surplus-value produced, by the two
factors: rate of surplus-value and amount of variable capital advanced. The rate of surplus-value,
or the degree of exploitation of labour-power, and the value of labour-power, or the amount of
necessary working time being given, it is self evident that the greater the variable capital, the
greater would be the mass of the value produced and of the surplus-value. If the limit of the
working day is given, and also the limit of its necessary constituent, the mass of value and
surplus-value that an individual capitalist produces, is clearly exclusively dependent on the mass
of labour that he sets in motion. But this, under the conditions supposed above, depends on the
mass of labour-power, or the number of labourers whom he exploits, and this number in its turn is
determined by the amount of the variable capital advanced. With a given rate of surplus-value,
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and a given value of labour-power, therefore, the masses of surplus-value produced vary directly
as the amounts of the variable capitals advanced. Now we know that the capitalist divides his
capital into two parts. One part he lays out in means of production. This is the constant part of his
capital. The other part he lays out in living labour-power. This part forms his variable capital. On
the basis of the same mode of social production, the division of capital into constant and variable
differs in different branches of production, and within the same branch of production, too, this
relation changes with changes in the technical conditions and in the social combinations of the
processes of production. But in whatever proportion a given capital breaks up into a constant and
a variable part, whether the latter is to the former as 1:2 or 1:10 or 1:x, the law just laid down is
not affected by this. For, according to our previous analysis, the value of the constant capital
reappears in the value of the product, but does not enter into the newly produced value, the newly
created value product. To employ 1,000 spinners, more raw material, spindles, &c., are, of
course, required, than to employ 100. The value of these additional means of production however
may rise, fall, remain unaltered, be large or small; it has no influence on the process of creation of
surplus-value by means of the labour-powers that put them in motion. The law demonstrated
above now, therefore, takes this form: the masses of value and of surplus-value produced by
different capitals – the value of labour-power being given and its degree of exploitation being
equal – vary directly as the amounts of the variable constituents of these capitals, i.e., as their
constituents transformed into living labour-power.
This law clearly contradicts all experience based on appearance. Everyone knows that a cotton
spinner, who, reckoning the percentage on the whole of his applied capital, employs much
constant and little variable capital, does not, on account of this, pocket less profit or surplus-value
than a baker, who relatively sets in motion much variable and little constant capital. For the
solution of this apparent contradiction, many intermediate terms are as yet wanted, as from the
standpoint of elementary algebra many intermediate terms are wanted to understand that 0/0 may
represent an actual magnitude. Classical economy, although not formulating the law, holds
instinctively to it, because it is a necessary consequence of the general law of value. It tries to
rescue the law from collision with contradictory phenomena by a violent abstraction. It will be
seen later 2 how the school of Ricardo has come to grief over this stumbling block. Vulgar
economy which, indeed, “has really learnt nothing,” here as everywhere sticks to appearances in
opposition to the law which regulates and explains them. In opposition to Spinoza, it believes that
“ignorance is a sufficient reason.”
The labour which is set in motion by the total capital of a society, day in, day out, may be
regarded as a single collective working day. If, e.g., the number of labourers is a million, and the
average working day of a labourer is 10 hours, the social working day consists of ten million
hours. With a given length of this working day, whether its limits are fixed physically or socially,
the mass of surplus-value can only be increased by increasing the number of labourers, i.e., of the
labouring population. The growth of population here forms the mathematical limit to the
production of surplus-value by the total social capital. On the contrary, with a given amount of
population, this limit is formed by the possible lengthening of the workingday. 3 It will, however,
be seen in the following chapter that this law only holds for the form of surplus-value dealt with
up to the present.
From the treatment of the production of surplus-value, so far, it follows that not every sum of
money, or of value, is at pleasure transformable into capital. To effect this transformation, in fact,
a certain minimum of money or of exchange-value must be presupposed in the hands of the
individual possessor of money or commodities. The minimum of variable capital is the cost price
of a single labour-power, employed the whole year through, day in, day out, for the production of

216

Chapter 11

surplus-value. If this labourer were in possession of his own means of production, and were
satisfied to live as a labourer, he need not work beyond the time necessary for the reproduction of
his means of subsistence, say 8 hours a day. He would, besides, only require the means of
production sufficient for 8 working hours. The capitalist, on the other hand, who makes him do,
besides these 8 hours, say 4 hours’ surplus labour, requires an additional sum of money for
furnishing the additional means of production. On our supposition, however, he would have to
employ two labourers in order to live, on the surplus-value appropriated daily, as well as, and no
better than a labourer, i.e., to be able to satisfy his necessary wants. In this case the mere
maintenance of life would be the end of his production, not the increase of wealth; but this latter
is implied in capitalist production. That he may live only twice as well as an ordinary labourer,
and besides turn half of the surplus-value produced into capital, he would have to raise, with the
number of labourers, the minimum of the capital advanced 8 times. Of course he can, like his
labourer, take to work himself, participate directly in the process of production, but he is then
only a hybrid between capitalist and labourer, a “small master.” A certain stage of capitalist
production necessitates that the capitalist be able to devote the whole of the time during which he
functions as a capitalist, i.e., as personified capital, to the appropriation and therefore control of
the labour of others, and to the selling of the products of this labour. 4 The guilds of the middle
ages therefore tried to prevent by force the transformation of the master of a trade into a capitalist,
by limiting the number of labourers that could be employed by one master within a very small
maximum. The possessor of money or commodities actually turns into a capitalist in such cases
only where the minimum sum advanced for production greatly exceeds the maximum of the
middle ages. Here, as in natural science, is shown the correctness of the law discovered by Hegel
(in his “Logic”), that merely quantitative differences beyond a certain point pass into qualitative
changes. 5
The minimum of the sum of value that the individual possessor of money or commodities must
command, in order to metamorphose himself into a capitalist, changes with the different stages of
development of capitalist production, and is at given stages different in different spheres of
production, according to their special and technical conditions. Certain spheres of production
demand, even at the very outset of capitalist production, a minimum of capital that is not as yet
found in the hands of single individuals. This gives rise partly to state subsidies to private
persons, as in France in the time of Clobber, and as in many German states up to our own epoch,
partly to the formation of societies with legal monopoly for the exploitation of certain branches of
industry and commerce, the forerunners of our modern joint stock companies.6
Within the process of production, as we have seen, capital acquired the command over labour,
i.e., over functioning labour-power or the labourer himself. Personified capital, the capitalist takes
care that the labourer does his work regularly and with the proper degree of intensity.
Capital further developed into a coercive relation, which compels the working class to do more
work than the narrow round of its own life-wants prescribes. As a producer of the activity of
others, as a pumper-out of surplus labour and exploiter of labour-power, it surpasses in energy,
disregard of bounds, recklessness and efficiency, all earlier systems of production based on
directly compulsory labour.
At first, capital subordinates labour on the basis of the technical conditions in which it historically
finds it. It does not, therefore, change immediately the mode of production. The production of
surplus-value – in the form hitherto considered by us – by means of simple extension of the
working day, proved, therefore, to be independent of any change in the mode of production itself.
It was not less active in the old-fashioned bakeries than in the modern cotton factories.
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If we consider the process of production from the point of view of the simple labour process, the
labourer stands in relation to the means of production, not in their quality as capital, but as the
mere means and material of his own intelligent productive activity. In tanning, e.g., he deals with
the skins as his simple object of labour. It is not the capitalist whose skin he tans. But it is
different as soon as we deal with the process of production from the point of view of the process
of creation of surplus-value. The means of production are at once changed into means for the
absorption of the labour of others. It is now no longer the labourer that employs the means of
production, but the means of production that employ the labourer. Instead of being consumed by
him as material elements of his productive activity, they consume him as the ferment necessary to
their own life-process, and the life-process of capital consists only in its movement as value
constantly expanding, constantly multiplying itself. Furnaces and workshops that stand idle by
night, and absorb no living labour, are “a mere loss” to the capitalist. Hence, furnaces and
workshops constitute lawful claims upon the night-labour of the work-people. The simple
transformation of money into the material factors of the process of production, into means of
production, transforms the latter into a title and a right to the labour and surplus labour of others.
An example will show, in conclusion, how this sophistication, peculiar to and characteristic of
capitalist production, this complete inversion of the relation between dead and living labour,
between value and the force that creates value, mirrors itself in the consciousness of capitalists.
During the revolt of the English factory lords between 1848 and 1850, “the head of one of the
oldest and most respectable houses in the West of Scotland, Messrs. Carlile Sons & Co., of the
linen and cotton thread factory at Paisley, a company which has now existed for about a century,
which was in operation in 1752, and four generations of the same family have conducted it” ...
this “very intelligent gentleman” then wrote a letter 7 in the Glasgow Daily Mail of April 25th,
1849, with the title, “The relay system,” in which among other things the following grotesquely
naïve passage occurs: “Let us now ... see what evils will attend the limiting to 10 hours the
working of the factory.... They amount to the most serious damage to the millowner’s prospects
and property. If he (i.e., his “hands”) worked 12 hours before, and is limited to 10, then every 12
machines or spindles in his establishment shrink to 10, and should the works be disposed of, they
will be valued only as 10, so that a sixth part would thus be deducted from the value of every
factory in the country.” 8
To this West of Scotland bourgeois brain, inheriting the accumulated capitalistic qualities of
“four generations,” the value of the means of production, spindles, &c., is so inseparably mixed
up with their property, as capital, to expand their own value, and to swallow up daily a definite
quantity of the unpaid labour of others, that the head of the firm of Carlile & Co. actually
imagines that if he sells his factory, not only will the value of the spindles be paid to him, but, in
addition, their power of annexing surplus-value, not only the labour which is embodied in them,
and is necessary to the production of spindles of this kind, but also the surplus labour which they
help to pump out daily from the brave Scots of Paisley, and for that very reason he thinks that
with the shortening of the working day by 2 hours, the selling-price of 12 spinning machines
dwindles to that of 10!
1

This elementary law appears to be unknown to the vulgar economists, who, upside-down
Archimedes, in the determination of the market-price of labour by supply and demand, imagine they
have found the fulcrum by means of which, not to move the world, but to stop its motion.
2
Further particulars will be given in Book IV.
3
“The Labour, that is the economic time, of society, is a given portion, say ten hours a day of a
million of people, or ten million hours.... Capital has its boundary of increase. This boundary may, at
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any given period, be attained in the actual extent of economic time employed.” (“An Essay on the
Political Economy of Nations.” London, 1821, pp. 47, 49.)
4
“The farmer cannot rely on his own labour, and if he does, I will maintain that he is a loser by it. His
employment should be a general attention to the whole: his thresher must be watched, or he will soon
lose his wages in corn not threshed out, his mowers, reapers, &c., must be looked after; he must
constantly go round his fences; he must see there is no neglect; which would be the case if he was
confined to any one spot.” (“An Inquiry into the Connexion between the Present Price of Provisions
and the Size of Farms, &c. By a Farmer.” London, 1773, p. 12.) This book is very interesting. In it the
genesis of the “capitalist farmer” or “merchant farmer,” as he is explicitly called, may be studied, and
his self-glorification at the expense of the small farmer who has only to do with bare subsistence, be
noted. “The class of capitalists are from the first partially, and they become ultimately completely,
discharged from the necessity of the manual labour.” (“Textbook of Lectures on the Political
Economy of Nations. By the Rev. Richard Jones.” Hertford 1852. Lecture III., p. 39.)
5
The molecular theory of modern chemistry first scientifically worked out by Laurent and Gerhardt
rests on no other law. (Addition to 3rd Edition.) For the explanation of this statement, which is not
very clear to non-chemists, we remark that the author speaks here of the homologous series of carbon
compounds, first so named by C. Gerhardt in 1843, each series of which has its own general algebraic
formula. Thus the series of paraffins: CnH2n+2, that of the normal alcohols: CnH2n+2O; of the normal
fatty acids: CnH2nO2 and many others. In the above examples, by the simply quantitative addition of
CH2 to the molecular formula, a qualitatively different body is each time formed. On the share
(overestimated by Marx) of Laurent and Gerhardt in the determination of this important fact see Kopp,
“Entwicklung der Chemie.” Munchen, 1873, pp. 709, 716, and Schorkmmer, “The Rise and
Development of Organic Chemistry.” London, 1879, p. 54. — F. E.. See Letter from Marx to Engels,
22 June 1867
For Hegel’s formulation of the idea in the Logic, see Remark: Examples of Such Nodal Lines; the
Maxim, ‘Nature Does Not Make Leaps’.
6
Martin Luther calls these kinds of institutions: “The Company Monopolia.”
7
Reports of Insp. of Fact., April 30th, 1849, p. 59.
8
l.c., p. 60. Factory Inspector Stuart, himself a Scotchman, and in contrast to the English Factory
Inspectors, quite taken captive by the capitalistic method of thinking, remarks expressly on this letter
which he incorporates in his report that it is “the most useful of the communications which any of the
factory-owners working with relays have given to those engaged in the same trade, and which is the
most calculated to remove the prejudices of such of them as have scruples respecting any change of
the arrangement of the hours of work.”

Part 4: Production of Relative
Surplus-Value
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Chapter 12: The Concept of Relative SurplusValue
That portion of the working day which merely produces an equivalent for the value paid by the
capitalist for his labour-power, has, up to this point, been treated by us as a constant magnitude,
and such in fact it is, under given conditions of production and at a given stage in the economic
development of society. Beyond this, his necessary labour-time, the labourer, we saw, could
continue to work for 2, 3, 4, 6, &c., hours. The rate of surplus-value and the length of the working
day depended on the magnitude of this prolongation. Though the necessary labour-time was
constant, we saw, on the other hand, that the total working day was variable. Now suppose we
have a working day whose length, and whose apportionment between necessary labour and
surplus labour, are given. Let the whole line a c, a–b–c represent, for example, a working day of
12 hours; the portion of a b 10 hours of necessary labour, and the portion b c 2 hours of surplus
labour. How now can the production of surplus-value be increased, i.e., how can the surplus
labour be prolonged, without, or independently of, any prolongation of a c?
Although the length of a c is given, b c appears to be capable of prolongation, if not by extension
beyond its end c, which is also the end of the working day a c, yet, at all events, by pushing back
its starting-point b in the direction of a. Assume that b'–b in the line ab'bc is equal to half of b c
a–––b'–b––c
or to one hour’s labour-time. If now, in a c, the working day of 12 hours, we move the point b to
b', b c becomes b' c; the surplus labour increases by one half, from 2 hours to 3 hours, although
the working day remains as before at 12 hours. This extension of the surplus labour-time from b c
to b' c, from 2 hours to 3 hours, is, however, evidently impossible, without a simultaneous
contraction of the necessary labour-time from a b into a b', from 10 hours to 9 hours. The
prolongation of the surplus labour would correspond to a shortening of the necessary labour; or a
portion of the labour-time previously consumed, in reality, for the labourer’s own benefit, would
be converted into labour-time for the benefit of the capitalist. There would be an alteration, not in
the length of the working day, but in its division into necessary labour-time and surplus labourtime.
On the other hand, it is evident that the duration of the surplus labour is given, when the length of
the working day, and the value of labour-power, are given. The value of labour-power, i.e., the
labour-time requisite to produce labour-power, determines the labour-time necessary for the
reproduction of that value. If one working-hour be embodied in sixpence, and the value of a day’s
labour-power be five shillings, the labourer must work 10 hours a day, in order to replace the
value paid by capital for his labour-power, or to produce an equivalent for the value of his daily
necessary means of subsistence. Given the value of these means of subsistence, the value of his
labour-power is given; 1 and given the value of his labour-power, the duration of his necessary
labour-time is given. The duration of the surplus labour, however, is arrived at, by subtracting the
necessary labour-time from the total working day. Ten hours subtracted from twelve, leave two,
and it is not easy to see, how, under the given conditions, the surplus labour can possibly be
prolonged beyond two hours. No doubt, the capitalist can, instead of five shillings, pay the
labourer four shillings and sixpence or even less. For the reproduction of this value of four
shillings and sixpence, nine hours’ labour-time would suffice; and consequently three hours of
surplus labour, instead of two, would accrue to the capitalist, and the surplus-value would rise
from one shilling to eighteen-pence. This result, however, would be obtained only by lowering
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the wages of the labourer below the value of his labour-power. With the four shillings and
sixpence which he produces in nine hours, he commands one-tenth less of the necessaries of life
than before, and consequently the proper reproduction of his labour-power is crippled. The
surplus labour would in this case be prolonged only by an overstepping of its normal limits; its
domain would be extended only by a usurpation of part of the domain of necessary labour-time.
Despite the important part which this method plays in actual practice, we are excluded from
considering it in this place, by our assumption, that all commodities, including labour-power, are
bought and sold at their full value. Granted this, it follows that the labour-time necessary for the
production of labour-power, or for the reproduction of its value, cannot be lessened by a fall in
the labourer’s wages below the value of his labour-power, but only by a fall in this value itself.
Given the length of the working day, the prolongation of the surplus labour must of necessity
originate in the curtailment of the necessary labour-time; the latter cannot arise from the former.
In the example we have taken, it is necessary that the value of labour-power should actually fall
by one-tenth, in order that the necessary labour-time may be diminished by one-tenth, i.e., from
ten hours to nine, and in order that the surplus labour may consequently be prolonged from two
hours to three.
Such a fall in the value of labour-power implies, however, that the same necessaries of life which
were formerly produced in ten hours, can now be produced in nine hours. But this is impossible
without an increase in the productiveness of labour. For example, suppose a shoe-maker, with
given tools, makes in one working day of twelve hours, one pair of boots. If he must make two
pairs in the same time, the productiveness of his labour must be doubled; and this cannot be done,
except by an alteration in his tools or in his mode of working, or in both. Hence, the conditions of
production, i.e., his mode of production, and the labour-process itself, must be revolutionised. By
increase in the productiveness of labour, we mean, generally, an alteration in the labour-process,
of such a kind as to shorten the labour-time socially necessary for the production of a commodity,
and to endow a given quantity of labour with the power of producing a greater quantity of usevalue. 2 Hitherto in treating of surplus-value, arising from a simple prolongation of the working
day, we have assumed the mode of production to be given and invariable. But when surplus-value
has to be produced by the conversion of necessary labour into surplus labour, it by no means
suffices for capital to take over the labour-process in the form under which it has been historically
handed down, and then simply to prolong the duration of that process. The technical and social
conditions of the process, and consequently the very mode of production must be revolutionised,
before the productiveness of labour can be increased. By that means alone can the value of
labour-power be made to sink, and the portion of the working day necessary for the reproduction
of that value, be shortened.
The surplus-value produced by prolongation of the working day, I call absolute surplus-value. On
the other hand, the surplus-value arising from the curtailment of the necessary labour-time, and
from the corresponding alteration in the respective lengths of the two components of the working
day, I call relative surplus-value.
In order to effect a fall in the value of labour-power, the increase in the productiveness of labour
must seize upon those branches of industry whose products determine the value of labour-power,
and consequently either belong to the class of customary means of subsistence, or are capable of
supplying the place of those means. But the value of a commodity is determined, not only by the
quantity of labour which the labourer directly bestows upon that commodity, but also by the
labour contained in the means of production. For instance, the value of a pair of boots depends
not only on the cobbler’s labour, but also on the value of the leather, wax, thread, &c. Hence, a
fall in the value of labour-power is also brought about by an increase in the productiveness of

222

Chapter 12

labour, and by a corresponding cheapening of commodities in those industries which supply the
instruments of labour and the raw material, that form the material elements of the constant capital
required for producing the necessaries of life. But an increase in the productiveness of labour in
those branches of industry which supply neither the necessaries of life, nor the means of
production for such necessaries, leaves the value of labour-power undisturbed.
The cheapened commodity, of course, causes only a pro tanto fall in the value of labour-power, a
fall proportional to the extent of that commodity’s employment in the reproduction of labourpower. Shirts, for instance, are a necessary means of subsistence, but are only one out of many.
The totality of the necessaries of life consists, however, of various commodities, each the product
of a distinct industry; and the value of each of those commodities enters as a component part into
the value of labour-power. This latter value decreases with the decrease of the labour-time
necessary for its reproduction; the total decrease being the sum of all the different curtailments of
labour-time effected in those various and distinct industries. This general result is treated, here, as
if it were the immediate result directly aimed at in each individual case. Whenever an individual
capitalist cheapens shirts, for instance, by increasing the productiveness of labour he by no means
necessarily aims at reducing the value of labour-power and shortening, pro tanto the necessary
labour-time. But it is only in so far as he ultimately contributes to this result, that he assists in
raising the general rate of surplus-value. 3 The general and necessary tendencies of capital must be
distinguished from their forms of manifestation.
It is not our intention to consider, here, the way in which the laws, immanent in capitalist
production, manifest themselves in the movements of individual masses of capital, where they
assert themselves as coercive laws of competition, and are brought home to the mind and
consciousness of the individual capitalist as the directing motives of his operations. But this much
is clear; a scientific analysis of competition is not possible, before we have a conception of the
inner nature of capital, just as the apparent motions of the heavenly bodies are not intelligible to
any but him, who is acquainted with their real motions, motions which are not directly perceptible
by the senses. Nevertheless, for the better comprehension of the production of relative surplusvalue, we may add the following remarks, in which we assume nothing more than the results we
have already obtained.
If one hour’s labour is embodied in sixpence, a value of six shillings will be produced in a
working day of 12 hours. Suppose, that with the prevailing productiveness of labour, 12 articles
are produced in these 12 hours. Let the value of the means of production used up in each article
be sixpence. Under these circumstances, each article costs one shilling: sixpence for the value of
the means of production, and sixpence for the value newly added in working with those means.
Now let some one capitalist contrive to double the productiveness of labour, and to produce in the
working day of 12 hours, 24 instead of 12 such articles. The value of the means of production
remaining the same, the value of each article will fall to ninepence, made up of sixpence for the
value of the means of production and threepence for the value newly added by the labour. Despite
the doubled productiveness of labour, the day’s labour creates, as before, a new value of six
shillings and no more, which, however, is now spread over twice as many articles. Of this value
each article now has embodied in it 1/24th, instead of 1/12th, threepence instead of sixpence; or,
what amounts to the same thing, only half an hour’s instead of a whole hour’s labour-time, is now
added to the means of production while they are being transformed into each article. The
individual value of these articles is now below their social value; in other words, they have cost
less labour-time than the great bulk of the same article produced under the average social
conditions. Each article costs, on an average, one shilling, and represents 2 hours of social labour;
but under the altered mode of production it costs only ninepence, or contains only 1½ hours’
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labour. The real value of a commodity is, however, not its individual value, but its social value;
that is to say, the real value is not measured by the labour-time that the article in each individual
case costs the producer, but by the labour-time socially required for its production. If therefore,
the capitalist who applies the new method, sells his commodity at its social value of one shilling,
he sells it for threepence above its individual value, and thus realises an extra surplus-value of
threepence. On the other hand, the working day of 12 hours is, as regards him, now represented
by 24 articles instead of 12. Hence, in order to get rid of the product of one working day, the
demand must be double what it was, i.e., the market must become twice as extensive. Other
things being equal, his commodities can command a more extended market only by a diminution
of their prices. He will therefore sell them above their individual but under their social value, say
at tenpence each. By this means he still squeezes an extra surplus-value of one penny out of each.
This augmentation of surplus-value is pocketed by him, whether his commodities belong or not to
the class of necessary means of subsistence that participate in determining the general value of
labour-power. Hence, independently of this latter circumstance, there is a motive for each
individual capitalist to cheapen his commodities, by increasing the productiveness of labour.
Nevertheless, even in this case, the increased production of surplus-value arises from the
curtailment of the necessary labour-time, and from the corresponding prolongation of the surplus
labour. 4 Let the necessary labour-time amount to 10 hours, the value of a day’s labour-power to
five shillings, the surplus labour-time to 2 hours, and the daily surplus-value to one shilling. But
the capitalist now produces 24 articles, which he sells at tenpence a-piece, making twenty
shillings in all. Since the value of the means of production is twelve shillings, 14 2/5 of these
articles merely replace the constant capital advanced. The labour of the 12 hours’ working day is
represented by the remaining 9 3/5 articles. Since the price of the labour-power is five shillings, 6
articles represent the necessary labour-time, and 3 3/5 articles the surplus labour. The ratio of the
necessary labour to the surplus labour, which under average social conditions was 5:1, is now
only 5:3. The same result may be arrived at in the following way. The value of the product of the
working day of 12 hours is twenty shillings. Of this sum, twelve shillings belong to the value of
the means of production, a value that merely re-appears. There remain eight shillings, which are
the expression in money, of the value newly created during the working day. This sum is greater
than the sum in which average social labour of the same kind is expressed: twelve hours of the
latter labour are expressed by six shillings only. The exceptionally productive labour operates as
intensified labour; it creates in equal periods of time greater values than average social labour of
the same kind. (See Ch. I. Sect 2. p. 44.) But our capitalist still continues to pay as before only
five shillings as the value of a day’s labour-power. Hence, instead of 10 hours, the labourer need
now work only 7½ hours, in order to reproduce this value. His surplus labour is, therefore,
increased by 2½ hours, and the surplus-value he produces grows from one, into three shillings.
Hence, the capitalist who applies the improved method of production, appropriates to surplus
labour a greater portion of the working day, than the other capitalists in the same trade. He does
individually, what the whole body of capitalists engaged in producing relative surplus-value, do
collectively. On the other hand, however, this extra surplus-value vanishes, so soon as the new
method of production has become general, and has consequently caused the difference between
the individual value of the cheapened commodity and its social value to vanish. The law of the
determination of value by labour-time, a law which brings under its sway the individual capitalist
who applies the new method of production, by compelling him to sell his goods under their social
value, this same law, acting as a coercive law of competition, forces his competitors to adopt the
new method. 5 The general rate of surplus-value is, therefore, ultimately affected by the whole
process, only when the increase in the productiveness of labour, has seized upon those branches
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of production that are connected with, and has cheapened those commodities that form part of,
the necessary means of subsistence, and are therefore elements of the value of labour-power.
The value of commodities is in inverse ratio to the productiveness of labour. And so, too, is the
value of labour-power, because it depends on the values of commodities. Relative surplus-value
is, on the contrary, directly proportional to that productiveness. It rises with rising and falls with
falling productiveness. The value of money being assumed to be constant, an average social
working day of 12 hours always produces the same new value, six shillings, no matter how this
sum may be apportioned between surplus-value and wages. But if, in consequence of increased
productiveness, the value of the necessaries of life fall, and the value of a day’s labour-power be
thereby reduced from five shillings to three, the surplus-value increases from one shilling to three.
Ten hours were necessary for the reproduction of the value of the labour-power; now only six are
required. Four hours have been set free, and can be annexed to the domain of surplus labour.
Hence there is immanent in capital an inclination and constant tendency, to heighten the
productiveness of labour, in order to cheapen commodities, and by such cheapening to cheapen
the labourer himself. 6
The value of a commodity is, in itself, of no interest to the capitalist. What alone interests him, is
the surplus-value that dwells in it, and is realisable by sale. Realisation of the surplus-value
necessarily carries with it the refunding of the value that was advanced. Now, since relative
surplus-value increases in direct proportion to the development of the productiveness of labour,
while, on the other hand, the value of commodities diminishes in the same proportion; since one
and the same process cheapens commodities, and augments the surplus-value contained in them;
we have here the solution of the riddle: why does the capitalist, whose sole concern is the
production of exchange-value, continually strive to depress the exchange-value of commodities?
A riddle with which Quesnay, one of the founders of Political Economy, tormented his
opponents, and to which they could give him no answer.
“You acknowledge,” he says, “that the more expenses and the cost of labour can, in the
manufacture of industrial products, be reduced without injury to production, the more
advantageous is such reduction, because it diminishes the price of the finished article. And yet,
you believe that the production of wealth, which arises from the labour of the workpeople,
consists in the augmentation of the exchange-value of their products.” 7
The shortening of the working day is, therefore, by no means what is aimed at, in capitalist
production, when labour is economised by increasing its productiveness.8 It is only the shortening
of the labour-time, necessary for the production of a definite quantity of commodities, that is
aimed at. The fact that the workman, when the productiveness of his labour has been increased,
produces, say 10 times as many commodities as before, and thus spends one-tenth as much
labour-time on each, by no means prevents him from continuing to work 12 hours as before, nor
from producing in those 12 hours 1,200 articles instead of 120. Nay, more, his working day may
be prolonged at the same time, so as to make him produce, say 1,400 articles in 14 hours. In the
treatises, therefore, of economists of the stamp of MacCulloch, Ure, Senior, and tutti quanti [the
like], we may read upon one page, that the labourer owes a debt of gratitude to capital for
developing his productiveness, because the necessary labour-time is thereby shortened, and on the
next page, that he must prove his gratitude by working in future for 15 hours instead of 10. The
object of all development of the productiveness of labour, within the limits of capitalist
production, is to shorten that part of the working day, during which the workman must labour for
his own benefit, and by that very shortening, to lengthen the other part of the day, during which
he is at liberty to work gratis for the capitalist. How far this result is also attainable, without
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cheapening commodities, will appear from an examination of the particular modes of producing
relative surplus-value, to which examination we now proceed.
1

The value of his average daily wages is determined by what the labourer requires “so as to live,
labour, and generate.” (Wm. Petty: “Political Anatomy of Ireland,” 1672, p. 64.) “The price of Labour
is always constituted of the price of necessaries ... whenever ... the labouring man’s wages will not,
suitably to his low rank and station, as a labouring man, support such a family as is often the lot of
many of them to have,” he does not receive proper wages. (J. Vanderlint, l.c., p. 15.) “Le simple
ouvrier, qui n’a que ses bras et son industrie, n’a rien qu’autant qu’il parvient à vendre à d’autres sa
peine... En tout genre de travail il doit arriver, et il arrive en effet, que le salaire de l’ouvrier se borne à
ce qui lui est nécessaire pour lui procurer sa subsistance.” [The mere workman, who has only his arms
and his industry, has nothing unless he succeeds in selling his labour to others ... In every kind of work
it cannot fail to happen, as a matter of fact it does happen, that the wages of the workman are limited
to what is necessary to procure him his subsistence.] (Turgot, “Réflexions, &c.,” Oeuvres, éd. Daire t.
I, p. 10.) “The price of the necessaries of life is, in fact, the cost of producing labour.” (Malthus,
“Inquiry into, &c., Rent,” London, 1815, p. 48, note.)
2
Quando si perfezionano le arti, che non è altro che la scoperta di nuove vie, onde si possa compiere
una manufattura con meno gente o (che è lo stesso) in minor tempo di prima.” (Galiani, l.c., p. 159.)
“L’économie sur les frais de production ne peut donc être autre chose que l’économie sur la quantité
de travail employé pour produire.” [Perfection of the crafts means nothing other than the discovery of
new ways of making a product with fewer people, or (which is the same thing) in less time than
previously] (Sismondi, “Études,” t. I. p. 22.)
3
“Let us suppose ... the products ... of the manufacturer are doubled by improvement in machinery ...
he will be able to clothe his workmen by means of a smaller proportion of the entire return ... and thus
his profit will be raised. But in no other way will it be influenced.” (Ramsay, l.c., pp. 168, 169.)
4
“A man’s profit does not depend upon his command of the produce of other men’s labour, but upon
his command of labour itself. If he can sell his goods at a higher price, while his workmen’s wages
remain unaltered, he is clearly benefited.... A smaller proportion of what he produces is sufficient to
put that labour into motion, and a larger proportion consequently remains for himself.” (“Outlines of
Pol. Econ.” London, 1832, pp. 49, 50.)
5
“If my neighbour by doing much with little labour, can sell cheap, I must contrive to sell as cheap as
he. So that every art, trade, or engine, doing work with labour of fewer hands, and consequently
cheaper, begets in others a kind of necessity and emulation, either of using the same art, trade, or
engine, or of inventing something like it, that every man may be upon the square, that no man may be
able to undersell his neighbour.” (“The Advantages of the East India Trade to England,” London,
1720, p. 67.)
6
“In whatever proportion the expenses of a labourer are diminished, in the same proportion will his
wages be diminished, if the restraints upon industry are at the same time taken off.” (“Considerations
Concerning Taking off the Bounty on Corn Exported,” &c., London, 1753, p. 7.) “The interest of trade
requires, that corn and all provisions should be as cheap as possible; for whatever makes them dear,
must make labour dear also ... in all countries, where industry is not restrained, the price of provisions
must affect the price of labour. This will always be diminished when the necessaries of life grow
cheaper.” (I. c., p. 3.) “Wages are decreased in the same proportion as the powers of production
increase. Machinery, it is true, cheapens the necessaries of life, but it also cheapens the labourer.” (“A
Prize Essay on the Comparative Merits of Competition and Co-operation.” London, 1834, p. 27.)
7
“Ils conviennent que plus on peut, sans préjudice, épargner de frais ou de travaux dispendieux dans
la fabrication des ouvrages des artisans, plus cette épargne est profitable par la diminution des prix de
ces ouvrages. Cependant ils croient que la production de richesse qui résulte des travaux des artisans
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consiste dans l’augmentation de la valeur vénale de leurs ouvrages.” (Quesnay: “Dialogues sur le
Commerce et les Travaux des Artisans.” pp. 188, 189.)
8
“Ces spéculateurs si économes du travail des ouvriers qu’il faudrait qu’ils payassent.” [These
speculators, who are so economical of the labour of workers they would have to pay] (J. N. Bidaut:
“Du Monopole qui s’établit dans les arts industriels et le commerce.” Paris, 1828, p. 13.) “The
employer will be always on the stretch to economise time and labour.” (Dugald Stewart: Works ed. by
Sir W. Hamilton, Edinburgh, v., viii., 1855. “Lectures on Polit. Econ.,” p. 318.) “Their (the
capitalists’) interest is that the productive powers of the labourers they employ should be the greatest
possible. On promoting that power their attention is fixed and almost exclusively fixed.” (R. Jones:
l.c., Lecture III.)

Chapter 13: Co-operation
Capitalist production only then really begins, as we have already seen, when each individual
capital employs simultaneously a comparatively large number of labourers; when consequently
the labour-process is carried on on an extensive scale and yields, relatively, large quantities of
products. A greater number of labourers working together, at the same time, in one place (or, if
you will, in the same field of labour), in order to produce the same sort of commodity under the
mastership of one capitalist, constitutes, both historically and logically, the starting-point of
capitalist production. With regard to the mode of production itself, manufacture, in its strict
meaning, is hardly to be distinguished, in its earliest stages, from the handicraft trades of the
guilds, otherwise than by the greater number of workmen simultaneously employed by one and
the same individual capital. The workshop of the medieval master handicraftsman is simply
enlarged.
At first, therefore, the difference is purely quantitative. We have shown that the surplus-value
produced by a given capital is equal to the surplus-value produced by each workman multiplied
by the number of workmen simultaneously employed. The number of workmen in itself does nor
affect, either the rate of surplus-value, or the degree of exploitation of labour-power. If a working
day of 12 hours be embodied in six shillings, 1,200 such days will be embodied in 1,200 times 6
shillings. In one case 12 × 1,200 working-hours, and in the other 12 such hours are incorporated
in the product. In the production of value a number of workmen rank merely as so many
individual workmen; and it therefore makes no difference in the value produced whether the
1,200 men work separately, or united under the control of one capitalist.
Nevertheless, within certain limits, a modification takes place. The labour realised in value, is
labour of an average social quality; is consequently the expenditure of average labour-power. Any
average magnitude, however, is merely the average of a number of separate magnitudes all of one
kind, but differing as to quantity. In every industry, each individual labourer, be he Peter or Paul,
differs from the average labourer. These individual differences, or “errors” as they are called in
mathematics, compensate one another, and vanish, whenever a certain minimum number of
workmen are employed together. The celebrated sophist and sycophant, Edmund Burke, goes so
far as to make the following assertion, based on his practical observations as a farmer; viz., that
“in so small a platoon” as that of five farm labourers, all individual differences in the labour
vanish, and that consequently any given five adult farm labourers taken together, will in the same
time do as much work as any other five. 1 But, however that may be, it is clear, that the collective
working day of a large number of workmen simultaneously employed, divided by the number of
these workmen, gives one day of average social labour. For example, let the working day of each
individual be 12 hours. Then the collective working day of 12 men simultaneously employed,
consists of 144 hours; and although the labour of each of the dozen men may deviate more or less
from average social labour, each of them requiring a different time for the same operation, yet
since the working day of each is one-twelfth of the collective working day of 144 hours, it
possesses the qualities of an average social working day. From the point of view, however, of the
capitalist who employs these 12 men, the working day is that of the whole dozen. Each individual
man’s day is an aliquot part of the collective working day, no matter whether the 12 men assist
one another in their work, or whether the connexion between their operations consists merely in
the fact, that the men are all working for the same capitalist. But if the 12 men are employed in
six pairs, by as many different small masters, it will be quite a matter of chance, whether each of
these masters produces the same value, and consequently whether he realises the general rate of
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surplus-value. Deviations would occur in individual cases. If one workman required considerably
more time for the production of a commodity than is socially necessary, the duration of the
necessary labour-time would, in his case, sensibly deviate from the labour-time socially necessary
on an average; and consequently his labour would not count as average labour, nor his labourpower as average labour-power. It would either be not saleable at all, or only at something below
the average value of labour-power. A fixed minimum of efficiency in all labour is therefore
assumed, and we shall see, later on, that capitalist production provides the means of fixing this
minimum. Nevertheless, this minimum deviates from the average, although on the other hand the
capitalist has to pay the average value of labour-power. Of the six small masters, one would
therefore squeeze out more than the average rate of surplus-value, another less. The inequalities
would be compensated for the society at large, but not for the individual masters. Thus the laws
of the production of value are only fully realised for the individual producer, when he produces as
a capitalist, and employs a number of workmen together, whose labour, by its collective nature, is
at once stamped as average social labour. 2
Even without an alteration in the system of working, the simultaneous employment of a large
number of labourers effects a revolution in the material conditions of the labour-process. The
buildings in which they work, the store-houses for the raw material, the implements and utensils
used simultaneously or in turns by the workmen; in short, a portion of the means of production,
are now consumed in common. On the one hand, the exchange-value of these means of
production is not increased; for the exchange-value of a commodity is not raised by its use-value
being consumed more thoroughly and to greater advantage. On the other hand, they are used in
common, and therefore on a larger scale than before. A room where twenty weavers work at
twenty looms must be larger than the room of a single weaver with two assistants. But it costs
less labour to build one workshop for twenty persons than to build ten to accommodate two
weavers each; thus the value of the means of production that are concentrated for use in common
on a large scale does not increase in direct proportion to the expansion and to the increased useful
effect of those means. When consumed in common, they give up a smaller part of their value to
each single product; partly because the total value they part with is spread over a greater quantity
of products, and partly because their value, though absolutely greater, is, having regard to their
sphere of action in the process, relatively less than the value of isolated means of production.
Owing to this, the value of a part of the constant capital falls, and in proportion to the magnitude
of the fall, the total value of the commodity also falls. The effect is the same as if the means of
production had cost less. The economy in their application is entirely owing to their being
consumed in common by a large number of workmen. Moreover, this character of being
necessary conditions of social labour, a character that distinguishes them from the dispersed and
relatively more costly means of production of isolated, independent labourers, or small masters, is
acquired even when the numerous workmen assembled together do not assist one another, but
merely work side by side. A portion of the instruments of labour acquires this social character
before the labour-process itself does so.
Economy in the use of the means of production has to be considered under two aspects. First, as
cheapening commodities, and thereby bringing about a fall in the value of labour-power.
Secondly, as altering the ratio of the surplus-value to the total capital advanced, i.e., to the sum of
the values of the constant and variable capital. The latter aspect will not be considered until we
come to the third book, to which, with the object of treating them in their proper connexion, we
also relegate many other points that relate to the present question. The march of our analysis
compels this splitting up of the subject-matter, a splitting up that is quite in keeping with the spirit
of capitalist production. For since, in this mode of production, the workman finds the instruments

229

Chapter 13

of labour existing independently of him as another man’s property, economy in their use appears,
with regard to him, to be a distinct operation, one that does not concern him, and which,
therefore, has no connexion with the methods by which his own personal productiveness is
increased.
When numerous labourers work together side by side, whether in one and the same process, or in
different but connected processes, they are said to co-operate, or to work in co-operation. 3
Just as the offensive power of a squadron of cavalry, or the defensive power of a regiment of
infantry is essentially different from the sum of the offensive or defensive powers of the
individual cavalry or infantry soldiers taken separately, so the sum total of the mechanical forces
exerted by isolated workmen differs from the social force that is developed, when many hands
take part simultaneously in one and the same undivided operation, such as raising a heavy weight,
turning a winch, or removing an obstacle. 4 In such cases the effect of the combined labour could
either not be produced at all by isolated individual labour, or it could only be produced by a great
expenditure of time, or on a very dwarfed scale. Not only have we here an increase in the
productive power of the individual, by means of co-operation, but the creation of a new power,
namely, the collective power of masses.5
Apart from the new power that arises from the fusion of many forces into one single force, mere
social contact begets in most industries an emulation and a stimulation of the animal spirits that
heighten the efficiency of each individual workman. Hence it is that a dozen persons working
together will, in their collective working day of 144 hours, produce far more than twelve isolated
men each working 12 hours, or than one man who works twelve days in succession. 6 The reason
of this is that man is, if not as Aristotle contends, a political,7 at all events a social animal.
Although a number of men may be occupied together at the same time on the same, or the same
kind of work, yet the labour of each, as a part of the collective labour, may correspond to a
distinct phase of the labour-process, through all whose phases, in consequence of co-operation,
the subject of their labour passes with greater speed. For instance, if a dozen masons place
themselves in a row, so as to pass stones from the foot of a ladder to its summit, each of them
does the same thing; nevertheless, their separate acts form connected parts of one total operation;
they are particular phases, which must be gone through by each stone; and the stones are thus
carried up quicker by the 24 hands of the row of men than they could be if each man went
separately up and down the ladder with his burden. 8 The object is carried over the same distance
in a shorter time. Again, a combination of labour occurs whenever a building, for instance, is
taken in hand on different sides simultaneously; although here also the co-operating masons are
doing the same, or the same kind of work. The 12 masons, in their collective working day of 144
hours, make much more progress with the building than one mason could make working for 12
days, or 144 hours. The reason is, that a body of men working in concert has hands and eyes both
before and behind, and is, to a certain degree, omnipresent. The various parts of the work
progress simultaneously.
In the above instances we have laid stress upon the point that the men do the same, or the same
kind of work, because this, the most simple form of labour in common, plays a great part in cooperation, even in its most fully developed stage. If the work be complicated, then the mere
number of the men who co-operate allows of the various operations being apportioned to different
hands, and, consequently, of being carried on simultaneously. The time necessary for the
completion of the whole work is thereby shortened. 9
In many industries, there are critical periods, determined by the nature of the process, during
which certain definite results must be obtained. For instance, if a flock of sheep has to be shorn,
or a field of wheat to be cut and harvested, the quantity and quality of the product depends on the
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work being begun and ended within a certain time. In these cases, the time that ought to be taken
by the process is prescribed, just as it is in herring fishing. A single person cannot carve a
working day of more than, say 12 hours, out of the natural day, but 100 men co-operating extend
the working day to 1,200 hours. The shortness of the time allowed for the work is compensated
for by the large mass of labour thrown upon the field of production at the decisive moment. The
completion of the task within the proper time depends on the simultaneous application of
numerous combined working days; the amount of useful effect depends on the number of
labourers; this number, however, is always smaller than the number of isolated labourers required
to do the same amount of work in the same period.10 It is owing to the absence of this kind of cooperation that, in the western part of the United States, quantities of corn, and in those parts of
East India where English rule has destroyed the old communities, quantities of cotton, are yearly
wasted. 11
On the one hand, co-operation allows of the work being carried on over an extended space; it is
consequently imperatively called for in certain undertakings, such as draining, constructing
dykes, irrigation works, and the making of canals, roads and railways. On the other hand, while
extending the scale of production, it renders possible a relative contraction of the arena. This
contraction of arena simultaneous with, and arising from, extension of scale, whereby a number
of useless expenses are cut down, is owing to the conglomeration of labourers, to the aggregation
of various processes, and to the concentration of the means of production.12
The combined working day produces, relatively to an equal sum of isolated working days, a
greater quantity of use-values, and, consequently, diminishes the labour-time necessary for the
production of a given useful effect. Whether the combined working day, in a given case, acquires
this increased productive power, because it heightens the mechanical force of labour, or extends
its sphere of action over a greater space, or contracts the field of production relatively to the scale
of production, or at the critical moment sets large masses of labour to work, or excites emulation
between individuals and raises their animal spirits, or impresses on the similar operations carried
on by a number of men the stamp of continuity and many-sidedness, or performs simultaneously
different operations, or economises the means of production by use in common, or lends to
individual labour the character of average social labour whichever of these be the cause of the
increase, the special productive power of the combined working day is, under all circumstances,
the social productive power of labour, or the productive power of social labour. This power is due
to co-operation itself. When the labourer co-operates systematically with others, he strips off the
fetters of his individuality, and develops the capabilities of his species.13
As a general rule, labourers cannot co-operate without being brought together: their assemblage
in one place is a necessary condition of their co-operation. Hence wage-labourers cannot cooperate, unless they are employed simultaneously by the same capital, the same capitalist, and
unless therefore their labour-powers are bought simultaneously by him. The total value of these
labour-powers, or the amount of the wages of these labourers for a day, or a week, as the case
may be, must be ready in the pocket of the capitalist, before the workmen are assembled for the
process of production. The payment of 300 workmen at once, though only for one day, requires a
greater outlay of capital, than does the payment of a smaller number of men, week by week,
during a whole year. Hence the number of the labourers that co-operate, or the scale of cooperation, depends, in the first instance, on the amount of capital that the individual capitalist can
spare for the purchase of labour-power; in other words, on the extent to which a single capitalist
has command over the means of subsistence of a number of labourers.
And as with the variable, so it is with the constant capital. For example, the outlay on raw
material is 30 times as great, for the capitalist who employs 300 men, as it is for each of the 30
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capitalists who employ 10 men. The value and quantity of the instruments of labour used in
common do not, it is true, increase at the same rate as the number of workmen, but they do
increase very considerably. Hence, concentration of large masses of the means of production in
the hands of individual capitalists, is a material condition for the co-operation of wage-labourers,
and the extent of the co-operation or the scale of production, depends on the extent of this
concentration.
We saw in a former chapter, that a certain minimum amount of capital was necessary, in order
that the number of labourers simultaneously employed, and, consequently, the amount of surplusvalue produced, might suffice to liberate the employer himself from manual labour, to convert
him from a small master into a capitalist, and thus formally to establish capitalist production. We
now see that a certain minimum amount is a necessary condition for the conversion of numerous
isolated and independent processes into one combined social process.
We also saw that at first, the subjection of labour to capital was only a formal result of the fact,
that the labourer, instead of working for himself, works for and consequently under the capitalist.
By the co-operation of numerous wage-labourers, the sway of capital develops into a requisite for
carrying on the labour-process itself, into a real requisite of production. That a capitalist should
command on the field of production, is now as indispensable as that a general should command
on the field of battle.
All combined labour on a large scale requires, more or less, a directing authority, in order to
secure the harmonious working of the individual activities, and to perform the general functions
that have their origin in the action of the combined organism, as distinguished from the action of
its separate organs. A single violin player is his own conductor; an orchestra requires a separate
one. The work of directing, superintending, and adjusting, becomes one of the functions of
capital, from the moment that the labour under the control of capital, becomes co-operative. Once
a function of capital, it acquires special characteristics.
The directing motive, the end and aim of capitalist production, is to extract the greatest possible
amount of surplus-value, 14 and consequently to exploit labour-power to the greatest possible
extent. As the number of the co-operating labourers increases, so too does their resistance to the
domination of capital, and with it, the necessity for capital to overcome this resistance by
counterpressure. The control exercised by the capitalist is not only a special function, due to the
nature of the social labour-process, and peculiar to that process, but it is, at the same time, a
function of the exploitation of a social labour-process, and is consequently rooted in the
unavoidable antagonism between the exploiter and the living and labouring raw material he
exploits.
Again, in proportion to the increasing mass of the means of production, now no longer the
property of the labourer, but of the capitalist, the necessity increases for some effective control
over the proper application of those means. 15 Moreover, the co-operation of wage labourers is
entirely brought about by the capital that employs them. Their union into one single productive
body and the establishment of a connexion between their individual functions, are matters foreign
and external to them, are not their own act, but the act of the capital that brings and keeps them
together. Hence the connexion existing between their various labours appears to them, ideally, in
the shape of a preconceived plan of the capitalist, and practically in the shape of the authority of
the same capitalist, in the shape of the powerful will of another, who subjects their activity to his
aims. If, then, the control of the capitalist is in substance two-fold by reason of the two-fold
nature of the process of production itself, which, on the one hand, is a social process for
producing use-values, on the other, a process for creating surplus-value in form that control is
despotic. As co-operation extends its scale, this despotism takes forms peculiar to itself. Just as at
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first the capitalist is relieved from actual labour so soon as his capital has reached that minimum
amount with which capitalist production, as such, begins, so now, he hands over the work of
direct and constant supervision of the individual workmen, and groups of workmen, to a special
kind of wage-labourer. An industrial army of workmen, under the command of a capitalist,
requires, like a real army, officers (managers), and sergeants (foremen, overlookers), who, while
the work is being done, command in the name of the capitalist. The work of supervision becomes
their established and exclusive function. When comparing the mode of production of isolated
peasants and artisans with production by slave-labour, the political economist counts this labour
of superintendence among the faux frais of production. 16 But, when considering the capitalist
mode of production, he, on the contrary, treats the work of control made necessary by the cooperative character of the labour-process as identical with the different work of control,
necessitated by the capitalist character of that process and the antagonism of interests between
capitalist and labourer.17 It is not because he is a leader of industry that a man is a capitalist; on
the contrary, he is a leader of industry because he is a capitalist. The leadership of industry is an
attribute of capital, just as in feudal times the functions of general and judge, were attributes of
landed property. 18
The labourer is the owner of his labour-power until he has done bargaining for its sale with the
capitalist; and he can sell no more than what he has i.e., his individual, isolated labour-power.
This state of things is in no way altered by the fact that the capitalist, instead of buying the
labour-power of one man, buys that of 100, and enters into separate contracts with 100
unconnected men instead of with one. He is at liberty to set the 100 men to work, without letting
them co-operate. He pays them the value of 100 independent labour-powers, but he does not pay
for the combined labour-power of the hundred. Being independent of each other, the labourers are
isolated persons, who enter into relations with the capitalist, but not with one another. This cooperation begins only with the labour-process, but they have then ceased to belong to themselves.
On entering that process, they become incorporated with capital. As co-operators, as members of
a working organism, they are but special modes of existence of capital. Hence, the productive
power developed by the labourer when working in co-operation, is the productive power of
capital. This power is developed gratuitously, whenever the workmen are placed under given
conditions, and it is capital that places them under such conditions. Because this power costs
capital nothing, and because, on the other hand, the labourer himself does not develop it before
his labour belongs to capital, it appears as a power with which capital is endowed by Nature - a
productive power that is immanent in capital.
The colossal effects of simple co-operation are to be seen in the gigantic structures of the ancient
Asiatics, Egyptians, Etruscans, &c.
“It has happened in times past that these Oriental States, after supplying the
expenses of their civil and military establishments, have found themselves in
possession of a surplus which they could apply to works of magnificence or utility
and in the construction of these their command over the hands and arms of almost
the entire non-agricultural population has produced stupendous monuments which
still indicate their power. The teeming valley of the Nile ... produced food for a
swarming non-agricultural population, and this food, belonging to the monarch
and the priesthood, afforded the means of erecting the mighty monuments which
filled the land.... In moving the colossal statues and vast masses of which the
transport creates wonder, human labour almost alone, was prodigally used.... The
number of the labourers and the concentration of their efforts sufficed. We see
mighty coral reefs rising from the depths of the ocean into islands and firm land,
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yet each individual depositor is puny, weak, and contemptible. The nonagricultural labourers of an Asiatic monarchy have little but their individual
bodily exertions to bring to the task, but their number is their strength, and the
power of directing these masses gave rise to the palaces and temples, the
pyramids, and the armies of gigantic statues of which the remains astonish and
perplex us. It is that confinement of the revenues which feed them, to one or a few
hands, which makes such undertakings possible.” 19
This power of Asiatic and Egyptian kings, Etruscan theocrats, &c., has in modern society been
transferred to the capitalist, whether he be an isolated, or as in joint-stock companies, a collective
capitalist.
Co-operation, such as we find it at the dawn of human development, among races who live by the
chase, 20 or, say, in the agriculture of Indian communities, is based, on the one hand, on ownership
in common of the means of production, and on the other hand, on the fact, that in those cases,
each individual has no more torn himself off from the navel-string of his tribe or community, than
each bee has freed itself from connexion with the hive. Such co-operation is distinguished from
capitalistic co-operation by both of the above characteristics. The sporadic application of cooperation on a large scale in ancient times, in the middle ages, and in modern colonies, reposes on
relations of dominion and servitude, principally on slavery. The capitalistic form, on the contrary,
pre-supposes from first to last, the free wage-labourer, who sells his labour-power to capital.
Historically, however, this form is developed in opposition to peasant agriculture and to the
carrying on of independent handicrafts whether in guilds or not.21 From the standpoint of these,
capitalistic co-operation does not manifest itself as a particular historical form of co-operation,
but co-operation itself appears to be a historical form peculiar to, and specifically distinguishing,
the capitalist process of production.
Just as the social productive power of labour that is developed by co-operation, appears to be the
productive power of capital, so co-operation itself, contrasted with the process of production
carried on by isolated independent labourers, or even by small employers, appears to be a specific
form of the capitalist process of production. It is the first change experienced by the actual
labour-process, when subjected to capital. This change takes place spontaneously. The
simultaneous employment of a large number of wage-labourers, in one and the same process,
which is a necessary condition of this change, also forms the starting-point of capitalist
production. This point coincides with the birth of capital itself. If then, on the one hand, the
capitalist mode of production presents itself to us historically, as a necessary condition to the
transformation of the labour-process into a social process, so, on the other hand, this social form
of the labour-process presents itself, as a method employed by capital for the more profitable
exploitation of labour, by increasing that labour’s productiveness.
In the elementary form, under which we have hitherto viewed it, co-operation is a necessary
concomitant of all production on a large scale, but it does not, in itself, represent a fixed form
characteristic of a particular epoch in the development of the capitalist mode of production. At the
most it appears to do so, and that only approximately, in the handicraft-like beginnings of
manufacture, 22 and in that kind of agriculture on a large scale, which corresponds to the epoch of
manufacture, and is distinguished from peasant agriculture, mainly by the number of the
labourers simultaneously employed, and by the mass of the means of production concentrated for
their use. Simple co-operation is always the prevailing form, in those branches of production in
which capital operates on a large scale, and division of labour and machinery play but a
subordinate part.
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Co-operation ever constitutes the fundamental form of the capitalist mode of production,
nevertheless the elementary form of co-operation continues to subsist as a particular form of
capitalist production side by side with the more developed forms of that mode of production.

1

“Unquestionably, there is a good deal of difference between the value of one man’s labour and that
of another from strength, dexterity, and honest application. But I am quite sure, from my best
observation, that any given five men will, in their total, afford a proportion of labour equal to any
other five within the periods of life I have stated; that is, that among such five men there will be one
possessing all the qualifications of a good workman, one bad, and the other three middling, and
approximating to the first, and the last. So that in so small a platoon as that of even five, you will find
the full complement of all that five men can earn.” (E. Burke, 1. c., pp. 15, 16.) Compare Quételet on
the average individual.
2
Professor Roscher claims to have discovered that one needlewoman employed by Mrs. Roscher
during two days, does more work than two needlewomen employed together during one day. The
learned professor should not study the capitalist process of production in the nursery, nor under
circumstances where the principal personage, the capitalist, is wanting.
3
“Concours de forces.” (Destutt de Tracy, l.c., p. 80.)
4
“There are numerous operations of so simple a kind as not to admit a division into parts, which
cannot be performed without the co-operation of many pairs of hands. I would instance the lifting of a
large tree on to a wain ... everything, in short, which cannot be done unless a great many pairs of
hands help each other in the same undivided employment and at the same time.” (E. G. Wakefield: “A
View of the Art of Colonisation.” London, 1849, p. 168.)
5
“As one man cannot, and ten men must strain to lift a ton of weight, yet 100 men can do it only by
the strength of a finger of each of them.” (John Betters: “Proposals for Raising a Colledge of
Industry.” London, 1696, p. 21.)
6
“There is also” (when the same number of men are employed by one farmer on 300 acres, instead of
by ten farmers with 30 acres a piece) “an advantage in the proportion of servants, which will not so
easily be understood but by practical men; for it is natural to say, as 1 is to 4, so are 3 to 12; but this
will not hold good in practice; for in harvest time and many other operations which require that kind
of despatch by the throwing many hands together, the work is better and more expeditiously done: f i.
in harvest, 2 drivers, 2 loaders, 2 pitchers, 2 rakers, and the rest at the rick, or in the barn, will
despatch double the work that the same number of hands would do if divided into different gangs on
different farms.” (“An Inquiry into the Connexion between the Present Price of Provisions and the
Size of Farms.” By a Farmer. London, 1773, pp. 7, 8.)
7
Strictly, Aristotle’s definition is that man is by nature a town-citizen. This is quite as characteristic of
ancient classical society as Franklin’s definition of man, as a tool-making animal, is characteristic of
Yankeedom.
8
“On doit encore remarquer que cette division partielle de travail peut se faire quand même les
ouvriers sont occupés d’une même besogne. Des maçons par exemple, occupés à faire passer de mains
en mains des briques à un échafaudage supérieur, font tous la même besogne, et pourtant il existe
parmi eux une espèce de division de travail, qui consiste en ce que chacun d’eux fait passer la brique
par un espace donné, et que tous ensemble la font parvenir beaucoup plus promptement à l’endroit
marqué qu’ils ne le feraient si chacun d’eux portait sa brique séparément jusqu’à l’échafaudage
supérieur.” [It should be noted further that this partial division of labour can occur even when the
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workers are engaged in the same task. Masons, for example, engaged in passing bricks from hand to
hand to a higher stage of the building, are all performing the same task, and yet there does exist
amongst them a sort of division of labour. This consists in the fact that each of them passes the brick
through a given space, and, taken together, they make it arrive much more quickly at the required spot
than they would do if each of them carried his brick separately to the upper storey] (F. Skarbek:
“Théorie des richesses sociales.” Paris, 1839, t. I, pp. 97, 98.)
9
“Est-il question d’exécuter un travail compliqué, plusieurs choses doivent être faites simultanément.
L’un en fait une pendant que l’autre en fait une autre, et tous contribuent à l’effet qu’un seul homme
n’aurait pu produire. L’un rame pendant que l’autre tient le gouvernail, et qu’un troisième jette le filet
on harponne le poisson, et la pêche a un succès impossible sans ce concours.” [Is it a question of
undertaking a complex piece of labour? Many things must be done simultaneously. One person does
one thing, while another does something else, and they all contribute to an effect that a single man
would be unable to produce. One rows while the other holds the rudder, and a third casts the net or
harpoons the fish; in this way fishing enjoys a success that would be impossible without this cooperation] (Destutt de Tracy, l.c.)
10
“The doing of it (agricultural work) at the critical juncture is of so much the greater consequence.”
(“An Inquiry into the Connexion between the Present Price,” &c., p. 9.) “In agriculture, there is no
more important factor than that of time.” (Liebig: “Ueber Theorie und Praxis in der Landwirtschaft.”
1856, p. 23.)
11
“The next evil is one which one would scarcely expect to find in a country which exports more
labour than any other in the world, with the exception, perhaps, of China and England ‒ the
impossibility of procuring a sufficient number of hands to clean the cotton. The consequence of this is
that large quantities of the crop are left unpicked, while another portion is gathered from the ground
when it has fallen, and is of course discoloured and partially rotted, so that for want of labour at the
proper season the cultivator is actually forced to submit to the loss of a large part of that crop for
which England is so anxiously looking.” (“Bengal Hurkaru.” Bi-Monthly Overland Summary of
News, 22nd July, 1861.)
12
In the progress of culture “all, and perhaps more than all, the capital and labour which once loosely
occupied 500 acres, are now concentrated for the more complete tillage of 100.” Although “relatively
to the amount of capital and labour employed, space is concentrated, it is an enlarged sphere of
production, as compared to the sphere of production formerly occupied or worked upon by one single
independent agent of production.” (R. Jones: “An Essay on the Distribution of Wealth,” part I. On
Rent. London, 1831. p. 191.)
13
“La forza di ciascuno uomo è minima, ma la riunione delle minime forze forma una forza totale
maggiore anche della somma delle forze medesime fino a che le forze per essere riunite possono
diminuere il tempo ed accrescere lo spazio della loro azione.” (G. R. Carli, Note to P. Verri, l.c., t. xv.,
p. 196.)
14
“Profits ... is the sole end of trade.” (J. Vanderlint, l.c., p. 11.)
15
That Philistine paper, the Spectator, states that after the introduction of a sort of partnership
between capitalist and workmen in the “Wirework Company of Manchester,” “the first result was a
sudden decrease in waste, the men not seeing why they should waste their own property any more
than any other master’s, and waste is, perhaps, next to bad debts, the greatest source of manufacturing
loss.” The same paper finds that the main defect in the Rochdale co-operative experiments is this:
“They showed that associations of workmen could manage shops, mills, and almost all forms of
industry with success, and they immediately improved the condition of the men; but then they did not
leave a clear place for masters.” Quelle horreur!
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Professor Cairnes, after stating that the superintendence of labour is a leading feature of production
by slaves in the Southern States of North America, continues: “The peasant proprietor (of the North),
appropriating the whole produce of his toil, needs no other stimulus to exertion. Superintendence is
here completely dispensed with.” (Cairnes, l.c., pp. 48, 49.)
17
Sir James Steuart, a writer altogether remarkable for his quick eye for the characteristic social
distinctions between different modes of production, says: “Why do large undertakings in the
manufacturing way ruin private industry, but by coming nearer to the simplicity of slaves?” (“Prin. of
Pol. Econ.,” London, 1767, v. I., pp. 167, 168.)
18
Auguste Comte and his school might therefore have shown that feudal lords are an eternal necessity
in the same way that they have done in the case of the lords of capital.
19
R. Jones. “Textbook of Lectures,” &c., pp. 77, 78. The ancient Assyrian, Egyptian, and other
collections in London, and in other European capitals, make us eye-witnesses of the modes of carrying
on that co-operative labour.
20
Linguet is improbably right, when in his “Théorie des Lois Civiles,” he declares hunting to be the
first form of co-operation, and man-hunting (war) one of the earliest forms of hunting.
21
Peasant agriculture on a small scale, and the carrying on of independent handicrafts, which together
form the basis of the feudal mode of production, and after the dissolution of that system, continue side
by side with the capitalist mode, also form the economic foundation of the classical communities at
their best, after the primitive form of ownership of land in common had disappeared, and before
slavery had seized on production in earnest.
22
“Whether the united skill, industry, and emulation of many together on the same work be not the
way to advance it? And whether it had been otherwise possible for England, to have carried on her
Woollen Manufacture to so great a perfection?” (Berkeley. “The Querist.” London, 1751, p. 56, par.
521.)

Chapter 14: Division of Labour and Manufacture
Section 1: Two-Fold Origin of Manufacture
That co-operation which is based on division of labour, assumes its typical form in manufacture,
and is the prevalent characteristic form of the capitalist process of production throughout the
manufacturing period properly so called. That period, roughly speaking, extends from the middle
of the 16th to the last third of the 18th century.
Manufacture takes its rise in two ways:
(1.) By the assemblage, in one workshop under the control of a single capitalist, of labourers
belonging to various independent handicrafts, but through whose hands a given article must pass
on its way to completion. A carriage, for example, was formerly the product of the labour of a
great number of independent artificers, such as wheelwrights, harness-makers, tailors, locksmiths,
upholsterers, turners, fringe-makers, glaziers, painters, polishers, gilders, &c. In the manufacture
of carriages, however, all these different artificers are assembled in one building where they work
into one another’s hands. It is true that a carriage cannot be gilt before it has been made. But if a
number of carriages are being made simultaneously, some may be in the hands of the gilders
while others are going through an earlier process. So far, we are still in the domain of simple cooperation, which finds its materials ready to hand in the shape of men and things. But very soon
an important change takes place. The tailor, the locksmith, and the other artificers, being now
exclusively occupied in carriage-making, each gradually loses, through want of practice, the
ability to carry on, to its full extent, his old handicraft. But, on the other hand, his activity now
confined in one groove, assumes the form best adapted to the narrowed sphere of action. At first,
carriage manufacture is a combination of various independent handicrafts. By degrees, it becomes
the splitting up of carriage-making into its various detail processes, each of which crystallises into
the exclusive function of a particular workman, the manufacture, as a whole, being carried on by
the men in conjunction. In the same way, cloth manufacture, as also a whole series of other
manufactures, arose by combining different handicrafts together under the control of a single
capitalist. 1
(2.) Manufacture also arises in a way exactly the reverse of this - namely, by one capitalist
employing simultaneously in one workshop a number of artificers, who all do the same, or the
same kind of work, such as making paper, type, or needles. This is co-operation in its most
elementary form. Each of these artificers (with the help, perhaps, of one or two apprentices),
makes the entire commodity, and he consequently performs in succession all the operations
necessary for its production. He still works in his old handicraft-like way. But very soon external
circumstances cause a different use to be made of the concentration of the workmen on one spot,
and of the simultaneousness of their work. An increased quantity of the article has perhaps to be
delivered within a given time. The work is therefore re-distributed. Instead of each man being
allowed to perform all the various operations in succession, these operations are changed into
disconnected, isolated ones, carried on side by side; each is assigned to a different artificer, and
the whole of them together are performed simultaneously by the co-operating workmen. This
accidental repartition gets repeated, develops advantages of its own, and gradually ossifies into a
systematic division of labour. The commodity, from being the individual product of an
independent artificer, becomes the social product of a union of artificers, each of whom performs
one, and only one, of the constituent partial operations. The same operations which, in the case of
a papermaker belonging to a German Guild, merged one into the other as the successive acts of
one artificer, became in the Dutch paper manufacture so many partial operations carried on side
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by side by numerous co-operating labourers. The needlemaker of the Nuremberg Guild was the
cornerstone on which the English needle manufacture was raised. But while in Nuremberg that
single artificer performed a series of perhaps 20 operations one after another, in England it was
not long before there were 20 needlemakers side by side, each performing one alone of those 20
operations, and in consequence of further experience, each of those 20 operations was again split
up, isolated, and made the exclusive function of a separate workman.
The mode in which manufacture arises, its growth out of handicrafts, is therefore two-fold. On the
one hand, it arises from the union of various independent handicrafts, which become stripped of
their independence and specialised to such an extent as to be reduced to mere supplementary
partial processes in the production of one particular commodity. On the other hand, it arises from
the co-operation of artificers of one handicraft; it splits up that particular handicraft into its
various detail operations, isolating, and making these operations independent of one another up to
the point where each becomes the exclusive function of a particular labourer. On the one hand,
therefore, manufacture either introduces division of labour into a process of production, or further
develops that division; on the other hand, it unites together handicrafts that were formerly
separate. But whatever may have been its particular starting-point, its final form is invariably the
same - a productive mechanism whose parts are human beings.
For a proper understanding of the division of labour in manufacture, it is essential that the
following points be firmly grasped. First, the decomposition of a process of production into its
various successive steps coincides, here, strictly with the resolution of a handicraft into its
successive manual operations. Whether complex or simple, each operation has to be done by
hand, retains the character of a handicraft, and is therefore dependent on the strength, skill,
quickness, and sureness, of the individual workman in handling his tools. The handicraft
continues to be the basis. This narrow technical basis excludes a really scientific analysis of any
definite process of industrial production, since it is still a condition that each detail process gone
through by the product must be capable of being done by hand and of forming, in its way, a
separate handicraft. It is just because handicraft skill continues, in this way, to be the foundation
of the process of production, that each workman becomes exclusively assigned to a partial
function, and that for the rest of his life, his labour-power is turned into the organ of this detail
function.
Secondly, this division of labour is a particular sort of co-operation, and many of its
disadvantages spring from the general character of co-operation, and not from this particular form
of it.

Section 2: The Detail Labourer and his Implements
If we now go more into detail, it is, in the first place, clear that a labourer who all his life
performs one and the same simple operation, converts his whole body into the automatic,
specialised implement of that operation. Consequently, he takes less time in doing it, than the
artificer who performs a whole series of operations in succession. But the collective labourer,
who constitutes the living mechanism of manufacture, is made up solely of such specialised detail
labourers. Hence, in comparison with the independent handicraft, more is produced in a given
time, or the productive power of labour is increased. 2 Moreover, when once this fractional work
is established as the exclusive function of one person, the methods it employs become perfected.
The workman’s continued repetition of the same simple act, and the concentration of his attention
on it, teach him by experience how to attain the desired effect with the minimum of exertion. But
since there are always several generations of labourers living at one time, and working together at
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the manufacture of a given article, the technical skill, the tricks of the trade thus acquired, become
established, and are accumulated and handed down.3
Manufacture, in fact, produces the skill of the detail labourer, by reproducing, and systematically
driving to an extreme within the workshop, the naturally developed differentiation of trades
which it found ready to hand in society at large. On the other hand, the conversion of fractional
work into the life-calling of one man, corresponds to the tendency shown by earlier societies, to
make trades hereditary; either to petrify them into castes, or whenever definite historical
conditions beget in the individual a tendency to vary in a manner incompatible with the nature of
castes, to ossify them into guilds. Castes and guilds arise from the action of the same natural law,
that regulates the differentiation of plants and animals into species and varieties, except that,
when a certain degree of development has been reached, the heredity of castes and the
exclusiveness of guilds are ordained as a law of society. 4
“The muslins of Dakka in fineness, the calicoes and other piece goods of
Coromandel in brilliant and durable colours, have never been surpassed. Yet they
are produced without capital, machinery, division of labour, or any of those means
which give such facilities to the manufacturing interest of Europe. The weaver is
merely a detached individual, working a web when ordered of a customer, and
with a loom of the rudest construction, consisting sometimes of a few branches or
bars of wood, put roughly together. There is even no expedient for rolling up the
warp; the loom must therefore be kept stretched to its full length, and becomes so
inconveniently large, that it cannot be contained within the hut of the
manufacturer, who is therefore compelled to ply his trade in the open air, where it
is interrupted by every vicissitude of the weather.”5
It is only the special skill accumulated from generation to generation, and transmitted from father
to son, that gives to the Hindu, as it does to the spider, this proficiency. And yet the work of such
a Hindu weaver is very complicated, compared with that of a manufacturing labourer.
An artificer, who performs one after another the various fractional operations in the production of
a finished article, must at one time change his place, at another his tools. The transition from one
operation to another interrupts the flow of his labour, and creates, so to say, gaps in his working
day. These gaps close up so soon as he is tied to one and the same operation all day long; they
vanish in proportion as the changes in his work diminish. The resulting increased productive
power is owing either to an increased expenditure of labour-power in a given time i.e., to
increased intensity of labour or to a decrease in the amount of labour-power unproductively
consumed. The extra expenditure of power, demanded by every transition from rest to motion, is
made up for by prolonging the duration of the normal velocity when once acquired. On the other
hand, constant labour of one uniform kind disturbs the intensity and flow of a man’s animal
spirits, which find recreation and delight in mere change of activity.
The productiveness of labour depends not only on the proficiency of the workman, but on the
perfection of his tools. Tools of the same kind, such as knives, drills, gimlets, hammers, &c., may
be employed in different processes; and the same tool may serve various purposes in a single
process. But so soon as the different operations of a labour-process are disconnected the one from
the other, and each fractional operation acquires in the hands of the detail labourer a suitable and
peculiar form, alterations become necessary in the implements that previously served more than
one purpose. The direction taken by this change is determined by the difficulties experienced in
consequence of the unchanged form of the implement. Manufacture is characterised by the
differentiation of the instruments of labour - a differentiation whereby implements of a given sort
acquire fixed shapes, adapted to each particular application, and by the specialisation of those
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instruments, giving to each special implement its full play only in the hands of a specific detail
labourer. In Birmingham alone 500 varieties of hammers are produced, and not only is each
adapted to one particular process, but several varieties often serve exclusively for the different
operations in one and the same process. The manufacturing period simplifies, improves, and
multiplies the implements of labour, by adapting them to the exclusively special functions of each
detail labourer.6 It thus creates at the same time one of the material conditions for the existence of
machinery, which consists of a combination of simple instruments.
The detail labourer and his implements are the simplest elements of manufacture. Let us now turn
to its aspect as a whole.

Section 3: The Two Fundamental Forms of Manufacture:
Heterogeneous Manufacture, Serial Manufacture
The organisation of manufacture has two fundamental forms which, in spite of occasional
blending, are essentially different in kind, and, moreover, play very distinct parts in the
subsequent transformation of manufacture into modern industry carried on by machinery. This
double character arises from the nature of the article produced. This article either results from the
mere mechanical fitting together of partial products made independently, or owes its completed
shape to a series of connected processes and manipulations.
A locomotive, for instance, consists of more than 5,000 independent parts. It cannot, however,
serve as an example of the first kind of genuine manufacture, for it is a structure produced by
modern mechanical industry. But a watch can; and William Petty used it to illustrate the division
of labour in manufacture. Formerly the individual work of a Nuremberg artificer, the watch has
been transformed into the social product of an immense number of detail labourers, such as
mainspring makers, dial makers, spiral spring makers, jewelled hole makers, ruby lever makers,
hand makers, case makers, screw makers, gilders, with numerous subdivisions, such as wheel
makers (brass and steel separate), pin makers, movement makers, acheveur de pignon (fixes the
wheels on the axles, polishes the facets, &c.), pivot makers, planteur de finissage (puts the wheels
and springs in the works), finisseur de barillet (cuts teeth in the wheels, makes the holes of the
right size, &c.), escapement makers, cylinder makers for cylinder escapements, escapement wheel
makers, balance wheel makers, raquette makers (apparatus for regulating the watch), the planteur
d’échappement (escapement maker proper); then the repasseur de barillet (finishes the box for the
spring, &c.), steel polishers, wheel polishers, screw polishers, figure painters, dial enamellers
(melt the enamel on the copper), fabricant de pendants (makes the ring by which the case is
hung), finisseur de charnière (puts the brass hinge in the cover, &c.), faiseur de secret (puts in the
springs that open the case), graveur, ciseleur, polisseur de boîte, &c., &c., and last of all the
repasseur, who fits together the whole watch and hands it over in a going state. Only a few parts
of the watch pass through several hands; and all these membra disjecta come together for the first
time in the hand that binds them into one mechanical whole. This external relation between the
finished product, and its various and diverse elements makes it, as well in this case as in the case
of all similar finished articles, a matter of chance whether the detail labourers are brought
together in one workshop or not. The detail operations may further be carried on like so many
independent handicrafts, as they are in the Cantons of Vaud and Neufchâtel; while in Geneva
there exist large watch manufactories where the detail labourers directly co-operate under the
control of a single capitalist. And even in the latter case the dial, the springs, and the case, are
seldom made in the factory itself. To carry on the trade as a manufacture, with concentration of
workmen, is, in the watch trade, profitable only under exceptional conditions, because
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competition is greater between the labourers who desire to work at home, and because the
splitting up of the work into a number of heterogeneous processes, permits but little use of the
instruments of labour in common, and the capitalist, by scattering the work, saves the outlay on
workshops, &c. 7 Nevertheless the position of this detail labourer who, though he works at home,
does so for a capitalist (manufacturer, établisseur), is very different from that of the independent
artificer, who works for his own customers. 8
The second kind of manufacture, its perfected form, produces articles that go through connected
phases of development, through a series of processes step by step, like the wire in the
manufacture of needles, which passes through the hands of 72 and sometimes even 92 different
detail workmen.
In so far as such a manufacture, when first started, combines scattered handicrafts, it lessens the
space by which the various phases of production are separated from each other. The time taken in
passing from one stage to another is shortened, so is the labour that effectuates this passage.9 In
comparison with a handicraft, productive power is gained, and this gain is owing to the general
co-operative character of manufacture. On the other hand, division of labour, which is the
distinguishing principle of manufacture, requires the isolation of the various stages of production
and their independence of each other. The establishment and maintenance of a connexion
between the isolated functions necessitates the incessant transport of the article from one hand to
another, and from one process to another. From the standpoint of modern mechanical industry,
this necessity stands forth as a characteristic and costly disadvantage, and one that is immanent in
the principle of manufacture. 10
If we confine our attention to some particular lot of raw materials, of rags, for instance, in paper
manufacture, or of wire in needle manufacture, we perceive that it passes in succession through a
series of stages in the hands of the various detail workmen until completion. On the other hand, if
we look at the workshop as a whole, we see the raw material in all the stages of its production at
the same time. The collective labourer, with one set of his many hands armed with one kind of
tools, draws the wire, with another set, armed with different tools, he, at the same time,
straightens it, with another, he cuts it, with another, points it, and so on. The different detail
processes, which were successive in time, have become simultaneous, go on side by side in space.
Hence, production of a greater quantum of finished commodities in a given time. 11 This
simultaneity, it is true, is due to the general co-operative form of the process as a whole; but
Manufacture not only finds the conditions for co-operation ready to hand, it also, to some extent,
creates them by the sub-division of handicraft labour. On the other hand, it accomplishes this
social organisation of the labour-process only by riveting each labourer to a single fractional
detail.
Since the fractional product of each detail labourer is, at the same time, only a particular stage in
the development of one and the same finished article, each labourer, or each group of labourers,
prepares the raw material for another labourer or group. The result of the labour of the one is the
starting-point for the labour of the other. The one workman therefore gives occupation directly to
the other. The labour-time necessary in each partial process, for attaining the desired effect, is
learnt by experience; and the mechanism of Manufacture, as a whole, is based on the assumption
that a given result will be obtained in a given time. It is only on this assumption that the various
supplementary labour-processes can proceed uninterruptedly, simultaneously, and side by side. It
is clear that this direct dependence of the operations, and therefore of the labourers, on each other,
compels each one of them to spend on his work no more than the necessary time, and thus a
continuity, uniformity, regularity, order, 12 and even intensity of labour, of quite a different kind,
is begotten than is to be found in an independent handicraft or even in simple co-operation. The
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rule, that the labour-time expended on a commodity should not exceed that which is socially
necessary for its production, appears, in the production of commodities generally, to be
established by the mere effect of competition; since, to express ourselves superficially, each
single producer is obliged to sell his commodity at its market-price. In Manufacture, on the
contrary, the turning out of a given quantum of product in a given time is a technical law of the
process of production itself. 13
Different operations take, however, unequal periods, and yield therefore, in equal times unequal
quantities of fractional products. If, therefore, the same labourer has, day after day, to perform the
same operation, there must be a different number of labourers for each operation; for instance, in
type manufacture, there are four founders and two breakers to one rubber: the founder casts 2,000
type an hour, the breaker breaks up 4,000, and the rubber polishes 8,000. Here we have again the
principle of co-operation in its simplest form, the simultaneous employment of many doing the
same thing; only now, this principle is the expression of an organic relation. The division of
labour, as carried out in Manufacture, not only simplifies and multiplies the qualitatively different
parts of the social collective labourer, but also creates a fixed mathematical relation or ratio which
regulates the quantitative extent of those parts i.e., the relative number of labourers, or the relative
size of the group of labourers, for each detail operation. It develops, along with the qualitative
sub-division of the social labour-process, a quantitative rule and proportionality for that process.
When once the most fitting proportion has been experimentally established for the numbers of the
detail labourers in the various groups when producing on a given scale, that scale can be extended
only by employing a multiple of each particular group. 14 There is this to boot, that the same
individual can do certain kinds of work just as well on a large as on a small scale; for instance,
the labour of superintendence, the carriage of the fractional product from one stage to the next,
&c. The isolation of such functions, their allotment to a particular labourer, does not become
advantageous till after an increase in the number of labourers employed; but this increase must
affect every group proportionally.
The isolated group of labourers to whom any particular detail function is assigned, is made up of
homogeneous elements, and is one of the constituent parts of the total mechanism. In many
manufactures, however, the group itself is an organised body of labour, the total mechanism
being a repetition or multiplication of these elementary organisms. Take, for instance, the
manufacture of glass bottles. It may be resolved into three essentially different stages. First, the
preliminary stage, consisting of the preparation of the components of the glass, mixing the sand
and lime, &c., and melting them into a fluid mass of glass.15 Various detail labourers are
employed in this first stage, as also in the final one of removing the bottles from the drying
furnace, sorting and packing them, &c. In the middle, between these two stages, comes the glass
melting proper, the manipulation of the fluid mass. At each mouth of the furnace, there works a
group, called “the hole,” consisting of one bottlemaker or finisher, one blower, one gatherer, one
putter-up or whetter-off, and one taker-in. These five detail workers are so many special organs of
a single working organism that acts only as a whole, and therefore can operate only by the direct
co-operation of the whole five. The whole body is paralysed if but one of its members be
wanting. But a glass furnace has several openings (in England from 4 to 6), each of which
contains an earthenware melting-pot full of molten glass, and employs a similar five-membered
group of workers. The organisation of each group is based on division of labour, but the bond
between the different groups is simple co-operation, which, by using in common one of the
means of production, the furnace, causes it to be more economically consumed. Such a furnace,
with its 4-6 groups, constitutes a glass house; and a glass manufactory comprises a number of
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such glass houses, together with the apparatus and workmen requisite for the preparatory and
final stages.
Finally, just as Manufacture arises in part from the combination of various handicrafts, so, too, it
develops into a combination of various manufactures. The larger English glass manufacturers, for
instance, make their own earthenware melting-pots, because, on the quality of these depends, to a
great extent, the success or failure of the process. The manufacture of one of the means of
production is here united with that of the product. On the other hand, the manufacture of the
product may be united with other manufactures, of which that product is the raw material, or with
the products of which it is itself subsequently mixed. Thus, we find the manufacture of flint glass
combined with that of glass cutting and brass founding; the latter for the metal settings of various
articles of glass. The various manufactures so combined form more or less separate departments
of a larger manufacture, but are at the same time independent processes, each with its own
division of labour. In spite of the many advantages offered by this combination of manufactures,
it never grows into a complete technical system on its own foundation. That happens only on its
transformation into an industry carried on by machinery.
Early in the manufacturing period, the principle of lessening the necessary labour-time in the
production of commodities 16, was accepted and formulated: and the use of machines, especially
for certain simple first processes that have to be conducted on a very large scale, and with the
application of great force, sprang up here and there. Thus, at an early period in paper
manufacture, the tearing up of the rags was done by paper-mills; and in metal works, the
pounding of the ores was effected by stamping mills.17 The Roman Empire had handed down the
elementary form of all machinery in the water-wheel. 18
The handicraft period bequeathed to us the great inventions of the compass, of gunpowder, of
type-printing, and of the automatic clock. But, on the whole, machinery played that subordinate
part which Adam Smith assigns to it in comparison with division of labour.19 The sporadic use of
machinery in the 17th century was of the greatest importance, because it supplied the great
mathematicians of that time with a practical basis and stimulant to the creation of the science of
mechanics.
The collective labourer, formed by the combination of a number of detail labourers, is the
machinery specially characteristic of the manufacturing period. The various operations that are
performed in turns by the producer of a commodity, and coalesce one with another during the
progress of production, lay claim to him in various ways. In one operation he must exert more
strength, in another more skill, in another more attention; and the same individual does not
possess all these qualities in an equal degree. After Manufacture has once separated, made
independent, and isolated the various operations, the labourers are divided, classified, and
grouped according to their predominating qualities. If their natural endowments are, on the one
hand, the foundation on which the division of labour is built up, on the other hand, Manufacture,
once introduced, develops in them new powers that are by nature fitted only for limited and
special functions. The collective labourer now possesses, in an equal degree of excellence, all the
qualities requisite for production, and expends them in the most economical manner, by
exclusively employing all his organs, consisting of particular labourers, or groups of labourers, in
performing their special functions.20 The one-sidedness and the deficiencies of the detail labourer
become perfections when he is a part of the collective labourer.21 The habit of doing only one
thing converts him into a never failing instrument, while his connexion with the whole
mechanism compels him to work with the regularity of the parts of a machine.22
Since the collective labourer has functions, both simple and complex, both high and low, his
members, the individual labour-powers, require different degrees of training, and must therefore
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have different values. Manufacture, therefore, develops a hierarchy of labour-powers, to which
there corresponds a scale of wages. If, on the one hand, the individual labourers are appropriated
and annexed for life by a limited function; on the other hand, the various operations of the
hierarchy are parcelled out among the labourers according to both their natural and their acquired
capabilities. 23 Every process of production, however, requires certain simple manipulations,
which every man is capable of doing. They too are now severed from their connexion with the
more pregnant moments of activity, and ossified into exclusive functions of specially appointed
labourers. Hence, Manufacture begets, in every handicraft that it seizes upon, a class of so-called
unskilled labourers, a class which handicraft industry strictly excluded. If it develops a one-sided
speciality into a perfection, at the expense of the whole of a man’s working capacity, it also
begins to make a speciality of the absence of all development. Alongside of the hierarchic
gradation there steps the simple separation of the labourers into skilled and unskilled. For the
latter, the cost of apprenticeship vanishes; for the former, it diminishes, compared with that of
artificers, in consequence of the functions being simplified. In both cases the value of labourpower falls. 24 An exception to this law holds good whenever the decomposition of the labourprocess begets new and comprehensive functions, that either had no place at all, or only a very
modest one, in handicrafts. The fall in the value of labour-power, caused by the disappearance or
diminution of the expenses of apprenticeship, implies a direct increase of surplus-value for the
benefit of capital; for everything that shortens the necessary labour-time required for the
reproduction of labour-power, extends the domain of surplus labour.

Section 4: Division of Labour in Manufacture, and Division of
Labour in Society
We first considered the origin of Manufacture, then its simple elements, then the detail labourer
and his implements, and finally, the totality of the mechanism. We shall now lightly touch upon
the relation between the division of labour in manufacture, and the social division of labour,
which forms the foundation of all production of commodities.
If we keep labour alone in view, we may designate the separation of social production into its
main divisions or genera – viz., agriculture, industries, &c., as division of labour in general, and
the splitting up of these families into species and sub-species, as division of labour in particular,
and the division of labour within the workshop as division of labour in singular or in detail. 25
Division of labour in a society, and the corresponding tying down of individuals to a particular
calling, develops itself, just as does the division of labour in manufacture, from opposite startingpoints. Within a family, 26 and after further development within a tribe, there springs up naturally
a division of labour, caused by differences of sex and age, a division that is consequently based
on a purely physiological foundation, which division enlarges its materials by the expansion of
the community, by the increase of population, and more especially, by the conflicts between
different tribes, and the subjugation of one tribe by another. On the other hand, as I have before
remarked, the exchange of products springs up at the points where different families, tribes,
communities, come in contact; for, in the beginning of civilisation, it is not private individuals but
families, tribes, &c., that meet on an independent footing. Different communities find different
means of production, and different means of subsistence in their natural environment. Hence,
their modes of production, and of living, and their products are different. It is this spontaneously
developed difference which, when different communities come in contact, calls forth the mutual
exchange of products, and the consequent gradual conversion of those products into commodities.
Exchange does not create the differences between the spheres of production, but brings what are
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already different into relation, and thus converts them into more or less inter-dependent branches
of the collective production of an enlarged society. In the latter case, the social division of labour
arises from the exchange between spheres of production, that are originally distinct and
independent of one another. In the former, where the physiological division of labour is the
starting-point, the particular organs of a compact whole grow loose, and break off, principally
owing to the exchange of commodities with foreign communities, and then isolate themselves so
far, that the sole bond, still connecting the various kinds of work, is the exchange of the products
as commodities. In the one case, it is the making dependent what was before independent; in the
other case, the making independent what was before dependent.
The foundation of every division of labour that is well developed, and brought about by the
exchange of commodities, is the separation between town and country. 27 It may be said, that the
whole economic history of society is summed up in the movement of this antithesis. We pass it
over, however, for the present.
Just as a certain number of simultaneously employed labourers are the material pre-requisites for
division of labour in manufacture, so are the number and density of the population, which here
correspond to the agglomeration in one workshop, a necessary condition for the division of labour
in society. 28 Nevertheless, this density is more or less relative. A relatively thinly populated
country, with well-developed means of communication, has a denser population than a more
numerously populated country, with badly-developed means of communication; and in this sense
the Northern States of the American Union, for instance, are more thickly populated than India.29
Since the production and the circulation of commodities are the general pre-requisites of the
capitalist mode of production, division of labour in manufacture demands, that division of labour
in society at large should previously have attained a certain degree of development. Inversely, the
former division reacts upon and develops and multiplies the latter. Simultaneously, with the
differentiation of the instruments of labour, the industries that produce these instruments, become
more and more differentiated. 30 If the manufacturing system seize upon an industry, which,
previously, was carried on in connexion with others, either as a chief or as a subordinate industry,
and by one producer, these industries immediately separate their connexion, and become
independent. If it seize upon a particular stage in the production of a commodity, the other stages
of its production become converted into so many independent industries. It has already been
stated, that where the finished article consists merely of a number of parts fitted together, the
detail operations may re-establish themselves as genuine and separate handicrafts. In order to
carry out more perfectly the division of labour in manufacture, a single branch of production is,
according to the varieties of its raw material, or the various forms that one and the same raw
material may assume, split up into numerous, and to some extent, entirely new manufactures.
Accordingly, in France alone, in the first half of the 18th century, over 100 different kinds of silk
stuffs were woven, and, in Avignon, it was law, that “every apprentice should devote himself to
only one sort of fabrication, and should not learn the preparation of several kinds of stuff at
once.” The territorial division of labour, which confines special branches of production to special
districts of a country, acquires fresh stimulus from the manufacturing system, which exploits
every special advantage. 31 The Colonial system and the opening out of the markets of the world,
both of which are included in the general conditions of existence of the manufacturing period,
furnish rich material for developing the division of labour in society. It is not the place, here, to
go on to show how division of labour seizes upon, not only the economic, but every other sphere
of society, and everywhere lays the foundation of that all engrossing system of specialising and
sorting men, that development in a man of one single faculty at the expense of all other faculties,
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which caused A. Ferguson, the master of Adam Smith, to exclaim: “We make a nation of Helots,
and have no free citizens.” 32
But, in spite of the numerous analogies and links connecting them, division of labour in the
interior of a society, and that in the interior of a workshop, differ not only in degree, but also in
kind. The analogy appears most indisputable where there is an invisible bond uniting the various
branches of trade. For instance the cattle-breeder produces hides, the tanner makes the hides into
leather, and the shoemaker, the leather into boots. Here the thing produced by each of them is but
a step towards the final form, which is the product of all their labours combined. There are,
besides, all the various industries that supply the cattle-breeder, the tanner, and the shoemaker
with the means of production. Now it is quite possible to imagine, with Adam Smith, that the
difference between the above social division of labour, and the division in manufacture, is merely
subjective, exists merely for the observer, who, in a manufacture, can see with one glance, all the
numerous operations being performed on one spot, while in the instance given above, the
spreading out of the work over great areas, and the great number of people employed in each
branch of labour, obscure the connexion. 33 But what is it that forms the bond between the
independent labours of the cattle-breeder, the tanner, and the shoemaker? It is the fact that their
respective products are commodities. What, on the other hand, characterises division of labour in
manufactures? The fact that the detail labourer produces no commodities.34 It is only the common
product of all the detail labourers that becomes a commodity. 35 Division of labour in society is
brought about by the purchase and sale of the products of different branches of industry, while the
connexion between the detail operations in a workshop, is due to the sale of the labour-power of
several workmen to one capitalist, who applies it as combined labour-power. The division of
labour in the workshop implies concentration of the means of production in the hands of one
capitalist; the division of labour in society implies their dispersion among many independent
producers of commodities. While within the workshop, the iron law of proportionality subjects
definite numbers of workmen to definite functions, in the society outside the workshop, chance
and caprice have full play in distributing the producers and their means of production among the
various branches of industry. The different spheres of production, it is true, constantly tend to an
equilibrium: for, on the one hand, while each producer of a commodity is bound to produce a usevalue, to satisfy a particular social want, and while the extent of these wants differs quantitatively,
still there exists an inner relation which settles their proportions into a regular system, and that
system one of spontaneous growth; and, on the other hand, the law of the value of commodities
ultimately determines how much of its disposable working-time society can expend on each
particular class of commodities. But this constant tendency to equilibrium, of the various spheres
of production, is exercised, only in the shape of a reaction against the constant upsetting of this
equilibrium. The a priori system on which the division of labour, within the workshop, is
regularly carried out, becomes in the division of labour within the society, an a posteriori, natureimposed necessity, controlling the lawless caprice of the producers, and perceptible in the
barometrical fluctuations of the market-prices. Division of labour within the workshop implies
the undisputed authority of the capitalist over men, that are but parts of a mechanism that belongs
to him. The division of labour within the society brings into contact independent commodityproducers, who acknowledge no other authority but that of competition, of the coercion exerted
by the pressure of their mutual interests; just as in the animal kingdom, the bellum omnium contra
omnes [war of all against all – Hobbes] more or less preserves the conditions of existence of
every species. The same bourgeois mind which praises division of labour in the workshop, lifelong annexation of the labourer to a partial operation, and his complete subjection to capital, as
being an organisation of labour that increases its productiveness - that same bourgeois mind
denounces with equal vigour every conscious attempt to socially control and regulate the process
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of production, as an inroad upon such sacred things as the rights of property, freedom and
unrestricted play for the bent of the individual capitalist. It is very characteristic that the
enthusiastic apologists of the factory system have nothing more damning to urge against a general
organisation of the labour of society, than that it would turn all society into one immense factory.
If, in a society with capitalist production, anarchy in the social division of labour and despotism
in that of the workshop are mutual conditions the one of the other, we find, on the contrary, in
those earlier forms of society in which the separation of trades has been spontaneously developed,
then crystallised, and finally made permanent by law, on the one hand, a specimen of the
organisation of the labour of society, in accordance with an approved and authoritative plan, and
on the other, the entire exclusion of division of labour in the workshop, or at all events a mere
dwarflike or sporadic and accidental development of the same. 36
Those small and extremely ancient Indian communities, some of which have continued down to
this day, are based on possession in common of the land, on the blending of agriculture and
handicrafts, and on an unalterable division of labour, which serves, whenever a new community
is started, as a plan and scheme ready cut and dried. Occupying areas of from 100 up to several
thousand acres, each forms a compact whole producing all it requires. The chief part of the
products is destined for direct use by the community itself, and does not take the form of a
commodity. Hence, production here is independent of that division of labour brought about, in
Indian society as a whole, by means of the exchange of commodities. It is the surplus alone that
becomes a commodity, and a portion of even that, not until it has reached the hands of the State,
into whose hands from time immemorial a certain quantity of these products has found its way in
the shape of rent in kind. The constitution of these communities varies in different parts of India.
In those of the simplest form, the land is tilled in common, and the produce divided among the
members. At the same time, spinning and weaving are carried on in each family as subsidiary
industries. Side by side with the masses thus occupied with one and the same work, we find the
“chief inhabitant,” who is judge, police, and tax-gatherer in one; the book-keeper, who keeps the
accounts of the tillage and registers everything relating thereto; another official, who prosecutes
criminals, protects strangers travelling through and escorts them to the next village; the boundary
man, who guards the boundaries against neighbouring communities; the water-overseer, who
distributes the water from the common tanks for irrigation; the Brahmin, who conducts the
religious services; the schoolmaster, who on the sand teaches the children reading and writing;
the calendar-Brahmin, or astrologer, who makes known the lucky or unlucky days for seed-time
and harvest, and for every other kind of agricultural work; a smith and a carpenter, who make and
repair all the agricultural implements; the potter, who makes all the pottery of the village; the
barber, the washerman, who washes clothes, the silversmith, here and there the poet, who in some
communities replaces the silversmith, in others the schoolmaster. This dozen of individuals is
maintained at the expense of the whole community. If the population increases, a new community
is founded, on the pattern of the old one, on unoccupied land. The whole mechanism discloses a
systematic division of labour; but a division like that in manufactures is impossible, since the
smith and the carpenter, &c., find an unchanging market, and at the most there occur, according
to the sizes of the villages, two or three of each, instead of one.37 The law that regulates the
division of labour in the community acts with the irresistible authority of a law of Nature, at the
same time that each individual artificer, the smith, the carpenter, and so on, conducts in his
workshop all the operations of his handicraft in the traditional way, but independently, and
without recognising any authority over him. The simplicity of the organisation for production in
these self-sufficing communities that constantly reproduce themselves in the same form, and
when accidentally destroyed, spring up again on the spot and with the same name 38 - this
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simplicity supplies the key to the secret of the unchangeableness of Asiatic societies, an
unchangeableness in such striking contrast with the constant dissolution and refounding of Asiatic
States, and the never-ceasing changes of dynasty. The structure of the economic elements of
society remains untouched by the storm-clouds of the political sky.
The rules of the guilds, as I have said before, by limiting most strictly the number of apprentices
and journeymen that a single master could employ, prevented him from becoming a capitalist.
Moreover, he could not employ his journeymen in many other handicrafts than the one in which
he was a master. The guilds zealously repelled every encroachment by the capital of merchants,
the only form of free capital with which they came in contact. A merchant could buy every kind
of commodity, but labour as a commodity he could not buy. He existed only on sufferance, as a
dealer in the products of the handicrafts. If circumstances called for a further division of labour,
the existing guilds split themselves up into varieties, or founded new guilds by the side of the old
ones; all this, however, without concentrating various handicrafts in a single workshop. Hence,
the guild organisation, however much it may have contributed by separating, isolating, and
perfecting the handicrafts, to create the material conditions for the existence of manufacture,
excluded division of labour in the workshop. On the whole, the labourer and his means of
production remained closely united, like the snail with its shell, and thus there was wanting the
principal basis of manufacture, the separation of the labourer from his means of production, and
the conversion of these means into capital.
While division of labour in society at large, whether such division be brought about or not by
exchange of commodities, is common to economic formations of society the most diverse,
division of labour in the workshop, as practised by manufacture, is a special creation of the
capitalist mode of production alone.

Section 5: The Capitalistic Character of Manufacture
An increased number of labourers under the control of one capitalist is the natural starting-point,
as well of co-operation generally, as of manufacture in particular. But the division of labour in
manufacture makes this increase in the number of workmen a technical necessity. The minimum
number that any given capitalist is bound to employ is here prescribed by the previously
established division of labour. On the other hand, the advantages of further division are
obtainable only by adding to the number of workmen, and this can be done only by adding
multiples of the various detail groups. But an increase in the variable component of the capital
employed necessitates an increase in its constant component, too, in the workshops, implements,
&c., and, in particular, in the raw material, the call for which grows quicker than the number of
workmen. The quantity of it consumed in a given time, by a given amount of labour, increases in
the same ratio as does the productive power of that labour in consequence of its division. Hence,
it is a law, based on the very nature of manufacture, that the minimum amount of capital, which is
bound to be in the hands of each capitalist, must keep increasing; in other words, that the
transformation into capital of the social means of production and subsistence must keep
extending. 39
In manufacture, as well as in simple co-operation, the collective working organism is a form of
existence of capital. The mechanism that is made up of numerous individual detail labourers
belongs to the capitalist. Hence, the productive power resulting from a combination of labours
appears to be the productive power of capital. Manufacture proper not only subjects the
previously independent workman to the discipline and command of capital, but, in addition,
creates a hierarchic gradation of the workmen themselves. While simple co-operation leaves the
mode of working by the individual for the most part unchanged, manufacture thoroughly
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revolutionises it, and seizes labour-power by its very roots. It converts the labourer into a crippled
monstrosity, by forcing his detail dexterity at the expense of a world of productive capabilities
and instincts; just as in the States of La Plata they butcher a whole beast for the sake of his hide or
his tallow. Not only is the detail work distributed to the different individuals, but the individual
himself is made the automatic motor of a fractional operation,40 and the absurd fable of Menenius
Agrippa, which makes man a mere fragment of his own body, becomes realised. 41 If, at first, the
workman sells his labour-power to capital, because the material means of producing a commodity
fail him, now his very labour-power refuses its services unless it has been sold to capital. Its
functions can be exercised only in an environment that exists in the workshop of the capitalist
after the sale. By nature unfitted to make anything independently, the manufacturing labourer
develops productive activity as a mere appendage of the capitalist’s workshop. 42 As the chosen
people bore in their features the sign manual of Jehovah, so division of labour brands the
manufacturing workman as the property of capital.
The knowledge, the judgement, and the will, which, though in ever so small a degree, are
practised by the independent peasant or handicraftsman, in the same way as the savage makes the
whole art of war consist in the exercise of his personal cunning these faculties are now required
only for the workshop as a whole. Intelligence in production expands in one direction, because it
vanishes in many others. What is lost by the detail labourers, is concentrated in the capital that
employs them. 43 It is a result of the division of labour in manufactures, that the labourer is
brought face to face with the intellectual potencies of the material process of production, as the
property of another, and as a ruling power. This separation begins in simple co-operation, where
the capitalist represents to the single workman, the oneness and the will of the associated labour.
It is developed in manufacture which cuts down the labourer into a detail labourer. It is completed
in modern industry, which makes science a productive force distinct from labour and presses it
into the service of capital.44
In manufacture, in order to make the collective labourer, and through him capital, rich in social
productive power, each labourer must be made poor in individual productive powers.
“Ignorance is the mother of industry as well as of superstition. Reflection and
fancy are subject to err; but a habit of moving the hand or the foot is independent
of either. Manufactures, accordingly, prosper most where the mind is least
consulted, and where the workshop may ... be considered as an engine, the parts of
which are men.” 45
As a matter of fact, some few manufacturers in the middle of the 18th century preferred, for
certain operations that were trade secrets, to employ half-idiotic persons. 46
“The understandings of the greater part of men,” says Adam Smith, “are
necessarily formed by their ordinary employments. The man whose whole life is
spent in performing a few simple operations ... has no occasion to exert his
understanding... He generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a
human creature to become.”
After describing the stupidity of the detail labourer he goes on:
“The uniformity of his stationary life naturally corrupts the courage of his mind...
It corrupts even the activity of his body and renders him incapable of exerting his
strength with vigour and perseverance in any other employments than that to
which he has been bred. His dexterity at his own particular trade seems in this
manner to be acquired at the expense of his intellectual, social, and martial
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virtues. But in every improved and civilised society, this is the state into which the
labouring poor, that is, the great body of the people, must necessarily fall.”47
For preventing the complete deterioration of the great mass of the people by division of labour, A.
Smith recommends education of the people by the State, but prudently, and in homeopathic
doses. G. Garnier, his French translator and commentator, who, under the first French Empire,
quite naturally developed into a senator, quite as naturally opposes him on this point. Education
of the masses, he urges, violates the first law of the division of labour, and with it
“our whole social system would be proscribed.” "Like all other divisions of
labour,” he says, “that between hand labour and head labour 48 is more
pronounced and decided in proportion as society (he rightly uses this word, for
capital, landed property and their State) becomes richer. This division of labour,
like every other, is an effect of past, and a cause of future progress... ought the
government then to work in opposition to this division of labour, and to hinder its
natural course? Ought it to expend a part of the public money in the attempt to
confound and blend together two classes of labour, which are striving after
division and separation?” 49
Some crippling of body and mind is inseparable even from division of labour in society as a
whole. Since, however, manufacture carries this social separation of branches of labour much
further, and also, by its peculiar division, attacks the individual at the very roots of his life50, it is
the first to afford the materials for, and to give a start to, industrial pathology.
“To subdivide a man is to execute him, if he deserves the sentence, to assassinate
him if he does not... The subdivision of labour is the assassination of a people.” 51
Co-operation based on division of labour, in other words, manufacture, commences as a
spontaneous formation. So soon as it attains some consistence and extension, it becomes the
recognised methodical and systematic form of capitalist production. History shows how the
division of labour peculiar to manufacture, strictly so called, acquires the best adapted form at
first by experience, as it were behind the backs of the actors, and then, like the guild handicrafts,
strives to hold fast that form when once found, and here and there succeeds in keeping it for
centuries. Any alteration in this form, except in trivial matters, is solely owing to a revolution in
the instruments of labour. Modern manufacture wherever it arises - I do not here allude to modern
industry based on machinery - either finds the disjecta membra poetae ready to hand, and only
waiting to be collected together, as is the case in the manufacture of clothes in large towns, or it
can easily apply the principle of division, simply by exclusively assigning the various operations
of a handicraft (such as book-binding) to particular men. In such cases, a week’s experience is
enough to determine the proportion between the numbers of the hands necessary for the various
functions. 52
By decomposition of handicrafts, by specialisation of the instruments of labour, by the formation
of detail labourers, and by grouping and combining the latter into a single mechanism, division of
labour in manufacture creates a qualitative gradation, and a quantitative proportion in the social
process of production; it consequently creates a definite organisation of the labour of society, and
thereby develops at the same time new productive forces in the society. In its specific capitalist
form - and under the given conditions, it could take no other form than a capitalistic one manufacture is but a particular method of begetting relative surplus-value, or of augmenting at the
expense of the labourer the self-expansion of capital - usually called social wealth, “Wealth of
Nations,” &c. It increases the social productive power of labour, not only for the benefit of the
capitalist instead of for that of the labourer, but it does this by crippling the individual labourers.
It creates new conditions for the lordship of capital over labour. If, therefore, on the one hand, it
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presents itself historically as a progress and as a necessary phase in the economic development of
society, on the other hand, it is a refined and civilised method of exploitation.
Political Economy, which as an independent science, first sprang into being during the period of
manufacture, views the social division of labour only from the standpoint of manufacture,53 and
sees in it only the means of producing more commodities with a given quantity of labour, and,
consequently, of cheapening commodities and hurrying on the accumulation of capital. In most
striking contrast with this accentuation of quantity and exchange-value, is the attitude of the
writers of classical antiquity, who hold exclusively by quality and use-value. 54 In consequence of
the separation of the social branches of production, commodities are better made, the various
bents and talents of men select a suitable field,55 and without some restraint no important results
can be obtained anywhere. 56 Hence both product and producer are improved by division of
labour. If the growth of the quantity produced is occasionally mentioned, this is only done with
reference to the greater abundance of use-values. There is not a word alluding to exchange-value
or to the cheapening of commodities. This aspect, from the standpoint of use-value alone, is taken
as well by Plato, 57 who treats division of labour as the foundation on which the division of
society into classes is based, as by Xenophon 58, who with characteristic bourgeois instinct,
approaches more nearly to division of labour within the workshop. Plato’s Republic, in so far as
division of labour is treated in it, as the formative principle of the State, is merely the Athenian
idealisation of the Egyptian system of castes, Egypt having served as the model of an industrial
country to many of his contemporaries also, amongst others to Isocrates,59 and it continued to
have this importance to the Greeks of the Roman Empire.60
During the manufacturing period proper, i.e., the period during which manufacture is the
predominant form taken by capitalist production, many obstacles are opposed to the full
development of the peculiar tendencies of manufacture. Although manufacture creates, as we
have already seen, a simple separation of the labourers into skilled and unskilled, simultaneously
with their hierarchic arrangement in classes, yet the number of the unskilled labourers, owing to
the preponderating influence of the skilled, remains very limited. Although it adapts the detail
operations to the various degrees of maturity, strength, and development of the living instruments
of labour, thus conducing to exploitation of women and children, yet this tendency as a whole is
wrecked on the habits and the resistance of the male labourers. Although the splitting up of
handicrafts lowers the cost of forming the workman, and thereby lowers his value, yet for the
more difficult detail work, a longer apprenticeship is necessary, and, even where it would be
superfluous, is jealously insisted upon by the workmen. In England, for instance, we find the laws
of apprenticeship, with their seven years’ probation, in full force down to the end of the
manufacturing period; and they are not thrown on one side till the advent of Modern Industry.
Since handicraft skill is the foundation of manufacture, and since the mechanism of manufacture
as a whole possesses no framework, apart from the labourers themselves, capital is constantly
compelled to wrestle with the insubordination of the workmen.
“By the infirmity of human nature,” says friend Ure, “it happens that the more
skilful the workman, the more self-willed and intractable he is apt to become, and
of course the less fit a component of a mechanical system in which ... he may do
great damage to the whole” 61
Hence throughout the whole manufacturing period there runs the complaint of want of discipline
among the workmen 62. And had we not the testimony of contemporary writers, the simple facts,
that during the period between the 16th century and the epoch of Modern Industry, capital failed
to become the master of the whole disposable working-time of the manufacturing labourers, that
manufactures are short-lived, and change their locality from one country to another with the
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emigrating or immigrating workmen, these facts would speak volumes. “Order must in one way
or another be established,” exclaims in 1770 the oft-cited author of the “Essay on Trade and
Commerce.” “Order,” re-echoes Dr. Andrew Ure 66 years later, “Order” was wanting in
manufacture based on “the scholastic dogma of division of labour,” and “Arkwright created
order.”
At the same time manufacture was unable, either to seize upon the production of society to its full
extent, or to revolutionise that production to its very core. It towered up as an economic work of
art, on the broad foundation of the town handicrafts, and of the rural domestic industries. At a
given stage in its development, the narrow technical basis on which manufacture rested, came
into conflict with requirements of production that were created by manufacture itself.
One of its most finished creations was the workshop for the production of the instruments of
labour themselves, including especially the complicated mechanical apparatus then already
employed.
A machine-factory, says Ure, “displayed the division of labour in manifold
gradations - the file, the drill, the lathe, having each its different workman in the
order of skill.” (P. 21.)
This workshop, the product of the division of labour in manufacture, produced in its turn machines. It is they that sweep away the handicraftsman’s work as the regulating principle of
social production. Thus, on the one hand, the technical reason for the life-long annexation of the
workman to a detail function is removed. On the other hand, the fetters that this same principle
laid on the dominion of capital, fall away.
1

To give a more modern instance: The silk spinning and weaving of Lyon and Nîmes “est toute
patriarcale; elle emploie beaucoup de femmes et d’enfants, mais sans les épuiser ni les corrompre; elle
les laisse dans leur belles valises de la Drôme, du Var, de l’Isère, de Vaucluse, pour y élever des vers
et dévider leurs cocons; jamais elle n’entre dans une véritable fabrique. Pour être aussi bien observé ...
le principe de la division du travail s’y revêt d’un caractère spécial. Il y a bien des dévideuses, des
moulineurs, des teinturiers, des encolleurs, puis des tisserands; mais ils ne sont pas réunis dans un
même établissement, ne dépendent pas d’un même maître, tous ils sont indépendants” [... is entirely
patriarchal; it employs a large number of women and children, but without exhausting or ruining
them; it allows them to stay in their beautiful valleys of the Drôme, the Var, the Isère, the Vaucluse,
cultuvating their silkworms and unwinding their cocoons; it never becomes a true factory industry.
However, the principle of the division of labour takes on a special character here. There do indeed
exist winders, throwsters. dyers, sizers, and finally weavers; but they are not assembled in the same
workshop, nor are they dependent on a single master; they are all independent] (A. Blanqui: “Cours,
d’Econ. Industrielle.” Recueilli par A. Blaise. Paris, 1838-39, p. 79.) Since Blanqui wrote this, the
various independent labourers have, to some extent, been united in factories. [And since Marx wrote
the above, the power-loom has invaded these factories, and is now 1886 rapidly superseding the handloom. (Added in the 4th German edition. The Krefeld silk industry also has its tale to tell anent this
subject.) F. E.]
2
“The more any manufacture of much variety shall be distributed and assigned to different artists, the
same must needs be better done and with greater expedition, with less loss of time and labour.” (“The
Advantages of the East India Trade,” Lond., 1720, p. 71.)
3
“Easy labour is transmitted skill.” (Th. Hodgskin, “Popular Political Economy,” p. 48.)
4
“The arts also have ... in Egypt reached the requisite degree of perfection. For it is the only country
where artificers may not in any way meddle with the affairs of another class of citizens, but must
follow that calling alone which by law is hereditary in their clan.... In other countries it is found that
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tradesmen divide their attention between too many objects. At one time they try agriculture, at another
they take to commerce, at another they busy themselves with two or three occupations at once. In free
countries, they mostly frequent the assemblies of the people.... In Egypt, on the contrary, every
artificer is severely punished if he meddles with affairs of State, or carries on several trades at once.
Thus there is nothing to disturb their application to their calling.... Moreover, since, they inherit from
their forefathers numerous rules, they are eager to discover fresh advantages” (Diodorus Siculus: Bibl.
Hist. I. 1. c., 74.)
5
“Historical and descriptive account of Brit. India, &c.,” by Hugh Murray and James Wilson, &c.,
Edinburgh 1832, v. II., p. 449. The Indian loom is upright, i.e., the warp is stretched vertically.
6
Darwin in his epoch-making work on the origin of species, remarks, with reference to the natural
organs of plants and animals: “So long as one and the same organ has different kinds of work to
perform, a ground for its changeability may possibly be found in this, that natural selection preserves
or suppresses each small variation of form less carefully than if that organ were destined for one
special purpose alone. Thus, knives that are adapted to cut all sorts of things, may, on the whole, be of
one shape; but an implement destined to be used exclusively in one way must have a different shape
for every different use.”
7
In the year 1854 Geneva produced 80,000 watches, which is not one-fifth of the production in the
Canton of Neufchâtel. La Chaux-de-Fond alone, which we may look upon as a huge watch
manufactory, produces yearly twice as many as Geneva. From 1850-61 Geneva produced 720,000
watches. See “Report from Geneva on the Watch Trade” in “Reports by H. M.’s Secretaries of
Embassy and Legation on the Manufactures, Commerce, &c., No. 6, 1863.” The want of connexion
alone, between the processes into which the production of articles that merely consist of parts fitted
together is split up, makes it very difficult to convert such a manufacture into a branch of modem
industry carried on by machinery; but in the case of a watch there are two other impediments in
addition, the minuteness and delicacy of its parts, and its character as an article of luxury. Hence their
variety, which is such, that in the best London houses scarcely a dozen watches are made alike in the
course of a year. The watch manufactory of Messrs. Vacheron & Constantin, in which machinery has
been employed with success, produces at the most three or four different varieties of size and form.
8
In watchmaking, that classical example of heterogeneous manufacture, we may study with great
accuracy the above-mentioned differentiation and specialisation of the instruments of labour caused
by the sub-division of handicrafts.
9
“In so close a cohabitation of the people, the carriage must needs be less.” (“The Advantages of the
East India Trade,” p. 106.)
10
“The isolation of the different stages of manufacture, consequent upon the employment of manual
labour, adds immensely to the cost of production, the loss mainly arising from the mere removals from
one process to another.” (“The Industry of Nations.” Lond., 1855, Part II, p. 200.)
11
“It (the division of labour) produces also an economy of time by separating the work into its
different branches, all of which may be carried on into execution at the same moment.... By carrying
on all the different processes at once, which an individual must have executed separately, it becomes
possible to produce a multitude of pins completely finished in the same time as a single pin might
have been either cut or pointed.” (Dugald Stewart, l.c., p. 319.)
12
“The more variety of artists to every manufacture... the greater the order and regularity of every
work, the same must needs be done in less time, the labour must be less.” (“The Advantages,” &c., p.
68.)
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Nevertheless, the manufacturing system, in many branches of industry, attains this result but very
imperfectly, because it knows not how to control with certainty the general chemical and physical
conditions of the process of production.
14
“When (from the peculiar nature of the produce of each manufactory), the number of processes into
which it is most advantageous to divide it is ascertained, as well as the number of individuals to be
employed, then all other manufactories which do not employ a direct multiple of this number will
produce the article at a greater cost.... Hence arises one of the causes of the great size of
manufacturing establishments.” (C. Babbage. “On the Economy of Machinery,” 1st ed. London. 1832.
Ch. xxi, pp. 172-73.)
15
In England, the melting-furnace is distinct from the glass-furnace in which the glass is manipulated.
In Belgium, one and the same furnace serves for both processes.
16
This can be seen from W. Petty, John Bellers, Andrew Yarranton, “The Advantages of the East
India Trade,” and J. Vanderlint, not to mention others.
17
Towards the end of the 16th century, mortars and sieves were still used in France for pounding and
washing ores.
18
The whole history of the development of machinery can be traced in the history of the corn mill.
The factory in England is still a “mill.” In German technological works of the first decade of this
century, the term “Mühle” is still found in use, not only for all machinery driven by the forces of
Nature, but also for all manufactures where apparatus in the nature of machinery is applied.
19
As will be seen more in detail in the fourth book of this work, Adam Smith has not established a
single new proposition relating to division of labour. What, however, characterises him as the political
economist par excellence of the period of Manufacture, is the stress he lays on division of labour. The
subordinate part which he assigns to machinery gave occasion in the early days of modern mechanical
industry to the polemic of Lauderdale, and, at a later period, to that of Ure. A. Smith also confounds
differentiation of the instruments of labour, in which the detail labourers themselves took an active
part, with the invention of machinery; in this latter, it is not the workmen in manufactories, but learned
men, handicraftsman, and even peasants (Brindley), who play a part.
20
“The master manufacturer, by dividing the work to be executed into different processes, each
requiring different degrees of skill or of force, can purchase exactly that precise quantity of both
which is necessary for each process; whereas, if the whole work were executed by one workman, that
person must possess sufficient skill to perform the most difficult, and sufficient strength to execute the
most laborious of the operations into which the article is divided.” (Ch. Babbage, l.c., ch. xix.)
21
For instance, abnormal development of some muscles, curvature of bones, &c.
22
The question put by one of the Inquiry Commissioners, How the young persons are kept steadily to
their work, is very correctly answered by Mr. Wm. Marshall, the general manager of a glass
manufactory: “They cannot well neglect their work; when they once begin, they must go on; they are
just the same as parts of a machine.” (“Children’s Empl. Comm.,” 4th Rep., 1865, p. 247.)
23
Dr. Ure, in his apotheosis of Modern Mechanical Industry, brings out the peculiar character of
manufacture more sharply than previous economists, who had not his polemical interest in the matter,
and more sharply even than his contemporaries Babbage, e.g., who, though much his superior as a
mathematician and mechanician, treated mechanical industry from the standpoint of manufacture
alone. Ure says, “This appropriation ... to each, a workman of appropriate value and cost was naturally
assigned, forms the very essence of division of labour.” On the other hand, he describes this division
as “adaptation of labour to the different talents of men,” and lastly, characterises the whole
manufacturing system as “a system for the division or gradation of labour,” as “the division of labour
into degrees of skill,” &c. (Ure, l.c., pp. 19-23 passim.)
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“Each handicraftsman being ... enabled to perfect himself by practice in one point, became ... a
cheaper workman.” (Ure, l.c., p. 19.)
25
“Division of labour proceeds from the separation of professions the most widely different to that
division, where several labourers divide between them the preparation of one and the same product, as
in manufacture.” (Storch: “Cours d’Econ. Pol.,” Paris Edn. t. I., p. 173.) “Nous rencontrons chez les
peuples parvenus à un certain degré de civilisation trois genres de divisions d’industrie: la première,
que nous nommerons générale, amène la distinction des producteurs en agriculteurs, manufacturiers et
commerçants, elle se rapporte aux trois principales branches d’industrie nationale; la seconde qu’on
pourrait appeler spéciale, est la division de chaque genre d’industrie en espèces ... la troisième division
d’industrie, celle enfin qu’on devrait qualifier de division de la besogne on de travail proprement dit,
est celle qui s’établit dans les arts et les métiers séparés ... qui s’établit dans la plupart des
manufactures et des ateliers.” [Among peoples which have reached a certain level of civilisation, we
meet with three kinds of division of labour: the first, which we shall call general, brings about the
division of the producers into agriculturalists, manufacturers, and traders, it corresponds to the three
main branches of the nation’s labour; the second, which one could call particular, is the division of
labour of each branch into species. ... The third division of labour, which one could designate as a
division of tasks, or of labour properly so called, is that which grows up in the individual crafts and
trades ... which is established in the majority of the manufactories and workshops] (Skarbek, l.c., pp.
84, 85.)
26
Note to the third edition. Subsequent very searching study of the primitive condition of man, led the
author to the conclusion, that it was not the family that originally developed into the tribe, but that, on
the contrary, the tribe was the primitive and spontaneously developed form of human association, on
the basis of blood relationship, and that out of the first incipient loosening of the tribal bonds, the
many and various forms of the family were afterwards developed. [F. E.]
27
Sir James Steuart is the economist who has handled this subject best. How little his book, which
appeared ten years before the “Wealth of Nations,” is known, even at the present time, may be judged
from the fact that the admirers of Malthus do not even know that the first edition of the latter’s work
on population contains, except in the purely declamatory part, very little but extracts from Steuart, and
in a less degree, from Wallace and Townsend.
28
“There is a certain density of population which is convenient, both for social intercourse, and for
that combination of powers by which the produce of labour is increased.” (James Mill, l.c., p. 50.) “As
the number of labourers increases, the productive power of society augments in the compound ratio of
that increase, multiplied by the effects of the division of labour.” (Th. Hodgskin, l.c., pp. 125, 126.)
29
In consequence of the great demand for cotton after 1861, the production of cotton, in some thickly
populated districts of India, was extended at the expense of rice cultivation. In consequence there
arose local famines, the defective means of communication not permitting the failure of rice in one
district to be compensated by importation from another.
30
Thus the fabrication of shuttles formed as early as the 17th century, a special branch of industry in
Holland.
31
Whether the woollen manufacture of England is not divided into several parts or branches
appropriated to particular places, where they are only or principally manufactured; fine cloths in
Somersetshire, coarse in Yorkshire, long ells at Exeter, soies at Sudbury, crapes at Norwich, linseys at
Kendal, blankets at Whitney, and so forth.” (Berkeley: “The Querist,” 1751, § 520.)
32
A. Ferguson: “History of Civil Society.” Edinburgh, 1767; Part iv, sect. ii., p. 285.
33
In manufacture proper, he says, the division of labour appears to be greater, because “those
employed in every different branch of the work can often be collected into the same workhouse, and
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placed at once under the view of the spectator. In those great manufactures, (!) on the contrary, which
are destined to supply the great wants of the great body of the people, every different branch of the
work employs so great a number of workmen, that it is impossible to collect them all into the same
workhouse ... the division is not near so obvious.” (A. Smith: “Wealth of Nations,” bk. i, ch. i.) The
celebrated passage in the same chapter that begins with the words, “Observe the accommodation of
the most common artificer or day-labourer in a civilised and thriving country,” &c., and then proceeds
to depict what an enormous number and variety of industries contribute to the satisfaction of the wants
of an ordinary labourer, is copied almost word for word from B. de Mandeville’s Remarks to his
“Fable of the Bees, or Private Vices, Publick Benefits.” (First ed., without the remarks, 1706; with the
remarks, 1714.)
34
“There is no longer anything which we can call the natural reward of individual labour. Each
labourer produces only some part of a whole, and each part, having no value or utility in itself, there is
nothing on which the labourer can seize, and say: It is my product, this I will keep to myself.”
(“Labour Defended against the Claims of Capital.” Lond., 1825, p. 25.) The author of this admirable
work is the Th. Hodgskin I have already cited.
35
This distinction between division of labour in society and in manufacture, was practically illustrated
to the Yankees. One of the new taxes devised at Washington during the civil war, was the duty of 6%
“on all industrial products.” Question: What is an industrial product? Answer of the legislature: A
thing is produced “when it is made,” and it is made when it is ready for sale. Now, for one example
out of many. The New York and Philadelphia manufacturers had previously been in the habit of
“making” umbrellas with all their belongings. But since an umbrella is a mixtum compositum of very
heterogeneous parts, by degrees these parts became the products of various separate industries, carried
on independently in different places. They entered as separate commodities into the umbrella
manufactory, where they were fitted together. The Yankees have given to articles thus fitted together,
the name of “assembled articles,” a name they deserve, for being an assemblage of taxes. Thus the
umbrella “assembles,” first, 6% on the price of each of its elements, and a further 6% on its own total
price.
36
“On peut... établir en règle générale, que moins l’autorité préside à la division du travail dans
l’intérieur de la société, plus la division du travail se développe dans l’intérieur de l’atelier, et plus elle
y est soumise à l’autorité d’un seul. Ainsi l’autorité dans l’atelier et celle dans la société, par rapport à
la division du travail, sont en raison inverse l’une de l’autre.” [It can ... be laid down as a general rule
that the less authority presides over the division of labour inside society, the more the division of
labour develops inside the workshop, and the more it is subjected there to the authority of a single
person. Thus authority in the workshop and authority in society in relation to the division of labour,
are in inverse ratio to each other] (Karl Marx, “Misère,” &c., pp. 130-131.)
37
Lieut.-Col. Mark Wilks: “Historical Sketches of the South of India.” Lond., 1810-17, v. I., pp. 11820. A good description of the various forms of the Indian communities is to be found in George
Campbell’s “Modern India.” Lond., 1852.
38
“Under this simple form ... the inhabitants of the country have lived from time immemorial. The
boundaries of the villages have been but seldom altered; and though the villages themselves have been
sometimes injured, and even desolated by war, famine, and disease, the same name, the same limits,
the same interests, and even the same families, have continued for ages. The inhabitants give
themselves no trouble about the breaking up and division of kingdoms; while the village remains
entire, they care not to what power it is transferred, or to what sovereign it devolves; its internal
economy remains unchanged.” (Th. Stamford Raffles, late Lieut. Gov. of Java: “The History of Java.”
Lond., 1817, Vol. I., p. 285.)
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“It is not sufficient that the capital” (the writer should have said the necessary means of subsistence
and of production) “required for the subdivision of handicrafts should be in readiness in the society: it
must also be accumulated in the hands of the employers in sufficiently large quantities to enable them
to conduct their operations on a large scale.... The more the division increases, the more does the
constant employment of a given number of labourers require a greater outlay of capital in tools, raw
material, &c.” (Storch: “Cours d’Econ. Polit.” Paris Ed., t. I., pp. 250, 251.) “La concentration des
instruments de production et la division du travail sont aussi inséparables l’une de l’autre que le sont,
dans le régime politique, la concentration des pouvoirs publics et la division des intérêts privés.” [The
concentration of the instruments of production and the division of labour are as inseparable one from
the other, as are, in the political sphere, the concentration of public powers and the division of private
interests.] (Karl Marx, l.c., p. 134.)
40
Dugald Stewart calls manufacturing labourers “living automatons ... employed in the details of the
work.” (I. c., p. 318.)
41
In corals, each individual is, in fact, the stomach of the whole group; but it supplies the group with
nourishment, instead of, like the Roman patrician, withdrawing it.
42
“L’ouvrier qui porte dans ses bras tout un métier, peut aller partout exercer son industrie et trouver
des moyens de subsister: l’autre (the manufacturing labourer) n’est qu’un accessoire qui, séparé de ses
confrères, n’a plus ni capacité, ni indépendance, et qui se trouve force d’accepter la loi qu’on juge à
propos de lui imposer.” [The worker who is the master of a whole craft can work and find the means
of subsistence anywhere; the other (the manufacturing labourer) is only an appendage who, when he is
separated from his fellows, possesses neither capability nor independence, and finds himself forced to
accept any law it is thought fit to impose] (Storch, l.c., Petersb. edit., 1815, t. I., p. 204.)
43
A. Ferguson, l.c., p. 281: “The former may have gained what the other has lost.”
44
“The man of knowledge and the productive labourer come to be widely divided from each other,
and knowledge, instead of remaining the handmaid of labour in the hand of the labourer to increase
his productive powers ... has almost everywhere arrayed itself against labour ... systematically
deluding and leading them (the labourers) astray in order to render their muscular powers entirely
mechanical and obedient.” (W. Thompson: “An Inquiry into the Principles of the Distribution of
Wealth.” London, 1824, p. 274.)
45
A. Ferguson, l.c., p. 280.
46
J. D. Tuckett: “A History of the Past and Present State of the Labouring Population.” Lond., 1846.
47
A. Smith: “Wealth of Nations,” Bk. v., ch. i, art. ii. Being a pupil of A. Ferguson who showed the
disadvantageous effects of division of labour, Adam Smith was perfectly clear on this point. In the
introduction to his work, where he ex professo praises division of labour, he indicates only in a
cursory manner that it is the source of social inequalities. It is not till the 5th Book, on the Revenue of
the State, that he reproduces Ferguson. In my “Misère de la Philosophie,” I have sufficiently explained
the historical connexion between Ferguson, A. Smith, Lemontey, and Say, as regards their criticisms
of Division of Labour, and have shown, for the first time, that Division of Labour as practised in
manufactures, is a specific form of the capitalist mode of production.
48
Ferguson had already said, l.c., p. 281: “And thinking itself, in this age of separations, may become
a peculiar craft.”
49
G. Garnier, vol. V. of his translation of A. Smith, pp. 4-5.
50
Ramazzini, professor of practical medicine at Padua, published in 1713 his work “De morbis
artificum,” which was translated into French 1781, reprinted 1841 in the “Encyclopédie des Sciences
Médicales. 7me Dis. Auteurs Classiques.” The period of Modern Mechanical Industry has, of course,
very much enlarged his catalogue of labour’s diseases. See “Hygiène physique et morale de l’ouvrier
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dans les grandes villes en général et dans la ville de Lyon en particulier. Par le Dr. A. L. Fonteret,
Paris, 1858,” and “Die Krankheiten, welche verschiednen Ständen, Altern und Geschlechtern
eigenthümlich sind. 6 Vols. Ulm, 1860,” and others. In 1854 the Society of Arts appointed a
Commission of Inquiry into industrial pathology. The list of documents collected by this commission
is to be seen in the catalogue of the “Twickenham Economic Museum.” Very important are the
official “Reports on Public Health.” See also Eduard Reich, M. D. “Ueber die Entartung des
Menschen,” Erlangen, 1868.
51
(D. Urquhart: “Familiar Words.” Lond., 1855, p. 119.) Hegel held very heretical views on division
of labour. In his “Rechtsphilosophie” he says: “By well educated men we understand in the first
instance, those who can do everything that others do.”
52
The simple belief in the inventive genius exercised a priori by the individual capitalist in division of
labour, exists now-a-days only among German professors, of the stamp of Herr Roscher, who, to
recompense the capitalist from whose Jovian head division of labour sprang ready formed, dedicates
to him “various wages” (diverse Arbeitslöhne). The more or less extensive application of division of
labour depends on length of purse, not on greatness of genius.
53
The older writers, like Petty and the anonymous author of “Advantages of the East India Trade,”
bring out the capitalist character of division of labour as applied in manufacture more than A. Smith
does.
54
Amongst the moderns may be excepted a few writers of the 18th century, like Beccaria and James
Harris, who with regard to division of labour almost entirely follow the ancients. Thus, Beccaria:
“Ciascuno prova coll’esperienza, che applicando la mano e l’ingegno sempre allo stesso genere di
opere e di produtte, egli più facili, più abbondanti e migliori ne traca risultati, di quello che se
ciascuno isolatamente le cose tutte a se necessarie soltanto facesse.... Dividendosi in tal maniera per la
comune e privata utilità gli uomini in varie classi e condizioni.” [Everyone knows from experience
that if the hands and the intelligence are always applied to the same kind of work and the same
products, these will be produced more easily, in greater abundance, and in higher quality, than if each
individual makes for himself all the things he needs ... In this way, men are divided up into various
classes and conditions, to their own advantage and to that of the commodity.](Cesare Beccaria:
“Elementi di Econ: Pubblica,” ed. Custodi, Parte Moderna, t. xi, p. 29.) James Harris, afterwards Earl
of Malmesbury, celebrated for the “Diaries” of his embassy at St. Petersburg, says in a note to his
“Dialogue Concerning Happiness,” Lond., 1741, reprinted afterwards in “Three Treatises, 3 Ed.,
Lond., 1772: “The whole argument to prove society natural (i.e., by division of employments) ... is
taken from the second book of Plato’s Republic.”

Thus, in the Odyssey xiv., 228, [“Αλλος γαρ ταλλοισιν ανερ επιτερπεται εργοις” For
different men take joy in different works] and Archilochus in Sextus Empiricus, [“αλλος
αλλω επ εργο καρδιην ιαινεται.” men differ as to things cheer their hearts]
56
[“Πολλ ηπισταιο εργα, χαχως δ ηπιστανο παντα.” He could do many works, but all of
them badly – Homer] Every Athenian considered himself superior as a producer of commodities
to a Spartan; for the latter in time of war had men enough at his disposal but could not command
money, as Thucydides makes Pericles say in the speech inciting the Athenians to the
Peloponnesian war: [“σωµασι τε ετοιµοτεροι οι αυτονργοι τωναντηρωπων η χρηµασι
πολεµειν” people producing for their own consumption will rather let war have their bodies than
their money] (Thuc.: 1, I. c. 41.) Nevertheless, even with regard to material production, [autarceia
self-sufficiency], as opposed to division of labour remained their ideal, [“παρων γαρ το, ευ,
παρα τουτων χαι το αυταρεσς.” For with the latter there is well-being, but with the former
55
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there is independence.] It should be mentioned here that at the date of the fall of the 30 Tyrants
there were still not 5,000 Athenians without landed property.
57
With Plato, division of labour within the community is a development from the multifarious
requirements, and the limited capacities of individuals. The main point with him is, that the
labourer must adapt himself to the work, not the work to the labourer; which latter is unavoidable,
if he carries on several trades at once, thus making one or the other of them subordinate.
[“Ου γαρ ετηελει το πραττοµενον τεν του πραττονιος σχηολεν περιµενειν, αλλ αναγκε το
ν πραττοντα το πραττοµενο επακολοοτηειν µε εν παρεργου µερει. Αναγκε. Εκ δε τουτον
πλειο τε εκαστα γιγνεται και καλλιον και ραον, οταν εις εν καια πηψσιν και εν καιρο σχ
ηολεν τον αλλον αγον, πραττε.”] [For the workman must wait upon the work; it will not wait
upon his leisure and allow itself to be done in a spare moment. — Yes, he must,— So the
conclusion is that more will be produced of every thing and the work will be more easily and
better done, when every man is set free from all other occupations to do, at the right time, the one
thing for which he is naturally fitted.] (Rep. 1. 2. Ed. Baiter, Orelli, &c.) So in Thucydides, l.c., c.
142: “Seafaring is an art like any other, and cannot, as circumstances require, be carried on as a
subsidiary occupation; nay, other subsidiary occupations cannot be carried on alongside of this
one.” If the work, says Plato, has to wait for the labourer, the critical point in the process is
missed and the article spoiled, “εργου χαιρον διολλυται.” [If someone lets slip ...] The same
Platonic idea is found recurring in the protest of the English bleachers against the clause in the
Factory Act that provides fixed mealtimes for all operatives. Their business cannot wait the
convenience of the workmen, for “in the various operations of singeing, washing, bleaching,
mangling, calendering, and dyeing, none of them can be stopped at a given moment without risk
of damage ... to enforce the same dinner hour for all the workpeople might occasionally subject
valuable goods to the risk of danger by incomplete operations.” Le platonisme où va-t-il se
nicher! [Where will Platonism be found next!]
58
Xenophon says, it is not only an honour to receive food from the table of the King of Persia, but
such food is much more tasty than other food. “And there is nothing wonderful in this, for as the other
arts are brought to special perfection in the great towns, so the royal food is prepared in a special way.
For in the small towns the same man makes bedsteads, doors, ploughs, and tables: often, too, he builds
houses into the bargain, and is quite content if he finds custom sufficient for his sustenance. It is
altogether impossible for a man who does so many things to do them all well. But in the great towns,
where each can find many buyers, one trade is sufficient to maintain the man who carries it on. Nay,
there is often not even need of one complete trade, but one man makes shoes for men, another for
women. Here and there one man gets a living by sewing, another by cutting out shoes; one does
nothing but cut out clothes, another nothing but sew the pieces together. It follows necessarily then,
that he who does the simplest kind of work, undoubtedly does it better than anyone else. So it is with
the art of cooking.” (Xen. Cyrop. I. viii., c. 2.) Xenophon here lays stress exclusively upon the
excellence to be attained in use-value, although he well knows that the gradations of the division of
labour depend on the extent of the market.
59
He (Busiris) divided them all into special castes ... commanded that the same individuals should
always carry on the same trade, for he knew that they who change their occupations become skilled in
none; but that those who constantly stick to one occupation bring it to the highest perfection. In truth,
we shall also find that in relation to the arts and handicrafts, they have outstripped their rivals more
than a master does a bungler; and the contrivances for maintaining the monarchy and the other
institutions of their State are so admirable that the most celebrated philosophers who treat of this
subject praise the constitution of the Egyptian State above all others. (Isocrates, Busiris, c. 8.)
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Cf. Diodorus Siculus.
Ure, l.c., p. 20.
62
This is more the case in England than in France, and more in France than in Holland.
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Chapter 15: Machinery and Modern Industry
Section 1 : The Development of Machinery
John Stuart Mill says in his “Principles of Political Economy":
“It is questionable if all the mechanical inventions yet made have lightened the
day’s toil of any human being.” 1
That is, however, by no means the aim of the capitalistic application of machinery. Like every
other increase in the productiveness of labour, machinery is intended to cheapen commodities,
and, by shortening that portion of the working day, in which the labourer works for himself, to
lengthen the other portion that he gives, without an equivalent, to the capitalist. In short, it is a
means for producing surplus-value.
In manufacture, the revolution in the mode of production begins with the labour-power, in
modern industry it begins with the instruments of labour. Our first inquiry then is, how the
instruments of labour are converted from tools into machines, or what is the difference between a
machine and the implements of a handicraft? We are only concerned here with striking and
general characteristics; for epochs in the history of society are no more separated from each other
by hard and fast lines of demarcation, than are geological epochs.
Mathematicians and mechanicians, and in this they are followed by a few English economists,
call a tool a simple machine, and a machine a complex tool. They see no essential difference
between them, and even give the name of machine to the simple mechanical powers, the lever,
the inclined plane, the screw, the wedge, &c. 2 As a matter of fact, every machine is a combination
of those simple powers, no matter how they may be disguised. From the economic standpoint this
explanation is worth nothing, because the historical element is wanting. Another explanation of
the difference between tool and machine is that in the case of a tool, man is the motive power,
while the motive power of a machine is something different from man, as, for instance, an animal,
water, wind, and so on. 3 According to this, a plough drawn by oxen, which is a contrivance
common to the most different epochs, would be a machine, while Claussen’s circular loom,
which, worked by a single labourer, weaves 96,000 picks per minute, would be a mere tool. Nay,
this very loom, though a tool when worked by hand, would, if worked by steam, be a machine.
And since the application of animal power is one of man’s earliest inventions, production by
machinery would have preceded production by handicrafts. When in 1735, John Wyatt brought
out his spinning machine, and began the industrial revolution of the 18th century, not a word did
he say about an ass driving it instead of a man, and yet this part fell to the ass. He described it as a
machine “to spin without fingers.” 4
All fully developed machinery consists of three essentially different parts, the motor mechanism,
the transmitting mechanism, and finally the tool or working machine. The motor mechanism is
that which puts the whole in motion. It either generates its own motive power, like the steamengine, the caloric engine, the electromagnetic machine, &c., or it receives its impulse from some
already existing natural force, like the water-wheel from a head of water, the wind-mill from
wind, &c. The transmitting mechanism, composed of fly-wheels, shafting, toothed wheels,
pullies, straps, ropes, bands, pinions, and gearing of the most varied kinds, regulates the motion,
changes its form where necessary, as for instance, from linear to circular, and divides and
distributes it among the working machines. These two first parts of the whole mechanism are
there, solely for putting the working machines in motion, by means of which motion the subject
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of labour is seized upon and modified as desired. The tool or working machine is that part of the
machinery with which the industrial revolution of the 18th century started. And to this day it
constantly serves as such a starting-point, whenever a handicraft, or a manufacture, is turned into
an industry carried on by machinery.
On a closer examination of the working machine proper, we find in it, as a general rule, though
often, no doubt, under very altered forms, the apparatus and tools used by the handicraftsman or
manufacturing workman; with this difference, that instead of being human implements, they are
the implements of a mechanism, or mechanical implements. Either the entire machine is only a
more or less altered mechanical edition of the old handicraft tool, as, for instance, the powerloom, 5 or the working parts fitted in the frame of the machine are old acquaintances, as spindles
are in a mule, needles in a stocking-loom, saws in a sawing-machine, and knives in a chopping
machine. The distinction between these tools and the body proper of the machine, exists from
their very birth; for they continue for the most part to be produced by handicraft, or by
manufacture, and are afterwards fitted into the body of the machine, which is the product of
machinery. 6 The machine proper is therefore a mechanism that, after being set in motion,
performs with its tools the same operations that were formerly done by the workman with similar
tools. Whether the motive power is derived from man, or from some other machine, makes no
difference in this respect. From the moment that the tool proper is taken from man, and fitted into
a mechanism, a machine takes the place of a mere implement. The difference strikes one at once,
even in those cases where man himself continues to be the prime mover. The number of
implements that he himself can use simultaneously, is limited by the number of his own natural
instruments of production, by the number of his bodily organs. In Germany, they tried at first to
make one spinner work two spinning-wheels, that is, to work simultaneously with both hands and
both feet. This was too difficult. Later, a treddle spinning-wheel with two spindles was invented,
but adepts in spinning, who could spin two threads at once, were almost as scarce as two-headed
men. The Jenny, on the other hand, even at its very birth, spun with 12-18 spindles, and the
stocking-loom knits with many thousand needles at once. The number of tools that a machine can
bring into play simultaneously, is from the very first emancipated from the organic limits that
hedge in the tools of a handicraftsman.
In many manual implements the distinction between man as mere motive power, and man as the
workman or operator properly so called, is brought into striking contrast. For instance, the foot is
merely the prime mover of the spinning-wheel, while the hand, working with the spindle, and
drawing and twisting, performs the real operation of spinning. It is this last part of the
handicraftsman’s implement that is first seized upon by the industrial revolution, leaving to the
workman, in addition to his new labour of watching the machine with his eyes and correcting its
mistakes with his hands, the merely mechanical part of being the moving power. On the other
hand, implements, in regard to which man has always acted as a simple motive power, as, for
instance, by turning the crank of a mill, 7 by pumping, by moving up and down the arm of a
bellows, by pounding with a mortar, &c., such implements soon call for the application of
animals, water 8 and wind as motive powers. Here and there, long before the period of
manufacture, and also, to some extent, during that period, these implements pass over into
machines, but without creating any revolution in the mode of production. It becomes evident, in
the period of modern industry, that these implements, even under their form of manual tools, are
already machines. For instance, the pumps with which the Dutch, in 1836-7, emptied the Lake of
Harlem, were constructed on the principle of ordinary pumps; the only difference being, that their
pistons were driven by cyclopean steam-engines, instead of by men. The common and very
imperfect bellows of the blacksmith is, in England, occasionally converted into a blowing-engine,

263

Chapter 15

by connecting its arm with a steam-engine. The steam-engine itself, such as it was at its
invention, during the manufacturing period at the close of the 17th century, and such as it
continued to be down to 1780, 9 did not give rise to any industrial revolution. It was, on the
contrary, the invention of machines that made a revolution in the form of steam-engines
necessary. As soon as man, instead of working with an implement on the subject of his labour,
becomes merely the motive power of an implement-machine, it is a mere accident that motive
power takes the disguise of human muscle; and it may equally well take the form of wind, water
or steam. Of course, this does not prevent such a change of form from producing great technical
alterations in the mechanism that was originally constructed to be driven by man alone. Now-adays, all machines that have their way to make, such as sewing-machines, bread-making
machines, &c., are, unless from their very nature their use on a small scale is excluded,
constructed to be driven both by human and by purely mechanical motive power.
The machine, which is the starting-point of the industrial revolution, supersedes the workman,
who handles a single tool, by a mechanism operating with a number of similar tools, and set in
motion by a single motive power, whatever the form of that power may be. 10 Here we have the
machine, but only as an elementary factor of production by machinery.
Increase in the size of the machine, and in the number of its working tools, calls for a more
massive mechanism to drive it; and this mechanism requires, in order to overcome its resistance,
a mightier moving power than that of man, apart from the fact that man is a very imperfect
instrument for producing uniform continued motion. But assuming that he is acting simply as a
motor, that a machine has taken the place of his tool, it is evident that he can be replaced by
natural forces. Of all the great motors handed down from the manufacturing period, horse-power
is the worst, partly because a horse has a head of his own, partly because he is costly, and the
extent to which he is applicable in factories is very restricted.11 Nevertheless the horse was
extensively used during the infancy of modern industry. This is proved, as well by the complaints
of contemporary agriculturists, as by the term “horse-power,” which has survived to this day as
an expression for mechanical force.
Wind was too inconstant and uncontrollable, and besides, in England, the birthplace of modern
industry, the use of water power preponderated even during the manufacturing period. In the 17th
century attempts had already been made to turn two pairs of millstones with a single water-wheel.
But the increased size of the gearing was too much for the water power, which had now become
insufficient, and this was one of the circumstances that led to a more accurate investigation of the
laws of friction. In the same way the irregularity caused by the motive power in mills that were
put in motion by pushing and pulling a lever, led to the theory, and the application, of the flywheel, which afterwards plays so important a part in modern industry. 12 In this way, during the
manufacturing period, were developed the first scientific and technical elements of Modern
Mechanical Industry. Arkwright’s throstle spinning mill was from the very first turned by water.
But for all that, the use of water, as the predominant motive power, was beset with difficulties. It
could not be increased at will, it failed at certain seasons of the year, and, above all, it was
essentially local.13 Not till the invention of Watt’s second and so-called double-acting steamengine, was a prime mover found, that begot its own force by the consumption of coal and water,
whose power was entirely under man’s control, that was mobile and a means of locomotion, that
was urban and not, like the waterwheel, rural, that permitted production to be concentrated in
towns instead of, like the water-wheels, being scattered up and down the country, 14 that was of
universal technical application, and, relatively speaking, little affected in its choice of residence
by local circumstances. The greatness of Watt’s genius showed itself in the specification of the
patent that he took out in April, 1784. In that specification his steam-engine is described, not as
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an invention for a specific purpose, but as an agent universally applicable in Mechanical Industry.
In it he points out applications, many of which, as for instance, the steam-hammer, were not
introduced till half a century later. Nevertheless he doubted the use of steam-engines in
navigation. His successors, Boulton and Watt, sent to the exhibition of 1851 steam-engines of
colossal size for ocean steamers.
As soon as tools had been converted from being manual implements of man into implements of a
mechanical apparatus, of a machine, the motive mechanism also acquired an independent form,
entirely emancipated from the restraints of human strength. Thereupon the individual machine,
that we have hitherto been considering, sinks into a mere factor in production by machinery. One
motive mechanism was now able to drive many machines at once. The motive mechanism grows
with the number of the machines that are turned simultaneously, and the transmitting mechanism
becomes a wide-spreading apparatus.
We now proceed to distinguish the co-operation of a number of machines of one kind from a
complex system of machinery.
In the one case, the product is entirely made by a single machine, which performs all the various
operations previously done by one handicraftsman with his tool; as, for instance, by a weaver
with his loom; or by several handicraftsman successively, either separately or as members of a
system of Manufacture. 15 For example, in the manufacture of envelopes, one man folded the
paper with the folder, another laid on the gum, a third turned the flap over, on which the device is
impressed, a fourth embossed the device, and so on; and for each of these operations the envelope
had to change hands. One single envelope machine now performs all these operations at once,
and makes more than 3,000 envelopes in an hour. In the London exhibition of 1862, there was an
American machine for making paper cornets. It cut the paper, pasted, folded, and finished 300 in
a minute. Here, the whole process, which, when carried on as Manufacture, was split up into, and
carried out by, a series of operations, is completed by a single machine, working a combination of
various tools. Now, whether such a machine be merely a reproduction of a complicated manual
implement, or a combination of various simple implements specialised by Manufacture, in either
case, in the factory, i.e., in the workshop in which machinery alone is used, we meet again with
simple co-operation; and, leaving the workman out of consideration for the moment, this cooperation presents itself to us, in the first instance, as the conglomeration in one place of similar
and simultaneously acting machines. Thus, a weaving factory is constituted of a number of
power-looms, working side by side, and a sewing factory of a number of sewing-machines all in
the same building. But there is here a technical oneness in the whole system, owing to all the
machines receiving their impulse simultaneously, and in an equal degree, from the pulsations of
the common prime mover, by the intermediary of the transmitting mechanism; and this
mechanism, to a certain extent, is also common to them all, since only particular ramifications of
it branch off to each machine. Just as a number of tools, then, form the organs of a machine, so a
number of machines of one kind constitute the organs of the motive mechanism.
A real machinery system, however, does not take the place of these independent machines, until
the subject of labour goes through a connected series of detail processes, that are carried out by a
chain of machines of various kinds, the one supplementing the other. Here we have again the cooperation by division of labour that characterises Manufacture; only now, it is a combination of
detail machines. The special tools of the various detail workmen, such as those of the beaters,
cambers, spinners, &c., in the woollen manufacture, are now transformed into the tools of
specialised machines, each machine constituting a special organ, with a special function, in the
system. In those branches of industry in which the machinery system is first introduced,
Manufacture itself furnishes, in a general way, the natural basis for the division, and consequent
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organisation, of the process of production. Nevertheless an essential difference at once
manifests itself. In Manufacture it is the workmen who, with their manual implements, must,
either singly or in groups, carry on each particular detail process. If, on the one hand, the
workman becomes adapted to the process, on the other, the process was previously made suitable
to the workman. This subjective principle of the division of labour no longer exists in production
by machinery. Here, the process as a whole is examined objectively, in itself, that is to say,
without regard to the question of its execution by human hands, it is analysed into its constituent
phases; and the problem, how to execute each detail process, and bind them all into a whole, is
solved by the aid of machines, chemistry, &c. 17 But, of course, in this case also, theory must be
perfected by accumulated experience on a large scale. Each detail machine supplies raw material
to the machine next in order; and since they are all working at the same time, the product is
always going through the various stages of its fabrication, and is also constantly in a state of
transition, from one phase to another. Just as in Manufacture, the direct co-operation of the detail
labourers establishes a numerical proportion between the special groups, so in an organised
system of machinery, where one detail machine is constantly kept employed by another, a fixed
relation is established between their numbers, their size, and their speed. The collective machine,
now an organised system of various kinds of single machines, and of groups of single machines,
becomes more and more perfect, the more the process as a whole becomes a continuous one, i.e.,
the less the raw material is interrupted in its passage from its first phase to its last; in other words,
the more its passage from one phase to another is effected, not by the hand of man, but by the
machinery itself. In Manufacture the isolation of each detail process is a condition imposed by the
nature of division of labour, but in the fully developed factory the continuity of those processes is,
on the contrary, imperative.
A system of machinery, whether it reposes on the mere co-operation of similar machines, as in
weaving, or on a combination of different machines, as in spinning, constitutes in itself a huge
automaton, whenever it is driven by a self-acting prime mover. But although the factory as a
whole be driven by its steam-engine, yet either some of the individual machines may require the
aid of the workman for some of their movements (such aid was necessary for the running in of the
mule carriage, before the invention of the self-acting mule, and is still necessary in fine-spinning
mills); or, to enable a machine to do its work, certain parts of it may require to be handled by the
workman like a manual tool; this was the case in machine-makers’ workshops, before the
conversion of the slide rest into a self-actor. As soon as a machine executes, without man’s help,
all the movements requisite to elaborate the raw material, needing only attendance from him, we
have an automatic system of machinery, and one that is susceptible of constant improvement in
its details. Such improvements as the apparatus that stops a drawing frame, whenever a sliver
breaks, and the self-acting stop, that stops the power-loom so soon as the shuttle bobbin is
emptied of weft, are quite modern inventions. As an example, both of continuity of production,
and of the carrying out of the automatic principle, we may take a modern paper mill. In the paper
industry generally, we may advantageously study in detail not only the distinctions between
modes of production based on different means of production, but also the connexion of the social
conditions of production with those modes: for the old German paper-making furnishes us with a
sample of handicraft production; that of Holland in the 17th and of France in the 18th century
with a sample of manufacturing in the strict sense; and that of modern England with a sample of
automatic fabrication of this article. Besides these, there still exist, in India and China, two
distinct antique Asiatic forms of the same industry.
An organised system of machines, to which motion is communicated by the transmitting
mechanism from a central automaton, is the most developed form of production by machinery.
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Here we have, in the place of the isolated machine, a mechanical monster whose body fills whole
factories, and whose demon power, at first veiled under the slow and measured motions of his
giant limbs, at length breaks out into the fast and furious whirl of his countless working organs.
There were mules and steam-engines before there were any labourers, whose exclusive
occupation it was to make mules and steam-engines; just as men wore clothes before there were
such people as tailors. The inventions of Vaucanson, Arkwright, Watt, and others, were, however,
practicable, only because those inventors found, ready to hand, a considerable number of skilled
mechanical workmen, placed at their disposal by the manufacturing period. Some of these
workmen were independent handicraftsman of various trades, others were grouped together in
manufactures, in which, as before-mentioned, division of labour was strictly carried out. As
inventions increased in number, and the demand for the newly discovered machines grew larger,
the machine-making industry split up, more and more, into numerous independent branches, and
division of labour in these manufactures was more and more developed. Here, then, we see in
Manufacture the immediate technical foundation of modern industry. Manufacture produced the
machinery, by means of which modern industry abolished the handicraft and manufacturing
systems in those spheres of production that it first seized upon. The factory system was therefore
raised, in the natural course of things, on an inadequate foundation. When the system attained to a
certain degree of development, it had to root up this ready-made foundation, which in the
meantime had been elaborated on the old lines, and to build up for itself a basis that should
correspond to its methods of production. Just as the individual machine retains a dwarfish
character, so long as it is worked by the power of man alone, and just as no system of machinery
could be properly developed before the steam-engine took the place of the earlier motive powers,
animals, wind, and even water; so, too, modern industry was crippled in its complete
development, so long as its characteristic instrument of production, the machine, owed its
existence to personal strength and personal skill, and depended on the muscular development, the
keenness of sight, and the cunning of hand, with which the detail workmen in manufactures, and
the manual labourers in handicrafts, wielded their dwarfish implements. Thus, apart from the
dearness of the machines made in this way, a circumstance that is ever present to the mind of the
capitalist, the expansion of industries carried on by means of machinery, and the invasion by
machinery of fresh branches of production, were dependent on the growth of a class of workmen,
who, owing to the almost artistic nature of their employment, could increase their numbers only
gradually, and not by leaps and bounds. But besides this, at a certain stage of its development,
modern industry became technologically incompatible with the basis furnished for it by
handicraft and Manufacture. The increasing size of the prime movers, of the transmitting
mechanism, and of the machines proper, the greater complication, multiformity and regularity of
the details of these machines, as they more and more departed from the model of those originally
made by manual labour, and acquired a form, untrammelled except by the conditions under which
they worked, 18 the perfecting of the automatic system, and the use, every day more unavoidable,
of a more refractory material, such as iron instead of wood - the solution of all these problems,
which sprang up by the force of circumstances, everywhere met with a stumbling-block in the
personal restrictions, which even the collective labourer of Manufacture could not break through,
except to a limited extent. Such machines as the modern hydraulic press, the modern power-loom,
and the modern carding engine, could never have been furnished by Manufacture.
A radical change in the mode of production in one sphere of industry involves a similar change in
other spheres. This happens at first in such branches of industry as are connected together by
being separate phases of a process, and yet are isolated by the social division of labour, in such a
way, that each of them produces an independent commodity. Thus spinning by machinery made
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weaving by machinery a necessity, and both together made the mechanical and chemical
revolution that took place in bleaching, printing, and dyeing, imperative. So too, on the other
hand, the revolution in cotton-spinning called forth the invention of the gin, for separating the
seeds from the cotton fibre; it was only by means of this invention, that the production of cotton
became possible on the enormous scale at present required. 19 But more especially, the revolution
in the modes of production of industry and agriculture made necessary a revolution in the general
conditions of the social process of production, i.e., in the means of communication and of
transport. In a society whose pivot, to use an expression of Fourier, was agriculture on a small
scale, with its subsidiary domestic industries, and the urban handicrafts, the means of
communication and transport were so utterly inadequate to the productive requirements of the
manufacturing period, with its extended division of social labour, its concentration of the
instruments of labour, and of the workmen, and its colonial markets, that they became in fact
revolutionised. In the same way the means of communication and transport handed down from
the manufacturing period soon became unbearable trammels on modern industry, with its feverish
haste of production, its enormous extent, its constant flinging of capital and labour from one
sphere of production into another, and its newly-created connexions with the markets of the
whole world. Hence, apart from the radical changes introduced in the construction of sailing
vessels, the means of communication and transport became gradually adapted to the modes of
production of mechanical industry, by the creation of a system of river steamers, railways, ocean
steamers, and telegraphs. But the huge masses of iron that had now to be forged, to be welded, to
be cut, to be bored, and to be shaped, demanded, on their part, cyclopean machines, for the
construction of which the methods of the manufacturing period were utterly inadequate.
Modern Industry had therefore itself to take in hand the machine, its characteristic instrument of
production, and to construct machines by machines. It was not till it did this, that it built up for
itself a fitting technical foundation, and stood on its own feet. Machinery, simultaneously with the
increasing use of it, in the first decades of this century, appropriated, by degrees, the fabrication
of machines proper. But it was only during the decade preceding 1866, that the construction of
railways and ocean steamers on a stupendous scale called into existence the cyclopean machines
now employed in the construction of prime movers.
The most essential condition to the production of machines by machines was a prime mover
capable of exerting any amount of force, and yet under perfect control. Such a condition was
already supplied by the steam-engine. But at the same time it was necessary to produce the
geometrically accurate straight lines, planes, circles, cylinders, cones, and spheres, required in the
detail parts of the machines. This problem Henry Maudsley solved in the first decade of this
century by the invention of the slide rest, a tool that was soon made automatic, and in a modified
form was applied to other constructive machines besides the lathe, for which it was originally
intended. This mechanical appliance replaces, not some particular tool, but the hand itself, which
produces a given form by holding and guiding the cutting tool along the iron or other material
operated upon. Thus it became possible to produce the forms of the individual parts of machinery
“with a degree of ease, accuracy, and speed, that no accumulated experience of
the hand of the most skilled workman could give.” 20
If we now fix our attention on that portion of the machinery employed in the construction of
machines, which constitutes the operating tool, we find the manual implements re-appearing, but
on a cyclopean scale. The operating part of the boring machine is an immense drill driven by a
steam-engine; without this machine, on the other hand, the cylinders of large steam-engines and
of hydraulic presses could not be made. The mechanical lathe is only a cyclopean reproduction of
the ordinary foot-lathe; the planing machine, an iron carpenter, that works on iron with the same
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tools that the human carpenter employs on wood; the instrument that, on the London wharves,
cuts the veneers, is a gigantic razor; the tool of the shearing machine, which shears iron as easily
as a tailor’s scissors cut cloth, is a monster pair of scissors; and the steam-hammer works with an
ordinary hammer head, but of such a weight that not Thor himself could wield it. 21 These steamhammers are an invention of Nasmyth, and there is one that weighs over 6 tons and strikes with a
vertical fall of 7 feet, on an anvil weighing 36 tons. It is mere child’s-play for it to crush a block
of granite into powder, yet it is no less capable of driving, with a succession of light taps, a nail
into a piece of soft wood. 22
The implements of labour, in the form of machinery, necessitate the substitution of natural forces
for human force, and the conscious application of science, instead of rule of thumb. In
Manufacture, the organisation of the social labour-process is purely subjective; it is a combination
of detail labourers; in its machinery system, modern industry has a productive organism that is
purely objective, in which the labourer becomes a mere appendage to an already existing material
condition of production. In simple co-operation, and even in that founded on division of labour,
the suppression of the isolated, by the collective, workman still appears to be more or less
accidental. Machinery, with a few exceptions to be mentioned later, operates only by means of
associated labour, or labour in common. Hence the co-operative character of the labour-process
is, in the latter case, a technical necessity dictated by the instrument of labour itself.

Section 2: The Value Transferred by Machinery to the Product
We saw that the productive forces resulting from co-operation and division of labour cost capital
nothing. They are natural forces of social labour. So also physical forces, like steam, water, &c.,
when appropriated to productive processes, cost nothing. But just as a man requires lungs to
breathe with, so he requires something that is work of man’s hand, in order to consume physical
forces productively. A water-wheel is necessary to exploit the force of water, and a steam-engine
to exploit the elasticity of steam. Once discovered, the law of the deviation of the magnetic needle
in the field of an electric current, or the law of the magnetisation of iron, around which an electric
current circulates, cost never a penny. 23 But the exploitation of these laws for the purposes of
telegraphy, &c., necessitates a costly and extensive apparatus. The tool, as we have seen, is not
exterminated by the machine. From being a dwarf implement of the human organism, it expands
and multiplies into the implement of a mechanism created by man. Capital now sets the labourer
to work, not with a manual tool, but with a machine which itself handles the tools. Although,
therefore, it is clear at the first glance that, by incorporating both stupendous physical forces, and
the natural sciences, with the process of production, modern industry raises the productiveness of
labour to an extraordinary degree, it is by no means equally clear, that this increased productive
force is not, on the other hand, purchased by an increased expenditure of labour. Machinery, like
every other component of constant capital, creates no new value, but yields up its own value to
the product that it serves to beget. In so far as the machine has value, and, in consequence, parts
with value to the product, it forms an element in the value of that product. Instead of being
cheapened, the product is made dearer in proportion to the value of the machine. And it is clear as
noon-day, that machines and systems of machinery, the characteristic instruments of labour of
Modern Industry, are incomparably more loaded with value than the implements used in
handicrafts and manufactures.
In the first place, it must be observed that the machinery, while always entering as a whole into
the labour-process, enters into the value-begetting process only by bits. It never adds more value
than it loses, on an average, by wear and tear. Hence there is a great difference between the value
of a machine, and the value transferred in a given time by that machine to the product. The longer
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the life of the machine in the labour-process, the greater is that difference. It is true, no doubt, as
we have already seen, that every instrument of labour enters as a whole into the labour-process,
and only piece-meal, proportionally to its average daily loss by wear and tear, into the valuebegetting process. But this difference between the instrument as a whole and its daily wear and
tear, is much greater in a machine than in a tool, because the machine, being made from more
durable material, has a longer life; because its employment, being regulated by strictly scientific
laws, allows of greater economy in the wear and tear of its parts, and in the materials it consumes;
and lastly, because its field of production is incomparably larger than that of a tool. After making
allowance, both in the case of the machine and of the tool, for their average daily cost, that is for
the value they transmit to the product by their average daily wear and tear, and for their
consumption of auxiliary substance, such as oil, coal, and so on, they each do their work
gratuitously, just like the forces furnished by Nature without the help of man. The greater the
productive power of the machinery compared with that of the tool, the greater is the extent of its
gratuitous service compared with that of the tool. In modern industry man succeeded for the first
time in making the product of his past labour work on a large scale gratuitously, like the forces of
Nature. 24
In treating of Co-operation and Manufacture, it was shown that certain general factors of
production, such as buildings, are, in comparison with the scattered means of production of the
isolated workman, economised by being consumed in common, and that they therefore make the
product cheaper. In a system of machinery, not only is the framework of the machine consumed
in common by its numerous operating implements, but the prime mover, together with a part of
the transmitting mechanism, is consumed in common by the numerous operative machines.
Given the difference between the value of the machinery, and the value transferred by it in a day
to the product, the extent to which this latter value makes the product dearer, depends in the first
instance, upon the size of the product; so to say, upon its area. Mr. Baynes, of Blackburn, in a
lecture published in 1858, estimates that
“each real mechanical horse-power 25 will drive 450 self-acting mule spindles,
with preparation, or 200 throstle spindles, or 15 looms for 40 inch cloth with the
appliances for warping, sizing, &c.”
In the first case, it is the day’s produce of 450 mule spindles, in the second, of 200 throstle
spindles, in the third, of 15 power-looms, over which the daily cost of one horse-power, and the
wear and tear of the machinery set in motion by that power, are spread; so that only a very minute
value is transferred by such wear and tear to a pound of yarn or a yard of cloth. The same is the
case with the steam-hammer mentioned above. Since its daily wear and tear, its coalconsumption, &c., are spread over the stupendous masses of iron hammered by it in a day, only a
small value is added to a hundred weight of iron; but that value would be very great, if the
cyclopean instrument were employed in driving in nails.
Given a machine’s capacity for work, that is, the number of its operating tools, or, where it is a
question of force, their mass, the amount of its product will depend on the velocity of its working
parts, on the speed, for instance, of the spindles, or on the number of blows given by the hammer
in a minute. Many of these colossal hammers strike seventy times in a minute, and Ryder’s patent
machine for forging spindles with small hammers gives as many as 700 strokes per minute.
Given the rate at which machinery transfers its value to the product, the amount of value so
transferred depends on the total value of the machinery. 26 The less labour it contains, the less
value it imparts to the product. The less value it gives up, so much the more productive it is, and
so much the more its services approximate to those of natural forces. But the production of
machinery by machinery lessens its value relatively to its extension and efficacy.
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An analysis and comparison of the prices of commodities produced by handicrafts or
manufactures, and of the prices of the same commodities produced by machinery, shows
generally, that, in the product of machinery, the value due to the instruments of labour increases
relatively, but decreases absolutely. In other words, its absolute amount decreases, but its amount,
relatively to the total value of the product, of a pound of yarn, for instance, increases. 27
It is evident that whenever it costs as much labour to produce a machine as is saved by the
employment of that machine, there is nothing but a transposition of labour; consequently the total
labour required to produce a commodity is not lessened or the productiveness of labour is not
increased. It is clear, however, that the difference between the labour a machine costs, and the
labour it saves, in other words, that the degree of its productiveness does not depend on the
difference between its own value and the value of the implement it replaces. As long as the labour
spent on a machine, and consequently the portion of its value added to the product, remains
smaller than the value added by the workman to the product with his tool, there is always a
difference of labour saved in favour of the machine. The productiveness of a machine is therefore
measured by the human labour-power it replaces. According to Mr. Baynes, 2 operatives are
required for the 450 mule spindles, inclusive of preparation machinery, 28 that are driven by onehorse power; each self-acting mule spindle, working ten hours, produces 13 ounces of yarn
(average number of thickness); consequently 2½ operatives spin weekly 365 5/8 lbs. of yarn.
Hence, leaving waste on one side, 366 lbs. of cotton absorb, during their conversion into yarn,
only 150 hours’ labour, or fifteen days’ labour of ten hours each. But with a spinning-wheel,
supposing the hand-spinner to produce thirteen ounces of yarn in sixty hours, the same weight of
cotton would absorb 2,700 days’ labour of ten hours each, or 27,000 hours’ labour.29 Where
blockprinting, the old method of printing calico by hand, has been superseded by machine
printing, a single machine prints, with the aid of one man or boy, as much calico of four colours
in one hour, as it formerly took 200 men to do. 30 Before Eli Whitney invented the cotton gin in
1793, the separation of the seed from a pound of cotton cost an average day’s labour. By means
of his invention one negress was enabled to clean 100 lbs. daily; and since then, the efficacy of
the gin has been considerably increased. A pound of cotton wool, previously costing 50 cents to
produce, included after that invention more unpaid labour, and was consequently sold with
greater profit, at 10 cents. In India they employ for separating the wool from the seed, an
instrument, half machine, half tool, called a churka; with this one man and a woman can clean 28
lbs. daily. With the churka invented some years ago by Dr. Forbes, one man and a boy produce
250 lbs. daily. If oxen, steam, or water, be used for driving it, only a few boys and girls as feeders
are required. Sixteen of these machines driven by oxen do as much work in a day as formerly 750
people did on an average.31
As already stated, a steam-plough does as much work in one hour at a cost of three-pence, as 66
men at a cost of 15 shillings. I return to this example in order to clear up an erroneous notion. The
15 shillings are by no means the expression in money of all the labour expended in one hour by
the 66 men. If the ratio of surplus labour to necessary labour were 100%, these 66 men would
produce in one hour a value of 30 shillings, although their wages, 15 shillings, represent only
their labour for half an hour. Suppose, then, a machine cost as much as the wages for a year of the
150 men it displaces, say £3,000; this £3,000 is by no means the expression in money of the
labour added to the object produced by these 150 men before the introduction of the machine, but
only of that portion of their year’s labour which was expended for themselves and represented by
their wages. On the other hand, the £3,000, the money-value of the machine, expresses all the
labour expended on its production, no matter in what proportion this labour constitutes wages for
the workman, and surplus-value for the capitalist. Therefore, though a machine cost as much as
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the labour-power displaced by it costs, yet the labour materialised in it is even then much less
than the living labour it replaces. 32
The use of machinery for the exclusive purpose of cheapening the product, is limited in this way,
that less labour must be expended in producing the machinery than is displaced by the
employment of that machinery, For the capitalist, however, this use is still more limited. Instead
of paying for the labour, he only pays the value of the labour-power employed; therefore, the
limit to his using a machine is fixed by the difference between the value of the machine and the
value of the labour-power replaced by it. Since the division of the day’s work into necessary and
surplus labour differs in different countries, and even in the same country at different periods, or
in different branches of industry; and further, since the actual wage of the labourer at one time
sinks below the value of his labour-power, at another rises above it, it is possible for the
difference between the price of the machinery and the price of the labour-power replaced by that
machinery to vary very much, although the difference between the quantity of labour requisite to
produce the machine and the total quantity replaced by it, remain constant.33 But it is the former
difference alone that determines the cost, to the capitalist, of producing a commodity, and,
through the pressure of competition, influences his action. Hence the invention now-a-days of
machines in England that are employed only in North America; just as in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, machines were invented in Germany to be used only in Holland, and just
as many a French invention of the eighteenth century was exploited in England alone. In the older
countries, machinery, when employed in some branches of industry, creates such a redundancy of
labour in other branches that in these latter the fall of wages below the value of labour-power
impedes the use of machinery, and, from the standpoint of the capitalist, whose profit comes, not
from a diminution of the labour employed, but of the labour paid for, renders that use superfluous
and often impossible. In some branches of the woollen manufacture in England the employment
of children has during recent years been considerably diminished, and in some cases has been
entirely abolished. Why? Because the Factory Acts made two sets of children necessary, one
working six hours, the other four, or each working five hours. But the parents refused to sell the
“half-timers” cheaper than the “full-timers.” Hence the substitution of machinery for the “halftimers.” 34 Before the labour of women and of children under 10 years of age was forbidden in
mines, capitalists considered the employment of naked women and girls, often in company with
men, so far sanctioned by their moral code, and especially by their ledgers, that it was only after
the passing of the Act that they had recourse to machinery. The Yankees have invented a stonebreaking machine. The English do not make use of it, because the “wretch” 35who does this work
gets paid for such a small portion of his labour, that machinery would increase the cost of
production to the capitalist.36 In England women are still occasionally used instead of horses for
hauling canal boats 37, because the labour required to produce horses and machines is an
accurately known quantity, while that required to maintain the women of the surplus-population
is below all calculation. Hence nowhere do we find a more shameful squandering of human
labour-power for the most despicable purposes than in England, the land of machinery.

Section 3: The Proximate Effects of Machinery on the
Workman
The starting-point of modern industry is, as we have shown, the revolution in the instruments of
labour, and this revolution attains its most highly developed form in the organised system of
machinery in a factory. Before we inquire how human material is incorporated with this objective
organism, let us consider some general effects of this revolution on the labourer himself.
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A. Appropriation of Supplementary Labour-Power by
Capital. The Employment of Women and Children
In so far as machinery dispenses with muscular power, it becomes a means of employing
labourers of slight muscular strength, and those whose bodily development is incomplete, but
whose limbs are all the more supple. The labour of women and children was, therefore, the first
thing sought for by capitalists who used machinery. That mighty substitute for labour and
labourers was forthwith changed into a means for increasing the number of wage-labourers by
enrolling, under the direct sway of capital, every member of the workman’s family, without
distinction of age or sex. Compulsory work for the capitalist usurped the place, not only of the
children’s play, but also of free labour at home within moderate limits for the support of the
family. 38
The value of labour-power was determined, not only by the labour-time necessary to maintain the
individual adult labourer, but also by that necessary to maintain his family. Machinery, by
throwing every member of that family on to the labour-market, spreads the value of the man’s
labour-power over his whole family. It thus depreciates his labour-power. To purchase the labourpower of a family of four workers may, perhaps, cost more than it formerly did to purchase the
labour-power of the head of the family, but, in return, four days’ labour takes the place of one,
and their price falls in proportion to the excess of the surplus labour of four over the surplus
labour of one. In order that the family may live, four people must now, not only labour, but
expend surplus labour for the capitalist. Thus we see, that machinery, while augmenting the
human material that forms the principal object of capital’s exploiting power,39 at the same time
raises the degree of exploitation.
Machinery also revolutionises out and out the contract between the labourer and the capitalist,
which formally fixes their mutual relations. Taking the exchange of commodities as our basis, our
first assumption was that capitalist and labourer met as free persons, as independent owners of
commodities; the one possessing money and means of production, the other labour-power. But
now the capitalist buys children and young persons under age. Previously, the workman sold his
own labour-power, which he disposed of nominally as a free agent. Now he sells wife and child.
He has become a slave-dealer. 40 The demand for children’s labour often resembles in form the
inquiries for negro slaves, such as were formerly to be read among the advertisements in
American journals.
“My attention,” says an English factory inspector, “was drawn to an advertisement
in the local paper of one of the most important manufacturing towns of my
district, of which the following is a copy: Wanted, 12 to 20 young persons, not
younger than what can pass for 13 years. Wages, 4 shillings a week. Apply &c.” 41
The phrase “what can pass for 13 years,” has reference to the fact, that by the Factory Act,
children under 13 years may work only 6 hours. A surgeon officially appointed must certify their
age. The manufacturer, therefore, asks for children who look as if they were already 13 years old.
The decrease, often by leaps and bounds in the number of children under 13 years employed in
factories, a decrease that is shown in an astonishing manner by the English statistics of the last 20
years, was for the most part, according to the evidence of the factory inspectors themselves, the
work of the certifying surgeons, who overstated the age of the children, agreeably to the
capitalist’s greed for exploitation, and the sordid trafficking needs of the parents. In the notorious
district of Bethnal Green, a public market is held every Monday and Tuesday morning, where
children of both sexes from 9 years of age upwards, hire themselves out to the silk manufacturers.
"The usual terms are 1s. 8d. a week (this belongs to the parents) and ‘2d. for myself and tea.’ The
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contract is binding only for the week. The scene and language while this market is going on are
quite disgraceful.” 42 It has also occurred in England, that women have taken “children from the
workhouse and let any one have them out for 2s. 6d. a week.” 43 In spite of legislation, the number
of boys sold in Great Britain by their parents to act as live chimney-sweeping machines (although
there exist plenty of machines to replace them) exceeds 2,000.44 The revolution effected by
machinery in the juridical relations between the buyer and the seller of labour-power, causing the
transaction as a whole to lose the appearance of a contract between free persons, afforded the
English Parliament an excuse, founded on juridical principles, for the interference of the state
with factories. Whenever the law limits the labour of children to 6 hours in industries not before
interfered with, the complaints of the manufacturers are always renewed. They allege that
numbers of the parents withdraw their children from the industry brought under the Act, in order
to sell them where “freedom of labour” still rules, i.e., where children under 13 years are
compelled to work like grown-up people, and therefore can be got rid of at a higher price. But
since capital is by nature a leveller, since it exacts in every sphere of production equality in the
conditions of the exploitation of labour, the limitation by law of children’s labour, in one branch
of industry, becomes the cause of its limitation in others.
We have already alluded to the physical deterioration as well of the children and young-persons
as of the women, whom machinery, first directly in the factories that shoot up on its basis, and
then indirectly in all the remaining branches of industry, subjects to the exploitation of capital. In
this place, therefore, we dwell only on one point, the enormous mortality, during the first few
years of their life, of the children of the operatives. In sixteen of the registration districts into
which England is divided, there are, for every 100,000 children alive under the age of one year,
only 9,000 deaths in a year on an average (in one district only 7,047); in 24 districts the deaths are
over 10,000, but under 11,000; in 39 districts, over 11,000, but under 12,000; in 48 districts over
12,000, but under 13,000; in 22 districts over 20,000; in 25 districts over 21,000; in 17 over
22,000; in 11 over 23,000; in Hoo, Wolverhampton, Ashton-under-Lyne, and Preston, over
24,000; in Nottingham, Stockport, and Bradford, over 25,000; in Wisbeach, 16,000; and in
Manchester, 26,125. 45 As was shown by an official medical inquiry in the year 1861, the high
death-rates are, apart from local causes, principally due to the employment of the mothers away
from their homes, and to the neglect and maltreatment, consequent on her absence, such as,
amongst others, insufficient nourishment, unsuitable food, and dosing with opiates; besides this,
there arises an unnatural estrangement between mother and child, and as a consequence
intentional starving and poisoning of the children. 46 In those agricultural districts, “where a
minimum in the employment of women exists, the death-rate is on the other hand very low.” 47
The Inquiry Commission of 1861 led, however, to the unexpected result, that in some purely
agricultural districts bordering on the North Sea, the death-rate of children under one year old
almost equalled that of the worst factory districts. Dr. Julian Hunter was therefore commissioned
to investigate this phenomenon on the spot. His report is incorporated with the “Sixth Report on
Public Health.” 48 Up to that time it was supposed, that the children were decimated by malaria,
and other diseases peculiar to low-lying and marshy districts. But the inquiry showed the very
opposite, namely, that the same cause which drove away malaria, the conversion of the land, from
a morass in winter and a scanty pasture in summer, into fruitful corn land, created the exceptional
death-rate of the infants.49 The 70 medical men, whom Dr. Hunter examined in that district, were
“wonderfully in accord” on this point. In fact, the revolution in the mode of cultivation had led to
the introduction of the industrial system.
Married women, who work in gangs along with boys and girls, are, for a stipulated sum of
money, placed at the disposal of the farmer, by a man called the “undertaker,” who contracts for
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the whole gang. “These gangs will sometimes travel many miles from their own village; they are
to be met morning and evening on the roads, dressed in short petticoats, with suitable coats and
boots, and sometimes trousers, looking wonderfully strong and healthy, but tainted with a
customary immorality and heedless of the fatal results which their love of this busy and
independent life is bringing on their unfortunate offspring who are pining at home.” 50
Every phenomenon of the factory districts is here reproduced, including, but to a greater extent,
ill-disguised infanticide, and dosing children with opiates.51
“My knowledge of such evils,” says Dr. Simon, the medical officer of the Privy
Council and editor in chief of the Reports on Public Health, “may excuse the
profound misgiving with which I regard any large industrial employment of adult
women.” 52
“Happy indeed,” exclaims Mr. Baker, the factory inspector, in his official report, “happy indeed
will it be for the manufacturing districts of England, when every married woman having a family
is prohibited from working in any textile works at all.”53
The moral degradation caused by the capitalistic exploitation of women and children has been so
exhaustively depicted by F. Engels in his “Lage der Arbeitenden Klasse Englands,” and other
writers, that I need only mention the subject in this place. But the intellectual desolation
artificially produced by converting immature human beings into mere machines for the
fabrication of surplus-value, a state of mind clearly distinguishable from that natural ignorance
which keeps the mind fallow without destroying its capacity for development, its natural fertility,
this desolation finally compelled even the English Parliament to make elementary education a
compulsory condition to the “productive” employment of children under 14 years, in every
industry subject to the Factory Acts. The spirit of capitalist production stands out clearly in the
ludicrous wording of the so-called education clauses in the Factory Acts, in the absence of an
administrative machinery, an absence that again makes the compulsion illusory, in the opposition
of the manufacturers themselves to these education clauses, and in the tricks and dodges they put
in practice for evading them.
“For this the legislature is alone to blame, by having passed a delusive law, which,
while it would seem to provide that the children employed in factories shall be
educated, contains no enactment by which that professed end can be secured. It
provides nothing more than that the children shall on certain days of the week, and
for a certain number of hours (three) in each day, be inclosed within the four walls
of a place called a school, and that the employer of the child shall receive weekly
a certificate to that effect signed by a person designated by the subscriber as a
schoolmaster or schoolmistress.” 54
Previous to the passing of the amended Factory Act, 1844, it happened, not unfrequently, that the
certificates of attendance at school were signed by the schoolmaster or schoolmistress with a
cross, as they themselves were unable to write.
“On one occasion, on visiting a place called a school, from which certificates of
school attendance, had issued, I was so struck with the ignorance of the master,
that I said to him: ‘Pray, sir, can you read?’ His reply was: ‘Aye, summat!’ and as
a justification of his right to grant certificates, he added: ‘At any rate, I am before
my scholars.’”
The inspectors, when the Bill of 1844 was in preparation, did not fail to represent the disgraceful
state of the places called schools, certificates from which they were obliged to admit as a
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compliance with the laws, but they were successful only in obtaining thus much, that since the
passing of the Act of 1845,
the figures in the school certificate must be filled up in the handwriting of the
schoolmaster, who must also sign his Christian and surname in full.” 55
Sir John Kincaid, factory inspector for Scotland, relates experiences of the same kind.
“The first school we visited was kept by a Mrs. Ann Killin. Upon asking her to
spell her name, she straightway made a mistake, by beginning with the letter C,
but correcting herself immediately, she said her name began with a K. On looking
at her signature, however, in the school certificate books, I noticed that she spelt it
in various ways, while her handwriting left no doubt as to her unfitness to teach.
She herself also acknowledged that she could not keep the register ... In a second
school I found the schoolroom 15 feet long, and 10 feet wide, and counted in this
space 75 children, who were gabbling something unintelligible”56 But it is not
only in the miserable places above referred to that the children obtain certificates
of school attendance without having received instruction of any value, for in many
schools where there is a competent teacher, his efforts are of little avail from the
distracting crowd of children of all ages, from infants of 3 years old and upwards;
his livelihood, miserable at the best, depending on the pence received from the
greatest number of children whom it is possible to cram into the space. To this is
to be added scanty school furniture, deficiency of books, and other materials for
teaching, and the depressing effect upon the poor children themselves of a close,
noisome atmosphere. I have been in many such schools, where I have seen rows
of children doing absolutely nothing; and this is certified as school attendance,
and, in statistical returns, such children are set down as being educated.” 57
In Scotland the manufacturers try all they can to do without the children that are obliged to attend
school.
“It requires no further argument to prove that the educational clauses of the
Factory Act, being held in such disfavour among mill-owners, tend in a great
measure to exclude that class of children alike from the employment and the
benefit of education contemplated by this Act.”58
Horribly grotesque does this appear in print works, which are regulated by a special Act. By that
Act,
“every child, before being employed in a print work must have attended school for
at least 30 days, and not less than 150 hours, during the six months immediately
preceding such first day of employment, and during the continuance of its
employment in the print works, it must attend for a like period of 30 days, and 150
hours during every successive period of six months.... The attendance at school
must be between 8 a.m. and 6 p.m. No attendance of less than 2½ hours, nor more
than 5 hours on any one day, shall be reckoned as part of the 150 hours. Under
ordinary circumstances the children attend school morning and afternoon for 30
days, for at least 5 hours each day, and upon the expiration of the 30 days, the
statutory total of 150 hours having been attained, having, in their language, made
up their book, they return to the print work, where they continue until the six
months have expired, when another instalment of school attendance becomes due,
and they again seek the school until the book is again made up.... Many boys
having attended school for the required number of hours, when they return to
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school after the expiration of their six months’ work in the print work, are in the
same condition as when they first attended school as print-work boys, that they
have lost all they gained by their previous school attendance.... In other print
works the children’s attendance at school is made to depend altogether upon the
exigencies of the work in the establishment. The requisite number of hours is
made up each six months, by instalments consisting of from 3 to 5 hours at a time,
spreading over, perhaps, the whole six months.... For instance, the attendance on
one day might be from 8 to 11 a.m., on another day from 1 p.m. to 4 p.m., and the
child might not appear at school again for several days, when it would attend from
3 p.m. to 6 p.m.; then it might attend for 3 or 4 days consecutively, or for a week,
then it would not appear in school for 3 weeks or a month, after that upon some
odd days at some odd hours when the operative who employed it chose to spare it;
and thus the child was, as it were, buffeted from school to work, from work to
school, until the tale of 150 hours was told.” 59
By the excessive addition of women and children to the ranks of the workers, machinery at last
breaks down the resistance which the male operatives in the manufacturing period continued to
oppose to the despotism of capital.60

B. Prolongation of the Working day
If machinery be the most powerful means for increasing the productiveness of labour – i.e., for
shortening the working-time required in the production of a commodity, it becomes in the hands
of capital the most powerful means, in those industries first invaded by it, for lengthening the
working day beyond all bounds set by human nature. It creates, on the one hand, new conditions
by which capital is enabled to give free scope to this its constant tendency, and on the other hand,
new motives with which to whet capital’s appetite for the labour of others.
In the first place, in the form of machinery, the implements of labour become automatic, things
moving and working independent of the workman. They are thenceforth an industrial perpetuum
mobile, that would go on producing forever, did it not meet with certain natural obstructions in
the weak bodies and the strong wills of its human attendants. The automaton, as capital, and
because it is capital, is endowed, in the person of the capitalist, with intelligence and will; it is
therefore animated by the longing to reduce to a minimum the resistance offered by that repellent
yet elastic natural barrier, man. 61 This resistance is moreover lessened by the apparent lightness
of machine work, and by the more pliant and docile character of the women and children
employed on it. 62
The productiveness of machinery is, as we saw, inversely proportional to the value transferred by
it to the product. The longer the life of the machine, the greater is the mass of the products over
which the value transmitted by the machine is spread, and the less is the portion of that value
added to each single commodity. The active lifetime of a machine is, however, clearly dependent
on the length of the working day, or on the duration of the daily labour-process multiplied by the
number of days for which the process is carried on.
The wear and tear of a machine is not exactly proportional to its working-time. And even if it
were so, a machine working 16 hours daily for 7½ years, covers as long a working period as, and
transmits to the total product no more value than, the same machine would if it worked only 8
hours daily for 15 years. But in the first case the value of the machine would be reproduced twice
as quickly as in the latter, and the capitalist would, by this use of the machine, absorb in 7½ years
as much surplus-value as in the second case he would in 15.
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The material wear and tear of a machine is of two kinds. The one arises from use, as coins wear
away by circulating, the other from non-use, as a sword rusts when left in its scabbard. The latter
kind is due to the elements. The former is more or less directly proportional, the latter to a certain
extent inversely proportional, to the use of the machine. 63
But in addition to the material wear and tear, a machine also undergoes, what we may call a moral
depreciation. It loses exchange-value, either by machines of the same sort being produced
cheaper than it, or by better machines entering into competition with it.64 In both cases, be the
machine ever so young and full of life, its value is no longer determined by the labour actually
materialised in it, but by the labour-time requisite to reproduce either it or the better machine. It
has, therefore, lost value more or less. The shorter the period taken to reproduce its total value,
the less is the danger of moral depreciation; and the longer the working day, the shorter is that
period. When machinery is first introduced into an industry, new methods of reproducing it more
cheaply follow blow upon blow65, and so do improvements, that not only affect individual parts
and details of the machine, but its entire build. It is, therefore, in the early days of the life of
machinery that this special incentive to the prolongation of the working day makes itself felt most
acutely. 66
Given the length of the working day, all other circumstances remaining the same, the exploitation
of double the number of workmen demands, not only a doubling of that part of constant capital
which is invested in machinery and buildings, but also of that part which is laid out in raw
material and auxiliary substances. The lengthening of the working day, on the other hand, allows
of production on an extended scale without any alteration in the amount of capital laid out on
machinery and buildings.67 Not only is there, therefore, an increase of surplus-value, but the
outlay necessary to obtain it diminishes. It is true that this takes place, more or less, with every
lengthening of the working day; but in the case under consideration, the change is more marked,
because the capital converted into the instruments of labour preponderates to a greater degree. 68
The development of the factory system fixes a constantly increasing portion of the capital in a
form, in which, on the one hand, its value is capable of continual self-expansion, and in which, on
the other hand, it loses both use-value and exchange-value whenever it loses contact with living
labour. “When a labourer,” said Mr. Ashworth, a cotton magnate, to Professor Nassau W. Senior,
“lays down his spade, he renders useless, for that period, a capital worth eighteen-pence. When
one of our people leaves the mill, he renders useless a capital that has cost £100,000.”69 Only
fancy! making “useless” for a single moment, a capital that has cost £100,000! It is, in truth,
monstrous, that a single one of our people should ever leave the factory! The increased use of
machinery, as Senior after the instruction he received from Ashworth clearly perceives, makes a
constantly increasing lengthening of the working day “desirable.” 70
Machinery produces relative surplus-value; not only by directly depreciating the value of labourpower, and by indirectly cheapening the same through cheapening the commodities that enter into
its reproduction, but also, when it is first introduced sporadically into an industry, by converting
the labour employed by the owner of that machinery, into labour of a higher degree and greater
efficacy, by raising the social value of the article produced above its individual value, and thus
enabling the capitalist to replace the value of a day’s labour-power by a smaller portion of the
value of a day’s product. During this transition period, when the use of machinery is a sort of
monopoly, the profits are therefore exceptional, and the capitalist endeavours to exploit
thoroughly “the sunny time of this his first love,” by prolonging the working day as much as
possible. The magnitude of the profit whets his appetite for more profit.
As the use of machinery becomes more general in a particular industry, the social value of the
product sinks down to its individual value, and the law that surplus-value does not arise from the
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labour-power that has been replaced by the machinery, but from the labour-power actually
employed in working with the machinery, asserts itself. Surplus-value arises from variable capital
alone, and we saw that the amount of surplus-value depends on two factors, viz., the rate of
surplus-value and the number of the workmen simultaneously employed. Given the length of the
working day, the rate of surplus-value is determined by the relative duration of the necessary
labour and of the surplus labour in a day. The number of the labourers simultaneously employed
depends, on its side, on the ratio of the variable to the constant capital. Now, however much the
use of machinery may increase the surplus labour at the expense of the necessary labour by
heightening the productiveness of labour, it is clear that it attains this result, only by diminishing
the number of workmen employed by a given amount of capital. It converts what was formerly
variable capital, invested in labour-power, into machinery which, being constant capital, does not
produce surplus-value. It is impossible, for instance, to squeeze as much surplus-value out of 2 as
out of 24 labourers. If each of these 24 men gives only one hour of surplus labour in 12, the 24
men give together 24 hours of surplus labour, while 24 hours is the total labour of the two men.
Hence, the application of machinery to the production of surplus-value implies a contradiction
which is immanent in it, since of the two factors of the surplus-value created by a given amount
of capital, one, the rate of surplus-value, cannot be increased, except by diminishing the other, the
number of workmen. This contradiction comes to light, as soon as by the general employment of
machinery in a given industry, the value of the machine-produced commodity regulates the value
of all commodities of the same sort; and it is this contradiction, that in its turn, drives the
capitalist, without his being conscious of the fact, 71 to excessive lengthening of the working day,
in order that he may compensate the decrease in the relative number of labourers exploited, by an
increase not only of the relative, but of the absolute surplus labour.
If, then, the capitalistic employment of machinery, on the one hand, supplies new and powerful
motives to an excessive lengthening of the working day, and radically changes, as well the
methods of labour, as also the character of the social working organism, in such a manner as to
break down all opposition to this tendency, on the other hand it produces, partly by opening out to
the capitalist new strata of the working-class, previously inaccessible to him, partly by setting free
the labourers it supplants, a surplus working population, 72 which is compelled to submit to the
dictation of capital. Hence that remarkable phenomenon in the history of modern industry, that
machinery sweeps away every moral and natural restriction on the length of the working day.
Hence, too, the economic paradox, that the most powerful instrument for shortening labour-time,
becomes the most unfailing means for placing every moment of the labourer’s time and that of his
family, at the disposal of the capitalist for the purpose of expanding the value of his capital. “If,”
dreamed Aristotle, the greatest thinker of antiquity, “if every tool, when summoned, or even of its
own accord, could do the work that befits it, just as the creations of Daedalus moved of
themselves, or the tripods of Hephaestos went of their own accord to their sacred work, if the
weavers’ shuttles were to weave of themselves, then there would be no need either of apprentices
for the master workers, or of slaves for the lords.” 73And Antipatros, a Greek poet of the time of
Cicero, hailed the invention of the water-wheel for grinding corn, an invention that is the
elementary form of all machinery, as the giver of freedom to female slaves, and the bringer back
of the golden age. 74 Oh! those heathens! They understood, as the learned Bastiat, and before him
the still wiser MacCulloch have discovered, nothing of Political Economy and Christianity. They
did not, for example, comprehend that machinery is the surest means of lengthening the working
day. They perhaps excused the slavery of one on the ground that it was a means to the full
development of another. But to preach slavery of the masses, in order that a few crude and halfeducated parvenus, might become “eminent spinners,” “extensive sausage-makers,” and
“influential shoe-black dealers,” to do this, they lacked the bump of Christianity.
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C. Intensification of Labour
The immoderate lengthening of the working day, produced by machinery in the hands of capital,
leads to a reaction on the part of society, the very sources of whose life are menaced; and, thence,
to a normal working day whose length is fixed by law. Thenceforth a phenomenon that we have
already met with, namely, the intensification of labour, develops into great importance. Our
analysis of absolute surplus-value had reference primarily to the extension or duration of the
labour, its intensity being assumed as given. We now proceed to consider the substitution of a
more intensified labour for labour of more extensive duration, and the degree of the former.
It is self-evident, that in proportion as the use of machinery spreads, and the experience of a
special class of workmen habituated to machinery accumulates, the rapidity and intensity of
labour increase as a natural consequence. Thus in England, during half a century, lengthening of
the working day went hand in hand with increasing intensity of factory labour. Nevertheless the
reader will clearly see, that where we have labour, not carried on by fits and starts, but repeated
day after day with unvarying uniformity, a point must inevitably be reached, where extension of
the working day and intensity of the labour mutually exclude one another, in such a way that
lengthening of the working day becomes compatible only with a lower degree of intensity, and a
higher degree of intensity, only with a shortening of the working day. So soon as the gradually
surging revolt of the working-class compelled Parliament to shorten compulsorily the hours of
labour, and to begin by imposing a normal working day on factories proper, so soon consequently
as an increased production of surplus-value by the prolongation of the working day was once for
all put a stop to, from that moment capital threw itself with all its might into the production of
relative surplus-value, by hastening on the further improvement of machinery. At the same time a
change took place in the nature of relative surplus-value. Generally speaking, the mode of
producing relative surplus-value consists in raising the productive power of the workman, so as to
enable him to produce more in a given time with the same expenditure of labour. Labour-time
continues to transmit as before the same value to the total product, but this unchanged amount of
exchange-value is spread over more use-value; hence the value of each single commodity sinks.
Otherwise, however, so soon as the compulsory shortening of the hours of labour takes place. The
immense impetus it gives the development of productive power, and to economy in the means of
production, imposes on the workman increased expenditure of labour in a given time, heightened
tension of labour-power, and closer filling up of the pores of the working day, or condensation of
labour to a degree that is attainable only within the limits of the shortened working day. This
condensation of a greater mass of labour into a given period thenceforward counts for what it
really is, a greater quantity of labour. In addition to a measure of its extension, i.e., duration,
labour now acquires a measure of its intensity or of the degree of its condensation or density. 75
The denser hour of the ten hours’ working day contains more labour, i.e., expended labour-power
than the more porous hour of the twelve hours’ working day. The product therefore of one of the
former hours has as much or more value than has the product of 1 1/5 of the latter hours. Apart
from the increased yield of relative surplus-value through the heightened productiveness of
labour, the same mass of value is now produced for the capitalist say by 3 1/3 hours of surplus
labour, and 6 2/3 hours of necessary labour, as was previously produced by four hours of surplus
labour and eight hours of necessary labour.
We now come to the question: How is the labour intensified?
The first effect of shortening the working day results from the self-evident law, that the efficiency
of labour-power is in an inverse ratio to the duration of its expenditure. Hence, within certain
limits what is lost by shortening the duration is gained by the increasing tension of labour-power.
That the workman moreover really does expend more labour-power, is ensured by the mode in
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which the capitalist pays him. In those industries, such as potteries, where machinery plays little
or no part, the introduction of the Factory Acts has strikingly shown that the mere shortening of
the working day increases to a wonderful degree the regularity, uniformity, order, continuity, and
energy of the labour. 77 It seemed, however, doubtful whether this effect was produced in the
factory proper, where the dependence of the workman on the continuous and uniform motion of
the machinery had already created the strictest discipline. Hence, when in 1844 the reduction of
the working day to less than twelve hours was being debated, the masters almost unanimously
declared
“that their overlookers in the different rooms took good care that the hands lost no
time,” that “the extent of vigilance and attention on the part of the workmen was
hardly capable of being increased,” and, therefore, that the speed of the machinery
and other conditions remaining unaltered, “to expect in a well-managed factory
any important result from increased attention of the workmen was an absurdity.” 78
This assertion was contradicted by experiments. Mr. Robert Gardner reduced the hours of labour
in his two large factories at Preston, on and after the 20th April, 1844, from twelve to eleven
hours a day. The result of about a year’s working was that “the same amount of product for the
same cost was received, and the workpeople as a whole earned in eleven hours as much wages as
they did before in twelve.” 79 I pass over the experiments made in the spinning and carding rooms,
because they were accompanied by an increase of 2% in the speed of the machines. But in the
weaving department, where, moreover, many sorts of figured fancy articles were woven, there
was not the slightest alteration in the conditions of the work. The result was: “From 6th January
to 20th April, 1844, with a twelve hours’ day, average weekly wages of each hand 10s. 1½d.,
from 20th April to 29th June, 1844, with day of eleven hours, average weekly wages 10s. 3½d.” 80
Here we have more produced in eleven hours than previously in twelve, and entirely in
consequence of more steady application and economy of time by the workpeople. While they got
the same wages and gained one hour of spare time, the capitalist got the same amount produced
and saved the cost of coal, gas, and other such items, for one hour. Similar experiments, and with
the like success, were carried out in the mills of Messrs. Horrocks and Jacson.81
The shortening of the hours of labour creates, to begin with, the subjective conditions for the
condensation of labour, by enabling the workman to exert more strength in a given time. So soon
as that shortening becomes compulsory, machinery becomes in the hands of capital the objective
means, systematically employed for squeezing out more labour in a given time. This is effected in
two ways: by increasing the speed of the machinery, and by giving the workman more machinery
to tent. Improved construction of the machinery is necessary, partly because without it greater
pressure cannot be put on the workman, and partly because the shortened hours of labour force
the capitalist to exercise the strictest watch over the cost of production. The improvements in the
steam-engine have increased the piston speed, and at the same time have made it possible, by
means of a greater economy of power, to drive with the same or even a smaller consumption of
coal more machinery with the same engine. The improvements in the transmitting mechanism
have lessened friction, and, what so strikingly distinguishes modern from the older machinery,
have reduced the diameter and weight of the shafting to a constantly decreasing minimum.
Finally, the improvements in the operative machines have, while reducing their size, increased
their speed and efficiency, as in the modern power-loom; or, while increasing the size of their
framework, have also increased the extent and number of their working parts, as in spinningmules, or have added to the speed of these working parts by imperceptible alterations of detail,
such as those which ten years ago increased the speed of the spindles in self-acting mules by onefifth.
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The reduction of the working day to 12 hours dates in England from 1832. In 1836 a
manufacturer stated:
“The labour now undergone in the factories is much greater than it used to be ...
compared with thirty or forty years ago ... owing to the greater attention and
activity required by the greatly increased speed which is given to the
machinery.” 82
In the year 1844, Lord Ashley, now Lord Shaftesbury, made in the House of Commons the
following statements, supported by documentary evidence:
“The labour performed by those engaged in the processes of manufacture, is three
times as great as in the beginning of such operations. Machinery has executed, no
doubt, the work that would demand the sinews of millions of men; but it has also
prodigiously multiplied the labour of those who are governed by its fearful
movements.... In 1815, the labour of following a pair of mules spinning cotton of
No. 40 – reckoning 12 hours to the working day – involved a necessity of walking
8 miles. In 1832, the distance travelled in following a pair of mules, spinning
cotton yarn of the same number, was 20 miles, and frequently more. In 1835”
(query – 1815 or 1825?) “the spinner put up daily, on each of these mules, 820
stretches, making a total of 1,640 stretches in the course of the day. In 1832, the
spinner put up on each mule 2,200 stretches, making a total of 4,400. In 1844,
2,400 stretches, making a total of 4,800; and in some cases the amount of labour
required is even still greater.... I have another document sent to me in 1842,
stating that the labour is progressively increasing - increasing not only because the
distance to be travelled is greater, but because the quantity of goods produced is
multiplied, while the hands are fewer in proportion than before; and, moreover,
because an inferior species of cotton is now often spun, which it is more difficult
to work.... In the carding-room there has also been a great increase of labour. One
person there does the work formerly divided between two. In the weaving-room,
where a vast number of persons are employed, and principally females ... the
labour has increased within the last few years fully 10 per cent., owing to the
increased speed of the machinery in spinning. In 1838, the number of hanks spun
per week was 18,000, in 1843 it amounted to 21,000. In 1819, the number of picks
in power-loom-weaving per minute was 60 – in 1842 it was 140, showing a vast
increase of labour.” 83
In the face of this remarkable intensity of labour which had already been reached in 1844 under
the Twelve Hours’ Act, there appeared to be a justification for the assertion made at that time by
the English manufacturers, that any further progress in that direction was impossible, and
therefore that every further reduction of the hours of labour meant a lessened production. The
apparent correctness of their reasons will be best shown by the following contemporary statement
by Leonard Horner, the factory inspector, their ever watchful censor.
“Now, as the quantity produced must, in the main, be regulated by the speed of
the machinery, it must be the interest of the mill-owner to drive it at the utmost
rate of speed consistent with these following conditions, viz., the preservation of
the machinery from too rapid deterioration; the preservation of the quality of the
article manufactured; and the capability of the workman to follow the motion
without a greater exertion than he can sustain for a constancy. One of the most
important problems, therefore, which the owner of a factory has to solve is to find
out the maximum speed at which he can run, with a due regard to the above
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conditions. It frequently happens that he finds he has gone too fast, that breakages
and bad work more than counterbalance the increased speed, and that he is
obliged to slacken his pace. I therefore concluded, that as an active and intelligent
mill-owner would find out the safe maximum, it would not be possible to produce
as much in eleven hours as in twelve. I further assumed that the operative paid by
piecework, would exert himself to the utmost consistent with the power of
continuing at the same rate.” 84
Horner, therefore, came to the conclusion that a reduction of the working hours below twelve
would necessarily diminish production. 85 He himself, ten years later, cites his opinion of 1845 in
proof of how much he under-estimated in that year the elasticity of machinery, and of man’s
labour-power, both of which are simultaneously stretched to an extreme by the compulsory
shortening of the working day.
We now come to the period that follows the introduction of the Ten Hours’ Act in 1847 into the
English cotton, woollen, silk, and flax mills.
“The speed of the spindles has increased upon throstles 500, and upon mules
1,000 revolutions a minute, i.e., the speed of the throstle spindle, which in 1839
was 4,500 times a minute, is now (1862) 5,000; and of the mule spindle, that was
5,000, is now 6,000 times a minute, amounting in the former case to one-tenth,
and in the second case to one-fifth additional increase.” 86
James Nasmyth, the eminent civil engineer of Patricroft, near Manchester, explained in a letter to
Leonard Horner, written in 1852, the nature of the improvements in the steam-engine that had
been made between the years 1848 and 1852. After remarking that the horse-power of steamengines, being always estimated in the official returns according to the power of similar engines
in 1828 87, is only nominal, and can serve only as an index of their real power, he goes on to say:
“I am confident that from the same weight of steam-engine machinery, we are
now obtaining at least 50 per cent. more duty or work performed on the average,
and that in many cases the identical steam-engines which in the days of the
restricted speed of 220 feet per minute, yielded 50 horsepower, are now yielding
upwards of 100...” "The modern steam-engine of 100 horse-power is capable of
being driven at a much greater force than formerly, arising from improvements in
its construction, the capacity and construction of the boilers, &c....” “Although the
same number of hands are employed in proportion to the horse-power as at former
periods, there are fewer hands employed in proportion to the machinery.” 88 “In the
year 1850, the factories of the United Kingdom employed 134,217 nominal horsepower to give motion to 25,638,716 spindles and 301,445 looms. The number of
spindles and looms in 1856 was respectively 33,503,580 of the former, and
369,205 of the latter, which, reckoning the force of the nominal horse-power
required to be the same as in 1850, would require a force equal to 175,000 horses,
but the actual power given in the return for 1856 is 161,435, less by above 10,000
horses than, calculating upon the basis of the return of 1850, the factories ought to
have required in 1856.” 89 “The facts thus brought out by the Return (of 1856)
appear to be that the factory system is increasing rapidly; that although the same
number of hands are employed in proportion to the horse-power as at former
periods, there are fewer hands employed in proportion to the machinery; that the
steam-engine is enabled to drive an increased weight of machinery by economy of
force and other methods, and that an increased quantity of work can be turned off
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by improvements in machinery, and in methods of manufacture, by increase of
speed of the machinery, and by a variety of other causes.” 90
“The great improvements made in machines of every kind have raised their
productive power very much. Without any doubt, the shortening of the hours of
labour... gave the impulse to these improvements. The latter, combined with the
more intense strain on the workman, have had the effect, that at least as much is
produced in the shortened (by two hours or one-sixth) working day as was
previously produced during the longer one.” 91
One fact is sufficient to show how greatly the wealth of the manufacturers increased along with
the more intense exploitation of labour-power. From 1838 to 1850, the average proportional
increase in English cotton and other factories was 32%, while from 1850 to 1856 it amounted to
86%.
But however great the progress of English industry had been during the 8 years from 1848 to
1856 under the influence of a working day of 10 hours, it was far surpassed during the next
period of 6 years from 1856 to 1862. In silk factories, for instance, there were in 1856, spindles
1,093,799; in 1862, 1,388,544; in 1856, looms 9,260; in 1862, 10,709. But the number of
operatives was, in 1856, 56,131; in 1862, 52,429. The increase in the spindles was therefore
26.9% and in the looms 15.6%, while the number of the operatives decreased 7%. In the year
1850 there were employed in worsted mills 875,830 spindles; in 1856, 1,324,549 (increase
51.2%), and in 1862, 1,289,172 (decrease 2.7%). But if we deduct the doubling spindles that
figure in the numbers for 1856, but not in those for 1862, it will be found that after 1856 the
number of spindles remained nearly stationary. On the other hand, after 1850, the speed of the
spindles and looms was in many cases doubled. The number of power-looms in worsted mills
was, in 1850, 32,617; in 1856, 38,956; in 1862, 43,048. The number of the operatives was, in
1850, 79,737; in 1856, 87,794; in 1862, 86,063; included in these, however, the children under 14
years of age were, in 1850, 9,956; in 1856, 11,228; in 1862, 13,178. In spite, therefore, of the
greatly increased number of looms in 1862, compared with 1856, the total number of the
workpeople employed decreased, and that of the children exploited increased.92
On the 27th April, 1863, Mr. Ferrand said in the House of Commons:
“I have been informed by delegates from 16 districts of Lancashire and Cheshire,
in whose behalf I speak, that the work in the factories is, in consequence of the
improvements in machinery, constantly on the increase. Instead of as formerly one
person with two helps tenting two looms, one person now tents three looms
without helps, and it is no uncommon thing for one person to tent four. Twelve
hours’ work, as is evident from the facts adduced, is now compressed into less
than 10 hours. It is therefore self-evident, to what an enormous extent the toil of
the factory operative has increased during the last 10 years.” 93
Although, therefore, the Factory Inspectors unceasingly and with justice, commend the results of
the Acts of 1844 and 1850, yet they admit that the shortening of the hours of labour has already
called forth such an intensification of the labour as is injurious to the health of the workman and
to his capacity for work.
“In most of the cotton, worsted, and silk mills, an exhausting state of excitement
necessary to enable the workers satisfactorily to mind the machinery, the motion
of which has been greatly accelerated within the last few years, seems to me not
unlikely to be one of the causes of that excess of mortality from lung disease,
which Dr. Greenhow has pointed out in his recent report on this subject.” 94
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There cannot be the slightest doubt that the tendency that urges capital, so soon as a prolongation
of the hours of labour is once for all forbidden, to compensate itself, by a systematic heightening
of the intensity of labour, and to convert every improvement in machinery into a more perfect
means of exhausting the workman, must soon lead to a state of things in which a reduction of the
hours of labour will again be inevitable.95 On the other hand, the rapid advance of English
industry between 1848 and the present time, under the influence of a day of 10 hours, surpasses
the advance made between 1833 and 1847, when the day was 12 hours long, by far more than the
latter surpasses the advance made during the half century after the first introduction of the factory
system, when the working day was without limits. 96

Section 4: The Factory
At the commencement of this chapter we considered that which we may call the body of the
factory, i.e., machinery organised into a system. We there saw how machinery, by annexing the
labour of women and children, augments the number of human beings who form the material for
capitalistic exploitation, how it confiscates the whole of the workman’s disposable time, by
immoderate extension of the hours of labour, and how finally its progress, which allows of
enormous increase of production in shorter and shorter periods, serves as a means of
systematically getting more work done in a shorter time, or of exploiting labour-power more
intensely. We now turn to the factory as a whole, and that in its most perfect form.
Dr. Ure, the Pindar of the automatic factory, describes it, on the one hand, as
“Combined co-operation of many orders of workpeople, adult and young, in
tending with assiduous skill, a system of productive machines, continuously
impelled by a central power” (the prime mover); on the other hand, as “a vast
automaton, composed of various mechanical and intellectual organs, acting in
uninterrupted concert for the production of a common object, all of them being
subordinate to a self-regulated moving force.”
These two descriptions are far from being identical. In one, the collective labourer, or social body
of labour, appears as the dominant subject, and the mechanical automaton as the object; in the
other, the automaton itself is the subject, and the workmen are merely conscious organs, coordinate with the unconscious organs of the automaton, and together with them, subordinated to
the central moving-power. The first description is applicable to every possible employment of
machinery on a large scale, the second is characteristic of its use by capital, and therefore of the
modern factory system. Ure prefers therefore, to describe the central machine, from which the
motion comes, not only as an automaton, but as an autocrat. “In these spacious halls the
benignant power of steam summons around him his myriads of willing menials.” 97
Along with the tool, the skill of the workman in handling it passes over to the machine. The
capabilities of the tool are emancipated from the restraints that are inseparable from human
labour-power. Thereby the technical foundation on which is based the division of labour in
Manufacture, is swept away. Hence, in the place of the hierarchy of specialised workmen that
characterises manufacture, there steps, in the automatic factory, a tendency to equalise and reduce
to one and the same level every kind of work that has to be done by the minders of the
machines; 98 in the place of the artificially produced differentiations of the detail workmen, step
the natural differences of age and sex.
So far as division of labour re-appears in the factory, it is primarily a distribution of the workmen
among the specialised machines; and of masses of workmen, not however organised into groups,
among the various departments of the factory, in each of which they work at a number of similar
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machines placed together; their co-operation, therefore, is only simple. The organised group,
peculiar to manufacture, is replaced by the connexion between the head workman and his few
assistants. The essential division is, into workmen who are actually employed on the machines
(among whom are included a few who look after the engine), and into mere attendants (almost
exclusively children) of these workmen. Among the attendants are reckoned more or less all
“Feeders” who supply the machines with the material to be worked. In addition to these two
principal classes, there is a numerically unimportant class of persons, whose occupation it is to
look after the whole of the machinery and repair it from time to time; such as engineers,
mechanics, joiners, &c. This is a superior class of workmen, some of them scientifically
educated, others brought up to a trade; it is distinct from the factory operative class, and merely
aggregated to it. 99 This division of labour is purely technical.
To work at a machine, the workman should be taught from childhood, in order that he may learn
to adapt his own movements to the uniform and unceasing motion of an automaton. When the
machinery, as a whole, forms a system of manifold machines, working simultaneously and in
concert, the co-operation based upon it, requires the distribution of various groups of workmen
among the different kinds of machines. But the employment of machinery does away with the
necessity of crystallising this distribution after the manner of Manufacture, by the constant
annexation of a particular man to a particular function. 100 Since the motion of the whole system
does not proceed from the workman, but from the machinery, a change of persons can take place
at any time without an interruption of the work. The most striking proof of this is afforded by the
relays system, put into operation by the manufacturers during their revolt from 1848-1850. Lastly,
the quickness with which machine work is learnt by young people, does away with the necessity
of bringing up for exclusive employment by machinery, a special class of operatives.101 With
regard to the work of the mere attendants, it can, to some extent, be replaced in the mill by
machines, 102 and owing to its extreme simplicity, it allows of a rapid and constant change of the
individuals burdened with this drudgery.
Although then, technically speaking, the old system of division of labour is thrown overboard by
machinery, it hangs on in the factory, as a traditional habit handed down from Manufacture, and
is afterwards systematically re-moulded and established in a more hideous form by capital, as a
means of exploiting labour-power. The life-long speciality of handling one and the same tool,
now becomes the life-long speciality of serving one and the same machine. Machinery is put to a
wrong use, with the object of transforming the workman, from his very childhood, into a part of a
detail-machine. 103 In this way, not only are the expenses of his reproduction considerably
lessened, but at the same time his helpless dependence upon the factory as a whole, and therefore
upon the capitalist, is rendered complete. Here as everywhere else, we must distinguish between
the increased productiveness due to the development of the social process of production, and that
due to the capitalist exploitation of that process. In handicrafts and manufacture, the workman
makes use of a tool, in the factory, the machine makes use of him. There the movements of the
instrument of labour proceed from him, here it is the movements of the machine that he must
follow. In manufacture the workmen are parts of a living mechanism. In the factory we have a
lifeless mechanism independent of the workman, who becomes its mere living appendage.
“The miserable routine of endless drudgery and toil in which the same mechanical
process is gone through over and over again, is like the labour of Sisyphus. The
burden of labour, like the rock, keeps ever falling back on the worn-out
labourer.” 104
At the same time that factory work exhausts the nervous system to the uttermost, it does away
with the many-sided play of the muscles, and confiscates every atom of freedom, both in bodily
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and intellectual activity. The lightening of the labour, even, becomes a sort of torture, since the
machine does not free the labourer from work, but deprives the work of all interest. Every kind of
capitalist production, in so far as it is not only a labour-process, but also a process of creating
surplus-value, has this in common, that it is not the workman that employs the instruments of
labour, but the instruments of labour that employ the workman. But it is only in the factory
system that this inversion for the first time acquires technical and palpable reality. By means of
its conversion into an automaton, the instrument of labour confronts the labourer, during the
labour-process, in the shape of capital, of dead labour, that dominates, and pumps dry, living
labour-power. The separation of the intellectual powers of production from the manual labour,
and the conversion of those powers into the might of capital over labour, is, as we have already
shown, finally completed by modern industry erected on the foundation of machinery. The
special skill of each individual insignificant factory operative vanishes as an infinitesimal
quantity before the science, the gigantic physical forces, and the mass of labour that are embodied
in the factory mechanism and, together with that mechanism, constitute the power of the
“master.” This “master,” therefore, in whose brain the machinery and his monopoly of it are
inseparably united, whenever he falls out with his “hands,” contemptuously tells them:
“The factory operatives should keep in wholesome remembrance the fact that
theirs is really a low species of skilled labour; and that there is none which is more
easily acquired, or of its quality more amply remunerated, or which by a short
training of the least expert can be more quickly, as well as abundantly, acquired....
The master’s machinery really plays a far more important part in the business of
production than the labour and the skill of the operative, which six months’
education can teach, and a common labourer can learn.” 106
The technical subordination of the workman to the uniform motion of the instruments of labour,
and the peculiar composition of the body of workpeople, consisting as it does of individuals of
both sexes and of all ages, give rise to a barrack discipline, which is elaborated into a complete
system in the factory, and which fully develops the before mentioned labour of overlooking,
thereby dividing the workpeople into operatives and overlookers, into private soldiers and
sergeants of an industrial army. “The main difficulty [in the automatic factory] ... lay ... above all
in training human beings to renounce their desultory habits of work, and to identify themselves
with the unvarying regularity of the complex automaton. To devise and administer a successful
code of factory discipline, suited to the necessities of factory diligence, was the Herculean
enterprise, the noble achievement of Arkwright! Even at the present day, when the system is
perfectly organised and its labour lightened to the utmost, it is found nearly impossible to convert
persons past the age of puberty, into useful factory hands.” 107 The factory code in which capital
formulates, like a private legislator, and at his own good will, his autocracy over his workpeople,
unaccompanied by that division of responsibility, in other matters so much approved of by the
bourgeoisie, and unaccompanied by the still more approved representative system, this code is
but the capitalistic caricature of that social regulation of the labour-process which becomes
requisite in co-operation on a great scale, and in the employment in common, of instruments of
labour and especially of machinery. The place of the slave-driver’s lash is taken by the
overlooker’s book of penalties. All punishments naturally resolve themselves into fines and
deductions from wages, and the law-giving talent of the factory Lycurgus so arranges matters,
that a violation of his laws is, if possible, more profitable to him than the keeping of them.108 We
shall here merely allude to the material conditions under which factory labour is carried on. Every
organ of sense is injured in an equal degree by artificial elevation of the temperature, by the dustladen atmosphere, by the deafening noise, not to mention danger to life and limb among the
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thickly crowded machinery, which, with the regularity of the seasons, issues its list of the killed
and wounded in the industrial battle.109 Economy of the social means of production, matured and
forced as in a hothouse by the factory system, is turned, in the hands of capital, into systematic
robbery of what is necessary for the life of the workman while he is at work, robbery of space,
light, air, and of protection to his person against the dangerous and unwholesome
accompaniments of the productive process, not to mention the robbery of appliances for the
comfort of the workman. 110 Is Fourier wrong when he calls factories “tempered bagnos"? 111

Section 5: The Strife Between Workman and Machine
The contest between the capitalist and the wage-labourer dates back to the very origin of capital.
It raged on throughout the whole manufacturing period. 112 But only since the introduction of
machinery has the workman fought against the instrument of labour itself, the material
embodiment of capital. He revolts against this particular form of the means of production, as
being the material basis of the capitalist mode of production.
In the 17th century nearly all Europe experienced revolts of the workpeople against the ribbonloom, a machine for weaving ribbons and trimmings, called in Germany Bandmühle,
Schnurmühle, and Mühlenstuhl. These machines were invented in Germany. Abbé Lancellotti, in
a work that appeared in Venice in 1636, but which was written in 1579, says as follows:
“Anthony Müller of Danzig saw about 50 years ago in that town, a very ingenious
machine, which weaves 4 to 6 pieces at once. But the Mayor being apprehensive
that this invention might throw a large number of workmen on the streets, caused
the inventor to be secretly strangled or drowned.”
In Leyden, this machine was not used till 1629; there the riots of the ribbon-weavers at length
compelled the Town Council to prohibit it.
“In hac urbe,” says Boxhorn (Inst. Pol., 1663), referring to the introduction of this
machine into Leyden, “ante hos viginti circiter annos instrumentum quidam
invenerunt textorium, quo solus plus panni et facilius conficere poterat, quan
plures aequali tempore. Hinc turbae ortae et querulae textorum, tandemque usus
hujus instrumenti a magistratu prohibitus est.”
[In this town, about twenty years ago certain people invented an instrument for
weaving, with which a single person could weave more cloth, and more easily,
than many others in the same length of time. As a result there arose disturbances
and complaints from the weavers, until the Town Council finally prohibited the
use of this instrument.]
After making various decrees more or less prohibitive against this loom in 1632, 1639, &c., the
States General of Holland at length permitted it to be used, under certain conditions, by the decree
of the 15th December, 1661. It was also prohibited in Cologne in 1676, at the same time that its
introduction into England was causing disturbances among the workpeople. By an imperial Edict
of 19th Feb., 1685, its use was forbidden throughout all Germany. In Hamburg it was burnt in
public by order of the Senate. The Emperor Charles VI., on 9th Feb., 1719, renewed the edict of
1685, and not till 1765 was its use openly allowed in the Electorate of Saxony. This machine,
which shook Europe to its foundations, was in fact the precursor of the mule and the power-loom,
and of the industrial revolution of the 18th century. It enabled a totally inexperienced boy, to set
the whole loom with all its shuttles in motion, by simply moving a rod backwards and forwards,
and in its improved form produced from 40 to 50 pieces at once.
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About 1630, a wind-sawmill, erected near London by a Dutchman, succumbed to the excesses of
the populace. Even as late as the beginning of the 18th century, sawmills driven by water
overcame the opposition of the people, supported as it was by Parliament, only with great
difficulty. No sooner had Everet in 1758 erected the first wool-shearing machine that was driven
by water-power, than it was set on fire by 100,000 people who had been thrown out of work.
Fifty thousand workpeople, who had previously lived by carding wool, petitioned Parliament
against Arkwright’s scribbling mills and carding engines. The enormous destruction of machinery
that occurred in the English manufacturing districts during the first 15 years of this century,
chiefly caused by the employment of the power-loom, and known as the Luddite movement, gave
the anti-Jacobin governments of a Sidmouth, a Castlereagh, and the like, a pretext for the most
reactionary and forcible measures. It took both time and experience before the workpeople learnt
to distinguish between machinery and its employment by capital, and to direct their attacks, not
against the material instruments of production, but against the mode in which they are used.113
The contests about wages in Manufacture, pre-suppose manufacture, and are in no sense directed
against its existence. The opposition against the establishment of new manufactures, proceeds
from the guilds and privileged towns, not from the workpeople. Hence the writers of the
manufacturing period treat the division of labour chiefly as a means of virtually supplying a
deficiency of labourers, and not as a means of actually displacing those in work. This distinction
is self-evident. If it be said that 100 millions of people would be required in England to spin with
the old spinning-wheel the cotton that is now spun with mules by 500,000 people, this does not
mean that the mules took the place of those millions who never existed. It means only this, that
many millions of workpeople would be required to replace the spinning machinery. If, on the
other hand, we say, that in England the power-loom threw 800,000 weavers on the streets, we do
not refer to existing machinery, that would have to be replaced by a definite number of
workpeople, but to a number of weavers in existence who were actually replaced or displaced by
the looms. During the manufacturing period, handicraft labour, altered though it was by division
of labour, was yet the basis. The demands of the new colonial markets could not be satisfied
owing to the relatively small number of town operatives handed down from the middle ages, and
the manufactures proper opened out new fields of production to the rural population, driven from
the land by the dissolution of the feudal system. At that time, therefore, division of labour and cooperation in the workshops, were viewed more from the positive aspect, that they made the
workpeople more productive. 114 Long before the period of modern industry, co-operation and the
concentration of the instruments of labour in the hands of a few, gave rise, in numerous countries
where these methods were applied in agriculture, to great, sudden and forcible revolutions in the
modes of production, and consequentially, in the conditions of existence, and the means of
employment of the rural populations. But this contest at first takes place more between the large
and the small landed proprietors, than between capital and wage labour; on the other hand, when
the labourers are displaced by the instruments of labour, by sheep, horses, &c., in this case force
is directly resorted to in the first instance as the prelude to the industrial revolution. The labourers
are first driven from the land, and then come the sheep. Land grabbing on a great scale, such as
was perpetrated in England, is the first step in creating a field for the establishment of agriculture
on a great scale. 115 Hence this subversion of agriculture puts on, at first, more the appearance of a
political revolution.
The instrument of labour, when it takes the form of a machine, immediately becomes a
competitor of the workman himself.116 The self-expansion of capital by means of machinery is
thenceforward directly proportional to the number of the workpeople, whose means of livelihood
have been destroyed by that machinery. The whole system of capitalist production is based on the
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fact that the workman sells his labour-power as a commodity. Division of labour specialises this
labour-power, by reducing it to skill in handling a particular tool. So soon as the handling of this
tool becomes the work of a machine, then, with the use-value, the exchange-value too, of the
workman’s labour-power vanishes; the workman becomes unsaleable, like paper money thrown
out of currency by legal enactment. That portion of the working-class, thus by machinery
rendered superfluous, i.e., no longer immediately necessary for the self-expansion of capital,
either goes to the wall in the unequal contest of the old handicrafts and manufactures with
machinery, or else floods all the more easily accessible branches of industry, swamps the labourmarket, and sinks the price of labour-power below its value. It is impressed upon the workpeople,
as a great consolation, first, that their sufferings are only temporary (“a temporary
inconvenience"), secondly, that machinery acquires the mastery over the whole of a given field of
production, only by degrees, so that the extent and intensity of its destructive effect is diminished.
The first consolation neutralises the second. When machinery seizes on an industry by degrees, it
produces chronic misery among the operatives who compete with it. Where the transition is rapid,
the effect is acute and felt by great masses. History discloses no tragedy more horrible than the
gradual extinction of the English hand-loom weavers, an extinction that was spread over several
decades, and finally sealed in 1838. Many of them died of starvation, many with families
vegetated for a long time on 2½ d. a day. 117 On the other hand, the English cotton machinery
produced an acute effect in India. The Governor General reported 1834-35:
“The misery hardly finds a parallel in the history of commerce. The bones of the
cotton-weavers are bleaching the plains of India.”
No doubt, in turning them out of this “temporal” world, the machinery caused them no more than
“a temporary inconvenience.” For the rest, since machinery is continually seizing upon new fields
of production, its temporary effect is really permanent. Hence, the character of independence and
estrangement which the capitalist mode of production as a whole gives to the instruments of
labour and to the product, as against the workman, is developed by means of machinery into a
thorough antagonism. 118 Therefore, it is with the advent of machinery, that the workman for the
first time brutally revolts against the instruments of labour.
The instrument of labour strikes down the labourer. This direct antagonism between the two
comes out most strongly, whenever newly introduced machinery competes with handicrafts or
manufactures, handed down from former times. But even in modern industry the continual
improvement of machinery, and the development of the automatic system, has an analogous
effect.
“The object of improved machinery is to diminish manual labour, to provide for
the performance of a process or the completion of a link in a manufacture by the
aid of an iron instead of the human apparatus.” 119“The adaptation of power to
machinery heretofore moved by hand, is almost of daily occurrence ... the minor
improvements in machinery having for their object economy of power, the
production of better work, the turning off more work in the same time, or in
supplying the place of a child, a female, or a man, are constant, and although
sometimes apparently of no great moment, have somewhat important results.”120
“Whenever a process requires peculiar dexterity and steadiness of hand, it is
withdrawn, as soon as possible, from the cunning workman, who is prone to
irregularities of many kinds, and it is placed in charge of a peculiar mechanism, so
self-regulating that a child can superintend it.” 121“On the automatic plan skilled
labour gets progressively superseded.” 122“The effect of improvements in
machinery, not merely in superseding the necessity for the employment of the
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same quantity of adult labour as before, in order to produce a given result, but in
substituting one description of human labour for another, the less skilled for the
more skilled, juvenile for adult, female for male, causes a fresh disturbance in the
rate of wages.” 123 “The effect of substituting the self-acting mule for the common
mule, is to discharge the greater part of the men spinners, and to retain adolescents
and children.” 124
The extraordinary power of expansion of the factory system owing to accumulated practical
experience, to the mechanical means at hand, and to constant technical progress, was proved to us
by the giant strides of that system under the pressure of a shortened working day. But who, in
1860, the Zenith year of the English cotton industry, would have dreamt of the galloping
improvements in machinery, and the corresponding displacement of working people, called into
being during the following 3 years, under the stimulus of the American Civil War? A couple of
examples from the Reports of the Inspectors of Factories will suffice on this point. A Manchester
manufacturer states:
“We formerly had 75 carding engines, now we have 12, doing the same quantity
of work.... We are doing with fewer hands by 14, at a saving in wages of £10 aweek. Our estimated saving in waste is about 10% in the quantity of cotton
consumed.” “In another fine-spinning mill in Manchester, I was informed that
through increased speed and the adoption of some self-acting processes, a
reduction had been made, in number, of a fourth in one department, and of above
half in another, and that the introduction of the combing machine in place of the
second carding, had considerably reduced, the number of hands formerly
employed in the carding-room.”
Another spinning-mill is estimated to effect a saving of labour of 10%. The Messrs. Gilmour,
spinners at Manchester, state: “In our blowing-room department we consider our expense with
new machinery is fully one-third less in wages and hands ... in the jack-frame and drawing-frame
room, about one-third less in expense, and likewise one-third less in hands; in the spinning room
about one-third less in expenses. But this is not all; when our yarn goes to the manufacturers, it is
so much better by the application of our new machinery, that they will produce a greater quantity
of cloth, and cheaper than from the yarn produced by old machinery.” 125 Mr. Redgrave further
remarks in the same Report:
“The reduction of hands against increased production is, in fact, constantly taking
place, in woollen mills the reduction commenced some time since, and is
continuing; a few days since, the master of a school in the neighbourhood of
Rochdale said to me, that the great falling off in the girls’ school is not only
caused by the distress, but by the changes of machinery in the woollen mills, in
consequence of which a reduction of 70 short-timers had taken place.” 126
The following table shows the total result of the mechanical improvements in the English cotton
industry due to the American Civil War.
Number of Factories
England and Wales
Scotland
Ireland
United Kingdom
Number of Power Looms
England and Wales

1857
2,046
152
12
2,210
1857
275,590

1861
2,715
163
9
2,887
1861
368,125

1868
2,405
131
13
2,549
1868
344,719

291

Scotland
Ireland
United Kingdom
Number of Spindles
England and Wales
Scotland
Ireland
United Kingdom
Number of Persons
Employed
England and Wales
Scotland
Ireland
United Kingdom
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21,624
1,633
298,847
1857
25,818,576
2,041,129
150,512
28,010,217

30,110
1,757
399,992
1861
28,352,125
1,915,398
119,944
30,387,467

31,864
2,746
379,329
1868
30,478,228
1,397,546
124,240
32,000,014

1857

1861

1868

341,170
34,698
3,345
379,213

407,598
41,237
2,734
452,569

357,052
39,809
4,203
401,064

Hence, between 1861 and 1868, 338 cotton factories disappeared, in other words more productive
machinery on a larger scale was concentrated in the hands of a smaller number of capitalists. The
number of power-looms decreased by 20,663; but since their product increased in the same
period, an improved loom must have yielded more than an old one. Lastly the number of spindles
increased by 1,612,541, while the number of operatives decreased by 50,505. The “temporary”
misery inflicted on the workpeople by the cotton-crisis, was heightened, and from being
temporary made permanent, by the rapid and persistent progress of machinery.
But machinery not only acts as a competitor who gets the better of the workman, and is constantly
on the point of making him superfluous. It is also a power inimical to him, and as such capital
proclaims it from the roof tops and as such makes use of it. It is the most powerful weapon for
repressing strikes, those periodical revolts of the working-class against the autocracy of capital.127
According to Gaskell, the steam-engine was from the very first an antagonist of human power, an
antagonist that enabled the capitalist to tread under foot the growing claims of the workmen, who
threatened the newly born factory system with a crisis. 128 It would be possible to write quite a
history of the inventions, made since 1830, for the sole purpose of supplying capital with
weapons against the revolts of the working-class. At the head of these in importance, stands the
self-acting mule, because it opened up a new epoch in the automatic system. 129
Nasmyth, the inventor of the steam-hammer, gives the following evidence before the Trades’
Union Commission, with regard to the improvements made by him in machinery and introduced
in consequence of the wide-spread and long strikes of the engineers in 1851.
“The characteristic feature of our modern mechanical improvements, is the
introduction of self-acting tool machinery. What every mechanical workman has
now to do, and what every boy can do, is not to work himself but to superintend
the beautiful labour of the machine. The whole class of workmen that depend
exclusively on their skill, is now done away with. Formerly, I employed four boys
to every mechanic. Thanks to these new mechanical combinations, I have reduced
the number of grown-up men from 1,500 to 750. The result was a considerable
increase in my profits.”
Ure says of a machine used in calico printing:
“At length capitalists sought deliverance from this intolerable bondage” [namely
the, in their eyes, burdensome terms of their contracts with the workmen] “in the
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resources of science, and were speedily re-instated in their legitimate rule, that of
the head over the inferior members.”
Speaking of an invention for dressing warps:
“Then the combined malcontents, who fancied themselves impregnably
entrenched behind the old lines of division of labour, found their flanks turned and
their defences rendered useless by the new mechanical tactics, and were obliged to
surrender at discretion.”
With regard to the invention of the self-acting mule, he says:
“A creation destined to restore order among the industrious classes.... This
invention confirms the great doctrine already propounded, that when capital
enlists science into her service, the refractory hand of labour will always be taught
docility.” 130
Although Ure’s work appeared 30 years ago, at a time when the factory system was
comparatively but little developed, it still perfectly expresses the spirit of the factory, not only by
its undisguised cynicism, but also by the naïveté with which it blurts out the stupid contradictions
of the capitalist brain. For instance, after propounding the “doctrine” stated above, that capital,
with the aid of science taken into its pay, always reduces the refractory hand of labour to docility,
he grows indignant because
“it (physico-mechanical science) has been accused of lending itself to the rich
capitalist as an instrument for harassing the poor.”
After preaching a long sermon to show how advantageous the rapid development of machinery is
to the working-classes, he warns them, that by their obstinacy and their strikes they hasten that
development.
“Violent revulsions of this nature,” he says, “display short-sighted man in the
contemptible character of a self-tormentor.”
A few pages before he states the contrary.
“Had it not been for the violent collisions and interruptions resulting from
erroneous views among the factory operatives, the factory system would have
been developed still more rapidly and beneficially for all concerned.” Then he
exclaims again: “Fortunately for the state of society in the cotton districts of Great
Britain, the improvements in machinery are gradual.” “It” (improvement in
machinery) “is said to lower the rate of earnings of adults by displacing a portion
of them, and thus rendering their number superabundant as compared with the
demand for their labour. It certainly augments the demand for the labour of
children and increases the rate of their wages.”
On the other hand, this same dispenser of consolation defends the lowness of the children’s wages
on the ground that it prevents parents from sending their children at too early an age into the
factory. The whole of his book is a vindication of a working day of unrestricted length; that
Parliament should forbid children of 13 years to be exhausted by working 12 hours a day,
reminds his liberal soul of the darkest days of the Middle Ages. This does not prevent him from
calling upon the factory operatives to thank Providence, who by means of machinery has given
them the leisure to think of their “immortal interests.” 131
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Section 6: The Theory of Compensation as Regards the
Workpeople Displaced by Machinery
James Mill, MacCulloch, Torrens, Senior, John Stuart Mill, and a whole series besides, of
bourgeois political economists, insist that all machinery that displaces workmen, simultaneously
and necessarily sets free an amount of capital adequate to employ the same identical workmen. 132
Suppose a capitalist to employ 100 workmen, at £30 a year each, in a carpet factory. The variable
capital annually laid out amounts, therefore, to £3,000. Suppose, also, that he discharges 50 of his
workmen, and employs the remaining 50 with machinery that costs him £1,500. To simplify
matters, we take no account of buildings, coal, &c. Further suppose that the raw material annually
consumed costs £3,000, both before and after the change.133 Is any capital set free by this
metamorphosis? Before the change, the total sum of £6,000 consisted half of constant, and half of
variable capital. After the change it consists of £4,500 constant ( £3,000 raw material and £1,500
machinery), and £1,500 variable capital. The variable capital, instead of being one half, is only
one quarter, of the total capital. Instead of being set free, a part of the capital is here locked up in
such a way as to cease to be exchanged against labour-power: variable has been changed into
constant capital. Other things remaining unchanged, the capital of £6,000, can, in future, employ
no more than 50 men. With each improvement in the machinery, it will employ fewer. If the
newly introduced machinery had cost less than did the labour-power and implements displaced by
it, if, for instance, instead of costing £1,500, it had cost only £1,000, a variable capital of £1,000
would have been converted into constant capital, and locked up; and a capital of £500 would have
been set free. The latter sum, supposing wages unchanged, would form a fund sufficient to
employ about 16 out of the 50 men discharged; nay, less than 16, for, in order to be employed as
capital, a part of this £500 must now become constant capital, thus leaving only the remainder to
be laid out in labour-power.
But, suppose, besides, that the making of the new machinery affords employment to a greater
number of mechanics, can that be called compensation to the carpet-makers, thrown on the
streets? At the best, its construction employs fewer men than its employment displaces. The sum
of £1,500 that formerly represented the wages of the discharged carpet-makers, now represents in
the shape of machinery: (1) the value of the means of production used in the construction of that
machinery, (2) the wages of the mechanics employed in its construction, and (3) the surplus-value
falling to the share of their “master.” Further, the machinery need not be renewed till it is worn
out. Hence, in order to keep the increased number of mechanics in constant employment, one
carpet manufacturer after another must displace workmen by machines.
As a matter of fact the apologists do not mean this sort of setting free.
They have in their minds the means of subsistence of the liberated work-people. It cannot be
denied, in the above instance, that the machinery not only liberates 50 men, thus placing them at
others’ disposal, but, at the same time, it withdraws from their consumption, and sets free, means
of subsistence to the value of £1,500. The simple fact, by no means a new one, that machinery
cuts off the workmen from their means of subsistence is, therefore, in economic parlance
tantamount to this, that machinery liberates means of subsistence for the workman, or converts
those means into capital for his employment. The mode of expression, you see, is everything.
Nominibus mollire licet mala.
This theory implies that the £1,500 worth of means of subsistence was capital that was being
expanded by the labour of the 50 men discharged. That, consequently, this capital falls out of
employment so soon as they commence their forced holidays, and never rests till it has found a
fresh investment, where it can again be productively consumed by these same 50 men. That
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sooner or later, therefore, the capital and the workmen must come together again, and that, then,
the compensation is complete. That the sufferings of the workmen displaced by machinery are
therefore as transient as are the riches of this world.
In relation to the discharged workmen, the £1,500 worth of means of subsistence never was
capital. What really confronted them as capital, was the sum of £1,500, afterwards laid out in
machinery. On looking closer it will be seen that this sum represented part of the carpets
produced in a year by the 50 discharged men, which part they received as wages from their
employer in money instead of in kind. With the carpets in the form of money, they bought means
of subsistence to the value of £1,500. These means, therefore, were to them, not capital, but
commodities, and they, as regards these commodities, were not wage-labourers, but buyers. The
circumstance that they were “freed” by the machinery, from the means of purchase, changed them
from buyers into non-buyers. Hence a lessened demand for those commodities – voilà tout. If this
diminution be not compensated by an increase from some other quarter, the market price of the
commodities falls. If this state of things lasts for some time, and extends, there follows a
discharge of workmen employed in the production of these commodities. Some of the capital that
was previously devoted to production of necessary means of subsistence, has to become
reproduced in another form. While prices fall, and capital is being displaced, the labourers
employed in the production of necessary means of subsistence are in their turn “freed” from a part
of their wages. Instead, therefore, of proving that, when machinery frees the workman from his
means of subsistence, it simultaneously converts those means into capital for his further
employment, our apologists, with their cut-and-dried law of supply and demand, prove, on the
contrary, that machinery throws workmen on the streets, not only in that branch of production in
which it is introduced, but also in those branches in which it is not introduced.
The real facts, which are travestied by the optimism of economists, are as follows: The labourers,
when driven out of the workshop by the machinery, are thrown upon the labour market, and there
add to the number of workmen at the disposal of the capitalists. In Part VII of this book it will be
seen that this effect of machinery, which, as we have seen, is represented to be a compensation to
the working class, is on the contrary a most frightful scourge. For the present I will only say this:
The labourers that are thrown out of work in any branch of industry, can no doubt seek for
employment in some other branch. If they find it, and thus renew the bond between them and the
means of subsistence, this takes place only by the intermediary of a new and additional capital
that is seeking investment; not at all by the intermediary of the capital that formerly employed
them and was afterwards converted into machinery. And even should they find employment, what
a poor look-out is theirs! Crippled as they are by division of labour, these poor devils are worth so
little outside their old trade, that they cannot find admission into any industries, except a few of
inferior kind, that are over-supplied with underpaid workmen. 134 Further, every branch of
industry attracts each year a new stream of men, who furnish a contingent from which to fill up
vacancies, and to draw a supply for expansion. So soon as machinery sets free a part of the
workmen employed in a given branch of industry, the reserve men are also diverted into new
channels of employment, and become absorbed in other branches; meanwhile the original
victims, during the period of transition, for the most part starve and perish.
It is an undoubted fact that machinery, as such, is not responsible for “setting free” the workman
from the means of subsistence. It cheapens and increases production in that branch which it seizes
on, and at first makes no change in the mass of the means of subsistence produced in other
branches. Hence, after its introduction, the society possesses as much, if not more, of the
necessaries of life than before, for the labourers thrown out of work; and that quite apart from the
enormous share of the annual produce wasted by the non-workers. And this is the point relied on
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by our apologists! The contradictions and antagonisms inseparable from the capitalist
employment of machinery, do not exist, they say, since they do not arise out of machinery, as
such, but out of its capitalist employment! Since therefore machinery, considered alone, shortens
the hours of labour, but, when in the service of capital, lengthens them; since in itself it lightens
labour, but when employed by capital, heightens the intensity of labour; since in itself it is a
victory of man over the forces of Nature, but in the hands of capital, makes man the slave of those
forces; since in itself it increases the wealth of the producers, but in the hands of capital, makes
them paupers - for all these reasons and others besides, says the bourgeois economist without
more ado, it is clear as noon-day that all these contradictions are a mere semblance of the reality,
and that, as a matter of fact, they have neither an actual nor a theoretical existence. Thus he saves
himself from all further puzzling of the brain, and what is more, implicitly declares his opponent
to be stupid enough to contend against, not the capitalistic employment of machinery, but
machinery itself.
No doubt he is far from denying that temporary inconvenience may result from the capitalist use
of machinery. But where is the medal without its reverse! Any employment of machinery, except
by capital, is to him an impossibility. Exploitation of the workman by the machine is therefore,
with him, identical with exploitation of the machine by the workman. Whoever, therefore,
exposes the real state of things in the capitalistic employment of machinery, is against its
employment in any way, and is an enemy of social progress! 135 Exactly the reasoning of the
celebrated Bill Sykes. “Gentlemen of the jury, no doubt the throat of this commercial traveller has
been cut. But that is not my fault, it is the fault of the knife. Must we, for such a temporary
inconvenience, abolish the use of the knife? Only consider! where would agriculture and trade be
without the knife? Is it not as salutary in surgery, as it is knowing in anatomy? And in addition a
willing help at the festive board? If you abolish the knife – you hurl us back into the depths of
barbarism.” 136
Although machinery necessarily throws men out of work in those industries into which it is
introduced, yet it may, notwithstanding this, bring about an increase of employment in other
industries. This effect, however, has nothing in common with the so-called theory of
compensation. Since every article produced by a machine is cheaper than a similar article
produced by hand, we deduce the following infallible law: If the total quantity of the article
produced by machinery, be equal to the total quantity of the article previously produced by a
handicraft or by manufacture, and now made by machinery, then the total labour expended is
diminished. The new labour spent on the instruments of labour, on the machinery, on the coal,
and so on, must necessarily be less than the labour displaced by the use of the machinery;
otherwise the product of the machine would be as dear, or dearer, than the product of the manual
labour. But, as a matter of fact, the total quantity of the article produced by machinery with a
diminished number of workmen, instead of remaining equal to, by far exceeds the total quantity
of the hand-made article that has been displaced. Suppose that 400,000 yards of cloth have been
produced on power-looms by fewer weavers than could weave 100,000 yards by hand. In the
quadrupled product there lies four times as much raw material. Hence the production of raw
material must be quadrupled. But as regards the instruments of labour, such as buildings, coal,
machinery, and so on, it is different; the limit up to which the additional labour required for their
production can increase, varies with the difference between the quantity of the machine-made
article, and the quantity of the same article that the same number of workmen could make by
hand.
Hence, as the use of machinery extends in a given industry, the immediate effect is to increase
production in the other industries that furnish the first with means of production. How far
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employment is thereby found for an increased number of men, depends, given the length of the
working day and the intensity of labour, on the composition of the capital employed, i.e., on the
ratio of its constant to its variable component. This ratio, in its turn, varies considerably with the
extent to which machinery has already seized on, or is then seizing on, those trades. The number
of the men condemned to work in coal and metal mines increased enormously owing to the
progress of the English factory system; but during the last few decades this increase of number
has been less rapid, owing to the use of new machinery in mining. 137 A new type of workman
springs into life along with the machine, namely, its maker. We have already learnt that
machinery has possessed itself even of this branch of production on a scale that grows greater
every day. 138 As to raw material, 139 there is not the least doubt that the rapid strides of cotton
spinning, not only pushed on with tropical luxuriance the growth of cotton in the United States,
and with it the African slave trade, but also made the breeding of slaves the chief business of the
border slave-states. When, in 1790, the first census of slaves was taken in the United States, their
number was 697,000; in 1861 it had nearly reached four millions. On the other hand, it is no less
certain that the rise of the English woollen factories, together with the gradual conversion of
arable land into sheep pasture, brought, about the superfluity of agricultural labourers that led to
their being driven in masses into the towns. Ireland, having during the last twenty years reduced
its population by nearly one half, is at this moment undergoing the process of still further
reducing the number of its inhabitants, so as exactly to suit the requirements of its landlords and
of the English woollen manufacturers.
When machinery is applied to any of the preliminary or intermediate stages through which the
subject of labour has to pass on its way to completion, there is an increased yield of material in
those stages, and simultaneously an increased demand for labour in the handicrafts or
manufactures supplied by the produce of the machines. Spinning by machinery, for example,
supplied yarn so cheaply and so abundantly that the hand-loom weavers were, at first, able to
work full time without increased outlay. Their earnings accordingly rose.140 Hence a flow of
people into the cotton-weaving trade, till at length the 800,000 weavers, called into existence by
the Jenny, the throstle and the mule, were overwhelmed by the power-loom. So also, owing to the
abundance of clothing materials produced by machinery, the number of tailors, seamstresses and
needlewomen, went on increasing until the appearance of the sewing-machine.
In proportion as machinery, with the aid of a relatively small number of workpeople, increases
the mass of raw materials, intermediate products, instruments of labour, &c., the working-up of
these raw materials and intermediate products becomes split up into numberless branches; social
production increases in diversity. The factory system carries the social division of labour
immeasurably further than does manufacture, for it increases the productiveness of the industries
it seizes upon, in a far higher degree.
The immediate result of machinery is to augment surplus-value and the mass of products in which
surplus-value is embodied. And, as the substances consumed by the capitalists and their
dependents become more plentiful, so too do these orders of society. Their growing wealth, and
the relatively diminished number of workmen required to produce the necessaries of life beget,
simultaneously with the rise of new and luxurious wants, the means of satisfying those wants. A
larger portion of the produce of society is changed into surplus-produce, and a larger part of the
surplus-produce is supplied for consumption in a multiplicity of refined shapes. In other words,
the production of luxuries increases.141 The refined and varied forms of the products are also due
to new relations with the markets of the world, relations that are created by modern industry. Not
only are greater quantities of foreign articles of luxury exchanged for home products, but a
greater mass of foreign raw materials, ingredients, and intermediate products, are used as means

297

Chapter 15

of production in the home industries. Owing to these relations with the markets of the world, the
demand for labour increases in the carrying trades, which split up into numerous varieties.142
The increase of the means of production and subsistence, accompanied by a relative diminution in
the number of labourers, causes an increased demand for labour in making canals, docks, tunnels,
bridges, and so on, works that can only bear fruit in the far future. Entirely new branches of
production, creating new fields of labour, are also formed, as the direct result either of machinery
or of the general industrial changes brought about by it. But the place occupied by these branches
in the general production is, even in the most developed countries, far from important. The
number of labourers that find employment in them is directly proportional to the demand, created
by those industries, for the crudest form of manual labour. The chief industries of this kind are, at
present, gas-works, telegraphs, photography, steam navigation, and railways. According to the
census of 1861 for England and Wales, we find in the gas industry (gas-works, production of
mechanical apparatus, servants of the gas companies, &c), 15,211 persons; in telegraphy, 2,399;
in photography, 2,366; steam navigation, 3,570; and in railways, 70,599, of whom the unskilled
“navvies,” more or less permanently employed, and the whole administrative and commercial
staff, make up about 28,000. The total number of persons, therefore, employed in these five new
industries amounts to 94,145.
Lastly, the extraordinary productiveness of modern industry, accompanied as it is by both a more
extensive and a more intense exploitation of labour-power in all other spheres of production,
allows of the unproductive employment of a larger and larger part of the working-class, and the
consequent reproduction, on a constantly extending scale, of the ancient domestic slaves under
the name of a servant class, including men-servants, women-servants, lackeys, &c. According to
the census of 1861, the population of England and Wales was 20,066,244; of these, 9,776,259
males, and 10,289,965 females. If we deduct from this population all who are too old or too
young for work, all unproductive women, young persons and children, the “ideological” classes,
such as government officials, priests, lawyers, soldiers, &c.; further, all who have no occupation
but to consume the labour of others in the form of rent, interest, &c.; and, lastly, paupers,
vagabonds, and criminals, there remain in round numbers eight millions of the two sexes of every
age, including in that number every capitalist who is in any way engaged in industry, commerce,
or finance. Among these 8 millions are:
PERSONS
Agricultural labourers (including
shepherds, farm servants, and
maidservants living in the houses of
farmers)
All who are employed in cotton, woollen,
worsted, flax, hemp, silk, and jute
factories, in stocking making and lace
making by machinery

1,098,261

143

642,607

All who are employed in coal mines and
metal mines
All who are employed in metal works
(blastfurnaces, rolling mills, &c.), and
metal manufactures of every kind

565,835
144

396,998
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The servant class

145

1,208,648

All the persons employed in textile factories and in mines, taken together, number 1,208,442;
those employed in textile factories and metal industries, taken together, number 1,039,605; in
both cases less than the number of modern domestic slaves. What a splendid result of the
capitalist exploitation of machinery!

Section 7: Repulsion and Attraction of Workpeople by the
Factory System. Crises in the Cotton Trade
All political economists of any standing admit that the introduction of new machinery has a
baneful effect on the workmen in the old handicrafts and manufactures with which this machinery
at first competes. Almost all of them bemoan the slavery of the factory operative. And what is the
great trump-card that they play? That machinery, after the horrors of the period of introduction
and development have subsided, instead of diminishing, in the long run increases the number of
the slaves of labour! Yes, Political Economy revels in the hideous theory, hideous to every
“philanthropist” who believes in the eternal Nature-ordained necessity for capitalist production,
that after a period of growth and transition, even its crowning success, the factory system based
on machinery, grinds down more workpeople than on its first introduction it throws on the
streets. 146
It is true that in some cases, as we saw from instances of English worsted and silk factories, an
extraordinary extension of the factory system may, at a certain stage of its development, be
accompanied not only by a relative, but by an absolute decrease in the number of operatives
employed. In the year 1860, when a special census of all the factories in the United Kingdom was
taken by order of Parliament, the factories in those parts of Lancashire, Cheshire, and Yorkshire,
included in the district of Mr. Baker, the factory inspector, numbered 652; 570 of these contained
85,622 power-looms, 6,819,146 spindles (exclusive of doubling spindles), employed 27,439
horse-power (steam), and 1,390 (water), and 94,119 persons. In the year 1865, the same factories
contained, looms 95,163, spindles 7,025,031, had a steam-power of 28,925 horses, and a waterpower of 1,445 horses, and employed 88,913 persons. Between 1860 and 1865, therefore, the
increase in looms was 11%, in spindles 3%, and in engine-power 3%, while the number of
persons employed decreased 5½%.147 Between 1852 and 1862, considerable extension of the
English woollen manufacture took place, while the number of hands employed in it remained
almost stationary,
“showing how greatly the introduction of new machines had superseded the
labour of preceding periods.” 148
In certain cases, the increase in the number of hands employed is only apparent; that is, it is not
due to the extension of the factories already established, but to the gradual annexation of
connected trades; for instance, the increase in power-looms, and in the hands employed by them
between 1838 and 1856, was, in the cotton trade, simply owing to the extension of this branch of
industry; but in the other trades to the application of steam-power to the carpet-loom, to the
ribbon-loom, and to the linen-loom, which previously had been worked by the power of men. 149
Hence the increase of the hands in these latter trades was merely a symptom of a diminution in
the total number employed. Finally, we have considered this question entirely apart from the fact,
that everywhere, except in the metal industries, young persons (under 18), and women and
children form the preponderating element in the class of factory hands.
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Nevertheless, in spite of the mass of hands actually displaced and virtually replaced by
machinery, we can understand how the factory operatives, through the building of more mills and
the extension of old ones in a given industry, may become more numerous than the
manufacturing workmen and handicraftsman that have been displaced. Suppose, for example, that
in the old mode of production, a capital of £500 is employed weekly, two-fifths being constant
and three-fifths variable capital, i.e., £200 being laid out in means of production, and £300, say £1
per man, in labour-power. On the introduction of machinery the composition of this capital
becomes altered. We will suppose it to consist of four-fifths constant and one-fifth variable,
which means that only £100 is now laid out in labour-power. Consequently, two-thirds of the
workmen are discharged. If now the business extends, and the total capital employed grows to
£1,500 under unchanged conditions, the number of operatives employed will increase to 300, just
as many as before the introduction of the machinery. If the capital further grows to £2,000, 400
men will be employed, or one-third more than under the old system. Their numbers have, in point
of fact, increased by 100, but relatively, i.e., in proportion to the total capital advanced, they have
diminished by 800, for the £2,000 capital would, in the old state of things, have employed 1,200
instead of 400 men. Hence, a relative decrease in the number of hands is consistent with an actual
increase. We assumed above that while the total capital increases, its composition remains the
same, because the conditions of production remain constant. But we have already seen that, with
every advance in the use of machinery, the constant component of capital, that part which
consists of machinery, raw material, &c., increases, while the variable component, the part laid
out in labour-power, decreases. We also know that in no other system of production is
improvement so continuous, and the composition of the capital employed so constantly changing
as in the factory system. These changes are, however, continually interrupted by periods of rest,
during which there is a mere quantitative extension of the factories on the existing technical basis.
During such periods the operatives increase in number. Thus, in 1835, the total number of
operatives in the cotton, woollen, worsted, flax, and silk factories of the United Kingdom was
only 354,684; while in 1861 the number of the power-loom weavers alone (of both sexes and of
all ages, from eight years upwards), amounted to 230,654. Certainly, this growth appears less
important when we consider that in 1838 the hand-loom weavers with their families still
numbered 800,000, 150 not to mention those thrown out of work in Asia, and on the Continent of
Europe.
In the few remarks I have still to make on this point, I shall refer to some actually existing
relations, the existence of which our theoretical investigation has not yet disclosed.
So long as, in a given branch of industry, the factory system extends itself at the expense of the
old handicrafts or of manufacture, the result is as sure as is the result of an encounter between an
army furnished with breach-loaders, and one armed with bows and arrows. This first period,
during which machinery conquers its field of action, is of decisive importance owing to the
extraordinary profits that it helps to produce. These profits not only form a source of accelerated
accumulation, but also attract into the favoured sphere of production a large part of the additional
social capital that is being constantly created, and is ever on the look-out for new investments.
The special advantages of this first period of fast and furious activity are felt in every branch of
production that machinery invades. So soon, however, as the factory system has gained a certain
breadth of footing and a definite degree of maturity, and, especially, so soon as its technical basis,
machinery, is itself produced by machinery; so soon as coal mining and iron mining, the metal
industries, and the means of transport have been revolutionised; so soon, in short, as the general
conditions requisite for production by the modern industrial system have been established, this
mode of production acquires an elasticity, a capacity for sudden extension by leaps and bounds
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that finds no hindrance except in the supply of raw material and in the disposal of the produce.
On the one hand, the immediate effect of machinery is to increase the supply of raw material in
the same way, for example, as the cotton gin augmented the production of cotton.151 On the other
hand, the cheapness of the articles produced by machinery, and the improved means of transport
and communication furnish the weapons for conquering foreign markets. By ruining handicraft
production in other countries, machinery forcibly converts them into fields for the supply of its
raw material. In this way East India was compelled to produce cotton, wool, hemp, jute, and
indigo for Great Britain. 152 By constantly making a part of the hands “supernumerary,” modern
industry, in all countries where it has taken root, gives a spur to emigration and to the
colonisation of foreign lands, which are thereby converted into settlements for growing the raw
material of the mother country; just as Australia, for example, was converted into a colony for
growing wool. 153 A new and international division of labour, a division suited to the requirements
of the chief centres of modern industry springs up, and converts one part of the globe into a
chiefly agricultural field of production, for supplying the other part which remains a chiefly
industrial field. This revolution hangs together with radical changes in agriculture which we need
not here further inquire into. 154
On the motion of Mr. Gladstone, the House of Commons ordered, on the 17th February, 1867, a
return of the total quantities of grain, corn, and flour, of all sorts, imported into, and exported
from, the United Kingdom, between the years 1831 and 1866. I give below a summary of the
result. The flour is given in quarters of corn. (See the Table on p. 426.)
QUINQUENNIAL PERIODS AND THE YEAR 1866
ANNUAL 1831-1835
AVERAGE

1836-1840

1841-1845

1846-1850

Import

1,096,373

2,389,729

2,843,865

8,776,552

Export

225,263

251,770

139,056

155,461

Excess of
import over
export

871,110

2,137,959

2,704,809

8,621,091

1851-1855

1861-1865

1866

8,345,237 10,913,612 15,009,871

16,457,340

307,491

1856-1860

341,150

302,754

216,218

8,037,746 10,572,462 14,707,117

16,241,122

Yearly
24,621,107 25,929,507 27,262,569 27,797,598 27,572,923 28,391,544 29,381,460
average in
each period

29,935,404

POPULATION

Average
quantity of
corn etc,. in
qrs.,
consumed
annually per
head over
and above
the home
produce
consumed

0.036

0.082

0.099

0.310

0.291

0.372

0.501

0.543
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The enormous power, inherent in the factory system, of expanding by jumps, and the dependence
of that system on the markets of the world, necessarily beget feverish production, followed by
over-filling of the markets, whereupon contraction of the markets brings on crippling of
production. The life of modern industry becomes a series of periods of moderate activity,
prosperity, over-production, crisis and stagnation. The uncertainty and instability to which
machinery subjects the employment, and consequently the conditions of existence, of the
operatives become normal, owing to these periodic changes of the industrial cycle. Except in the
periods of prosperity, there rages between the capitalists the most furious combat for the share of
each in the markets. This share is directly proportional to the cheapness of the product. Besides
the rivalry that this struggle begets in the application of improved machinery for replacing labourpower, and of new methods of production, there also comes a time in every industrial cycle, when
a forcible reduction of wages beneath the value of labour-power, is attempted for the purpose of
cheapening commodities.155
A necessary condition, therefore, to the growth of the number of factory hands, is a proportionally
much more rapid growth of the amount of capital invested in mills. This growth, however, is
conditioned by the ebb and flow of the industrial cycle. It is, besides, constantly interrupted by
the technical progress that at one time virtually supplies the place of new workmen, at another,
actually displaces old ones. This qualitative change in mechanical industry continually discharges
hands from the factory, or shuts its doors against the fresh stream of recruits, while the purely
quantitative extension of the factories absorbs not only the men thrown out of work, but also fresh
contingents. The workpeople are thus continually both repelled and attracted, hustled from pillar
to post, while, at the same time, constant changes take place in the sex, age, and skill of the
levies.
The lot of the factory operatives will be best depicted by taking a rapid survey of the course of the
English cotton industry.
From 1770 to 1815 this trade was depressed or stagnant for 5 years only. During this period of 45
years the English manufacturers had a monopoly of machinery and of the markets of the world.
From 1815 to 1821 depression; 1822 and 1823 prosperity; 1824 abolition of the laws against
Trades’ Unions, great extension of factories everywhere; 1825 crisis; 1826 great misery and riots
among the factory operatives; 1827 slight improvement; 1828 great increase in power-looms, and
in exports; 1829 exports, especially to India, surpass all former years; 1830 glutted markets, great
distress; 1831 to 1833 continued depression, the monopoly of the trade with India and China
withdrawn from the East India Company; 1834 great increase of factories and machinery,
shortness of hands. The new poor law furthers the migration of agricultural labourers into the
factory districts. The country districts swept of children. White slave trade; 1835 great prosperity,
contemporaneous starvation of the hand-loom weavers; 1836 great prosperity; 1837 and 1838
depression and crisis; 1839 revival; 1840 great depression, riots, calling out of the military; 1841
and 1842 frightful suffering among the factory operatives; 1842 the manufacturers lock the hands
out of the factories in order to enforce the repeal of the Corn Laws. The operatives stream in
thousands into the towns of Lancashire and Yorkshire, are driven back by the military, and their
leaders brought to trial at Lancaster; 1843 great misery; 1844 revival; 1845 great prosperity; 1846
continued improvement at first, then reaction. Repeal of the Corn Laws; 1847 crisis, general
reduction of wages by 10 and more per cent. in honour of the “big loaf"; 1848 continued
depression; Manchester under military protection; 1849 revival; 1850 prosperity; 1851 falling
prices, low wages, frequent strikes; 1852 improvement begins, strikes continue, the
manufacturers threaten to import foreign hands; 1853 increasing exports. Strike for 8 months, and
great misery at Preston; 1854 prosperity, glutted markets; 1855 news of failures stream in from
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the United States, Canada, and the Eastern markets; 1856 great prosperity; 1857 crisis; 1858
improvement; 1859 great prosperity, increase in factories; 1860 Zenith of the English cotton
trade, the Indian, Australian, and other markets so glutted with goods that even in 1863 they had
not absorbed the whole lot; the French Treaty of Commerce, enormous growth of factories and
machinery; 1861 prosperity continues for a time, reaction, the American Civil War, cotton
famine: 1862 to 1863 complete collapse.
The history of the cotton famine is too characteristic to dispense with dwelling upon it for a
moment. From the indications as to the condition of the markets of the world in 1860 and 1861,
we see that the cotton famine came in the nick of time for the manufacturers, and was to some
extent advantageous to them, a fact that was acknowledged in the reports of the Manchester
Chamber of Commerce, proclaimed in Parliament by Palmerston and Derby, and confirmed by
events. 156 No doubt, among the 2,887 cotton mills in the United Kingdom in 1861, there were
many of small size. According to the report of Mr. A. Redgrave, out of the 2,109 mills included
in his district, 392, or 19% employed less than ten horse-power each; 345, or 16% employed 10
H. P., and less than 20 H. P.; while 1,372 employed upwards of 20 H. P. 157 The majority of the
small mills were weaving sheds, built during the period of prosperity after 1858, for the most part
by speculators, of whom one supplied the yarn, another the machinery, a third the buildings, and
were worked by men who had been overlookers, or by other persons of small means. These small
manufacturers mostly went to the wall. The same fate would have overtaken them in the
commercial crisis that was staved off only by the cotton famine. Although they formed one-third
of the total number of manufacturers, yet their mills absorbed a much smaller part of the capital
invested in the cotton trade. As to the extent of the stoppage, it appears from authentic estimates,
that in October 1862, 60.3% of the spindles, and 58% of the looms were standing. This refers to
the cotton trade as a whole, and, of course, requires considerable modification for individual
districts. Only very few mills worked full time (60 hours a week), the remainder worked at
intervals. Even in those few cases where full time was worked, and at the customary rate of piecewage, the weekly wages of the operatives necessarily shrank, owing to good cotton being
replaced by bad, Sea Island by Egyptian (in fine spinning mills), American and Egyptian by
Surat, and pure cotton by mixings of waste and Surat. The shorter fibre of the Surat cotton and its
dirty condition, the greater fragility of the thread, the substitution of all sorts of heavy ingredients
for flour in sizing the warps, all these lessened the speed of the machinery, or the number of the
looms that could be superintended by one weaver, increased the labour caused by defects in the
machinery, and reduced the piece-wage by reducing the mass of the product turned off. Where
Surat cotton was used, the loss to the operatives when on full time, amounted to 20, 30, and more
per cent. But besides this, the majority of the manufacturers reduced the rate of piece-wage by 5,
7½, and 10 per cent. We can therefore conceive the situation of those hands who were employed
for only 3, 3½ or 4 days a week, or for only 6 hours a day. Even in 1863, after a comparative
improvement had set in, the weekly wages of spinners and of weavers were 3s. 4d., 3s. 10d., 4s.
6d. and 5s. 1d. 158 Even in this miserable state of things, however, the inventive spirit of the master
never stood still, but was exercised in making deductions from wages. These were to some extent
inflicted as a penalty for defects in the finished article that were really due to his bad cotton and
to his unsuitable machinery. Moreover, where the manufacturer owned the cottages of the
workpeople, he paid himself his rents by deducting the amount from these miserable wages. Mr.
Redgrave tells us of self-acting minders (operatives who manage a pair of self-acting mules)
“earning at the end of a fortnight’s full work 8s. 11d., and that from this sum was
deducted the rent of the house, the manufacturer, however, returning half the rent
as a gift. The minders took away the sum of 6s. 11d. In many places the self-
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acting minders ranged from 5s. to 9s. per week, and the weavers from 2s. to 6s.
per week, during the latter part of 1862.” 159
Even when working short time the rent was frequently deducted from the wages of the
operatives. 160 No wonder that in some parts of Lancashire a kind of famine fever broke out. But
more characteristic than all this, was, the revolution that took place in the process of production at
the expense of the workpeople. Experimenta in corpore vili, like those of anatomists on frogs,
were formally made.
“Although,” says Mr. Redgrave, “I have given the actual earnings of the
operatives in the several mills, it does not follow that they earn the same amount
week by week. The operatives are subject to great fluctuation from the constant
experimentalising of the manufacturers ... the earnings of the operatives rise and
fall with the quality of the cotton mixings; sometimes they have been within 15
per cent. of former earnings, and then, in a week or two, they have fallen off from
50 to 60 per cent.” 161
These experiments were not made solely at the expense of the workman’s means of subsistence.
His five senses also had to pay the penalty.
“The people who are employed in making up Surat cotton complain very much.
They inform me, on opening the bales of cotton there is an intolerable smell,
which causes sickness.... In the mixing, scribbling and carding rooms, the dust and
dirt which are disengaged, irritate the air passages, and give rise to cough and
difficulty of breathing. A disease of the skin, no doubt from the irritation of the
dirt contained in the Surat cotton, also prevails.... The fibre being so short, a great
amount of size, both animal and vegetable, is used.... Bronchitis is more prevalent
owing to the dust. Inflammatory sore throat is common, from the same cause.
Sickness and dyspepsia are produced by the frequent breaking of the weft, when
the weaver sucks the weft through the eye of the shuttle.” On the other hand, the
substitutes for flour were a Fortunatus’ purse to the manufacturers, by increasing
the weight of the yarn. They caused “15 lbs. of raw material to weigh 26 lbs. after
it was woven.” 162
In the Report of Inspectors of Factories for 30th April, 1864, we read as follows:
“The trade is availing itself of this resource at present to an extent which is even
discreditable. I have heard on good authority of a cloth weighing 8 lbs. which was
made of 5 1/4 lbs. cotton and 2 3/4 lbs. size; and of another cloth weighing 5 1/4
lbs., of which 2 lbs. was size. These were ordinary export shirtings. In cloths of
other descriptions, as much as 50 per cent. size is sometimes added; so that a
manufacturer may, and does truly boast, that he is getting rich by selling cloth for
less money per pound than he paid for the mere yarn of which they are
composed.” 163
But the workpeople had to suffer, not only from the experiments of the manufacturers inside the
mills, and of the municipalities outside, not only from reduced wages and absence of work, from
want and from charity, and from the eulogistic speeches of lords and commons.
“Unfortunate females who, in consequence of the cotton famine, were at its
commencement thrown out of employment, and have thereby become outcasts of
society; and now, though trade has revived, and work is plentiful, continue
members of that unfortunate class, and are likely to continue so. There are also in
the borough more youthful prostitutes than I have known for the last 25 years.” 164

304

Chapter 15

We find then, in the first 45 years of the English cotton trade, from 1770 to 1815, only 5 years of
crisis and stagnation; but this was the period of monopoly. The second period from 1815 to 1863
counts, during its 48 years, only 20 years of revival and prosperity against 28 of depression and
stagnation. Between 1815 and 1830 the competition with the continent of Europe and with the
United States sets in. After 1833, the extension of the Asiatic markets is enforced by “destruction
of the human race” (the wholesale extinction of Indian hand-loom weavers). After the repeal of
the Corn Laws, from 1846 to 1863, there are 8 years of moderate activity and prosperity against 9
years of depression and stagnation. The condition of the adult male operatives, even during the
years of prosperity, may be judged from the note subjoined.165

Section 8: Revolution Effected in Manufacture, Handicrafts,
and Domestic Industry by Modern Industry
A. Overthrow of Co-operation Based on Handicraft and on
the Division of Labour
We have seen how machinery does away with co-operation based on handicrafts, and with
manufacture based on the division of handicraft labour. An example of the first sort is the
mowing-machine; it replaces co-operation between mowers. A striking example of the second
kind, is the needle-making machine. According to Adam Smith, 10 men, in his day, made in cooperation, over 48,000 needles a-day. On the other hand, a single needle-machine makes 145,000
in a working day of 11 hours. One woman or one girl superintends four such machines, and so
produces near upon 600,000 needles in a day, and upwards of 3,000,000 in a week. 166 A single
machine, when it takes the place of co-operation or of manufacture, may itself serve as the basis
of an industry of a handicraft character. Still, such a return to handicrafts is but a transition to the
factory system, which, as a rule, makes its appearance so soon as the human muscles are replaced,
for the purpose of driving the machines, by a mechanical motive power, such as steam or water.
Here and there, but in any case only for a time, an industry may be carried on, on a small scale,
by means of mechanical power. This is effected by hiring steam-power, as is done in some of the
Birmingham trades, or by the use of small caloric-engines, as in some branches of weaving. 167 In
the Coventry silk weaving industry the experiment of “cottage factories” was tried. In the centre
of a square surrounded by rows of cottages, an engine-house was built and the engine connected
by shafts with the looms in the cottages. In all cases the power was hired at so much per loom.
The rent was payable weekly, whether the looms worked or not. Each cottage held from 2 to 6
looms; some belonged to the weaver, some were bought on credit, some were hired. The struggle
between these cottage factories and the factory proper, lasted over 12 years. It ended with the
complete ruin of the 300 cottage factories. 168 Wherever the nature of the process did not involve
production on a large scale, the new industries that have sprung up in the last few decades, such
as envelope making, steel-pen making, &c., have, as a general rule, first passed through the
handicraft stage, and then the manufacturing stage, as short phases of transition to the factory
stage. The transition is very difficult in those cases where the production of the article by
manufacture consists, not of a series of graduated processes, but of a great number of
disconnected ones. This circumstance formed a great hindrance to the establishment of steel-pen
factories. Nevertheless, about 15 years ago, a machine was invented that automatically performed
6 separate operations at once. The first steel-pens were supplied by the handicraft system, in the
year 1820, at £7 4s. the gross; in 1830 they-were supplied by manufacture at 8s., and today the
factory system supplies them to the trade at from 2 to 6d. the gross.169
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B. Reaction of the Factory System on Manufacture and
Domestic Industries
Along with the development of the factory system and of the revolution in agriculture that
accompanies it, production in all the other branches of industry not only extends, but alters its
character. The principle, carried out in the factory system, of analysing the process of production
into its constituent phases, and of solving the problems thus proposed by the application of
mechanics, of chemistry, and of the whole range of the natural sciences, becomes the determining
principle everywhere. Hence, machinery squeezes itself into the manufacturing industries first for
one detail process, then for another. Thus the solid crystal of their organisation, based on the old
division of labour, becomes dissolved, and makes way for constant changes. Independently of
this, a radical change takes place in the composition of the collective labourer, a change of the
persons working in combination. In contrast with the manufacturing period, the division of labour
is thenceforth based, wherever possible, on the employment of women, of children of all ages,
and of unskilled labourers, in one word, on cheap labour, as it is characteristically called in
England. This is the case not only with all production on a large scale, whether employing
machinery or not, but also with the so-called domestic industry, whether carried on in the houses
of the workpeople or in small workshops. This modern so-called domestic industry has nothing,
except the name, in common with the old-fashioned domestic industry, the existence of which
pre-supposes independent urban handicrafts, independent peasant farming, and above all, a
dwelling-house for the labourer and his family. That old-fashioned industry has now been
converted into an outside department of the factory, the manufactory, or the warehouse. Besides
the factory operatives, the manufacturing workmen and the handicraftsman, whom it concentrates
in large masses at one spot, and directly commands, capital also sets in motion, by means, of
invisible threads, another army; that of the workers in the domestic industries, who dwell in the
large towns and are also scattered over the face of the country. An example: The shirt factory of
Messrs. Tillie at Londonderry, which employs 1,000 operatives in the factory itself, and 9,000
people spread up and down the country and working in their own houses. 170
The exploitation of cheap and immature labour-power is carried out in a more shameless manner
in modern Manufacture than in the factory proper. This is because the technical foundation of the
factory system, namely, the substitution of machines for muscular power, and the light character
of the labour, is almost entirely absent in Manufacture, and at the same time women and overyoung children are subjected, in a most unconscionable way, to the influence of poisonous or
injurious substances. This exploitation is more shameless in the so-called domestic industry than
in manufactures, and that because the power of resistance in the labourers decreases with their
dissemination; because a whole series of plundering parasites insinuate themselves between the
employer and the workman; because a domestic industry has always to compete either with the
factory system, or with manufacturing in the same branch of production; because poverty robs the
workman of the conditions most essential to his labour, of space, light and ventilation; because
employment becomes more and more irregular; and, finally, because in these the last resorts of
the masses made “redundant” by modern industry and Agriculture, competition for work attains
its maximum. Economy in the means of production, first systematically carried out in the factory
system, and there, from the very beginning, coincident with the most reckless squandering of
labour-power, and robbery of the conditions normally requisite for labour – this economy now
shows its antagonistic and murderous side more and more in a given branch of industry, the less
the social productive power of labour and the technical basis for a combination of processes are
developed in that branch.
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C. Modern Manufacture
I now proceed, by a few examples, to illustrate the principles laid down above. As a matter of
fact, the reader is already familiar with numerous instances given in the chapter on the working
day. In the hardware manufactures of Birmingham and the neighbourhood, there are employed,
mostly in very heavy work, 30,000 children and young persons, besides 10,000 women. There
they are to be seen in the unwholesome brass-foundries, button factories, enamelling, galvanising,
and lackering works. 171 Owing to the excessive labour of their workpeople, both adult and nonadult, certain London houses where newspapers and books are printed, have got the ill-omened
name of “slaughterhouses.” 172 Similar excesses are practised in book-binding, where the victims
are chiefly women, girls, and children; young persons have to do heavy work in rope-walks and
night-work in salt mines, candle manufactories, and chemical works; young people are worked to
death at turning the looms in silk weaving, when it is not carried on by machinery. 173 One of the
most shameful, the most dirty, and the worst paid kinds of labour, and one on which women and
young girls are by preference employed, is the sorting of rags. It is well known that Great Britain,
apart from its own immense store of rags, is the emporium for the rag trade of the whole world.
They flow in from Japan, from the most remote States of South America, and from the Canary
Islands. But the chief sources of their supply are Germany, France, Russia, Italy, Egypt, Turkey,
Belgium, and Holland. They are used for manure, for making bedflocks, for shoddy, and they
serve as the raw material of paper. The rag-sorters are the medium for the spread of small-pox
and other infectious diseases, and they themselves are the first victims. 174 A classical example of
over-work, of hard and inappropriate labour, and of its brutalising effects on the workman from
his childhood upwards, is afforded not only by coal-mining and miners generally, but also by tile
and brick making, in which industry the recently invented machinery is, in England, used only
here and there. Between May and September the work lasts from 5 in the morning till 8 in the
evening, and where the drying is done in the open air, it often lasts from 4 in the morning till 9 in
the evening. Work from 5 in the morning till 7 in the evening is considered “reduced” and
“moderate.” Both boys and girls of 6 and even of 4 years of age are employed. They work for the
same number of hours, often longer, than the adults. The work is hard and the summer heat
increases the exhaustion. In a certain tile-field at Mosley, e.g., a young woman, 24 years of age,
was in the habit of making 2,000 tiles a day, with the assistance of 2 little girls, who carried the
clay for her, and stacked the tiles. These girls carried daily 10 tons up the slippery sides of the
clay pits, from a depth of 30 feet, and then for a distance of 210 feet.
“It is impossible for a child to pass through the purgatory of a tile-field without
great moral degradation... the low language, which they are accustomed to hear
from their tenderest years, the filthy, indecent, and shameless habits, amidst
which, unknowing, and half wild, they grow up, make them in after-life lawless,
abandoned, dissolute.... A frightful source of demoralisation is the mode of living.
Each moulder, who is always a skilled labourer, and the chief of a group, supplies
his 7 subordinates with board and lodging in his cottage. Whether members of his
family or not, the men, boys, and girls all sleep in the cottage, which contains
generally two, exceptionally 3 rooms, all on the ground floor, and badly
ventilated. These people are so exhausted after the day’s hard work, that neither
the rules of health, of cleanliness, nor of decency are in the least observed. Many
of these cottages are models of untidiness, dirt, and dust.... The greatest evil of the
system that employs young girls on this sort of work, consists in this, that, as a
rule, it chains them fast from childhood for the whole of their after-life to the most
abandoned rabble. They become rough, foul-mouthed boys, before Nature has
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taught them that they are women. Clothed in a few dirty rags, the legs naked far
above the knees, hair and face besmeared with dirt, they learn to treat all feelings
of decency and of shame with contempt. During meal-times they lie at full length
in the fields, or watch the boys bathing in a neighbouring canal. Their heavy day’s
work at length completed, they put on better clothes, and accompany the men to
the public houses.”
That excessive insobriety is prevalent from childhood upwards among the whole of this class, is
only natural.
“The worst is that the brickmakers despair of themselves. You might as well, said
one of the better kind to a chaplain of Southallfield, try to raise and improve the
devil as a brickie, sir!” 175
As to the manner, in which capital effects an economy in the requisites of labour, in modern
Manufacture (in which I include all workshops of larger size, except factories proper), official
and most ample material bearing on it is to be found in the Public Health Reports IV. (1863) and
VI. (1864). The description of the workshops, more especially those of the London printers and
tailors, surpasses the most loathsome phantasies of our romance writers. The effect on the health
of the workpeople is self-evident. Dr. Simon, the chief medical officer of the Privy Council and
the official editor of the “Public Health Reports,” says:
“In my fourth Report (1863) I showed, how it is practically impossible for the
workpeople to insist upon that which is their first sanitary right, viz., the right that,
no matter what the work for which their employer brings them together, the
labour, so far as it depends upon him, should be freed from all avoidably
unwholesome conditions. I pointed out, that while the workpeople are practically
incapable of doing themselves this sanitary justice, they are unable to obtain any
effective support from the paid administrations of the sanitary police.... The life of
myriads of workmen and workwomen is now uselessly tortured and shortened by
the never-ending physical suffering that their mere occupation begets.”176
In illustration of the way in which the workrooms influence the state of health Dr. Simon gives
the following table of mortality. 177
Number of Persons of all
ages in the respective
industries

Industry
compared as
regards health

Death-rate per 100,000 men
in the respective industries
between the stated ages
Age 25-35

958,265

22,301 men
12,379 women
13,803

}

Age 35-45

Age 45-55

Agriculture in
England &
Wales

743

805

1141

London tailors

958

1,262

2,093

London printers

894

1,747

2,367
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D. Modern Domestic Industry
I now come to the so-called domestic industry. In order to get an idea of the horrors of this
sphere, in which capital conducts its exploitation in the background of modern mechanical
industry, one must go to the apparently quite idyllic trade of nail-making, 178 carried on in a few
remote villages of England. In this place, however, it will be enough to give a few examples from
those branches of the lace-making and straw-plaiting industries that are not yet carried on by the
aid of machinery, and that as yet do not compete with branches carried on in factories or in
manufactories.
Of the 150,000 persons employed in England in the production of lace, about 10,000 fall under
the authority of the Factory Act, 1861. Almost the whole of the remaining 140,000 are women,
young persons, and children of both sexes, the male sex, however, being weakly represented. The
state of health of this cheap material for exploitation will be seen from the following table,
computed by Dr. Trueman, physician to the Nottingham General Dispensary. Out of 686 female
patients who were lace-makers, most of them between the ages of 17 and 24, the number of
consumptive ones were:
1852. – 1 in 45. 1857. – 1 in 13.
1853. – 1 in 28. 1858. – 1 in 15.
1854. – 1 in 17. 1859. – 1 in 9.
1856. – 1 in 15. 1861. – 1 in 8. 179
This progress in the rate of consumption ought to suffice for the most optimist of progressists,
and for the biggest hawker of lies among the Free-trade bagmen of Germany.
The Factory Act of 1861 regulates the actual making of the lace, so far as it is done by machinery,
and this is the rule in England. The branches that we are now about to examine, solely with regard
to those of the workpeople who work at home, and not those who work in manufactories or
warehouses, fall into two divisions, viz. (1), finishing; (2), mending. The former gives the
finishing touches to the machine-made lace, and includes numerous sub-divisions.
The lace finishing is done either in what are called “mistresses’ houses,” or by women in their
own houses, with or without the help of their children. The women who keep the “mistresses’
houses” are themselves poor. The workroom is in a private house. The mistresses take orders
from manufacturers, or from warehousemen, and employ as many women, girls, and young
children as the size of their rooms and the fluctuating demand of the business will allow. The
number of the workwomen employed in these workrooms varies from 20 to 40 in some, and from
10 to 20 in others. The average age at which the children commence work is six years, but in
many cases it is below five. The usual working-hours are from 8 in the morning till eight in the
evening, with 1½ hours for meals, which are taken at irregular intervals, and often in the foul
workrooms. When business is brisk, the labour frequently lasts from 8 or even 6 o’clock in the
morning till 10, 11, or 12 o’clock at night. In English barracks the regulation space allotted to
each soldier is 500-600 cubic feet, and in the military hospitals 1,200 cubic feet. But in those
finishing sties there are but 67 to 100 cubic feet to each person. At the same time the oxygen of
the air is consumed by gas-lights. In order to keep the lace clean, and although the floor is tiled or
gagged, the children are often compelled, even in winter, to pull off their shoes.
“It is not at all uncommon in Nottingham to find 14 to 20 children huddled
together in a small room, of, perhaps, not more than 12 feet square, and employed
for 15 hours out of the 24, at work that of itself is exhausting, from its weariness
and monotony, and is besides carried on under every possible unwholesome
condition.... Even the very youngest children work with a strained attention and a
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rapidity that is astonishing, hardly ever giving their fingers rest or glowering their
motion. If a question be asked them, they never raise their eyes from their work
from fear of losing a single moment.”
The “long stick” is used by the mistresses as a stimulant more and more as the working hours are
prolonged.
“The children gradually tire and become as restless as birds towards the end of
their long detention at an occupation that is monotonous, eye-straining, and
exhausting from the uniformity in the posture of the body. Their work is like
slavery.” 180
When women and their children work at home, which now-a-days means in a hired room, often in
a garret, the state of things is, if possible, still worse. This sort of work is given out within a circle
of 80 miles radius from Nottingham. On leaving the warehouses at 9 or 10 o’clock at night, the
children are often given a bundle of lace to take home with them and finish. The Pharisee of a
capitalist represented by one of his servants, accompanies this action, of course, with the
unctuous phrase: “That’s for mother,” yet he knows well enough that the poor children must sit
up and help. 181
Pillow lace-making is chiefly carried on in England in two agricultural districts; one, the Honiton
lace district, extending from 20 to 30 miles along the south coast of Devonshire, and including a
few places in North Devon; the other comprising a great part of the counties of Buckingham,
Bedford, and Northampton, and also the adjoining portions of Oxfordshire and Huntingdonshire.
The cottages of the agricultural labourers are the places where the work is usually carried on.
Many manufacturers employ upwards of 3,000 of these lace-makers, who are chiefly children and
young persons of the female sex exclusively. The state of things described as incidental to lace
finishing is here repeated, save that instead of the “mistresses’ houses,” we find what are called
“lace-schools,” kept by poor women in their cottages. From their fifth year and often earlier, until
their twelfth or fifteenth year, the children work in these schools; during the first year the very
young ones work from four to eight hours, and later on, from six in the morning till eight and ten
o’clock at night.
“The rooms are generally the ordinary living rooms of small cottages, the chimney
stopped up to keep out draughts, the inmates kept warm by their own animal heat
alone, and this frequently in winter. In other cases, these so-called school-rooms
are like small store-rooms without fire-places.... The over-crowding in these dens
and the consequent vitiation of the air are often extreme. Added to this is the
injurious effect of drains, privies, decomposing substances, and other filth usual in
the purlieus of the smaller cottages.” With regard to space: “In one lace-school 18
girls and a mistress, 35 cubic feet to each person; in another, where the smell was
unbearable, 18 persons and 24½ cubic feet per head. In this industry are to be
found employed children of 2 and 2½ years.” 182
Where lace-making ends in the counties of Buckingham and Bedford, straw-plaiting begins, and
extends over a large part of Hertfordshire and the westerly and northerly parts of Essex. In 1861,
there were 40,043 persons employed in straw-plaiting and straw-hat making; of these 3,815 were
males of all ages, the rest females, of whom 14,913, including about 7,000 children, were under
20 years of age. In the place of the lace-schools we find here the “straw-plait schools.” The
children commence their instruction in straw-plaiting generally in their 4th, often between their
3rd and 4th year. Education, of course, they get none. The children themselves call the
elementary schools, “natural schools,” to distinguish them from these blood-sucking institutions,
in which they are kept at work simply to get through the task, generally 30 yards daily, prescribed
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by their half-starved mothers. These same mothers often make them work at home, after school is
over, till 10, 11, and 12 o’clock at night. The straw cuts their mouths, with which they constantly
moisten it, and their fingers. Dr. Ballard gives it as the general opinion of the whole body of
medical officers in London, that 300 cubic feet is the minimum space proper for each person in a
bedroom or workroom. But in the straw-plait schools space is more sparingly allotted than in the
lace-schools, “12 2/3, 17, 18½ and below 22 cubic feet for each person.”
“The smaller of these numbers, says one of the commissioners, Mr. White,
represents less space than the half of what a child would occupy if packed in a box
measuring 3 feet in each direction.”
Thus do the children enjoy life till the age of 12 or 14. The wretched half-starved parents think of
nothing but getting as much as possible out of their children. The latter, as soon as they are grown
up, do not care a farthing, and naturally so, for their parents, and leave them.
“It is no wonder that ignorance and vice abound in a population so brought up....
Their morality is at the lowest ebb,... a great number of the women have
illegitimate children, and that at such an immature age that even those most
conversant with criminal statistics are astounded.” 183
And the native land of these model families is the pattern Christian country for Europe; so says at
least Count Montalembert, certainly a competent authority on Christianity!
Wages in the above industries, miserable as they are (the maximum wages of a child in the strawplait schools rising in rare cases to 3 shillings), are reduced far below their nominal amount by the
prevalence of the truck system everywhere, but especially in the lace districts.184

E. Passage of Modern Manufacture, and Domestic
Industry into Modern Mechanical Industry. The Hastening
of this Revolution by the Application of the Factory Acts to
those Industries
The cheapening of labour-power, by sheer abuse of the labour of women and children, by sheer
robbery of every normal condition requisite for working and living, and by the sheer brutality of
overwork and night-work, meets at last with natural obstacles that cannot be overstepped. So also,
when based on these methods, do the cheapening of commodities and capitalist exploitation in
general. So soon as this point is at last reached – and it takes many years – the hour has struck for
the introduction of machinery, and for the thenceforth rapid conversion of the scattered domestic
industries and also of manufactures into factory industries.
An example, on the most colossal scale, of this movement is afforded by the production of
wearing apparel. This industry, according to the classification of the Children’s Employment
Commission, comprises straw-hat makers, ladies’-hat makers, cap-makers, tailors, milliners and
dressmakers, shirt-makers, corset-makers, glove-makers, shoemakers, besides many minor
branches, such as the making of neck-ties, collars, &c. In 1861, the number of females employed
in these industries, in England and Wales, amounted to 586,299, of these 115,242 at the least
were under 20, and 16,650. under 15 years of age. The number of these workwomen in the United
Kingdom in 1861, was 750,334. The number of males employed in England and Wales, in hatmaking, shoemaking, glove-making and tailoring was 437,969; of these 14,964 under 15 years,
89,285 between 15 and 20, and 333,117 over 20 years. Many of the smaller branches are not
included in these figures. But take the figures as they stand; we then have for England and Wales
alone, according to the census of 1861, a total of 1,024,277 persons, about as many as are
absorbed by agriculture and cattle breeding. We begin to understand what becomes of the
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immense quantities of goods conjured up by the magic of machinery, and of the enormous masses
of workpeople, which that machinery sets free.
The production of wearing apparel is carried on partly in manufactories in whose workrooms
there is but a reproduction of that division of labour, the membra disjecta of which were found
ready to hand; partly by small master-handicraftsmen; these, however, do not, as formerly, work
for individual consumers, but for manufactories and warehouses, and to such an extent that often
whole towns and stretches of country carry on certain branches, such as shoemaking, as a
speciality; finally, on a very great scale by the so-called domestic workers, who form an external
department of the manufactories, warehouses, and even of the workshops of the smaller
masters. 185
The raw material, &c., is supplied by mechanical industry, the mass of cheap human material
(taillable à merci et miséricorde) is composed of the individuals “liberated” by mechanical
industry and improved agriculture. The manufactures of this class owed their origin chiefly to the
capitalist’s need of having at hand an army ready equipped to meet any increase of demand.186
These manufactures, nevertheless, allowed the scattered handicrafts and domestic industries to
continue to exist as a broad foundation. The great production of surplus-value in these branches
of labour, and the progressive cheapening of their articles, were and are chiefly due to the
minimum wages paid, no more than requisite for a miserable vegetation, and to the extension of
working-time up to the maximum endurable by the human organism. It was in fact by the
cheapness of the human sweat and the human blood, which were converted into commodities,
that the markets were constantly being extended, and continue daily to be extended; more
especially was this the case with England’s colonial markets, where, besides, English tastes and
habits prevail. At last the critical point was reached. The basis of the old method, sheer brutality
in the exploitation of the workpeople, accompanied more or less by a systematic division of
labour, no longer sufficed for the extending markets and for the still more rapidly extending
competition of the capitalists. The hour struck for the advent of machinery. The decisively
revolutionary machine, the machine which attacks in an equal degree the whole of the numberless
branches of this sphere of production, dressmaking, tailoring, shoemaking, sewing, hat-making,
and many others, is the sewing-machine.
Its immediate effect on the workpeople is like that of all machinery, which, since the rise of
modern industry, has seized upon new branches of trade. Children of too tender an age are sent
adrift. The wage of the machine hands rises compared with that of the house-workers, many of
whom belong to the poorest of the poor. That of the better situated handicraftsman, with whom
the machine competes, sinks. The new machine hands are exclusively girls and young women.
With the help of mechanical force, they destroy the monopoly that male labour had of the heavier
work, and they drive off from the lighter work numbers of old women and very young children.
The overpowering competition crushes the weakest of the manual labourers. The fearful increase
in death from starvation during the last 10 years in London runs parallel with the extension of
machine sewing. 187 The new workwomen turn the machines by hand and foot, or by hand alone,
sometimes sitting, sometimes standing, according to the weight, size, and special make of the
machine, and expend a great deal of labour-power. Their occupation is unwholesome, owing to
the long hours, although in most cases they are not so long as under the old system. Wherever the
sewing-machine locates itself in narrow and already over-crowded workrooms, it adds to the
unwholesome influences.
“The effect,” says Mr. Lord, “on entering low-ceiled workrooms in which 30 to 40 machine
hands are working is unbearable.... The heat, partly due to the gas stoves used for warming the
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irons, is horrible.... Even when moderate hours of work, i.e., from 8 in the morning till 6 in the
evening, prevail in such places, yet 3 or 4 persons fall into a swoon regularly every day.” 188
The revolution in the industrial methods which is the necessary result of the revolution in the
instruments of production, is effected by a medley of transition forms. These forms vary
according to the extent to which the sewing-machine has become prevalent in one branch, of
industry or the other, to the time during which it has been in operation, to the previous condition
of the workpeople, to the preponderance of manufacture, of handicrafts or of domestic industry,
to the rent of the workrooms, 189 &c. In dressmaking, for instance, where the labour for the most
part was already organised, chiefly by simple co-operation, the sewing-machine at first formed
merely a new factor in that manufacturing industry. In tailoring, shirtmaking, shoemaking, &c.,
all the forms are intermingled. Here the factory system proper. There middlemen receive the raw
material from the capitalist en chef, and group around their sewing-machines, in “chambers” and
“garrets,” from 10 to 50 or more workwomen. Finally, as is always the case with machinery when
not organised into a system, and when it can also be used in dwarfish proportions, handicraftsman
and domestic workers, along with their families, or with a little extra labour from without, make
use of their own sewing-machines. 190 The system actually prevalent in England is, that the
capitalist concentrates a large number of machines on his premises, and then distributes the
produce of those machines for further manipulation amongst the domestic workers.191 The variety
of the transition forms, however, does not conceal the tendency to conversion into the factory
system proper. This tendency is nurtured by the very nature of the sewing-machine, the manifold
uses of which push on the concentration, under one roof, and one management, of previously
separated branches of a trade. It is also favoured by the circumstance that preparatory
needlework, and certain other operations, are most conveniently done on the premises where the
machine is at work; as well as by the inevitable expropriation of the hand sewers, and of the
domestic workers who work with their own machines. This fate has already in part overtaken
them. The constantly increasing amount of capital invested in sewing-machines, 192 gives the spur
to the production of, and gluts the markets with, machine-made articles, thereby giving the signal
to the domestic workers for the sale of their machines. The overproduction of sewing-machines
themselves, causes their producers, in bad want of a sale, to let them out for so much a week, thus
crushing by their deadly competition the small owners of machines.193 Constant changes in the
construction of the machines, and their ever-increasing cheapness, depreciate day by day the
older makes, and allow of their being sold in great numbers, at absurd prices, to large capitalists,
who alone can thus employ them at a profit. Finally, the substitution of the steam-engine for man
gives in this, as in all similar revolutions, the finishing blow. At first, the use of steam power
meets with mere technical difficulties, such as unsteadiness in the machines, difficulty in
controlling their speed, rapid wear and tear of the lighter machines, &c., all of which are soon
overcome by experience. 194 If, on the one hand, the concentration of many machines in large
manufactories leads to the use of steam power, on the other hand, the competition of steam with
human muscles hastens on the concentration of workpeople and machines in large factories. Thus
England is at present experiencing, not only in the colossal industry of making wearing apparel,
but in most of the other trades mentioned above, the conversion of manufacture, of handicrafts,
and of domestic work into the factory system, after each of those forms of production, totally
changed and disorganised under the influence of modern industry, has long ago reproduced, and
even overdone, all the horrors of the factory system, without participating in any of the elements
of social progress it contains. 195
This industrial revolution which takes place spontaneously, is artificially helped on by the
extension of the Factory Acts to all industries in which women, young persons and children are
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employed. The compulsory regulation of the working day as regards its length, pauses, beginning
and end, the system of relays of children, the exclusion of all children under a certain age, &c.,
necessitate on the one hand more machinery196 and the substitution of steam as a motive power in
the place of muscles. 197 On the other hand, in order to make up for the loss of time, an expansion
occurs of the means of production used in common, of the furnaces, buildings, &c., in one word,
greater concentration of the means of production and a correspondingly greater concourse of
workpeople. The chief objection, repeatedly and passionately urged on behalf of each
manufacture threatened with the Factory Act, is in fact this, that in order to continue the business
on the old scale a greater outlay of capital will be necessary. But as regards labour in the so-called
domestic industries and the intermediate forms between them and Manufacture, so soon as limits
are put to the working day and to the employment of children, those industries go to the wall.
Unlimited exploitation of cheap labour-power is the sole foundation of their power to compete.
One of the essential conditions for the existence of the factory system, especially when the length
of the working day is fixed, is certainty in the result, i.e., the production in a given time of a given
quantity of commodities, or of a given useful effect. The statutory pauses in the working day,
moreover, imply the assumption that periodical and sudden cessation of the work does no harm to
the article undergoing the process of production. This certainty in the result, and this possibility
of interrupting the work are, of course, easier to be attained in the purely mechanical industries
than in those in which chemical and physical processes play a part; as, for instance, in the
earthenware trade, in bleaching, dyeing, baking, and in most of the metal industries. Wherever
there is a workingday without restriction as to length, wherever there is night-work and
unrestricted waste of human life, there the slightest obstacle presented by the nature of the work
to a change for the better is soon looked upon as an everlasting barrier erected by Nature. No
poison kills vermin with more certainty than the Factory Act removes such everlasting barriers.
No one made a greater outcry over “impossibilities” than our friends the earthenware
manufacturers. In 1864, however, they were brought under the Act, and within sixteen months
every “impossibility” had vanished.
“The improved method,” called forth by the Act, “of making slip by pressure
instead of by evaporation, the newly-constructed stoves for drying the ware in its
green state, &c., are each events of great importance in the pottery art, and mark
an advance which the preceding century could not rival.... It has even
considerably reduced the temperature of the stoves themselves with a considerable
saving of fuel, and with a readier effect on the ware.”198
In spite of every prophecy, the cost-price of earthenware did not rise, but the quantity produced
did, and to such an extent that the export for the twelve months, ending December, 1865,
exceeded in value by £138,628 the average of the preceding three years. In the manufacture of
matches it was thought to be an indispensable requirement, that boys, even while bolting their
dinner, should go on dipping the matches in melted phosphorus, the poisonous vapour from
which rose into their faces. The Factory Act (1864) made the saving of time a necessity, and so
forced into existence a dipping machine, the vapour from which could not come in contact with
the workers. 199 So, at the present time, in those branches of the lace manufacture not yet subject
to the Factory Act, it is maintained that the meal-times cannot be regular owing to the different
periods required by the various kinds of lace for drying, which periods vary from three minutes
up to an hour and more. To this the Children’s Employment Commissioners answer:
“The circumstances of this case are precisely analogous to that of the paperstainers, dealt with in our first report. Some of the principal manufacturers in the
trade urged that in consequence of the nature of the materials used, and their
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various processes, they would be unable, without serious loss, to stop for mealtimes at any given moment. But it was seen from the evidence that, by due care
and previous arrangement, the apprehended difficulty would be got over; and
accordingly, by clause 6 of section 6 of the Factory Acts Extension Act, passed
during this Session of Parliament, an interval of eighteen months is given to them
from the passing of the Act before they are required to conform to the meal hours,
specified by the Factory Acts.” 200

Hardly had the Act been passed when our friends the manufacturers found out:
“The inconveniences we expected to arise from the introduction of the Factory
Acts into our branch of manufacture, I am happy to say, have not arisen. We do
not find the production at all interfered with; in short, we produce more in the
same time.” 201
It is evident that the English legislature, which certainly no one will venture to reproach with
being overdosed with genius, has been led by experience to the conclusion that a simple
compulsory law is sufficient to enact away all the so-called impediments, opposed by the nature
of the process, to the restriction and regulation of the working day. Hence, on the introduction of
the Factory Act into a given industry, a period varying from six to eighteen months is fixed within
which it is incumbent on the manufacturers to remove all technical impediments to the working
of the Act. Mirabeau’s “Impossible! ne me dites jamais ce bête de mot!” is particularly applicable
to modern technology. But though the Factory Acts thus artificially ripen the material elements
necessary for the conversion of the manufacturing system into the factory system, yet at the same
time, owing to the necessity they impose for greater outlay of capital, they hasten on the decline
of the small masters, and the concentration of capital.202
Besides the purely technical impediments that are removable by technical means, the irregular
habits of the workpeople themselves obstruct the regulation of the hours of labour. This is
especially the case where piece-wage predominates, and where loss of time in one part of the day
or week can be made good by subsequent over-time, or by night-work, a process which brutalises
the adult workman, and ruins his wife and children. 203 Although this absence of regularity in the
expenditure of labour-power is a natural and rude reaction against the tedium of monotonous
drudgery, it originates, also, to a much greater degree from anarchy in production, anarchy that in
its turn pre-supposes unbridled exploitation of labour-power by the capitalist. Besides the general
periodic changes of the industrial cycle, and the special fluctuations in the markets to which each
industry is subject, we may also reckon what is called “the season,” dependent either on the
periodicity of favourable seasons of the year for navigation; or on fashion, and the sudden placing
of large orders that have to be executed in the shortest possible time. The habit of giving such
orders becomes more frequent with the extension of railways and telegraphs.
“The extension of the railway system throughout the country has tended very
much to encourage giving short notice. Purchasers now come up from Glasgow,
Manchester, and Edinburgh once every fortnight or so to the wholesale city
warehouses which we supply, and give small orders requiring immediate
execution, instead of buying from stock as they used to do. Years ago we were
always able to work in the slack times, so as to meet demand of the next season,
but now no one can say beforehand what will be the demand then.” 204
In those factories and manufactories that are not yet subject to the Factory Acts, the most fearful
over-work prevails periodically during what is called the season, in consequence of sudden
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orders. In the outside department of the factory, of the manufactory, and of the warehouse, the socalled domestic workers, whose employment is at the best irregular, are entirely dependent for
their raw material and their orders on the caprice of the capitalist, who, in this industry, is not
hampered by any regard for depreciation of his buildings and machinery, and risks nothing by a
stoppage of work, but the skin of the worker himself. Here then he sets himself systematically to
work to form an industrial reserve force that shall be ready at a moment’s notice; during one part
of the year he decimates this force by the most inhuman toil, during the other part, he lets it starve
for want of work.
“The employers avail themselves of the habitual irregularity in the homework,
when any extra work is wanted at a push, so that the work goes on till 11, and 12
p.m. or 2 a.m., or as the usual phrase is, “all hours,” and that in localities where
“the stench is enough to knock you down, you go to the door, perhaps, and open
it, but shudder to go further.” 205 “They are curious men,” said one of the
witnesses, a shoemaker, speaking of the masters, “they think it does a boy no
harm to work too hard for half the year, if he is nearly idle for the other half.”206
In the same way as technical impediments, so, too, those “usages which have grown with the
growth of trade” were and still are proclaimed by interested capitalists as obstacles due to the
nature of the work. This was a favourite cry of the cotton lords at the time they were first
threatened with the Factory Acts. Although their industry more than any other depends on
navigation, yet experience has given them the lie. Since then, every pretended obstruction to
business has been treated by the Factory inspectors as a mere sham. 207 The thoroughly
conscientious investigations of the Children’s Employment Commission prove that the effect of
the regulation of the hours of work, in some industries, was to spread the mass of labour
previously employed more evenly over the whole year 208 that this regulation was the first rational
bridle on the murderous, meaningless caprices of fashion,209 caprices that consort so badly with
the system of modern industry; that the development of ocean navigation and of the means of
communication generally, has swept away the technical basis on which season-work was really
supported, 210and that all other so-called unconquerable difficulties vanish before larger buildings,
additional machinery, increase in the number of workpeople employed, 211 and the alterations
caused by all these in the mode of conducting the wholesale trade.212 But for all that, capital never
becomes reconciled to such changes – and this is admitted over and over again by its own
representatives – except “under the pressure of a General Act of Parliament”213 for the
compulsory regulation of the hours of labour.

Section 9: The Factory Acts. Sanitary and Educational Clauses
of the same. Their General Extension in England
Factory legislation, that first conscious and methodical reaction of society against the
spontaneously developed form of the process of production, is, as we have seen, just as much the
necessary product of modern industry as cotton yarn, self-actors, and the electric telegraph.
Before passing to the consideration of the extension of that legislation in England, we shall
shortly notice certain clauses contained in the Factory Acts, and not relating to the hours of work.
Apart from their wording, which makes it easy for the capitalist to evade them, the sanitary
clauses are extremely meagre, and, in fact, limited to provisions for whitewashing the walls, for
insuring cleanliness in some other matters, for ventilation, and for protection against dangerous
machinery. In the third book we shall return again to the fanatical opposition of the masters to
those clauses which imposed upon them a slight expenditure on appliances for protecting the
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limbs of their workpeople, an opposition that throws a fresh and glaring light on the Free-trade
dogma, according to which, in a society with conflicting interests, each individual necessarily
furthers the common weal by seeking nothing but his own personal advantage! One example is
enough. The reader knows that during the last 20 years, the flax industry has very much extended,
and that, with that extension, the number of scutching mills in Ireland has increased. In 1864
there were in that country 1,800 of these mills. Regularly in autumn and winter women and
“young persons,” the wives, sons, and daughters of the neighbouring small farmers, a class of
people totally unaccustomed to machinery, are taken from field labour to feed the rollers of the
scutching mills with flax. The accidents, both as regards number and kind, are wholly
unexampled in the history of machinery. In one scutching mill, at Kildinan, near Cork, there
occurred between 1852 and 1856, six fatal accidents and sixty mutilations; every one of which
might have been prevented by the simplest appliances, at the cost of a few shillings. Dr. W.
White, the certifying surgeon for factories at Downpatrick, states in his official report, dated the
15th December, 1865:
“The serious accidents at the scutching mills are of the most fearful nature. In
many cases a quarter of the body is torn from the trunk, and either involves death,
or a future of wretched incapacity and suffering. The increase of mills in the
country will, of course, extend these dreadful results, and it will be a great boon if
they are brought under the legislature. I am convinced that by proper supervision
of scutching mills a vast sacrifice of life and limb would be averted.”214
What could possibly show better the character of the capitalist mode of production, than the
necessity that exists for forcing upon it, by Acts of Parliament, the simplest appliances for
maintaining cleanliness and health? In the potteries the Factory Act of 1864 “has whitewashed
and cleansed upwards of 200 workshops, after a period of abstinence from any such cleaning, in
many cases of 20 years, and in some, entirely,” (this is the “abstinence” of the capitalist!) “in
which were employed 27,800 artisans, hitherto breathing through protracted days and often nights
of labour, a mephitic atmosphere, and which rendered an otherwise comparatively innocuous
occupation, pregnant with disease and death. The Act has improved the ventilation very much.” 215
At the same time, this portion of the Act strikingly shows that the capitalist mode of production,
owing to its very nature, excludes all rational improvement beyond a certain point. It has been
stated over and over again that the English doctors are unanimous in declaring that where the
work is continuous, 500 cubic feet is the very least space that should be allowed for each person.
Now, if the Factory Acts, owing to their compulsory provisions, indirectly hasten on the
conversion of small workshops into factories, thus indirectly attacking the proprietary rights of
the smaller capitalists, and assuring a monopoly to the great ones, so, if it were made obligatory
to provide the proper space for each workman in every workshop, thousands of small employers
would, at one full swoop, be expropriated directly! The very root of the capitalist mode of
production, i.e., the self-expansion of all capital, large or small, by means of the “free” purchase
and consumption of labour-power, would be attacked. Factory legislation is therefore brought to a
deadlock before these 500 cubic feet of breathing space. The sanitary officers, the industrial
inquiry commissioners, the factory inspectors, all harp, over and over again, upon the necessity
for those 500 cubic feet, and upon the impossibility of wringing them out of capital. They thus, in
fact, declare that consumption and other lung diseases among the workpeople are necessary
conditions to the existence of capital.216
Paltry as the education clauses of the Act appear on the whole, yet they proclaim elementary
education to be an indispensable condition to the employment of children.217 The success of those
clauses proved for the first time the possibility of combining education and gymnastics218 with
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manual labour, and, consequently, of combining manual labour with education and gymnastics.
The factory inspectors soon found out by questioning the schoolmasters, that the factory children,
although receiving only one half the education of the regular day scholars, yet learnt quite as
much and often more.
“This can be accounted for by the simple fact that, with only being at school for
one half of the day, they are always fresh, and nearly always ready and willing to
receive instruction. The system on which they work, half manual labour, and half
school, renders each employment a rest and a relief to the other; consequently,
both are far more congenial to the child, than would be the case were he kept
constantly at one. It is quite clear that a boy who has been at school all the
morning, cannot (in hot weather particularly) cope with one who comes fresh and
bright from his work.” 219
Further information on this point will be found in Senior’s speech at the Social Science Congress
at Edinburgh in 1863. He there shows, amongst other things, how the monotonous and uselessly
long school hours of the children of the upper and middle classes, uselessly add to the labour of
the teacher, “while he not only fruitlessly but absolutely injuriously, wastes the time, health, and
energy of the children.” 220 From the Factory system budded, as Robert Owen has shown us in
detail, the germ of the education of the future, an education that will, in the case of every child
over a given age, combine productive labour with instruction and gymnastics, not only as one of
the methods of adding to the efficiency of production, but as the only method of producing fully
developed human beings.
Modern industry, as we have seen, sweeps away by technical means the manufacturing division
of labour, under which each man is bound hand and foot for life to a single detail-operation. At
the same time, the capitalistic form of that industry reproduces this same division of labour in a
still more monstrous shape; in the factory proper, by converting the workman into a living
appendage of the machine; and everywhere outside the Factory, partly by the sporadic use of
machinery and machine workers, 221 partly by re-establishing the division of labour on a fresh
basis by the general introduction of the labour of women and children, and of cheap unskilled
labour.
The antagonism between the manufacturing division of labour and the methods of modern
industry makes itself forcibly felt. It manifests itself, amongst other ways, in the frightful fact that
a great part of the children employed in modern factories and manufactures, are from their earliest
years riveted to the most simple manipulations, and exploited for years, without being taught a
single sort of work that would afterwards make them of use, even in the same manufactory or
factory. In the English letter-press printing trade, for example, there existed formerly a system,
corresponding to that in the old manufactures and handicrafts, of advancing the apprentices from
easy to more and more difficult work. They went through a course of teaching till they were
finished printers. To be able to read and write was for every one of them a requirement of their
trade. All this was changed by the printing machine. It employs two sorts of labourers, one grown
up, renters, the other, boys mostly from 11 to 17 years of age whose sole business is either to
spread the sheets of paper under the machine, or to take from it the printed sheets. They perform
this weary task, in London especially, for 14, 15, and 16 hours at a stretch, during several days in
the week, and frequently for 36 hours, with only 2 hours’ rest for meals and sleep. 222 A great part
of them cannot read, and they are, as a rule, utter savages and very extraordinary creatures.
“To qualify them for the work which they have to do, they require no intellectual
training; there is little room in it for skill, and less for judgment; their wages,
though rather high for boys, do not increase proportionately as they grow up, and
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the majority of them cannot look for advancement to the better paid and more
responsible post of machine minder, because while each machine has but one
minder, it has at least two, and often four boys attached to it.”223
As soon as they get too old for such child’s work, that is about 17 at the latest, they are
discharged from the printing establishments. They become recruits of crime. Several attempts to
procure them employment elsewhere, were rendered of no avail by their ignorance and brutality,
and by their mental and bodily degradation.
As with the division of labour in the interior of the manufacturing workshops, so it is with the
division of labour in the interior of society. So long as handicraft and manufacture form the
general groundwork of social production, the subjection of the producer to one branch
exclusively, the breaking up of the multifariousness of his employment 224 is a necessary step in
the development. On that groundwork each separate branch of production acquires empirically
the form that is technically suited to it, slowly perfects it, and, so soon as a given degree of
maturity has been reached, rapidly crystallises that form. The only thing, that here and there
causes a change, besides new raw material supplied by commerce, is the gradual alteration of the
instruments of labour. But their form, too, once definitely settled by experience, petrifies, as is
proved by their being in many cases handed down in the same form by one generation to another
during thousands of years. A characteristic feature is, that, even down into the eighteenth century,
the different trades were called “mysteries” (mystères); 225 into their secrets none but those duly
initiated could penetrate. modern industry rent the veil that concealed from men their own social
process of production, and that turned the various, spontaneously divided branches of production
into so many riddles, not only to outsiders, but even to the initiated. The principle which it
pursued, of resolving each process into its constituent movements, without any regard to their
possible execution by the hand of man, created the new modern science of technology. The
varied, apparently unconnected, and petrified forms of the industrial processes now resolved
themselves into so many conscious and systematic applications of natural science to the
attainment of given useful effects. Technology also discovered the few main fundamental forms
of motion, which, despite the diversity of the instruments used, are necessarily taken by every
productive action of the human body; just as the science of mechanics sees in the most
complicated machinery nothing but the continual repetition of the simple mechanical powers.
Modern industry never looks upon and treats the existing form of a process as final. The technical
basis of that industry is therefore revolutionary, while all earlier modes of production were
essentially conservative.226 By means of machinery, chemical processes and other methods, it is
continually causing changes not only in the technical basis of production, but also in the functions
of the labourer, and in the social combinations of the labour-process. At the same time, it thereby
also revolutionises the division of labour within the society, and incessantly launches masses of
capital and of workpeople from one branch of production to another. But if modern industry, by
its very nature, therefore necessitates variation of labour, fluency of function, universal mobility
of the labourer, on the other hand, in its capitalistic form, it reproduces the old division of labour
with its ossified particularisations. We have seen how this absolute contradiction between the
technical necessities of modern industry, and the social character inherent in its capitalistic form,
dispels all fixity and security in the situation of the labourer; how it constantly threatens, by
taking away the instruments of labour, to snatch from his hands his means of subsistence, 227 and,
by suppressing his detail-function, to make him superfluous. We have seen, too, how this
antagonism vents its rage in the creation of that monstrosity, an industrial reserve army, kept in
misery in order to be always at the disposal of capital; in the incessant human sacrifices from
among the working-class, in the most reckless squandering of labour-power and in the
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devastation caused by a social anarchy which turns every economic progress into a social
calamity. This is the negative side. But if, on the one hand, variation of work at present imposes
itself after the manner of an overpowering natural law, and with the blindly destructive action of a
natural law that meets with resistance228 at all points, modern industry, on the other hand, through
its catastrophes imposes the necessity of recognising, as a fundamental law of production,
variation of work, consequently fitness of the labourer for varied work, consequently the greatest
possible development of his varied aptitudes. It becomes a question of life and death for society
to adapt the mode of production to the normal functioning of this law. Modern Industry, indeed,
compels society, under penalty of death, to replace the detail-worker of to-day, grappled by lifelong repetition of one and the same trivial operation, and thus reduced to the mere fragment of a
man, by the fully developed individual, fit for a variety of labours, ready to face any change of
production, and to whom the different social functions he performs, are but so many modes of
giving free scope to his own natural and acquired powers.
One step already spontaneously taken towards effecting this revolution is the establishment of
technical and agricultural schools, and of “écoles d’enseignement professionnel,” in which the
children of the working-men receive some little instruction in technology and in the practical
handling of the various implements of labour. Though the Factory Act, that first and meagre
concession wrung from capital, is limited to combining elementary education with work in the
factory, there can be no doubt that when the working-class comes into power, as inevitably it
must, technical instruction, both theoretical and practical, will take its proper place in the
working-class schools. There is also no doubt that such revolutionary ferments, the final result of
which is the abolition of the old division of labour, are diametrically opposed to the capitalistic
form of production, and to the economic status of the labourer corresponding to that form. But the
historical development of the antagonisms, immanent in a given form of production, is the only
way in which that form of production can be dissolved and a new form established. “Ne sutor
ultra crepidam” – this nec plus ultra of handicraft wisdom became sheer nonsense, from the
moment the watchmaker Watt invented the steam-engine, the barber Arkwright, the throstle, and
the working-jeweller, Fulton, the steamship. 229
So long as Factory legislation is confined to regulating the labour in factories, manufactories, &c.,
it is regarded as a mere interference with the exploiting rights of capital. But when it comes to
regulating the so-called “home-labour,” 230 it is immediately viewed as a direct attack on the patria
potestas, on parental authority. The tender-hearted English Parliament long affected to shrink
from taking this step. The force of facts, however, compelled it at last to acknowledge that
modern industry, in overturning the economic foundation on which was based the traditional
family, and the family labour corresponding to it, had also unloosened all traditional family ties.
The rights of the children had to be proclaimed. The final report of the Ch. Empl. Comm. of
1866, states:
“It is unhappily, to a painful degree, apparent throughout the whole of the
evidence, that against no persons do the children of both sexes so much require
protection as against their parents.” The system of unlimited exploitation of
children’s labour in general and the so-called home-labour in particular is
"maintained only because the parents are able, without check or control, to
exercise this arbitrary and mischievous power over their young and tender
offspring.... Parents must not possess the absolute power of making their children
mere ‘machines to earn so much weekly wage....’ The children and young
persons, therefore, in all such cases may justifiably claim from the legislature, as a
natural right, that an exemption should be secured to them, from what destroys
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prematurely their physical strength, and lowers them in the scale of intellectual
and moral beings.” 231
It was not, however, the misuse of parental authority that created the capitalistic exploitation,
whether direct or indirect, of children’s labour; but, on the contrary, it was the capitalistic mode
of exploitation which, by sweeping away the economic basis of parental authority, made its
exercise degenerate into a mischievous misuse of power. However terrible and disgusting the
dissolution, under the capitalist system, of the old family ties may appear, nevertheless, modern
industry, by assigning as it does an important part in the process of production, outside the
domestic sphere, to women, to young persons, and to children of both sexes, creates a new
economic foundation for a higher form of the family and of the relations between the sexes. It is,
of course, just as absurd to hold the Teutonic-Christian form of the family to be absolute and final
as it would be to apply that character to the ancient Roman, the ancient Greek, or the Eastern
forms which, moreover, taken together form a series in historical development. Moreover, it is
obvious that the fact of the collective working group being composed of individuals of both sexes
and all ages, must necessarily, under suitable conditions, become a source of humane
development; although in its spontaneously developed, brutal, capitalistic form, where the
labourer exists for the process of production, and not the process of production for the labourer,
that fact is a pestiferous source of corruption and slavery. 232
The necessity for a generalisation of the Factory Acts, for transforming them from an exceptional
law relating to mechanical spinning and weaving – those first creations of machinery – into a law
affecting social production as a whole, arose, as we have seen, from the mode in which modern
industry was historically developed. In the rear of that industry, the traditional form of
manufacture, of handicraft, and of domestic industry, is entirely revolutionised; manufactures are
constantly passing into the factory system, and handicrafts into manufactures; and lastly, the
spheres of handicraft and of the domestic industries become, in a, comparatively speaking,
wonderfully short time, dens of misery in which capitalistic exploitation obtains free play for the
wildest excesses. There are two circumstances that finally turn the scale: first, the constantly
recurring experience that capital, so soon as it finds itself subject to legal control at one point,
compensates itself all the more recklessly at other points;233 secondly, the cry of the capitalists for
equality in the conditions of competition, i.e., for equal restrain on all exploitation of labour.234
On this point let us listen to two heart-broken cries. Messrs. Cooksley of Bristol, nail and chain,
&c., manufacturers, spontaneously introduced the regulations of the Factory Act into their
business.
“As the old irregular system prevails in neighbouring works, the Messrs. Cooksley
are subject to the disadvantage of having their boys enticed to continue their
labour elsewhere after 6 p.m. ‘This,’ they naturally say, ‘is an unjustice and loss to
us, as it exhausts a portion of the boy’s strength, of which we ought to have the
full benefit’.” 235
Mr. J. Simpson (paper box and bagmaker, London) states before the commissioners of the Ch.
Empl. Comm.:
“He would sign any petition for it” (legislative interference)... “As it was, he
always felt restless at night, when he had closed his place, lest others should be
working later than him and getting away his orders.” 236
Summarising, the Ch. Empl. Comm. says:
“It would be unjust to the larger employers that their factories should be placed
under regulation, while the hours of labour in the smaller places in their own
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branch of business were under no legislative restriction. And to the injustice
arising from the unfair conditions of competition, in regard to hours, that would be
created if the smaller places of work were exempt, would be added the
disadvantage to the larger manufacturers, of finding their supply of juvenile and
female labour drawn off to the places of work exempt from legislation. Further, a
stimulus would be given to the multiplication of the smaller places of work, which
are almost invariably the least favourable to the health, comfort, education, and
general improvement of the people.” 237
In its final report the Commission proposes to subject to the Factory Act more than 1,400,000
children, young persons, and women, of which number about one half are exploited in small
industries and by the so-called home-work. 238 It says,
“But if it should seem fit to Parliament to place the whole of that large number of
children, young persons and females under the protective legislation above
adverted to ... it cannot be doubted that such legislation would have a most
beneficent effect, not only upon the young and the feeble, who are its more
immediate objects, but upon the still larger body of adult workers, who would in
all these employments, both directly and indirectly, come immediately under its
influence. It would enforce upon them regular and moderate hours; it would lead
to their places of work being kept in a healthy and cleanly state; it would therefore
husband and improve that store of physical strength on which their own wellbeing and that of the country so much depends; it would save the rising generation
from that overexertion at an early age which undermines their constitutions and
leads to premature decay; finally, it would ensure them – at least up to the age of
13 – the opportunity of receiving the elements of education, and would put an end
to that utter ignorance ... so faithfully exhibited in the Reports of our Assistant
Commissioners, and which cannot be regarded without the deepest pain, and a
profound sense of national degradation.” 239
The Tory Cabinet 240 announced in the Speech from the Throne, on February 5, 1867, that it had
framed the proposals of the Industrial Commission of Inquiry241 into Bills. To get that far, another
twenty years of experimentum in corpore vili had been required. Already in 1840 a Parliamentary
Commission of Inquiry on the labour of children had been appointed. Its Report, in 1842,
unfolded, in the words of Nassau W. Senior,
“the most frightful picture of avarice, selfishness and cruelty on the part of
masters and of parents, and of juvenile and infantile misery, degradation and
destruction ever presented.... It may be supposed that it describes the horrors of a
past age. But there is unhappily evidence that those horrors continue as intense as
they were. A pamphlet published by Hardwicke about 2 years ago states that the
abuses complained of in 1842, are in full bloom at the present day. It is a strange
proof of the general neglect of the morals and health of the children of the
working-class, that this report lay unnoticed for 20 years, during which the
children, ‘bred up without the remotest sign of comprehension as to what is meant
by the term morals, who had neither knowledge, nor religion, nor natural
affection,’ were allowed to become the parents of the present generation.” 242
The social conditions having undergone a change, Parliament could not venture to shelve the
demands of the Commission of 1862, as it had done those of the Commission of 1840. Hence in
1864, when the Commission had not yet published more than a part of its reports, the earthenware
industries (including the potteries), makers of paperhangings, matches, cartridges, and caps, and
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fustian cutters were made subject to the Acts in force in the textile industries. In the Speech from
the Throne, on 5th February, 1867, the Tory Cabinet of the day announced the introduction of
Bills, founded on the final recommendations of the Commission, which had completed its labours
in 1866.
On the 15th August, 1867, the Factory Acts Extension Act, and on the 21st August, the
Workshops’ Regulation Act received the Royal Assent; the former Act having reference to large
industries, the latter to small.
The former applies to blast-furnaces, iron’ and copper mills, foundries, machine shops, metal
manufactories, gutta-percha works, paper mills, glass-works, tobacco manufactories, letter-press
printing (including newspapers), book-binding, in short to all industrial establishments of the
above kind, in which 50 individuals or more are occupied simultaneously, and for not less than
100 days during the year.
To give an idea of the extent of the sphere embraced by the Workshops’ Regulation Act in its
application, we cite from its interpretation clause, the following passages:
“Handicraft shall mean any manual labour exercised by way of trade, or for
purposes of gain in, or incidental to, the making any article or part of an article, or
in, or incidental to, the altering, repairing, ornamenting, finishing, or otherwise
adapting for sale any article.”
“Workshop shall mean any room or place whatever in the open air or undercover,
in which any handicraft is carried on by any child, young person, or woman, and
to which and over which the person by whom such child, young person, or woman
is employed, has the right of access and control.”
“Employed shall mean occupied in any handicraft, whether for wages or not,
under a master or under a parent as herein defined.”
“Parent shall mean parent, guardian, or person, having the custody of, or control
over, any... child or young person.”
Clause 7, which imposes a penalty for employment of children, young persons, and women,
contrary to the provisions of the Act, subjects to fines, not only the occupier of the workshop,
whether parent or not, but even
“the parent of, or the person deriving any direct benefit from the labour of, or
having the control over, the child, young person or woman.”
The Factory Acts Extension Act, which affects the large establishments, derogates from the
Factory Act by a crowd of vicious exceptions and cowardly compromises with the masters.
The Workshops’ Regulation Act, wretched in all its details, remained a dead letter in the hands of
the municipal and local authorities who were charged with its execution. When, in 1871,
Parliament withdrew from them this power, in order to confer it on the Factory Inspectors, to
whose province it thus added by a single stroke more than one hundred thousand workshops, and
three hundred brickworks, care was taken at the same time not to add more than eight assistants to
their already undermanned staff. 243
What strikes us, then, in the English legislation of 1867, is, on the one hand, the necessity
imposed on the parliament of the ruling classes, of adopting in principle measures so
extraordinary, and on so great a scale, against the excesses of capitalistic exploitation; and on the
other hand, the hesitation, the repugnance, and the bad faith, with which it lent itself to the task of
carrying those measures into practice.

323

Chapter 15

The Inquiry Commission of 1862 also proposed a new regulation of the mining industry, an
industry distinguished from others by the exceptional characteristic that the interests of landlord
and capitalist there join hands. The antagonism of these two interests had been favourable to
Factory legislation, while on the other hand the absence of that antagonism is sufficient to explain
the delays and chicanery of the legislation on mines.
The Inquiry Commission of 1840 had made revelations so terrible, so shocking, and creating such
a scandal all over Europe, that to salve its conscience Parliament passed the Mining Act of 1842,
in which it limited itself to forbidding the employment underground in mines of children under 10
years of age and females.
Then another Act, The Mines’ Inspecting Act of 1860, provides that mines shall be inspected by
public officers nominated specially for that purpose, and that boys between the ages of 10 and 12
years shall not be employed, unless they have a school certificate, or go to school for a certain
number of hours. This Act was a complete dead letter owing to the ridiculously small number of
inspectors, the meagreness of their powers, and other causes that will become apparent as we
proceed.
One of the most recent Blue books on mines is the “Report from the Select Committee on Mines,
together with &c. Evidence, 23rd July, 1866.” This Report is the work of a Parliamentary
Committee selected from members of the House of Commons, and authorised to summon and
examine witnesses. It is a thick folio volume in which the Report itself occupies only five lines to
this effect; that the committee has nothing to say, and that more witnesses must be examined!
The mode of examining the witnesses reminds one of the cross-examination of witnesses in
English courts of justice, where the advocate tries, by means of impudent, unexpected, equivocal
and involved questions, put without connexion, to intimidate, surprise, and confound the witness,
and to give a forced meaning to the answers extorted from him. In this inquiry the members of the
committee themselves are the cross-examiners, and among them are to be found both mineowners and mine exploiters; the witnesses are mostly working coal miners. The whole farce is too
characteristic of the spirit of capital, not to call for a few extracts from this Report. For the sake of
conciseness I have classified them. I may also add that every question and its answer are
numbered in the English Blue books.
1. Employment in mines of boys of 10 years and upwards. – In the mines the work, inclusive
of going and returning, usually lasts 14 or 15 hours, sometimes even from 3, 4 and 5 o’clock a.m.,
till 5 and 6 o’clock p.m. (n. 6, 452, 83). The adults work in two shifts, of eight hours each; but
there is no alternation with the boys, on account of the expense (n. 80, 203, 204). The younger
boys are chiefly employed in opening and shutting the ventilating doors in the various parts of the
mine; the older ones are employed on heavier work, in carrying coal, &c. (n. 122, 739, 1747).
They work these long hours underground until their 18th or 22nd year, when they are put to
miner’s work proper (n. 161). Children and young persons are at present worse treated, and
harder worked than at any previous period (n. 1663-1667). The miners demand almost
unanimously an act of Parliament prohibiting the employment in mines of children under 14. And
now Hussey Vivian (himself an exploiter of mines) asks:
“Would not the opinion of the workman depend upon the poverty of the
workman’s family?” Mr. Bruce: “Do you not think it would be a very hard case,
where a parent had been injured, or where he was sickly, or where a father was
dead, and there was only a mother, to prevent a child between 12 and 14 earning
1s. 7d. a day for the good of the family? ... You must lay down a general rule? ...
Are you prepared to recommend legislation which would prevent the employment
of children under 12 and 14, whatever the state of their parents might be?” “Yes.”
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(ns. 107-110). Vivian: “Supposing that an enactment were passed preventing the
employment of children under the age of 14, would it not be probable that ... the
parents of children would seek employment for their children in other directions,
for instance, in manufacture?” “Not generally I think” (n. 174). Kinnaird: “Some
of the boys are keepers of doors?” “Yes.” “Is there not generally a very great
draught every time you open a door or close it?” “Yes, generally there is.” “It
sounds a very easy thing, but it is in fact rather a painful one?” “He is imprisoned
there just the same as if he was in a cell of a gaol.” Bourgeois Vivian: “Whenever
a boy is furnished with a lamp cannot he read?” “Yes, he can read, if he finds
himself in candles.... I suppose he would be found fault with if he were discovered
reading; he is there to mind his business, he has a duty to perform, and he has to
attend to it in the first place, and I do not think it would be allowed down the pit.”
(ns. 139, 141, 143, 158, 160).
II. Education. – The working miners want a law for the compulsory education of their children,
as in factories. They declare the clauses of the Act of 1860, which require a school certificate to
be obtained before employing boys of 10 and 12 years of age, to be quite illusory. The
examination of the witnesses on this subject is truly droll.
“Is it (the Act) required more against the masters or against the parents?” “It is
required against both I think.” “You cannot say whether it is required against one
more than against the other?” “No; I can hardly answer that question.” (ns. 115,
116). “Does there appear to be any desire on the part of the employers that the
boys should have such hours as to enable them to go to school?” “No; the hours
are never shortened for that purpose.” (n. 137) Mr. Kinnaird: “Should you say that
the colliers generally improve their education; have you any instances of men who
have, since they began to work, greatly improved their education, or do they not
rather go back, and lose any advantage that they may have gained?” “They
generally become worse: they do not improve; they acquire bad habits; they get on
to drinking and gambling and such like, and they go completely to wreck.” (n.
211.) “Do they make any attempt of the kind (for providing instruction) by having
schools at night?” “There are few collieries where night schools are held, and
perhaps at those collieries a few boys do go to those schools; but they are so
physically exhausted that it is to no purpose that they go there.” (n. 454.) “You are
then,” concludes the bourgeois, “against education?” “Most certainly not; but,”
&c. (n. 443.) “But are they (the employers) not compelled to demand them
(school certificates)?” “By law they are; but I am not aware that they are
demanded by the employers.” “Then it is your opinion, that this provision of the
Act as to requiring certificates, is not generally carried out in the collieries?” “It is
not carried out.” (ns. 443, 444.) “Do the men take a great interest in this question
(of education)?” “The majority of them do.” (n. 717.) “Are they very anxious to
see the law enforced?” “The majority are.” (n. 718.) “Do you think that in this
country any law that you pass ... can really be effectual unless the population
themselves assist in putting it into operation?” “Many a man might wish to object
to employing a boy, but he would perhaps become marked by it.” (n. 720.)
“Marked by whom?” “By his employers.” (n. 721.) “Do you think that the
employers would find any fault with a man who obeyed the law... ?” “I believe
they would.” (n. 722.) “Have you ever heard of any workman objecting to employ
a boy between 10 and 12, who could not write or read?” “It is not left to men’s
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option.” (n. 123.) “Would you call for the interference of Parliament?” “I think
that if anything effectual is to be done in the education of the colliers’ children, it
will have to be made compulsory by Act of Parliament.” (n. 1634.) “Would you
lay that obligation upon the colliers only, or all the workpeople of Great Britain?”
“I came to speak for the colliers.” (n. 1636.) “Why should you distinguish them
(colliery boys) from other boys?” “Because I think they are an exception to the
rule.” (n. 1638.) “In what respect?” “In a physical respect.” (n. 1639.) “Why
should education be more valuable to them than to other classes of lads?” “I do
not know that it is more valuable; but through the over-exertion in mines there is
less chance for the boys that are employed there to get education, either at Sunday
schools, or at day schools.” (n. 1640.) “It is impossible to look at a question of this
sort absolutely by itself?” (n. 1644.) “Is there a sufficiency of schools?” – “No"...
(n. 1646). “If the State were to require that every child should be sent to school,
would there be schools for the children to go to?” “No; but I think if the
circumstances were to spring up, the schools would be forthcoming.” (n. 1647.)
“Some of them (the boys) cannot read and write at all, I suppose?” “The majority
cannot... The majority of the men themselves cannot.” (ns. 705, 725.)
III. Employment of women. – Since 1842 women are no more employed underground, but are
occupied on the surface in loading the coal, &c., in drawing the tubs to the canals and railway
waggons, in sorting, &c. Their numbers have considerably increased during the last three or four
years. (n. 1727.) They are mostly the wives, daughters, and widows of the working miners, and
their ages range from 12 to 50 or 60 years. (ns. 645, 1779.)
“What is the feeling among the working miners as to the employment of women?”
“I think they generally condemn it.” (n. 648.) “What objection do you see to it?”
“I think it is degrading to the sex.” (n. 649.) “There is a peculiarity of dress?”
“Yes ... it is rather a man’s dress, and I believe in some cases, it drowns all sense
of decency.” “Do the women smoke?” “Some do.” “And I suppose it is very dirty
work?” “Very dirty.” “They get black and grimy?” “As black as those who are
down the mines ... I believe that a woman having children (and there are plenty on
the banks that have) cannot do her duty to her children.” (ns. 650-654, 701.) “Do
you think that those widows could get employment anywhere else, which would
bring them in as much wages as that (from 8s. to 10s. a week)?” “I cannot speak
to that.” (n. 709.) “You would still be prepared, would you,” (flint-hearted
fellow!) “to prevent their obtaining a livelihood by these means?” “I would.” (n.
710.) “What is the general feeling in the district ... as to the employment of
women?” “The feeling is that it is degrading; and we wish as miners to have more
respect to the fair sex than to see them placed on the pit bank... Some part of the
work is very hard; some of these girls have raised as much as 10 tons of stuff a
day.” (ns. 1715,1717.) “Do you think that the women employed about the
collieries are less moral than the women employed in the factories?” “. ..the
percentage of bad ones may be a little more ... than with the girls in the factories.”
(n. 1237.) “But you are not quite satisfied with the state of morality in the
factories?” “No.” (n. 1733.) “Would you prohibit the employment of women in
factories also?” “No, I would not.” (n. 1734.) “Why not?” “I think it a more
honourable occupation for them in the mills.” (n. 1735.) “Still it is injurious to
their morality, you think?” “Not so much as working on the pit bank; but it is
more on the social position I take it; I do not take it on its moral ground alone. The
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degradation, in its social bearing on the girls, is deplorable in the extreme. When
these 400 or 500 girls become colliers’ wives, the men suffer greatly from this
degradation, and it causes them to leave their homes and drink.” (n. 1736.) “You
would be obliged to stop the employment of women in the ironworks as well,
would you not, if you stopped it in the collieries?” “I cannot speak for any other
trade.” (n. 1737.) “Can you see any difference in the circumstances of women
employed in ironworks, and the circumstances of women employed above ground
in collieries?” “I have not ascertained anything as to that.” (n. 1740.) “Can you see
anything that makes a distinction between one class and the other?” “I have not
ascertained that, but I know from house to house visitation, that it is a deplorable
state of things in our district....” (n. 1741.) “Would you interfere in every case
with the employment of women where that employment was degrading?” “It
would become injurious, I think, in this way: the best feelings of Englishmen have
been gained from the instruction of a mother. ...” (n. 1750.) “That equally applies
to agricultural employments, does it not?” “Yes, but that is only for two seasons,
and we have work all the four seasons.” (n. 1751.) “They often work day and
night, wet through to the skin, their constitution undermined and their health
ruined.” “You have not inquired into that subject perhaps?” “I have certainly
taken note of it as I have gone along, and certainly I have seen nothing parallel to
the effects of the employment of women on the pit bank.... It is the work of a
man... a strong man.” (ns. 1753, 1793, 1794.) “Your feeling upon the whole
subject is that the better class of colliers who desire to raise themselves and
humanise themselves, instead of deriving help from the women, are pulled down
by them?” “Yes.” (n. 1808.) After some further crooked questions from these
bourgeois, the secret of their “sympathy” for widows, poor families, &c., comes
out at last. “The coal proprietor appoints certain gentlemen to take the oversight of
the workings, and it is their policy, in order to receive approbation, to place things
on the most economical basis they can, and these girls are employed at from 1s.
up to 1s. 6d. a day, where a man at the rate of 2s. 6d. a day would have to be
employed.” (n. 1816.)
IV. Coroner’s inquests. –
“With regard to coroner’s inquests in your district, have the workmen confidence
in the proceedings at those inquests when accidents occur?” “No; they have not.”
(n. 360.) “Why not?” “Chiefly because the men who are generally chosen, are
men who know nothing about mines and such like.” “Are not workmen
summoned at all upon the juries?” “Never but as witnesses to my knowledge.”
“Who are the people who are generally summoned upon these juries?” “Generally
tradesmen in the neighbourhood ... from their circumstances they are sometimes
liable to be influenced by their employers ... the owners of the works. They are
generally men who have no knowledge, and can scarcely understand the witnesses
who are called before them, and the terms which are used and such like.” “Would
you have the jury composed of persons who had been employed in mining?”
“Yes, partly... they (the workmen) think that the verdict is not in accordance with
the evidence given generally.” (ns. 361, 364, 366, 368, 371, 375.) “One great
object in summoning a jury is to have an impartial one, is it not?” “Yes, I should
think so.” “Do you think that the juries would be impartial if they were composed
to a considerable extent of workmen?” “I cannot see any motive which the
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workmen would have to act partially ... they necessarily have a better knowledge
of the operations in connexion with the mine.” “You do not think there would be a
tendency on the part of the workmen to return unfairly severe verdicts?” “No, I
think not.” (ns. 378, 379, 380.)
V. False weights and measures. – The workmen demand to be paid weekly instead of
fortnightly, and by weight instead of by cubical contents of the tubs; they also demand protection
against the use of false weights, &c. (n. 1071.)
“If the tubs were fraudulently increased, a man could discontinue working by
giving 14 days’ notice?” “But if he goes to another place, there is the same thing
going on there.” (n. 1071.) “But he can leave that place where the wrong has been
committed?” “It is general; wherever he goes, he has to submit to it.” (n. 1072.)
“Could a man leave by giving 14 days’ notice?” “Yes.” (n. 1073.) And yet they
are not satisfied!
VI. Inspection of mines. – Casualties from explosions are not the only things the workmen suffer
from. (n. 234, sqq.)
“Our men complained very much of the bad ventilation of the collieries ... the
ventilation is so bad in general that the men can scarcely breathe; they are quite
unfit for employment of any kind after they have been for a length of time in
connexion with their work; indeed, just at the part of the mine where I am
working, men have been obliged to leave their employment and come home in
consequence of that ... some of them have been out of work for weeks just in
consequence of the bad state of the ventilation where there is not explosive gas ...
there is plenty of air generally in the main courses, yet pains are not taken to get
air into the workings where men are working.” “Why do you not apply to the
inspector?” “To tell the truth there are many men who are timid on that point;
there have been cases of men being sacrificed and losing their employment in
consequence of applying to the inspector.” “Why is he a marked man for having
complained?” “Yes...... And he finds it difficult to get employment in another
mine?” “Yes.” “Do you think the mines in your neighbourhood are sufficiently
inspected to insure a compliance with the provisions of the Act?” “No; they are
not inspected at all ... the inspector has been down just once in the pit, and it has
been going seven years.... In the district to which I belong there are not a
sufficient number of inspectors. We have one old man more than 70 years of age
to inspect more than 130 collieries.” “You wish to have a class of subinspectors?” “Yes.” (ns. 234, 241, 251, 254, 274, 275, 554, 276, 293.) “But do you
think it would be possible for Government to maintain such an army of inspectors
as would be necessary to do all that you want them to do, without information
from the men?” “No, I should think it would be next to impossible....” “It would
be desirable the inspectors should come oftener?” “Yes, and without being sent
for.” (n. 280, 277.) “Do you not think that the effect of having these inspectors
examining the collieries so frequently would be to shift the responsibility (!) of
supplying proper ventilation from the owners of the collieries to the Government
officials?” “No, I do not think that, I think that they should make it their business
to enforce the Acts which are already in existence.” (n. 285.) “When you speak of
sub-inspectors, do you mean men at a less salary, and of an inferior stamp to the
present inspectors?” “I would not have them inferior, if you could get them
otherwise.” (n. 294.) “Do you merely want more inspectors, or do you want a
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lower class of men as an inspector?” “A man who would knock about, and see
that things are kept right; a man who would not be afraid of himself.” (n. 295.) “If
you obtained your wish in getting an inferior class of inspectors appointed, do you
think that there would be no danger from want of skill, &c?” “I think not, I think
that the Government would see after that, and have proper men in that position.”
(n. 297.)
This kind of examination becomes at last too much even for the chairman of the committee, and
he interrupts with the observation:
“You want a class of men who would look into all the details of the mine, and
would go into all the holes and corners, and go into the real facts ... they would
report to the chief inspector, who would then bring his scientific knowledge to
bear on the facts they have stated?” (ns. 298, 299.) “Would it not entail very great
expense if all these old workings were kept ventilated?” “Yes, expense might be
incurred, but life would be at the same time protected.” (n. 531.)
A working miner objects to the 17th section of the Act of 1860; he says,
“At the present time, if the inspector of mines finds a part of the mine unfit to
work in, he has to report it to the mine-owner and the Home Secretary. After
doing that, there is given to the owner 20 days to look over the matter; at the end
of 20 days he has the power to refuse making any alteration in the mine; but, when
he refuses, the mine-owner writes to the Home Secretary, at the same time
nominating five engineers, and from those five engineers named by the mineowner himself, the Home Secretary appoints one, I think, as arbitrator, or appoints
arbitrators from them; now we think in that case the mine-owner virtually
appoints his own arbitrator.” (n. 581.)
Bourgeois examiner, himself a mine-owner:
“But ... is this a merely speculative objection?” (n. 586.) “Then you have a very
poor opinion of the integrity of mining engineers?” “It is most certainly unjust and
inequitable.” (n. 588.) “Do not mining engineers possess a sort of public
character, and do not you think that they are above making such a partial decision
as you apprehend?” “I do not wish to answer such a question as that with respect
to the personal character of those men. I believe that in many cases they would act
very partially indeed, and that it ought not to be in their hands to do so, where
men’s lives are at stake.” (n. 589.)
This same bourgeois is not ashamed to put this question: “Do you not think that the mine-owner
also suffers loss from an explosion?” Finally, “Are not you workmen in Lancashire able to take
care of your own interests without calling in the Government to help you?” “No.” (n. 1042.)
In the year 1865 there were 3,217 coal mines in Great Britain, and 12 inspectors. A Yorkshire
mine-owner himself calculates (Times, 26th January, 1867), that putting on one side their office
work, which absorbs all their time, each mine can be visited but once in ten years by an inspector.
No wonder that explosions have increased progressively, both in number and extent (sometimes
with a loss of 200-300 men), during the last ten years. These are the beauties of “free” capitalist
production! [This sentence has been added to the English text in conformity with the 4th German
edition. – Ed.]
The very defective Act, passed in 1872, is the first that regulates the hours of labour of the
children employed in mines, and makes exploiters and owners, to a certain extent, responsible for
so-called accidents.
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The Royal Commission appointed in 1867 to inquire into the employment in agriculture of
children, young persons, and women, has published some very important reports. Several
attempts to apply the principles of the Factory Acts, but in a modified form, to agriculture have
been made, but have so far resulted in complete failure. All that I wish to draw attention to here is
the existence of an irresistible tendency towards the general application of those principles.
If the general extension of factory legislation to all trades for the purpose of protecting the
working-class both in mind and body has become inevitable, on the other hand, as we have
already pointed out, that extension hastens on the general conversion of numerous isolated small
industries into a few combined industries carried on upon a large scale; it therefore accelerates the
concentration of capital and the exclusive predominance of the factory system. It destroys both
the ancient and the transitional forms, behind which the dominion of capital is still in part
concealed, and replaces them by the direct and open sway of capital; but thereby it also
generalises the direct opposition to this sway. While in each individual workshop it enforces
uniformity, regularity, order, and economy, it increases by the immense spur which the limitation
and regulation of the working day give to technical improvement, the anarchy and the
catastrophes of capitalist production as a whole, the intensity of labour, and the competition of
machinery with the labourer. By the destruction of petty and domestic industries it destroys the
last resort of the “redundant population,” and with it the sole remaining safety-valve of the whole
social mechanism. By maturing the material conditions, and the combination on a social scale of
the processes of production, it matures the contradictions and antagonisms of the capitalist form
of production, and thereby provides, along with the elements for the formation of a new society,
the forces for exploding the old one.244

Section 10: Modern Industry and Agriculture
The revolution called forth by modern industry in agriculture, and in the social relations of
agricultural producers, will be investigated later on. In this place, we shall merely indicate a few
results by way of anticipation. If the use of machinery in agriculture is for the most part free from
the injurious physical effect it has on the factory operative, its action in superseding the labourers
is more intense, and finds less resistance, as we shall see later in detail. In the counties of
Cambridge and Suffolk, for example, the area of cultivated land has extended very much within
the last 20 years (up to 1868), while in the same period the rural population has diminished, not
only relatively, but absolutely. In the United States it is as yet only virtually that agricultural
machines replace labourers; in other words, they allow of the cultivation by the farmer of a larger
surface, but do not actually expel the labourers employed. In 1861 the number of persons
occupied in England and Wales in the manufacture of agricultural machines was 1,034, whilst the
number of agricultural labourers employed in the use of agricultural machines and steam-engines
did not exceed 1,205.
In the sphere of agriculture, modern industry has a more revolutionary effect than elsewhere, for
this reason, that it annihilates the peasant, that bulwark of the old society, and replaces him by the
wage-labourer. Thus the desire for social changes, and the class antagonisms are brought to the
same level in the country as in the towns. The irrational, old-fashioned methods of agriculture are
replaced by scientific ones. Capitalist production completely tears asunder the old bond of union
which held together agriculture and manufacture in their infancy. But at the same time it creates
the material conditions for a higher synthesis in the future, viz., the union of agriculture and
industry on the basis of the more perfected forms they have each acquired during their temporary
separation. Capitalist production, by collecting the population in great centres, and causing an
ever-increasing preponderance of town population, on the one hand concentrates the historical
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motive power of society; on the other hand, it disturbs the circulation of matter between man and
the soil, i.e., prevents the return to the soil of its elements consumed by man in the form of food
and clothing; it therefore violates the conditions necessary to lasting fertility of the soil. By this
action it destroys at the same time the health of the town labourer and the intellectual life of the
rural labourer. 245 But while upsetting the naturally grown conditions for the maintenance of that
circulation of matter, it imperiously calls for its restoration as a system, as a regulating law of
social production, and under a form appropriate to the full development of the human race. In
agriculture as in manufacture, the transformation of production under the sway of capital, means,
at the same time, the martyrdom of the producer; the instrument of labour becomes the means of
enslaving, exploiting, and impoverishing the labourer; the social combination and organisation of
labour-processes is turned into an organised mode of crushing out the workman’s individual
vitality, freedom, and independence. The dispersion of the rural labourers over larger areas breaks
their power of resistance while concentration increases that of the town operatives. In modern
agriculture, as in the urban industries, the increased productiveness and quantity of the labour set
in motion are bought at the cost of laying waste and consuming by disease labour-power itself.
Moreover, all progress in capitalistic agriculture is a progress in the art, not only of robbing the
labourer, but of robbing the soil; all progress in increasing the fertility of the soil for a given time,
is a progress towards ruining the lasting sources of that fertility. The more a country starts its
development on the foundation of modern industry, like the United States, for example, the more
rapid is this process of destruction. 246Capitalist production, therefore, develops technology, and
the combining together of various processes into a social whole, only by sapping the original
sources of all wealth-the soil and the labourer.
1

Mill should have said, “of any human being not fed by other people’s labour,” for, without doubt,
machinery has greatly increased the number of well-to-do idlers.
2
See, for instance, Hutton: “Course of Mathematics.”
3
“From this point of view we may draw a sharp line of distinction between a tool and a machine:
spades, hammers, chisels, &c., combinations of levers and of screws, in all of which, no matter how
complicated they may be in other respects, man is the motive power, ... all this falls under the idea of a
tool; but the plough, which is drawn by animal power, and wind-mills, &c., must be classed among
machines.” (Wilhelm Schulz: “Die Bewegung der Produktion.” Zürich, 1843, p. 38.) In many respects
a book to be recommended.
4
Before his time, spinning machines, although very imperfect ones, had already been used, and Italy
was probably the country of their first appearance. A critical history of technology would show how
little any of the inventions of the 18th century are the work of a single individual. Hitherto there is no
such book. Darwin has interested us in the history of Nature’s Technology, i.e., in the formation of the
organs of plants and animals, which organs serve as instruments of production for sustaining life.
Does not the history of the productive organs of man, of organs that are the material basis of all social
organisation, deserve equal attention? And would not such a history be easier to compile, since, as
Vico says, human history differs from natural history in this, that we have made the former, but not
the latter? Technology discloses man’s mode of dealing with Nature, the process of production by
which he sustains his life, and thereby also lays bare the mode of formation of his social relations, and
of the mental conceptions that flow from them. Every history of religion, even, that fails to take
account of this material basis, is uncritical. It is, in reality, much easier to discover by analysis the
earthly core of the misty creations of religion, than, conversely, it is, to develop from the actual
relations of life the corresponding celestialised forms of those relations. The latter method is the only
materialistic, and therefore the only scientific one. The weak points in the abstract materialism of
natural science, a materialism that excludes history and its process, are at once evident from the
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abstract and ideological conceptions of its spokesmen, whenever they venture beyond the bounds of
their own speciality.
5
Especially in the original form of the power-loom, we recognise, at the first glance, the ancient loom.
In its modern form, the power-loom has undergone essential alterations.
6
It is only during the last 15 years (i.e., since about 1850), that a constantly increasing portion of these
machine tools have been made in England by machinery, and that not by the same manufacturers who
make the machines. Instances of machines for the fabrication of these mechanical tools are, the
automatic bobbin-making engine, the cardsetting engine, shuttle-making machines, and machines for
forging mule and throstle spindles.
7
Moses says: “Thou shalt not muzzle the ox that treads the corn.” The Christian philanthropists of
Germany, on the contrary, fastened a wooden board round the necks of the serfs, whom they used as a
motive power for grinding, in order to prevent them from putting flour into their mouths with their
hands.
8
It was partly the want of streams with a good fall on them, and partly their battles with
superabundance of water in other respects, that compelled the Dutch to resort to wind as a motive
power. The wind-mill itself they got from Germany, where its invention was the origin of a pretty
squabble between the nobles, the priests, and the emperor, as to which of those three the wind
“belonged.” The air makes bondage, was the cry in Germany, at the same time that the wind was
making Holland free. What it reduced to bondage in this case, was not the Dutchman, but the land for
the Dutchman. In 1836, 12,000 windmills of 6,000 horse-power were still employed in Holland, to
prevent two-thirds of the land from being reconverted into morasses.
9
It was, indeed, very much improved by Watt’s first so-called single acting engine; but, in this form,
it continued to be a mere machine for raising water, and the liquor from salt mines.
10
“The union of all these simple instruments, set in motion by a single motor, constitutes a machine.”
(Babbage, l.c.)
11
In January, 1861, John C. Morton read before the Society of Arts a paper on “The forces employed
in agriculture.” He there states: “Every improvement that furthers the uniformity of the land makes the
steam-engine more and more applicable to the production of pure mechanical force.... Horse-power is
requisite wherever crooked fences and other obstructions prevent uniform action. These obstructions
are vanishing day by day. For operations that demand more exercise of will than actual force, the only
power applicable is that controlled every instant by the human mind-in other words, man-power.” Mr.
Morton then reduces steam-power, horse-power, and man-power, to the unit in general use for steamengines, namely, the force required to raise 33,000 lbs. one foot in one minute, and reckons the cost of
one horse-power from a steam-engine to be 3d., and from a horse to be 5½d. per hour. Further, if a
horse must fully maintain its health, it can work no more than 8 hours a day. Three at the least out of
every seven horses used on tillage land during the year can be dispensed with by using steam-power,
at an expense not greater than that which, the horses dispensed with, would cost during the 3 or 4
months in which alone they can be used effectively. Lastly, steam-power, in those agricultural
operations in which it can be employed, improves, in comparison with horse-power, the quality of the
work. To do the work of a steam-engine would require 66 men, at a total cost of 15s. an hour, and to
do the work of a horse, 32 men, at a total cost of 8s. an hour.
12
Faulhaber, 1625; De Caus, 1688.
13
The modern turbine frees the industrial exploitation of water-power from many of its former fetters.
14
“In the early days of textile manufactures, the locality of the factory depended upon the existence of
a stream having a sufficient fall to turn a water-wheel; and, although the establishment of the watermills was the commencement of the breaking up of the domestic system of manufacture, yet the mills
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necessarily situated upon streams, and frequently at considerable distances the one from the other,
formed part of a rural, rather than an urban system; and it was not until the introduction of the steampower as a substitute for the stream that factories were congregated in towns, and localities where the
coal and water required for the production of steam were found in sufficient quantities. The steamengine is the parent of manufacturing towns.” (A. Redgrave in “Reports of the Insp. of Fact., 30th
April, 1860,” p. 36.)
15
From the standpoint of division of labour in Manufacture, weaving was not simple, but, on the
contrary, complicated manual labour; and consequently the power-loom is a machine that does very
complicated work. It is altogether erroneous to suppose that modern machinery originally appropriated
those operations alone, which division of labour had simplified. Spinning and weaving were, during
the manufacturing period, split up into new species, and the implements were modified and improved;
but the labour itself was in no way divided, and it retained its handicraft character. It is not the labour,
but the instrument of labour, that serves as the starting-point of the machine.
16
Before the epoch of Mechanical Industry, the wool manufacture was the predominating
manufacture in England. Hence it was in this industry that, in the first half of the 18th century, the
most experiments were made. Cotton, which required less careful preparation for its treatment by
machinery, derived the benefit of the experience gained on wool, just as afterwards the manipulation
of wool by machinery was developed on the lines of cotton-spinning and weaving by machinery. It
was only during the 10 years immediately preceding 1866, that isolated details of the wool
manufacture, such as woolcombing, were incorporated in the factory system. “The application of
power to the process of combing wool ... extensively in operation since the introduction of the
combingmachine, especially Lister’s ... undoubtedly had the effect of throwing a very large number of
men out of work. Wool was formerly combed by hand, most frequently in the cottage of the comber. It
is now very generally combed in the factory, and hand-labour is superseded, except in some particular
kinds of work, in which hand-combed wool is still preferred. Many of the hand-combers found
employment in the factories, but the produce of the hand-combers bears so small a proportion to that
of the machine, that the employment of a very large number of combers has passed away.” (“Rep. of
lnsp. of Fact. for 31st Oct., 1856,” p. 16.)
17
“The principle of the factory system, then, is to substitute ... the partition of a process into its
essential constituents, for the division or graduation of labour among artisans.” (Andrew Ure: “The
Philosophy of Manufactures,” Lond., 1835, p. 20.)
18
The power-loom was at first made chiefly of wood; in its improved modern form it is made of iron.
To what an extent the old forms of the instruments of production influenced their new forms at first
starting, is shown by, amongst other things, the most superficial comparison of the present powerloom with the old one, of the modern blowing apparatus of a blast-furnace with the first inefficient
mechanical reproduction of the ordinary bellows, and perhaps more strikingly than in any other way,
by the attempts before the invention of the present locomotive, to construct a locomotive that actually
had two feet, which after the fashion of a horse, it raised alternately from the ground. It is only after
considerable development of the science of mechanics, and accumulated practical experience, that the
form of a machine becomes settled entirely in accordance with mechanical principles, and
emancipated from the traditional form of the tool that gave rise to it.
19
Eli Whitney’s cotton gin had until very recent times undergone less essential changes than any other
machine of the 18th century. It is only during the last decade (i.e., since 1856) that another American,
Mr. Emery, of Albany, New York, has rendered Whitney’s gin antiquated by an improvement as
simple as it is effective.
20
“The Industry of Nations,” Lond., 1855, Part II., p. 239. This work also remarks: ‘Simple and
outwardly unimportant as this appendage to lathes may appear, it is not, we believe, averring too much
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to state, that its influence in improving and extending the use of machinery has been as great as that
produced by Watt’s improvements of the steam-engine itself. Its introduction went at once to perfect
all machinery, to cheapen it, and to stimulate invention and improvement.”
21
One of these machines, used for forging paddle-wheel shafts in London, is called “Thor.” It forges a
shaft of 16½ tons with as much ease as a blacksmith forges a horseshoe.
22
Wood-working machines that are also capable of being employed on a small scale are mostly
American inventions.
23
Science, generally speaking, costs the capitalist nothing, a fact that by no means hinders him from
exploiting it. The science of others is as much annexed by capital as the labour of others. Capitalistic
appropriation and personal appropriation, whether of science or of material wealth, are, however,
totally different things. Dr. Ure himself deplores the gross ignorance of mechanical science existing
among his dear machinery-exploiting manufacturers, and Liebig can a tale unfold about the
astounding ignorance of chemistry displayed by English chemical manufacturers.
24
Ricardo lays such stress on this effect of machinery (of which, in other connexions, he takes no
more notice than he does of the general distinction between the labour process and the process of
creating surplus-value), that he occasionally loses sight of the value given up by machines to the
product, and puts machines on the same footing as natural forces. Thus “Adam Smith nowhere
undervalues the services which the natural agents and machinery perform for us, but he very justly
distinguishes the nature of the value which they add to commodities... as they perform their work
gratuitously, the assistance which they afford us, adds nothing to value in exchange.” (Ric., l.c., pp.
336, 337.) This observation of Ricardo is of course correct in so far as it is directed against J. B. Say,
who imagines that machines render the “service” of creating value which forms a part of “profits.”
25
A horse-power is equal to a force of 33,000 foot-pounds per minute, i.e., to a force that raises
33,000 pounds one foot in a minute, or one pound 33,000 feet. This is the horse power meant in the
text. In ordinary language, and also here and there in quotations in this work, a distinction is drawn
between the “nominal” and the “commercial” or “indicated” horse-power of the same engine. The old
or nominal horse-power is calculated exclusively from the length of piston-stroke, and the diameter of
the cylinder, and leaves pressure of steam and piston speed out of consideration. It expresses
practically this: This engine would be one of 50 horse-power, if it were driven with the same low
pressure of steam, and the same slow piston speed, as in the days of Boulton and Watt. But the two
latter factors have increased enormously since those days. In order to measure the mechanical force
exerted today by an engine, an indicator has been invented which shows the pressure of the steam in
the cylinder. The piston speed is easily ascertained. Thus the “indicated” or “commercial” horsepower of an engine is expressed by a mathematical formula, involving diameter of cylinder, length of
stroke, piston speed, and steam pressure, simultaneously, and showing what multiple of 33,000
pounds is really raised by the engine in a minute. Hence, one “nominal” horse-power may exert three,
four, or even five “indicated” or “real” horse-powers. This observation is made for the purpose of
explaining various citations in the subsequent pages. — F. E.
26
The reader who is imbued with capitalist notions will naturally miss here the “interest” that the
machine, in proportion to its capital value, adds to the product. It is, however, easily seen that since a
machine no more creates new value than any other part of constant capital, it cannot add any value
under the name of “interest.” It is also evident that here, where we are treating of the production of
surplus-value, we cannot assume a priori the existence of any part of that value under the name of
interest. The capitalist mode of calculating, which appears, primâ facie, absurd, and repugnant to the
laws of the creation of value, will be explained in the third book of this work.
27
This portion of value which is added by the machinery, decreases both absolutely and relatively,
when the machinery does away with horses and other animals that are employed as mere moving
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forces, and not as machines for changing the form of matter. It may here be incidentally observed, that
Descartes, in defining animals as mere machines, saw with eyes of the manufacturing period, while to
eyes of the middle ages, animals were assistants to man, as they were later to Von Haller in his
“Restauration der Staatswissenschaften.” That Descartes, like Bacon, anticipated an alteration in the
form of production, and the practical subjugation of Nature by Man, as a result of the altered methods
of thought, is plain from his “Discours de la Méthode.” He there says: “Il est possible (by the methods
he introduced in philosophy) de parvenir à des connaissances fort utiles à la vie, et qu’au lieu de cette
philosophie spéculative qu’on enseigne dans les écoles, on en peut trouver une pratique, par laquelle,
connaissant la force et les actions du feu, de l’eau, de l’air, des astres, et de tous les autres corps qui
nous environnent, aussi distinctement que nous connaissons les divers métiers de nos artisans, nous les
pourrions employer en même façon à tous les usages auxquels ils sont propres, et ainsi nous rendre
comme maîtres et possesseurs de la nature” and thus “contribuer au perfectionnement de la vie
humaine.” [It is possible to attain knowledge very useful in life and, in place of the speculative
philosophy taught in the schools, one can find a practical philosophy by which, given that we know
the powers and the effectiveness of fire, water, air, the stars, and all the other bodies that surround us,
as well and as accurately as we know the various trades of our craftsmen, we shall be able to employ
them in the same manner as the latter to all uses to which they are adapted, and thus as it were make
ourselves the masters and possessors of nature, and thus contributing to the perfection of human life.]
In the preface to Sir Dudley North’s “Discourses upon Trade” (1691) it is stated, that Descartes’
method had begun to free Political Economy from the old fables and superstitious notions of gold,
trade, &c. On the whole, however, the early English economists sided with Bacon and Hobbes as their
philosophers; while, at a later period, the philosopher [...] of Political Economy in England, France,
and Italy, was Locke.
28
According to the annual report (1863) of the Essen chamber of commerce, there was produced in
1862, at the cast-steel works of Krupp, with its 161 furnaces, thirty-two steam-engines (in the year
1800 this was about the number of all the steam-engines working in Manchester), and fourteen steamhammers (representing in all 1,236 horse-power) forty-nine forges, 203 tool-machines, and about
2,400 workmen - thirteen million pounds of cast steel. Here there are not two workmen to each horsepower.
29
Babbage estimates that in Java the spinning labour alone adds 117% to the value of the cotton. At
the same period (1832) the total value added to the cotton by machinery and labour in the finespinning industry, amounted to about 33% of the value of the cotton. (“On the Economy of
Machinery,” pp. 165, 166.)
30
Machine printing also economises colour.
31
See Paper read by Dr. Watson, Reporter on Products to the Government of India, before the Society
of Arts, 17th April, 1860.
32
“These mute agents (machines) are always the produce of much less labour than that which they
displace, even when they are of the same money-value.” (Ricardo, l.c., p. 40.)
33
Hence in a communistic society there would be a very different scope for the employment of
machinery than there can be in a bourgeois society.
34
“Employers of labour would not unnecessarily retain two sets of children under thirteen.... In fact
one class of manufacturers, the spinners of woollen yarn, now rarely employ children under thirteen
years of age, i.e., half-timers. They have introduced improved and new machinery of various kinds,
which altogether supersedes the employment of children (i.e., under 13 years); f. i., I will mention one
process as an illustration of this diminution in the number of children, wherein by the addition of an
apparatus, called a piecing machine, to existing machines, the work of six or four half-timers,
according to the peculiarity of each machine, can be performed by one young person (over 13 years)...
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the half-time system ‘stimulated’ the invention of the piecing machine.” (Reports of Insp. of Fact. for
31st Oct., 1858.)
35
“Wretch” is the recognised term in English Political Economy for the agricultural labourer.
36
“Machinery ... can frequently not be employed until labour (he means wages) rises.” (Ricardo, l.c.,
p. 479.)
37
See “Report of the Social Science Congress, at Edinburgh.” Oct., 1863.
38
Dr. Edward Smith, during the cotton crisis caused by the American Civil War, was sent by the
English Government to Lancashire, Cheshire, and other places, to report on the sanitary condition of
the cotton operatives. He reported, that from a hygienic point of view, and apart from the banishment
of the operatives from the factory atmosphere, the crisis had several advantages. The women now had
sufficient leisure to give their infants the breast, instead of poisoning them with “Godfrey’s cordial.”
They had time to learn to cook. Unfortunately the acquisition of this art occurred at a time when they
had nothing to cook. But from this we see how capital, for the purposes of its self-expansion, has
usurped the labour necessary in the home of the family. This crisis was also utilised to teach sewing to
the daughters of the workmen in sewing schools. An American revolution and a universal crisis, in
order that the working girls, who spin for the whole world, might learn to sew!
39
“The numerical increase of labourers has been great, through the growing substitution of female for
male, and above all, of childish for adult labour. Three girls of 13, at wages of from 6 shillings to 8
shillings a week, have replaced the one man of mature age, of wages varying from 18 shillings to 45
shillings.” (Th. de Quincey: “The Logic of Political Econ.,” London, 1844. Note to p. 147.) Since
certain family functions, such as nursing and suckling children, cannot be entirely suppressed, the
mothers confiscated by capital, must try substitutes of some sort. Domestic work, such as sewing and
mending, must be replaced by the purchase of ready-made articles. Hence, the diminished expenditure
of labour in the house is accompanied by an increased expenditure of money. The cost of keeping the
family increases, and balances the greater income. In addition to this, economy and judgment in the
consumption and preparation of the means of subsistence becomes impossible. Abundant material
relating to these facts, which are concealed by official Political Economy, is to be found in the Reports
of the Inspectors of Factories, of the Children’s Employment Commission, and more especially in the
Reports on Public Health.
40
In striking contrast with the great fact, that the shortening of the hours of labour of women and
children in English factories was exacted from capital by the male operatives, we find in the latest
reports of the Children’s Employment Commission traits of the operative parents in relation to the
traffic in children, that are truly revolting and thoroughly like slave-dealing. But the Pharisee of a
capitalist, as may be seen from the same reports, denounces this brutality which he himself creates,
perpetuates, and exploits, and which he moreover baptises “freedom of labour.” “Infant labour has
been called into aid ... even to work for their own daily bread. Without strength to endure such
disproportionate toil, without instruction to guide their future life, they have been thrown into a
situation physically and morally polluted. The Jewish historian has remarked upon the overthrow of
Jerusalem by Titus that it was no wonder it should have been destroyed, with such a signal
destruction, when an inhuman mother sacrificed her own offspring to satisfy the cravings of absolute
hunger.” (“Public Economy Concentrated.” Carlisle, 1833, p. 66.)
41
A. Redgrave in “Reports of lnsp. of Fact. for 31st October, 1858,” pp. 40, 41.
42
“Children’s Employment Commission, Fifth Report,” London, 1866, p. 81, n. 31. [Added in the 4th
German edition. — The Bethnal Green silk industry is now almost destroyed. — F. E.]
43
“Children’s Employment Commission, Third Report,” London, 1864, p. 53, n. 15.
44
l.c., Fifth Report, p. 22, n. 137.
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“Sixth Report on Public Health,” Lond., 1864, p. 34.
“It (the inquiry of 1861)... showed, moreover, that while, with the described circumstances, infants
perish under the neglect and mismanagement which their mothers’ occupations imply, the mothers
become to a grievous extent denaturalised towards their offspring - commonly not troubling
themselves much at the death, and even sometimes... taking direct measures to insure it.” (l.c.)
47
l.c., p. 454.
48
l.c., pp. 454-463. “Report by Dr. Henry Julian Hunter on the excessive mortality of infants in some
rural districts of England.”
49
l.c., p. 35 and pp. 455, 456.
50
l.c., p. 456.
51
In the agricultural as well as in the factory districts the consumption of opium among the grown-up
labourers, both male and female, is extending daily. “To push the sale of opiate... is the great aim of
some enterprising wholesale merchants. By druggists it is considered the leading article.” (l.c., p. 459.)
Infants that take opiates “shrank up into little old men,” or “wizened like little monkeys.” (l.c., p. 460.)
We here see how India and China avenged themselves on England.
52
l.c., p. 37.
53
“Rep. of Insp. of Fact. for 31st Oct., 1862,” p. 59. Mr. Baker was formerly a doctor.
54
L. Horner in “Reports of Insp. of Fact. for 30th June, 1857,” p. 17.
55
L. Horner in “Rep. of lnsp. of Fact. for 31st Oct., 1855,” pp. 18, 19.
56
Sir John Kincaid in “Rep. of Insp. of Fact. for 31st Oct., 1858,” pp. 31, 32.
57
L. Horner in “Reports, &c., for 31st Oct., 1857,” pp. 17, 18.
58
Sir J. Kincaid in “Reports, &c., 31st Oct., 1856,” p. 66
59
A. Redgrave in “Rep. of Insp. of Fact., 31st. Oct., 1857,” pp. 41-42. In those industries where the
Factory Act proper (not the Print Works Act referred to in the text) has been in force for some time,
the obstacles in the way of the education clauses have, in recent years, been overcome. In industries
not under the Act, the views of Mr. J. Geddes, a glass manufacturer, still extensively prevail. He
informed Mr. White, one of the Inquiry Commissioners: “As far as I can see, the greater amount of
education which a part of the working-class has enjoyed for some years past is an evil. It is dangerous,
because it makes them independent.” (“Children’s Empl. Comm., Fourth Report,” Lond., 1865, p.
253.)
60
“Mr. E., a manufacturer ... informed me that he employed females exclusively at his power-looms ...
gives a decided preference to married females, especially those who have families at home dependent
on them for support; they are attentive, docile, more so than unmarried females, and are compelled to
use their utmost exertions to procure the necessaries of life. Thus are the virtues, the peculiar virtues
of the female character to be perverted to her injury – thus all that is most dutiful and tender in her
nature is made a means of her bondage and suffering.” (Ten Hours’ Factory Bill. The Speech of Lord
Ashley, March 15th, Lond., 1844, p. 20.)
61
“Since the general introduction of machinery, human nature has been forced far beyond its average
strength.” (Rob. Owen: “Observations on the Effects of the Manufacturing System,” 2nd Ed., London,
1817.)
62
The English, who have a tendency to look upon the earliest form of appearance of a thing as the
cause of its existence, are in the habit of attributing the long hours of work in factories to the extensive
kidnapping of children, practised by capitalists in the infancy of the factory system, on workhouses
and orphanages, by means of which robbery, unresisting material for exploitation was procured. Thus,
for instance, Ficiden, himself a manufacturer, says: “It is evident that the long hours of work were
46
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brought about by the circumstance of so great a number of destitute children being supplied from
different parts of the country, that the masters were independent of the hands, and that having once
established the custom by means of the miserable materials they had procured in this way, they could
impose it on their neighbours with the greater facility.” (J. Ficiden: “The Curse of the Factory
System,” Lond., 1836, p. I 1.) With reference to the labour of women, Saunders, the factory inspector,
says in his report of 1844: “Amongst the female operatives there are some women who, for many
weeks in succession, except for a few days, are employed from 6 a. m. till midnight, with less than 2
hours for meals, so that on 5 days of the week they have only 6 hours left out of the 24, for going to
and from their homes and resting in bed.”
63
“Occasion... injury to the delicate moving parts of metallic mechanism by inaction.” (Ure, l.c., p.
281.)
64
The Manchester Spinner (Times, 26th Nov., 1862) before referred to says in relation to this subject:
“It (namely, the “allowance for deterioration of machinery") is also intended to cover the loss which is
constantly arising from the superseding of machines before they are worn out, by others of a new and
better construction.”
65
“It has been estimated, roughly, that the first individual of a newly-invented machine will cost about
five times as much as the construction of the second.” (Babbage, l.c., p. 349.)
66
“The improvements which took place not long ago in frames for making patent net were so great
that a machine in good repair which had cost £1,200, sold a few years after for £60 ... improvements
succeeded each other so rapidly, that machines which had never been finished were abandoned in the
hands of their makers, because new improvements had superseded their utility.” (Babbage, l.c., p.
233.) In these stormy, go-ahead times, therefore, the tulle manufacturers soon extended the working
day, by means of double sets of hands, from the original 8 hours to 24.
67
“It is self-evident, that, amid the ebbings and flowings of the markets and the alternate expansions
and contractions of demand, occasions will constantly recur, in which the manufacturer may employ
additional floating capital without employing additional fixed capital... if additional quantities of raw
material can be worked up without incurring an additional expense for buildings and machinery.” (R.
Torrens: “On Wages and Combination.” London, 1834, p. 64.)
68
This circumstance is mentioned only for the sake of completeness, for I shall not consider the rate of
profit, i.e., the ratio of the surplus-value to the total capital advanced, until I come to the third book.
69
Senior, “Letters on the Factory Act.” London, 1837, pp. 13, 14.
70
“The great proportion of fixed to circulating capital ... makes long hours of work desirable.” With
the increased use of machinery, &c., “the motives to long hours of work will become greater, as the
only means by which a large proportion of fixed capital can be made profitable.” (l.c., pp. 11-13.)
“There are certain expenses upon a mill which go on in the same proportion whether the mill be
running short or full time, as, for instance, rent rates, and taxes, insurance against fire, wages of
several permanent servants, deterioration of machinery, with various other charges upon a
manufacturing establishment, the proportion of which to profits increases as the production
decreases.” (“Rep. of Insp. of Fact. for 31st Oct., 1862,” p. 19.)
71
Why it is, that the capitalist, and also the political economists who are imbued with his views, are
unconscious of this immanent contradiction, will appear from the first part of the third book.
72
It is one of the greatest merits of Ricardo to have seen in machinery not only the means of
producing commodities, but of creating a “redundant population.”
73
F. Biese. “Die Philosophie des Aristoteles,” Vol. 2. Berlin, 1842, p. 408.
74
I give below the translation of this poem by Stolberg, because it brings into relief, quite in the spirit
of former quotations referring to division of labour, the antithesis between the views of the ancients
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and the moderns. “Spare the hand that grinds the corn, Oh, miller girls, and softly sleep. Let
Chanticleer announce the morn in vain! Deo has commanded the work of the girls to be done by the
Nymphs, and now they skip lightly over the wheels, so that the shaken axles revolve with their spokes
and pull round the load of the revolving stones. Let us live the life of our fathers, and let us rest from
work and enjoy the gifts that the Goddess sends us.”
“Schonet der mahlenden Hand, o Müllerinnen, und schlafet
Sanft! es verkünde der Hahn euch den Morgen umsonst!
Däo hat die Arbeit der Midchen den Nymphen befohlen,
Und itzt hüpfen sic leicht über die Räder dahin,
Daß die erschütterten Achsen mit ihren Speichen sich wälzen,
Und im Kreise die Last drehen des wälzenden Steins.
Laßt uns leben das Leben der Väter, und laBt uns der Gaben
Arbeitslos uns freun, welche die Göttin uns schenkt.”
(Gedichte aus dem Griechischen übersetzt von Christian Graf zu Stolberg, Hamburg, 1782.)
75
There are, of course, always differences, in the intensities of the labour in various industries. But
these differences are, as Adam Smith has shown, compensated to a partial extent by minor
circumstances, peculiar to each sort of labour. Labour-time, as a measure of value, is not, however,
affected in this case, except in so far as the duration of labour, and the degree of its intensity, are two
antithetical and mutually exclusive expressions for one and the same quantity of labour.
76
Especially by piece-work, a form we shall investigate in Part VI. of this book.
77
See “Rep. of lnsp. of Fact. for 31st October, 1865.”
78
Rep. of Insp. of Fact. for 1844 and the quarter ending 30th April, 1845, pp. 20-21.
79
l.c., p. 19. Since the wages for piece-work were unaltered, the weekly wages depended on the
quantity produced.
80
l.c., p. 20.
81
The moral element played an important part in the above experiments. The workpeople told the
factory inspector: “We work with more spirit, we have the reward ever before us of getting away
sooner at night, and one active and cheerful spirit pervades the whole mill, from the youngest piecer to
the oldest hand, and we can greatly help each other.” (l.c., p. 21.)
82
John Fielden, l.c., p. 32.
83
Lord Ashley, l.c., pp. 6-9, passim.
84
Rep. of Insp. of Fact. for Quarter ending 30th September, 1844, and from 1st October, 1844, to 30th
April, 1845, p. 20.
85
l.c., p. 22.
86
“Rep. of lnsp. of Fact. for 31st October, 1862,” p. 62.
87
This was altered in the “Parliamentary Return” of 1862. In it the actual horse-power of the modern
steam engines and water wheels appears in place of the nominal. The doubling spindles, too, are no
longer included in the spinning spindles (as was the case in the “Returns” of 1839, 1850, and 1856);
further, in the case of woollen mills, the number of “gigs” is added, a distinction made between jute
and hemp mills on the one hand and flax mills on the other, and finally stocking-weaving is for the
first time inserted in the report.
88
“Rep. of Insp. of Fact. for 31st October, 1856,” pp. 13-14, 20 and 1852, p. 23.
89
l.c., pp. 14-15.
90
l.c., p. 20.
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91

“Reports, &c., for 31st October, 1858,” pp. 9-10. Compare “Reports, &c., for 30th April, 1860,” p.
30, sqq.
92
“Reports of lnsp. of Fact. for 31st Oct., 1862,” pp. 100 and 130.
93
On 2 modern power-looms a weaver now makes in a week of 60 hours 26 pieces of certain quality,
length, and breadth; while on the old power-looms he could make no more than 4 such pieces. The
cost of weaving a piece of such cloth had already soon after 1850 fallen from 2s. 9d. to 5 1/8d.
“Thirty years ago (1841) one spinner with three placers was not required to attend to more than one
pair of mules with 300-324 spindles. At the present time (1871) he has to mind with the help of 5
piecers 2,200 spindles, and produces not less than seven times as much yarn as in 1841.” (Alex.
Redgrave, Factory Inspector – in the Journal of Arts, 5th January, 1872.)
94
“Rep. of Insp. of Fact. for 31st Oct., 1861,” pp. 25, 26.
95
The agitation for a working day of 8 hours has now (1867) begun in Lancashire among the factory
operatives.
96
The following few figures indicate the increase in the “factories” of the United Kingdom since
1848:

Quantity
Exported.
1848.

Quantity
Exported.
1851.

Quantity
Exported.
1860.

Quantity
Exported.
1865.

COTTON
Cotton yarn

lbs.
135,831,162

lbs.
143,966,106

lbs.
197,343,655

lbs.
103,751,455

—

lbs.
4,392,176

lbs.
6,297,554

lbs.
4,648,611

yds.
1,091,373,930

yds.
1,543,161,789

yds.
2,776,218,427

yds.
2,015,237,851

Yarn

lbs.
11,722,182

lbs.
18,841,326

lbs.
31,210,612

lbs.
36,777,334

Cloth

yds.
88,901,519

yds.
129,106,753

yds.
143,996,773

yds.
247,012.529

Yarn

lbs.
466,825

lbs.
462,513

lbs.
897,402

lbs.
812,589

Cloth

—

yds.
1,181,455

yds.
1,307,293

yds.
2,869,837

Woollen and
Worsted
yarns

—

lbs.
14,670,880

lbs.
27,533,968

lbs.
31,669,267

Cloth

—

yds.
151,231,153

yds.
190,371,507

yds.
278,837,418

Sewing thread
Cotton cloth
FLAX & HEMP

SILK

WOOL
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Value
Exported.
1848.
£

Value
Exported.
1851.
£

Value
Exported.
1860.
£

Value
Exported.
1865.
£

COTTON
Yarn

5,927,831

6,634,026

9,870,875

10,351,049

Cloth

16,753,369

23,454,810

42,141,505

46,903,796

Yarn

493,449

951,426

1,801,272

2,505,497

Cloth

2,802,789

4,107,396

4,804,803

9,155,358

Yarn

77,789

196,380

826,107

768,064

Cloth

—

1,130,398

1,587,303

1,409,221

Yarn

776,975

1,484,544

3,843,450

5,424,047

Cloth

5,733,828

8,377,183

12,156,998

20,102,259

FLAX & HEMP

SILK

WOOL

See the Blue books “Statistical Abstract of the United
Kingdom,” Nos. 8 and 13. Lond., 1861 and 1866. In
Lancashire the number of mills increased only 4 per cent.
between 1839 and 1850; 19 per cent. between 1850 and 1856;
and 33 per cent. between 1856 and 1862; while the persons
employed in them during each of the above periods of 11 years
increased absolutely, but diminished relatively. (See “Rep. of
Insp. of Fact., for 31st Oct., 1862,” p. 63.) The cotton trade
preponderates in Lancashire. We may form an idea of the
stupendous nature of the cotton trade in that district when we
consider that, of the gross number of textile factories in the
United Kingdom, it absorbs 45.2 per cent., of the spindles 83.3
per cent., of the power-looms 81.4 per cent., of the mechanical
horse-power 72.6 per cent., and of the total number of persons
employed 58.2 per cent. (l.c., pp. 62-63.)
97

Ure, l.c., p. 18.
Ure, l.c., P. 3 1. See Karl Marx, l.c., pp. 140-141.
99
It looks very like intentional misleading by statistics (which misleading it would be possible to
prove in detail in other cases too), when the English factory legislation excludes from its operation the
98
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class of labourers last mentioned in the text, while the parliamentary returns expressly include in the
category of factory operatives, not only engineers, mechanics, &c., but also managers, salesmen,
messengers, warehousemen, packers, &c., in short everybody, except the owner of the factory himself.
100
Ure grants this. He says, “in case of need,” the workmen can be moved at the will of the manager
from one machine to another, and he triumphantly exclaims: “Such a change is in flat contradiction
with the old routine, that divides the labour, and to one workman assigns the task of fashioning the
head of a needle, to another the sharpening of the point.” He had much better have asked himself, why
this “old routine” is departed from in the automatic factory, only “in case of need. “
101
When distress is very great, as, for instance, during the American Civil War, the factory operative
is now and then set by the Bourgeois to do the roughest of work, such as road-making, &c.. The
English “ateliers nationaux” [national workshops] of 1862 and the following years, established for the
benefit of the destitute cotton operatives, differ from the French of 1848 in this, that in the latter the
workmen had to do unproductive work at the expense of the state, in the former they had to do
productive municipal work to the advantage of the bourgeois, and that, too, cheaper than the regular
workmen, with whom they were thus thrown into competition. “The physical appearance of the cotton
operatives is unquestionably improved. This I attribute ... as to the men, to outdoor labour on public
works.” (“Rep. of Insp. of Fact., 31st Oct., 1863,” p. 59.) The writer here alludes to the Preston factory
operatives, who were employed on Preston Moor.
102
An example: The various mechanical apparatus introduced since the Act of 1844 into woollen
mills, for replacing the labour of children. So soon as it shall happen that the children of the
manufacturers themselves have to go through a course of schooling as helpers in the mill, this almost
unexplored territory of mechanics will soon make remarkable progress. “Of machinery, perhaps selfacting mules are as dangerous as any other kind. Most of the accidents from them happen to little
children, from their creeping under the mules to sweep the floor whilst the mules are in motion.
Several ‘minders’ have been fined for this offence, but without much general benefit. If machine
makers would only invent a self-sweeper, by whose use the necessity for these little children to creep
under the machinery might be prevented, it would be a happy addition to our protective measures.”
(“Reports of Insp. of Fact. for 31st. Oct., 1866,” p. 63.)
103
So much then for Proudhon’s wonderful idea: he “construes” machinery not as a synthesis of
instruments of labour, but as a synthesis of detail operations for the benefit of the labourer himself.
104
F. Engels, l.c., p. 217. Even an ordinary and optimist Free-trader, like Mr. Molinari, goes so far as
to say, “Un homme s’use plus vite en surveillant, quinze heures par jour, l’évolution uniforme d’un
mécanisme, qu’en exercant, dans le même espace de temps, sa force physique. Ce travail de
surveillance qui servirait peut-être d’utile gymnastique à l’intelligence, s’il n’était pas trop prolongé,
détruit à la longue, par son excès, et l’intelligence, et le corps même.” [A man becomes exhausted
more quickly when he watches over the uniform motion of mechanism for fifteen hours a day, than
when he applies his physical strength over the same period of time. This labour of surveillance, which
might perhaps serve as a useful exercise for the mind, if it did not go on too long, destroys both the
mind and the body in the long run, through excessive application] (G. de Molinari: “Études
Économiques.” Paris, 1846.)
105
F. Engels, l.c., p. 216.
106
“The Master Spinners’ and Manufacturers’ Defence Fund. Report of the Committee.” Manchester,
1854, p. 17. We shall see hereafter, that the “master” can sing quite another song, when he is
threatened with the loss of his “living” automaton.
107
Ure, l.c., p. 15. Whoever knows the life history of Arkwright, will never dub this barber-genius
“noble.” Of all the great inventors of the 18th century, he was incontestably the greatest thiever of
other people’s inventions and the meanest fellow.
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“The slavery in which the bourgeoisie has bound the proletariat, comes nowhere more plainly into
daylight than in the factory system. In it all freedom comes to an end both at law and in fact. The
workman must be in the factory at half past five. If he come a few minutes late, he is punished; if he
come 10 minutes late, he is not allowed to enter until after breakfast, and thus loses a quarter of a
day’s wage. He must eat, drink and sleep at word of command.... The despotic bell calls him from his
bed, calls him from breakfast and dinner. And how does he fare in the mill? There the master is the
absolute law-giver. He makes what regulations he pleases; he alters and makes additions to his code at
pleasure; and if he insert the veriest nonsense, the courts say to the workman: Since you have entered
into this contract voluntarily, you must now carry it out .... These workmen are condemned to live,
from their ninth year till their death, under this mental and bodily torture.” (F. Engels, l.c., p. 217, sq.)
What, “the courts say,” I will illustrate by two examples. One occurs at Sheffield at the end of 1866.
In that town a workman had engaged himself for 2 years in a steelworks. In consequence of a quarrel
with his employer he left the works, and declared that under no circumstances would he work for that
master any more. He was prosecuted for breach of contract, and condemned to two months’
imprisonment. (If the master break the contract, he can be proceeded against only in a civil action, and
risks nothing but money damages.) After the workman has served his two months, the master invites
him to return to the works, pursuant to the contract. Workman says: No, he has already been punished
for the breach. The master prosecutes again, the court condemns again, although one of the judges,
Mr. Shee, publicly denounces this as a legal monstrosity, by which a man can periodically, as long as
he lives, be punished over and over again for the same offence or crime. This judgment was given not
by the “Great Unpaid,” the provincial Dogberries, but by one of the highest courts of justice in
London. — [Added in the 4th German edition. — This has now been done away with. With few
exceptions, e.g., when public gas-works are involved, the worker in England is now put on an equal
footing with the employer in case of breach of contract and can be sued only civilly. — F. E.] The
second case occurs in Wiltshire at the end of November 1863. About 30 power-loom weavers, in the
employment of one Harrup, a cloth manufacturer at Leower’s Mill, Westbury Leigh, struck work
because master Harrup indulged in the agreeable habit of making deductions from their wages for
being late in the morning; 6d. for 2 minutes; 1s. for 3 minutes, and 1s. 6d. for ten minutes. This is at
the rate of 9s. per hour, and £4 10s. 0d. per diem; while the wages of the weavers on the average of a
year, never exceeded 10s. to 12s. weekly. Harrup also appointed a boy to announce the starting time
by a whistle, which he often did before six o’clock in the morning: and if the hands were not all there
at the moment the whistle ceased, the doors were closed, and those hands who were outside were
fined: and as there was no clock on the premises, the unfortunate hands were at the mercy of the
young Harrup-inspired time-keeper. The hands on strike, mothers of families as well as girls, offered
to resume work if the timekeeper were replaced by a clock, and a more reasonable scale of fines were
introduced. Harrup summoned I9 women and girls before the magistrates for breach of contract. To
the utter indignation of all present, they were each mulcted in a fine of 6d. and 2s. 6d. for costs.
Harrup was followed from the court by a crowd of people who hissed him. A favourite operation with
manufacturers is to punish the workpeople by deductions made from their wages on account of faults
in the material worked on. This method gave rise in 1866 to a general strike in the English pottery
districts. The reports of the Ch. Empl. Com. (1863-1866), give cases where the worker not only
receives no wages, but becomes, by means of his labour, and of the penal regulations, the debtor to
boot, of his worthy master. The late cotton crisis also furnished edifying examples of the sagacity
shown by the factory autocrats in making deductions from wages. Mr. R. Baker, the Inspector of
Factories, says, “I have myself had lately to direct prosecutions against one cotton mill occupier for
having in these pinching and painful times deducted 10d. a piece from some of the young workers
employed by him, for the surgeon’s certificate (for which he himself had only paid 6d.), when only
allowed by the law to deduct 3d., and by custom nothing at all .... And I have been informed of
another, who, in order to keep without the law, but to attain the same object, charges the poor children
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who work for him a shilling each, as a fee for learning them the art and mystery of cotton spinning, so
soon as they are declared by the surgeon fit and proper persons for that occupation. There may
therefore be undercurrent causes for such extraordinary exhibitions as strikes, not only wherever they
arise, but particularly at such times as the present, which without explanation, render them
inexplicable to the public understanding.” He alludes here to a strike of power-loom weavers at
Darwen, June, 1863. (“Reports of Insp. of Fact. for 30 April, 1863,” pp. 50-51.) The reports always go
beyond their official dates.
109
The protection afforded by the Factory Acts against dangerous machinery has had a beneficial
effect. “But ... there are other sources of accident which did not exist twenty years since; one
especially, viz., the increased speed of the machinery. Wheels, rollers, spindles and shuttles are now
propelled at increased and increasing rates; fingers must be quicker and defter in their movements to
take up the broken thread, for, if placed with hesitation or carelessness, they are sacrificed.... A large
number of accidents are caused by the eagerness of the workpeople to get through their work
expeditiously. It must be remembered that it is of the highest importance to manufacturers that their
machinery should be in motion, i.e., producing yarns and goods. Every minute’s stoppage is not only a
loss of power, but of production, and the workpeople are urged by the overlookers, who are interested
in the quantity of work turned off, to keep the machinery in motion, and it is no less important to those
of the operatives who are paid by the weight or piece, that the machines should be kept in motion.
Consequently, although it is strictly forbidden in many, nay in most factories, that machinery should
be cleaned while in motion, it is nevertheless the constant practice in most, if not in all, that the
workpeople do, unreproved, pick out waste, wipe rollers and wheels, &c., while their frames are in
motion. Thus from this cause only, 906 accidents have occurred during the six months.... Although a
great deal of cleaning is constantly going on day by day, yet Saturday is generally the day set apart for
the thorough cleaning of the machinery, and a great deal of this is done while the machinery is in
motion.” Since cleaning is not paid for, the workpeople seek to get done with it as speedily as
possible. Hence “the number of accidents which occur on Fridays, and especially on Saturdays, is
much larger than on any other day. On the former day the excess is nearly 12 per cent. over the
average number of the four first days of the week, and on the latter day the excess is 25 per cent. over
the average of the preceding five days; or, if the number of working-hours on Saturday being taken
into account — 7½ hours on Saturday as compared with 10½ on other days — there is an excess of 65
per cent. on Saturdays over the average of the other five days.” (“Rep. of Insp. of Fact., 31st Oct.,
1866,” pp. 9, 15, 16, 17.)
110
In Part I. of Book III. I shall give an account of a recent campaign by the English manufacturers
against the Clauses in the Factory Acts that protect the “hands” against dangerous machinery. For the
present, let this one quotation from the official report of Leonard Horner suffice: “I have heard some
mill-owners speak with inexcusable levity of some of the accidents; such, for instance, as the loss of a
finger being a trifling matter. A working-man’s living and prospects depend so much upon his fingers,
that any loss of them is a very serious matter to him. When I have heard such inconsiderate remarks
made, I have usually put this question: Suppose you were in want of an additional workman, and two
were to apply, both equally well qualified in other respects, but one had lost a thumb or a forefinger,
which would you engage? There never was a hesitation as to the answer....” The manufacturers have
“mistaken prejudices against what they have heard represented as a pseudo-philanthropic legislation.”
(“Rep. of Insp. of Fact., 31st Oct., 1855.") These manufacturers are clever folk, and not without reason
were they enthusiastic for the slave-holders’ rebellion.
111
In those factories that have been longest subject to the Factory Acts, with their compulsory
limitation of the hours of labour, and other regulations, many of the older abuses have vanished. The
very improvement of the machinery demands to a certain extent “improved construction of the
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buildings,” and this is an advantage to the workpeople. (See “Rep. of Insp. of Fact. for 31st Oct.,
1863,” p. 109.)
112
See amongst others, John Houghton: “Husbandry and Trade Improved.” London, 1727. “The
Advantages of the East India Trade, 1720.” John Bellers, l.c. “The masters and their workmen are,
unhappily, in a perpetual war with each other. The invariable object of the former is to get their work
done as cheaply as possible; and they do not fail to employ every artifice to this purpose, whilst the
latter are equally attentive to every occasion of distressing their masters into a compliance with higher
demands.” (“An Enquiry into the Causes of the Present High Price of Provisions,” pp. 61-62. Author,
the Rev. Nathaniel Forster, quite on the side of the workmen.)
113
In old-fashioned manufactures the revolts of the workpeople against machinery, even to this day,
occasionally assume a savage character, as in the case of the Sheffield file cutters in 1865.
114
Sir James Steuart also understands machinery quite in this sense. “Je considère donc les machines
comme des moyens d’augmenter (virtuellement) le nombre des gens industrieux qu’on n’est pas
obligé de nourrir.... En quoi l’effet d’une machine diffère-t-il de celui de nouveaux habitants?”
(French trans. t. I., l. I., ch. XIX.) More naïve is Petty, who says, it replaces “Polygamy.” The above
point of view is, at the most, admissible only for some parts of the United States. On the other hand,
“machinery can seldom be used with success to abridge the labour of an individual; more time would
be lost in its construction than could be saved by its application. It is only really useful when it acts on
great masses, when a single machine can assist the work of thousands. It is accordingly in the most
populous countries, where there are most idle men, that it is most abundant.... It is not called into use
by a scarcity of men, but by the facility with which they can be brought to work in masses.” (Piercy
Ravenstone: “Thoughts on the Funding System and its Effects.” London, 1824, p. 45.)
115
[Note in the 4th German edition. — This applies to Germany too. Where in our country agriculture
on a large scale exists, hence particularly in the East, it has become possible only in consequence of
the clearing of the estates (“Bauernlegen”), a practice which became widerspread in the 16th century
and was particularly so since 1648. — F. E.]
116
“Machinery and labour are in constant competition.” Ricardo, l.c., p. 479.
117
The competition between hand-weaving and power-weaving in England, before the passing of the
Poor Law of 1833, was prolonged by supplementing the wages, which had fallen considerably below
the minimum, with parish relief. “The Rev. Mr. Turner was, in 1827, rector of Wilmslow in Cheshire,
a manufacturing district. The questions of the Committee of Emigration, and Mr. Turner’s answers,
show how the competition of human labour is maintained against machinery. ‘Question: Has not the
use of the power-loom superseded the use of the hand-loom? Answer: Undoubtedly; it would have
superseded them much more than it has done, if the hand-loom weavers were not enabled to submit to
a reduction of wages.’ ‘Question: But in submitting he has accepted wages which are insufficient to
support him, and looks to parochial contribution as the remainder of his support? Answer: Yes, and in
fact the competition between the hand-loom and the power-loom is maintained out of the poor-rates.’
Thus degrading pauperism or expatriation, is the benefit which the industrious receive from the
introduction of machinery, to be reduced from the respectable and in some degree independent
mechanic, to the cringing wretch who lives on the debasing bread of charity. This they call a
temporary inconvenience.” (“A Prize Essay on the Comparative Merits of Competition and Cooperation.” Lond., 1834, p. 29.)
118
“The same cause which may increase the revenue of the country” (i.e., as Ricardo explains in the
same passage, the revenues of landlords and capitalists, whose wealth, from the economic point of
view, forms the Wealth of the Nation), “may at the same time render the population redundant and
deteriorate the condition of the labourer.” (Ricardo, l.c., p. 469.) “The constant aim and the tendency
of every improvement in machinery is, in fact, to do away entirely with the labour of man, or to lessen
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its price by substituting the labour of women and children for that of grown-up men, or of unskilled
for that of skilled workmen.” (Ure, l.c., t. I., p. 35.)
119
“Rep. Insp. Fact. for 31st October, 1858,” p. 43.
120
“Rep. lnsp. Fact. for 31st October, 1856,” p. 15.
121
Ure, l.c., p. 19. “The great advantage of the machinery employed in brick-making consists in this,
that the employer is made entirely independent of skilled labourers.” (“Ch. Empl. Comm. V. Report,”
Lond., 1866, p. 130, n. 46.) Mr. A. Sturrock, superintendent of the machine department of the Great
Northern Railway, says, with regard to the building of locomotives, &c.: “Expensive English
workmen are being less used every day. The production of the workshops of England is being
increased by the use of improved tools and these tools are again served by a low class of labour....
Formerly their skilled labour necessarily produced all the parts of engines. Now the parts of engines
are produced by labour with less skill, but with good tools. By tools, I mean engineer’s machinery,
lathes, planing machines, drills, and so on.” (“Royal Com. on Railways,” Lond., 1867, Minutes of
Evidence, n. 17, 862 and 17, 863.)
122
Ure, l.c., p. 20.
123
Ure, l.c., p. 321.
124
Ure, l.c., p. 23.
125
“Rep. Insp. Fact., 31st Oct., 1863,” pp. 108,109.
126
l.c., p. 109. The rapid improvement of machinery, during the crisis, allowed the English
manufacturers, immediately after the termination of the American Civil War, and almost in no time, to
glut the markets of the world again. Cloth, during the last six months of 1866, was almost unsaleable.
Thereupon began the consignment of goods to India and China, thus naturally making the glut more
intense. At the beginning of 1867 the manufacturers resorted to their usual way out of the difficulty,
viz., reducing wages 5 per cent. The workpeople resisted, and said that the only remedy was to work
short time, 4 days a-week; and their theory was the correct one. After holding out for some time, the
self-elected captains of industry had to make up their minds to short time, with reduced wages in some
places, and in others without.
127
“The relation of master and man in the blown-flint bottle trades amounts to a chronic strike.”
Hence the impetus given to the manufacture of pressed glass, in which the chief operations are done
by machinery. One firm in Newcastle, who formerly produced 350,000 lbs. of blown-flint glass, now
produces in its place 3,000,500 lbs. of pressed glass. (“Ch. Empl. Comm., Fourth Rep.,” 1865, pp.
262-263.)
128
Gaskell. “The Manufacturing Population of England,” London, 1833, pp. 3, 4.
129
W. Fairbairn discovered several very important applications of machinery to the construction of
machines, in consequence of strikes in his own workshops.
130
Ure, l.c., pp. 368-370
131
Ure, l.c., pp. 368, 7, 370, 280, 281, 321, 370, 475.
132
Ricardo originally was also of this opinion, but afterwards expressly disclaimed it with the
scientific impartiality and love of truth characteristic of him. See l.c., ch. xxxi. “On Machinery.”
133
Nota bene. My illustration is entirely on the lines of those given by the above named economists.
134
A disciple of Ricardo, in answer to the insipidities of J. B. Say, remarks on this point: “Where
division of labour is well developed, the skill of the labourer is available only in that particular branch
in which it has been acquired; he himself is a sort of machine. It does not therefore help matters one
jot, to repeat in parrot fashion, that things have a tendency to find their level. On looking around us we
cannot but see, that they are unable to find their level for a long time; and that when they do find it,
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the level is always lower than at the commencement of the process.” (“An Inquiry into those
Principles Respecting the Nature of Demand,” &c., Lond. 1821, p. 72.)
135
MacCulloch, amongst others, is a past master in this pretentious cretinism. “If,” he says, with the
affected naïveté of a child of 8 years, “if it be advantageous, to develop the skill of the workman more
and more, so that he is capable of producing, with the same or with a less quantity of labour, a
constantly increasing quantity of commodities, it must also be advantageous, that he should avail
himself of the help of such machinery as will assist him most effectively in the attainment of this
result.” (MacCulloch: “Princ. of Pol. Econ.,” Lond. 1830, p. 166.)
136
“The inventor of the spinning machine has ruined India, a fact, however, that touches us but little.”
A. Thiers: De la propriété. — M. Thiers here confounds the spinning machine with the power-loom,
“a fact, however, that touches us but little.”
137
According to the census of 1861 (Vol. II., Lond., 1863), the number of people employed in coal
mines in England and Wales, amounted to 246,613 of which 73,545 were under, and 173,067 were
over 20 years. Of those under 20, 835 were between 5 and 10 years, 30,701 between 10 and 15 years,
42,010 between 15 and 19 years. The number employed in iron, copper, lead, tin, and other mines of
every description, was 319, 222.
138
In England and Wales, in 1861, there were employed in making machinery, 60,807 persons,
including the masters and their clerks, &c., also all agents and business people connected with this
industry, but excluding the makers of small machines, such as sewing-machines, &c., as also the
makers of the operative parts of machines, such as spindles. The total number of civil engineers
amounted to 3,329.
139
Since iron is one of the most important raw materials; let me here state that, in 1861, there were in
England and Wales 125,771 operative iron founders, of whom 123,430 were males, 2,341 females. Of
the former 30,810 were under, and 92,620 over 20 years.
140
“A family of four grown-up persons, with two children as winders, earned at the end of the last,
and the beginning of the present century, by ten hours’ daily labour, £4 a week. If the work was very
pressing, they could earn more.... Before that, they had always suffered from a deficient supply of
yarn.” (Gaskell, l.c., pp. 25-27.)
141
F. Engels, in “Lage, &c.,” points out the miserable condition of a large number of those who work
on these very articles of luxury. See also numerous instances in the “Reports of the Children’s
Employment Commission.”
142
In 1861, in England and Wales, there were 94,665 sailors in the merchant service.
143
Of these only 177,596 are males above 13 years of age.
144
Of these, 30,501 are females.
145
Of these, 137,447 males. None are included in the 1,208,648 who do not serve in private houses.
Between 1861 and 1870 the number of male servants nearly doubled itself. It increased to 267,671. In
the year 1847 there were 2,694 gamekeepers (for the landlords’ preserves), in 1869 there were 4,921.
The young servant girls in the houses of the London lower middle class are in common parlance called
“slaveys.”
146
Ganilh, on the contrary, considers the final result of the factory system to be an absolutely less
number of operatives, at whose expense an increased number of “gens honnêtes” live and develop
their well-known “perfectibilité perfectible.” Little as he understands the movement of production, at
least he feels, that machinery must needs be a very fatal institution, if its introduction converts busy
workmen into paupers, and its development calls more slaves of labour into existence than it has
suppressed. It is not possible to bring out the cretinism of his standpoint, except by his own words:
“Les classes condamnées à produire et à consommer diminuent, et les classes qui dirigent le travail,
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qui soulagent, consolent, et éclairent toute la population, se multiplient ... et s’approprient tous les
bienfaits qui résultent de la diminution des frais du travail, de l’abondance des productions, et du bon
marché des consommations. Dans cette direction, l’espéce humaine s’élève aux plus hautes
conceptions du génie, pénètre dans les profoundeurs mystérieuses de la religion, établit les principes
salutaires de la morale (which consists in ‘s’approprier tous les beinfaits,’ &c.), les lois tutélaires de la
liberté (liberty of ‘les classes condamnées à produire?’) et du pouvoir, de l’obéissance et de la justice,
du devoir et de la l’humanité.” [The classes condemned to produce and to consume diminish, and the
classes which direct labour, which relieve, console and enlighten the whole population, multiply ...
and appropriate all the benefits which result from the diminution of the costs of labour, from the
abundance of products and the cheapness of consumer goods. In this way, the human species rises to
the highest creations of genius, penetrates the mysterious depths of religion, and establishes the
salutory principles of morality, the laws for the protection of liberty, and power, of obedience and
justice, of obligation and humanity] For this twaddle, see “Des Systèmes d’Economie Politique, &c.,
Par M. Ch. Ganilh,” 2ème ed., Paris, 1821, t. I, p. 224, and see p. 212.
147
“Reports of Insp. of Fact., 31 Oct., 1865,” p. 58, sq. At the same time, however, means of
employment for an increased number of hands was ready in 110 new mills with 11,625 looms,
628,576 spindles and 2,695 total horse-power of steam and water (l.c.).
148
“Reports, &c., for 31 Oct., 1862,” p. 79. At the end of 1871, Mr. A. Redgrave, the factory
inspector, in a lecture given at Bradford, in the New Mechanics’ Institution, said: “What has struck me
for some time past is the altered appearance of the woollen factories. Formerly they were filled with
women and children, now machinery seems to do all the work. At my asking for an explanation of this
from a manufacturer, he gave me the following: ‘Under the old system I employed 63 persons; after
the introduction of improved machinery I reduced my hands to 33, and lately, in consequence of new
and extensive alterations, I have been in a position to reduce those 33 to 13’.”
149
See “Reports, &c., 31 Oct., 1856,” p. 16.
150
“The sufferings of the hand-loom weavers were the subject of an inquiry by a Royal Commission,
but although their distress was acknowledged and lamented, the amelioration of their condition was
left, and probably necessarily so, to the chances and changes of time, which it may now be hoped” [20
years later!] “have nearly obliterated those miseries, and not improbably by the present great extention
of the power-loom.” (“Rep. Insp. of Fact., 31 Oct., 1856,” p. 15.)
151
Other ways in which machinery affects the production of raw material will be mentioned in the
third book.
152

EXPORT OF COTTON FROM INDIA TO
GREAT BRITAIN.
1846. —

34,540,143 lbs.

1860. —

204,141,168 lbs.

1865. —

445,947,600 lbs.

EXPORT OF WOOL FROM INDIA TO
GREAT BRITAIN.
1846. —

4,570,581 lbs.

1860. —

20,214,173 lbs.
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1865. —

20,679,111 lbs.

153

EXPORT OF WOOL FROM THE CAPE
TO GREAT BRITAIN.
1846. —

2,958,457 lbs.

1860. —

16,574,345 lbs.

1865. —

29,920,623 lbs.

EXPORT OF WOOL FROM AUSTRALIA
TO GREAT BRITAIN.
1846. —

21,789,346 lbs.

1860. —

59,166,616 lbs.

1865. —

109,734,261 lbs.

154

The economic development of the United States is itself a product of European, more especially of
English modern industry. In their present form (1866) the States must still be considered a European
colony. [Added in the 4th German edition. — “Since then they have developed into country whose
industry holds second place in the world, without on that account entirely losing their colonial
character.” — F. E.]

EXPORT OF COTTON FROM THE
UNITED STATES TO GREAT BRITAIN
1846. —

401,949,393 lbs.

1852. —

765,630,543 lbs.

1859. —

961,707,264 lbs.

1860. —

1,115,890,608 lbs.

EXPORT OF CORN, &c., FROM THE
UNITED STATES TO GREAT BRITAIN
1862
Wheat, cwts

16,202,312 41,033,503

Barley, cwts

3,669,653

6,624,800

Oats, cwts

3,174,801

4,496,994

Rye, cwts

388,749

7,108
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Flour, cwts
Buckwheat, cwts
Maize, cwts
Bere or Bigg (a
sort of Barley),
cwts
Peas, cwts
Beans, cwts
Total exports
155

3,819,440

7,207,113

1,054

19,571

5,473,161 11,694,818
2,039

7,675

811,620

1,024,722

1,822,972

2,037,137

— 74,083,441

In an appeal made in July, 1866, to the Trade Societies of England, by the shoemakers of Leicester,
who had been thrown on the streets by a lock-out, it is stated: “Twenty years ago the Leicester shoe
trade was revolutionised by the introduction of riveting in the place of stitching. At that time good
wages could be earned. Great competition was shown between the different firms as to which could
turn out the neatest article. Shortly afterwards, however a worse kind of competition sprang up,
namely, that of underselling one another in the market. The injurious consequences soon manifested
themselves in reductions of wages, and so sweepingly quick was the fall in the price of labour, that
many firms now pay only one half of the original wages. And yet, though wages sink lower and lower,
profits appear, with each alteration in the scale of wages, to increase.” Even bad times are utilised by
the manufacturers, for making exceptional profits by excessive lowering of wages, i.e., by a direct
robbery of the labourer’s means of subsistence. One example (it has reference to the crisis in the
Coventry silk weaving): “From information I have received from manufacturers as well as workmen,
there seems to be no doubt that wages have been reduced to a greater extent than either the
competition of the foreign producers, or other circumstances have rendered necessary ... the majority
of weavers are working at a reduction of 30 to 40 per cent. in their wages. A piece of ribbon for
making which the weaver got 6s. or 7s. five years back, now only brings them 3s. 3d. or 3s. 6d.; other
work is now priced at 2s. and 2s. 3d. which was formerly priced at 4s. and 4s. 3d. The reduction in
wage seems to have been carried to a greater extent than is necessary for increasing demand. Indeed,
the reduction in the cost of weaving, in the case of many descriptions of ribbons, has not been
accompanied by any corresponding reduction in the selling price of the manufactured article.” (Mr. F.
D. Longe’s Report. “Ch. Emp. Com., V. Rep., 1866,” p. 114, 1.)
156
Conf “Reports of Insp. of Fact., 31st October, 1862,” p. 30.
157
l.c., p. 19.
158
“Rep. Insp. of Fact., 31st October, 1863,” pp. 41-45.
159
l.c., pp. 41-42
160
l.c., p. 57.
161
l.c., pp. 50-51.
162
l.c., pp. 62-63.
163
“Rep. &c., 30th April, 1864,” p. 27.
164
From a letter of Mr. Harris, Chief Constable of Bolton, in “Rep. of Insp. of Fact., 31st October,
1865,” pp. 61-62.
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In an appeal, dated 1863, of the factory operatives of Lancashire, &c., for the purpose of forming a
society for organised emigration, we find the following: “That a large emigration of factory workers is
now absolutely essential to raise them from their present prostrate condition, few will deny; but to
show that a continuous stream of emigration is at all times demanded, and, without which it is
impossible for than to maintain their position in ordinary times, we beg to call attention to the
subjoined facts: — In 1814 the official value of cotton goods exported was £17,665,378, whilst the
real marketable value was £20,070,824. In 1858 the official value of cotton goods exported, was
£182,221,681; but the real or marketable value was only £43,001,322, being a ten-fold quantity sold
for little more than double the former price. To produce results so disadvantageous to the country
generally, and to the factory workers in particular, several causes have co-operated, which, had
circumstances permitted, we should have brought more prominently under your notice; suffice it for
the present to say that the most obvious one is the constant redundancy of labour, without which a
trade so ruinous in its effects never could have been carried on, and which requires a constantly
extending market to save it from annihilation. Our cotton mills may be brought to a stand by the
periodical stagnations of trade, which, under present arrangements, are as inevitable as death itself; but
the human mind is constantly at work, and although we believe we are under the mark in stating that
six millions of persons have left these shores during the last 25 years, yet, from the natural increase of
population, and the displacement of labour to cheapen production, a large percentage of the male
adults in the most prosperous times find it impossible to obtain work in factories on any conditions
whatever.” (“Reports of Insp. of Fact., 30th April 1863,” pp. 51-52.) We shall, in a later chapter, see
how our friends, the manufacturers, endeavoured, during the catastrophe in the cotton trade, to prevent
by every means, including State interference, the emigration of the operatives.
166
“Ch. Empt. Comm. III. Report, 1864,” p. 108, n. 447.
167
In the United States the restoration, in this way, of handicrafts based on machinery is frequent; and
therefore, when the inevitable transition to the factory system shall take place, the ensuing
concentration will, compared with Europe and even with England, stride on in seven-league boots.
168
See “Rep. of Insp. of Fact., 31st Oct., 1865,” p. 64.
169
Mr. Gillott erected in Birmingham the first steel-pen factory on a large scale. It produced, so early
as 1851, over 180,000,000 of pens yearly, and consumed 120 tons of steel. Birmingham has the
monopoly of this industry in the United Kingdom, and at present produces thousands of millions of
steel-pens. According to the Census of 1861, the number of persons employed was 1,428, of whom
1,268 females from 5 years of age upwards.
170
“Ch. Empl. Comm. II. Rep. 1864,” p. LXVIII., n. 415.
171
And now forsooth children are employed at file-cutting in Sheffield.
172
“Ch. Empl. Comm., V. Rep. 1866,” p. 3, n. 24; p. 6, n. 55, 56; p. 7, n. 59, 60.
173
l.c., pp. 114, 115, n. 6, 7. The commissioner justly remarks that though as a rule machines take the
place of men, here literally young persons replace machines.
174
See the Report on the rag trade, and numerous details in “Public Health, VIII. Rep.” Lond. 1866,
app., pp. 196, 208.
175
“Ch. Empl. Comm. V. Rep., 1866,” pp. xvi-xviii, n. 86-97, and pp. 130-133, n. 39-71. See also III.
Rep., 1864, pp. 48, 56.
176
“Public Health. Sixth Rep.,” Lond. 1864, pp. 29, 31.
177
l.c., p. 30. Dr. Simon remarks that the mortality among the London tailors and printers between the
ages of 25 and 35 is in fact much greater, because the employers in London obtain from the country a
great number of young people up to 30 years of age, as “apprentices” and “improvers,” who come for
the purpose of being perfected in their trade. These figure in the census as Londoners, they swell out
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the number of heads on which the London death-rate is calculated, without adding proportionally to
the number of deaths in that place. The greater part of them in fact return to the country, and
especially in cases of severe illness. (l.c.)
178
I allude here to hammered nails, as distinguished from nails cut out and made by machinery. See
“Child. Empl. Comm., Third Rep.,” pp. xi., xix., n. 125-130, p. 52, n. 11, p. 114, n. 487, p. 137, n.
674.
179
“Ch. Empl. Comm., II. Rep.,” p. xxii, n. 166.
180
“Ch. Empl. Comm., II. Rep., 1864,” pp. xix., xx., xxi.
181
l.c., pp. xxi.. xxii.
182
l.c., pp. xxix., xxx.
183
l.c., pp. xi., xii.
184
“Child. Empl. Comm., I. Rep. 1863,” p. 185.
185
In England millinery and dressmaking are for the most part carried on, on the premises of the
employer, partly by workwomen who live there, partly by women who live off the premises.
186
Mr. White, a commissioner, visited a military clothing manufactory that employed 1,000 to 1,200
persons, almost all females, and a shoe manufactory with 1,300 persons; of these nearly one half were
children and young persons.
187
An instance. The weekly report of deaths by the Registrar-General dated 26th Feb., 1864, contains
5 cases of death from starvation. On the same day The Times reports another case. Six victims of
starvation in one week!
188
“Child. Empl. Comm., Second Rep., 1864,” p. lxvii., n. 406-9, p. 84, n. 124, p. lxxiii, n. 441, p. 68,
n. 6, p. 84, n. 126, p. 78, n. 85, p. 76, n. 69, p. lxxii, n. 483.
189
“The rental of premises required for workrooms seems the element which ultimately determines
the point; and consequently it is in the metropolis, that the old system of giving work out to small
employers and families has been longest retained, and earliest returned to.” (l.c., p. 83, n. 123.) The
concluding statement in this quotation refers exclusively to shoemaking.
190
In glove-making and other industries where the condition of the work-people is hardly
distinguishable from that of paupers, this does not occur.
191
l.c., p. 83, n. 122.
192
In the wholesale boot and shoe trade of Leicester alone, there were in 1864, 800 sewing-machines
already in use.
193
l.c., p. 84, n. 124.
194
Instances: The Army Clothing Depot at Pimlico, London, the Shirt factory of Tillie and Henderson
at Londonderry, and the clothes factory of Messrs. Tait at Limerick which employs about 1,200 hands.
195
“Tendency to Factory System” (l.c., p. lxvii). “The whole employment is at this time in a state of
transition, and is undergoing the same Change as that effected in the lace trade, weaving, &c.” (l.c., n.
405.) “A complete revolution” (l.c., p. xlvi., n. 318). At the date of the Child. Empl. Comm. of 1840
stocking making was still done by manual labour. Since 1846 various sorts of machines have been
introduced, which are now driven by steam. The total number of persons of both sexes and of all ages
from 3 years upwards, employed in stocking making in England, was in 1862 about 129,000. Of these
only 4,063 were, according to the Parliamentary Return of the 11th February, 1862, working under the
Factory Acts.
196
Thus, e.g., in the earthenware trade, Messrs. Cochrane, of the Britain Pottery, Glasgow, report: “To
keep up our quantity we have gone extensively into machines wrought by unskilled labour, and every
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day convinces us that we can produce a greater quantity than by the old method.” (“Rep. of Insp. of
Fact., 31st Oct., 1865,” p. 13.) “The effect of the Fact. Acts is to force on the further introduction of
machinery” (l.c., pp. 13-14).
197
Thus, after the extension of the Factory Act to the potteries, great increase of powerjiggers in place
of hand-moved jiggers.
198
“Report of lnsp. of Fact., 31st Oct., 1865,” pp. 96 and 127.
199
The introduction of this and other machinery into match-making caused in one department alone
230 young persons to be replaced by 32 boys and girls of 14 to 17 years of age. This saving in labour
was carried still further in 1865, by the employment of steam power.
200
“Ch. Empl. Comm., 11. Rep., 1864,” p. ix., n. 50.
201
“Rep. of Insp. of Fact., 31st Oct., 1865,” p..22.
202
“But it must be borne in mind that those improvements, though carried out fully in some
establishments, are by no means general, and are not capable of being brought into use in many of the
old manufactories without an expenditure of capital beyond the means of many of the present
occupiers.” “I cannot but rejoice,” writes Sub-Insp. May, “that notwithstanding the temporary
disorganisation which inevitably follows the introduction of such a measure (as the Factory Act
Extension Act), and is, indeed, directly indicative of the evils which it was intended to remedy, &c.”
(Rep. of Insp. of Fact., 31st Oct., 1865.)
203
With blast furnaces, for instance, “work towards the end of the week being generally much
increased in duration in consequence of the habit of the men of idling on Monday and occasionally
during a part or the whole of Tuesday also.” (“Child. Empl. Comm., III. Rep.,” p. vi.) “The little
masters generally have very irregular hours. They lose two or three days, and then work all night to
make it up.... They always employ their own children, if they have any.” (l.c., p. vii.) “The want of
regularity in coming to work, encouraged by the possibility and practice of making up for this by
working longer hours.” (l.c., p. xviii.) “In Birmingham ... an enormous amount of time is lost ... idling
part of the time, slaving the rest.” (l.c., p. xi.)
204
“Child. Empl. Comm., IV., Rep.,” p. xxxii., “The extension of the railway system is said to have
contributed greatly to this custom of giving sudden orders, and the consequent hurry, neglect of mealtimes, and late hours of the workpeople.” (l.c., p. xxxi.)
205
“Ch. Empl. Comm, IV. Rep.,” pp. xxxv., n. 235, 237.
206
“Ch. Empl. Comm. IV. Rep.,” p. 127, n. 56.
207
“With respect to the loss of trade by non-completion of shipping orders in time, I remember that
this was the pet argument of the factory masters in 1832 and 1833. Nothing that can be advanced now
on this subject, could have the force that it had then, before steam had halved all distances and
established new regulations for transit. It quite failed at that time of proof when put to the test, and
again it will certainly fail should it have to be tried.” (“Reports of Insp. of Fact., 31 Oct., 1862,” pp.
54, 55.)
208
“Ch. Empl. Comm. IV. Rep.,” p. xviii, n. 118.
209
John Bellers remarked as far back as 1699: “The uncertainty of fashions does increase necessitous
poor. It has two great mischiefs in it. 1st, The journeymen are miserable in winter for want of work,
the mercers and master-weavers not daring to lay out their stocks to keep the journeymen employed
before the spring comes, and they know what the fashion will then be; 2ndly, In the spring the
journeymen are not sufficient, but the master-weavers must draw in many prentices, that they may
supply the trade of the kingdom in a quarter or half a year, which robs the plough of hands, drains the
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country of labourers, and in a great part stocks the city with beggars, and starves some in winter that
are ashamed to beg.” (“Essays about the Poor, Manufactures, &c.,” p. 9.)
210
“Ch. Empl. Comm. V. Rep.,” p. 171, n. 34.
211
The evidence of some Bradford export-houses is as follows: “Under these circumstances, it seems
clear that no boys need be worked longer than from 8 a.m. to 7 or 7.30 p.m., in making up. It is merely
a question of extra hands and extra outlay. If some masters were not so greedy, the boys would not
work late; an extra machine costs only £16 or £18; much of such over-time as does occur is to be
referred to an insufficiency of appliances, and a want of space.” “Ch. Empl, Comm. V. Rep.,” p. 171,
n. 35, 36, 38.
212
l.c. A London manufacturer, who in other respects looks upon the compulsory regulation of the
hours of labour as a protection for the workpeople against the manufacturers, and for the
manufacturers themselves against the wholesale trade, states: “The pressure in our business is caused
by the shippers, who want, e.g., to send the goods by sailing vessel so as to reach their destination at a
given season, and at the same time want to pocket the difference in freight between a sailing vessel
and a steamship, or who select the earlier of two steamships in order to be in the foreign market before
their competitors.”
213
“This could be obviated,” says a manufacturer, “at the expense of an enlargement of the works
under the pressure of a General Act of Parliament.” l.c., p. x., n. 38.
214
l.c., p. xv., n. 72. sqq.
215
“Rep. Insp. Fact., 31st October, 1865,” p. 127.
216
It has been found out by experiment, that with each respiration of average intensity made by a
healthy average individual, about 25 cubic inches of air are consumed, and that about 20 respirations
are made in each minute. Hence the air inhaled in 24 hours by each individual is about 720,000 cubic
inches, or 416 cubic feet. It is clear, however, that air which has been once breathed, can no longer
serve for the same process until it has been purified in the great workshop of Nature. According to the
experiments of Valentin and Brunner, it appears that a healthy man gives off about 1,300 cubic inches
of carbonic acid per hour; this would give about 8 ounces of solid carbon thrown off from the lungs in
24 hours. “Every man should have at least 800 cubic feet.” (Huxley.)
217
According to the English Factory Act, parents cannot send their children under 14 years of age into
Factories under the control of the Act, unless at the same time they allow them to receive elementary
education. The manufacturer is responsible for compliance with the Act. “Factory education is
compulsory, and it is a condition of labour.” (“Rep. Insp. Fact., 31st Oct., 1865,” p. 111.)
218
On the very advantageous results of combining gymnastics (and drilling in the case of boys) with
compulsory education for factory children and pauper scholars, see the speech of N. W. Senior at the
seventh annual congress of “The National Association for the Promotion of Social Science,” in
“Report of Proceedings, &c.,” Lond. 1863, pp. 63, 64, also the “Rep. Insp. Fact., 31st Oct., 1865,” pp.
118, 119, 120, 126, sqq.
219
“Rep. Insp. Fact., 31st Oct., 1865,” p. 118. A silk manufacturer naively states to the Children’s
Employment Commissioners: “I am quite sure that the true secret of producing efficient workpeople is
to be found in uniting education and labour from a period of childhood. Of course the occupation must
not be too severe, nor irksome, or unhealthy. But of the advantage of the union I have no doubt. I wish
my own children could have some work as well as play to give variety to their schooling.” (“Ch.
Empl. Comm. V. Rep.,” p. 82, n. 36.)
220
Senior, l.c., p. 66. How modern industry, when it has attained to a certain pitch, is capable, by the
revolution it effects in the mode of production and in the social conditions of production, of also
revolutionising people’s minds, is strikingly shown by a comparison of Senior’s speech in 1863, with
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his philippic against the Factory Act of 1833; or by a comparison, of the views of the congress above
referred to, with the fact that in certain country districts of England poor parents are forbidden, on pain
of death by starvation, to educate their children. Thus, e.g., Mr. Snell reports it to be a common
occurrence in Somersetshire that, when a poor person claims parish relief, he is compelled to take his
children from school. Mr. Wollarton, the clergyman at Feltham, also tells of cases where all relief was
denied to certain families “because they were sending their children to school!”
221
Wherever handicraft-machines, driven by men, compete directly or indirectly with more developed
machines driven by mechanical power, a great change takes place with regard to the labourer who
drives the machine. At first the steam-engine replaces this labourer, afterwards he must replace the
steam-engine. Consequently the tension and the amount of tambour-power expended become
monstrous, and especially so in the case of the children who are condemned to this torture. Thus Mr.
Longe; one of the commissioners, found in Coventry and the neighbourhood boys of from 10 to 15
years employed in driving the ribbon-looms, not to mention younger children who had to drive
smaller machines. “It is extraordinarily fatiguing work. The boy is a mere substitute for steam power.”
(“Ch. Empl. Comm. V, Rep. 1866;” p. 114, n. 6.) As to the fatal consequences of “this system of
slavery,” as the official report styles it, see l.c., p. 114 sqq.
222
l.c., p. 3, n. 24.
223
l.c., P. 7, n. 60.
224
“In some parts of the Highlands of Scotland, not many years ago, every peasant, according to the
Statistical Account, made his own shoes of leather tanned by himself. Many a shepherd and cottar too,
with his wife and children, appeared at Church in clothes which had been touched by no hands but
their own, since they were shorn from the sheep and sown in the flaxfield. In the preparation of these.
it is added, scarcely a single article had been purchased, except the awl, needle, thimble, and a very
few parts of the iron-work employed in the weaving. The dyes, toci, were chiefly extracted by the
women from trees, shrubs and herbs.” (Dugald Stewart’s “Works,” Hamilton’s Ed., Vol. viii., pp. 327328.)
225
In the celebrated “Livre des métiers” of Etienne Boileau, we find it prescribed that a journeyman
on being admitted among the masters had to swear “to love his brethren with brotherly love, to
support them in their respective trades, not wilfully to betray the secrets of the trade, and besides, in
the interests of all, not to recommend his own wares by calling the attention of the buyer to defects in
the articles made by others.”
226
“The bourgeoisie cannot exist without continually revolutionising the instruments of production,
and thereby the relations of production and all the social relations. Conservation, in an unaltered form,
of the old modes of production was on the contrary the first condition of existence for all earlier
industrial classes. Constant revolution in production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social
conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation, distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones.
All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are
swept away, all new formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into
air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real
conditions of life, and his relations with his kind.” (F. Engels und Karl Marx: “Manifest der
Kommunistischen Partei.” Lond. 1848, p. 5.)
227
“You take my life
When you do take the means whereby I live.”
Shakespeare.
228
A French workman, on his return from San-Francisco, writes as follows: “I never could have
believed, that I was capable of working at the various occupations I was employed on in California. I
was firmly convinced that I was fit for nothing but letter-press printing.... Once in the midst of this
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world of adventurers, who change their occupation as often as they do their shirt, egad, I did as the
others. As mining did not turn out remunerative enough, I left it for the town, where in succession I
became typographer, slater, plumber, &c. In consequence of thus finding out that I am fit to any sort
of work, I feel less of a mollusk and more of a man.” (A. Corbon, “De l’enseignement professionnel,”
2ème ed., p. 50.)
229
John Bellers, a very phenomenon in the history of Political Economy, saw most clearly at the end
of the 17th century, the necessity for abolishing the present system of education and division of
labour, which beget hypertrophy and atrophy at the two opposite extremities of society. Amongst
other things he says this: “An idle learning being little better than the learning of idleness.... Bodily
labour, it’s a primitive institution of God.... Labour being as proper for the bodies’ health as eating is
for its living; for what pains a man saves by ease, he will find in disease.... Labour adds oil to the lamp
of life, when thinking inflames it.... A childish silly employ” (a warning this, by presentiment, against
the Basedows and their modern imitators) “leaves the children’s minds silly,” (“Proposals for Raising
a Colledge of Industry of all Useful Trades and Husbandry.” Lond., 1696, pp. 12, 14, 18.)
230
This sort of labour goes on mostly in small workshops, as we have seen in the lacemaking and
straw-plaiting trades, and as could be shown more in detail from the metal trades of Sheffield,
Birmingham, &c.
231
“Ch. Empl. Comm., V. Rep.,” p. xxv., n. 162, and II. Rep., p. xxxviii., n, 285, 289, p. xxv., xxvi., n.
191.
232
“Factory labour may be as pure and as excellent as domestic labour, and perhaps more so.” (“Rep.
Insp. of Fact., 31st October, 1865,” p. 129.)
233
“Rep. Insp. of Fact., 31st October, 1865,” pp. 27-32.
234
Numerous instances will be found in “Rep. of Insp. of Fact.”
235
“Ch. Empl. Comm., V. Rep.,” p. x., n. 35.
236
“Ch. Empl. Comm., V. Rep.,” p. ix., n. 28.
237
l.c., p. xxv., n. 165-167. As to the advantages of large scale, compared with small scale, industries,
see “Ch. Empl. Comm., III. Rep.,” p. 13, n. 144, p. 25, n. 121, p. 26, n. 125, p. 27, n. 140, &c.
238
The trades proposed to be brought under the Act were the following: Lace-making, stockingweaving, straw-plaiting, the manufacture of wearing apparel with its numerous sub-divisions, artificial
flower-making, shoemaking, hat-making, glove-making, tailoring, all metal works, from blast
furnaces down to needleworks, &c., paper-mills, glassworks, tobacco factories, India-rubber works,
braid-making (for weaving), hand-carpetmaking, umbrella and parasol making, the manufacture of
spindles and spools, letterpress printing, book-binding, manufacture of stationery (including paper
bags, cards, coloured paper, &c.), rope-making, manufacture of jet ornaments, brick-making, silk
manufacture by hand, Coventry weaving, salt works, tallow chandlers, cement works, sugar refineries,
biscuit-making, various industries connected with timber, and other mixed trades.
239
l.c., p. xxv., n. 169.
240
Here (from “The Tory Cabinet...... to “Nassau W. Senior") the English text has been altered in
conformity with the 4th German edition. — Ed.
241
The Factory Acts Extension Act was passed on August 12, 1867. It regulates all foundries,
smithies, and metal manufactories, including machine shops; furthermore glass-works, paper mills,
gutta-percha and India-rubber works, tobacco manufactories, letter-press printing and book-binding
works, and, lastly, all workshops in which more than 50 persons are employed. The Hours of Labour
Regulation Act, passed on August 17, 1867, regulates the smaller workshops and the so-called
domestic industries. I shall revert to these Acts and to the new Mining Act of 1872 in Volume II.
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Senior, “Social Science Congress,” pp. 55-58.
The “personnel” of this staff consisted of 2 inspectors, 2 assistant inspectors and 41 sub-inspectors.
Eight additional sub-inspectors were appointed in 1871. The total cost of administering the Acts in
England, Scotland, and Ireland amounted for the year 1871-72 to no more than £25,347, inclusive of
the law expenses incurred by prosecutions of offending masters.
244
Robert Owen, the father of Co-operative Factories and Stores, but who, as before remarked, in no
way shared the illusions of his followers with regard to the bearing of these isolated elements of
transformation, not only practically made the factory system the sole foundation of his experiments,
but also declared that system to be theoretically the starting-point of the social revolution. Herr
Vissering, Professor of Political Economy in the University of Leyden, appears to have a suspicion of
this when, in his “Handboek van Practische Staatshuishoudkunde, 1860-62,” which reproduces all the
platitudes of vulgar economy, he strongly supports handicrafts against the factory system.
[Added in the 4th German edition — The “hopelessly bewildering tangle of contradictory
enactments” (S. 314) (present volume, p. 284) which English legislation called into life by means of
the mutually conflicting Factory Acts, the Factory Acts Extension Act and the Workshops’ Act,
finally became intolerable, and thus all legislative enactments on this subject were codified in the
Factory and Workshop Act of 1878. Of course no detailed critique of this English industrial code now
in effect can be presented here. The following remarks will have to suffice. The Act comprises:
1) Textile Mills. Here everything remains about as it was: children more than 10 years of age may
work 5½ hours a day; or 6 hours and Saturday off; young persons and women, 10 hours on 5 days, and
at most 6½ on Saturday.
2) Non-Textile Factories. Here the regulations are brought closer than before to those of No. 1, but
there are still several exceptions which favour the capitalists and which in certain cases may be
expanded by special permission of the Home Secretary.
3) Workshops, defined approximately as in the former Act; as for the children, young workers and
women employed there, the workshops are about on a par with the non-textile factories, but again
conditions are easier in details.
4) Workshops in which no children or young workers are employed, but only persons of both sexes
above the age of 18; this category enjoy still easier conditions.
5) Domestic Workshops, where only members of the family are employed, in the family dwelling:
still more elastic regulations and simultaneously the restriction that the inspector may, without special
permission of the ministry or a court, enter only rooms not used also for dwelling purposes; and lastly
unrestricted freedom for straw-plaiting and lace and glove-making by members of the family. With all
its defects this Act, together with the Swiss Federal Factory Law of March 23, 1877, is still by far the
best piece of legislation in this field. A comparison of it with the said Swiss federal law is of particular
interest because it clearly demonstrates the merits and demerits of the two legislative methods — the
English, “historical” method, which intervenes when occasion requires, and the continental method,
which is built up on the traditions of the French Revolution and generalises more. Unfortunately, due
to insufficient inspection personnel, the English code is still largely a dead letter with regard to its
application to workshops. — F. E.]
245
“You divide the people into two hostile camps of clownish boors and emasculated dwarfs. Good
heavens! a nation divided into agricultural and commercial interests, calling itself sane; nay, styling
itself enlightened and civilised, not only in spite of, but in consequence of this monstrous and
unnatural division.” (David Urquhart, l.c., p. 119.) This passage shows, at one and the same time, the
strength and the weakness of that kind of criticism which knows how to judge and condemn the
present, but not how to comprehend it.
243
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See Liebig: “Die Chemie in ihrer Anwendung auf Agricultur und Physiologie,” 7. Auflage, 1862,
and especially the “Einleitung in die Naturgesetze des Feldbaus,” in the 1st Volume. To have
developed from the point of view of natural science, the negative, i.e., destructive side of modern
agriculture, is one of Liebig’s immortal merits. His summary, too, of the history of agriculture,
although not free from gross errors, contains flashes of light. It is, however, to be regretted that he
ventures on such haphazard assertions as the following: “By greater pulverising and more frequent
ploughing, the circulation of air in the interior of porous soil is aided, and the surface exposed to the
action of the atmosphere is increased and renewed; but it is easily seen that the increased yield of the
land cannot be proportional to the labour spent on that land, but increases in a much smaller
proportion. This law,” adds Liebig, “was first enunciated by John Stuart Mill in his ‘Principles of Pol.
Econ.,’ Vol. 1, p. 17, as follows: ‘That the produce of land increases, caeteris paribus, in a
diminishing ratio to the increase of the labourers employed’ (Mill here introduces in an erroneous
form the law enunciated by Ricardo’s school, for since the ‘decrease of the labourers employed,’ kept
even pace in England with the advance of agriculture, the law discovered in, and applied to, England,
could have no application to that country, at all events), ‘is the universal law of agricultural industry.’
This is very remarkable, since Mill was ignorant of the reason for this law.” (Liebig, l.c., Bd. I., p. 143
and Note.) Apart from Liebig’s wrong interpretation of the word “labour,” by which word he
understands something quite different from what Political Economy does, it is, in any case, “very
remarkable” that he should make Mr. John Stuart Mill the first propounder of a theory which was first
published by James Anderson in A. Smith’s days, and was repeated in various works down to the
beginning of the 19th century; a theory which Malthus, that master in plagiarism (the whole of his
population theory is a shameless plagiarism), appropriated to himself in 1815; which West developed
at the same time as, and independently of, Anderson; which in the year 1817 was connected by
Ricardo with the general theory of value, then made the round of the world as Ricardo’s theory, and in
1820 was vulgarised by James Mill, the father of John Stuart Mill; and which, finally, was reproduced
by John Stuart Mill and others, as a dogma already quite commonplace, and known to every
schoolboy. It cannot be denied that John Stuart Mill owes his, at all events, “remarkable” authority
almost entirely to such quid-pro-quos.

Part 5: Production of Absolute and
Relative Surplus-Value

359

Chapter 16

Chapter 16: Absolute and Relative SurplusValue
In considering the labour-process, we began (see Chapter VII.) by treating it in the abstract, apart
from its historical forms, as a process between man and Nature. We there stated, “If we examine
the whole labour-process, from the point of view of its result, it is plain that both the instruments
and the subject of labour are means of production, and that the labour itself is productive labour.”
And in Note 2, same page, we further added: “This method of determining, from the standpoint of
the labour-process alone, what is productive labour, is by no means directly applicable to the case
of the capitalist process of production.” We now proceed to the further development of this
subject.
So far as the labour-process is purely individual, one and the same labourer unites in himself all
the functions, that later on become separated. When an individual appropriates natural objects for
his livelihood, no one controls him but himself. Afterwards he is controlled by others. A single
man cannot operate upon Nature without calling his own muscles into play under the control of
his own brain. As in the natural body head and hand wait upon each other, so the labour-process
unites the labour of the hand with that of the head. Later on they part company and even become
deadly foes. The product ceases to be the direct product of the individual, and becomes a social
product, produced in common by a collective labourer, i.e., by a combination of workmen, each
of whom takes only a part, greater or less, in the manipulation of the subject of their labour. As
the co-operative character of the labour-process becomes more and more marked, so, as a
necessary consequence, does our notion of productive labour, and of its agent the productive
labourer, become extended. In order to labour productively, it is no longer necessary for you to do
manual work yourself; enough, if you are an organ of the collective labourer, and perform one of
its subordinate functions. The first definition given above of productive labour, a definition
deduced from the very nature of the production of material objects, still remains correct for the
collective labourer, considered as a whole. But it no longer holds good for each member taken
individually.
On the other hand, however, our notion of productive labour becomes narrowed. Capitalist
production is not merely the production of commodities, it is essentially the production of
surplus-value. The labourer produces, not for himself, but for capital. It no longer suffices,
therefore, that he should simply produce. He must produce surplus-value. That labourer alone is
productive, who produces surplus-value for the capitalist, and thus works for the self-expansion
of capital. If we may take an example from outside the sphere of production of material objects, a
schoolmaster is a productive labourer when, in addition to belabouring the heads of his scholars,
he works like a horse to enrich the school proprietor. That the latter has laid out his capital in a
teaching factory, instead of in a sausage factory, does not alter the relation. Hence the notion of a
productive labourer implies not merely a relation between work and useful effect, between
labourer and product of labour, but also a specific, social relation of production, a relation that
has sprung up historically and stamps the labourer as the direct means of creating surplus-value.
To be a productive labourer is, therefore, not a piece of luck, but a misfortune. In Book IV. which
treats of the history of the theory, it will be more clearly seen, that the production of surplus-value
has at all times been made, by classical political economists, the distinguishing characteristic of
the productive labourer. Hence their definition of a productive labourer changes with their
comprehension of the nature of surplus-value. Thus the Physiocrats insist that only agricultural
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labour is productive, since that alone, they say, yields a surplus-value. And they say so because,
with them, surplus-value has no existence except in the form of rent.
The prolongation of the working day beyond the point at which the labourer would have
produced just an equivalent for the value of his labour-power, and the appropriation of that
surplus labour by capital, this is production of absolute surplus-value. It forms the general
groundwork of the capitalist system, and the starting-point for the production of relative surplusvalue. The latter pre-supposes that the working day is already divided into two parts, necessary
labour, and surplus labour. In order to prolong the surplus labour, the necessary labour is
shortened by methods whereby the equivalent for the wages is produced in less time. The
production of absolute surplus-value turns exclusively upon the length of the working day; the
production of relative surplus-value, revolutionises out and out the technical processes of labour,
and the composition of society. It therefore pre-supposes a specific mode, the capitalist mode of
production, a mode which, along with its methods, means, and conditions, arises and develops
itself spontaneously on the foundation afforded by the formal subjection of labour to capital. In
the course of this development, the formal subjection is replaced by the real subjection of labour
to capital.
It will suffice merely to refer to certain intermediate forms, in which surplus labour is not
extorted by direct compulsion from the producer, nor the producer himself yet formally subjected
to capital. In such forms capital has not yet acquired the direct control of the labour-process. By
the side of independent producers who carry on their handicrafts and agriculture in the traditional
old-fashioned way, there stands the usurer or the merchant, with his usurer’s capital or merchant’s
capital, feeding on them like a parasite. The predominance, in a society, of this form of
exploitation excludes the capitalist mode of production; to which mode, however, this form may
serve as a transition, as it did towards the close of the Middle Ages. Finally, as is shown by
modern “domestic industry,” some intermediate forms are here and there reproduced in the
background of Modern Industry, though their physiognomy is totally changed.
If, on the one hand, the mere formal subjection of labour to capital suffices for the production of
absolute surplus-value, if, e.g., it is sufficient that handicraftsmen who previously worked on their
own account, or as apprentices of a master, should become wage labourers under the direct
control of a capitalist; so, on the other hand, we have seen, how the methods of producing relative
surplus-value, are, at the same time, methods of producing absolute surplus-value. Nay, more, the
excessive prolongation of the working day turned out to be the peculiar product of Modern
Industry. Generally speaking, the specifically capitalist mode of production ceases to be a mere
means of producing relative surplus-value, so soon as that mode has conquered an entire branch
of production; and still more so, so soon as it has conquered all the important branches. It then
becomes the general, socially predominant form of production. As a special method of producing
relative surplus-value, it remains effective only, first, in so far as it seizes upon industries that
previously were only formally subject to capital, that is, so far as it is propagandist; secondly, in
so far as the industries that have been taken over by it, continue to be revolutionised by changes
in the methods of production.
From one standpoint, any distinction between absolute and relative surplus-value appears
illusory. Relative surplus-value is absolute, since it compels the absolute prolongation of the
working day beyond the labour-time necessary to the existence of the labourer himself. Absolute
surplus-value is relative, since it makes necessary such a development of the productiveness of
labour, as will allow of the necessary labour-time being confined to a portion of the working day.
But if we keep in mind the behaviour of surplus-value, this appearance of identity vanishes. Once
the capitalist mode of production is established and become general, the difference between
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absolute and relative surplus-value makes itself felt, whenever there is a question of raising the
rate of surplus-value. Assuming that labour-power is paid for at its value, we are confronted by
this alternative: given the productiveness of labour and its normal intensity, the rate of surplusvalue can be raised only by the actual prolongation of the working day; on the other hand, given
the length of the working day, that rise can be effected only by a change in the relative
magnitudes of the components of the working day, viz., necessary labour and surplus labour; a
change which, if the wages are not to fall below the value of labour-power, presupposes a change
either in the productiveness or in the intensity of the labour.
If the labourer wants all his time to produce the necessary means of subsistence for himself and
his race, he has no time left in which to work gratis for others. Without a certain degree of
productiveness in his labour, he has no such superfluous time at his disposal; without such
superfluous time, no surplus labour, and therefore no capitalists, no slave-owners, no feudal lords,
in one word, no class of large proprietors. 1
Thus we may say that surplus-value rests on a natural basis; but this is permissible only in the
very general sense, that there is no natural obstacle absolutely preventing one man from
disburdening himself of the labour requisite for his own existence, and burdening another with it,
any more, for instance, than unconquerable natural obstacle prevent one man from eating the
flesh of another. 2 No mystical ideas must in any way be connected, as sometimes happens, with
this historically developed productiveness of labour. It is only after men have raised themselves
above the rank of animals, when therefore their labour has been to some extent socialised, that a
state of things arises in which the surplus labour of the one becomes a condition of existence for
the other. At the dawn of civilisation the productiveness acquired by labour is small, but so too
are the wants which develop with and by the means of satisfying them. Further, at that early
period, the portion of society that lives on the labour of others is infinitely small compared with
the mass of direct producers. Along with the progress in the productiveness of labour, that small
portion of society increases both absolutely and relatively.3 Besides, capital with its
accompanying relations springs up from an economic soil that is the product of a long process of
development. The productiveness of labour that serves as its foundation and starting-point, is a
gift, not of nature, but of a history embracing thousands of centuries.
Apart from the degree of development, greater or less, in the form of social production, the
productiveness of labour is fettered by physical conditions. These are all referable to the
constitution of man himself (race, &c.), and to surrounding nature. The external physical
conditions fall into two great economic classes, (1) Natural wealth in means of subsistence, i.e., a
fruitful soil, waters teeming with fish, &c., and (2), natural wealth in the instruments of labour,
such as waterfalls, navigable rivers, wood, metal, coal, &c. At the dawn of civilisation, it is the
first class that turns the scale; at a higher stage of development, it is the second. Compare, for
example, England with India, or in ancient times, Athens and Corinth with the shores of the Black
Sea.
The fewer the number of natural wants imperatively calling for satisfaction, and the greater the
natural fertility of the soil and the favourableness of the climate, so much less is the labour-time
necessary for the maintenance and reproduction of the producer. So much greater therefore can be
the excess of his labours for others over his labour for himself. Diodorus long ago remarked this
in relation to the ancient Egyptians.
“It is altogether incredible how little trouble and expense the bringing up of their
children causes them. They cook for them the first simple food at hand; they also
give them the lower part of the papyrus stem to eat, so far as it can be roasted in
the fire, and the roots and stalks of marsh plants, some raw, some boiled and
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roasted. Most of the children go without shoes and unclothed, for the air is so
mild. Hence a child, until he is grown up, costs his parents not more, on the
whole, than twenty drachmas. It is this, chiefly, which explains why the
population of Egypt is so numerous, and, therefore, why so many great works can
be undertaken.” 4
Nevertheless the grand structures of ancient Egypt are less due to the extent of its population than
to the large proportion of it that was freely disposable. Just as the individual labourer can do more
surplus labour in proportion as his necessary labour-time is less, so with regard to the working
population. The smaller the part of it which is required for the production of the necessary means
of subsistence, so much the greater is the part that can be set to do other work.
Capitalist production once assumed, then, all other circumstances remaining the same, and given
the length of the working day, the quantity of surplus labour will vary with the physical
conditions of labour, especially with the fertility of the soil. But it by no means follows from this
that the most fruitful soil is the most fitted for the growth of the capitalist mode of production.
This mode is based on the dominion of man over nature. Where nature is too lavish, she “keeps
him in hand, like a child in leading-strings.” She does not impose upon him any necessity to
develop himself. 5 It is not the tropics with their luxuriant vegetation, but the temperate zone, that
is the mother-country of capital. It is not the mere fertility of the soil, but the differentiation of the
soil, the variety of its natural products, the changes of the seasons, which form the physical basis
for the social division of labour, and which, by changes in the natural surroundings, spur man on
to the multiplication of his wants, his capabilities, his means and modes of labour. It is the
necessity of bringing a natural force under the control of society, of economising, of
appropriating or subduing it on a large scale by the work of man’s hand, that first plays the
decisive part in the history of industry. Examples are, the irrigation works in Egypt, 6 Lombardy,
Holland, or in India and Persia where irrigation by means of artificial canals, not only supplies the
soil with the water indispensable to it, but also carries down to it, in the shape of sediment from
the hills, mineral fertilisers. The secret of the flourishing state of industry in Spain and Sicily
under the dominion of the Arabs lay in their irrigation works. 7
Favourable natural conditions alone, give us only the possibility, never the reality, of surplus
labour, nor, consequently, of surplus-value and a surplus-product. The result of difference in the
natural conditions of labour is this, that the same quantity of labour satisfies, in different
countries, a different mass of requirements, 8 consequently, that under circumstances in other
respects analogous, the necessary labour-time is different. These conditions affect surplus labour
only as natural limits, i.e., by fixing the points at which labour for others can begin. In proportion
as industry advances, these natural limits recede. In the midst of our West European society,
where the labourer purchases the right to work for his own livelihood only by paying for it in
surplus labour, the idea easily takes root that it is an inherent quality of human labour to furnish a
surplus-product. 9 But consider, for example, an inhabitant of the eastern islands of the Asiatic
Archipelago, where sago grows wild in the forests.
“When the inhabitants have convinced themselves, by boring a hole in the tree,
that the pith is ripe, the trunk is cut down and divided into several pieces, the pith
is extracted, mixed with water and filtered: it is then quite fit for use as sago. One
tree commonly yields 300 lbs., and occasionally 500 to 600 lbs. There, then,
people go into the forests, and cut bread for themselves, just as with us they cut
fire-wood.” 10
Suppose now such an eastern bread-cutter requires 12 working hours a week for the satisfaction
of all his wants. Nature’s direct gift to him is plenty of leisure time. Before he can apply this

363

Chapter 16

leisure time productively for himself, a whole series of historical events is required; before he
spends it in surplus labour for strangers, compulsion is necessary. If capitalist production were
introduced, the honest fellow would perhaps have to work six days a week, in order to appropriate
to himself the product of one working day. The bounty of Nature does not explain why he would
then have to work 6 days a week, or why he must furnish 5 days of surplus labour. It explains
only why his necessary labour-time would be limited to one day a week. But in no case would his
surplus-product arise from some occult quality inherent in human labour.
Thus, not only does the historically developed social productiveness of labour, but also its natural
productiveness, appear to be productiveness of the capital with which that labour is incorporated.
Ricardo never concerns himself about the origin of surplus-value. He treats it as a thing inherent
in the capitalist mode of production, which mode, in his eyes, is the natural form of social
production. Whenever he discusses the productiveness of labour, he seeks in it, not the cause of
surplus-value, but the cause that determines the magnitude of that value. On the other hand, his
school has openly proclaimed the productiveness of labour to be the originating cause of profit
(read: Surplus-value). This at all events is a progress as against the mercantilists who, on their
side, derived the excess of the price over the cost of production of the product, from the act of
exchange, from the product being sold above its value. Nevertheless, Ricardo’s school simply
shirked the problem, they did not solve it. In fact these bourgeois economists instinctively saw,
and rightly so, that it is very dangerous to stir too deeply the burning question of the origin of
surplus-value. But what are we to think of John Stuart Mill, who, half a century after Ricardo,
solemnly claims superiority over the mercantilists, by clumsily repeating the wretched evasions
of Ricardo’s earliest vulgarisers?
Mill says:
“The cause of profit is that labour produces more than is required for its support.”
So far, nothing but the old story; but Mill wishing to add something of his own, proceeds:
“To vary the form of the theorem; the reason why capital yields a profit, is
because food, clothing, materials and tools, last longer than the time which was
required to produce them.”
He here confounds the duration of labour-time with the duration of its products. According to this
view, a baker whose product lasts only a day, could never extract from his workpeople the same
profit, as a machine maker whose products endure for 20 years and more. Of course it is very
true, that if a bird’s nest did not last longer than the time it takes in building, birds would have to
do without nests.

This fundamental truth once established, Mill establishes his own superiority over the
mercantilists.
“We thus see,” he proceeds, “that profit arises, not from the incident of exchange,
but from the productive power of labour; and the general profit of the country is
always what the productive power of labour makes it, whether any exchange takes
place or not. If there were no division of employments, there would be no buying
or selling, but there would still be profit.”
For Mill then, exchange, buying and selling, those general conditions of capitalist production, are
but an incident, and there would always be profits even without the purchase and sale of labourpower!
“If,” he continues, “the labourers of the country collectively produce twenty per cent more than
their wages, profits will be twenty per cent, whatever prices may or may not be.” This is, on the

364

Chapter 16

one hand, a rare bit of tautology; for if labourers produce a surplus-value of 20% for the
capitalist, his profit will be to the total wages of the labourers as 20:100. On the other hand, it is
absolutely false to say that “profits will be 20%.” They will always be less, because they are
calculated upon the sum total of the capital advanced. If, for example, the capitalist have
advanced £500, of which £4OO is laid out in means of production and £100 in wages, and if the
rate of surplus-value be 20%, the rate of profit will be 20:500, i.e., 4% and not 20%.
Then follows a splendid example of Mill’s method of handling the different historical forms of
social production.
“I assume, throughout, the state of things which, where the labourers and
capitalists are separate classes, prevails, with few exceptions, universally; namely,
that the capitalist advances the whole expenses, including the entire remuneration
of the labourer.”
Strange optical illusion to see everywhere a state of things which as yet exists only exceptionally
on our earth. 11 But let us finish – Mill is willing to concede,
“that he should do so is not a matter of inherent necessity.” On the contrary: “the
labourer might wait, until the production is complete, for all that part of his wages
which exceeds mere necessaries: and even for the whole, if he has funds in hand
sufficient for his temporary support. But in the latter case, the labourer is to that
extent really a capitalist in the concern, by supplying a portion of the funds
necessary for carrying it on.”
Mill might have gone further and have added, that the labourer who advances to himself not only
the necessaries of life but also the means of production, is in reality nothing but his own wagelabourer. He might also have said that the American peasant proprietor is but a serf who does
enforced labour for himself instead of for his lord.
After thus proving clearly, that even if capitalist production had no existence, still it would
always exist, Mill is consistent enough to show, on the contrary, that it has no existence, even
when it does exist.
“And even in the former case” (when the workman is a wage labourer to whom
the capitalist advances all the necessaries of life, he the labourer), “may be looked
upon in the same light,” (i.e., as a capitalist), “since, contributing his labour at less
than the market-price, (!) he may be regarded as lending the difference (?) to his
employer and receiving it back with interest, &c.” 12
In reality, the labourer advances his labour gratuitously to the capitalist during, say one week, in
order to receive the market price at the end of the week, &c., and it is this which, according to
Mill, transforms him into a capitalist. On the level plain, simple mounds look like hills; and the
imbecile flatness of the present bourgeoisie is to be measured by the altitude of its great intellects.
1

“The very existence of the master-capitalists, as a distinct class, is dependent on the productiveness
of industry.” (Ramsay, l.c., p. 206.) “If each man’s labour were but enough to produce his own food,
there could be no property.” (Ravenstone, l.c. p. 14, 15.)
2
According to a recent calculation, there are yet at least 4,000,000 cannibals in those parts of the earth
which have already been explored.
3
“Among the wild Indians in America, almost everything is the labourer’s, 99 parts of a hundred are
to be put upon the account of labour. In England, perhaps, the labourer has not 2/3.” (The Advantages
of the East India Trade, &c., p. 73.)
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Diodorus, l.c., l. I., c. 80.
“The first (natural wealth) as it is most noble and advantageous, so doth it make the people careless,
proud, and given to all excesses; whereas the second enforceth vigilancy, literature, arts and policy.”
(England’s Treasure by Foreign Trade. Or the Balance of our Foreign Trade is the Rule of our
Treasure. Written by Thomas Mun of London, merchant, and now published for the common good by
his son John Mun. London, 1669, p. 181, 182.) “Nor can I conceive a greater curse upon a body of
people, than to be thrown upon a spot of land, where the productions for subsistence and food were, in
great measure, spontaneous, and the climate required or admitted little care for raiment and covering...
there may be an extreme on the other side. A soil incapable of produce by labour is quite as bad as a
soil that produces plentifully without any labour.” (An Inquiry into the Present High Price of
Provisions. Lond. 1767, p. 10.)
6
The necessity for predicting the rise and fall of the Nile created Egyptian astronomy, and with it the
dominion of the priests, as directors of agriculture. “Le solstice est le moment de l’année ou
commence la crue du Nil, et celui que les Egyptiens ont du observer avec le plus d’attention.... C’était
cette année tropique qu’il leur importait de marquer pour se diriger dans leurs opérations agricoles. Ils
durent donc chercher dans le ciel un signe apparent de son retour.” [The solstice is the moment of the
year when the Nile begins to rise, and it is the moment the Egyptians have had to watch for with the
greatest attention ... It was the evolution of the tropical year which they had to establish firmly so as to
conduct their agricultural operations in accordance with it. They therefore had to search the heavens
for a visible sign of the solstice’s return.] (Cuvier: Discours sur les révolutions du globe, ed. Hoefer,
Paris, 1863, p. 141.)
7
One of the material bases of the power of the state over the small disconnected producing organisms
in India, was the regulation of the water supply. The Mahometan rulers of India understood this better
than their English successors. It is enough to recall to mind the famine of 1866, which cost the lives of
more than a million Hindus in the district of Orissa, in the Bengal presidency.
8
“There are no two countries which furnish an equal number of the necessaries of life in equal plenty,
and with the same quantity of labour. Men’s wants increase or diminish with the severity or
temperateness of the climate they live in; consequently, the proportion of trade which the inhabitants
of different countries are obliged to carry on through necessity cannot be the same, nor is it practicable
to ascertain the degree of variation farther than by the degrees of Heat and Cold; from whence one
may make this general conclusion, that the quantity of labour required for a certain number of people
is greatest in cold climates, and least in hot ones; for in the former men not only want more clothes,
but the earth more cultivating than in the latter.” (An Essay on the Governing Causes of the Natural
Rate of Interest. Lond. 1750. p. 60.) The author of this epoch-making anonymous work is J. Massy.
Hume took his theory of interest from it.
9
“Chaque travail doit (this appears also to be part of the droits et devoirs du citoyen [rights and duties
of the citizen]) laisser un excédent.” [All labour must leave a surplus] Proudhon.
10
F. Schouw: “Die Erde, die Pflanze und der Mensch,” 2. Ed. Leipz. 1854, p. 148.
11
In earlier editions of Capital the quotation from John Stuart Mill, “I assume throughout...of the
labourer,” had been given incorrectly, the words “where the labourers and capitalists are separate
classes” having been left out. Marx, in a letter dated November 28, 1878, pointed this out to
Danielson, the Russian translator of Capital, adding:
“The next two sentences, viz. ‘Strange optical illusion to see everywhere a state of things which as yet
exists only exceptionally on our earth. But let us finish’ - should be deleted and the following sentence
substituted:
5
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“Mr. Mill is good enough to believe that this state of things is not an absolute necessity, even in that
economic system in which ‘labourers and capitalists are separate classes.’”
The substance of this note has been taken from the Volksausgabe. The quotation from Mill is from his
Principles of Political Economy, Book II, Chap XV, 5.
12
J. St. Mill. Principles of Pol. Econ. Lond. 1868, p. 252-53 passim.

Chapter 17: Changes of Magnitude in the Price
of Labour-Power and in Surplus-Value
The value of labour-power is determined by the value of the necessaries of life habitually
required by the average labourer. The quantity of these necessaries is known at any given epoch
of a given society, and can therefore be treated as a constant magnitude. What changes, is the
value of this quantity. There are, besides, two other factors that enter into the determination of the
value of labour-power. One, the expenses of developing that power, which expenses vary with the
mode of production; the other, its natural diversity, the difference between the labour-power of
men and women, of children and adults. The employment of these different sorts of labourpower, an employment which is, in its turn, made necessary by the mode of production, makes a
great difference in the cost of maintaining the family of the labourer, and in the value of the
labour-power of the adult male. Both these factors, however, are excluded in the following
investigation. 1
I assume (1) that commodities are sold at their value; (2) that the price of labour-power rises
occasionally above its value, but never sinks below it.
On this assumption we have seen that the relative magnitudes of surplus-value and of price of
labour-power are determined by three circumstances; (1) the length of the working day, or the
extensive magnitude of labour; (2) the normal intensity of labour, its intensive magnitude,
whereby a given quantity of labour is expended in a given time; (3) the productiveness of labour,
whereby the same quantum of labour yields, in a given time, a greater or less quantum of product,
dependent on the degree of development in the conditions of production. Very different
combinations are clearly possible, according as one of the three factors is constant and two
variable, or two constant and one variable, or lastly, all three simultaneously variable. And the
number of these combinations is augmented by the fact that, when these factors simultaneously
vary, the amount and direction of their respective variations may differ. In what follows the chief
combinations alone are considered.

Section 1: Length of the Working day and Intensity of Labour
Constant. Productiveness of Labour Variable
On these assumptions the value of labour-power, and the magnitude of surplus-value, are
determined by three laws.
(1.) A working day of given length always creates the same amount of value, no matter how the
productiveness of labour, and, with it, the mass of the product, and the price of each single
commodity produced, may vary.
If the value created by a working day of 12 hours be, say, six shillings, then, although the mass of
the articles produced varies with the productiveness of labour, the only result is that the value
represented by six shillings is spread over a greater or less number of articles.
(2.) Surplus-value and the value of labour-power vary in opposite directions. A variation in the
productiveness of labour, its increase or diminution, causes a variation in the opposite direction in
the value of labour-power, and in the same direction in surplus-value.
The value created by a working day of 12 hours is a constant quantity, say, six shillings. This
constant quantity is the sum of the surplus-value plus the value of the labour-power, which latter
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value the labourer replaces by an equivalent. It is self-evident, that if a constant quantity consists
of two parts, neither of them can increase without the other diminishing. Let the two parts at
starting be equal; 3 shillings value of labour-power, 3 shillings surplus-value. Then the value of
the labour-power cannot rise from three shillings to four, without the surplus-value falling from
three shillings to two; and the surplus-value cannot rise from three shillings to four, without the
value of labour-power falling from three shillings to two. Under these circumstances, therefore,
no change can take place in the absolute magnitude, either of the surplus-value, or of the value of
labour-power, without a simultaneous change in their relative magnitudes, i.e., relatively to each
other. It is impossible for them to rise or fall simultaneously.
Further, the value of labour-power cannot fall, and consequently surplus-value cannot rise,
without a rise in the productiveness of labour. For instance, in the above case, the value of the
labour-power cannot sink from three shillings to two, unless an increase in the productiveness of
labour makes it possible to produce in 4 hours the same quantity of necessaries as previously
required 6 hours to produce. On the other hand, the value of the labour-power cannot rise from
three shillings to four, without a decrease in the productiveness of labour, whereby eight hours
become requisite to produce the same quantity of necessaries, for the production of which six
hours previously sufficed. It follows from this, that an increase in the productiveness of labour
causes a fall in the value of labour-power and a consequent rise in surplus-value, while, on the
other hand, a decrease in such productiveness causes a rise in the value of labour-power, and a
fall in surplus-value.
In formulating this law, Ricardo overlooked one circumstance; although a change in the
magnitude of the surplus-value or surplus labour causes a change in the opposite direction in the
magnitude of the value of labour-power, or in the quantity of necessary labour, it by no means
follows that they vary in the same proportion. They do increase or diminish by the same quantity.
But their proportional increase or diminution depends on their original magnitudes before the
change in the productiveness of labour took place. If the value of the labour-power be 4 shillings,
or the necessary labour time 8 hours, and the surplus-value be 2 shillings, or the surplus labour 4
hours, and if, in consequence of an increase in the productiveness of labour, the value of the
labour-power fall to 3 shillings, or the necessary labour to 6 hours, the surplus-value will rise to 3
shillings, or the surplus labour to 6 hours. The same quantity, 1 shilling or 2 hours, is added in
one case and subtracted in the other. But the proportional change of magnitude is different in each
case. While the value of the labour-power falls from 4 shillings to 3, i.e., by 1/4 or 25%, the
surplus-value rises from 2 shillings to 3, i.e., by 1/2 or 50%. It therefore follows that the
proportional increase or diminution in surplus-value, consequent on a given change in the
productiveness of labour, depends on the original magnitude of that portion of the working day
which embodies itself in surplus-value; the smaller that portion, the greater is the proportional
change; the greater that portion, the less is the proportional change.
(3.) Increase or diminution in surplus-value is always consequent on, and never the cause of, the
corresponding diminution or increase in the value of labour-power. 2
Since the working day is constant in magnitude, and is represented by a value of constant
magnitude, since, to every variation in the magnitude of surplus-value, there corresponds an
inverse variation in the value of labour-power, and since the value of labour-power cannot
change, except in consequence of a change in the productiveness of labour, it clearly follows,
under these conditions, that every change of magnitude in surplus-value arises from an inverse
change of magnitude in the value of labour-power. If, then, as we have already seen, there can be
no change of absolute magnitude in the value of labour-power, and in surplus-value,
unaccompanied by a change in their relative magnitudes, so now it follows that no change in their
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relative magnitudes is possible, without a previous change in the absolute magnitude of the value
of labour-power.
According to the third law, a change in the magnitude of surplus-value, presupposes a movement
in the value of labour-power, which movement is brought about by a variation in the
productiveness of labour. The limit of this change is given by the altered value of labour-power.
Nevertheless, even when circumstances allow the law to operate, subsidiary movements may
occur. For example: if in consequence of the increased productiveness of labour, the value of
labour-power falls from 4 shillings to 3, or the necessary labour time from 8 hours to 6, the price
of labour-power may possibly not fall below 3s. 8d., 3s. 6d., or 3s. 2d., and the surplus-value
consequently not rise above 3s. 4d., 3s. 6d., or 3s. 10d. The amount of this fall, the lowest limit of
which is 3 shillings (the new value of labour-power), depends on the relative weight, which the
pressure of capital on the one side, and the resistance of the labourer on the other, throws into the
scale.
The value of labour-power is determined by the value of a given quantity of necessaries. It is the
value and not the mass of these necessaries that varies with the productiveness of labour. It is,
however, possible that, owing to an increase of productiveness, both the labourer and the
capitalist may simultaneously be able to appropriate a greater quantity of these necessaries,
without any change in the price of labour-power or in surplus-value. If the value of labour-power
be 3 shillings, and the necessary labour time amount to 6 hours, if the surplus-value likewise be 3
shillings, and the surplus labour 6 hours, then if the productiveness of labour were doubled
without altering the ratio of necessary labour to surplus labour, there would be no change of
magnitude in surplus-value and price of labour-power. The only result would be that each of them
would represent twice as many use-values as before; these use-values being twice as cheap as
before. Although labour-power would be unchanged in price, it would be above its value. If,
however, the price of labour-power had fallen, not to 1s. 6d., the lowest possible point consistent
with its new value, but to 2s. 10d. or 2s. 6d., still this lower price would represent an increased
mass of necessaries. In this way it is possible with an increasing productiveness of labour, for the
price of labour-power to keep on falling, and yet this fall to be accompanied by a constant growth
in the mass of the labourer's means of subsistence. But even in such case, the fall in the value of
labour-power would cause a corresponding rise of surplus-value, and thus the abyss between the
labourer's position and that of the capitalist would keep widening. 3
Ricardo was the first who accurately formulated the three laws we have above stated. But he falls
into the following errors: (1) he looks upon the special conditions under which these laws hold
good as the general and sole conditions of capitalist production. He knows no change, either in
the length of the working day, or in the intensity of labour; consequently with him there can be
only one variable factor, viz., the productiveness of labour; (2), and this error vitiates his analysis
much more than (1), he has not, any more than have the other economists, investigated surplusvalue as such, i.e., independently of its particular forms, such as profit, rent, &c. He therefore
confounds together the laws of the rate of surplus-value and the laws of the rate of profit. The rate
of profit is, as we have already said, the ratio of the surplus-value to the total capital advanced;
the rate of surplus-value is the ratio of the surplus-value to the variable part of that capital.
Assume that a capital C of £500 is made up of raw material, instruments of labour, &c. (c) to the
amount of £400; and of wages (v) to the amount of £100; and further, that the surplus-value (s) =
£100. Then we have rate of surplus-value s/v = £100/£100 = 100%. But the rate of profit s/c =
£100/£500 = 20%. It is, besides, obvious that the rate of profit may depend on circumstances that
in no way affect the rate of surplus-value. I shall show in Book III. that, with a given rate of
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surplus-value, we may have any number of rates of profit, and that various rates of surplus-value
may, under given conditions, express themselves in a single rate of profit.

Section 2: Working day Constant. Productiveness of Labour
Constant. Intensity of Labour Variable
Increased intensity of labour means increased expenditure of labour in a given time. Hence a
working day of more intense labour is embodied in more products than is one of less intense
labour, the length of each day being the same. Increased productiveness of labour also, it is true,
will supply more products in a given working day. But in this latter case, the value of each single
product falls, for it costs less labour than before; in the former case, that value remains
unchanged, for each article costs the same labour as before. Here we have an increase in the
number of products, unaccompanied by a fall in their individual prices: as their number increases,
so does the sum of their prices. But in the case of increased productiveness, a given value is
spread over a greater mass of products. Hence the length of the working day being constant, a
day's labour of increased intensity will be incorporated in an increased value, and, the value of
money remaining unchanged, in more money. The value created varies with the extent to which
the intensity of labour deviates from its normal intensity in the society. A given working day,
therefore, no longer creates a constant, but a variable value; in a day of 12 hours of ordinary
intensity, the value created is, say 6 shillings, but with increased intensity, the value created may
be 7, 8, or more shillings. It is clear that, if the value created by a day's labour increases from,
say, 6 to 8 shillings then the two parts into which this value is divided, viz., price of labour-power
and surplus-value, may both of them increase simultaneously, and either equally or unequally.
They may both simultaneously increase from 3 shillings to 4. Here, the rise in the price of labourpower does not necessarily imply that the price has risen above the value of labour-power. On the
contrary, the rise in price may be accompanied by a fall in value. This occurs whenever the rise in
the price of labour-power does not compensate for its increased wear and tear.
We know that, with transitory exceptions, a change in the productiveness of labour does not cause
any change in the value of labour-power, nor consequently in the magnitude of surplus-value,
unless the products of the industries affected are articles habitually consumed by the labourers. In
the present case this condition no longer applies. For when the variation is either in the duration
or in the intensity of labour, there is always a corresponding change in the magnitude of the value
created, independently of the nature of the article in which that value is embodied.
If the intensity of labour were to increase simultaneously and equally in every branch of industry,
then the new and higher degree of intensity would become the normal degree for the society, and
would therefore cease to be taken account of. But still, even then, the intensity of labour would be
different in different countries, and would modify the international application of the law of
value. The more intense working day of one nation would be represented by a greater sum of
money than would the less intense day of another nation. 4

Section 3: Productiveness and Intensity of Labour Constant.
Length of the Working day Variable
The working day may vary in two ways. It may be made either longer or shorter. From our
present data, and within the limits of the assumptions made above we obtain the following laws:
(1.) The working day creates a greater or less amount of value in proportion to its length – thus, a
variable and not a constant quantity of value.
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(2.) Every change in the relation between the magnitudes of surplus-value and of the value of
labour-power arises from a change in the absolute magnitude of the surplus labour, and
consequently of the surplus-value.
(3.) The absolute value of labour-power can change only in consequence of the reaction exercised
by the prolongation of surplus labour upon the wear and tear of labour-power. Every change in
this absolute value is therefore the effect, but never the cause, of a change in the magnitude of
surplus-value.
We begin with the case in which the working day is shortened.
(1.) A shortening of the working day under the conditions given above, leaves the value of
labour-power, and with it, the necessary labour time, unaltered. It reduces the surplus labour and
surplus-value. Along with the absolute magnitude of the latter, its relative magnitude also falls,
i.e., its magnitude relatively to the value of labour-power whose magnitude remains unaltered.
Only by lowering the price of labour-power below its value could the capitalist save himself
harmless.
All the usual arguments against the shortening of the working day, assume that it takes place
under the conditions we have here supposed to exist; but in reality the very contrary is the case: a
change in the productiveness and intensity of labour either precedes, or immediately follows, a
shortening of the working day. 5
(2.) Lengthening of the working day. Let the necessary labour time be 6 hours, or the value of
labour-power 3 shillings; also let the surplus labour be 6 hours or the surplus-value 3 shillings.
The whole working day then amounts to 12 hours and is embodied in a value of 6 shillings. If,
now, the working day be lengthened by 2 hours and the price of labour-power remain unaltered,
the surplus-value increases both absolutely and relatively. Although there is no absolute change in
the value of labour-power, it suffers a relative fall. Under the conditions assumed in 1. there could
not be a change of relative magnitude in the value of labour-power without a change in its
absolute magnitude. Here, on the contrary, the change of relative magnitude in the value of
labour-power is the result of the change of absolute magnitude in surplus-value.
Since the value in which a day's labour is embodied, increases with the length of that day, it is
evident that the surplus-value and the price of labour-power may simultaneously increase, either
by equal or unequal quantities. This simultaneous increase is therefore possible in two cases, one,
the actual lengthening of the working day, the other, an increase in the intensity of labour
unaccompanied by such lengthening.
When the working day is prolonged, the price of labour-power may fall below its value, although
that price be nominally unchanged or even rise. The value of a day's labour-power is, as will be
remembered, estimated from its normal average duration, or from the normal duration of life
among the labourers, and from corresponding normal transformations of organised bodily matter
into motion, 6 in conformity with the nature of man. Up to a certain point, the increased wear and
tear of labour-power, inseparable from a lengthened working day, may be compensated by higher
wages. But beyond this point the wear and tear increases in geometrical progression, and every
condition suitable for the normal reproduction and functioning of labour-power is suppressed.
The price of labour-power and the degree of its exploitation cease to be commensurable
quantities.
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Section 4: Simultaneous Variations in the Duration,
Productiveness, and Intensity of Labour
It is obvious that a large number of combinations are here possible. Any two of the factors may
vary and the third remain constant, or all three may vary at once. They may vary either in the
same or in different degrees, in the same or in opposite directions, with the result that the
variations counteract one another, either wholly or in part. Nevertheless the analysis of every
possible case is easy in view of the results given in I., II., and III. The effect of every possible
combination may be found by treating each factor in turn as variable, and the other two constant
for the time being. We shall, therefore, notice, and that briefly, but two important cases.

A. Diminishing Productiveness of Labour with a
Simultaneous Lengthening of the Working day
In speaking of diminishing productiveness of labour, we here refer to diminution in those
industries whose products determine the value of labour-power; such a diminution, for example,
as results from decreasing fertility of the soil, and from the corresponding dearness of its
products. Take the working day at 12 hours and the value created by it at 6 shillings, of which one
half replaces the value of the labour-power, the other forms the surplus-value. Suppose, in
consequence of the increased dearness of the products of the soil, that the value of labour-power
rises from 3 shillings to 4, and therefore the necessary labour time from 6 hours to 8. If there be
no change in the length of the working day, the surplus labour would fall from 6 hours to 4, the
surplus-value from 3 shillings to 2. If the day be lengthened by 2 hours, i.e., from 12 hours to 14,
the surplus labour remains at 6 hours, the surplus-value at 3 shillings *, but the surplus-value
decreases compared with the value of labour-power, as measured by the necessary labour time. If
the day be lengthened by 4 hours, viz., from 12 hours to 16, the proportional magnitudes of
surplus-value and value of labour-power, of surplus labour and necessary labour, continue
unchanged, but the absolute magnitude of surplus-value rises from 3 shillings to 4, that of the
surplus labour from 6 hours to 8, an increment of 33 1/3%. Therefore, with diminishing
productiveness of labour and a simultaneous lengthening of the working day, the absolute
magnitude of surplus-value may continue unaltered, at the same time that its relative magnitude
diminishes; its relative magnitude may continue unchanged, at the same time that its absolute
magnitude increases; and, provided the lengthening of the day be sufficient, both may increase.
In the period between 1799 and 1815 the increasing price of provisions led in England to a
nominal rise in wages, although the real wages, expressed in the necessaries of life, fell. From this
fact West and Ricardo drew the conclusion, that the diminution in the productiveness of
agricultural labour had brought about a fall in the rate of surplus-value, and they made this
assumption of a fact that existed only in their imaginations, the starting-point of important
investigations into the relative magnitudes of wages, profits, and rent. But, as a matter of fact,
surplus-value had at that time, thanks to the increased intensity of labour, and to the prolongation
of the working day, increased both in absolute and relative magnitude. This was the period in
which the right to prolong the hours of labour to an outrageous extent was established; 7 the
period that was especially characterised by an accelerated accumulation of capital here, by
pauperism there. 8

*

Earlier English translations have “6 sh.” instead of 3 shillings. This error was pointed out to us by a reader, we have
investigated and checked with the 1872 German Edition and duly corrected an obvious error.
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B. Increasing Intensity and Productiveness of Labour with
Simultaneous Shortening of the Working day
Increased productiveness and greater intensity of labour, both have a like effect. They both
augment the mass of articles produced in a given time. Both, therefore, shorten that portion of the
working day which the labourer needs to produce his means of subsistence or their equivalent.
The minimum length of the working day is fixed by this necessary but contractile portion of it. If
the whole working day were to shrink to the length of this portion, surplus labour would vanish, a
consummation utterly impossible under the régime of capital. Only by suppressing the capitalist
form of production could the length of the working day be reduced to the necessary labour time.
But, even in that case, the latter would extend its limits. On the one hand, because the notion of
“means of subsistence” would considerably expand, and the labourer would lay claim to an
altogether different standard of life. On the other hand, because a part of what is now surplus
labour, would then count as necessary labour; I mean the labour of forming a fund for reserve and
accumulation.
The more the productiveness of labour increases, the more can the working day be shortened; and
the more the working day is shortened, the more can the intensity of labour increase. From a
social point of view, the productiveness increases in the same ratio as the economy of labour,
which, in its turn, includes not only economy of the means of production, but also the avoidance
of all useless labour. The capitalist mode of production, while on the one hand, enforcing
economy in each individual business, on the other hand, begets, by its anarchical system of
competition, the most outrageous squandering of labour-power and of the social means of
production, not to mention the creation of a vast number of employments, at present
indispensable, but in themselves superfluous.
The intensity and productiveness of labour being given, the time which society is bound to devote
to material production is shorter, and as a consequence, the time at its disposal for the free
development, intellectual and social, of the individual is greater, in proportion as the work is more
and more evenly divided among all the able-bodied members of society, and as a particular class
is more and more deprived of the power to shift the natural burden of labour from its own
shoulders to those of another layer of society. In this direction, the shortening of the working day
finds at last a limit in the generalisation of labour. In capitalist society spare time is acquired for
one class by converting the whole life-time of the masses into labour time.
1

Note in the 3rd German edition. — The case considered at pages 321-324 is here of course omitted.
— F. E.
2
To this third law MacCulloch has made, amongst others, this absurd addition, that a rise in surplusvalue, unaccompanied by a fall in the value of labour-power, can occur through the abolition of taxes
payable by the capitalist. The abolition of such taxes makes no change whatever in the quantity of
surplus-value that the capitalist extorts at first-hand from the labourer. It alters only the proportion in
which that surplus-value is divided between himself and third persons. It consequently makes no
alteration whatever in the relation between surplus-value and value of labour-power. MacCulloch's
exception therefore proves only his misapprehension of the rule, a misfortune that as often happens to
him in the vulgarisation of Ricardo, as it does to J. B. Say in the vulgarisation of Adam Smith.
3
“When an alteration takes place in the productiveness of industry, and that either more or less is
produced by a given quantity of labour and capital, the proportion of wages may obviously vary,
whilst the quantity, which that proportion represents, remains the same, or the quantity may vary,
whilst the proportion remains the same.” (“Outlines of Political Economy, &c.,” p. 67.)
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“All things being equal, the English manufacturer can turn out a considerably larger amount of work
in a given time than a foreign manufacturer, so much as to counterbalance the difference of the
working days, between 60 hours a week here, and 72 or 80 elsewhere.” (Rep. of Insp. of Fact. for 31st
Oct., 1855, p. 65.) The most infallible means for reducing this qualitative difference between the
English and Continental working hour would be a law shortening quantitatively the length of the
working day in Continental factories.
5
“There are compensating circumstances ... which the working of the Ten Hours' Act has brought to
light.” (“Rep. of Insp. of Fact. for 31st Oct. 1848,” p. 7.)
6
“The amount of labour which a man had undergone in the course of 24 hours might be
approximately arrived at by an examination of the chemical changes which had taken place in his
body, changed forms in matter indicating the anterior exercise of dynamic force.” (Grove: “On the
Correlation of Physical Forces.”)
7
“Corn and labour rarely march quite abreast; but there is an obvious limit, beyond which they cannot
be separated. With regard to the unusual exertions made by the labouring classes in periods of
dearness, which produce the fall of wages noticed in the evidence” (namely, before the Parliamentary
Committee of Inquiry, 1814-15), “they are most meritorious in the individuals, and certainly favour
the growth of capital. But no man of humanity could wish to see them constant and unremitted. They
are most admirable as a temporary relief; but if they were constantly in action, effects of a similar kind
would result from them, as from the population of a country being pushed to the very extreme limits
of its food.” (Malthus: “Inquiry into the Nature and Progress of Rent,” Lond., 1815, p. 48, note.) All
honour to Malthus that he lays stress on the lengthening of the hours of labour, a fact to which he
elsewhere in his pamphlet draws attention, while Ricardo and others, in face of the most notorious
facts, make invariability in the length of the working day the groundwork of all their investigations.
But the conservative interests, which Malthus served, prevented him from seeing that an unlimited
prolongation of the working day, combined with an extraordinary development of machinery, and the
exploitation of women and children, must inevitably have made a great portion of the working-class
“supernumerary,” particularly whenever the war should have ceased, and the monopoly of England in
the markets of the world should have come to an end. It was, of course, far more convenient, and
much more in conformity with the interests of the ruling classes, whom Malthus adored like a true
priest, to explain this “over-population” by the eternal laws of Nature, rather than by the historical
laws of capitalist production.
8
“A principal cause of the increase of capital, during the war, proceeded from the greater exertions,
and perhaps the greater privations of the labouring classes, the most numerous in every society. More
women and children were compelled by necessitous circumstances, to enter upon laborious
occupations, and former workmen were, from the same cause, obliged to devote a greater portion of
their time to increase production.” (Essays on Pol. Econ., in which are illustrated the principal causes
of the present national distress. Lond., 1830, p. 248.)

Chapter 18: Various Formula for the rate of
Surplus-Value
We have seen that the rate of surplus-value is represented by the following formulae:
Surplus-value
s
Surplus-value
Surplus-labour
=
=
I.
Variable Capital v
Value of labour-power Necessary labour

( )

The two first of these formulae represent, as a ratio of values, that which, in the third, is
represented as a ratio of the times during which those values are produced. These formulae,
supplementary the one to the other, are rigorously definite and correct. We therefore find them
substantially, but not consciously, worked out in classical Political Economy. There we meet with
the following derivative formulae.
Surplus-labour
Surplus-value
Surplus-product
=
=
II.
Working day
Value of the Product
Total Product
One and the same ratio is here expressed as a ratio of labour-times, of the values in which those
labour-times are embodied, and of the products in which those values exist. It is of course
understood that, by “Value of the Product,” is meant only the value newly created in a working
day, the constant part of the value of the product being excluded.
In all of these formulae (II.), the actual degree of exploitation of labour, or the rate of surplusvalue, is falsely expressed. Let the working day be 12 hours. Then, making the same assumptions
as in former instances, the real degree of exploitation of labour will be represented in the
following proportions.
6 hours surplus-labour
Surplus-value of 3 sh.
=
= 100%
6 hours necessary labour
Variable Capital of 3 sh.
From formulae II. we get very differently,
6 hours surplus-labour
Surplus-value of 3 sh.
=
= 50%
Working day of 12 hours
Value created of 6 sh.
These derivative formulae express, in reality, only the proportion in which the working day, or
the value produced by it, is divided between capitalist and labourer. If they are to be treated as
direct expressions of the degree of self-expansion of capital, the following erroneous law would
hold good: Surplus-labour or surplus-value can never reach 100%. 1 Since the surplus-labour is
only an aliquot part of the working day, or since surplus-value is only an aliquot part of the value
created, the surplus-labour must necessarily be always less than the working day, or the surplusvalue always less than the total value created. In order, however, to attain the ratio of 100:100
they must be equal. In order that the surplus-labour may absorb the whole day (i.e., an average
day of any week or year), the necessary labour must sink to zero. But if the necessary labour
vanish, so too does the surplus-labour, since it is only a function of the former. The ratio
Surplus-labour or Surplus-value
Working day
Value created
can therefore never reach the limit 100/100, still less rise to 100 + x/100. But not so the rate of
surplus-value, the real degree of exploitation of labour. Take, e.g., the estimate of L. de Lavergne,
according to which the English agricultural labourer gets only 1/4, the capitalist (farmer) on the
other hand 3/4 of the product 2 or its value, apart from the question of how the booty is
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subsequently divided between the capitalist, the landlord, and others. According to this, this
surplus-labour of the English agricultural labourer is to his necessary labour as 3:1, which gives a
rate of exploitation of 300%.
The favorite method of treating the working day as constant in magnitude became, through the
use of formulae II., a fixed usage, because in them surplus-labour is always compared with a
working day of given length. The same holds good when the repartition of the value produced is
exclusively kept in sight. The working day that has already been realized in given value, must
necessarily be a day of given length.
The habit of representing surplus-value and value of labour-power as fractions of the value
created – a habit that originates in the capitalist mode of production itself, and whose import will
hereafter be disclosed – conceals the very transaction that characterizes capital, namely the
exchange of variable capital for living labour-power, and the consequent exclusion of the labourer
from the product. Instead of the real fact, we have false semblance of an association, in which
labourer and capitalist divide the product in proportion to the different elements which they
respectively contribute towards its formation.3
Moreover, the formulae II. can at any time be reconverted into formulae I. If, for instance, we
have
Surplus-labour of 6 hours
Working day of 12 hours
then the necessary labour-time being 12 hours less the surplus-labour of 6 hours, we get the
following result,
Surplus-labour of 6 hours
100
=
Necessary labour of 6 hours
100
There is a third formula which I have occasionally already anticipated; it is
Surplus-value
Surplus-labour
Unpaid labour
=
=
III.
Value of labour-power
Necessary labour
Paid labour
After the investigations we have given above, it is no longer possible to be misled, by the formula
Unpaid labour,
Paid labour
into concluding, that the capitalist pays for labour and not for labour-power. This formula is only
a popular expression for
Surplus-labour,
Necessary labour
The capitalist pays the value, so far as price coincides with value, of the labour-power, and
receives in exchange the disposal of the living labour-power itself. His usufruct is spread over
two periods. During one the labourer produces a value that is only equal to the value of his
labour-power; he produces its equivalent. This the capitalist receives in return for his advance of
the price of the labour-power, a product ready made in the market. During the other period, the
period of surplus-labour, the usufruct of the labour-power creates a value for the capitalist, that
costs him no equivalent. 4 This expenditure of labour-power comes to him gratis. In this sense it is
that surplus-labour can be called unpaid labour.
Capital, therefore, it not only, as Adam Smith says, the command over labour. It is essentially the
command over unpaid labour. All surplus-value, whatever particular form (profit, interest, or
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rent), it may subsequently crystallize into, is in substance the materialisation of unpaid labour.
The secret of the self-expansion of capital resolves itself into having the disposal of a definite
quantity of other people’s unpaid labour.
1

Thus, e.g., in “Dritter Brief an v. Kirchmann von Rodbertus. Widerlegung der Ricardo’schen Lehre
von der Grundrente und Begrundung einer neuen Rententheorie.” Berlin, 1851. I shall return to this
letter later on; in spite of its erroneous theory of rent, it sees through the nature of capitalist
production.
NOTE ADDED IN THE 3RD GERMAN EDITION: It may be seen from this how favorably Marx
judged his predecessors, whenever he found in them real progress, or new and sound ideas. The
subsequent publications of Robertus’ letters to Rud. Meyer has shown that the above
acknowledgement by Marx wants restricting to some extent. In those letters this passage occurs:
“Capital must be rescued not only from labor, but from itself, and that will be best effected, by treating
the acts of the industrial capitalist as economic and political functions, that have been delegated to him
with his capital, and by treating his profit as a form of salary, because we still know no other social
organisation. But salaries may be regulated, and may also be reduced if they take too much from
wages. The irruption of Marx into Society, as I may call his book, must be warded off.... Altogether,
Marx’s book is not so much an investigation into capital, as a polemic against the present form of
capital, a form which he confounds with the concept itself of capital.”
("Briefe, &c., von Dr. Robertus-Jagetzow, herausgg. von Dr. Rud. Meyer,” Berlin, 1881, I, Bd. P.111,
46. Brief von Rodbertus.) To such ideological commonplaces did the bold attack by Robertus in his
“social letters” finally dwindle down. — F. E.
2
That part of the product which merely replaces the constant capital advanced is of course left out in
this calculation. Mr. L. de Lavergne, a blind admirer of England, is inclined to estimate the share of
the capitalist too low, rather than too high.
3
All well-developed forms of capitalist production being forms of co-operation, nothing is, of course,
easier, than to make abstraction from their antagonistic character, and to transform them by a word
into some form of free association, as is done by A. de Laborde in “De l’Esprit d’Association dans
tous les intérêts de la communauté". Paris 1818. H. Carey, the Yankee, occasionally performs this
conjuring trick with like success, even with the relations resulting from slavery.
4
Although the Physiocrats could not penetrate the mystery of surplus-value, yet this much was clear
to them, viz., that it is “une richesse indépendante et disponible qu’il (the possessor) n’a point achetée
et qu’il vend.” [a wealth which is independent and disposable, which he ... has not bought and which
he sells] (Turgot: “Réflexions sur la Formation et la Distribution des Richesses,” p.11.)
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Chapter 19: The Transformation of the Value
(and Respective Price) of Labour-Power into
Wages
On the surface of bourgeois society the wage of the labourer appears as the price of labour, a
certain quantity of money that is paid for a certain quantity of labour. Thus people speak of the
value of labour and call its expression in money its necessary or natural price. On the other hand
they speak of the market-prices of labour, i.e., prices oscillating above or below its natural price.
But what is the value of a commodity? The objective form of the social labour expended in its
production. And how do we measure the quantity of this value? By the quantity of the labour
contained in it. How then is the value, e.g., of a 12 hour working-day to be determined? By the 12
working-hours contained in a working day of 12 hours, which is an absurd tautology. 1
In order to be sold as a commodity in the market, labour must at all events exist before it is sold.
But, could the labourer give it an independent objective existence, he would sell a commodity and
not labour. 2
Apart from these contradictions, a direct exchange of money, i.e., of realized labour, with living
labour would either do away with the law of value which only begins to develop itself freely on
the basis of capitalist production, or do away with capitalist production itself, which rests directly
on wage-labour. The working day of 12 hours embodies itself, e.g., in a money-value of 6s. Either
equivalents are exchanged, and then the labourer receives 6s, for 12 hours’ labour; the price of his
labour would be equal to the price of his product. In this case he produces no surplus-value for
the buyer of his labour, the 6s. are not transformed into capital, the basis of capitalist production
vanishes. But it is on this very basis that he sells his labour and that his labour is wage-labour. Or
else he receives for 12 hours’ labour less than 6s., i.e., less than 12 hours’ labour. Twelve hours’
labour are exchanged against 10, 6, &c., hours’ labour. This equalisation of unequal quantities not
merely does away with the determination of value. Such a self-destructive contradiction cannot be
in any way even enunciated or formulated as a law. 3
It is of no avail to deduce the exchange of more labour against less, from their difference of form,
the one being realized, the other living. 4 This is the more absurd as the value of a commodity is
determined not by the quantity of labour actually realized in it, but by the quantity of living
labour necessary for its production. A commodity represents, say, 6 working-hours. If an
invention is made by which it can be produced in 3 hours, the value, even of the commodity
already produced, falls by half. It represents now 3 hours of social labour instead of the 6
formerly necessary. It is the quantity of labour required for its production, not the realized form of
that labour, by which the amount of the value of a commodity is determined.
That which comes directly face to face with the possessor of money on the market, is in fact not
labour, but the labourer. What the latter sells is his labour-power. As soon as his labour actually
begins, it has already ceased to belong to him; it can therefore no longer be sold by him. Labour
is the substance, and the immanent measure of value, but has itself no value.5
In the expression “value of labour,” the idea of value is not only completely obliterated, but
actually reversed. It is an expression as imaginary as the value of the earth. These imaginary
expressions, arise, however, from the relations of production themselves. They are categories for
the phenomenal forms of essential relations. That in their appearance things often represent
themselves in inverted form is pretty well known in every science except Political Economy. 6
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Classical Political Economy borrowed from every-day life the category “price of labour” without
further criticism, and then simply asked the question, how is this price determined? It soon
recognized that the change in the relations of demand and supply explained in regard to the price
of labour, as of all other commodities, nothing except its changes i.e., the oscillations of the
market-price above or below a certain mean. If demand and supply balance, the oscillation of
prices ceases, all other conditions remaining the same. But then demand and supply also cease to
explain anything. The price of labour, at the moment when demand and supply are in equilibrium,
is its natural price, determined independently of the relation of demand and supply. And how this
price is determined is just the question. Or a larger period of oscillations in the market-price is
taken, e.g., a year, and they are found to cancel one the other, leaving a mean average quantity, a
relatively constant magnitude. This had naturally to be determined otherwise than by its own
compensating variations. This price which always finally predominates over the accidental
market-prices of labour and regulates them, this “necessary price” (Physiocrats) or “natural price”
of labour (Adam Smith) can, as with all other commodities, be nothing else than its value
expressed in money. In this way Political Economy expected to penetrate athwart the accidental
prices of labour, to the value of labour. As with other commodities, this value was determined by
the cost of production. But what is the cost of production - of the labourer, i.e., the cost of
producing or reproducing the labourer himself? This question unconsciously substituted itself in
Political Economy for the original one; for the search after the cost of production of labour as
such turned in a circle and never left the spot. What economists therefore call value of labour, is
in fact the value of labour-power, as it exists in the personality of the labourer, which is as
different from its function, labour, as a machine is from the work it performs. Occupied with the
difference between the market-price of labour and its so-called value, with the relation of this
value to the rate of profit, and to the values of the commodities produced by means of labour,
&c., they never discovered that the course of the analysis had led not only from the market-prices
of labour to its presumed value, but had led to the resolution of this value of labour itself into the
value of labour-power. Classical economy never arrived at a consciousness of the results of its
own analysis; it accepted uncritically the categories “value of labour,” “natural price of labour,”
&c., as final and as adequate expressions for the value-relation under consideration, and was thus
led, as will be seen later, into inextricable confusion and contradiction, while it offered to the
vulgar economists a secure basis of operations for their shallowness, which on principle worships
appearances only.
Let us next see how value (and price) of labour-power, present themselves in this transformed
condition as wages.
We know that the daily value of labour-power is calculated upon a certain length of the labourer’s
life, to which, again, corresponds a certain length of working day. Assume the habitual working
day as 12 hours, the daily value of labour-power as 3s., the expression in money of a value that
embodies 6 hours of labour. If the labourer receives 3s., then he receives the value of his labourpower functioning through 12 hours. If, now, this value of a day’s labour-power is expressed as
the value of a day’s labour itself, we have the formula: Twelve hours’ labour has a value of 3s.
The value of labour-power thus determines the value of labour, or, expressed in money, its
necessary price. If, on the other hand, the price of labour-power differs from its value, in like
manner the price of labour differs from its so-called value.
As the value of labour is only an irrational expression for the value of labour-power, it follows, of
course, that the value of labour must always be less than the value it produces, for the capitalist
always makes labour-power work longer than is necessary for the reproduction of its own value.
In the above example, the value of the labour-power that functions through 12 hours is 3s., a
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value for the reproduction of which 6 hours are required. The value which the labour-power
produces is, on the other hand, 6s., because it, in fact, functions during 12 hours, and the value it
produces depends, not on its own value, but on the length of time it is in action. Thus, we have a
result absurd at first sight that labour which creates a value of 6s. possesses a value of 3s.7
We see, further: The value of 3s. by which a part only of the working day – i.e., 6 hours’ labour-is
paid for, appears as the value or price of the whole working day of 12 hours, which thus includes
6 hours unpaid for. The wage form thus extinguishes every trace of the division of the working
day into necessary labour and surplus labour, into paid and unpaid labour. All labour appears as
paid labour. In the corvée, the labour of the worker for himself, and his compulsory labour for his
lord, differ in space and time in the clearest possible way. In slave labour, even that part of the
working day in which the slave is only replacing the value of his own means of existence, in
which, therefore, in fact, he works for himself alone, appears as labour for his master. All the
slave’s labour appears as unpaid labour. 8 In wage labour, on the contrary, even surplus labour, or
unpaid labour, appears as paid. There the property-relation conceals the labour of the slave for
himself; here the money-relation conceals the unrequited labour of the wage labourer.
Hence, we may understand the decisive importance of the transformation of value and price of
labour-power into the form of wages, or into the value and price of labour itself. This phenomenal
form, which makes the actual relation invisible, and, indeed, shows the direct opposite of that
relation, forms the basis of all the juridical notions of both labourer and capitalist, of all the
mystifications of the capitalistic mode of production, of all its illusions as to liberty, of all the
apologetic shifts of the vulgar economists.
If history took a long time to get at the bottom of the mystery of wages, nothing, on the other
hand, is more easy to understand than the necessity, the raison d’etre, of this phenomenon.
The exchange between capital and labour at first presents itself to the mind in the same guise as
the buying and selling of all other commodities. The buyer gives a certain sum of money, the
seller an article of a nature different from money. The jurist’s consciousness recognizes in this, at
most, a material difference, expressed in the juridically equivalent formula: “Do ut des, do ut
facias, facio ut des, facio ut facias.” 9
Furthermore, exchange-value and use-value, being intrinsically incommensurable magnitudes, the
expressions “value of labour,” “price of labour,” do not seem more irrational than the expressions
“value of cotton,” “price of cotton.” Moreover, the labourer is paid after he has given his labour.
In its function of means of payment, money realizes subsequently the value or price of the article
supplied – i.e., in this particular case, the value or price of the labour supplied. Finally, the usevalue supplied by the labourer to the capitalist is not, in fact, his labour-power, but its function,
some definite useful labour, the work of tailoring, shoemaking, spinning, &c. That this same
labour is, on the other hand, the universal value-creating element, and thus possesses a property
by which it differs from all other commodities, is beyond the cognizance of the ordinary mind.
Let us put ourselves in the place of the labourer who receives for 12 hours’ labour, say the value
produced by 6 hours’ labour, say 3s. For him, in fact, his 12 hours’ labour is the means of buying
the 3s. The value of his labour-power may vary, with the value of his usual means of subsistence,
from 3 to 4 shillings, or from 3 to 2 shillings; or, if the value of his labour-power remains
constant, its price may, in consequence of changing relations of demand and supply, rise to 4s. or
fall to 2s. He always gives 12 hours of labour. Every change in the amount of the equivalent that
he receives appears to him, therefore, necessarily as a change in the value or price of his 12
hours’ work. This circumstance misled Adam Smith, who treated the working day as a constant
quantity, 10 to the assertion that the value of labour is constant, although the value of the means of
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subsistence may vary, and the same working day, therefore, may represent itself in more or less
money for the labourer.
Let us consider, on the other hand, the capitalist. He wishes to receive as much labour as possible
for as little money as possible. Practically, therefore, the only thing that interests him is the
difference between the price of labour-power and the value which its function creates. But, then,
he tries to buy all commodities as cheaply as possible, and always accounts for his profit by
simple cheating, by buying under, and selling over the value. Hence, he never comes to see that,
if such a thing as the value of labour really existed, and he really paid this value, no capital would
exist, his money would not be turned into capital.
Moreover, the actual movement of wages presents phenomena which seem to prove that not the
value of labour-power is paid, but the value of its function, of labour itself. We may reduce these
phenomena to two great classes: 1.) Change of wages with the changing length of the working
day. One might as well conclude that not the value of a machine is paid, but that of its working,
because it costs more to hire a machine for a week than for a day. 2.) The individual difference in
the wages of different labourers who do the same kind of work. We find this individual
difference, but are not deceived by it, in the system of slavery, where, frankly and openly, without
any circumlocution, labour-power itself is sold. Only, in the slave system, the advantage of a
labour-power above the average, and the disadvantage of a labour-power below the average,
affects the slave-owner; in the wage-labour system, it affects the labourer himself, because his
labour-power is, in the one case, sold by himself, in the other, by a third person.
For the rest, in respect to the phenomenal form, “value and price of labour,” or “wages,” as
contrasted with the essential relation manifested therein, viz., the value and price of labourpower, the same difference holds that holds in respect to all phenomena and their hidden
substratum. The former appear directly and spontaneously as current modes of thought; the latter
must first be discovered by science. Classical Political Economy nearly touches the true relation
of things, without, however, consciously formulating it. This it cannot, so long as it sticks in its
bourgeois
skin.
1

“Mr.Ricardo ingeniously enough avoids a difficulty which, on a first view, threatens to encumber his
doctrine — that value depends on the quantity of labour employed in production. If this principle is
rigidly adhered to, it follows that the value of labour depends on the quantity of labour employed in
producing it — which is evidently absurd. By a dexterous turn, therefore, Mr. Ricardo makes the
value of labour depend on the quantity of labour required to produce wages; or, to give him the benefit
of his own language, he maintains, that the value of labour is to be estimated by the quantity of labour
required to produce wages; by which he means the quantity of labour required to produce the money
or commodities given to the labourer. This is similar to saying, that the value of cloth is estimated, not
by the quantity of labour bestowed on its production, but by the quantity of labour bestowed on the
production of the silver, for which the cloth is exchanged.” — “A Critical Dissertation on the Nature,
&c., of Value,” pp. 50, 51.
2
“If you call labour a commodity, it is not like a commodity which is first produced in order to
exchange, and then brought to market where it must exchange with other commodities according to
the respective quantities of each which there may be in the market at the time; labour is created the
moment it is brought to market; nay, it is brought to market before it is created.” — “Observations on
Certain Verbal Disputes,” &c., pp. 75, 76.
3
“Treating labour as a commodity, and capital, the produce of labour, as another, then, if the values of
these two commodities were regulated by equal quantities of labour, a given amount of labour would
... exchange for that quantity of capital which had been produced by the same amount of labour;
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antecedent labour would ... exchange for the same amount as present labour. But the value of labour in
relation to other commodities ... is determined not by equal quantities of labour.” — E. G. Wakefield
in his edition of Adam Smith’s “Wealth of Nations,” Vol. I., London, 1836, p. 231, note.
4
“There has to be a new agreement” (a new edition of the social contract!) “that whenever there is an
exchange of work done for work to be done, the latter” (the capitalist) “is to receive a higher value
than the former” (the worker). — Simonde (de Sismondi), “De la Richesse Commerciale,” Geneva,
1803, Vol I, p. 37.
5
“Labour the exclusive standard of value ... the creator of all wealth, no commodity.” Thomas
Hodgskin, “Popul. Polit. Econ.,” p. 186.
6
On the other hand, the attempt to explain such expressions as merely poetic license only shows the
impotence of the analysis. Hence, in answer to Proudhon’s phrase; “Labour is called value, not as
being a commodity itself, but in view of the values supposed to be potentially embodied in it. The
value of labour is a figurative expression,” &c. I have remarked: “In labour, commodity, which is a
frightful reality, he (Proudhon) sees nothing but a grammatical ellipsis. The whole of existing society,
then, based upon labour commodity, is henceforth based upon a poetic license, on a figurative
expression. Does society desire to eliminate all the inconveniences which trouble it, it has only to
eliminate all the ill-sounding terms. Let it change the language, and for that it has only to address itself
to the Academy and ask it for a new edition of its dictionary.” (Karl Marx, “Misère de la Philosophie,”
pp. 34, 35.) It is naturally still more convenient to understand by value nothing at all. Then one can
without difficulty subsume everything under this category. Thus, e.g., J. B. Say: “What is value?”
Answer: “That which a thing is worth"; and what is “price"? Answer: “The value of a thing expressed
in money.” And why has agriculture a value? Answer: “Because one sets a price on it.” Therefore
value is what a thing is worth, and the land has its “value,” because its value is “expressed in money.”
This is, anyhow, a very simple way of explaining the why and the wherefore of things.
7
Cf. “Zur Kritik &c.,” p. 40, where I state that, in the portion of that work that deals with Capital, this
problem will be solved: “How does production, on the basis of exchange-value determined simply by
labour-time, lead to the result that the exchange-value of labour is less than the exchange-value of its
product?”
8
The “Morning Star,” a London Free-trade organ, naif to silliness, protested again and again during
the American Civil War, with all the moral indignation of which man is capable, that the Negro in the
“Confederate States” worked absolutely for nothing. It should have compared the daily cost of such a
Negro with that of the free workman in the East-end of London.
9
I give in order that you may give; I give in order that you may produce; I produce so that you may
give; I produce so that you may produce.
10
Adam Smith only accidentally alludes to the variation of the working day when he is referring to
piece-wages.

Chapter 20: Time-Wages
Wages themselves again take many forms, a fact not recognizable in the ordinary economic
treatises which, exclusively interested in the material side of the question, neglect every
difference of form. An exposition of all these forms however, belongs to the special study of
wage labour, not therefore to this work. Still the two fundamental forms must be briefly worked
out here.
The sale of labour-power, as will be remembered, takes place for a definite period of time. The
converted form under which the daily, weekly, &c., value of labour-power presents itself, is
hence that of time wages, therefore day-wages, &c.
Next it is to be noted that the laws set forth, in the 17th chapter, on the changes in the relative
magnitudes of price of labour-power and surplus-value, pass by a simple transformation of form,
into laws of wages. Similarly the distinction between the exchange-value of labour power, and the
sum of the necessaries of life into which this value is converted, now reappears as the distinction
between nominal and real wages. It would be useless to repeat here, with regard to the
phenomenal form, what has been already worked out in the substantial form. We limit ourselves
therefore to a few points characteristic of time-wages.
The sum of money 1 which the labourer receives for his daily or weekly labour, forms the amount
of his nominal wages, or of his wages estimated in value. But it is clear that according to the
length of the working day, that is, according to the amount of actual labour daily supplied, the
same daily or weekly wage may represent very different prices of labour, i.e., very different sums
of money for the same quantity of labour. 2 We must, therefore, in considering time-wages, again
distinguish between the sum-total of the daily or weekly wages, &c., and the price of labour. How
then, to find this price, i.e., the money-value of a given quantity of labour? The average price of
labour is found, when the average daily value of the labour-power is divided by the average
number of hours in the working day. If, e.g., the daily value of labour-power is 3 shillings, the
value of the product of 6 working-hours, and if the working day is 12 hours, the price of 1
working hour is 3/12 shillings = 3d. The price of the working-hour thus found serves as the unit
measure for the price of labour.
It follows therefore that the daily and weekly wages, &c., may remain the same, although the
price of labour falls constantly. If, e.g., the habitual working day is 10 hours and the daily value
of the labour-power 3s., the price of the working-hour is 3 3/5d. It falls to 3s. as soon as the
working day rises to 12 hours, to 2 2/5d as soon as it rises to 15 hours. Daily or weekly wages
remain, despite all this, unchanged. On the contrary, the daily or weekly wages may rise, although
the price of labour remains constant or even falls. If, e.g., the working day is 10 hours, and the
daily value of labour-power 3 shillings, the price of one working-hour is 3 3/5d. If the labourer, in
consequence of increase of trade, works 12 hours, the price of labour remaining the same, his
daily wage now rises to 3 shillings 7 1/5 d. without any variation in the price of labour. The same
result might follow if, instead of the extensive amount of labour, its intensive amount increased.
3
The rise of the nominal daily or weekly wages may therefore be accompanied by a price of
labour that remains stationary or falls. The same holds as to the income of the labourer’s family,
as soon as the quantity of labour expended by the head of the family is increased by the labour of
the members of his family. There are, therefore, methods of lowering the price of labour
independent of the reduction of the nominal daily or weekly wages. 4
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As a general law it follows that, given the amount of daily or weekly labour, &c., the daily or
weekly wages depend on the price of labour which itself varies either with the value of labourpower, or with the difference between its price and its value. Given, on the other hand, the price
of labour, the daily or weekly wages depend on the quantity of the daily or weekly labour.
The unit-measure for time-wages, the price of the working-hour, is the quotient of the value of a
day’s labour-power, divided by the number of hours of the average working day. Let the latter be
12 hours, and the daily value of labour-power 3 shillings, the value of the product of 6 hours of
labour. Under these circumstances the price of a working hour is 3d.; the value produced in it is
6d. If the labourer is now employed less than 12 hours (or less than 6 days in the week), e.g., only
6 or 8 hours, he receives, with this price of labour, only 2s. or 1s. 6d. a day. 5 As on our hypothesis
he must work on the average 6 hours daily, in order to produce a day’s wage corresponding
merely to the value of his labour power, as according to the same hypothesis he works only half
of every hour for himself, and half for the capitalist, it is clear that he cannot obtain for himself
the value of the product of 6 hours if he is employed less than 12 hours. In previous chapters we
saw the destructive consequences of over-work; here we find the sources of the sufferings that
result to the labourer from his insufficient employment.
If the hour’s wage is fixed so that the capitalist does not bind himself to pay a day’s or a week’s
wage, but only to pay wages for the hours during which he chooses to employ the labourer, he
can employ him for a shorter time than that which is originally the basis of the calculation of the
hour-wage, or the unit-measure of the price of labour. Since this unit is determined by the ratio
daily value of labour-power
working day of a given number of hours’
it, of course, loses all meaning as soon as the working day ceases to contain a definite number of
hours. The connection between the paid and the unpaid labour is destroyed. The capitalist can
now wring from the labour a certain quantity of surplus labour without allowing him the labourtime necessary for his own subsistence. He can annihilate all regularity of employment, and
according to his own convenience, caprice, and the interest of the moment, make the most
enormous overwork alternate with relative or absolute cessation of work. He can, under the
pretense of paying “the normal price of labour,” abnormally lengthen the working day without
any corresponding compensation to the labourer. Hence the perfectly rational revolt in 1860 of
the London labourers, employed in the building trades, against the attempt of the capitalists to
impose on them this sort of wage by the hour. The legal limitation of the working day puts an end
to such mischief, although not, of course, to the diminution of employment caused by the
competition of machinery, by changes in the quality of the labourers employed, and by crises
partial or general.
With an increasing daily or weekly wage the price of labour may remain nominally constant, and
yet may fall below its normal level. This occurs every time that, the price of labour (reckoned per
working-hour) remaining constant, the working day is prolonged beyond its customary length. If
in the fraction:
daily value of labour power
working day
the denominator increases, the numerator increases yet more rapidly. The value of labour-power,
as dependent on its wear and tear, increases with the duration of its functioning, and in more rapid
proportion than the increase of that duration. In many branches of industry where time-wage is
the general rule without legal limits to the working-time, the habit has, therefore, spontaneously
grown up of regarding the working day as normal only up to a certain point, e.g., up to the
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expiration of the tenth hour (“normal working day,” “the day’s work,” “the regular hours of
work”). Beyond this limit the working-time is over-time, and is, taking the hour as unit-measure,
paid better (“extra pay”), although often in a proportion ridiculously small. 6 The normal working
day exists here as a fraction of the actual working day, and the latter, often during the whole year,
lasts longer than the former. 7 The increase in the price of labour with the extension of the
working day beyond a certain normal limit, takes such a shape in various British industries that
the low price of labour during the so-called normal time compels the labourer to work during the
better paid over-time, if he wishes to obtain a sufficient wage at all.8 Legal limitation of the
working day puts an end to these amenities.9
It is a fact generally known that, the longer the working days, in any branch of industry, the lower
are the wages. 10 A. Redgrave, factory inspector, illustrates this by a comparative review of the 20
years from 1839-1859, according to which wages rose in the factories under the 10 Hours Law,
whilst they fell in the factories in which the work lasted 14 to 15 hours daily. 11
From the law, “the price of labour being given, the daily or weekly wage depends on the quantity
of labour expended,” it follows, first of all, that the lower the price of labour, the greater must be
the quantity of labour, or the longer must be the working day for the labourer to secure even a
miserable average wage. The lowness of the price of labour acts here as a stimulus to the
extension of the labour-time. 12
On the other hand, the extension of the working-time produces, in its turn, a fall in the price of
labour, and with this a fall in the day’s or week’s wages.
The determination of the price of labour by:
daily value of labour power
working day of a given number of hours
shows that a mere prolongation of the working day lowers the price of labour, if no compensation
steps in. But the same circumstances which allow the capitalist in the long run to prolong the
working day, also allow him first, and compel him finally, to nominally lower the price of labour
until the total price of the increased number of hours is lowered, and, therefore, the daily or
weekly wage. Reference to two circumstances is sufficient here. If one man does the work of 1½
or 2 men, the supply of labour increases, although the supply of labour-power on the market
remains constant. The competition thus created between the labourers allows the capitalist to beat
down the price of labour, whilst the falling price of labour allows him, on the other hand, to screw
up still further the working-time. 13 Soon, however, this command over abnormal quantities of
unpaid labour, i.e., quantities in excess of the average social amount, becomes a source of
competition amongst the capitalists themselves. A part of the price of the commodity consists of
the price of labour. The unpaid part of the labour-price need not be reckoned in the price of the
commodity. It may be presented to the buyer. This is the first step to which competition leads.
The second step to which it drives is to exclude also from the selling price of the commodity at
least a part of the abnormal surplus-value created by the extension of the working day. In this
way, an abnormally low selling price of the commodity arises, at first sporadically, and becomes
fixed by degrees; a lower selling price which henceforward becomes the constant basis of a
miserable wage for an excessive working-time, as originally it was the product of these very
circumstances. This movement is simply indicated here, as the analysis of competition does not
belong to this part of our subject. Nevertheless, the capitalist may, for a moment, speak for
himself. “In Birmingham there is so much competition of masters one against another that many
are obliged to do things as employers that they would otherwise be ashamed of; and yet no more
money is made, but only the public gets the benefit.”14 The reader will remember the two sorts of
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London bakers, of whom one sold the bread at its full price (the “full-priced” bakers), the other
below its normal price (“the under-priced,” “the undersellers”). The “full-priced” denounced their
rivals before the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry: “They only exist now by first defrauding
the public, and next getting 18 hours’ work out of their men for 12 hours’ wages.... The unpaid
labour of the men was made ... the source whereby the competition was carried on, and continues
so to this day.... The competition among the master bakers is the cause of the difficulty in getting
rid of night-work. An underseller, who sells his bread below the cost-price according to the price
of flour, must make it up by getting more out of the labour of the men.... If I got only 12 hours’
work out of my men, and my neighbor got 18 or 20, he must beat me in the selling price. If the
men could insist on payment for over-work, this would be set right.... A large number of those
employed by the undersellers are foreigners and youths, who are obliged to accept almost any
wages they can obtain.” 15
This jeremiad is also interesting because it shows how the appearance only of the relations of
production mirrors itself in the brain of the capitalist. The capitalist does not know that the
normal price of labour also includes a definite quantity of unpaid labour, and that this very unpaid
labour is the normal source of his gain. The category of surplus labour-time does not exist at all
for him, since it is included in the normal working day, which he thinks he has paid for in the
day’s wages. But over-time does exist for him, the prolongation of the working day beyond the
limits corresponding with the usual price of labour. Face to face with his underselling competitor,
he even insists upon extra pay for this over-time. He again does not know that this extra pay
includes unpaid labour, just as well as does the price of the customary hour of labour. For
example, the price of one hour of the 12 hours’ working day is 3d., say the value-product of half a
working-hour, whilst the price of the over-time working-hour is 4d., or the value-product of 2/3
of a working hour. In the first case the capitalist appropriates to himself one-half, in the second,
one-third
of
the
working-hour
without
paying
for
it.
1

The value of money itself is here always supposed constant.
“The price of labour is the sum paid for a given quantity of labour.” (Sir Edward West, “Price of
Corn and Wages of Labour,” London, 1836, p. 67.) West is the author of the anonymous “Essay on
the Application of Capital to Land.” by a Fellow of the University College of Oxford, London, 1815.
An epoch-making work in the history of Political Economy.
3
“The wages of labour depend upon the price of labour and the quantity of labour performed.... An
increase in the wages of labour does not necessarily imply an enhancement of the price of labour.
From fuller employment, and greater exertions, the wages of labour may be considerably increased,
while the price of labour may continue the same.” (West, op. cit., pp. 67, 68, 112.) The main question:
“How is the price of labour determined?” West, however, dismisses with mere banalities.
4
This is perceived by the fanatical representative of the industrial bourgeoisie of the 18th century, the
author of the “Essay on Trade and Commerce” often quoted by us, although he puts the matter in a
confused way: “It is the quantity of labour and not the price of it” (he means by this the nominal daily
or weekly wages) “that is determined by the price of provisions and other necessaries: reduce the price
of necessaries very low, and of course you reduce the quantity of labour in proportion. Master
manufacturers know that there are various ways of raising and felling the price of labour, besides that
of altering its nominal amount.” (op. cit., pp. 48, 61.) In his “Three Lectures on the Rate of Wages,”
London, 1830, in which N. W. Senior uses West’s work without mentioning it, he says: “The labourer
is principally interested in the amount of wages” (p. 14), that is to say, the labourer is principally
interested in what he receives, the nominal sum of his wages, not in that which he gives, the amount of
labour!
2

388
5

Chapter 20

The effect of such an abnormal lessening of employment is quite different from that of a general
reduction of the working day, enforced by law. The former has nothing to do with the absolute length
of the working day, and may occur just as well in a working day of 15, as of 6 hours. The normal price
of labour is in the first case calculated on the labourer working 15 hours, in the second case on his
working 6 hours a day on the average. The result is therefore the same, if he in the one case is
employed only for 7½, in the other only for 3 hours.
6
“The rate of payment for overtime (in lace-making) is so small, from ½ d. and ¾ d. to 2d. per hour,
that it stands in painful contrast to the amount of injury produced to the health and stamina of the
workpeople.... The small amount thus earned is also often obliged to be spent in extra nourishment.”
(“Child.Empl.Com., II. Rep.,” p. xvi., n. 117.)
7
E.g., in paper-staining before the recent introduction into this trade of the Factory Act. “We work on
with no stoppage for meals, so that the day’s work of 10½ hours is finished by 4:30 p.m., and all after
that is over-time, and we seldom leave off working before 6 p.m., so that we are really working overtime the whole year round.” (Mr. Smith’s “Evidence in Child. Empl. Com., 1. Rep.,” p. 125.)
8
E.g., in the Scotch bleaching-works. “In some parts of Scotland this trade” (before the introduction
of the Factory Act in 1862) “was carried on by a system of over-time, i.e., ten hours a day were the
regular hours of work, for which a nominal wage of 1s. 2d. per day was paid to a man, there being
every day over-time for three or four hours, paid at the rate of 3d. per hour. The effect of this system
... a man could not earn more than 8s. per week when working the ordinary hours ... without over-time
they could not earn a fair day’s wages.” (“Rept. of Insp. of Factories,” April 30th, 1863, p. 10.) “The
higher wages, for getting adult males to work longer hours, are a temptation too strong to be resisted.”
(“Rept. of Insp. of Fact.,” April 30th, 1848, p. 5.) The book-binding trade in the city of London
employs very many young girls from 14 to 15 years old, and that under indentures which prescribe
certain definite hours of labour. Nevertheless, they work in the last week of each month until 10, 11,
12, or 1 o’clock at night, along with the older labourers, in a very mixed company. “The masters tempt
them by extra pay and supper,” which they eat in neighboring public houses. The great debauchery
thus produced among these “young immortals” (“Children’s Employment Comm., V. Rept.,” p. 44, n.
191) is compensated by the fact that among the rest many Bibles and religious books are bound by
them.
9
See “Reports of lnsp. of Fact.,” 30th April, 1863, p. 10. With very accurate appreciation of the state
of things, the London labourers employed in the building trades declared, during the great strike and
lock-out of 1860, that they would only accept wages by the hour under two conditions: (1), that, with
the price of the working-hour, a normal working day of 9 and 10 hours respectively should be fixed,
and that the price of the hour for the 10 hours’ working day should be higher than that for the hour of
the 9 hours working day; (2), that every hour beyond the normal working day should be reckoned as
over-time and proportionally more highly paid.
10
“It is a very notable thing, too, that where long hours are the rule, small wages are also so.”
(“Report of Insp. of Fact.,” 31st. Oct., 1863, p. 9.) “The work which obtains the scanty pittance of
food, is, for the most part, excessively prolonged.” (“Public Health, Sixth Report,” 1864, p. 15.)
11
“Report of Inspectors of Fact.,” 30th April, 1860, pp. 31, 32.
12
The hand nail-makers in England, e.g., have, on account of the low price of labour, to work 15
hours a day in order to hammer out their miserable weekly wage. “It’s a great many hours in a day (6
a.m. to 8 p.m.), and he has to work hard all the time to get 11 d. or 1s., and there is the wear of the
tools, the cost of firing, and something for waste iron to go out of this, which takes off altogether 2½d.
or 3d.” (“Children’s Employment Com., III. Report,” p. 136, n. 671.) The women earn by the same
working-time a week’s wage of only 5 shillings. (l.c., p. 137, n. 674.)
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If a factory-hand, e.g., refused to work the customary long hours, “he would very shortly be
replaced by somebody who would work any length of time, and thus be thrown out of employment.”
(“Reports of Inspectors of Factories,” 30th April, 1848. Evidence, p. 39, n. 58.) “If one man performs
the work of two... the rate of profits will generally be raised ... in consequence of the additional supply
of labour having diminished its price.” (Senior, l.c., p. 15.)
14
“Children’s Employment Com., III Rep.,” Evidence, p. 66, n. 22.
15
“Report, &c., Relative to the Grievances Complained of by the Journeymen Bakers.” London, 1862,
p. 411, and ib. Evidence, notes 479, 359, 27. Anyhow the full-priced bakers, as was mentioned above,
and as their spokesman, Bennett, himself admits, make their men “generally begin work at 11 p.m. ...
up to 8 o’clock the next morning.... They are then engaged all day long ... as late as 7 o’clock in the
evening.” (l.c., p. 22.)

Chapter 21: Piece Wages
Wages by the piece are nothing else than a converted form of wages by time, just as wages by
time are a converted form of the value or price of labour-power.

In piece wages it seems at first sight as if the use-value bought from the labourer was, not
the function of his labour-power, living labour, but labour already realized in the product,
and as if the price of this labour was determined, not as with time-wages, by the fraction
daily value of labour-power
the working day of a given number of hours
but by the capacity for work of the producer. 1
The confidence that trusts in this appearance ought to receive a first severe shock from
the fact that both forms of wages exist side by side, simultaneously, in the same branches
of industry; e.g.,
“the compositors of London, as a general rule, work by the piece, time-work being
the exception, while those in the country work by the day, the exception being
work by the piece. The shipwrights of the port of London work by the job or
piece, while those of all other parts work by the day.” 2
In the same saddlery shops of London, often for the same work, piece wages are paid to the
French, time-wages to the English. In the regular factories in which throughout piece wages
predominate, particular kinds of work are unsuitable to this form of wage, and are therefore paid
by time. 3 But it is, moreover, self-evident that the difference of form in the payment of wages
alters in no way their essential nature, although the one form may be more favorable to the
development of capitalist production than the other.
Let the ordinary working day contain 12 hours of which 6 are paid, 6 unpaid. Let its valueproduct be 6 shillings, that of one hour’s labour therefore 6d. Let us suppose that, as the result of
experience, a labourer who works with the average amount of intensity and skill, who, therefore,
gives in fact only the time socially necessary to the production of an article, supplies in 12 hours
24 pieces, either distinct products or measurable parts of a continuous whole. Then the value of
these 24 pieces, after. subtraction of the portion of constant capital contained in them, is 6
shillings, and the value of a single piece 3d. The labourer receives 1 ½d. per piece, and thus earns
in 12 hours 3 shillings. Just as, with time-wages, it does not matter whether we assume that the
labourer works 6 hours for himself and 6 hours for the capitalist, or half of every hour for himself,
and the other half for the capitalist, so here it does not matter whether we say that each individual
piece is half paid, and half unpaid for, or that the price of 12 pieces is the equivalent only of the
value of the labour-power, whilst in the other 12 pieces surplus-value is incorporated.
The form of piece wages is just as irrational as that of time-wages. Whilst in our example two
pieces of a commodity, after subtraction of the value of the means of production consumed in
them, are worth 6d. as being the product of one hour, the labourer receives for them a price of 3d.
Piece wages do not, in fact, distinctly express any relation of value. It is not, therefore, a question
of measuring the value of the piece by the working-time incorporated in it, but on the contrary, of
measuring the working-time the labourer has expended by the number of pieces he has produced.
In time-wages, the labour is measured by its immediate duration; in piece wages, by the quantity
of products in which the labour has embodied itself during a given time. 4 The price of labour time
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itself is finally determined by the equation: value of a day’s labour = daily value of labour-power.
Piece-wage is, therefore, only a modified form of time-wage.
Let us now consider a little more closely the characteristic peculiarities of piece wages.
The quality of the labour is here controlled by the work itself, which must be of average
perfection if the piece-price is to be paid in full. piece wages become, from this point of view, the
most fruitful source of reductions of wages and capitalistic cheating.
They furnish to the capitalist an exact measure for the intensity of labour. Only the working-time
which is embodied in a quantum of commodities determined beforehand, and experimentally
fixed, counts as socially necessary working-time, and is paid as such. In the larger workshops of
the London tailors, therefore, a certain piece of work, a waistcoat, e.g., is called an hour, or half
an hour, the hour at 6d. By practice it is known how much is the average product of one hour.
With new fashions, repairs, &c., a contest arises between master and labourer as to whether a
particular piece of work is one hour, and so on, until here also experience decides. Similarly in
the London furniture workshops, &c. If the labourer does not possess the average capacity, if he
cannot in consequence supply a certain minimum of work per day, he is dismissed. 5
Since the quality and intensity of the work are here controlled by the form of wage itself,
superintendence of labour becomes in great part superfluous. Piece wages therefore lay the
foundation of the modern “domestic labour,” described above, as well as of a hierarchically
organized system of exploitation and oppression. The latter has two fundamental forms. On the
one hand, piece wages facilitate the interposition of parasites between the capitalist and the wagelabourer, the “sub-letting of labour.” The gain of these middlemen comes entirely from the
difference between the labour-price which the capitalist pays, and the part of that price which
they actually allow to reach the labourer. 6 In England this system is characteristically called the
“sweating system.” On the other hand, piece-wage allows the capitalist to make a contract for so
much per piece with the head labourer – in manufactures with the chief of some group, in mines
with the extractor of the coal, in the factory with the actual machine-worker – at a price for which
the head labourer himself undertakes the enlisting and payment of his assistant work people. The
exploitation of the labourer by capital is here effected through the exploitation of the labourer by
the labourer. 7
Given piece-wage, it is naturally the personal interest of the labourer to strain his labour-power as
intensely as possible; this enables the capitalist to raise more easily the normal degree of intensity
of labour. 8 It is moreover now the personal interest of the labourer to lengthen the working day,
since with it his daily or weekly wages rise.9 This gradually brings on a reaction like that already
described in time-wages, without reckoning that the prolongation of the working day, even if the
piece wage remains constant, includes of necessity a fall in the price of the labour.
In time-wages, with few exceptions, the same wage holds for the same kind of work, whilst in
piece wages, though the price of the working time is measured by a certain quantity of product,
the day’s or week’s wage will vary with the individual differences of the labourers, of whom one
supplies in a given time the minimum of product only, another the average, a third more than the
average. With regard to actual receipts there is, therefore, great variety according to the different
skill, strength, energy, staying-power, &c., of the individual labourers.10 Of course this does not
alter the general relations between capital and wage-labour. First, the individual differences
balance one another in the workshop as a whole, which thus supplies in a given working-time the
average product, and the total wages paid will be the average wages of that particular branch of
industry. Second, the proportion between wages and surplus-value remains unaltered, since the
mass of surplus labour supplied by each particular labourer corresponds with the wage received
by him. But the wider scope that piece-wage gives to individuality tends to develop on the one
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hand that individuality, and with it the sense of liberty, independence, and self-control of the
labourers, and on the other, their competition one with another. Piece-work has, therefore, a
tendency, while raising individual wages above the average, to lower this average itself. But
where a particular rate of piece-wage has for a long time been fixed by tradition, and its lowering,
therefore, presented especial difficulties, the masters, in such exceptional cases, sometimes had
recourse to its compulsory transformation into time-wages. Hence, e.g., in 1860 a great strike
among the ribbon-weavers of Coventry. 11 Piece-wage is finally one of the chief supports of the
hour-system described in the preceding chapter.12
From what has been shown so far, it follows that piece-wage is the form of wages most in
harmony with the capitalist mode of production. Although by no means new – it figures side by
side with time-wages officially in the French and English labour statutes of the 14th century – it
only conquers a larger field for action during the period of manufacture, properly so-called. In the
stormy youth of modern industry, especially from 1797 to 1815, it served as a lever for the
lengthening of the working day, and the lowering of wages. Very important materials for the
fluctuation of wages during that period are to be found in the Blue books: “Report and Evidence
from the Select Committee on Petitions respecting the Corn Laws” (Parliamentary Session of
1813-14), and “Report from the Lords’ Committee, on the State of the Growth, Commerce, and
Consumption of Grain, and all Laws relating thereto” (Session of 1814-15). Here we find
documentary evidence of the constant lowering of the price of labour from the beginning of the
anti-Jacobin War. In the weaving industry, e.g., piece wages had fallen so low that, in spite of the
very great lengthening of the working day, the daily wages were then lower than before.
“The real earnings of the cotton weaver are now far less than they were; his
superiority over the common labourer, which at first was very great, has now
almost entirely ceased. Indeed... the difference in the wages of skillful and
common labour is far less now than at any former period.” 13
How little the increased intensity and extension of labour through piece wages benefited the
agricultural proletariat, the following passage borrowed from a work on the side of the landlords
and farmers shows:
“By far the greater part of agricultural operations is done by people who are hired
for the day or on piece-work. Their weekly wages are about 12s., and although it
may be assumed that a man earns on piece-work under the greater stimulus to
labour, 1s. or perhaps 2s. more than on weekly wages, yet it is found, on
calculating his total income, that his loss of employment, during the year,
outweighs this gain...Further, it will generally be found that the wages of these
men bear a certain proportion to the price of the necessary means of subsistence,
so that a man with two children is able to bring up his family without recourse to
parish relief.” 14
Malthus at that time remarked with reference to the facts published by Parliament:
“I confess that I see, with misgiving, the great extension of the practice of piecewage. Really hard work during 12 or 14 hours of the day, or for any longer time,
is too much for any human being.” 15
In the workshops under the Factory Acts, piece wages become the general rule, because capital
can there only increase the efficacy of the working day by intensifying labour.16
With the changing productiveness of labour the same quantum of product represents a varying
working-time. Therefore, piece-wage also varies, for it is the money expression of a determined
working-time. In our example above, 24 pieces were produced in 12 hours, whilst the value of the
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product of the 12 hours was 6s., the daily value of the labour-power 3s., the price of the labourhour 3d., and the wage for one piece ½d. In one piece half-an-hour’s labour was absorbed. If the
same working day now supplies, in consequence of the doubled productiveness of labour, 48
pieces instead of 24, and all other circumstances remain unchanged, then the piece-wage falls
from 1 ½d. to 3/4d., as every piece now only represents 1/4, instead of ½ of a working-hour. 24
by 1½d. = 3s., and in like manner 48 by 3/4d. = 3s. In other words, piece-wage is lowered in the
same proportion as the number of the pieces produced in the same time rises, 17 and, therefore, as
the working time spent on the same piece falls. This change in piece-wage, so far purely nominal,
leads to constant battles between capitalist and labour. Either because the capitalist uses it as a
pretext for actually lowering the price of labour, or because increased productive power of labour
is accompanied by an increased intensity of the same. Or because the labourer takes seriously the
appearance of piece wages (viz., that his product is paid for, and not his labour-power) and
therefore revolts against a lowering of wages, unaccompanied by a lowering in the selling price of
the commodity.
“The operatives...carefully watch the price of the raw material and the price of
manufactured goods, and are thus enabled to form an accurate estimate of their
master’s profits.” 18
The capitalist rightly knocks on the head such pretensions as gross errors as to the nature of
wage-labour. 19 He cries out against this usurping attempt to lay taxes on the advance of industry,
and declares roundly that the productiveness of labour does not concern the labourer at all.20
1

“The system of piece-work illustrates an epoch in the history of the working-man; it is halfway
between the position of the mere day-labourer depending upon the will of the capitalist and the cooperative artisan, who in the not distant future promises to combine the artisan and the capitalist in his
own person. Piece-workers are in fact their own masters, even whilst working upon the capital of the
employer.” (John Watts: “Trade Societies and Strikes, Machinery and Co-operative Societies.”
Manchester, 1865, pp. 52, 53.) I quote this little work because it is a very sink of all long-ago-rotten,
apologetic commonplaces. This same Mr. Watts earlier traded in Owenism and published in 1842
another pamphlet: “Facts and Fictions of Political Economists,” in which among other things he
declares that “property is robbery.” That was long ago.
2
T. J. Dunning: “Trades’ Unions and Strikes,” Lond., 1860, p. 22.
3
How the existence, side by side and simultaneously, of these two forms of wage favors the masters’
cheating: “A factory employs 400 people, the half of which work by the piece, and have a direct
interest in working longer hours. The other 200 are paid by the day, work equally long with the others,
and get no more money for their over-time.... The work of these 200 people for half an hour a day is
equal to one person’s work for 50 hours, or 5/6’s of one person’s labour in a week, and is a positive
gain to the employer.” (“Reports of Insp. of Fact., 31st Oct., 1860,” p. 9.) “Over-working to a very
considerable extent still prevails; and, in most instances, with that security against detection and
punishment which the law itself affords. I have in many former reports shown ... the injury to
workpeople who are not employed on piece-work, but receive weekly wages.” (Leonard Horner in
“Reports of Insp. of Fact.,” 30th April, 1859, pp. 8, 9.)
4
“Wages can be measured in two ways: either by the duration of the labour, or by its product.”
(“Abrégé élémentaire des principes de l’économie politique.” Paris, 1796, p. 32.) The author of this
anonymous work: G. Garnier.
5
“So much weight of cotton is delivered to him” (the spinner), “and he has to return by a certain time,
in lieu of it, a given weight of twist or yarn, of a certain degree of fineness, and he is paid so much per
pound for all that he so returns. If his work is defective in quality, the penalty falls on him, if less in
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quantity than the minimum fixed for a given time, he is dismissed and an abler operative procured.”
(Ure, l.c., p. 317.)
6
“It is when work passes through several hands, each of which is to take its share of profits, while
only the last does the work, that the pay which reaches the workwoman is miserably disproportioned.”
(“Child. Emp. Comm. II Report,” p. 1xx., n. 424.)
7
Even Watts, the apologetic, remarks: “It would be a great improvement to the system of piece-work,
if all the men employed on a job were partners in the contract, each according to his abilities, instead
of one man being interested in over-working his fellows for his own benefit.” (l.c., p. 53.) On the
vileness of this system, cf. “Child. Emp. Comm., Rep. III.,” p. 66, n. 22, p. 11, n. 124, p. xi, n. 13, 53,
59, &c.
8
This spontaneous result is often artificially helped along, e.g., in the Engineering Trade of London, a
customary trick is “the selecting of a man who possesses superior physical strength and quickness, as
the principal of several workmen, and paying him an additional rate, by the quarter or otherwise, with
the understanding that he is to exert himself to the utmost to induce the others, who are only paid the
ordinary wages, to keep up to him ... without any comment this will go far to explain many of the
complaints of stinting the action, superior skill, and working-power, made by the employers against
the men” (in Trades-Unions. Dunning, l.c., pp. 22, 23). As the author is himself a labourer and
secretary of a Trades’ Union, this might be taken for exaggeration. But the reader may compare the
“highly respectable” “Cyclopedia of Agriculture” of J. C. Morton, Art., the article “Labourer,” where
this method is recommended to the farmers as an approved one.
9
“All those who are paid by piece-work ... profit by the transgression of the legal limits of work. This
observation as to the willingness to work over-time is especially applicable to the women employed as
weavers and reelers.” (“Rept. of Insp. of Fact., 30th April, 1858,” p. 9.) “This system” (piece-work),
“so advantageous to the employer ... tends directly to encourage the young potter greatly to over-work
himself during the four or five years during which he is employed in the piece-work system, but at low
wages.... This is ... another great cause to which the bad constitutions of the potters are to be
attributed.” (“Child. Empl. Comm. 1. Rept.,” p. xiii.)
10
“Where the work in any trade is paid for by the piece at so much per job ... wages may very
materially differ in amount.... But in work by the day there is generally an uniform rate ... recognized
by both employer and employed as the standard of wages for the general run of workmen in the
trade.” (Dunning, l.c., p. 17.)
11
“The work of the journeyman-artisans will be ruled by the day or by the piece. These masterartisans know about how much work a journeyman-artisan can do per day in each craft, and often pay
them in proportion to the work which they do; the journey men, therefore, work as much as they can,
in their own interest, without any further inspection.” (Cantillon, “Essai sur la Nature du Commerce
en général,” Amst. Ed., 1756, pp. 185 and 202. The first edition appeared in 1755.) Cantillon, from
whom Quesnay, Sir James Steuart & A. Smith have largely drawn, already here represents piece-wage
as simply a modified form of time-wage. The French edition of Cantillon professes in its title to be a
translation from the English, but the English edition: “The Analysis of Trade, Commerce, &c.,” by
Philip Cantillon, late of the city of London, Merchant, is not only of later date (1759), but proves by
its contents that it is a later and revised edition: e.g., in the French edition, Hume is not yet mentioned,
whilst in the English, on the other hand, Petty hardly figures any longer. The English edition is
theoretically less important, but it contains numerous details referring specifically to English
commerce, bullion trade, &c., that are wanting in the French text. The words on the title-page of the
English edition, according to which the work is “taken chiefly from the manuscript of a very ingenious
gentleman, deceased, and adapted, &c.,” seem, therefore, a pure fiction, very customary at that time.
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12

“How often have we seen, in some workshops, many more workers recruited than the work actually
called for? On many occasions, workers are recruited in anticipation of future work, which may never
materialize. Because they are paid by piece wages, it is said that no risk is incurred, since any loss of
time will be charged against the unemployed.” (H. Gregoir: “Les Typographes devant le Tribunal
correctionnel de Bruxelles,” Brusseles, 1865, p. 9.)
13
“Remarks on the Commercial Policy of Great Britain,” London, 1815.
14
“A Defense of the Landowners and Farmers of Great Britain,” 1814, pp. 4, 5
15
Malthus, “Inquiry into the Nature and Progress of Rent,” Lond., 1815.
16
“Those who are paid by piece-work ... constitute probably four-fifths of the workers in the
factories.” “Report of Insp. of Fact.,” 30th April, 1858.
17
“The productive power of his spinning-machine is accurately measured, and the rate of pay for work
done with it decreases with, though not as, the increase of its productive power.” (Ure, l.c., p. 317.)
This last apologetic phrase Ure himself again cancels. The lengthening of the mule causes some
increase of labour, he admits. The labour does therefore not diminish in the same ratio as its
productivity increases. Further: “By this increase the productive power of the machine will be
augmented one-fifth. When this event happens the spinner will not be paid at the same rate for work
done as he was before, but as that rate will not be diminished in the ratio of one-fifth, the improvement
will augment his money earnings for any given number of hours’ work,” but “the foregoing statement
requires a certain modification.... The spinner has to pay something additional for juvenile aid out of
his additional sixpence, accompanied by displacing a portion of adults” (l.c., p. 321), which has in no
way a tendency to raise wages.
18
H. Fawcett: “The Economic Position of the British labourer.” Cambridge and London, 1865, p. 178.
19
In the “London Standard” of October 26, 1861, there is a report of proceedings of the firm of John
Bright & Co., before the Rochdale magistrates “to prosecute for intimidation the agents of the Carpet
Weavers Trades’ Union. Bright’s partners had introduced new machinery which would turn out 240
yards of carpet in the time and with the labour (!) previously required to produce 160 yards. The
workmen had no claim whatever to share in the profits made by the investment of their employer’s
capital in mechanical improvements. Accordingly, Messrs. Bright proposed to lower the rate of pay
from 1½d. per yard to 1d., leaving the earnings of the men exactly the same as before for the same
labour. But there was a nominal reduction, of which the operatives, it is asserted, had not fair warning
beforehand.”
20

“Trades’ Unions, in their desire to maintain wages, endeavor to share in the benefits of
improved machinery.” (Quelle horreur!) “... the demanding higher wages, because labour
is abbreviated, is in other words the endeavor to establish a duty on mechanical
improvements.” (“On Combination of Trades,” new ed., London, 1834, p. 42.)

Chapter 22: National Differences of Wages
In the 17th chapter we were occupied with the manifold combinations which may bring about a
change in magnitude of the value of labour-power – this magnitude being considered either
absolutely or relatively, i.e., as compared with surplus-value; whilst on the other hand, the
quantum of the means of subsistence in which the price of labour is realized might again undergo
fluctuations independent of, or different from, the changes of this price.1 As has been already
said, the simple translation of the value, or respectively of the price, of labour-power into the
exoteric form of wages transforms all these laws into laws of the fluctuations of wages. That
which appears in these fluctuations of wages within a single country as a series of varying
combinations, may appear in different countries as contemporaneous difference of national
wages. In the comparison of the wages in different nations, we must therefore take into account
all the factors that determine changes in the amount of the value of labour-power; the price and
the extent of the prime necessaries of life as naturally and historically developed, the cost of
training the labourers, the part played by the labour of women and children, the productiveness of
labour, its extensive and intensive magnitude. Even the most superficial comparison requires the
reduction first of the average day-wage for the same trades, in different countries, to a uniform
working day. After this reduction to the same terms of the day-wages, time-wage must again be
translated into piece-wage, as the latter only can be a measure both of the productivity and the
intensity of labour.
In every country there is a certain average intensity of labour below which the labour for the
production of a commodity requires more than the socially necessary time, and therefore does not
reckon as labour of normal quality. Only a degree of intensity above the national average affects,
in a given country, the measure of value by the mere duration of the working-time. This is not the
case on the universal market, whose integral parts are the individual countries. The average
intensity of labour changes from country to country; here it is greater, there less. These national
averages form a scale, whose unit of measure is the average unit of universal labour. The more
intense national labour, therefore, as compared with the less intense, produces in the same time
more value, which expresses itself in more money.
But the law of value in its international application is yet more modified by the fact that on the
world-market the more productive national labour reckons also as the more intense, so long as the
more productive nation is not compelled by competition to lower the selling price of its
commodities to the level of their value.
In proportion as capitalist production is developed in a country, in the same proportion do the
national intensity and productivity of labour there rise above the international level.2 The
different quantities of commodities of the same kind, produced in different countries in the same
working-time, have, therefore, unequal international values, which are expressed in different
prices, i.e., in sums of money varying according to international values. The relative value of
money will, therefore, be less in the nation with more developed capitalist mode of production
than in the nation with less developed. It follows, then, that the nominal wages, the equivalent of
labour-power expressed in money, will also be higher in the first nation than in the second; which
does not at all prove that this holds also for the real wages, i.e., for the means of subsistence
placed at the disposal of the labourer.
But even apart from these relative differences of the value of money in different countries, it will
be found, frequently, that the daily or weekly, &tc., wage in the first nation is higher than in the
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second, whilst the relative price of labour, i.e., the price of labour as compared both with surplusvalue and with the value of the product, stands higher in the second than in the first. 3
J. W. Cowell, member of the Factory Commission of 1833, after careful investigation of the
spinning trade, came to the conclusion that
“in England wages are virtually lower to the capitalist, though higher to the
operative than on the Continent of Europe.” 4
The English Factory Inspector, Alexander Redgrave, in his report of Oct. 31st, 1866, proves by
comparative statistics with continental states, that in spite of lower wages and much longer
working-time, continental labour is, in proportion to the product, dearer than English. An English
manager of a cotton factory in Oldenburg declares that the working time there lasted from 5:30
a.m. to 8 p.m., Saturdays included, and that the workpeople there, when under English
overlookers, did not supply during this time quite so much product as the English in 10 hours, but
under German overlookers much less. Wages are much lower than in England, in many cases
50%, but the number of hands in proportion to the machinery was much greater, in certain
departments in the proportion of 5:3.
Mr. Redgrave gives very full details as to the Russian cotton factories. The data were given him
by an English manager until recently employed there. On this Russian soil, so fruitful of all
infamies, the old horrors of the early days of English factories are in full swing. The managers
are, of course, English, as the native Russian capitalist is of no use in factory business. Despite all
over-work, continued day and night, despite the most shameful under-payment of the
workpeople, Russian manufacture manages to vegetate only by prohibition of foreign
competition.
I give, in conclusion, a comparative table of Mr. Redgrave’s, on the average number of spindles
per factory and per spinner in the different countries of Europe. He himself remarks that he had
collected these figures a few years ago, and that since that time the size of the factories and the
number of spindles per labourer in England has increased. He supposes, however, an
approximately equal progress in the continental countries mentioned, so that the numbers given
would still have their value for purposes of comparison.
AVERAGE NUMBER OF SPINDLES PER FACTORY
England, average of spindles per factory
12,600
France, average of spindles per factory
1,500
Prussia, average of spindles per factory
1,500
Belgium, average of spindles per factory
4,000
Saxony, average of spindles per factory
4,500
Austria, average of spindles per factory
7,000
Switzerland, average of spindles per factory 8,000
AVERAGE NUMBER OF PERSONS EMPLOYED TO SPINDLES
one person to 14 spindles
France
one person to 28 spindles
Russia
one person to 37 spindles
Prussia
one person to 46 spindles
Bavaria
one person to 49 spindles
Austria
one person to 50 spindles
Belgium
one person to 50 spindles
Saxony
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one person to 55 spindles
one person to 55 spindles
one person to 74 spindles

“This comparison,” says Mr. Redgrave, “is yet more unfavorable to Great Britain, inasmuch as
there is so large a number of factories in which weaving by power is carried on in conjunction
with spinning” (whilst in the table the weavers are not deducted), “and the factories abroad are
chiefly spinning factories; if it were possible to compare like with like, strictly, I could find many
cotton spinning factories in my district in which mules containing 2,200 spindles are minded by
one man (the minder) and two assistants only, turning off daily 220 lbs. of yarn, measuring 400
miles in length.” 5
It is well known that in Eastern Europe, as well as in Asia, English companies have undertaken
the construction of railways, and have, in making them, employed side by side with the native
labourers, a certain number of English working-men. Compelled by practical necessity, they thus
have had to take into account the national difference in the intensity of labour, but this has
brought them no loss. Their experience shows that even if the height of wages corresponds more
or less with the average intensity of labour, the relative price of labour varies generally in the
inverse direction.
In an “Essay on the Rate of Wages,” 6 one of his first economic writings, H. Carey tries to prove
that the wages of the different nations are directly proportional to the degree of productiveness of
the national working days, in order to draw from this international relation the conclusion that
wages everywhere rise and fall in proportion to the productiveness of labour. The whole of our
analysis of the production of surplus-value shows the absurdity of this conclusion, even if Carey
himself had proved his premises instead of, after his usual uncritical and superficial fashion,
shuffling to and fro a confused mass of statistical materials. The best of it is that he does not
assert that things actually are as they ought to be according to his theory. For State intervention
has falsified the natural economic relations. The different national wages must be reckoned,
therefore, as if that part of each that goes to the State in the form of taxes, came to the labourer
himself. Ought not Mr. Carey to consider further whether those “State expenses” are not the
“natural” fruits of capitalistic development? The reasoning is quite worthy of the man who first
declared the relations of capitalist production to be eternal laws of nature and reason, whose free,
harmonious working is only disturbed by the intervention of the State, in order afterwards to
discover that the diabolical influence of England on the world market (an influence which, it
appears, does not spring from the natural laws of capitalist production) necessitates State
intervention, i.e., the protection of those laws of nature and reason by the State, alias the System
of Protection. He discovered further that the theorems of Ricardo and others, in which existing
social antagonisms and contradictions are formulated, are not the ideal product of the real
economic movement, but on the contrary, that the real antagonisms of capitalist production in
England and elsewhere are the result of the theories of Ricardo and others! Finally he discovered
that it is, in the last resort, commerce that destroys the inborn beauties and harmonies of the
capitalist mode of production. A step further and he will, perhaps, discover that the one evil in
capitalist production is capital itself. Only a man with such atrocious want of the critical faculty
and such spurious erudition deserved, in spite of his Protectionist heresy, to become the secret
source of the harmonious wisdom of a Bastiat, and of all the other Free-trade optimists of today.
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“It is not accurate to say that wages” (he deals here with their money expression) “are increased,
because they purchase more of a cheaper article.” (David Buchanan in his edition of Adam Smith’s
“Wealth of Nations,” 1814, Vol. 1, p. 417, note.)
2
We shall inquire, in another place, what circumstances in relation to productivity may modify this
law for individual branches of industry.
3
James Anderson remarks in his polemic against Adam Smith: “It deserves, likewise, to be remarked,
that although the apparent price of Labour is usually lower in poor countries, where the produce of the
soil, and grain in general, is cheap; yet it is in fact for the most part really higher than in other
countries. For it is not the wages that is given to the labourer per day that constitutes the real price of
labour, although it is its apparent price. The real price is that which a certain quantity of work
performed actually costs the employer; and considered in this light, labour is in almost all cases
cheaper in rich countries than in those that are poorer, although the price of grain and other provisions
is usually much lower in the last than in the first.... Labour estimated by the day is much lower in
Scotland than in England.... Labour by the piece is generally cheaper in England.” (James Anderson,
“Observations on the Means of Exciting a Spirit of National Industry,” &tc., Edin. 1777, pp. 350,
351.) On the contrary, lowness of wages produces, in its turn, dearness of labour. “Labour being
dearer in Ireland than it is in England ... because the wages are so much lower.” (N. 2079 in “Royal
Commission on Railways, Minutes,” 1867.)
4
(Ure, op. cit., p. 314.)
5
(“Reports of Insp. of Fact.,” 31st Oct., 1866, pp. 31-37, passim.)
6
“Essay on the Rate of Wages, with an Examination of the Causes of the Differences in the Condition
of the Labouring Population throughout the World,” Philadelphia, 1835.

Part 7: The Accumulation of Capital
The conversion of a sum of money into means of production and labour-power, is the first step
taken by the quantum of value that is going to function as capital. This conversion takes place in
the market, within the sphere of circulation. The second step, the process of production, is
complete so soon as the means of production have been converted into commodities whose value
exceeds that of their component parts, and, therefore, contains the capital originally advanced,
plus a surplus-value. These commodities must then be thrown into circulation. They must be sold,
their value realised in money, this money afresh converted into capital, and so over and over
again. This circular movement, in which the same phases are continually gone through in
succession, forms the circulation of capital.
The first condition of accumulation is that the capitalist must have contrived to sell his
commodities, and to reconvert into capital the greater part of the money so received. In the
following pages we shall assume that capital circulates in its normal way. The detailed analysis of
the process will be found in Book II.
The capitalist who produces surplus-value – i.e., who extracts unpaid labour directly from the
labourers, and fixes it in commodities, is, indeed, the first appropriator, but by no means the
ultimate owner, of this surplus-value. He has to share it with capitalists, with landowners, &c.,
who fulfil other functions in the complex of social production. Surplus-value, therefore, splits up
into various parts. Its fragments fall to various categories of persons, and take various forms,
independent the one of the other, such as profit, interest, merchants’ profit, rent, &c. It is only in
Book III. that we can take in hand these modified forms of surplus-value.
On the one hand, then, we assume that the capitalist sells at their value the commodities he has
produced, without concerning ourselves either about the new forms that capital assumes while in
the sphere of circulation, or about the concrete conditions of reproduction hidden under these
forms. On the other hand, we treat the capitalist producer as owner of the entire surplus-value, or,
better perhaps, as the representative of all the sharers with him in the booty. We, therefore, first of
all consider accumulation from an abstract point of view – i.e., as a mere phase in the actual
process of production.
So far as accumulation takes place, the capitalist must have succeeded in selling his commodities,
and in reconverting the sale-money into capital. Moreover, the breaking-up of surplus-value into
fragments neither alters its nature nor the conditions under which it becomes an element of
accumulation. Whatever be the proportion of surplus-value which the industrial capitalist retains
for himself, or yields up to others, he is the one who, in the first instance, appropriates it. We,
therefore, assume no more than what actually takes place. On the other hand, the simple
fundamental form of the process of accumulation is obscured by the incident of the circulation
which brings it about, and by the splitting up of surplus-value. An exact analysis of the process,
therefore, demands that we should, for a time, disregard all phenomena that hide the play of its
inner mechanism.
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Chapter 23: Simple Reproduction
Whatever the form of the process of production in a society, it must be a continuous process,
must continue to go periodically through the same phases. A society can no more cease to
produce than it can cease to consume. When viewed, therefore, as a connected whole, and as
flowing on with incessant renewal, every social process of production is, at the same time, a
process of reproduction.
The conditions of production are also those of reproduction. No society can go on producing, in
other words, no society can reproduce, unless it constantly reconverts a part of its products into
means of production, or elements of fresh products. All other circumstances remaining the same,
the only mode by which it can reproduce its wealth, and maintain it at one level, is by replacing
the means of production – i.e., the instruments of labour, the raw material, and the auxiliary
substances consumed in the course of the year – by an equal quantity of the same kind of articles;
these must be separated from the mass of the yearly products, and thrown afresh into the process
of production. Hence, a definite portion of each year’s product belongs to the domain of
production. Destined for productive consumption from the very first, this portion exists, for the
most part, in the shape of articles totally unfitted for individual consumption.
If production be capitalistic in form, so, too, will be reproduction. Just as in the former the labour
process figures but as a means towards the self-expansion of capital, so in the latter it figures but
as a means of reproducing as capital – i.e., as self-expanding value – the value advanced. It is
only because his money constantly functions as capital that the economic guise of a capitalist
attaches to a man. If, for instance, a sum of £100 has this year been converted into capital, and
produced a surplus-value of £20, it must continue during next year, and subsequent years, to
repeat the same operation. As a periodic increment of the capital advanced, or periodic fruit of
capital in process, surplus-value acquires the form of a revenue flowing out of capital.1
If this revenue serve the capitalist only as a fund to provide for his consumption, and be spent as
periodically as it is gained, then, caeteris paribus, simple reproduction will take place. And
although this reproduction is a mere repetition of the process of production on the old scale, yet
this mere repetition, or continuity, gives a new character to the process, or, rather, causes the
disappearance of some apparent characteristics which it possessed as an isolated discontinuous
process.
The purchase of labour-power for a fixed period is the prelude to the process of production; and
this prelude is constantly repeated when the stipulated term comes to an end, when a definite
period of production, such as a week or a month, has elapsed. But the labourer is not paid until
after he has expended his labour-power, and realised in commodities not only its value, but
surplus-value. He has, therefore, produced not only surplus-value, which we for the present
regard as a fund to meet the private consumption of the capitalist, but he has also produced,
before it flows back to him in the shape of wages, the fund out of which he himself is paid, the
variable capital; and his employment lasts only so long as he continues to reproduce this fund.
Hence, that formula of the economists, referred to in Chapter XVIII, which represents wages as a
share in the product itself.2 What flows back to the labourer in the shape of wages is a portion of
the product that is continuously reproduced by him. The capitalist, it is true, pays him in money,
but this money is merely the transmuted form of the product of his labour. While he is converting
a portion of the means of production into products, a portion of his former product is being turned
into money. It is his labour of last week, or of last year, that pays for his labour-power this week
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or this year. The illusion begotten by the intervention of money vanishes immediately, if, instead
of taking a single capitalist and a single labourer, we take the class of capitalists and the class of
labourers as a whole. The capitalist class is constantly giving to the labouring class order-notes, in
the form of money, on a portion of the commodities produced by the latter and appropriated by
the former. The labourers give these order-notes back just as constantly to the capitalist class, and
in this way get their share of their own product. The transaction is veiled by the commodity form
of the product and the money form of the commodity.
Variable capital is therefore only a particular historical form of appearance of the fund for
providing the necessaries of life, or the labour-fund which the labourer requires for the
maintenance of himself and family, and which, whatever be the system of social production, he
must himself produce and reproduce. If the labour-fund constantly flows to him in the form of
money that pays for his labour, it is because the product he has created moves constantly away
from him in the form of capital. But all this does not alter the fact, that it is the labourer’s own
labour, realised in a product, which is advanced to him by the capitalist.3 Let us take a peasant
liable to do compulsory service for his lord. He works on his own land, with his own means of
production, for, say, 3 days a week. The 3 other days he does forced work on the lord’s domain.
He constantly reproduces his own labour-fund, which never, in his case, takes the form of a
money payment for his labour, advanced by another person. But in return, his unpaid forced
labour for the lord, on its side, never acquires the character of voluntary paid labour. If one fine
morning the lord appropriates to himself the land, the cattle, the seed, in a word, the, means of
production of this peasant, the latter will thenceforth be obliged to sell his labour-power to the
lord. He will, ceteris paribus, labour 6 days a week as before, 3 for himself, 3 for his lord, who
thenceforth becomes a wages-paying capitalist. As before, he will use up the means of production
as means of production, and transfer their value to the product. As before, a definite portion of the
product will be devoted to reproduction. But from the moment that the forced labour is changed
into wage labour, from that moment the labour-fund, which the peasant himself continues as
before to produce and reproduce, takes the form of a capital advanced in the form of wages by the
lord. The bourgeois economist whose narrow mind is unable to separate the form of appearance
from the thing that appears, shuts his eyes to the fact, that it is but here and there on the face of
the earth, that even nowadays the labour fund crops up in the form of capital.4
Variable capital, it is true, only then loses its character of a value advanced out of the capitalist’s
funds, 5 when we view the process of capitalist production in the flow of its constant renewal. But
that process must have had a beginning of some kind. From our present standpoint it therefore
seems likely that the capitalist, once upon a time, became possessed of money, by some
accumulation that took place independently of the unpaid labour of others, and that this was,
therefore, how he was enabled to frequent the market as a buyer of labour-power. However this
may be, the mere continuity of the process, the simple reproduction, brings about some other
wonderful changes, which affect not only the variable, but the total capital.
If a capital of £1,000 beget yearly a surplus-value of £200, and if this surplus-value be consumed
every year, it is clear that at the end of 5 years the surplus-value consumed will amount to 5 ×
£200 or the £1,000 originally advanced. If only a part, say one half, were consumed, the same
result would follow at the end of 10 years, since 10 × £100= £1,000. General Rule: The value of
the capital advanced divided by the surplus-value annually consumed, gives the number of years,
or reproduction periods, at the expiration of which the capital originally advanced has been
consumed by the capitalist and has disappeared. The capitalist thinks, that he is consuming the
produce of the unpaid labour of others, i.e., the surplus-value, and is keeping intact his original
capital; but what he thinks cannot alter facts. After the lapse of a certain number of years, the
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capital value he then possesses is equal to the sum total of the surplus-value appropriated by him
during those years, and the total value he has consumed is equal to that of his original capital. It is
true, he has in hand a capital whose amount has not changed, and of which a part, viz., the
buildings, machinery, &c., were already there when the work of his business began. But what we
have to do with here, is not the material elements, but the value, of that capital. When a person
gets through all his property, by taking upon himself debts equal to the value of that property, it is
clear that his property represents nothing but the sum total of his debts. And so it is with the
capitalist; when he has consumed the equivalent of his original capital, the value of his present
capital represents nothing but the total amount of the surplus-value appropriated by him without
payment. Not a single atom of the value of his old capital continues to exist.
Apart then from all accumulation, the mere continuity of the process of production, in other
words simple reproduction, sooner or later, and of necessity, converts every capital into
accumulated capital, or capitalised surplus-value. Even if that capital was originally acquired by
the personal labour of its employer, it sooner or later becomes value appropriated without an
equivalent, the unpaid labour of others materialised either in money or in some other object. We
saw in Chapt. IV.-VI. that in order to convert money into capital something more is required than
the production and circulation of commodities. We saw that on the one side the possessor of
value or money, on the other, the possessor of the value-creating substance; on the one side, the
possessor of the means of production and subsistence, on the other, the possessor of nothing but
labour-power, must confront one another as buyer and seller. The separation of labour from its
product, of subjective labour-power from the objective conditions of labour, was therefore the
real foundation in fact, and the starting-point of capitalist production.
But that which at first was but a starting-point, becomes, by the mere continuity of the process, by
simple reproduction, the peculiar result, constantly renewed and perpetuated, of capitalist
production. On the one hand, the process of production incessantly converts material wealth into
capital, into means of creating more wealth and means of enjoyment for the capitalist. On the
other hand, the labourer, on quitting the process, is what he was on entering it, a source of wealth,
but devoid of all means of making that wealth his own. Since, before entering on the process, his
own labour has already been alienated from himself by the sale of his labour-power, has been
appropriated by the capitalist and incorporated with capital, it must, during the process, be
realised in a product that does not belong to him. Since the process of production is also the
process by which the capitalist consumes labour-power, the product of the labourer is incessantly
converted, not only into commodities, but into capital, into value that sucks up the value-creating
power, into means of subsistence that buy the person of the labourer, into means of production
that command the producers. 6 The labourer therefore constantly produces material, objective
wealth, but in the form of capital, of an alien power that dominates and exploits him; and the
capitalist as constantly produces labour-power, but in the form of a subjective source of wealth,
separated from the objects in and by which it can alone be realised; in short he produces the
labourer, but as a wage labourer. 7 This incessant reproduction, this perpetuation of the labourer, is
the sine quâ non of capitalist production.
The labourer consumes in a two-fold way. While producing he consumes by his labour the means
of production, and converts them into products with a higher value than that of the capital
advanced. This is his productive consumption. It is at the same time consumption of his labourpower by the capitalist who bought it. On the other hand, the labourer turns the money paid to
him for his labour-power, into means of subsistence: this is his individual consumption. The
labourer’s productive consumption, and his individual consumption, are therefore totally distinct.
In the former, he acts as the motive power of capital, and belongs to the capitalist. In the latter, he

404

Chapter 23

belongs to himself, and performs his necessary vital functions outside the process of production.
The result of the one is, that the capitalist lives; of the other, that the labourer lives.
When treating of the working day, we saw that the labourer is often compelled to make his
individual consumption a mere incident of production. In such a case, he supplies himself with
necessaries in order to maintain his labour-power, just as coal and water are supplied to the
steam-engine and oil to the wheel. His means of consumption, in that case, are the mere means of
consumption required by a means of production; his individual consumption is directly
productive consumption. This, however, appears to be an abuse not essentially appertaining to
capitalist production. 8
The matter takes quite another aspect, when we contemplate, not the single capitalist, and the
single labourer, but the capitalist class and the labouring class, not an isolated process of
production, but capitalist production in full swing, and on its actual social scale. By converting
part of his capital into labour-power, the capitalist augments the value of his entire capital. He
kills two birds with one stone. He profits, not only by what he receives from, but by what he gives
to, the labourer. The capital given in exchange for labour-power is converted into necessaries, by
the consumption of which the muscles, nerves, bones, and brains of existing labourers are
reproduced, and new labourers are begotten. Within the limits of what is strictly necessary, the
individual consumption of the working class is, therefore, the reconversion of the means of
subsistence given by capital in exchange for labour-power, into fresh labour-power at the disposal
of capital for exploitation. It is the production and reproduction of that means of production so
indispensable to the capitalist: the labourer himself. The individual consumption of the labourer,
whether it proceed within the workshop or outside it, whether it be part of the process of
production or not, forms therefore a factor of the production and reproduction of capital; just as
cleaning machinery does, whether it be done while the machinery is working or while it is
standing. The fact that the labourer consumes his means of subsistence for his own purposes, and
not to please the capitalist, has no bearing on the matter. The consumption of food by a beast of
burden is none the less a necessary factor in the process of production, because the beast enjoys
what it eats. The maintenance and reproduction of the working class is, and must ever be, a
necessary condition to the reproduction of capital. But the capitalist may safely leave its
fulfilment to the labourer’s instincts of self-preservation and of propagation. All the capitalist
cares for, is to reduce the labourer’s individual consumption as far as possible to what is strictly
necessary, and he is far away from imitating those brutal South Americans, who force their
labourers to take the more substantial, rather than the less substantial, kind of food. 9
Hence both the capitalist and his ideological representative, the political economist, consider that
part alone of the labourer’s individual consumption to be productive, which is requisite for the
perpetuation of the class, and which therefore must take place in order that the capitalist may
have labour-power to consume; what the labourer consumes for his own pleasure beyond that
part, is unproductive consumption. 10 If the accumulation of capital were to cause a rise of wages
and an increase in the labourer’s consumption, unaccompanied by increase in the consumption of
labour-power by capital, the additional capital would be consumed unproductively. 11 In reality,
the individual consumption of the labourer is unproductive as regards himself, for it reproduces
nothing but the needy individual; it is productive to the capitalist and to the State, since it is the
production of the power that creates their wealth. 12
From a social point of view, therefore, the working class, even when not directly engaged in the
labour process, is just as much an appendage of capital as the ordinary instruments of labour.
Even its individual consumption is, within certain limits, a mere factor in the process of
production. That process, however, takes good care to prevent these self-conscious instruments
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from leaving it in the lurch, for it removes their product, as fast as it is made, from their pole to
the opposite pole of capital. Individual consumption provides, on the one hand, the means for
their maintenance and reproduction: on the other hand, it secures by the annihilation of the
necessaries of life, the continued re-appearance of the workman in the labour-market. The Roman
slave was held by fetters: the wage labourer is bound to his owner by invisible threads. The
appearance of independence is kept up by means of a constant change of employers, and by the
fictio juris of a contract.
In former times, capital resorted to legislation, whenever necessary, to enforce its proprietary
rights over the free labourer. For instance, down to 1815, the emigration of mechanics employed
in machine making was, in England, forbidden, under grievous pains and penalties.
The reproduction of the working class carries with it the accumulation of skill, that is handed
down from one generation to another. 13 To what extent the capitalist reckons the existence of
such a skilled class among the factors of production that belong to him by right, and to what
extent he actually regards it as the reality of his variable capital, is seen so soon as a crisis
threatens him with its loss. In consequence of the civil war in the United States and of the
accompanying cotton famine, the majority of the cotton operatives in Lancashire were, as is well
known, thrown out of work. Both from the working class itself, and from other ranks of society,
there arose a cry for State aid, or for voluntary national subscriptions, in order to enable the
“superfluous” hands to emigrate to the colonies or to the United States. Thereupon, The Times
published on the 24th March, 1863, a letter from Edmund Potter, a former president of the
Manchester Chamber of Commerce. This letter was rightly called in the House of Commons, the
manufacturers’ manifesto. 14 We cull here a few characteristic passages, in which the proprietary
rights of capital over labour-power are unblushingly asserted.
“He” (the man out of work) “may be told the supply of cotton-workers is too large
... and ... must ... in fact be reduced by a third, perhaps, and that then there will be
a healthy demand for the remaining two-thirds.... Public opinion... urges
emigration.... The master cannot willingly see his labour supply being removed;
he may think, and perhaps justly, that it is both wrong and unsound.... But if the
public funds are to be devoted to assist emigration, he bas a right to be heard, and
perhaps to protest.”
Mr. Potter then shows how useful the cotton trade is, how the “trade has undoubtedly drawn the
surplus-population from Ireland and from the agricultural districts,” how immense is its extent,
how in the year 1860 it yielded 5/13 ths of the total English exports, how, after a few years, it will
again expand by the extension of the market, particularly of the Indian market, and by calling
forth a plentiful supply of cotton at 6d. per lb. He then continues:
“Some time ...,one, two, or three years, it may be, will produce the quantity.... The
question I would put then is this – Is the trade worth retaining? Is it worth while to
keep the machinery (he means the living labour machines) in order, and is it not
the greatest folly to think of parting with that? I think it is. I allow that the workers
are not a property, not the property of Lancashire and the masters; but they are the
strength of both; they are the mental and trained power which cannot be. replaced
for a generation; the mere machinery which they work might much of it be
beneficially replaced, nay improved, in a twelvemonth 15 Encourage or allow (!)
the working-power to emigrate, and what of the capitalist?... Take away the cream
of the workers, and fixed capital will depreciate in a great degree, and the floating
will not subject itself to a struggle with the short supply of inferior labour.... We
are told the workers wish it” (emigration). “Very natural it is that they should do
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so.... Reduce, compress the cotton trade by taking away its working power and
reducing their wages expenditure, say one-fifth, or five millions, and what then
would happen to the class above, the small shopkeepers; and what of the rents, the
cottage rents.... Trace out the effects upwards to the small farmer, the better
householder, and ... the landowner, and say if there could be any suggestion more
suicidal to all classes of the country than by enfeebling a nation by exporting the
best of its manufacturing population, and destroying the value of some of its most
productive capital and enrichment .... I advise a loan (of five or six millions
sterling), ... extending it may be over two or three years, administered by special
commissioners added to the Boards of Guardians in the cotton districts, under
special legislative regulations, enforcing some occupation or labour, as a means of
keeping up at least the moral standard of the recipients of the loan... can anything
be worse for landowners or masters than parting with the best of the workers, and
demoralising and disappointing the rest by an extended depletive emigration, a
depletion of capital and value in an entire province?”
Potter, the chosen mouthpiece of the manufacturers, distinguishes two sorts of “machinery,” each
of which belongs to the capitalist, and of which one stands in his factory, the other at night-time
and on Sundays is housed outside the factory, in cottages. The one is inanimate, the other living.
The inanimate machinery not only wears out and depreciates from day to day, but a great part of
it becomes so quickly superannuated, by constant technical progress, that it can be replaced with
advantage by new machinery after a few months. The living machinery, on the contrary gets
better the longer it lasts, and in proportion as the skill, handed from one generation to another,
accumulates. The Times answered the cotton lord as follows:
“Mr. Edmund Potter is so impressed with the exceptional and supreme importance
of the cotton masters that, in order to preserve this class and perpetuate their
profession, he would keep half a million of the labouring class confined in a great
moral workhouse against their will. ‘Is the trade worth retaining?’ asks Mr. Potter.
‘Certainly by all honest means it is,’ we answer. ‘Is it worth while keeping the
machinery in order?’ again asks Mr. Potter. Here we hesitate. By the ‘machinery’
Mr. Potter means the human machinery, for he goes on to protest that he does not
mean to use them as an absolute property. We must confess that we do not think it
‘worth while,’ or even possible, to keep the human machinery in order – that is to
shut it up and keep it oiled till it is wanted. Human machinery will rust under
inaction, oil and rub it as you may. Moreover, the human machinery will, as we
have just seen, get the steam up of its own accord, and burst or run amuck in our
great towns. It might, as Mr. Potter says, require some time to reproduce the
workers, but, having machinists and capitalists at hand, we could always find
thrifty, hard, industrious men wherewith to improvise more master manufacturers
than we can ever want. Mr. Potter talks of the trade reviving ‘in one, two, or three
years,’ and he asks us not ‘to encourage or allow (!) the working power to
emigrate.’ 16 He says that it is very natural the workers should wish to emigrate;
but he thinks that in spite of their desire, the nation ought to keep this half million
of workers with their 700,000 dependents, shut up in the cotton districts; and as a
necessary consequence, he must of course think that the nation ought to keep
down their discontent by force, and sustain them by alms – and upon the chance
that the cotton masters may some day want them.... The time is come when the
great public opinion of these islands must operate to save this ‘working power’
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from those who would deal with it as they would deal with iron, and coal, and
cotton.”
The Times’ article was only a jeu d’esprit. The “great public opinion” was, in fact, of Mr. Potter’s
opinion, that the factory operatives are part of the movable fittings of a factory. Their emigration
was prevented. They were locked up in that “moral workhouse,” the cotton districts, and they
form, as before, “the strength” of the cotton manufacturers of Lancashire.
Capitalist production, therefore, of itself reproduces the separation between labour-power and the
means of labour. It thereby reproduces and perpetuates the condition for exploiting the labourer.
It incessantly forces him to sell his labour-power in order to live, and enables the capitalist to
purchase labour-power in order that he may enrich himself. 17 It is no longer a mere accident, that
capitalist and labourer confront each other in the market as buyer and seller. It is the process itself
that incessantly hurls back the labourer on to the market as a vendor of his labour-power, and that
incessantly converts his own product into a means by which another man can purchase him. In
reality, the labourer belongs to capital before he has sold himself to capital. His economic
bondage 18 is both brought about and concealed by the periodic sale of himself, by his change of
masters, and by the oscillations in the market-price of labour-power. 19
Capitalist production, therefore, under its aspect of a continuous connected process, of a process
of reproduction, produces not only commodities, not only surplus-value, but it also produces and
reproduces the capitalist relation; on the one side the capitalist, on the other the wage labourer.20
1

“Mais ces riches, qui consomment les produits du travail des autres, ne peuvent les obtenir que par
des échanges [purchases of commodities]. S’ils donnent cependant leur richesse acquise et accumulée
en retour contre ces produits nouveaux qui sont l’objet de leur fantaisie, ils semblent exposés à épuiser
bientôt leur fonds de réserve; ils ne travaillent point, avons-nous dit, et ils ne peuvent même travailler;
on croirait donc que chaque jour doit voir diminuer leurs vieilles richesses, et que lorsqu’il ne leur en
restera plus, rien ne sera offert en échange aux ouvriers qui travaillent exclusivement pour eux.... Mais
dans l’ordre social, la richesse a acquis la propriété de se reproduire par le travail d’autrui, et sans que
son propriétaire y concoure. La richesse, comme le travail, et par le travail, donne un fruit annuel qui
peut être détruit chaque année sans que le riche en devienne plus pauvre. Ce fruit est le revenu qui naît
du capital.” [The rich, who consume the labour of others, can only obtain them by making exchanges
... By giving away their acquired and accumulated wealth in exchange for the new products which are
the object of their capricious wishes, they seem to be exposed to an early exhaustion of their reserve
fund; we have already said that they do not work and are unable to work; therefore it could be
assumed with full justification that their former wealth would be diminishing with every day and that,
finally, a day would come when they would have nothing, and they would have nothing to offer to the
workers, who work exclusively for them. ... But, in the social order, wealth has acquired the power of
reproducing itself through the labour of others, without the help of its owners. Wealth, like labour, and
by means of labour, bears fruit every year, but this fruit can be destroyed every year without making
the rich man any poorer thereby. This fruit is the revenue which arises our of capital.] (Sismondi:
“Nouv. Princ. d’Econ. Pol.” Paris, 1819, t. I, pp. 81-82.)
2
“Wages as well as profits are to be considered, each of them, as really a portion of the finished
product.” (Ramsay, l. c., p. 142.) “The share of the product which comes to the labourer in the form of
wages.” (J. Mill, “Eléments, &c.” Translated by Parissot. Paris, 1823, p. 34.)
3
“When capital is employed in advancing to the workman his wages, it adds nothing to the funds for
the maintenance of labour.” (Cazenove in note to his edition of Malthus’ “Definitions in Pol. Econ.”
London, 1853, p. 22.)
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“The wages of labour are advanced by capitalists in the case of less than one fourth of the labourers
of the earth.” (Rich. Jones: “Textbook of Lectures on the Pol. Econ. of Nations.” Hertford, 1852, p.
36.)
5
“Though the manufacturer” (i.e., the labourer) “has his wages advanced to him by his master, he in
reality costs him no expense, the value of these wages being generally reserved, together with a profit,
in the improved value of the subject upon which his labour is bestowed.” (A. Smith, l. c., Book II. ch.
III, p. 311.)
6
“This is a remarkably peculiar property of productive labour. Whatever is productively consumed is
capital and it becomes capital by consumption.” (James Mill, l. c., p. 242.) James Mill, however, never
got on the track of this “remarkably peculiar property.”
7
“It is true indeed, that the first introducing a manufacture employs many poor, but they cease not to
be so, and the continuance of it makes many.” (“Reasons for a Limited Exportation of Wool.”
London, 1677, p. 19.) “The farmer now absurdly asserts, that he keeps the poor. They are indeed kept
in misery.” (“Reasons for the Late Increase of the Poor Rates: or a Comparative View of the Prices of
Labour and Provisions.” London, 1777, p. 31.)
8
Rossi would not declaim so emphatically against this, had he really penetrated the secret of
“productive consumption.”
9
“The labourers in the mines of S. America, whose daily task (the heaviest perhaps in the world)
consists in bringing to the surface on their shoulders a load of metal weighing from 180 to 200
pounds, from a depth of 450 feet, live on bread and beans only; they themselves would prefer the
bread alone for food, but their masters, who have found out that the men cannot work so hard on
bread, treat them like horses, and compel them to eat beans; beans, however, are relatively much
richer in bone-earth (phosphate of lime) than is bread.” (Liebig, l. c., vol. 1., p. 194, note.)
10
James Mill, l. c., p. 238
11
“If the price of labour should rise so high that, notwithstanding the increase of capital, no more
could be employed, I should say that such increase of capital would be still unproductively
consumed.” (Ricardo, l. c., p. 163.)
12
“The only productive consumption, properly so called, is the consumption or destruction of wealth”
(he alludes to the means of production) “by capitalists with a view to reproduction.... The workman ...
is a productive consumer to the person who employs him, and to the State, but not, strictly speaking,
to himself.” (Malthus’ “Definitions, &c.,” p. 30.)
13
“The only thing, of which one can say, that it is stored up and prepared beforehand, is the skill of
the labourer.... The accumulation and storage of skilled labour, that most important operation, is, as
regards the great mass of labourers, accomplished without any capital whatever.” (Th. Hodgskin:
“Labour Defended, &c.,” p. 13.)
14
“That letter might be looked upon as the manifesto of the manufacturers.” (Ferrand: “Motion on the
Cotton Famine.” H.o.C., 27th April, 1863.)
15
It will not be forgotten that this same capital sings quite another song, under ordinary
circumstances, when there is a question of reducing wages. Then the masters exclaim with one voice:
“The factory operatives should keep in wholesome remembrance the fact that theirs is really a low
species of skilled labour, and that there is none which is more easily acquired, or of its quality more
amply remunerated, or which, by a short training of the least expert, can be more quickly, as well as
abundantly, acquired ... The master’s machinery” (which we now learn can be replaced with
advantage in 12 months,) “really plays a far more important part in the business of production than the
labour and skill of the operative” (who cannot now be replaced under 30 years), “which six months’
education can reach, and a common labourer can learn.” (See ante, p. 423.)
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Parliament did not vote a single farthing in aid of emigration, but simply passed some Acts
empowering the municipal corporations to keep the operatives in a half-starved state, i.e., to exploit
them at less than the normal wages. On the other hand, when 3 years later, the cattle disease broke out,
Parliament broke wildly through its usages and voted, straight off, millions for indemnifying the
millionaire landlords, whose farmers in any event came off without loss, owing to the rise in the price
of meat. The bull-like bellow of the landed proprietors at the opening of Parliament, in 1866, showed
that a man can worship the cow Sabala without being a Hindu, and can change himself into an ox
without being a Jupiter.
17
“L’ouvrier demandait de la subsistence pour vivre, le chef demandait du travail pour gagner.” [The
worker required the means of subsistence to live, the boss required labour to make a profit] (Sismondi,
l. c., p. 91.)
18
A boorishly clumsy form of this bondage exists in the county of Durham. This is one of the few
counties, in which circumstances do not secure to the farmer undisputed proprietary rights over the
agricultural labourer. The mining industry allows the latter some choice. In this county, the farmer,
contrary to the custom elsewhere, rents only such farms as have on them labourers’ cottages. The rent
of the cottage is a part of the wages. These cottages are known as “hinds’ houses.” They are let to the
labourers in consideration of certain feudal services, under a contract called “bondage,” which,
amongst other things, binds the labourer, during the time he is employed elsewhere, to leave some
one, say his daughter, &c., to supply his place. The labourer himself is called a “bondsman.” The
relationship here set up also shows how individual consumption by the labourer becomes consumption
on behalf of capital - or productive consumption - from quite a new point of view: “It is curious to
observe that the very dung of the hind and bondsman is the perquisite of the calculating lord ... and the
lord will allow no privy but his own to exist in the neighbourhood, and will rather give a bit of manure
here and there for a garden than bate any part of his seigneurial right.” (“Public Health, Report VII.,
1864,” p. 188.)
19
It will not be forgotten, that, with respect to the labour of children, &c., even the formality of a
voluntary sale disappears.
20
“Capital pre-supposes wage labour, and wage labour pre-supposes capital. One is a necessary
condition to the existence of the other; they mutually call each other into existence. Does an operative
in a cotton-factory produce nothing but cotton goods? No, he produces capital. He produces values
that give fresh command over his labour, and that, by means of such command, create fresh values.”
(Karl Marx: “Lohnarbeit und Kapital,” in the Neue Rheinische Zeitung: No. 266, 7th April, 1849.) The
articles published under the above title in the N. Rh. Z. are parts of some lectures given by me on that
subject, in 1847, in the German “Arbeiter-Verein” at Brussels, the publication of which was
interrupted by the revolution of February.

Chapter 24: Conversion of Surplus-Value into
Capital
Section 1: Capitalist Production on a Progressively Increasing
Scale. Transition of the Laws of Property that Characterise
Production of Commodities into Laws of Capitalist
Appropriation
Hitherto we have investigated how surplus-value emanates from capital; we have now to see how
capital arises from surplus-value. Employing surplus-value as capital, reconverting it into capital,
is called accumulation of capital.1
First let us consider this transaction from the standpoint of the individual capitalist. Suppose a
spinner to have advanced a capital of £10,000, of which four-fifths (£8,000) are laid out in cotton,
machinery, &c., and one-fifth (£2,000) in wages. Let him produce 240,000 lbs. of yarn annually,
having a value of £2,000. The rate of surplus-value being 100%, the surplus-value lies in the
surplus or net product of 40,000 lbs. of yarn, one-sixth of the gross product, with a value of
£2,000 which will be realised by a sale. £2,000 is £2,000. We can neither see nor smell in this
sum of money a trace of surplus-value. When we know that a given value is surplus-value, we
know how its owner came by it; but that does not alter the nature either of value or of money.
In order to convert this additional sum of £2,000 into capital, the master-spinner will, all
circumstances remaining as before, advance four-fifths of it (£1,600) in the purchase of cotton,
&c., and one-fifth (£400) in the purchase of additional spinners, who will find in the market the
necessaries of life whose value the master has advanced to them.
Then the new capital of £2,000 functions in the spinning mill, and brings in, in its turn, a surplusvalue of £400.
The capital value was originally advanced in the money form. The surplus-value on the contrary
is, originally, the value of a definite portion of the gross product. If this gross product be sold,
converted into money, the capital value regains its original form. From this moment the capital
value and the surplus-value are both of them sums of money, and their reconversion into capital
takes place in precisely the same way. The one, as well as the other, is laid out by the capitalist in
the purchase of commodities that place him in a position to begin afresh the fabrication of his
goods, and this time, on an extended scale. But in order to be able to buy those commodities, he
must find them ready in the market.
His own yarns circulate, only because he brings his annual product to market, as all other
capitalists likewise do with their commodities. But these commodities, before coming to market,
were part of the general annual product, part of the total mass of objects of every kind, into which
the sum of the individual capitals, i.e., the total capital of society, had been converted in the
course of the year, and of which each capitalist had in hand only an aliquot part. The transactions
in the market effectuate only the interchange of the individual components of this annual product,
transfer them from one hand to another, but can neither augment the total annual production, nor
alter the nature of the objects produced. Hence the use that can be made of the total annual
product, depends entirely upon its own composition, but in no way upon circulation.
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The annual production must in the first place furnish all those objects (use values) from which the
material components of capital, used up in the course of the year, have to be replaced. Deducting
these there remains the net or surplus-product, in which the surplus-value lies. And of what does
this surplus-product consist? Only of things destined to satisfy the wants and desires of the
capitalist class, things which, consequently, enter into the consumption fund of the capitalists?
Were that the case, the cup of surplus-value would be drained to the very dregs, and nothing but
simple reproduction would ever take place.
To accumulate it is necessary to convert a portion of the surplus-product into capital. But we
cannot, except by a miracle, convert into capital anything but such articles as can be employed in
the labour process (i.e., means of production), and such further articles as are suitable for the
sustenance of the labourer (i.e., means of subsistence). Consequently, a part of the annual surplus
labour must have been applied to the production of additional means of production and
subsistence, over and above the quantity of these things required to replace the capital advanced.
In one word, surplus-value is convertible into capital solely because the surplus-product, whose
value it is, already comprises the material elements of new capital.2
Now in order to allow of these elements actually functioning as capital, the capitalist class
requires additional labour. If the exploitation of the labourers already employed do not increase,
either extensively or intensively, then additional labour-power must be found. For this the
mechanism of capitalist production provides beforehand, by converting the working class into a
class dependent on wages, a class whose ordinary wages suffice, not only for its maintenance, but
for its increase. It is only necessary for capital to incorporate this additional labour-power,
annually supplied by the working class in the shape of labourers of all ages, with the surplus
means of production comprised in the annual produce, and the conversion of surplus-value into
capital is complete. From a concrete point of view, accumulation resolves itself into the
reproduction of capital on a progressively increasing scale. The circle in which simple
reproduction moves, alters its form, and, to use Sismondi’s expression, changes into a spiral.3
Let us now return to our illustration. It is the old story: Abraham begat Isaac, Isaac begat Jacob,
and so on. The original capital of £10,000 brings in a surplus-value of £2,000, which is
capitalised. The new capital of £2,000 brings in a surplus-value of £400, and this, too, is
capitalised, converted into a second additional capital, which, in its turn, produces a further
surplus-value of £80. And so the ball rolls on.
We here leave out of consideration the portion of the surplus-value consumed by the capitalist.
Just as little does it concern us, for the moment, whether the additional capital is joined on to the
original capital, or is separated from it to function independently; whether the same capitalist,
who accumulated it employs it, or whether he hands it over to another. This only we must not
forget, that by the side of the newly-formed capital, the original capital continues to reproduce
itself, and to produce surplus-value, and that this is also true of all accumulated capital, and the
additional capital engendered by it.
The original capital was formed by the advance of £10,000. How did the owner become
possessed of it? “By his own labour and that of his forefathers,” answer unanimously the
spokesmen of Political Economy. 4 And, in fact, their supposition appears the only one consonant
with the laws of the production of commodities.
But it is quite otherwise with regard to the additional capital of £2,000. How that originated we
know perfectly well. There is not one single atom of its value that does not owe its existence to
unpaid labour. The means of production, with which the additional labour-power is incorporated,
as well as the necessaries with which the labourers are sustained, are nothing but component parts
of the surplus-product, of the tribute annually exacted from the working class by the capitalist
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class. Though the latter with a portion of that tribute purchases the additional labour-power even
at its full price, so that equivalent is exchanged for equivalent, yet the transaction is for all that
only the old dodge of every conqueror who buys commodities from the conquered with the
money he has robbed them of.
If the additional capital employs the person who produced it, this producer must not only continue
to augment the value of the original capital, but must buy back the fruits of his previous labour
with more labour than they cost. When viewed as a transaction between the capitalist class and
the working class, it makes no difference that additional labourers are employed by means of the
unpaid labour of the previously employed labourers. The capitalist may even convert the
additional capital into a machine that throws the producers of that capital out of work, and that
replaces them by a few children. In every case the working class creates by the surplus labour of
one year the capital destined to employ additional labour in the following year.5 And this is what
is called: creating capital out of capital.
The accumulation of the first additional capital of £2,000 presupposes a value of £10,000
belonging to the capitalist by virtue of his “primitive labour,” and advanced by him. The second
additional capital of £400 presupposes, on the contrary, only the previous accumulation of the
£2,000, of which the £400 is the surplus-value capitalised. The ownership of past unpaid labour is
thenceforth the sole condition for the appropriation of living unpaid labour on a constantly
increasing scale. The more the capitalist has accumulated, the more is he able to accumulate.
In so far as the surplus-value, of which the additional capital, No. 1, consists, is the result of the
purchase of labour-power with part of the original capital, a purchase that conformed to the laws
of the exchange of commodities, and that, from a legal standpoint, presupposes nothing beyond
the free disposal, on the part of the labourer, of his own capacities, and on the part of the owner of
money or commodities, of the values that belong to him; in so far as the additional capital, No. 2,
&c., is the mere result of No. 1, and, therefore, a consequence of the above conditions; in so far as
each single transaction invariably conforms to the laws of the exchange of commodities, the
capitalist buying labour-power, the labourer selling it, and we will assume at its real value; in so
far as all this is true, it is evident that the laws of appropriation or of private property, laws that
are based on the production and circulation of commodities, become by their own inner and
inexorable dialectic changed into their very opposite. The exchange of equivalents, the original
operation with which we started, has now become turned round in such a way that there is only an
apparent exchange. This is owing to the fact, first, that the capital which is exchanged for labourpower is itself but a portion of the product of others’ labour appropriated without an equivalent;
and, secondly, that this capital must not only be replaced by its producer, but replaced together
with an added surplus. The relation of exchange subsisting between capitalist and labourer
becomes a mere semblance appertaining to the process of circulation, a mere form, foreign to the
real nature of the transaction, and only mystifying it. The ever repeated purchase and sale of
labour-power is now the mere form; what really takes place is this – the capitalist again and again
appropriates, without equivalent, a portion of the previously materialised labour of others, and
exchanges it for a greater quantity of living labour. At first the rights of property seemed to us to
be based on a man’s own labour. At least, some such assumption was necessary since only
commodity-owners with equal rights confronted each other, and the sole means by which a man
could become possessed of the commodities of others, was by alienating his own commodities;
and these could be replaced by labour alone. Now, however, property turns out to be the right, on
the part of the capitalist, to appropriate the unpaid labour of others or its product, and to be the
impossibility, on the part of the labourer, of appropriating his own product. The separation of
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property from labour has become the necessary consequence of a law that apparently originated
in their identity. 6
Therefore, 7 however much the capitalist mode of appropriation may seem to fly in the face of the
original laws of commodity production, it nevertheless arises, not from a violation, but, on the
contrary, from the application of these laws. Let us make this clear once more by briefly
reviewing the consecutive phases of motion whose culminating point is capitalist accumulation.
We saw, in the first place, that the original conversion of a sum of values into capital was
achieved in complete accordance with the laws of exchange. One party to the contract sells his
labour-power, the other buys it. The former receives the value of his commodity, whose use value
– labour – is thereby alienated to the buyer. Means of production which already belong to the
latter are then transformed by him, with the aid of labour equally belonging to him, into a new
product which is likewise lawfully his.
The value of this product includes: first, the value of the used-up means of production. Useful
labour cannot consume these means of production without transferring their value to the new
product, but, to be saleable, labour-power must be capable of supplying useful labour in the
branch of industry in which it is to be employed.
The value of the new product further includes: the equivalent of the value of the labour-power
together with a surplus-value. This is so because the value of the labour-power – sold for a
definite length of time, say a day, a week, etc. – is less than the value created by its use during
that time. But the worker has received payment for the exchange-value of his labour-power and
by so doing has alienated its use value – this being the case in every sale and purchase.
The fact that this particular commodity, labour-power, possesses the peculiar use value of
supplying labour, and therefore of creating value, cannot affect the general law of commodity
production. If, therefore, the magnitude of value advanced in wages is not merely found again in
the product, but is found there augmented by a surplus-value, this is not because the seller has
been defrauded, for he has really received the value of his commodity; it is due solely to the fact
that this commodity has been used up by the buyer.
The law of exchange requires equality only between the exchange-values of the commodities
given in exchange for one another. From the very outset it presupposes even a difference between
their use values and it has nothing whatever to do with their consumption, which only begins after
the deal is closed and executed.
Thus the original conversion of money into capital is achieved in the most exact accordance with
the economic laws of commodity production and with the right of property derived from them.
Nevertheless, its result is:
(1) that the product belongs to the capitalist and not to the worker;
(2) that the value of this product includes, besides the value of the capital advanced, a surplusvalue which costs the worker labour but the capitalist nothing, and which none the less becomes
the legitimate property of the capitalist;
(3) that the worker has retained his labour-power and can sell it anew if he can find a buyer.
Simple reproduction is only the periodical repetition of this first operation; each time money is
converted afresh into capital. Thus the law is not broken; on the contrary, it is merely enabled to
operate continuously. “Several successive acts of exchange have only made the last represent the
first” (Sismondi, “Nouveaux Principes, etc.,” p. 70).
And yet we have seen that simple reproduction suffices to stamp this first operation, in so far as it
is conceived as an isolated process, with a totally changed character. “Of those who share the
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national income among themselves, the one side (the workers) acquire every year a fresh right to
their share by fresh work; the others (the capitalists) have already acquired, by work done
originally, a permanent right to their share” (Sismondi, l. c., pp. 110, 111). It is indeed notorious
that the sphere of labour is not the only one in which primogeniture works miracles.
Nor does it matter if simple reproduction is replaced by reproduction on an extended scale, by
accumulation. In the former case the capitalist squanders the whole surplus-value in dissipation,
in the latter he demonstrates his bourgeois virtue by consuming only a portion of it and
converting the rest into money.
The surplus-value is his property; it has never belonged to anyone else. If he advances it for the
purposes of production, the advances made come from his own funds, exactly as on the day when
he first entered the market. The fact that on this occasion the funds are derived from the unpaid
labour of his workers makes absolutely no difference. If worker B is paid out of the surplus-value
which worker A produced, then, in the first place, A furnished that surplus-value without having
the just price of his commodity cut by a half-penny, and, in the second place, the transaction is no
concern of B’s whatever. What B claims, and has a right to claim, is that the capitalist should pay
him the value of his labour-power. “Both were still gainers: the worker because he was advanced
the fruits of his labour” (should read: of the unpaid labour of other workers) “before the work was
done” (should read: before his own labour had borne fruit); “the employer (le maître), because the
labour of this worker was worth more than his wages” (should read: produced more value than
the value of his wages). (Sismondi, l. c., p. 135.)
To be sure, the matter looks quite different if we consider capitalist production in the
uninterrupted flow of its renewal, and if, in place of the individual capitalist and the individual
worker, we view in their totality, the capitalist class and the working class confronting each other.
But in so doing we should be applying standards entirely foreign to commodity production.
Only buyer and seller, mutually independent, face each other in commodity production. The
relations between them cease on the day when the term stipulated in the contract they concluded
expires. If the transaction is repeated, it is repeated as the result of a new agreement which has
nothing to do with the previous one and which only by chance brings the same seller together
again with the same buyer.
If, therefore, commodity production, or one of its associated processes, is to be judged according
to its own economic laws, we must consider each act of exchange by itself, apart from any
connexion with the act of exchange preceding it and that following it. And since sales and
purchases are negotiated solely between particular individuals, it is not admissible to seek here
for relations between whole social classes.
However long a series of periodical reproductions and preceding accumulations the capital
functioning today may have passed through, it always preserves its original virginity. So long as
the laws of exchange are observed in every single act of exchange the mode of appropriation can
be completely revolutionised without in any way affecting the property rights which correspond
to commodity production. These same rights remain in force both at the outset, when the product
belongs to its producer, who, exchanging equivalent for equivalent, can enrich himself only by
his own labour, and also in the period of capitalism, when social wealth becomes to an everincreasing degree the property of those who are in a position to appropriate continually and ever
afresh the unpaid labour of others.
This result becomes inevitable from the moment there is a free sale, by the labourer himself, of
labour-power as a commodity. But it is also only from then onwards that commodity production
is generalised and becomes the typical form of production; it is only from then onwards that, from
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the first, every product is produced for sale and all wealth produced goes through the sphere of
circulation. Only when and where wage labour is its basis does commodity production impose
itself upon society as a whole; but only then and there also does it unfold all its hidden
potentialities. To say that the supervention of wage labour adulterates commodity production is to
say that commodity production must not develop if it is to remain unadulterated. To the extent
that commodity production, in accordance with its own inherent laws, develops further, into
capitalist production, the property laws of commodity production change into the laws of
capitalist appropriation.8
We have seen that even in the case of simple reproduction, all capital, whatever its original
source, becomes converted into accumulated capital, capitalised surplus-value. But in the flood of
production all the capital originally advanced becomes a vanishing quantity (magnitudo
evanescens, in the mathematical sense), compared with the directly accumulated capital, i.e., with
the surplus-value or surplus-product that is reconverted into capital, whether it functions in the
hands of its accumulator, or in those of others. Hence, Political Economy describes capital in
general as “accumulated wealth” (converted surplus-value or revenue), “that is employed over
again in the production of surplus-value,” 9 and the capitalist as “the owner of surplus-value.” 10 It
is merely another way of expressing the same thing to say that all existing capital is accumulated
or capitalised interest, for interest is a mere fragment of surplus-value. 11

Section 2: Erroneous Conception, by Political Economy, of
Reproduction on a Progressively Increasing Scale
Before we further investigate accumulation or the reconversion of surplus-value into capital, we
must brush on one side an ambiguity introduced by the classical economists.
Just as little as the commodities that the capitalist buys with a part of the surplus-value for his
own consumption, serve the purpose of production and of creation of value, so little is the labour
that he buys for the satisfaction of his natural and social requirements, productive labour. Instead
of converting surplus-value into capital, he, on the contrary, by the purchase of those
commodities and that labour, consumes or expends it as revenue. In the face of the habitual mode
of life of the old feudal nobility, which, as Hegel rightly says, “consists in consuming what is in
hand,” and more especially displays itself in the luxury of personal retainers, it was extremely
important for bourgeois economy to promulgate the doctrine that accumulation of capital is the
first duty of every citizen, and to preach without ceasing, that a man cannot accumulate, if he eats
up all his revenue, instead of spending a good part of it in the acquisition of additional productive
labourers, who bring in more than they cost. On the other hand the economists had to contend
against the popular prejudice, that confuses capitalist production with hoarding, 12 and fancies that
accumulated wealth is either wealth that is rescued from being destroyed in its existing form, i.e.,
from being consumed, or wealth that is withdrawn from circulation. Exclusion of money from
circulation would also exclude absolutely its self-expansion as capital, while accumulation of a
hoard in the shape of commodities would be sheer tomfoolery. 13 The accumulation of
commodities in great masses is the result either of over-production or of a stoppage of
circulation. 14 It is true that the popular mind is impressed by the sight, on the one hand, of the
mass of goods that are stored up for gradual consumption by the rich,15 and on the other hand, by
the formation of reserve stocks; the latter, a phenomenon that is common to all modes of
production, and on which we shall dwell for a moment, when we come to analyse circulation.
Classical economy is therefore quite right, when it maintains that the consumption of surplusproducts by productive, instead of by unproductive labourers, is a characteristic feature of the
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process of accumulation. But at this point the mistakes also begin. Adam Smith has made it the
fashion, to represent accumulation as nothing more than consumption of surplus products by
productive labourers, which amounts to saying, that the capitalising of surplus-value consists in
merely turning surplus-value into labour-power.
Let us see what Ricardo, e.g., says:
“It must be understood that all the productions of a country are consumed; but it
makes the greatest difference imaginable whether they are consumed by those
who reproduce, or by those who do not reproduce another value. When we say
that revenue is saved, and added to capital, what we mean is, that the portion of
revenue, so said to be added to capital, is consumed by productive instead of
unproductive labourers. There can be no greater error than in supposing that
capital is increased by non-consumption.” 16
There can be no greater error than that which Ricardo and all subsequent economists repeat after
A. Smith, viz., that
“the part of revenue, of which it is said, it has been added to capital, is consumed
by productive labourers.”
According to this, all surplus-value that is changed into capital becomes variable capital. So far
from this being the case, the surplus-value, like the original capital, divides itself into constant
capital and variable capital, into means of production and labour-power. Labour-power is the
form under which variable capital exists during the process of production. In this process the
labour-power is itself consumed by the capitalist while the means of production are consumed by
the labour-power in the exercise of its function, labour. At the same time, the money paid for the
purchase of the labour-power, is converted into necessaries, that are consumed, not by
“productive labour,” but by the “productive labourer.” Adam Smith, by a fundamentally
perverted analysis, arrives at the absurd conclusion, that even though each individual capital is
divided into a constant and a variable part, the capital of society resolves itself only into variable
capital, i.e., is laid out exclusively in payment of wages. For instance, suppose a cloth
manufacturer converts £2,000 into capital. One portion he lays out in buying weavers, the other in
woollen yarn, machinery, &c. But the people, from whom he buys the yarn and the machinery,
pay for labour with a part of the purchase money, and so on until the whole £2,000 are spent in
the payment of wages, i.e., until the entire product represented by the £2,000 has been consumed
by productive labourers. It is evident that the whole gist of this argument lies in the words “and so
on,” which send us from pillar to post. In truth, Adam Smith breaks his investigation off, just
where its difficulties begin. 17
The annual process of reproduction is easily understood, so long as we keep in view merely the
sum total of the year’s production. But every single component of this product must be brought
into the market as a commodity, and there the difficulty begins. The movements of the individual
capitals, and of the personal revenues, cross and intermingle and are lost in the general change of
places, in the circulation of the wealth of society; this dazes the sight, and propounds very
complicated problems for solution. In the third part of Book II. I shall give the analysis of the real
bearings of the facts. It is one of the great merits of the Physiocrats, that in their Tableau
économique they were the first to attempt to depict the annual production in the shape in which it
is presented to us after passing through the process of circulation.18
For the rest, it is a matter of course, that Political Economy, acting in the interests of the capitalist
class, has not failed to exploit the doctrine of Adam Smith, viz., that the whole of that part of the
surplus-product which is converted into capital, is consumed by the working class.
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Section 3: Separation of Surplus-Value into Capital and
Revenue. The Abstinence Theory
In the last preceding chapter, we treated surplus-value (or the surplus-product) solely as a fund for
supplying the individual consumption of the capitalist. In this chapter we have, so far, treated it
solely as a fund for accumulation. It is, however, neither the one nor the other, but is both
together. One portion is consumed by the capitalist as revenue,19 the other is employed as capital,
is accumulated.
Given the mass of surplus-value, then, the larger the one of these parts, the smaller is the other.
Caeteris paribus, the ratio of these parts determines the magnitude of the accumulation. But it is
by the owner of the surplus-value, by the capitalist alone, that the division is made. It is his
deliberate act. That part of the tribute exacted by him which he accumulates, is said to be saved
by him, because he does not eat it, i.e., because he performs the function of a capitalist, and
enriches himself.
Except as personified capital, the capitalist has no historical value, and no right to that historical
existence, which, to use an expression of the witty Lichnowsky, “hasn’t got no date.” And so far
only is the necessity for his own transitory existence implied in the transitory necessity for the
capitalist mode of production. But, so far as he is personified capital, it is not values in use and
the enjoyment of them, but exchange-value and its augmentation, that spur him into action.
Fanatically bent on making value expand itself, he ruthlessly forces the human race to produce for
production’s sake; he thus forces the development of the productive powers of society, and
creates those material conditions, which alone can form the real basis of a higher form of society,
a society in which the full and free development of every individual forms the ruling principle.
Only as personified capital is the capitalist respectable. As such, he shares with the miser the
passion for wealth as wealth. But that which in the miser is a mere idiosyncrasy, is, in the
capitalist, the effect of the social mechanism, of which he is but one of the wheels. Moreover, the
development of capitalist production makes it constantly necessary to keep increasing the amount
of the capital laid out in a given industrial undertaking, and competition makes the immanent
laws of capitalist production to be felt by each individual capitalist, as external coercive laws. It
compels him to keep constantly extending his capital, in order to preserve it, but extend it he
cannot, except by means of progressive accumulation.
So far, therefore, as his actions are a mere function of capital – endowed as capital is, in his
person, with consciousness and a will – his own private consumption is a robbery perpetrated on
accumulation, just as in book-keeping by double entry, the private expenditure of the capitalist is
placed on the debtor side of his account against his capital. To accumulate, is to conquer the
world of social wealth, to increase the mass of human beings exploited by him, and thus to extend
both the direct and the indirect sway of the capitalist.20
But original sin is at work everywhere. As capitalist production, accumulation, and wealth,
become developed, the capitalist ceases to be the mere incarnation of capital. He has a fellowfeeling for his own Adam, and his education gradually enables him to smile at the rage for
asceticism, as a mere prejudice of the old-fashioned miser. While the capitalist of the classical
type brands individual consumption as a sin against his function, and as “abstinence” from
accumulating, the modernised capitalist is capable of looking upon accumulation as “abstinence”
from pleasure.
“Two souls, alas, do dwell with in his breast;
The one is ever parting from the other.” 21
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At the historical dawn of capitalist production, – and every capitalist upstart has personally to go
through this historical stage – avarice, and desire to get rich, are the ruling passions. But the
progress of capitalist production not only creates a world of delights; it lays open, in speculation
and the credit system, a thousand sources of sudden enrichment. When a certain stage of
development has been reached, a conventional degree of prodigality, which is also an exhibition
of wealth, and consequently a source of credit, becomes a business necessity to the “unfortunate”
capitalist. Luxury enters into capital’s expenses of representation. Moreover, the capitalist gets
rich, not like the miser, in proportion to his personal labour and restricted consumption, but at the
same rate as he squeezes out the labour-power of others, and enforces on the labourer abstinence
from all life’s enjoyments. Although, therefore, the prodigality of the capitalist never possesses
the bona fide character of the open-handed feudal lord’s prodigality, but, on the contrary, has
always lurking behind it the most sordid avarice and the most anxious calculation, yet his
expenditure grows with his accumulation, without the one necessarily restricting the other. But
along with this growth, there is at the same time developed in his breast, a Faustian conflict
between the passion for accumulation, and the desire for enjoyment.
Dr. Aikin says in a work published in 1795:
“The trade of Manchester may be divided into four periods. First, when
manufacturers were obliged to work hard for their livelihood.”
They enriched themselves chiefly by robbing the parents, whose children were bound as
apprentices to them; the parents paid a high premium, while the apprentices were starved. On the
other hand, the average profits were low, and to accumulate, extreme parsimony was requisite.
They lived like misers and were far from consuming even the interest on their capital.
“The second period, when they had begun to acquire little fortunes, but worked as
hard as before,” – for direct exploitation of labour costs labour, as every slavedriver knows – “and lived in as plain a manner as before.... The third, when luxury
began, and the trade was pushed by sending out riders for orders into every market
town in the Kingdom.... It is probable that few or no capitals of £3,000 to £4,000
acquired by trade existed here before 1690. However, about that time, or a little
later, the traders had got money beforehand, and began to build modern brick
houses, instead of those of wood and plaster.”
Even in the early part of the 18th century, a Manchester manufacturer, who placed a pint of
foreign wine before his guests, exposed himself to the remarks and headshakings of all his
neighbours. Before the rise of machinery, a manufacturer’s evening expenditure at the public
house where they all met, never exceeded sixpence for a glass of punch, and a penny for a screw
of tobacco. It was not till 1758, and this marks an epoch, that a person actually engaged in
business was seen with an equipage of his own.
“The fourth period,” the last 30 years of the 18th century, “is that in which
expense and luxury have made great progress, and was supported by a trade
extended by means of riders and factors through every part of Europe.”22
What would the good Dr. Aikin say if he could rise from his grave and see the Manchester of
today?
Accumulate, accumulate! That is Moses and the prophets! “Industry furnishes the material which
saving accumulates.” 23 Therefore, save, save, i.e., reconvert the greatest possible portion of
surplus-value, or surplus-product into capital! Accumulation for accumulation’s sake, production
for production’s sake: by this formula classical economy expressed the historical mission of the
bourgeoisie, and did not for a single instant deceive itself over the birth-throes of wealth. 24 But
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what avails lamentation in the face of historical necessity? If to classical economy, the proletarian
is but a machine for the production of surplus-value; on the other hand, the capitalist is in its eyes
only a machine for the conversion of this surplus-value into additional capital. Political Economy
takes the historical function of the capitalist in bitter earnest. In order to charm out of his bosom
the awful conflict between the desire for enjoyment and the chase after riches, Malthus, about the
year 1820, advocated a division of labour, which assigns to the capitalist actually engaged in
production, the business of accumulating, and to the other sharers in surplus-value, to the
landlords, the place-men, the beneficed clergy, &c., the business of spending. It is of the highest
importance, he says,
“to keep separate the passion for expenditure and the passion for accumulation.”25
The capitalists having long been good livers and men of the world, uttered loud cries. What,
exclaimed one of their spokesmen, a disciple of Ricardo, Mr. Malthus preaches high rents, heavy
taxes, &c., so that the pressure of the spur may constantly be kept on the industrious by
unproductive consumers! By all means, production, production on a constantly increasing scale,
runs the shibboleth; but
“production will, by such a process, be far more curbed in than spurred on. Nor is
it quite fair thus to maintain in idleness a number of persons, only to pinch others,
who are likely, from their characters, if you can force them to work, to work with
success.” 26
Unfair as he finds it to spur on the industrial capitalist, by depriving his bread of its butter, yet he
thinks it necessary to reduce the labourer’s wages to a minimum "to keep him industrious.” Nor
does he for a moment conceal the fact, that the appropriation of unpaid labour is the secret of
surplus-value.
“Increased demand on the part of the labourers means nothing more than their
willingness to take less of their own product for themselves, and leave a greater
part of it to their employers; and if it be said, that this begets glut, by lessening
consumption” (on the part of the labourers), “I can only reply that glut is
synonymous with large profits.” 27
The learned disputation, how the booty pumped out of the labourer may be divided, with most
advantage to accumulation, between the industrial capitalist and the rich idler, was hushed in face
of the revolution of July. Shortly afterwards, the town proletariat at Lyons sounded the tocsin of
revolution, and the country proletariat in England began to set fire to farm-yards and corn-stacks.
On this side of the Channel Owenism began to spread; on the other side, St. Simonism and
Fourierism. The hour of vulgar economy had struck. Exactly a year before Nassau W. Senior
discovered at Manchester, that the profit (including interest) of capital is the product of the last
hour of the twelve, he had announced to the world another discovery.
“I substitute,” he proudly says, “for the word capital, considered as an instrument
of production, the word abstinence.”
An unparalleled sample this, of the discoveries of vulgar economy! It substitutes for an economic
category, a sycophantic phrase – voilà tout. [that’s all]
“When the savage,” says Senior, “makes bows, he exercises an industry, but he
does not practise abstinence.” 28
This explains how and why, in the earlier states of society, the implements of labour were
fabricated without abstinence on the part of the capitalist.
“The more society progresses, the more abstinence is demanded,”29
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Namely, from those who ply the industry of appropriating the fruits of others’ industry. All the
conditions for carrying on the labour process are suddenly converted into so many acts of
abstinence on the part of the capitalist. If the corn is not all eaten, but part of it also sown –
abstinence of the capitalist. If the wine gets time to mature – abstinence of the capitalist 30 The
capitalist robs his own self, whenever he “lends (!) the instruments of production to the labourer,”
that is, whenever by incorporating labour-power with them, he uses them to extract surplus-value
out of that labour-power, instead of eating them up, steam-engines, cotton, railways, manure,
horses, and all; or as the vulgar economist childishly puts it, instead of dissipating “their value” in
luxuries and other articles of consumption.31 How the capitalists as a class are to perform that
feat, is a secret that vulgar economy has hitherto obstinately refused to divulge. Enough, that the
world still jogs on, solely through the self-chastisement of this modern penitent of Vishnu, the
capitalist. Not only accumulation, but the simple “conservation of a capital requires a constant
effort to resist the temptation of consuming it.” 32 The simple dictates of humanity therefore
plainly enjoin the release of the capitalist from this martyrdom and temptation, in the same way
that the Georgian slave-owner was lately delivered, by the abolition of slavery, from the painful
dilemma, whether to squander the surplus-product, lashed out of his niggers, entirely in
champagne, or whether to reconvert a part of it into more niggers and more land.
In economic forms of society of the most different kinds, there occurs, not only simple
reproduction, but, in varying degrees, reproduction on a progressively increasing scale. By
degrees more is produced and more consumed, and consequently more products have to be
converted into means of production. This process, however, does not present itself as
accumulation of capital, nor as the function of a capitalist, so long as the labourer’s means of
production, and with them, his product and means of subsistence, do not confront him in the
shape of capital.33 Richard Jones, who died a few years ago, and was the successor of Malthus in
the chair of Political Economy at Haileybury College, discusses this point well in the light of two
important facts. Since the great mass of the Hindu population are peasants cultivating their land
themselves, their products, their instruments of labour and means of subsistence never take “the
shape of a fund saved from revenue, which fund has, therefore, gone through a previous process
of accumulation.” 34 On the other hand, the non-agricultural labourers in those provinces where
the English rule has least disturbed the old system, are directly employed by the magnates, to
whom a portion of the agricultural surplus-product is rendered in the shape of tribute or rent. One
portion of this product is consumed by the magnates in kind, another is converted, for their use,
by the labourers, into articles of luxury and such like things, while the rest forms the wages of the
labourers, who own their implements of labour. Here, production and reproduction on a
progressively increasing scale, go on their way without any intervention from that queer saint,
that knight of the woeful countenance, the capitalist “abstainer.”
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Section 4: Circumstances that, Independently of the
Proportional Division of Surplus-Value into Capital and
Revenue, Determine the Amount of Accumulation.
Degree of Exploitation of Labour-Power. Productivity of
Labour. Growing Difference in Amount Between Capital
Employed and Capital Consumed. Magnitude of Capital
Advanced
The proportion in which surplus-value breaks up into capital and revenue being given, the
magnitude of the capital accumulated clearly depends on the absolute magnitude of the surplusvalue. Suppose that 80 per cent. were capitalised and 20 per cent. eaten up, the accumulated
capital will be £2,400 or £200, according as the total surplus-value has amounted to £3,000 or
£500. Hence all the circumstances that determine the mass of surplus-value operate to determine
the magnitude of the accumulation. We sum them up once again, but only in so far as they afford
new points of view in regard to accumulation.
It will be remembered that the rate of surplus-value depends, in the first place, on the degree of
exploitation of labour-power. Political Economy values this fact so highly, that it occasionally
identifies the acceleration of accumulation due to increased productiveness of labour, with its
acceleration due to increased exploitation of the labourer.35 In the chapters on the production of
surplus-value it was constantly presupposed that wages are at least equal to the value of labourpower. Forcible reduction of wages below this value plays, however, in practice too important a
part, for us not to pause upon it for a moment. It, in fact, transforms, within certain limits, the
labourer’s necessary consumption fund into a fund for the accumulation of capital.
“Wages,” says John Stuart Mill, “have no productive power; they are the price of
a productive power. Wages do not contribute, along with labour, to the production
of commodities, no more than the price of tools contributes along with the tools
themselves. If labour could be had without purchase, wages might be dispensed
with.” 36
But if the labourers could live on air they could not be bought at any price. The zero of their cost
is therefore a limit in a mathematical sense, always beyond reach, although we can always
approximate more and more nearly to it. The constant tendency of capital is to force the cost of
labour back towards this zero. A writer of the 18th century, often quoted already, the author of the
“Essay on Trade and Commerce,” only betrays the innermost secret soul of English capitalism,
when he declares the historic mission of England to be the forcing down of English wages to the
level of the French and the Dutch.37 With other things he says naively:
“But if our poor” (technical term for labourers) “will live luxuriously ... then
labour must, of course, be dear ... When it is considered what luxuries the
manufacturing populace consume, such as brandy, gin, tea, sugar, foreign fruit,
strong beer, printed linens, snuff, tobacco, &c.” 38
He quotes the work of a Northamptonshire manufacturer, who, with eyes squinting heavenward
moans:
“Labour is one-third cheaper in France than in England; for their poor work hard,
and fare hard, as to their food and clothing. Their chief diet is bread, fruit, herbs,
roots, and dried fish; for they very seldom eat flesh; and when wheat is dear, they
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eat very little bread.” “To which may be added,” our essayist goes on, “that their
drink is either water or other small liquors, so that they spend very little money....
These things are very difficult to be brought about; but they are not impracticable,
since they have been effected both in France and in Holland.”40
Twenty years later, an American humbug, the baronised Yankee, Benjamin Thompson (alias
Count Rumford) followed the same line of philanthropy to the great satisfaction of God and man.
His “Essays” are a cookery book with receipts of all kinds for replacing by some succedaneum
the ordinary dear food of the labourer. The following is a particularly successful receipt of this
wonderful philosopher:
“5 lbs. of barleymeal, 7½d.; 5 lbs. of Indian corn, 6¼d.; 3d. worth of red herring,
1d. salt, 1d. vinegar, 2d. pepper and sweet herbs, in all 20¾.; make a soup for 64
men, and at the medium price of barley and of Indian corn ... this soup may be
provided at ¼d., the portion of 20 ounces.” 41
With the advance of capitalistic production, the adulteration of food rendered Thompson’s ideal
superfluous. 42 At the end of the 18th and during the first ten years of the 19th century, the English
farmers and landlords enforced the absolute minimum of wage, by paying the agricultural
labourers less than the minimum in the form of wages, and the remainder in the shape of
parochial relief. An example of the waggish way in which the English Dogberries acted in their
“legal” fixing of a wages tariff:
“The squires of Norfolk had dined, says Mr. Burke, when they fixed the rate of
wages; the squires of Berks evidently thought the labourers ought not to do so,
when they fixed the rate of wages at Speenhamland, 1795.... There they decide
that ‘income (weekly) should be 3s. for a man,’ when the gallon or half-peck loaf
of 8 lbs. 11 oz. is at 1s., and increase regularly till bread is 1s. 5d.; when it is
above that sum decrease regularly till it be at 2s., and then his food should be 1/5
th less.” 43
Before the Committee of Inquiry of the House of Lords, 1814, a certain A. Bennett, a large
farmer, magistrate, poor-law guardian, and wage-regulator, was asked:
“Has any proportion of the value of daily labour been made up to the labourers out
of the poors’ rate?” Answer: “Yes, it has; the weekly income of every family is
made up to the gallon loaf (8 lbs. 11 oz.), and 3d. per head!... The gallon loaf per
week is what we suppose sufficient for the maintenance of every person in the
family for the week; and the 3d. is for clothes, and if the parish think proper to
find clothes; the 3d. is deducted. This practice goes through all the western part of
Wiltshire, and, I believe, throughout the country.” 44 “For years,” exclaims a
bourgeois author of that time, “they (the farmers) have degraded a respectable
class of their countrymen, by forcing them to have recourse to the workhouse ...
the farmer, while increasing his own gains, has prevented any accumulation on the
part of his labouring dependents.” 45
The part played in our days by the direct robbery from the labourer’s necessary consumption fund
in the formation of surplus-value, and, therefore, of the accumulation fund of capital, the socalled domestic industry has served to show. (Ch. xv., sect. 8, c.) Further facts on this subject will
be given later.
Although in all branches of industry that part of the constant capital consisting of instruments of
labour must be sufficient for a certain number of labourers (determined by the magnitude of the
undertaking), it by no means always necessarily increases in the same proportion as the quantity
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of labour employed. In a factory, suppose that 100 labourers working 8 hours a day yield 800
working-hours. If the capitalist wishes to raise this sum by one half, he can employ 50 more
workers; but then he must also advance more capital, not merely for wages, but for instruments of
labour. But he might also let the 100 labourers work 12 hours instead of 8, and then the
instruments of labour already to hand would be enough. These would then simply be more rapidly
consumed. Thus additional labour, begotten of the greater tension of labour-power, can augment
surplus-product and surplus-value (i.e., the subject-matter of accumulation), without
corresponding augmentation in the constant part of capital.
In the extractive industries, mines, &c., the raw materials form no part of the capital advanced.
The subject of labour is in this case not a product of previous labour, but is furnished by Nature
gratis, as in the case of metals, minerals, coal, stone, &c. In these cases the constant capital
consists almost exclusively of instruments of labour, which can very well absorb an increased
quantity of labour (day and night shifts of labourers, e.g.). All other things being equal, the mass
and value of the product will rise in direct proportion to the labour expended. As on the first day
of production, the original produce-formers, now turned into the creators of the material elements
of capital – man and Nature – still work together. Thanks to the elasticity of labour-power, the
domain of accumulation has extended without any previous enlargement of constant capital.
In agriculture the land under cultivation cannot be increased without the advance of more seed
and manure. But this advance once made, the purely mechanical working of the soil itself
produces a marvellous effect on the amount of the product. A greater quantity of labour, done by
the same number of labourers as before, thus increases the fertility, without requiring any new
advance in the instruments of labour. It is once again the direct action of man on Nature which
becomes an immediate source of greater accumulation, without the intervention of any new
capital.
Finally, in what is called manufacturing industry, every additional expenditure of labour
presupposes a corresponding additional expenditure of raw materials, but not necessarily of
instruments of labour. And as extractive industry and agriculture supply manufacturing industry
with its raw materials and those of its instruments of labour, the additional product the former
have created without additional advance of capital, tells also in favour of the latter.
General result: by incorporating with itself the two primary creators of wealth, labour-power and
the land, capital acquires a power of expansion that permits it to augment the elements of its
accumulation beyond the limits apparently fixed by its own magnitude, or by the value and the
mass of the means of production, already produced, in which it has its being.
Another important factor in the accumulation of capital is the degree of productivity of social
labour.
With the productive power of labour increases the mass of the products, in which a certain value,
and, therefore, a surplus-value of a given magnitude, is embodied. The rate of surplus-value
remaining the same or even falling, so long as it only falls more slowly, than the productive
power of labour rises, the mass of the surplus-product increases. The division of this product into
revenue and additional capital remaining the same, the consumption of the capitalist may,
therefore, increase without any decrease in the fund of accumulation. The relative magnitude of
the accumulation fund may even increase at the expense of the consumption fund, whilst the
cheapening of commodities places at the disposal of the capitalist as many means of enjoyment as
formerly, or even more than formerly. But hand-in-hand with the increasing productivity of
labour, goes, as we have seen, the cheapening of the labourer, therefore a higher rate of surplusvalue, even when the real wages are rising. The latter never rise proportionally to the productive
power of labour. The same value in variable capital therefore sets in movement more labour-
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power, and, therefore, more labour. The same value in constant capital is embodied in more
means of production, i.e., in more instruments of labour, materials of labour and auxiliary
materials; it therefore also supplies more elements for the production both of use value and of
value, and with these more absorbers of labour. The value of the additional capital, therefore,
remaining the same or even diminishing, accelerated accumulation still takes place. Not only does
the scale of reproduction materially extend, but the production of surplus-value increases more
rapidly than the value of the additional capital.
The development of the productive power of labour reacts also on the original capital already
engaged in the process of production. A part of the functioning constant capital consists of
instruments of labour, such as machinery, &c., which are not consumed, and therefore not
reproduced, or replaced by new ones of the same kind, until after long periods of time. But every
year a part of these instruments of labour perishes or reaches the limit of its productive function.
It reaches, therefore, in that year, the time for its periodical reproduction, for its replacement by
new ones of the same kind. If the productiveness of labour has, during the using up of these
instruments of labour, increased (and it develops continually with the uninterrupted advance of
science and technology), more efficient and (considering their increased efficiency), cheaper
machines, tools, apparatus, &c., replace the old. The old capital is reproduced in a more
productive form, apart from the constant detail improvements in the instruments of labour already
in use. The other part of the constant capital, raw material and auxiliary substances, is constantly
reproduced in less than a year; those produced by agriculture, for the most part annually. Every
introduction of improved methods, therefore, works almost simultaneously on the new capital and
on that already in action. Every advance in Chemistry not only multiplies the number of useful
materials and the useful applications of those already known, thus extending with the growth of
capital its sphere of investment. It teaches at the same time how to throw the excrements of the
processes of production and consumption back again into the circle of the process of
reproduction, and thus, without any previous outlay of capital, creates new matter for capital.
Like the increased exploitation of natural wealth by the mere increase in the tension of labourpower, science and technology give capital a power of expansion independent of the given
magnitude of the capital actually functioning. They react at the same time on that part of the
original capital which has entered upon its stage of renewal. This, in passing into its new shape,
incorporates gratis the social advance made while its old shape was being used up. Of course, this
development of productive power is accompanied by a partial depreciation of functioning capital.
So far as this depreciation makes itself acutely felt in competition, the burden falls on the
labourer, in the increased exploitation of whom the capitalist looks for his indemnification.
Labour transmits to its product the value of the means of production consumed by it. On the other
hand, the value and mass of the means of production set in motion by a given quantity of labour
increase as the labour becomes more productive. Though the same quantity of labour adds always
to its products only the same sum of new value, still the old capital value, transmitted by the
labour to the products, increases with the growing productivity of labour.
An English and a Chinese spinner, e.g., may work the same number of hours with the same
intensity; then they will both in a week create equal values. But in spite of this equality, an
immense difference will obtain between the value of the week’s product of the Englishman, who
works with a mighty automaton, and that of the Chinaman, who has but a spinning-wheel. In the
same time as the Chinaman spins one pound of cotton, the Englishman spins several hundreds of
pounds. A sum, many hundred times as great, of old values swells the value of his product, in
which those re-appear in a new, useful form, and can thus function anew as capital.
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“In 1782,” as Frederick Engels teaches us, “all the wool crop in England of the
three preceding years, lay untouched for want of labourers, and so it must have
lain, if newly invented machinery had not come to its aid and spun it.”46
Labour embodied in the form of machinery of course did not directly force into life a single man,
but it made it possible for a smaller number of labourers, with the addition of relatively less living
labour, not only to consume the wool productively, and put into it new value, but to preserve in
the form of yarn, &c., its old value. At the same time, it caused and stimulated increased
reproduction of wool. It is the natural property of living labour, to transmit old value, whilst it
creates new. Hence, with the increase in efficacy, extent and value of its means of production,
consequently with the accumulation that accompanies the development of its productive power,
labour keeps up and eternises an always increasing capital value in a form ever new.” 47 This
natural power of labour takes the appearance of an intrinsic property of capital, in which it is
incorporated, just as the productive forces of social labour take the appearance of inherent
properties of capital, and as the constant appropriation of surplus labour by the capitalists, takes
that of a constant self-expansion of capital.
With the increase of capital, the difference between the capital employed and the capital
consumed increases. In other words, there is increase in the value and the material mass of the
instruments of labour, such as buildings, machinery, drain-pipes, working-cattle, apparatus of
every kind that function for a longer or shorter time in processes of production constantly
repeated, or that serve for the attainment of particular useful effects, whilst they themselves only
gradually wear out, therefore only lose their value piecemeal, therefore transfer that value to the
product only bit by bit. In the same proportion as these instruments of labour serve as productformers without adding value to the product, i.e., in the same proportion as they are wholly
employed but only partly consumed, they perform, as we saw earlier, the same gratuitous service
as the natural forces, water, steam, air, electricity, etc. This gratuitous service of past labour,
when seized and filled with a soul by living labour, increases with the advancing stages of
accumulation.
Since past labour always disguises itself as capital, i.e., since the passive of the labour of A, B, C,
etc., takes the form of the active of the non-labourer X, bourgeois and political economists are
full of praises of the services of dead and gone labour, which, according to the Scotch genius
MacCulloch, ought to receive a special remuneration in the shape of interest, profit, etc. 48 The
powerful and ever-increasing assistance given by past labour to the living labour process under
the form of means of production is, therefore, attributed to that form of past labour in which it is
alienated, as unpaid labour, from the worker himself, i.e., to its capitalistic form. The practical
agents of capitalistic production and their pettifogging ideologists are as unable to think of the
means of production as separate from the antagonistic social mask they wear today, as a slaveowner to think of the worker himself as distinct from his character as a slave.
With a given degree of exploitation of labour-power, the mass of the surplus-value produced is
determined by the number of workers simultaneously exploited; and this corresponds, although in
varying proportions, with the magnitude of the capital. The more, therefore, capital increases by
means of successive accumulations, the more does the sum of the value increase that is divided
into consumption fund and accumulation fund. The capitalist can, therefore, live a more jolly life,
and at the same time show more “abstinence.” And, finally, all the springs of production act with
greater elasticity, the more its scale extends with the mass of the capital advanced.
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Section 5: The So-Called Labour Fund
It has been shown in the course of this inquiry that capital is not a fixed magnitude, but is a part
of social wealth, elastic and constantly fluctuating with the division of fresh surplus-value into
revenue and additional capital. It has been seen further that, even with a given magnitude of
functioning capital, the labour-power, the science, and the land (by which are to be understood,
economically, all conditions of labour furnished by Nature independently of man), embodied in it,
form elastic powers of capital, allowing it, within certain limits, a field of action independent of
its own magnitude. In this inquiry we have neglected all effects of the process of circulation,
effects which may produce very different degrees of efficiency in the same mass of capital. And
as we presupposed the limits set by capitalist production, that is to say, presupposed the process
of social production in a form developed by purely spontaneous growth, we neglected any more
rational combination, directly and systematically practicable with the means of production, and
the mass of labour-power at present disposable. Classical economy always loved to conceive
social capital as a fixed magnitude of a fixed degree of efficiency. But this prejudice was first
established as a dogma by the arch-Philistine, Jeremy Bentham, that insipid, pedantic, leathertongued oracle of the ordinary bourgeois intelligence of the 19th century.49 Bentham is among
philosophers what Martin Tupper is among poets. Both could only have been manufactured in
England. 50 In the light of his dogma the commonest phenomena of the process of production, as,
e.g., its sudden expansions and contractions, nay, even accumulation itself, become perfectly
inconceivable. 51The dogma was used by Bentham himself, as well as by Malthus, James Mill,
MacCulloch, etc., for an apologetic purpose, and especially in order to represent one part of
capital, namely, variable capital, or that part convertible into labour-power, as a fixed magnitude.
The material of variable capital, i.e., the mass of the means of subsistence it represents for the
labourer, or the so-called labour fund, was fabled as a separate part of social wealth, fixed by
natural laws and unchangeable. To set in motion the part of social wealth which is to function as
constant capital, or, to express it in a material form, as means of production, a definite mass of
living labour is required. This mass is given technologically. But neither is the number of
labourers required to render fluid this mass of labour-power given (it changes with the degree of
exploitation of the individual labour-power), nor is the price of this labour-power given, but only
its minimum limit, which is moreover very variable. The facts that lie at the bottom of this dogma
are these: on the one hand, the labourer has no right to interfere in the division of social wealth
into means of enjoyment for the non-labourer and means of production. 52 On the other hand, only
in favourable and exceptional cases, has he the power to enlarge the so-called labour fund at the
expense of the “revenue” of the wealthy.
What silly tautology results from the attempt to represent the capitalistic limits of the labour fund
as its natural and social limits may be seen, e.g., in Professor Fawcett.53
“The circulating capital of a country,” he says, “is its wage-fund. Hence, if we
desire to calculate the average money wages received by each labourer, we have
simply to divide the amount of this capital by the number of the labouring
population.” 54
That is to say, we first add together the individual wages actually paid, and then we affirm that
the sum thus obtained, forms the total value of the “labour fund” determined and vouchsafed to us
by God and Nature. Lastly, we divide the sum thus obtained by the number of labourers to find
out again how much may come to each on the average. An uncommonly knowing dodge this. It
did not prevent Mr. Fawcett saying in the same breath:
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“The aggregate wealth which is annually saved in England, is divided into two portions; one
portion is employed as capital to maintain our industry, and the other portion is exported to
foreign countries... Only a portion, and perhaps, not a large portion of the wealth which is
annually saved in this country, is invested in our own industry. 55
The greater part of the yearly accruing surplus-product, embezzled, because abstracted without
return of an equivalent, from the English labourer, is thus used as capital, not in England, but in
foreign countries. But with the additional capital thus exported, a part of the “labour fund”
invented by God and Bentham is also exported.56
1

“Accumulation of capital; the employment of a portion of revenue as capital.” (Malthus:
“Definitions, &c.,” ed. Cazenove, p. 11.) “Conversion of revenue into capital,” (Malthus: “Princ. of
Pol. Econ “ 2nd Ed., Lond.. 1836, p. 320.)
2
We here take no account of export trade, by means of which a nation can change articles of luxury
either into means of production or means of subsistence, and vice versà. In order to examine the object
of our investigation in its integrity, free from all disturbing subsidiary circumstances, we must treat the
whole world as one nation, and assume that capitalist production is everywhere established and has
possessed itself of every branch of industry.
3
Sismondi’s analysis of accumulation suffers from the great defect, that he contents himself, to too
great an extent, with the phrase “conversion of revenue into capital,” without fathoming the material
conditions of this operation.
4
“Le travail primitif auquel son capital a dû sa naissance.” [the original labour, to which his capital
owed its origin] Sismondi, l. c., ed. Paris, t. I., p. 109.
5
“Labour creates capital before capital employs labour.” E. G. Wakefield, “England and America,”
Lond., 1833, Vol. II, p. 110.
6
The property of the capitalist in the product of the labour of others “is a strict consequence of the law
of appropriation, the fundamental principle of which was, on the contrary, the exclusive title of every
labourer to the product of his own labour.” (Cherbuliez, “Richesse ou Pauvreté,” Paris, 1841, p. 58,
where, however, the dialectical reversal is not properly developed.)
7
The following passage (to p. 551 “laws of capitalist appropriation.”) has been added to the English
text in conformity with the 4th German edition.
8
We may well, therefore, feel astonished at the cleverness of Proudhon, who would abolish
capitalistic property by enforcing the eternal laws of property that are based on commodity
production!
9
“Capital, viz., accumulated wealth employed with a view to profit.” (Malthus, l. c.) “Capital ...
consists of wealth saved from revenue, and used with a view to profit.” (R. Jones: “An Introductory
Lecture on Polit. Econ.,” Lond., 1833, p. 16.)
10
“The possessors of surplus-produce or capital.” (“The Source and Remedy of the National
Difficulties. A Letter to Lord John Russell.” Lond., 1821.)
11
“Capital, with compound interest on every portion of capital saved, is so all engrossing that all the
wealth in the world from which income is derived, has long ago become the interest on capital.”
(London, Economist, 19th July, 1851.)
12
“No political economist of the present day can by saving mean mere hoarding: and beyond this
contracted and insufficient proceeding, no use of the term in reference to the national wealth can well
be imagined, but that which must arise from a different application of what is saved, founded upon a
real distinction between the different kinds of labour maintained by it.” (Malthus, l. c., pp. 38, 39.)
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Thus for instance, Balzac, who so thoroughly studied every shade of avarice, represents the old
usurer Gobseck as in his second childhood when he begins to heap up a hoard of commodities.
14
“Accumulation of stocks ... non-exchange ... over-production.” (Th. Corbet. l. c., p. 104.)
15
In this sense Necker speaks of the “objets de faste et de somptuosité,” [things of pomp and luxury]
of which “le temps a grossi l’accummulation,” [accumulation has grown with time] and which “les
lois de propriété ont rassemblés dans une seule classe de la société.” [the laws of property have
brought into the hands of one class of society alone] (Oeuvres de M. Necker, Paris and Lausanne,
1789, t. ii., p. 291.)
16
Ricardo, l.c., p. 163, note.
17
In spite of his “Logic,” John St. Mill never detects even such faulty analysis as this when made by
his predecessors, an analysis which, even from the bourgeois standpoint of the science, cries out for
rectification. In every case he registers with the dogmatism of a disciple, the confusion of his master’s
thoughts. So here: “The capital itself in the long run becomes entirely wages, and when replaced by
the sale of produce becomes wages again.”
18
In his description of the process of reproduction, and of accumulation, Adam Smith, in many ways,
not only made no advance, but even lost considerable ground, compared with his predecessors,
especially by the Physiocrats. Connected with the illusion mentioned in the text, is the really
wonderful dogma, left by him as an inheritance to Political Economy, the dogma, that the price of
commodities is made up of wages, profit (interest) and rent, i.e., of wages and surplus-value. Starting
from this basis, Storch naively confesses, “Il est impossible de résoudre le prix nécessaire dans ses
éléments les plus simples.” [... it is impossible to resolve the necessary price into its simplest
elements] (Storch, l. c., Petersb. Edit., 1815, t. ii., p. 141, note.) A fine science of economy this, which
declares it impossible to resolve the price of a commodity into its simplest elements! This point will
be further investigated in the seventh part of Book iii.
19
The reader will notice, that the word revenue is used in a double sense: first, to designate surplusvalue so far as it is the fruit periodically yielded by capital; secondly, to designate the part of that fruit
which is periodically consumed by the capitalist, or added to the fund that supplies his private
consumption. I have retained this double meaning because it harmonises with the language of the
English and French economists.
20
Taking the usurer, that old-fashioned but ever renewed specimen of the capitalist for his text, Luther
shows very aptly that the love of power is an element in the desire to get rich. “The heathen were able,
by the light of reason, to conclude that a usurer is a double-dyed thief and murderer. We Christians,
however, hold them in such honour, that we fairly worship them for the sake of their money....
Whoever eats up, robs, and steals the nourishment of another, that man commits as great a murder (so
far as in him lies) as he who starves a man or utterly undoes him. Such does a usurer, and sits the
while safe on his stool, when he ought rather to be hanging on the gallows, and be eaten by as many
ravens as he has stolen guilders, if only there were so much flesh on him, that so many ravens could
stick their beaks in and share it. Meanwhile, we hang the small thieves.... Little thieves are put in the
stocks, great thieves go flaunting in gold and silk.... Therefore is there, on this earth, no greater enemy
of man (after the devil) than a gripe-money, and usurer, for he wants to be God over all men. Turks,
soldiers, and tyrants are also bad men, yet must they let the people live, and Confess that they are bad,
and enemies, and do, nay, must, now and then show pity to some. But a usurer and money-glutton,
such a one would have the whole world perish of hunger and thirst, misery and want, so far as in him
lies, so that he may have all to himself, and every one may receive from him as from a God, and be his
serf for ever. To wear fine cloaks, golden chains, rings, to wipe his mouth, to be deemed and taken for
a worthy, pious man .... Usury is a great huge monster, like a werewolf, who lays waste all, more than
any Cacus, Gerion or Antus. And yet decks himself out, and would be thought pious, so that people
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may not see where the oxen have gone, that he drags backwards into his den. But Hercules shall hear
the cry of the oxen and of his prisoners, and shall seek Cacus even in cliffs and among rocks, and shall
set the oxen loose again from the villain. For Cacus means the villain that is a pious usurer, and steals,
robs, eats everything. And will not own that he has done it, and thinks no one will find him out,
because the oxen, drawn backwards into his den, make it seem, from their foot-prints, that they have
been let out. So the usurer would deceive the world, as though he were of use and gave the world
oxen, which he, however, rends, and eats all alone... And since we break on the wheel, and behead
highwaymen, murderers and housebreakers, how much more ought we to break on the wheel and
kill.... hunt down, curse and behead all usurers.” (Martin Luther, l. c.)
21
See Goethe’s “Faust.”
22
Dr. Aikin: “Description of the Country from 30 to 40 miles round Manchester.” Lond., 1795, p.
182, sq.
23
A. Smith, l. c., bk. iii., ch. iii.
24
Even J. B. Say says: “Les épargnes des riches se font aux dépens des pauvres.” [the savings of the
rich are made at the expense of the poor] “The Roman proletarian lived almost entirely at the expense
of society.... It can almost be said that modern society lives at the expense of the proletarians, on what
it keeps out of the remuneration of labour.” (Sismondi: “études, &c.,” t. i., p. 24.)
25
Malthus, l. c., pp. 319, 320.
26
“An Inquiry into those Principles Respecting the Nature of Demand, &c.,” p. 67.
27
l. c., p. 59.
28
(Senior, “Principes fondamentaux del’Écon. Pol.” trad. Arrivabene. Paris, 1836, p. 308.) This was
rather too much for the adherents of the old classical school. “Mr. Senior has substituted for it” (the
expression, labour and profit) “the expression labour and Abstinence. He who converts his revenue
abstains from the enjoyment which its expenditure would afford him. It is not the capital, but the use
of the capital productively, which is the cause of profits.” (John Cazenove, l. c., p. 130, Note.) John St.
Mill, on the contrary, accepts on the one hand Ricardo’s theory of profit, and annexes on the other
hand Senior’s “remuneration of abstinence.” He is as much at home in absurd contradictions, as he
feels at sea in the Hegelian contradiction, the source of all dialectic. It has never occurred to the vulgar
economist to make the simple reflexion, that every human action may be viewed, as “abstinence” from
its opposite. Eating is abstinence from fasting, walking, abstinence from standing still, working,
abstinence from idling, idling, abstinence from working, &c. These gentlemen would do well, to
ponder, once in a while, over Spinoza’s: “Determinatio est Negatio.”
29
Senior, l. c., p. 342.
30
“No one ... will sow his wheat, for instance, and allow it to remain a twelve month in the ground, or
leave his wine in a cellar for years, instead of consuming these things or their equivalent at once ...
unless he expects to acquire additional value, &c.” (Scrope, “Polit. Econ.,” edit. by A. Potter, New
York, 1841, pp. 133-134.)
31
“La privation que s’impose le capitalisté, en prêtant [The deprivation the capitalist imposes on
himself by lending ...] (this euphemism used, for the purpose of identifying, according to the approved
method of vulgar economy, the labourer who is exploited, with the industrial capitalist who exploits,
and to whom other capitalists lend money) ses instruments de production au travailleur, au lieu d’en
consacrer la valeur à son propre usage, en la transforment en objets d’utilité ou d’agrément.” [his
instruments of production to the worker, instead of devoting their value to his own consumption, by
transforming them into objects of utility or pleasure] (G. de Molinari, l. c., p. 36.)
32
“La conservation d’un capital exige ... un effort constant pour résister a la tentation de le
consommer.” (Courcelle-Seneuil, l. c., p. 57.)
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“The particular classes of income which yield the most abundantly to the progress of national
capital, change at different stages of their progress, and are, therefore, entirely different in nations
occupying different positions in that progress.... Profits ... unimportant source of accumulation,
compared with wages and rents, in the earlier stages of society.... When a considerable advance in the
powers of national industry has actually taken place, profits rise into comparative importance as a
source of accumulation.” (Richard Jones, “Textbook, &c.,” pp. 16, 21.)
34
l. c., p. 36, sq.
35
“Ricardo says: ‘In different stages of society the accumulation of capital or of the means of
employing’ (i.e., exploiting) ‘labour is more or less rapid, and must in all cases depend on the
productive powers of labour. The productive powers of labour are generally greatest where there is an
abundance of fertile land.’ If, in the first sentence, the productive powers of labour mean the smallness
of that aliquot part of any produce that goes to those whose manual labour produced it, the sentence is
nearly identical, because the remaining aliquot part is the fund whence capital can, if the owner
pleases, be accumulated. But then this does not generally happen, where there is most fertile land.”
(“Observations on Certain Verbal Disputes, &c.” pp. 74, 75.)
36
J. Stuart Mill: “Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy,” Lond., 1844, p. 90.
37
“An Essay on Trade and Commerce,” Lond., 1770, P. 44. The Times of December, 1866, and
January, 1867, in like manner published certain outpourings of the heart of the English mine-owner, in
which the happy lot of the Belgian miners was pictured, who asked and received no more than was
strictly necessary for them to live for their “masters.” The Belgian labourers have to suffer much, but
to figure in The Times as model labourers! In the beginning of February, 1867, came the answer: strike
of the Belgian miners at Marchienne, put down by powder and lead.
38
l. c., pp. 44, 46.
39
The Northamptonshire manufacturer commits a pious fraud, pardonable in one whose heart is so
full. He nominally compares the life of the English and French manufacturing labourer, but in the
words just quoted he is painting, as he himself confesses in his confused way, the French agricultural
labourers.
40
l. c., pp. 70, 71. Note in the 3rd German edition: today, thanks to the competition on the worldmarket, established since then, we have advanced much further. “If China,” says Mr. Stapleton, M.P.,
to his constituents, “should become a great manufacturing country, I do not see how the
manufacturing population of Europe could sustain the contest without descending to the level of their
competitors.” (Times, Sept. 3, 1873, p. 8.) The wished-for goal of English capital is no longer
Continental wages but Chinese.
41
Benjamin Thompson: “Essays, Political, Economical, and Philosophical, &c.,” 3 vols., Lond, 17961802, vol. i., p. 294. In his “The State of the Poor, or an History of the Labouring Classes in England,
&c.,” Sir F. M. Eden strongly recommends the Rumfordian beggar-soup to workhouse overseers, and
reproachfully warns the English labourers that “many poor people, particularly in Scotland, live, and
that very comfortably, for months together, upon oat-meal and barley-meal, mixed with only water
and salt.” (l. c., vol. i, book i., ch. 2, p. 503.) The same sort of hints in the 19th century. “The most
wholesome mixtures of flour having been refused (by the English agricultural labourer)... in Scotland,
where education is better, this prejudice is, probably, unknown.” (Charles H. Parry, M. D., “The
Question of the Necessity of the Existing Corn Laws Considered.” London, 1816, p. 69.) This same
Parry, however, complains that the English labourer is now (1815) in a much worse condition than in
Eden’s time (1797.)
42
From the reports of the last Parliamentary Commission on adulteration of means of subsistence, it
will be seen that the adulteration even of medicines is the rule, not the exception in England. E.g., the
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examination of 34 specimens of opium, purchased of as many different chemists in London, showed
that 31 were adulterated with poppy heads, wheat-flour, gum, clay, sand, &c. Several did not contain
an atom of morphia.
43
G. B. Newnham (barrister-at-law): “A Review of the Evidence before the Committee of the two
Houses of Parliament on the Corn Laws.” Lond., 1815, p. 20, note.
44
l. c., pp. 19, 20.
45
C. H. Parry, l. c., pp. 77, 69. The landlords, on their side, not only “indemnified” themselves for the
Anti-Jacobin War, which they waged in the name of England, but enriched themselves enormously.
Their rents doubled, trebled, quadrupled, “and in one instance, increased sixfold in eighteen years.” (I.
c., pp. 100, 101.)
46
Friedrich Engels, “Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England,” p. 20.
47
Classic economy has, on account of a deficient analysis of the labour process, and of the process of
creating value, never properly grasped this weighty element of reproduction, as may be seen in
Ricardo; he says, e.g., whatever the change in productive power, “a million men always produce in
manufactures the same value.” This is accurate, if the extension and degree of intensity of their labour
are given. But it does not prevent (this Ricardo overlooks in certain conclusions he draws) a million
men with different powers of productivity in their labour, turning into products very different masses
of the means of production, and therefore preserving in their products very different masses of value;
in consequence of which the values of the products yielded may vary considerably. Ricardo has, it
may be noted in passing, tried in vain to make clear to J. B. Say, by that very example, the difference
between use value (which he here calls wealth or material riches) and exchange-value. Say answers:
“Quant à la difficulté qu’élève Mr. Ricardo en disant que, par des procédés mieux entendus un million
de personnes peuvent produire deux fois, trois fois autant de richesses, sans produire plus de valeurs,
cette difficulté n’est pas une lorsque l’on considére, ainsi qu’on le doit, la production comme un
échange dans lequel on donne les services productifs de son travail, de sa terre, et de ses capitaux,
pour obtenir des produits. C’est par le moyen de ces services productifs, que nous acquérons tous les
produits qui sont au monde. Or... nous sommes d’autant plus riches, nos services productifs ont
d’autant plus de valeur qu’ils obtiennent dans l’échange appelé production une plus grande quantité de
choses utiles.” [As for the difficulty raised by Ricardo when he says that, by using better methods of
production, a million people can produce two or three times as much wealth, without producing any
more value, this difficulty disappears when one bears in mind, as one should, that production is like an
exchange in which a man contributes the productive services of his labour, his land, and his capital, in
order to obtain products. It is by means of these productive services that we acquire all the products
existing in the world. Therefore ... we are richer, our productive services have the more value, the
greater the quantity of useful things they bring in through the exchange which is called production] (J.
B. Say, “Lettres à M. Malthus,” Paris, 1820, pp. 168, 169.) The “difficulté” — it exists for him, not for
Ricardo — that Say means to clear up is this: Why does not the exchange-value of the use values
increase, when their quantity increases in consequence of increased productive power of labour?
Answer: the difficulty is met by calling use value, exchange-value, if you please. Exchange-value is a
thing that is connected one way or another with exchange. If therefore production is called an
exchange of labour and means of production against the product, it is clear as day that you obtain
more exchange-value in proportion as the production yields more use value. In other words, the more
use values, e.g., stockings, a working day yields to the stocking-manufacturer, the richer is he in
stockings. Suddenly, however, Say recollects that “with a greater quantity” of stockings their “price”
(which of course has nothing to do with their exchange-value!) falls “parce que la concurrence les (les
producteurs) oblige à donner les produits pour ce qu’ils leur coûtent... [because competition obliges
them (the producers) to sell their products for what they cost to make] But whence does the profit
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come, if the capitalist sells the commodities at cost-price? Never mind! Say declares that, in
consequence of increased productivity, every one now receives in return for a given equivalent two
pairs of stockings instead of one as before. The result he arrives at, is precisely that proposition of
Ricardo that he aimed at disproving. After this mighty effort of thought, he triumphantly apostrophises
Malthus in the words: “Telle est, monsieur, la doctrine bien liée, sans laquelle il est impossible, je le
déclare, d’expliquer les plus grandes difficultés de l’économie politique, et notamment, comment il se
peut qu’une nation soit plus riche lorsque ses produits diminuent de valeur, quoique la richesse soit de
la valeur.” [This, Sir, is the well-founded doctrine without which it is impossible, I say, to explain the
greatest difficulties in political economy, and, in particular, to explain why it is that a nation can be
richer when its products fall in value, even though wealth is value] (l. c., p. 170.) An English
economist remarks upon the conjuring tricks of the same nature that appear in Say’s “Lettres”: “Those
affected ways of talking make up in general that which M. Say is pleased to call his doctrine and
which he earnestly urges Malthus to teach at Hertford, as it is already taught ‘dans plusieurs parties de
l’Europe.’ He says, ‘Si vous trouvez une physionomie de paradoxe à toutes ces propositions, voyez les
choses qu’elles expriment, et j’ose croire qu’elles vous paraîtront fort simples et fort raisonnables.’ [in
numerous parts of Europe ... If all those propositions appear paradoxical to you, look at the things they
express, and I venture to believe that they will then appear very simple and very rational] Doubtless,
and in consequence of the same process, they will appear everything else, except original.” (“An
Inquiry into those Principles Respecting the Nature of Demand, &c.,” pp. 116, 110.)
48
MacCulloch took out a patent for “wages of past labour,” long before Senior did for “wages of
abstinence.”
49
Compare among others, Jeremy Bentham: “Théorie des Peines et des Récompenses,” traduct. d’Et.
Dumont, 3ème édit. Paris, 1826, t. II, L. IV., ch. II.
50
Bentham is a purely English phenomenon. Not even excepting our philosopher, Christian Wolff, in
no time and in no country has the most homespun commonplace ever strutted about in so self-satisfied
a way. The principle of utility was no discovery of Bentham. He simply reproduced in his dull way
what Helvétius and other Frenchmen had said with esprit in the 18th century. To know what is useful
for a dog, one must study dog-nature. This nature itself is not to be deduced from the principle of
utility. Applying this to man, he that would criticise all human acts, movements, relations, etc., by the
principle of utility, must first deal with human nature in general, and then with human nature as
modified in each historical epoch. Bentham makes short work of it. With the driest naiveté he takes
the modern shopkeeper, especially the English shopkeeper, as the normal man. Whatever is useful to
this queer normal man, and to his world, is absolutely useful. This yard-measure, then, he applies to
past, present, and future. The Christian religion, e.g., is “useful,” “because it forbids in the name of
religion the same faults that the penal code condemns in the name of the law.” Artistic criticism is
“harmful,” because it disturbs worthy people in their enjoyment of Martin Tupper, etc. With such
rubbish has the brave fellow, with his motto, “nuila dies sine line!,” piled up mountains of books. Had
I the courage of my friend, Heinrich Heine, I should call Mr. Jeremy a genius in the way of bourgeois
stupidity.
51
“Political economists are too apt to consider a certain quantity of capital and a certain number of
labourers as productive instruments of uniform power, or operating with a certain uniform intensity....
Those... who maintain ... that commodities are the sole agents of production ... prove that production
could never be enlarged, for it requires as an indispensable condition to such an enlargement that food,
raw materials, and tools should be previously augmented; which is in fact maintaining that no increase
of production can take place without a previous increase, or, in other words, that an increase is
impossible.” (S. Bailey: “Money and its Vicissitudes,” pp. 58 and 70.) Bailey criticises the dogma
mainly from the point of view of the process of circulation.

433
52

Chapter 24

John Stuart Mill, in his “Principles of Political Economy,” says: “The really exhausting and the
really repulsive labours instead of being better paid than others, are almost invariably paid the worst of
all.... The more revolting the occupation, the more certain it is to receive the minimum of
remuneration.... The hardships and the earnings, instead of being directly proportional, as in any just
arrangements of society they would be, are generally in an inverse ratio to one another.” To avoid
misunderstanding, let me say that although men like John Stuart Mill are to blame for the
contradiction between their traditional economic dogmas and their modern tendencies, it would be
very wrong to class them with the herd of vulgar economic apologists.
53
H. Fawcett, Professor of Political Economy at Cambridge. “The Economic position of the British
labourer.” London, 1865, p. 120.
54
I must here remind the reader that the categories, “variable and constant capital,” were first used by
me. Political Economy since the time of Adam Smith has confusedly mixed up the essential
distinctions involved in these categories, with the mere formal differences, arising out of the process
of circulation, of fixed and circulating capital. For further details on this point, see Book II., Part II.
55
Fawcett, l. c., pp. 122, 123.
56
It might be said that not only capital, but also labourers, in the shape of emigrants, are annually
exported from England. In the text, however, there is no question of the peculium of the emigrants,
who are in great part not labourers. The sons of farmers make up a great part of them. The additional
capital annually transported abroad to be put out at interest is in much greater proportion to the annual
accumulation than the yearly emigration is to the yearly increase of population.

Chapter 25: The General Law of Capitalist
Accumulation
Section 1: The Increased Demand for labour power that
Accompanies Accumulation, the Composition of Capital
Remaining the same
In this chapter we consider the influence of the growth of capital on the lot of the labouring class.
The most important factor in this inquiry is the composition of capital and the changes it
undergoes in the course of the process of accumulation.
The composition of capital is to be understood in a two-fold sense. On the side of value, it is
determined by the proportion in which it is divided into constant capital or value of the means of
production, and variable capital or value of labour power, the sum total of wages. On the side of
material, as it functions in the process of production, all capital is divided into means of
production and living labour power. This latter composition is determined by the relation between
the mass of the means of production employed, on the one hand, and the mass of labour necessary
for their employment on the other. I call the former the value-composition, the latter the technical
composition of capital.
Between the two there is a strict correlation. To express this, I call the value composition of
capital, in so far as it is determined by its technical composition and mirrors the changes of the
latter, the organic composition of capital. Wherever I refer to the composition of capital, without
further qualification, its organic composition is always understood.
The many individual capitals invested in a particular branch of production have, one with another,
more or less different compositions. The average of their individual compositions gives us the
composition of the total capital in this branch of production. Lastly, the average of these averages,
in all branches of production, gives us the composition of the total social capital of a country, and
with this alone are we, in the last resort, concerned in the following investigation.
Growth of capital involves growth of its variable constituent or of the part invested in labour
power. A part of the surplus-value turned into additional capital must always be re-transformed
into variable capital, or additional labour fund. If we suppose that, all other circumstances
remaining the same, the composition of capital also remains constant (i.e., that a definite mass of
means of production constantly needs the same mass of labour power to set it in motion), then the
demand for labour and the subsistence-fund of the labourers clearly increase in the same
proportion as the capital, and the more rapidly, the more rapidly the capital increases. Since the
capital produces yearly a surplus-value, of which one part is yearly added to the original capital;
since this increment itself grows yearly along with the augmentation of the capital already
functioning; since lastly, under special stimulus to enrichment, such as the opening of new
markets, or of new spheres for the outlay of capital in consequence of newly developed social
wants, &c., the scale of accumulation may be suddenly extended, merely by a change in the
division of the surplus-value or surplus-product into capital and revenue, the requirements of
accumulating capital may exceed the increase of labour power or of the number of labourers; the
demand for labourers may exceed the supply, and, therefore, wages may rise. This must, indeed,
ultimately be the case if the conditions supposed above continue. For since in each year more
labourers are employed than in its predecessor, sooner or later a point must be reached, at which
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the requirements of accumulation begin to surpass the customary supply of labour, and, therefore,
a rise of wages takes place. A lamentation on this score was heard in England during the whole of
the fifteenth, and the first half of the eighteenth centuries. The more or less favourable
circumstances in which the wage working class supports and multiplies itself, in no way alter the
fundamental character of capitalist production. As simple reproduction constantly reproduces the
capital relation itself, i.e., the relation of capitalists on the one hand, and wage workers on the
other, so reproduction on a progressive scale, i.e., accumulation, reproduces the capital relation
on a progressive scale, more capitalists or larger capitalists at this pole, more wage workers at
that. The reproduction of a mass of labour power, which must incessantly re-incorporate itself
with capital for that capital’s self-expansion; which cannot get free from capital, and whose
enslavement to capital is only concealed by the variety of individual capitalists to whom it sells
itself, this reproduction of labour power forms, in fact, an essential of the reproduction of capital
itself. Accumulation of capital is, therefore, increase of the proletariat.1
Classical economy grasped this fact so thoroughly that Adam Smith, Ricardo, &c., as mentioned
earlier, inaccurately identified accumulation with the consumption, by the productive labourers,
of all the capitalised part of the surplus-product, or with its transformation into additional wage
labourers. As early as 1696 John Bellers says:
“For if one had a hundred thousand acres of land and as many pounds in money,
and as many cattle, without a labourer, what would the rich man be, but a
labourer? And as the labourers make men rich, so the more labourers there will
be, the more rich men ... the labour of the poor being the mines of the rich.”2
So also Bernard de Mandeville at the beginning of the eighteenth century:
“It would be easier, where property is well secured, to live without money than
without poor; for who would do the work? ... As they [the poor] ought to be kept
from starving, so they should receive nothing worth saving. If here and there one
of the lowest class by uncommon industry, and pinching his belly, lifts himself
above the condition he was brought up in, nobody ought to hinder him; nay, it is
undeniably the wisest course for every person in the society, and for every private
family to be frugal; but it is the interest of all rich nations, that the greatest part of
the poor should almost never be idle, and yet continually spend what they get....
Those that get their living by their daily labour ... have nothing to stir them up to
be serviceable but their wants which it is prudence to relieve, but folly to cure.
The only thing then that can render the labouring man industrious, is a moderate
quantity of money, for as too little will, according as his temper is, either dispirit
or make him desperate, so too much will make him insolent and lazy.... From
what has been said, it is manifest, that, in a free nation, where slaves are not
allowed of, the surest wealth consists in a multitude of laborious poor; for besides,
that they are the never-failing nursery of fleets and armies, without them there
could be no enjoyment, and no product of any country could be valuable. “To
make the society” [which of course consists of non-workers] “happy and people
easier under the meanest circumstances, it is requisite that great numbers of them
should be ignorant as well as poor; knowledge both enlarges and multiplies our
desires, and the fewer things a man wishes for, the more easily his necessities may
be supplied.” 3
What Mandeville, an honest, clear-headed man, had not yet seen, is that the mechanism of the
process of accumulation itself increases, along with the capital, the mass of “labouring poor,” i.e.,
the wage labourers, who turn their labour power into an increasing power of self-expansion of the
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growing capital, and even by doing so must eternise their dependent relation on their own
product, as personified in the capitalists. In reference to this relation of dependence, Sir F. M.
Eden in his “The State of the Poor, an History of the Labouring Classes in England,” says,
“the natural produce of our soil is certainly not fully adequate to our subsistence;
we can neither be clothed, lodged nor fed but in consequence of some previous
labour. A portion at least of the society must be indefatigably employed .... There
are others who, though they ‘neither toil nor spin,’ can yet command the produce
of industry, but who owe their exemption from labour solely to civilisation and
order .... They are peculiarly the creatures of civil institutions, 4 which have
recognised that individuals may acquire property by various other means besides
the exertion of labour.... Persons of independent fortune ... owe their superior
advantages by no means to any superior abilities of their own, but almost entirely
... to the industry of others. It is not the possession of land, or of money, but the
command of labour which distinguishes the opulent from the labouring part of the
community .... This [scheme approved by Eden] would give the people of
property sufficient (but by no means too much) influence and authority over those
who ... work for them; and it would place such labourers, not in an abject or
servile condition, but in such a state of easy and liberal dependence as all who
know human nature, and its history, will allow to be necessary for their own
comfort.” 5
Sir F. M. Eden, it may be remarked in passing, is the only disciple of Adam Smith during the
eighteenth century that produced any work of importance.6
Under the conditions of accumulation supposed thus far, which conditions are those most
favourable to the labourers, their relation of dependence upon capital takes on a form endurable
or, as Eden says: “easy and liberal.” Instead of becoming more intensive with the growth of
capital, this relation of dependence only becomes more extensive, i.e., the sphere of capital’s
exploitation and rule merely extends with its own dimensions and the number of its subjects. A
larger part of their own surplus-product, always increasing and continually transformed into
additional capital, comes back to them in the shape of means of payment, so that they can extend
the circle of their enjoyments; can make some additions to their consumption-fund of clothes,
furniture, &c., and can lay by small reserve funds of money. But just as little as better clothing,
food, and treatment, and a larger peculium, do away with the exploitation of the slave, so little do
they set aside that of the wage worker. A rise in the price of labour, as a consequence of
accumulation of capital, only means, in fact, that the length and weight of the golden chain the
wage worker has already forged for himself, allow of a relaxation of the tension of it. In the
controversies on this subject the chief fact has generally been overlooked, viz., the differentia
specifica [defining characteristic] of capitalistic production. Labour power is sold today, not with
a view of satisfying, by its service or by its product, the personal needs of the buyer. His aim is
augmentation of his capital, production of commodities containing more labour than he pays for,
containing therefore a portion of value that costs him nothing, and that is nevertheless realised
when the commodities are sold. Production of surplus-value is the absolute law of this mode of
production. Labour-power is only saleable so far as it preserves the means of production in their
capacity of capital, reproduces its own value as capital, and yields in unpaid labour a source of
additional capital. 7 The conditions of its sale, whether more or less favourable to the labourer,
include therefore the necessity of its constant re-selling, and the constantly extended reproduction
of all wealth in the shape of capital. Wages, as we have seen, by their very nature, always imply
the performance of a certain quantity of unpaid labour on the part of the labourer. Altogether,
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irrespective of the case of a rise of wages with a falling price of labour, &c., such an increase only
means at best a quantitative diminution of the unpaid labour that the worker has to supply. This
diminution can never reach the point at which it would threaten the system itself. Apart from
violent conflicts as to the rate of wages (and Adam Smith has already shown that in such a
conflict, taken on the whole, the master is always master), a rise in the price of labour resulting
from accumulation of capital implies the following alternative:
Either the price of labour keeps on rising, because its rise does not interfere with the progress of
accumulation. In this there is nothing wonderful, for, says Adam Smith, “after these (profits) are
diminished, stock may not only continue to increase, but to increase much faster than before.... A
great stock, though with small profits, generally increases faster than a small stock with great
profits.” (l. c., ii, p. 189.) In this case it is evident that a diminution in the unpaid labour in no way
interferes with the extension of the domain of capital. – Or, on the other hand, accumulation
slackens in consequence of the rise in the price of labour, because the stimulus of gain is blunted.
The rate of accumulation lessens; but with its lessening, the primary cause of that lessening
vanishes, i.e., the disproportion between capital and exploitable labour power. The mechanism of
the process of capitalist production removes the very obstacles that it temporarily creates. The
price of labour falls again to a level corresponding with the needs of the self-expansion of capital,
whether the level be below, the same as, or above the one which was normal before the rise of
wages took place. We see thus: In the first case, it is not the diminished rate either of the absolute,
or of the proportional, increase in labour power, or labouring population, which causes capital to
be in excess, but conversely the excess of capital that makes exploitable labour power
insufficient. In the second case, it is not the increased rate either of the absolute, or of the
proportional, increase in labour power, or labouring population, that makes capital insufficient;
but, conversely, the relative diminution of capital that causes the exploitable labour power, or
rather its price, to be in excess. It is these absolute movements of the accumulation of capital
which are reflected as relative movements of the mass of exploitable labour power, and therefore
seem produced by the latter’s own independent movement. To put it mathematically: the rate of
accumulation is the independent, not the dependent, variable; the rate of wages, the dependent,
not the independent, variable. Thus, when the industrial cycle is in the phase of crisis, a general
fall in the price of commodities is expressed as a rise in the value of money, and, in the phase of
prosperity, a general rise in the price of commodities, as a fall in the value of money. The socalled currency school concludes from this that with high prices too much, with low prices too
little 8 money is in circulation. Their ignorance and complete misunderstanding of facts9 are
worthily paralleled by the economists, who interpret the above phenomena of accumulation by
saying that there are now too few, now too many wage labourers.
The law of capitalist production, that is at the bottom of the pretended “natural law of
population,” reduces itself simply to this: The correlation between accumulation of capital and
rate of wages is nothing else than the correlation between the unpaid labour transformed into
capital, and the additional paid labour necessary for the setting in motion of this additional
capital. It is therefore in no way a relation between two magnitudes, independent one of the other:
on the one hand, the magnitude of the capital; on the other, the number of the labouring
population; it is rather, at bottom, only the relation between the unpaid and the paid labour of the
same labouring population. If the quantity of unpaid labour supplied by the working class, and
accumulated by the capitalist class, increases so rapidly that its conversion into capital requires an
extraordinary addition of paid labour, then wages rise, and, all other circumstances remaining
equal, the unpaid labour diminishes in proportion. But as soon as this diminution touches the
point at which the surplus labour that nourishes capital is no longer supplied in normal quantity, a
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reaction sets in: a smaller part of revenue is capitalised, accumulation lags, and the movement of
rise in wages receives a check. The rise of wages therefore is confined within limits that not only
leave intact the foundations of the capitalistic system, but also secure its reproduction on a
progressive scale. The law of capitalistic accumulation, metamorphosed by economists into
pretended law of Nature, in reality merely states that the very nature of accumulation excludes
every diminution in the degree of exploitation of labour, and every rise in the price of labour,
which could seriously imperil the continual reproduction, on an ever-enlarging scale, of the
capitalistic relation. It cannot be otherwise in a mode of production in which the labourer exists to
satisfy the needs of self-expansion of existing values, instead of, on the contrary, material wealth
existing to satisfy the needs of development on the part of the labourer. As, in religion, man is
governed by the products of his own brain, so in capitalistic production, he is governed by the
products of his own hand. 10

Section 2: Relative Diminution of the Variable Part of Capital
Simultaneously with the Progress of Accumulation and of
the Concentration that Accompanies it
According to the economists themselves, it is neither the actual extent of social wealth, nor the
magnitude of the capital already functioning, that lead to a rise of wages, but only the constant
growth of accumulation and the degree of rapidity of that growth. (Adam Smith, Book I., chapter
8.) So far, we have only considered one special phase of this process, that in which the increase of
capital occurs along with a constant technical composition of capital. But the process goes
beyond this phase.
Once given the general basis of the capitalistic system, then, in the course of accumulation, a
point is reached at which the development of the productivity of social labour becomes the most
powerful lever of accumulation.
“The same cause,” says Adam Smith, “which raises the wages of labour, the
increase of stock, tends to increase its productive powers, and to make a smaller
quantity of labour produce a greater quantity of work.” 11
Apart from natural conditions, such as fertility of the soil, &c., and from the skill of independent
and isolated producers (shown rather qualitatively in the goodness than quantitatively in the mass
of their products), the degree of productivity of labour, in a given society, is expressed in the
relative extent of the means of production that one labourer, during a given time, with the same
tension of labour power, turns into products. The mass of the means of production which he thus
transforms, increases with the productiveness of his labour. But those means of production play a
double part. The increase of some is a consequence, that of the others a condition of the
increasing productivity of labour. E.g., with the division of labour in manufacture, and with the
use of machinery, more raw material is worked up in the same time, and, therefore, a greater mass
of raw material and auxiliary substances enter into the labour process. That is the consequence of
the increasing productivity of labour. On the other hand, the mass of machinery, beasts of burden,
mineral manures, drain-pipes, &c., is a condition of the increasing productivity of labour. So also
is it with the means of production concentrated in buildings, furnaces, means of transport, &c.
But whether condition or consequence, the growing extent of the means of production, as
compared with the labour power incorporated with them, is an expression of the growing
productiveness of labour. The increase of the latter appears, therefore, in the diminution of the
mass of labour in proportion to the mass of means of production moved by it, or in the diminution
of the subjective factor of the labour process as compared with the objective factor.
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This change in the technical composition of capital, this growth in the mass of means of
production, as compared with the mass of the labour power that vivifies them, is reflected again
in its value composition, by the increase of the constant constituent of capital at the expense of its
variable constituent. There may be, e.g., originally 50 per cent. of a capital laid out in means of
production, and 50 per cent. in labour power; later on, with the development of the productivity
of labour, 80 per cent. in means of production, 20 per cent. in labour power, and so on. This law
of the progressive increase in constant capital, in proportion to the variable, is confirmed at every
step (as already shown) by the comparative analysis of the prices of commodities, whether we
compare different economic epochs or different nations in the same epoch. The relative
magnitude of the element of price, which represents the value of the means of production only, or
the constant part of capital consumed, is in direct, the relative magnitude of the other element of
price that pays labour (the variable part of capital) is in inverse proportion to the advance of
accumulation.
This diminution in the variable part of capital as compared with the constant, or the altered valuecomposition of the capital, however, only shows approximately the change in the composition of
its material constituents. If, e.g., the capital-value employed today in spinning is 7/8 constant and
1/8 variable, whilst at the beginning of the 18th century it was ½ constant and ½ variable, on the
other hand, the mass of raw material, instruments of labour, &c., that a certain quantity of
spinning labour consumes productively today, is many hundred times greater than at the
beginning of the 18th century. The reason is simply that, with the increasing productivity of
labour, not only does the mass of the means of production consumed by it increase, but their
value compared with their mass diminishes. Their value therefore rises absolutely, but not in
proportion to their mass. The increase of the difference between constant and variable capital, is,
therefore, much less than that of the difference between the mass of the means of production into
which the constant, and the mass of the labour power into which the variable, capital is converted.
The former difference increases with the latter, but in a smaller degree.
But, if the progress of accumulation lessens the relative magnitude of the variable part of capital,
it by no means, in doing this, excludes the possibility of a rise in its absolute magnitude. Suppose
that a capital-value at first is divided into 50 per cent. of constant and 50 per cent. of variable
capital; later into 80 per cent. of constant and 20 per cent. of variable. If in the meantime the
original capital, say £6,000, has increased to £18,000, its variable constituent has also increased.
It was £3,000, it is now £3,600. But where as formerly an increase of capital by 20 per cent.
would have sufficed to raise the demand for labour 20 per cent., now this latter rise requires a
tripling of the original capital.
In Part IV, it was shown, how the development of the productiveness of social labour presupposes
co-operation on a large scale; how it is only upon this supposition that division and combination
of labour can be organised, and the means of production economised by concentration on a vast
scale; how instruments of labour which, from their very nature, are only fit for use in common,
such as a system of machinery, can be called into being; how huge natural forces can be pressed
into the service of production; and how the transformation can be effected of the process of
production into a technological application of science. On the basis of the production of
commodities, where the means of production are the property of private persons, and where the
artisan therefore either produces commodities, isolated from and independent of others, or sells
his labour power as a commodity, because he lacks the means for independent industry, cooperation on a large scale can realise itself only in the increase of individual capitals, only in
proportion as the means of social production and the means of subsistence are transformed into
the private property of capitalists. The basis of the production of commodities can admit of
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production on a large scale in the capitalistic form alone. A certain accumulation of capital, in the
hands of individual producers of commodities, forms therefore the necessary preliminary of the
specifically capitalistic mode of production. We had, therefore, to assume that this occurs during
the transition from handicraft to capitalistic industry. It may be called primitive accumulation,
because it is the historic basis, instead of the historic result of specifically capitalist production.
How it itself originates, we need not here inquire as yet. It is enough that it forms the starting
point. But all methods for raising the social productive power of labour that are developed on this
basis, are at the same time methods for the increased production of surplus-value or surplusproduct, which in its turn is the formative element of accumulation. They are, therefore, at the
same time methods of the production of capital by capital, or methods of its accelerated
accumulation. The continual re-transformation of surplus-value into capital now appears in the
shape of the increasing magnitude of the capital that enters into the process of production. This in
turn is the basis of an extended scale of production, of the methods for raising the productive
power of labour that accompany it, and of accelerated production of surplus-value. If, therefore, a
certain degree of accumulation of capital appears as a condition of the specifically capitalist mode
of production, the latter causes conversely an accelerated accumulation of capital. With the
accumulation of capital, therefore, the specifically capitalistic mode of production develops, and
with the capitalist mode of production the accumulation of capital. Both these economic factors
bring about, in the compound ratio of the impulses they reciprocally give one another, that change
in the technical composition of capital by which the variable constituent becomes always smaller
and smaller as compared with the constant.
Every individual capital is a larger or smaller concentration of means of production, with a
corresponding command over a larger or smaller labour-army. Every accumulation becomes the
means of new accumulation. With the increasing mass of wealth which functions as capital,
accumulation increases the concentration of that wealth in the hands of individual capitalists, and
thereby widens the basis of production on a large scale and of the specific methods of capitalist
production. The growth of social capital is effected by the growth of many individual capitals. All
other circumstances remaining the same, individual capitals, and with them the concentration of
the means of production, increase in such proportion as they form aliquot parts of the total social
capital. At the same time portions of the original capitals disengage themselves and function as
new independent capitals. Besides other causes, the division of property, within capitalist
families, plays a great part in this. With the accumulation of capital, therefore, the number of
capitalists grows to a greater or less extent. Two points characterise this kind of concentration
which grows directly out of, or rather is identical with, accumulation. First: The increasing
concentration of the social means of production in the hands of individual capitalists is, other
things remaining equal, limited by the degree of increase of social wealth. Second: The part of
social capital domiciled in each particular sphere of production is divided among many capitalists
who face one another as independent commodity-producers competing with each other.
Accumulation and the concentration accompanying it are, therefore, not only scattered over many
points, but the increase of each functioning capital is thwarted by the formation of new and the
sub-division of old capitals. Accumulation, therefore, presents itself on the one hand as increasing
concentration of the means of production, and of the command over labour; on the other, as
repulsion of many individual capitals one from another.
This splitting-up of the total social capital into many individual capitals or the repulsion of its
fractions one from another, is counteracted by their attraction. This last does not mean that simple
concentration of the means of production and of the command over labour, which is identical
with accumulation. It is concentration of capitals already formed, destruction of their individual
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independence, expropriation of capitalist by capitalist, transformation of many small into few
large capitals. This process differs from the former in this, that it only presupposes a change in
the distribution of capital already to hand, and functioning; its field of action is therefore not
limited by the absolute growth of social wealth, by the absolute limits of accumulation. Capital
grows in one place to a huge mass in a single hand, because it has in another place been lost by
many. This is centralisation proper, as distinct from accumulation and concentration.
The laws of this centralisation of capitals, or of the attraction of capital by capital, cannot be
developed here. A brief hint at a few facts must suffice. The battle of competition is fought by
cheapening of commodities. The cheapness of commodities demands, caeteris paribus, on the
productiveness of labour, and this again on the scale of production. Therefore, the larger capitals
beat the smaller. It will further be remembered that, with the development of the capitalist mode
of production, there is an increase in the minimum amount of individual capital necessary to carry
on a business under its normal conditions. The smaller capitals, therefore, crowd into spheres of
production which Modern Industry has only sporadically or incompletely got hold of. Here
competition rages in direct proportion to the number, and in inverse proportion to the magnitudes,
of the antagonistic capitals. It always ends in the ruin of many small capitalists, whose capitals
partly pass into the hands of their conquerors, partly vanish. Apart from this, with capitalist
production an altogether new force comes into play – the credit system, which in its first stages
furtively creeps in as the humble assistant of accumulation, drawing into the hands of individual
or associated capitalists, by invisible threads, the money resources which lie scattered, over the
surface of society, in larger or smaller amounts; but it soon becomes a new and terrible weapon in
the battle of competition and is finally transformed into an enormous social mechanism for the
centralisation of capitals.
Commensurately with the development of capitalist production and accumulation there develop
the two most powerful levers of centralisation – competition and credit. At the same time the
progress of accumulation increases the material amenable to centralisation, i.e., the individual
capitals, whilst the expansion of capitalist production creates, on the one hand, the social want,
and, on the other, the technical means necessary for those immense industrial undertakings which
require a previous centralisation of capital for their accomplishment. Today, therefore, the force
of attraction, drawing together individual capitals, and the tendency to centralisation are stronger
than ever before. But if the relative extension and energy of the movement towards centralisation
is determined, in a certain degree, by the magnitude of capitalist wealth and superiority of
economic mechanism already attained, progress in centralisation does not in any way depend
upon a positive growth in the magnitude of social capital. And this is the specific difference
between centralisation and concentration, the latter being only another name for reproduction on
an extended scale. Centralisation may result from a mere change in the distribution of capitals
already existing, from a simple alteration in the quantitative grouping of the component parts of
social capital. Here capital can grow into powerful masses in a single hand because there it has
been withdrawn from many individual hands. In any given branch of industry centralisation
would reach its extreme limit if all the individual capitals invested in it were fused into a single
capital. 12 In a given society the limit would be reached only when the entire social capital was
united in the hands of either a single capitalist or a single capitalist company.
Centralisation completes the work of accumulation by enabling industrial capitalists to extend the
scale of their operations. Whether this latter result is the consequence of accumulation or
centralisation, whether centralisation is accomplished by the violent method of annexation –
when certain capitals become such preponderant centres of attraction for others that they shatter
the individual cohesion of the latter and then draw the separate fragments to themselves – or
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whether the fusion of a number of capitals already formed or in process of formation takes place
by the smoother process of organising joint-stock companies – the economic effect remains the
same. Everywhere the increased scale of industrial establishments is the starting point for a more
comprehensive organisation of the collective work of many, for a wider development of their
material motive forces – in other words, for the progressive transformation of isolated processes
of production, carried on by customary methods, into processes of production socially combined
and scientifically arranged.
But accumulation, the gradual increase of capital by reproduction as it passes from the circular to
the spiral form, is clearly a very slow procedure compared with centralisation, which has only to
change the quantitative groupings of the constituent parts of social capital. The world would still
be without railways if it had had to wait until accumulation had got a few individual capitals far
enough to be adequate for the construction of a railway. Centralisation, on the contrary,
accomplished this in the twinkling of an eye, by means of joint-stock companies. And whilst
centralisation thus intensifies and accelerates the effects of accumulation, it simultaneously
extends and speeds those revolutions in the technical composition of capital which raise its
constant portion at the expense of its variable portion, thus diminishing the relative demand for
labour.
The masses of capital fused together overnight by centralisation reproduce and multiply as the
others do, only more rapidly, thereby becoming new and powerful levers in social accumulation.
Therefore, when we speak of the progress of social accumulation we tacitly include – today – the
effects of centralisation.
The additional capitals formed in the normal course of accumulation (see Chapter XXIV, Section
1) serve particularly as vehicles for the exploitation of new inventions and discoveries, and
industrial improvements in general. But in time the old capital also reaches the moment of
renewal from top to toe, when it sheds its skin and is reborn like the others in a perfected
technical form, in which a smaller quantity of labour will suffice to set in motion a larger quantity
of machinery and raw materials. The absolute reduction in the demand for labour which
necessarily follows from this is obviously so much the greater the higher the degree in which the
capitals undergoing this process of renewal are already massed together by virtue of the
centralisation movement.
On the one hand, therefore, the additional capital formed in the course of accumulation attracts
fewer and fewer labourers in proportion to its magnitude. On the other hand, the old capital
periodically reproduced with change of composition, repels more and more of the labourers
formerly employed by it.

Section 3: Progressive Production of a Relative surplus
population or Industrial Reserve Army
The accumulation of capital, though originally appearing as its quantitative extension only, is
effected, as we have seen, under a progressive qualitative change in its composition, under a
constant increase of its constant, at the expense of its variable constituent.13
The specifically capitalist mode of production, the development of the productive power of labour
corresponding to it, and the change thence resulting in the organic composition of capital, do not
merely keep pace with the advance of accumulation, or with the growth of social wealth. They
develop at a much quicker rate, because mere accumulation, the absolute increase of the total
social capital, is accompanied by the centralisation of the individual capitals of which that total is
made up; and because the change in the technological composition of the additional capital goes
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hand in hand with a similar change in the technological composition of the original capital. With
the advance of accumulation, therefore, the proportion of constant to variable capital changes. If
it was originally say 1:1, it now becomes successively 2:1, 3:1, 4:1, 5:1, 7:1, &c., so that, as the
capital increases, instead of ½ of its total value, only 1/3, 1/4, 1/5, 1/6, 1/8, &c., is transformed
into labour-power, and, on the other hand, 2/3, 3/4, 4/5, 5/6, 7/8 into means of production. Since
the demand for labour is determined not by the amount of capital as a whole, but by its variable
constituent alone, that demand falls progressively with the increase of the total capital, instead of,
as previously assumed, rising in proportion to it. It falls relatively to the magnitude of the total
capital, and at an accelerated rate, as this magnitude increases. With the growth of the total
capital, its variable constituent or the labour incorporated in it, also does increase, but in a
constantly diminishing proportion. The intermediate pauses are shortened, in which accumulation
works as simple extension of production, on a given technical basis. It is not merely that an
accelerated accumulation of total capital, accelerated in a constantly growing progression, is
needed to absorb an additional number of labourers, or even, on account of the constant
metamorphosis of old capital, to keep employed those already functioning. In its turn, this
increasing accumulation and centralisation becomes a source of new changes in the composition
of capital, of a more accelerated diminution of its variable, as compared with its constant
constituent. This accelerated relative diminution of the variable constituent, that goes along with
the accelerated increase of the total capital, and moves more rapidly than this increase, takes the
inverse form, at the other pole, of an apparently absolute increase of the labouring population, an
increase always moving more rapidly than that of the variable capital or the means of
employment. But in fact, it is capitalistic accumulation itself that constantly produces, and
produces in the direct ratio of its own energy and extent, a relatively redundant population of
labourers, i.e., a population of greater extent than suffices for the average needs of the selfexpansion of capital, and therefore a surplus population.
Considering the social capital in its totality, the movement of its accumulation now causes
periodical changes, affecting it more or less as a whole, now distributes its various phases
simultaneously over the different spheres of production. In some spheres a change in the
composition of capital occurs without increase of its absolute magnitude, as a consequence of
simple centralisation; in others the absolute growth of capital is connected with absolute
diminution of its variable constituent, or of the labour power absorbed by it; in others again,
capital continues growing for a time on its given technical basis, and attracts additional labour
power in proportion to its increase, while at other times it undergoes organic change, and lessens
its variable constituent; in all spheres, the increase of the variable part of capital, and therefore of
the number of labourers employed by it, is always connected with violent fluctuations and
transitory production of surplus population, whether this takes the more striking form of the
repulsion of labourers already employed, or the less evident but not less real form of the more
difficult absorption of the additional labouring population through the usual channels.14 With the
magnitude of social capital already functioning, and the degree of its increase, with the extension
of the scale of production, and the mass of the labourers set in motion, with the development of
the productiveness of their labour, with the greater breadth and fulness of all sources of wealth,
there is also an extension of the scale on which greater attraction of labourers by capital is
accompanied by their greater repulsion; the rapidity of the change in the organic composition of
capital, and in its technical form increases, and an increasing number of spheres of production
becomes involved in this change, now simultaneously, now alternately. The labouring population
therefore produces, along with the accumulation of capital produced by it, the means by which it
itself is made relatively superfluous, is turned into a relative surplus population; and it does this to
an always increasing extent.15 This is a law of population peculiar to the capitalist mode of
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production; and in fact every special historic mode of production has its own special laws of
population, historically valid within its limits and only in so far as man has not interfered with
them.
But if a surplus labouring population is a necessary product of accumulation or of the
development of wealth on a capitalist basis, this surplus population becomes, conversely, the
lever of capitalistic accumulation, nay, a condition of existence of the capitalist mode of
production. It forms a disposable industrial reserve army, that belongs to capital quite as
absolutely as if the latter had bred it at its own cost. Independently of the limits of the actual
increase of population, it creates, for the changing needs of the self-expansion of capital, a mass
of human material always ready for exploitation. With accumulation, and the development of the
productiveness of labour that accompanies it, the power of sudden expansion of capital grows
also; it grows, not merely because the elasticity of the capital already functioning increases, not
merely because the absolute wealth of society expands, of which capital only forms an elastic
part, not merely because credit, under every special stimulus, at once places an unusual part of
this wealth at the disposal of production in the form of additional capital; it grows, also, because
the technical conditions of the process of production themselves – machinery, means of transport,
&c. – now admit of the rapidest transformation of masses of surplus-product into additional
means of production. The mass of social wealth, overflowing with the advance of accumulation,
and transformable into additional capital, thrusts itself frantically into old branches of production,
whose market suddenly expands, or into newly formed branches, such as railways, &c., the need
for which grows out of the development of the old ones. In all such cases, there must be the
possibility of throwing great masses of men suddenly on the decisive points without injury to the
scale of production in other spheres. Overpopulation supplies these masses. The course
characteristic of modern industry, viz., a decennial cycle (interrupted by smaller oscillations), of
periods of average activity, production at high pressure, crisis and stagnation, depends on the
constant formation, the greater or less absorption, and the re-formation of the industrial reserve
army or surplus population. In their turn, the varying phases of the industrial cycle recruit the
surplus population, and become one of the most energetic agents of its reproduction. This peculiar
course of modern industry, which occurs in no earlier period of human history, was also
impossible in the childhood of capitalist production. The composition of capital changed but very
slowly. With its accumulation, therefore, there kept pace, on the whole, a corresponding growth
in the demand for labour. Slow as was the advance of accumulation compared with that of more
modern times, it found a check in the natural limits of the exploitable labouring population, limits
which could only be got rid of by forcible means to be mentioned later. The expansion by fits and
starts of the scale of production is the preliminary to its equally sudden contraction; the latter
again evokes the former, but the former is impossible without disposable human material, without
an increase, in the number of labourers independently of the absolute growth of the population.
This increase is effected by the simple process that constantly “sets free” a part of the labourers;
by methods which lessen the number of labourers employed in proportion to the increased
production. The whole form of the movement of modern industry depends, therefore, upon the
constant transformation of a part of the labouring population into unemployed or half-employed
hands. The superficiality of Political Economy shows itself in the fact that it looks upon the
expansion and contraction of credit, which is a mere symptom of the periodic changes of the
industrial cycle, as their cause. As the heavenly bodies, once thrown into a certain definite
motion, always repeat this, so is it with social production as soon as it is once thrown into this
movement of alternate expansion and contraction. Effects, in their turn, become causes, and the
varying accidents of the whole process, which always reproduces its own conditions, take on the
form of periodicity. When this periodicity is once consolidated, even Political Economy then sees
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that the production of a relative surplus population – i.e., surplus with regard to the average needs
of the self-expansion of capital – is a necessary condition of modern industry.
“Suppose,” says H. Merivale, formerly Professor of Political Economy at Oxford,
subsequently employed in the English Colonial Office, “suppose that, on the
occasion of some of these crises, the nation were to rouse itself to the effort of
getting rid by emigration of some hundreds of thousands of superfluous arms,
what would be the consequence? That, at the first returning demand for labour,
there would be a deficiency. However rapid reproduction may be, it takes, at all
events, the space of a generation to replace the loss of adult labour. Now, the
profits of our manufacturers depend mainly on the power of making use of the
prosperous moment when demand is brisk, and thus compensating themselves for
the interval during which it is slack. This power is secured to them only by the
command of machinery and of manual labour. They must have hands ready by
them, they must be able to increase the activity of their operations when required,
and to slacken it again, according to the state of the market, or they cannot
possibly maintain that pre-eminence in the race of competition on which the
wealth of the country is founded.” 16
Even Malthus recognises overpopulation as a necessity of modern industry, though, after his
narrow fashion, he explains it by the absolute over-growth of the labouring population, not by
their becoming relatively supernumerary. He says:
“Prudential habits with regard to marriage, carried to a considerable extent among
the labouring class of a country mainly depending upon manufactures and
commerce, might injure it.... From the nature of a population, an increase of
labourers cannot be brought into market in consequence of a particular demand till
after the lapse of 16 or 18 years, and the conversion of revenue into capital, by
saving, may take place much more rapidly: a country is always liable to an
increase in the quantity of the funds for the maintenance of labour faster than the
increase of population.” 17
After Political Economy has thus demonstrated the constant production of a relative surplus
population of labourers to be a necessity of capitalistic accumulation, she very aptly, in the guise
of an old maid, puts in the mouth of her “beau ideal” of a capitalist the following words addressed
to those supernumeraries thrown on the streets by their own creation of additional capital: –
“We manufacturers do what we can for you, whilst we are increasing that capital
on which you must subsist, and you must do the rest by accommodating your
numbers to the means of subsistence.” 18
Capitalist production can by no means content itself with the quantity of disposable labour power
which the natural increase of population yields. It requires for its free play an industrial reserve
army independent of these natural limits.
Up to this point it has been assumed that the increase or diminution of the variable capital
corresponds rigidly with the increase or diminution of the number of labourers employed.
The number of labourers commanded by capital may remain the same, or even fall, while the
variable capital increases. This is the case if the individual labourer yields more labour, and
therefore his wages increase, and this although the price of labour remains the same or even falls,
only more slowly than the mass of labour rises. Increase of variable capital, in this case, becomes
an index of more labour, but not of more labourers employed. It is the absolute interest of every
capitalist to press a given quantity of labour out of a smaller, rather than a greater number of
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labourers, if the cost is about the same. In the latter case, the outlay of constant capital increases
in proportion to the mass of labour set in action; in the former that increase is much smaller. The
more extended the scale of production, the stronger this motive. Its force increases with the
accumulation of capital.
We have seen that the development of the capitalist mode of production and of the productive
power of labour – at once the cause and effect of accumulation – enables the capitalist, with the
same outlay of variable capital, to set in action more labour by greater exploitation (extensive or
intensive) of each individual labour power. We have further seen that the capitalist buys with the
same capital a greater mass of labour power, as he progressively replaces skilled labourers by less
skilled, mature labour power by immature, male by female, that of adults by that of young
persons or children.
On the one hand, therefore, with the progress of accumulation, a larger variable capital sets more
labour in action without enlisting more labourers; on the other, a variable capital of the same
magnitude sets in action more labour with the same mass of labour power; and, finally, a greater
number of inferior labour powers by displacement of higher.
The production of a relative surplus population, or the setting free of labourers, goes on therefore
yet more rapidly than the technical revolution of the process of production that accompanies, and
is accelerated by, the advance of accumulation; and more rapidly than the corresponding
diminution of the variable part of capital as compared with the constant. If the means of
production, as they increase in extent and effective power, become to a less extent means of
employment of labourers, this state of things is again modified by the fact that in proportion as
the productiveness of labour increases, capital increases its supply of labour more quickly than its
demand for labourers. The overwork of the employed part of the working class swells the ranks
of the reserve, whilst conversely the greater pressure that the latter by its competition exerts on
the former, forces these to submit to overwork and to subjugation under the dictates of capital.
The condemnation of one part of the working class to enforced idleness by the overwork of the
other part, and the converse, becomes a means of enriching the individual capitalists,19 and
accelerates at the same time the production of the industrial reserve army on a scale
corresponding with the advance of social accumulation. How important is this element in the
formation of the relative surplus population, is shown by the example of England. Her technical
means for saving labour are colossal. Nevertheless, if to-morrow morning labour generally were
reduced to a rational amount, and proportioned to the different sections of the working class
according to age and sex, the working population to hand would be absolutely insufficient for the
carrying on of national production on its present scale. The great majority of the labourers now
“unproductive” would have to be turned into “productive” ones.
Taking them as a whole, the general movements of wages are exclusively regulated by the
expansion and contraction of the industrial reserve army, and these again correspond to the
periodic changes of the industrial cycle. They are, therefore, not determined by the variations of
the absolute number of the working population, but by the varying proportions in which the
working class is divided into active and reserve army, by the increase or diminution in the relative
amount of the surplus population, by the extent to which it is now absorbed, now set free. For
Modern Industry with its decennial cycles and periodic phases, which, moreover, as accumulation
advances, are complicated by irregular oscillations following each other more and more quickly,
that would indeed be a beautiful law, which pretends to make the action of capital dependent on
the absolute variation of the population, instead of regulating the demand and supply of labour by
the alternate expansion and contraction of capital, the labour-market now appearing relatively
under-full, because capital is expanding, now again over-full, because it is contracting. Yet this is
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the dogma of the economists. According to them, wages rise in consequence of accumulation of
capital. The higher wages stimulate the working population to more rapid multiplication, and this
goes on until the labour-market becomes too full, and therefore capital, relatively to the supply of
labour, becomes insufficient. Wages fall, and now we have the reverse of the medal. The working
population is little by little decimated as the result of the fall in wages, so that capital is again in
excess relatively to them, or, as others explain it, falling wages and the corresponding increase in
the exploitation of the labourer again accelerates accumulation, whilst, at the same time, the
lower wages hold the increase of the working class in check. Then comes again the time, when
the supply of labour is less than the demand, wages rise, and so on. A beautiful mode of motion
this for developed capitalist production! Before, in consequence of the rise of wages, any positive
increase of the population really fit for work could occur, the time would have been passed again
and again, during which the industrial campaign must have been carried through, the battle fought
and won.
Between 1849 and 1859, a rise of wages practically insignificant, though accompanied by falling
prices of corn, took place in the English agricultural districts. In Wiltshire, e.g., the weekly wages
rose from 7s. to 8s.; in Dorsetshire from 7s. or 8s., to 9s., &c. This was the result of an unusual
exodus of the agricultural surplus population caused by the demands of war, the vast extension of
railroads, factories, mines, &c. The lower the wages, the higher is the proportion in which ever so
insignificant a rise of them expresses itself. If the weekly wage, e.g., is 20s. and it rises to 22s.,
that is a rise of 10 per cent.; but if it is only 7s. and it rises to 9s., that is a rise of 28 4/7 per cent.,
which sounds very fine. Everywhere the farmers were howling, and the London Economist, with
reference to these starvation-wages, prattled quite seriously of “a general and substantial
advance.” 20 What did the farmers do now? Did they wait until, in consequence of this brilliant
remuneration, the agricultural labourers had so increased and multiplied that their wages must fall
again, as prescribed by the dogmatic economic brain? They introduced more machinery, and in a
moment the labourers were redundant again in a proportion satisfactory even to the farmers.
There was now “more capital” laid out in agriculture than before, and in a more productive form.
With this the demand for labour fell, not only relatively, but absolutely.
The above economic fiction confuses the laws that regulate the general movement of wages, or
the ratio between the working class – i.e., the total labour power – and the total social capital,
with the laws that distribute the working population over the different spheres of production. If,
e.g., in consequence of favourable circumstances, accumulation in a particular sphere of
production becomes especially active, and profits in it, being greater than the average profits,
attract additional capital, of course the demand for labour rises and wages also rise. The higher
wages draw a larger part of the working population into the more favoured sphere, until it is
glutted with labour power, and wages at length fall again to their average level or below it, if the
pressure is too great. Then, not only does the immigration of labourers into the branch of industry
in question cease; it gives place to their emigration. Here the political economist thinks he sees
the why and wherefore of an absolute increase of workers accompanying an increase of wages,
and of a diminution of wages accompanying an absolute increase of labourers. But he sees really
only the local oscillation of the labour-market in a particular sphere of production – he sees only
the phenomena accompanying the distribution of the working population into the different
spheres of outlay of capital, according to its varying needs.
The industrial reserve army, during the periods of stagnation and average prosperity, weighs
down the active labour-army; during the periods of over-production and paroxysm, it holds its
pretensions in check. Relative surplus population is therefore the pivot upon which the law of
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demand and supply of labour works. It confines the field of action of this law within the limits
absolutely convenient to the activity of exploitation and to the domination of capital.
This is the place to return to one of the grand exploits of economic apologetics. It will be
remembered that if through the introduction of new, or the extension of old, machinery, a portion
of variable capital is transformed into constant, the economic apologist interprets this operation
which “fixes” capital and by that very act sets labourers “free,” in exactly the opposite way,
pretending that it sets free capital for the labourers. Only now can one fully understand the
effrontery of these apologists. What are set free are not only the labourers immediately turned out
by the machines, but also their future substitutes in the rising generation, and the additional
contingent, that with the usual extension of trade on the old basis would be regularly absorbed.
They are now all “set free,” and every new bit of capital looking out for employment can dispose
of them. Whether it attracts them or others, the effect on the general labour demand will be nil, if
this capital is just sufficient to take out of the market as many labourers as the machines threw
upon it. If it employs a smaller number, that of the supernumeraries increases; if it employs a
greater, the general demand for labour only increases to the extent of the excess of the employed
over those “set free.” The impulse that additional capital, seeking an outlet, would otherwise have
given to the general demand for labour, is therefore in every case neutralised to the extent of the
labourers thrown out of employment by the machine. That is to say, the mechanism of capitalistic
production so manages matters that the absolute increase of capital is accompanied by no
corresponding rise in the general demand for labour. And this the apologist calls a compensation
for the misery, the sufferings, the possible death of the displaced labourers during the transition
period that banishes them into the industrial reserve army! The demand for labour is not identical
with increase of capital, nor supply of labour with increase of the working class. It is not a case of
two independent forces working on one another. Les dés sont pipés.
Capital works on both sides at the same time. If its accumulation, on the one hand, increases the
demand for labour, it increases on the other the supply of labourers by the “setting free” of them,
whilst at the same time the pressure of the unemployed compels those that are employed to
furnish more labour, and therefore makes the supply of labour, to a certain extent, independent of
the supply of labourers. The action of the law of supply and demand of labour on this basis
completes the despotism of capital. As soon, therefore, as the labourers learn the secret, how it
comes to pass that in the same measure as they work more, as they produce more wealth for
others, and as the productive power of their labour increases, so in the same measure even their
function as a means of the self-expansion of capital becomes more and more precarious for them;
as soon as they discover that the degree of intensity of the competition among themselves
depends wholly on the pressure of the relative surplus population; as soon as, by Trades’ Unions,
&c., they try to organise a regular co-operation between employed and unemployed in order to
destroy or to weaken the ruinous effects of this natural law of capitalistic production on their
class, so soon capital and its sycophant, Political Economy, cry out at the infringement of the
“eternal” and so to say “sacred” law of supply and demand. Every combination of employed and
unemployed disturbs the “harmonious” action of this law. But, on the other hand, as soon as (in
the colonies, e.g.) adverse circumstances prevent the creation of an industrial reserve army and,
with it, the absolute dependence of the working class upon the capitalist class, capital, along with
its commonplace Sancho Panza, rebels against the “sacred” law of supply and demand, and tries
to check its inconvenient action by forcible means and State interference.

449

Chapter 25

Section 4: Different Forms of the Relative surplus population.
The General Law of Capitalistic Accumulation
The relative surplus population exists in every possible form. Every labourer belongs to it during
the time when he is only partially employed or wholly unemployed. Not taking into account the
great periodically recurring forms that the changing phases of the industrial cycle impress on it,
now an acute form during the crisis, then again a chronic form during dull times – it has always
three forms, the floating, the latent, the stagnant.
In the centres of modern industry – factories, manufactures, ironworks, mines, &c. – the labourers
are sometimes repelled, sometimes attracted again in greater masses, the number of those
employed increasing on the whole, although in a constantly decreasing proportion to the scale of
production. Here the surplus population exists in the floating form.
In the automatic factories, as in all the great workshops, where machinery enters as a factor, or
where only the modern division of labour is carried out, large numbers of boys are employed up
to the age of maturity. When this term is once reached, only a very small number continue to find
employment in the same branches of industry, whilst the majority are regularly discharged. This
majority forms an element of the floating surplus population, growing with the extension of those
branches of industry. Part of them emigrates, following in fact capital that has emigrated. One
consequence is that the female population grows more rapidly than the male, teste England. That
the natural increase of the number of labourers does not satisfy the requirements of the
accumulation of capital, and yet all the time is in excess of them, is a contradiction inherent to the
movement of capital itself. It wants larger numbers of youthful labourers, a smaller number of
adults. The contradiction is not more glaring than that other one that there is a complaint of the
want of hands, while at the same time many thousands are out of work, because the division of
labour chains them to a particular branch of industry. 21
The consumption of labour power by capital is, besides, so rapid that the labourer, half-way
through his life, has already more or less completely lived himself out. He falls into the ranks of
the supernumeraries, or is thrust down from a higher to a lower step in the scale. It is precisely
among the work-people of modern industry that we meet with the shortest duration of life. Dr.
Lee, Medical Officer of Health for Manchester, stated
“that the average age at death of the Manchester ... upper middle class was 38
years, while the average age at death of the labouring class was 17; while at
Liverpool those figures were represented as 35 against 15. It thus appeared that
the well-to-do classes had a lease of life which was more than double the value of
that which fell to the lot of the less favoured citizens.”22
In order to conform to these circumstances, the absolute increase of this section of the proletariat
must take place under conditions that shall swell their numbers, although the individual elements
are used up rapidly. Hence, rapid renewal of the generations of labourers (this law does not hold
for the other classes of the population). This social need is met by early marriages, a necessary
consequence of the conditions in which the labourers of modern industry live, and by the
premium that the exploitation of children sets on their production.
As soon as capitalist production takes possession of agriculture, and in proportion to the extent to
which it does so, the demand for an agricultural labouring population falls absolutely, while the
accumulation of the capital employed in agriculture advances, without this repulsion being, as in
non-agricultural industries, compensated by a greater attraction. Part of the agricultural
population is therefore constantly on the point of passing over into an urban or manufacturing
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proletariat, and on the look-out for circumstances favourable to this transformation. (Manufacture
is used here in the sense of all non-agricultural industries.) 23 This source of relative surplus
population is thus constantly flowing. But the constant flow towards the towns pre-supposes, in
the country itself, a constant latent surplus population, the extent of which becomes evident only
when its channels of outlet open to exceptional width. The agricultural labourer is therefore
reduced to the minimum of wages, and always stands with one foot already in the swamp of
pauperism.
The third category of the relative surplus population, the stagnant, forms a part of the active
labour army, but with extremely irregular employment. Hence it furnishes to capital an
inexhaustible reservoir of disposable labour power. Its conditions of life sink below the average
normal level of the working class; this makes it at once the broad basis of special branches of
capitalist exploitation. It is characterised by maximum of working-time, and minimum of wages.
We have learnt to know its chief form under the rubric of “domestic industry.” It recruits itself
constantly from the supernumerary forces of modern industry and agriculture, and specially from
those decaying branches of industry where handicraft is yielding to manufacture, manufacture to
machinery. Its extent grows, as with the extent and energy of accumulation, the creation of a
surplus population advances. But it forms at the same time a self-reproducing and selfperpetuating element of the working class, taking a proportionally greater part in the general
increase of that class than the other elements. In fact, not only the number of births and deaths,
but the absolute size of the families stand in inverse proportion to the height of wages, and
therefore to the amount of means of subsistence of which the different categories of labourers
dispose. This law of capitalistic society would sound absurd to savages, or even civilised
colonists. It calls to mind the boundless reproduction of animals individually weak and constantly
hunted down. 24
The lowest sediment of the relative surplus population finally dwells in the sphere of pauperism.
Exclusive of vagabonds, criminals, prostitutes, in a word, the “dangerous” classes, this layer of
society consists of three categories. First, those able to work. One need only glance superficially
at the statistics of English pauperism to find that the quantity of paupers increases with every
crisis, and diminishes with every revival of trade. Second, orphans and pauper children. These are
candidates for the industrial reserve army, and are, in times of great prosperity, as 1860, e.g.,
speedily and in large numbers enrolled in the active army of labourers. Third, the demoralised
and ragged, and those unable to work, chiefly people who succumb to their incapacity for
adaptation, due to the division of labour; people who have passed the normal age of the labourer;
the victims of industry, whose number increases with the increase of dangerous machinery, of
mines, chemical works, &c., the mutilated, the sickly, the widows, &c. Pauperism is the hospital
of the active labour-army and the dead weight of the industrial reserve army. Its production is
included in that of the relative surplus population, its necessity in theirs; along with the surplus
population, pauperism forms a condition of capitalist production, and of the capitalist
development of wealth. It enters into the faux frais of capitalist production; but capital knows
how to throw these, for the most part, from its own shoulders on to those of the working class and
the lower middle class.
The greater the social wealth, the functioning capital, the extent and energy of its growth, and,
therefore, also the absolute mass of the proletariat and the productiveness of its labour, the greater
is the industrial reserve army. The same causes which develop the expansive power of capital,
develop also the labour power at its disposal. The relative mass of the industrial reserve army
increases therefore with the potential energy of wealth. But the greater this reserve army in
proportion to the active labour army, the greater is the mass of a consolidated surplus population,
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whose misery is in inverse ratio to its torment of labour. The more extensive, finally, the lazarus
layers of the working class, and the industrial reserve army, the greater is official pauperism. This
is the absolute general law of capitalist accumulation. Like all other laws it is modified in its
working by many circumstances, the analysis of which does not concern us here.
The folly is now patent of the economic wisdom that preaches to the labourers the
accommodation of their number to the requirements of capital. The mechanism of capitalist
production and accumulation constantly effects this adjustment. The first word of this adaptation
is the creation of a relative surplus population, or industrial reserve army. Its last word is the
misery of constantly extending strata of the active army of labour, and the dead weight of
pauperism.
The law by which a constantly increasing quantity of means of production, thanks to the advance
in the productiveness of social labour, may be set in movement by a progressively diminishing
expenditure of human power, this law, in a capitalist society – where the labourer does not
employ the means of production, but the means of production employ the labourer – undergoes a
complete inversion and is expressed thus: the higher the productiveness of labour, the greater is
the pressure of the labourers on the means of employment, the more precarious, therefore,
becomes their condition of existence, viz., the sale of their own labour power for the increasing of
another’s wealth, or for the self-expansion of capital. The fact that the means of production, and
the productiveness of labour, increase more rapidly than the productive population, expresses
itself, therefore, capitalistically in the inverse form that the labouring population always increases
more rapidly than the conditions under which capital can employ this increase for its own selfexpansion.
We saw in Part IV., when analysing the production of relative surplus-value: within the capitalist
system all methods for raising the social productiveness of labour are brought about at the cost of
the individual labourer; all means for the development of production transform themselves into
means of domination over, and exploitation of, the producers; they mutilate the labourer into a
fragment of a man, degrade him to the level of an appendage of a machine, destroy every remnant
of charm in his work and turn it into a hated toil; they estrange from him the intellectual
potentialities of the labour process in the same proportion as science is incorporated in it as an
independent power; they distort the conditions under which he works, subject him during the
labour process to a despotism the more hateful for its meanness; they transform his life-time into
working-time, and drag his wife and child beneath the wheels of the Juggernaut of capital. But all
methods for the production of surplus-value are at the same time methods of accumulation; and
every extension of accumulation becomes again a means for the development of those methods. It
follows therefore that in proportion as capital accumulates, the lot of the labourer, be his payment
high or low, must grow worse. The law, finally, that always equilibrates the relative surplus
population, or industrial reserve army, to the extent and energy of accumulation, this law rivets
the labourer to capital more firmly than the wedges of Vulcan did Prometheus to the rock. It
establishes an accumulation of misery, corresponding with accumulation of capital. Accumulation
of wealth at one pole is, therefore, at the same time accumulation of misery, agony of toil slavery,
ignorance, brutality, mental degradation, at the opposite pole, i.e., on the side of the class that
produces its own product in the form of capital. 25 This antagonistic character of capitalistic
accumulation is enunciated in various forms by political economists, although by them it is
confounded with phenomena, certainly to some extent analogous, but nevertheless essentially
distinct, and belonging to pre-capitalistic modes of production.
The Venetian monk Ortes, one of the great economic writers of the 18th century, regards the
antagonism of capitalist production as a general natural law of social wealth.
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“In the economy of a nation, advantages and evils always balance one another (il
bene ed il male economico in una nazione sempre all, istessa misura): the
abundance of wealth with some people, is always equal to the want of it with
others (la copia dei beni in alcuni sempre eguale alia mancanza di essi in altri): the
great riches of a small number are always accompanied by the absolute privation
of the first necessaries of life for many others. The wealth of a nation corresponds
with its population, and its misery corresponds with its wealth. Diligence in some
compels idleness in others. The poor and idle are a necessary consequence of the
rich and active,” &c.26
In a thoroughly brutal way about 10 years after Ortes, the Church of England parson, Townsend,
glorified misery as a necessary condition of wealth.
“Legal constraint (to labour) is attended with too much trouble, violence, and
noise, whereas hunger is not only a peaceable, silent, unremitted pressure, but as
the most natural motive to industry and labour, it calls forth the most powerful
exertions.”
Everything therefore depends upon making hunger permanent among the working class, and for
this, according to Townsend, the principle of population, especially active among the poor,
provides.
“It seems to be a law of Nature that the poor should be to a certain degree
improvident” [i.e., so improvident as to be born without a silver spoon in the
mouth], “that there may always be some to fulfil the most servile, the most sordid,
and the most ignoble offices in the community. The stock of human happiness is
thereby much increased, whilst the more delicate are not only relieved from
drudgery ... but are left at liberty without interruption to pursue those callings
which are suited to their various dispositions ... it” [the Poor Law] “tends to
destroy the harmony and beauty, the symmetry and order of that system which
God and Nature have established in the world.” 27 If the Venetian monk found in
the fatal destiny that makes misery eternal, the raison d’être of Christian charity,
celibacy, monasteries and holy houses, the Protestant prebendary finds in it a
pretext for condemning the laws in virtue of which the poor possessed a right to a
miserable public relief.
“The progress of social wealth,” says Storch, “begets this useful class of society ...
which performs the most wearisome, the vilest, the most disgusting functions,
which takes, in a word, on its shoulders all that is disagreeable and servile in life,
and procures thus for other classes leisure, serenity of mind and conventional”
[c’est bon!] “dignity of character.” 28
Storch asks himself in what then really consists the progress of this capitalistic civilisation with
its misery and its degradation of the masses, as compared with barbarism. He finds but one
answer: security!
“Thanks to the advance of industry and science,” says Sismondi, “every labourer
can produce every day much more than his consumption requires. But at the same
time, whilst his labour produces wealth, that wealth would, were he called on to
consume it himself, make him less fit for labour.” According to him, “men” [i.e.,
non-workers] “would probably prefer to do without all artistic perfection, and all
the enjoyments that manufacturers procure for us, if it were necessary that all
should buy them by constant toil like that of the labourer.... Exertion today is
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separated from its recompense; it is not the same man that first works, and then
reposes; but it is because the one works that the other rests.... The indefinite
multiplication of the productive powers of labour can then only have for result the
increase of luxury and enjoyment of the idle rich.” 29
Finally Destutt de Tracy, the fish-blooded bourgeois doctrinaire, blurts out brutally:
“In poor nations the people are comfortable, in rich nations they are generally
poor.” 30

Section 5: Illustrations of the General Law of Capitalist
Accumulation
A. England from 1846-1866
No period of modern society is so favourable for the study of capitalist accumulation as the
period of the last 20 years. It is as if this period had found Fortunatus’ purse. But of all countries
England again furnishes the classical example, because it holds the foremost place in the worldmarket, because capitalist production is here alone completely developed, and lastly, because the
introduction of the Free-trade millennium since 1846 has cut off the last retreat of vulgar
economy. The titanic advance of production – the latter half of the 20 years’ period again far
surpassing the former – has been already pointed out sufficiently in Part IV.
Although the absolute increase of the English population in the last half century was very great,
the relative increase or rate of growth fell constantly, as the following table borrowed from the
census shows.
Annual increase per cent. of the population of England and Wales in decimal numbers:
1811-1821
1821-1831
1831-1841
1841-1851
1851-1861

1.533 per cent.
1.446 per cent.
1.326 per cent.
1.216 per cent.
1.141 per cent.

Let us now, on the other hand, consider the increase of wealth. Here the movement of profit, rent
of land, &c., that come under the income tax, furnishes the surest basis. The increase of profits
liable to income tax (farmers and some other categories not included) in Great Britain from 1853
to 1864 amounted to 50.47% or 4.58% as the annual average, 31 that of the population during the
same period to about 12%. The augmentation of the rent of land subject to taxation (including
houses, railways, mines, fisheries, &c.), amounted for 1853 to 1864 to 38% or 3 5/12% annually.
Under this head the following categories show the greatest increase:
Excess of annual income
of 1864 over that of 1853
Houses
38.60%
Quarries
84.76%
Mines
68.85%
Ironworks
39.92%
Fisheries
57.37%

Increase
per year
3.50%
7.70%
6.26%
3.63%
5.21%
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Gasworks
Railways

126.02%
83.29%

11.45%
7.57%

If we compare the years from 1853 to 1864 in three sets of four consecutive years each, the rate
of augmentation of the income increases constantly. 32 It is, e.g., for that arising from profits
between 1853 to 1857, 1.73% yearly; 1857-1861, 2.74%, and for 1861-64, 9.30% yearly. The
sum of the incomes of the United Kingdom that come under the income tax was in 1856,
£307,068,898; in 1859, £328,127,416; in 1862, £351,745,241; in 1863, £359,142,897; in 1864,
£362,462,279; in 1865, £385,530,020. 33
The accumulation of capital was attended at the same time by its concentration and centralisation.
Although no official statistics of agriculture existed for England (they did for Ireland), they were
voluntarily given in 10 counties. These statistics gave the result that from 1851 to 1861 the
number of farms of less than 100 acres had fallen from 31,583 to 26,597, so that 5,016 had been
thrown together into larger farms. 34 From 1815 to 1825 no personal estate of more than
£1,000,000 came under the succession duty; from 1825 to 1855, however, 8 did; and 4 from 1856
to June, 1859, i.e., in 4½ years. 35 The centralisation will, however, be best seen from a short
analysis of the Income Tax Schedule D (profits, exclusive of farms, &c.), in the years 1864 and
1865. I note beforehand that incomes from this source pay income tax on everything over £60.
These incomes liable to taxation in England, Wales and Scotland, amounted in 1864 to
£95,844,222, in 1865 to £105,435,579. 36 The number of persons taxed were in 1864, 308,416, out
of a population of 23,891,009; in 1865, 332,431 out of a population of 24,127,003. The following
table shows the distribution of these incomes in the two years:

Total Income
of these
of these
of these
of these

Year ending
April 5th, 1864.
Income from
Income from
Profits
People
£95,844,222
308,416
57,028,289
23,334
36,415,225
3,619
22,809,781
832
8,744,762
91

Year ending
April 5th, 1865.
Income from
Income from
Profits
People
105,435,738
332,431
64,554,297
24,265
42,535,576
4,021
27,555,313
973
11,077,238
107

In 1855 there were produced in the United Kingdom 61,453,079 tons of coal, of value
£16,113,167; in 1864, 92,787,873 tons, of value £23,197,968; in 1855, 3,218,154 tons of pig-iron,
of value £8,045,385; 1864, 4,767,951 tons, of value £11,919,877. In 1854 the length of the
railroads worked in the United Kingdom was 8,054 miles, with a paid-up capital of £286,068,794;
in 1864 the length was 12,789 miles, with capital paid up of £425,719,613. In 1854 the total sum
of the exports and imports of the United Kingdom was £268,210,145; in 1865, £489,923,285. The
following table shows the movement of the exports:
1846
1849
1856
1860
1865
1866 3

£58,842,377
63,596,052
115,826,948
135,842,817
165,862,402
188,917,563
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After these few examples one understands the cry of triumph of the Registrar-General of the
British people:
“Rapidly as the population has increased, it has not kept pace with the progress of
industry and wealth.” 38
Let us turn now to the direct agents of this industry, or the producers of this wealth, to the
working class.
“It is one of the most melancholy features in the social state of this country,” says
Gladstone, “that while there was a decrease in the consuming powers of the
people, and while there was an increase in the privations and distress of the
labouring class and operatives, there was at the same time a constant accumulation
of wealth in the upper classes, and a constant increase of capital.”39
Thus spake this unctuous minister in the House of Commons of February 13th, 1843. On April
16th, 1863, 20 years later, in the speech in which he introduced his Budget:
“From 1842 to 1852 the taxable income of the country increased by 6 per cent....
In the 8 years from 1853 to 1861 it had increased from the basis taken in 1853 by
20 per cent.! The fact is so astonishing as to be almost incredible ... this
intoxicating augmentation of wealth and power ... entirely confined to classes of
property ... must be of indirect benefit to the labouring population, because it
cheapens the commodities of general consumption. While the rich have been
growing richer, the poor have been growing less poor. At any rate, whether the
extremes of poverty are less, I do not presume to say.” 40
How lame an anti-climax! If the working class has remained “poor,” only “less poor” in
proportion as it produces for the wealthy class “an intoxicating augmentation of wealth and
power,” then it has remained relatively just as poor. If the extremes of poverty have not lessened,
they have increased, because the extremes of wealth have. As to the cheapening of the means of
subsistence, the official statistics, e.g., the accounts of the London Orphan Asylum, show an
increase in price of 20% for the average of the three years 1860-1862, compared with 1851-1853.
In the following three years, 1863-1865, there was a progressive rise in the price of meat, butter,
milk, sugar, salt, coals, and a number of other necessary means of subsistence. 41 Gladstone’s
next Budget speech of April 7th, 1864, is a Pindaric dithyrambus on the advance of surplusvalue-making and the happiness of the people “tempered by poverty.” He speaks of masses “on
the border” of pauperism, of branches of trade in which “wages have not increased,” and finally
sums up the happiness of the working class in the words:
“human life is but, in nine cases out of ten, a struggle for existence.” 42
Professor Fawcett, not bound like Gladstone by official considerations, declares roundly:
“I do not, of course, deny that money wages have been augmented by this increase
of capital (in the last ten years), but this apparent advantage is to a great extent
lost, because many of the necessaries of life are becoming dearer” (he believes
because of the fall in value of the precious metals)..."the rich grow rapidly richer,
whilst there is no perceptible advance in the comfort enjoyed by the industrial
classes.... They (the labourers) become almost the slaves of the tradesman, to
whom they owe money.” 43
In the chapters on the “working day” and “machinery,” the reader has seen under what
circumstances the British working class created an “intoxicating augmentation of wealth and
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power” for the propertied classes. There we were chiefly concerned with the social functioning of
the labourer. But for a full elucidation of the law of accumulation, his condition outside the
workshop must also be looked at, his condition as to food and dwelling. The limits of this book
compel us to concern ourselves chiefly with the worst paid part of the industrial proletariat, and
with the agricultural labourers, who together form the majority of the working class.
But first, one word on official pauperism, or on that part of the working class which has forfeited
its condition of existence (the sale of labour power), and vegetates upon public alms. The official
list of paupers numbered in England44 851,369 persons; in 1856, 877,767; in 1865, 971,433. In
consequence of the cotton famine, it grew in the years 1863 and 1864 to 1,079,382 and 1,014,978.
The crisis of 1866, which fell most heavily on London, created in this centre of the world market,
more populous than the kingdom of Scotland, an increase of pauperism for the year 1866 of
19.5% compared with 1865, and of 24.4% compared with 1864, and a still greater increase for the
first months of 1867 as compared with 1866. From the analysis of the statistics of pauperism, two
points are to be taken. On the one hand, the fluctuation up and down of the number of paupers,
reflects the periodic changes of the industrial cycle. On the other, the official statistics become
more and more misleading as to the actual extent of pauperism in proportion as, with the
accumulation of capital, the class-struggle, and, therefore, the class consciousness of the working
men, develop. E.g., the barbarity in the treatment of the paupers, at which the English Press (The
Times, Pall Mall Gazette, etc.) have cried out so loudly during the last two years, is of ancient
date. F. Engels showed in 1844 exactly the same horrors, exactly the same transient canting
outcries of “sensational literature.” But frightful increase of “deaths by starvation” in London
during the last ten years proves beyond doubt the growing horror in which the working-people
hold the slavery of the workhouse, that place of punishment for misery.45

B. The Badly Paid Strata of the British Industrial Class
During the cotton famine of 1862, Dr. Smith was charged by the Privy Council with an inquiry
into the conditions of nourishment of the distressed operatives in Lancashire and Cheshire. His
observations during many preceding years had led him to the conclusion that “to avert starvation
diseases,” the daily food of an average woman ought to contain at least 3,900 grains of carbon
with 180 grains of nitrogen; the daily food of an average man, at least 4,300 grains of carbon with
200 grains of nitrogen; for women, about the same quantity of nutritive elements as are contained
in 2 lbs. of good wheaten bread, for men 1/9 more; for the weekly average of adult men and
women, at least 28,600 grains of carbon and 1,330 grains of nitrogen. His calculation was
practically confirmed in a surprising manner by its agreement with the miserable quantity of
nourishment to which want had forced down the consumption of the cotton operatives. This was,
in December, 1862, 29,211 grains of carbon, and 1,295 grains of nitrogen weekly.
In the year 1863, the Privy Council ordered an inquiry into the state of distress of the worstnourished part of the English working class. Dr. Simon, medical officer to the Privy Council,
chose for this work the above-mentioned Dr. Smith. His inquiry ranges on the one hand over the
agricultural labourers, on the other, over silk-weavers, needlewomen, kid-glovers, stockingweavers, glove-weavers, and shoemakers. The latter categories are, with the exception of the
stocking-weavers, exclusively town-dwellers. It was made a rule in the inquiry to select in each
category the most healthy families, and those comparatively in the best circumstances.
As a general result it was found that
“in only one of the examined classes of in-door operatives did the average
nitrogen supply just exceed, while in another it nearly reached, the estimated
standard of bare sufficiency [i.e., sufficient to avert starvation diseases], and that

457

Chapter 25

in two classes there was defect – in one, a very large defect – of both nitrogen and
carbon. Moreover, as regards the examined families of the agricultural population,
it appeared that more than a fifth were with less than the estimated sufficiency of
carbonaceous food, that more than one-third were with less than the estimated
sufficiency of nitrogenous food, and that in three counties (Berkshire,
Oxfordshire, and Somersetshire), insufficiency of nitrogenous food was the
average local diet.” 46
Among the agricultural labourers, those of England, the wealthiest part of the United Kingdom,
were the worst fed. 47 The insufficiency of food among the agricultural labourers, fell, as a rule,
chiefly on the women and children, for “the man must eat to do his work.” Still greater penury
ravaged the town-workers examined.
“They are so ill fed that assuredly among them there must be many cases of severe
and injurious privation.” 48
(“Privation” of the capitalist all this! i.e., “abstinence” from paying for the means of subsistence
absolutely necessary for the mere vegetation of his “hands.”) 49
The following table shows the conditions of nourishment of the above-named categories of purely
town-dwelling work-people, as compared with the minimum assumed by Dr. Smith, and with the
food-allowance of the cotton operatives during the time of their greatest distress:
Both Sexes

Average weekly Average weekly
carbon
nitrogen

Five
in-door
28,876 grains
occupations
Unemployed Lancashire
28,211 grains
Operatives
Minimum quantity to be
allowed to the Lancashire
28,600 grains
Operatives, equal number
of males and females

1,192 grains
1,295 grains

1,330 grains

One half, or 60/125, of the industrial labour categories investigated, had absolutely no beer, 28%
no milk. The weekly average of the liquid means of nourishment in the families varied from
seven ounces in the needle-women to 24¾ ounces in the stocking-makers. The majority of those
who did not obtain milk were needle-women in London. The quantity of bread-stuffs consumed
weekly varied from 7¾ lbs. for the needle-women to 11½ lbs. for the shoemakers, and gave a
total average of 9.9 lbs. per adult weekly. Sugar (treacle, etc.) varied from 4 ounces weekly for
the kid-glovers to 11 ounces for the stocking-makers; and the total average per week for all
categories was 8 ounces per adult weekly. Total weekly average of butter (fat, etc.) 5 ounces per
adult. The weekly average of meat (bacon, etc.) varied from 7¼ ounces for the silk-weavers, to
18¼ ounces for the kid-glovers; total average for the different categories 13.6 ounces. The weekly
cost of food per adult, gave the following average figures; silk-weavers 2s. 2½d., needle-women
2s. 7d., kid-glovers 2s. 9½d., shoemakers 2s 7¾d., stocking-weavers 2s. 6¼d. For the silkweavers of Macclesfield the average was only 1s. 8½d. The worst categories were the needlewomen, silk-weavers and kid-glovers. 50 Of these facts, Dr. Simon in his General Health Report
says:
“That cases are innumerable in which defective diet is the cause or the aggravator
of disease, can be affirmed by any one who is conversant with poor law medical
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practice, or with the wards and out-patient rooms of hospitals.... Yet in this point
of view, there is, in my opinion, a very important sanitary context to be added. It
must be remembered that privation of food is very reluctantly borne, and that as a
rule great poorness of diet will only come when other privations have preceded it.
Long before insufficiency of diet is a matter of hygienic concern, long before the
physiologist would think of counting the grains of nitrogen and carbon which
intervene between life and starvation, the household will have been utterly
destitute of material comfort; clothing and fuel will have been even scantier than
food – against inclemencies of weather there will have been no adequate
protection – dwelling space will have been stinted to the degree in which
overcrowding produces or increases disease; of household utensils and furniture
there will have been scarcely any ‒ even cleanliness will have been found costly
or difficult, and if there still be self-respectful endeavours to maintain it, every
such endeavour will represent additional pangs of hunger. The home, too, will be
where shelter can be cheapest bought; in quarters where commonly there is least
fruit of sanitary supervision, least drainage, least scavenging, least suppression of
public nuisances, least or worst water supply, and, if in town, least light and air.
Such are the sanitary dangers to which poverty is almost certainly exposed, when
it is poverty enough to imply scantiness of food. And while the sum of them is of
terrible magnitude against life, the mere scantiness of food is in itself of very
serious moment.... These are painful reflections, especially when it is remembered
that the poverty to which they advert is not the deserved poverty of idleness. In all
cases it is the poverty of working populations. Indeed, as regards the in-door
operatives, the work which obtains the scanty pittance of food, is for the most part
excessively prolonged. Yet evidently it is only in a qualified sense that the work
can be deemed self-supporting.... And on a very large scale the nominal selfsupport can be only a circuit, longer or shorter, to pauperism.” 51
The intimate connexion between the pangs of hunger of the most industrious layers of the
working class, and the extravagant consumption, coarse or refined, of the rich, for which
capitalist accumulation is the basis, reveals itself only when the economic laws are known. It is
otherwise with the “housing of the poor.” Every unprejudiced observer sees that the greater the
centralisation of the means of production, the greater is the corresponding heaping together of the
labourers, within a given space; that therefore the swifter capitalistic accumulation, the more
miserable are the dwellings of the working-people. “Improvements” of towns, accompanying the
increase of wealth, by the demolition of badly built quarters, the erection of palaces for banks,
warehouses, &c., the widening of streets for business traffic, for the carriages of luxury, and for
the introduction of tramways, &c., drive away the poor into even worse and more crowded hiding
places. On the other hand, every one knows that the dearness of dwellings is in inverse ratio to
their excellence, and that the mines of misery are exploited by house speculators with more profit
or less cost than ever were the mines of Potosi. The antagonistic character of capitalist
accumulation, and therefore of the capitalistic relations of property generally, 52 is here so evident,
that even the official English reports on this subject teem with heterodox onslaughts on “property
and its rights.” With the development of industry, with the accumulation of capital, with the
growth and “improvement” of towns, the evil makes such progress that the mere fear of
contagious diseases which do not spare even “respectability,” brought into existence from 1847 to
1864 no less than 10 Acts of Parliament on sanitation, and that the frightened bourgeois in some
towns, as Liverpool, Glasgow, &c., took strenuous measures through their municipalities.
Nevertheless Dr. Simon, in his report of 1865, says:
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“Speaking generally, it may be said that the evils are uncontrolled in England.”
By order of the Privy Council, in 1864, an inquiry was made into the conditions of the housing of
the agricultural labourers, in 1865 of the poorer classes in the towns. The results of the admirable
work of Dr. Julian Hunter are to be found in the seventh (1865) and eighth (1866) reports on
“Public Health.” To the agricultural labourers, I shall come later. On the condition of town
dwellings, I quote, as preliminary, a general remark of Dr. Simon.
“Although my official point of view,” he says, “is one exclusively physical,
common humanity requires that the other aspect of this evil should not be ignored
.... In its higher degrees it [i.e., over-crowding] almost necessarily involves such
negation of all delicacy, such unclean confusion of bodies and bodily functions,
such exposure of animal and sexual nakedness, as is rather bestial than human. To
be subject to these influences is a degradation which must become deeper and
deeper for those on whom it continues to work. To children who are born under its
curse, it must often be a very baptism into infamy. And beyond all measure
hopeless is the wish that persons thus circumstanced should ever in other respects
aspire to that atmosphere of civilisation which has its essence in physical and
moral cleanliness.” 53
London takes the first place in over-crowded habitations, absolutely unfit for human beings.
“He feels clear,” says Dr. Hunter, “on two points; first, that there are about 20
large colonies in London, of about 10,000 persons each, whose miserable
condition exceeds almost anything he has seen elsewhere in England, and is
almost entirely the result of their bad house accommodation; and second, that the
crowded and dilapidated condition of the houses of these colonies is much worse
than was the case 20 years ago.” 54 “It is not too much to say that life in parts of
London and Newcastle is infernal.” 55
Further, the better-off part of the working class, together with the small shopkeepers and other
elements of the lower middle class, falls in London more and more under the curse of these vile
conditions of dwelling, in proportion as “improvements,” and with them the demolition of old
streets and houses, advance, as factories and the afflux of human beings grow in the metropolis,
and finally as house rents rise with the ground-rents.
“Rents have become so heavy that few labouring men can afford more than one
room.” 56
There is almost no house-property in London that is not overburdened with a number of
middlemen. For the price of land in London is always very high in comparison with its yearly
revenue, and therefore every buyer speculates on getting rid of it again at a jury price (the
expropriation valuation fixed by jurymen), or on pocketing an extraordinary increase of value
arising from the neighbourhood of some large establishment. As a consequence of this there is a
regular trade in the purchase of “fag-ends of leases.”
“Gentlemen in this business may be fairly expected to do as they do – get all they
can from the tenants while they have them, and leave as little as they can for their
successors.” 57
The rents are weekly, and these gentlemen run no risk. In consequence of the making of railroads
in the City,
“the spectacle has lately been seen in the East of London of a number of families
wandering about some Saturday night with their scanty worldly goods on their
backs, without any resting place but the workhouse.” 58
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The workhouses are already over-crowded, and the “improvements” already sanctioned by
Parliament are only just begun. If labourers are driven away by the demolition of their old houses,
they do not leave their old parish, or at most they settle down on its borders, as near as they can
get to it.
“They try, of course, to remain as near as possible to their workshops. The
inhabitants do not go beyond the same or the next parish, parting their two-room
tenements into single rooms, and crowding even those.... Even at an advanced
rent, the people who are displaced will hardly be able to get an accommodation so
good as the meagre one they have left.... Half the workmen ... of the Strand ...
walked two miles to their work.” 59
This same Strand, a main thoroughfare which gives strangers an imposing idea of the wealth of
London, may serve as an example of the packing together of human beings in that town. In one of
its parishes, the Officer of Health reckoned 581 persons per acre, although half the width of the
Thames was reckoned in. It will be self-understood that every sanitary measure, which, as has
been the case hitherto in London, hunts the labourers from one quarter, by demolishing
uninhabitable houses, serves only to crowd them together yet more closely in another.
“Either,” says Dr. Hunter, “the whole proceeding will of necessity stop as an
absurdity, or the public compassion (!) be effectually aroused to the obligation
which may now be without exaggeration called national, of supplying cover to
those who by reason of their having no capital, cannot provide it for themselves,
though they can by periodical payments reward those who will provide it for
them.” 60
Admire this capitalistic justice! The owner of land, of houses, the businessman, when
expropriated by “improvements” such as railroads, the building of new streets, &c., not only
receives full indemnity. He must, according to law, human and divine, be comforted for his
enforced “abstinence” over and above this by a thumping profit. The labourer, with his wife and
child and chattels, is thrown out into the street, and – if he crowds in too large numbers towards
quarters of the town where the vestries insist on decency, he is prosecuted in the name of
sanitation!
Except London, there was at the beginning of the 19th century no single town in England of
100,000 inhabitants. Only five had more than 50,000. Now there are 28 towns with more than
50,000 inhabitants.
“The result of this change is not only that the class of town people is enormously
increased, but the old close-packed little towns are now centres, built round on
every side, open nowhere to air, and being no longer agreeable to the rich are
abandoned by them for the pleasanter outskirts. The successors of these rich are
occupying the larger houses at the rate of a family to each room [... and find
accommodation for two or three lodgers ...] and a population, for which the
houses were not intended and quite unfit, has been created, whose surroundings
are truly degrading to the adults and ruinous to the children.”61
The more rapidly capital accumulates in an industrial or commercial town, the more rapidly flows
the stream of exploitable human material, the more miserable are the improvised dwellings of the
labourers.
Newcastle-on-Tyne, as the centre of a coal and iron district of growing productiveness, takes the
next place after London in the housing inferno. Not less than 34,000 persons live there in single
rooms. Because of their absolute danger to the community, houses in great numbers have lately
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been destroyed by the authorities in Newcastle and Gateshead. The building of new houses
progresses very slowly, business very quickly. The town was, therefore, in 1865, more full than
ever. Scarcely a room was to let. Dr. Embleton, of the Newcastle Fever Hospital, says:
“There can be little doubt that the great cause of the continuance and spread of the
typhus has been the over-crowding of human beings, and the uncleanliness of
their dwellings. The rooms, in which labourers in many cases live, are situated in
confined and unwholesome yards or courts, and for space, light, air, and
cleanliness, are models of insufficiency and insalubrity, and a disgrace to any
civilised community; in them men, women, and children lie at night huddled
together: and as regards the men, the night-shift succeed the day-shift, and the
day-shift the night-shift in unbroken series for some time together, the beds
having scarcely time to cool; the whole house badly supplied with water and
worse with privies; dirty, unventilated, and pestiferous.” 62
The price per week of such lodgings ranges from 8d. to 3s.
“The town of Newcastle-on-Tyne,” says Dr. Hunter, “contains a sample of the
finest tribe of our countrymen, often sunk by external circumstances of house and
street into an almost savage degradation.” 63
As a result of the ebbing and flowing of capital and labour, the state of the dwellings of an
industrial town may today be bearable, tomorrow hideous. Or the aedileship of the town may
have pulled itself together for the removal of the most shocking abuses. Tomorrow, like a swarm
of locusts, come crowding in masses of ragged Irishmen or decayed English agricultural
labourers. They are stowed away in cellars and lofts, or the hitherto respectable labourer’s
dwelling is transformed into a lodging house whose personnel changes as quickly as the billets in
the 30 years’ war. Example: Bradford (Yorkshire). There the municipal philistine was just busied
with urban improvements. Besides, there were still in Bradford, in 1861, 1,751 uninhabited
houses. But now comes that revival of trade which the mildly liberal Mr. Forster, the negro’s
friend, recently crowed over with so much grace. With the revival of trade came of course an
overflow from the waves of the ever fluctuating “reserve army” or “relative surplus population.”
The frightful cellar habitations and rooms registered in the list,64 which Dr. Hunter obtained from
the agent of an Insurance Company, were for the most part inhabited by well-paid labourers.
They declared that they would willingly pay for better dwellings if they were to be had.
Meanwhile, they become degraded, they fall ill, one and all, whilst the mildly liberal Forster, M.
P., sheds tears over the blessings of Free Trade, and the profits of the eminent men of Bradford
who deal in worsted. In the Report of September, 1865, Dr. Bell, one of the poor law doctors of
Bradford, ascribes the frightful mortality of fever-patients in his district to the nature of their
dwellings.
“In one small cellar measuring 1,500 cubic feet ... there are ten persons ....
Vincent Street, Green Aire Place, and the Leys include 223 houses having 1,450
inhabitants, 435 beds, and 36 privies.... The beds ‒ and in that term I include any
roll of dirty old rags, or an armful of shavings ‒ have an average of 3.3 persons to
each, many have 5 and 6 persons to each, and some people, I am told, are
absolutely without beds; they sleep in their ordinary clothes, on the bare boards –
young men and women, married and unmarried, all together. I need scarcely add
that many of these dwellings are dark, damp, dirty, stinking holes, utterly unfit for
human habitations; they are the centres from which disease and death are
distributed amongst those in better circumstances, who have allowed them thus to
fester in our midst.” 65
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Bristol takes the third place after London in the misery of its dwellings.
“Bristol, where the blankest poverty and domestic misery abound in the wealthiest
town of Europe.” 66

C. The Nomad Population
We turn now to a class of people whose origin is agricultural, but whose occupation is in great
part industrial. They are the light infantry of capital, thrown by it, according to its needs, now to
this point, now to that. When they are not on the march, they “camp.” Nomad labour is used for
various operations of building and draining, brick-making, lime-burning, railway-making, &c. A
flying column of pestilence, it carries into the places in whose neighbourhood it pitches its camp,
small-pox, typhus, cholera, scarlet fever, &c. 67 In undertakings that involve much capital outlay,
such as railways, &c., the contractor himself generally provides his army with wooden huts and
the like, thus improvising villages without any sanitary provisions, outside the control of the local
boards, very profitable to the contractor, who exploits the labourers in two-fold fashion – as
soldiers of industry and as tenants. According as the wooden hut contains 1, 2, or 3 holes, its
inhabitant, navvy, or whatever he may be, has to pay 1, 3, or 4 shillings weekly. 68 One example
will suffice. In September, 1864, Dr. Simon reports that the Chairman of the Nuisances Removal
Committee of the parish of Sevenoaks sent the following denunciation to Sir George Grey, Home
Secretary: –
“Small-pox cases were rarely heard of in this parish until about twelve months
ago. Shortly before that time, the works for a railway from Lewisham to
Tunbridge were commenced here, and, in addition to the principal works being in
the immediate neighbourhood of this town, here was also established the depôt for
the whole of the works, so that a large number of persons was of necessity
employed here. As cottage accommodation could not be obtained for them all,
huts were built in several places along the line of the works by the contractor, Mr.
Jay, for their especial occupation. These huts possessed no ventilation nor
drainage, and, besides, were necessarily over-crowded, because each occupant had
to accommodate lodgers, whatever the number in his own family might be,
although there were only two rooms to each tenement. The consequences were,
according to the medical report we received, that in the night-time these poor
people were compelled to endure all the horror of suffocation to avoid the
pestiferous smells arising from the filthy, stagnant water, and the privies close
under their windows. Complaints were at length made to the Nuisances Removal
Committee by a medical gentleman who had occasion to visit these huts, and he
spoke of their condition as dwellings in the most severe terms, and he expressed
his fears that some very serious consequences might ensue, unless some sanitary
measures were adopted. About a year ago, Mr. Jay promised to appropriate a hut,
to which persons in his employ, who were suffering from contagious diseases,
might at once be removed. He repeated that promise on the 23rd July last, but
although since the date of the last Promise there have been several cases of smallpox in his huts, and two deaths from the same disease, yet he has taken no steps
whatever to carry out his promise. On the 9th September instant, Mr. Kelson,
surgeon, reported to me further cases of small-pox in the same huts, and he
described their condition as most disgraceful. I should add, for your (the Home
Secretary’s) information that an isolated house, called the Pest-house, which is set
apart for parishioners who might be suffering from infectious diseases, has been
continually occupied by such patients for many months past, and is also now
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occupied; that in one family five children died from small-pox and fever; that
from the 1st April to the 1st September this year, a period of five months, there
have been no fewer than ten deaths from small-pox in the parish, four of them
being in the huts already referred to; that it is impossible to ascertain the exact
number of persons who have suffered from that disease although they are known
to be many, from the fact of the families keeping it as private as possible.”69
The labourers in coal and other mines belong to the best paid categories of the British proletariat.
The price at which they buy their wages was shown on an earlier page.70 Here I merely cast a
hurried glance over the conditions of their dwellings. As a rule, the exploiter of a mine, whether
its owner or his tenant, builds a number of cottages for his hands. They receive cottages and coal
for firing “for nothing” – i.e., these form part of their wages, paid in kind. Those who are not
lodged in this way receive in compensation £4 per annum. The mining districts attract with
rapidity a large population, made up of the miners themselves, and the artisans, shopkeepers, &c.,
that group themselves around them. The ground-rents are high, as they are generally where
population is dense. The master tries, therefore, to run up, within the smallest space possible at
the mouth of the pit, just so many cottages as are necessary to pack together his hands and their
families. If new mines are opened in the neighbourhood, or old ones are again set working, the
pressure increases. In the construction of the cottages, only one point of view is of moment, the
“abstinence” of the capitalist from all expenditure that is not absolutely unavoidable.
“The lodging which is obtained by the pitman and other labourers connected with
the collieries of Northumberland and Durham,” says Dr. Julian Hunter, “is
perhaps, on the whole, the worst and the dearest of which any large specimens can
be found in England, the similar parishes of Monmouthshire excepted.... The
extreme badness is in the high number of men found in one room, in the smallness
of the ground-plot on which a great number of houses are thrust, the want of
water, the absence of privies, and the frequent placing of one house on the top of
another, or distribution into flats, ... the lessee acts as if the whole colony were
encamped, not resident.” 71
“In pursuance of my instructions,” says Dr. Stevens, “I visited most of the large
colliery villages in the Durham Union.... With very few exceptions, the general
statement that no means are taken to secure the health of the inhabitants would be
true of all of them.... All colliers are bound ['bound,’ an expression which, like
bondage, dates from the age of serfdom] to the colliery lessee or owner for twelve
months.... If the colliers express discontent, or in any way annoy the ‘viewer,’ a
mark of memorandum is made against their names, and, at the annual ‘binding,’
such men are turned off... It appears to me that no part of the ‘truck system’ could
be worse than what obtains in these densely-populated districts. The collier is
bound to take as part of his hiring a house surrounded with pestiferous influences;
he cannot help himself, and it appears doubtful whether anyone else can help him
except his proprietor (he is, to all intents and purposes, a serf), and his proprietor
first consults his balance-sheet, and the result is tolerably certain. The collier is
also often supplied with water by the proprietor, which, whether it be good or bad,
he has to pay for, or rather he suffers a deduction for from his wages.” 72
In conflict with “public opinion,” or even with the Officers of Health, capital makes no difficulty
about “justifying” the conditions partly dangerous, partly degrading, to which it confines the
working and domestic life of the labourer, on the ground that they are necessary for profit. It is
the same thing when capital “abstains” from protective measures against dangerous machinery in
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the factory, from appliances for ventilation and for safety in mines, &c. It is the same here with
the housing of the miners. Dr. Simon, medical officer of the Privy Council, in his official Report
says:
“In apology for the wretched household accommodation ... it is alleged that
miners are commonly worked on lease; that the duration of the lessee’s interest
(which in collieries is commonly for 21 years), is not so long that he should deem
it worth his while to create good accommodation for his labourers, and for the
tradespeople and others whom the work attracts; that even if he were disposed to
act liberally in the matter, this disposition would commonly be defeated by his
landlord’s tendency to fix on him, as ground-rent, an exorbitant additional charge
for the privilege of having on the surface of the ground the decent and
comfortable village which the labourers of the subterranean property ought to
inhabit, and that prohibitory price (if not actual prohibition) equally excludes
others who might desire to build. It would be foreign to the purpose of this report
to enter upon any discussion of the merits of the above apology. Nor here is it
even needful to consider where it would be that, if decent accommodation were
provided, the cost ... would eventually fall – whether on landlord, or lessee, or
labourer, or public. But in presence of such shameful facts as are vouched for in
the annexed reports [those of Dr. Hunter, Dr. Stevens, &c.] a remedy may well be
claimed.... Claims of landlordship are being so used as to do great public wrong.
The landlord in his capacity of mine-owner invites an industrial colony to labour
on his estate, and then in his capacity of surface-owner makes it impossible that
the labourers whom he collects, should find proper lodging where they must live.
The lessee [the capitalist exploiter] meanwhile has no pecuniary motive for
resisting that division of the bargain; well knowing that if its latter conditions be
exorbitant, the consequences fall, not on him, that his labourers on whom they fall
have not education enough to know the value of their sanitary rights, that neither
obscenest lodging nor foulest drinking water will be appreciable inducements
towards a ‘strike.’” 73

D. Effect of Crises on the Best Paid Part of the working
class
Before I turn to the regular agricultural labourers, I may be allowed to show, by one
example, how industrial revulsions affect even the best-paid, the aristocracy, of the
working class. It will be remembered that the year 1857 brought one of the great crises
with which the industrial cycle periodically ends. The next termination of the cycle was
due in 1866. Already discounted in the regular factory districts by the cotton famine,
which threw much capital from its wonted sphere into the great centres of the moneymarket, the crisis assumed, at this time, an especially financial character. Its outbreak in
1866 was signalised by the failure of a gigantic London Bank, immediately followed by
the collapse of countless swindling companies. One of the great London branches of
industry involved in the catastrophe was iron shipbuilding. The magnates of this trade
had not only over-produced beyond all measure during the overtrading time, but they
had, besides, engaged in enormous contracts on the speculation that credit would be
forthcoming to an equivalent extent. Now, a terrible reaction set in, that even at this hour
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(the end of March, 1867) continues in this and other London industries. To show the
condition of the labourers, I quote the following from the circumstantial report of a
correspondent of the Morning Star, who, at the end of 1866, and beginning of 1867,
visited the chief centres of distress:
“In the East End districts of Poplar, Millwall, Greenwich, Deptford, Limehouse
and Canning Town, at least 15,000 workmen and their families were in a state of
utter destitution, and 3,000 skilled mechanics were breaking stones in the
workhouse yard (after distress of over half a year’s duration).... I had great
difficulty in reaching the workhouse door, for a hungry crowd besieged it.... They
were waiting for their tickets, but the time had not yet arrived for the distribution.
The yard was a great square place with an open shed running all round it, and
several large heaps of snow covered the paving-stones in the middle. In the
middle, also, were little wicker-fenced spaces, like sheep pens, where in finer
weather the men worked; but on the day of my visit the pens were so snowed up
that nobody could sit in them. Men were busy, however, in the open shed breaking
paving-stones into macadam. Each man had a big paving-stone for a seat, and he
chipped away at the rime-covered granite with a big hammer until he had broken
up, and think! five bushels of it, and then he had done his day’s work, and got his
day’s pay – threepence and an allowance of food. In another part of the yard was a
rickety little wooden house, and when we opened the door of it, we found it filled
with men who were huddled together shoulder to shoulder for the warmth of one
another’s bodies and breath. They were picking oakum and disputing the while as
to which could work the longest on a given quantity of food – for endurance was
the point of honour. Seven thousand ... in this one workhouse ... were recipients of
relief ... many hundreds of them ... it appeared, were, six or eight months ago,
earning the highest wages paid to artisans.... Their number would be more than
doubled by the count of those who, having exhausted all their savings, still refuse
to apply to the parish, because they have a little left to pawn. Leaving the
workhouse, I took a walk through the streets, mostly of little one-storey houses,
that abound in the neighbourhood of Poplar. My guide was a member of the
Committee of the Unemployed.... My first call was on an ironworker who had
been seven and twenty weeks out of employment. I found the man with his family
sitting in a little back room. The room was not bare of furniture, and there was a
fire in it. This was necessary to keep the naked feet of the young children from
getting frost bitten, for it was a bitterly cold day. On a tray in front of the fire lay a
quantity of oakum, which the wife and children were picking in return for their
allowance from the parish. The man worked in the stone yard of the workhouse
for a certain ration of food, and threepence per day. He had now come home to
dinner quite hungry, as he told us with a melancholy smile, and his dinner
consisted of a couple of slices of bread and dripping, and a cup of milkless tea....
The next door at which we knocked was opened by a middle-aged woman, who,
without saying a word, led us into a little back parlour, in which sat all her family,
silent and fixedly staring at a rapidly dying fire. Such desolation, such
hopelessness was about these people and their little room, as I should not care to
witness again. ‘Nothing have they done, sir,’ said the woman, pointing to her
boys, ‘for six and twenty weeks; and all our money gone – all the twenty pounds
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that me and father saved when times were better, thinking it would yield a little to
keep us when we got past work. Look at it,’ she said, almost fiercely, bringing out
a bank-book with all its well kept entries of money paid in, and money taken out,
so that we could see how the little fortune had begun with the first five shilling
deposit, and had grown by little and little to be twenty pounds, and how it had
melted down again till the sum in hand got from pounds to shillings, and the last
entry made the book as worthless as a blank sheet. This family received relief
from the workhouse, and it furnished them with just one scanty meal per day....
Our next visit was to an iron labourer’s wife, whose husband had worked in the
yards. We found her ill from want of food, lying on a mattress in her clothes, and
just covered with a strip of carpet, for all the bedding had been pawned. Two
wretched children were tending her, themselves looking as much in need of
nursing as their mother. Nineteen weeks of enforced idleness had brought them to
this pass, and while the mother told the history of that bitter past, she moaned as if
all her faith in a future that should atone for it were dead.... On getting outside a
young fellow came running after us, and asked us to step inside his house and see
if anything could be done for him. A young wife, two pretty children, a cluster of
pawn-tickets, and a bare room were all he had to show.”
On the after pains of the crisis of 1866, the following extract from a Tory newspaper. It must not
be forgotten that the East-end of London, which is here dealt with, is not only the seat of the iron
shipbuilding mentioned above, but also of a so-called “home-industry” always underpaid.
“A frightful spectacle was to be seen yesterday in one part of the metropolis.
Although the unemployed thousands of the East-end did not parade with their
black flags en masse, the human torrent was imposing enough. Let us remember
what these people suffer. They are dying of hunger. That is the simple and terrible
fact. There are 40,000 of them.... In our presence, in one quarter of this wonderful
metropolis, are packed – next door to the most enormous accumulation of wealth
the world ever saw – cheek by jowl with this are 40,000 helpless, starving people.
These thousands are now breaking in upon the other quarters; always halfstarving, they cry their misery in our ears, they cry to Heaven, they tell us from
their miserable dwellings, that it is impossible for them to find work, and useless
for them to beg. The local ratepayers themselves are driven by the parochial
charges to the verge of pauperism.” – (Standard, 5th April, 1867.)
As it is the fashion amongst English capitalists to quote Belgium as the Paradise of the labourer
because “freedom of labour,” or what is the same thing, “freedom of capital,” is there limited
neither by the despotism of Trades’ Unions, nor by Factory Acts, a word or two on the
“happiness” of the Belgian labourer. Assuredly no one was more thoroughly initiated in the
mysteries of this happiness than the late M. Ducpétiaux, inspector-general of Belgian prisons and
charitable institutions, and member of the central commission of Belgian statistics. Let us take his
work: “Budgets économiques des classes ouvrières de la Belgique,” Bruxelles, 1855. Here we
find among other matters, a normal Belgian labourer’s family, whose yearly income and
expenditure he calculates on very exact data, and whose conditions of nourishment are then
compared with those of the soldier, sailor, and prisoner. The family “consists of father, mother,
and four children.” Of these 6 persons “four may be usefully employed the whole year through.”
It is assumed that “there is no sick person nor one incapable of work, among them,” nor are there
“expenses for religious, moral, and intellectual purposes, except a very small sum for church
sittings,” nor “contributions to savings banks or benefit societies,” nor “expenses due to luxury or
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the result of improvidence.” The father and eldest son, however, allow themselves “the use of
tobacco,” and on Sundays “go to the cabaret,” for which a whole 86 centimes a week are
reckoned.
“From a general compilation of wages allowed to the labourers in different trades,
it follows that the highest average of daily wage is 1 franc 56c., for men, 89
centimes for women, 56 centimes for boys, and 55 centimes for girls. Calculated
at this rate, the resources of the family would amount, at the maximum, to 1,068
francs a-year.... In the family ... taken as typical we have calculated all possible
resources. But in ascribing wages to the mother of the family we raise the
question of the direction of the household. How will its internal economy be cared
for? Who will look after the young children? Who will get ready the meals, do the
washing and mending? This is the dilemma incessantly presented to the
labourers.”
According to this the budget of the family is:
The father 300 working days at fr. 1.56 fr. 468
mother

300 working days at fr. 0.89 fr. 267

boy

300 working days at fr. 0.56 fr. 168

girl

300 working days at fr. 0.55 fr. 165
Total fr. 1,068

The annual expenditure of the family would cause a deficit upon the hypothesis that the labourer
has the food of:
The man-of-war’s man fr. 1,828 Deficit fr. 760
The soldier
fr. 1,473 Deficit fr. 405
The prisoner
fr. 1,112 Deficit fr. 44
“We see that few labouring families can reach, we will not say the average of the
sailor or soldier, but even that of the prisoner. The general average (of the cost of
each prisoner in the different prisons during the period 1847-1849), has been 63
centimes for all prisons. This figure, compared with that of the daily maintenance
of the labourer, shows a difference of 13 centimes. It must be remarked further,
that if in the prisons it is necessary to set down in the account the expenses of
administration and surveillance, on the other hand, the prisoners have not to pay
for their lodging; that the purchases they make at the canteens are not included in
the expenses of maintenance, and that these expenses are greatly lowered in
consequence of the large number of persons that make up the establishments, and
of contracting for or buying wholesale, the food and other things that enter into
their consumption.... How comes it, however, that a great number, we might say, a
great majority, of labourers, live in a more economical way? It is ... by adopting
expedients, the secret of which only the labourer knows; by reducing his daily
rations; by substituting rye-bread for wheat; by eating less meat, or even none at
all, and the same with butter and condiments; by contenting themselves with one
or two rooms where the family is crammed together, where boys and girls sleep
side by side, often on the same pallet; by economy of clothing, washing, decency;
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by giving up the Sunday diversions; by, in short, resigning themselves to the most
painful privations. Once arrived at this extreme limit, the least rise in the price of
food, stoppage of work, illness, increases the labourer’s distress and determines
his complete ruin; debts accumulate, credit fails, the most necessary clothes and
furniture are pawned, and finally, the family asks to be enrolled on the list of
paupers.” (Ducpétiaux, l. c., pp. 151, 154, 155.)
In fact, in this “Paradise of capitalists” there follows, on the smallest change in the price of the
most essential means of subsistence, a change in the number of deaths and crimes! (See
Manifesto of the Maatschappij: “De Vlamingen Vooruit!” Brussels, 1860, pp. 15, 16.) In all
Belgium are 930,000 families, of whom, according to the official statistics, 90,000 are wealthy
and on the list of voters = 450,000 persons; 390,000 families of the lower middle-class in towns
and villages, the greater part of them constantly sinking into the proletariat, = 1,950,000 persons.
Finally, 450,000 working class families = 2,250,000 persons, of whom the model ones enjoy the
happiness depicted by Ducpétiaux. Of the 450,000 working class families, over 200,000 are on
the pauper list.

E. The British Agricultural Proletariat
Nowhere does the antagonistic character of capitalistic production and accumulation assert itself
more brutally than in the progress of English agriculture (including cattle-breeding) and the
retrogression of the English agricultural labourer. Before I turn to his present situation, a rapid
retrospect. Modern agriculture dates in England from the middle of the 18th century, although the
revolution in landed property, from which the changed mode of production starts as a basis, has a
much earlier date.
If we take the statements of Arthur Young, a careful observer, though a superficial thinker, as to
the agricultural labourer of 1771, the latter plays a very pitiable part compared with his
predecessor of the end of the 14th century,
“when the labourer ... could live in plenty, and accumulate wealth,” 75
not to speak of the 15th century, “the golden age of the English labourer in town and country.”
We need not, however, go back so far. In a very instructive work of the year 1777 we read:
“The great farmer is nearly mounted to a level with him [the gentleman]; while
the poor labourer is depressed almost to the earth. His unfortunate situation will
fully appear, by taking a comparative view of it, only forty years ago, and at
present.... Landlord and tenant ... have both gone hand in hand in keeping the
labourer down.” 76
It is then proved in detail that the real agricultural wages between 1737 and 1777 fell nearly ¼ or
25 per cent.
“Modern policy,” says Dr. Richard Price also, “is, indeed, more favourable to the
higher classes of people; and the consequences may in time prove that the whole
kingdom will consist of only gentry and beggars, or of grandees and slaves.” 77
Nevertheless, the position of the English agricultural labourer from 1770 to 1780, with regard to
his food and dwelling, as well as to his self-respect, amusements, &c., is an ideal never attained
again since that time. His average wage expressed in pints of wheat was from 1770 to 1771, 90
pints, in Eden’s time (1797) only 65, in 1808 but 60.78
The state of the agricultural labourer at the end of the Anti-Jacobin War, during which landed
proprietors, farmers, manufacturers, merchants, bankers, stockbrokers, army-contractors, &c.,
enriched themselves so extraordinarily, has been already indicated above. The nominal wages
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rose in consequence partly of the bank-note depreciation, partly of a rise in the price of the
primary means of subsistence independent of this depreciation. But the actual wage-variation can
be evidenced in a very simple way, without entering into details that are here unnecessary. The
Poor Law and its administration were in 1795 and 1814 the same. It will be remembered how this
law was carried out in the country districts: in the form of alms the parish made up the nominal
wage to the nominal sum required for the simple vegetation of the labourer. The ratio between the
wages paid by the farmer, and the wage-deficit made good by the parish, shows us two things.
First, the falling of wages below their minimum; second, the degree in which the agricultural
labourer was a compound of wage labourer and pauper, or the degree in which he had been turned
into a serf of his parish. Let us take one county that represents the average condition of things in
all counties. In Northamptonshire, in 1795, the average weekly wage was 7s. 6d.; the total yearly
expenditure of a family of 6 persons, £36 12s. 5d.; their total income, £29 18s.; deficit made good
by the parish, £6 14s. 5d. In 1814, in the same county, the weekly wage was 12s. 2d.; the total
yearly expenditure of a family of 5 persons, £54 18s. 4d.; their total income, £36, 2s.; deficit
made good by the parish, £18 6s. 4d. 79 In 1795 the deficit was less than 1/4 the wage, in 1814,
more than half. It is self-evident that, under these circumstances, the meagre comforts that Eden
still found in the cottage of the agricultural labourer, had vanished by 1814.80 Of all the animals
kept by the farmer, the labourer, the instrumentum vocale, was, thenceforth, the most oppressed,
the worst nourished, the most brutally treated.
The same state of things went on quietly until
“the Swing riots, in 1830, revealed to us (i.e., the ruling classes) by the light of
blazing corn-stacks, that misery and black mutinous discontent smouldered quite
as fiercely under the surface of agricultural as of manufacturing England.”81
At this time, Sadler, in the House of Commons, christened the agricultural labourers “white
slaves,” and a Bishop echoed the epithet in the Upper House. The most notable political
economist of that period – E. G. Wakefield – says:
“The peasant of the South of England ... is not a freeman, nor is he a slave; he is a
pauper.” 82
The time just before the repeal of the Corn Laws threw new light on the condition of the
agricultural labourers. On the one hand, it was to the interest of the middle-class agitators to
prove how little the Corn Laws protected the actual producers of the corn. On the other hand, the
industrial bourgeoisie foamed with sullen rage at the denunciations of the factory system by the
landed aristocracy, at the pretended sympathy with the woes of the factory operatives, of those
utterly corrupt, heartless, and genteel loafers, and at their “diplomatic zeal” for factory legislation.
It is an old English proverb that “when thieves fall out, honest men come by their own,” and, in
fact, the noisy, passionate quarrel between the two fractions of the ruling class about the question,
which of the two exploited the labourers the more shamefully, was on each hand the midwife of
the truth. Earl Shaftesbury, then Lord Ashley, was commander-in-chief in the aristocratic,
philanthropic, anti-factory campaign. He was, therefore, in 1845, a favourite subject in the
revelations of the Morning Chronicle on the condition of the agricultural labourers. This journal,
then the most important Liberal organ, sent special commissioners into the agricultural districts,
who did not content themselves with mere general descriptions and statistics, but published the
names both of the labouring families examined and of their landlords. The following list gives the
wages paid in three villages in the neighbourhood of Blanford, Wimbourne, and Poole. The
villages are the property of Mr. G. Bankes and of the Earl of Shaftesbury. It will be noted that,
just like Bankes, this “low church pope,” this head of English pietists, pockets a great part of the
miserable wages of the labourers under the pretext of house-rent: –
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FIRST VILLAGE
(a) Children.
2
3
(b) Number of
4
5
Members in Family.
(c) Weekly Wage of 8s.
8s.
the Men.
0d.
0d.
(d) Weekly Wage of
–
–
the Children.
(e) Weekly Income of 8s.
8s.
the whole Family.
0d.
0d.
(f) Weekly Rent.
2s.
1s.
0d.
6d.
(g) Total Weekly
6s.
6s.
wage after deduction 0d.
6d.
of Rent.
(h) Weekly income 1s.
1s.
per head.
6d. 3½d.
SECOND VILLAGE
(a) Children.
(b) Number of Members in
Family.
(c) Weekly Wage of the
Men.
(d) Weekly Wage of the
Children.
(e) Weekly Income of the
whole Family.
(f) Weekly Rent.
(g) Total Weekly wage
after deduction of Rent.
(h) Weekly income per
head.

6
8

2
4

2
4

6
8

3
5

8s. 8s.
0d. 0d.
–
–

7s.
0d.
1/-,
1/6
10s.
6d.
2s.
0d.
8s.
6d.

7s. 0d.

8s. 8s.
0d. 0d.
1s. 1s.
0d. 0d.
7s. 7s.
0d. 0d.

1/-, 2/7s. 0d.
1s. 4d.
5s. 8d.

1s. 1s. 1s. 0
9d. 9d. 3/4d.
6
8

8
10

4
6

1s.
1½d.
3
5

7s. 7s. 7s. 7s. 7s. 0d.
0d. 0d. 0d. 0d.
1/-, 1/-, –
–
–
1/6 1/6
10s. 7s. 7s. 7s. 7s. 0d.
0d. 0d. 0d. 0d.
1s. 1s. 1s. 1s. 1s. 6½d.
6d. 3½d. 3½d. 6½d.
8s. 5s. 5s. 5s. 5s. 5½d.
6d. 8½d. 8½d. 5½d.
1s. 0 0s. 0s. 0s. 1s. 1d.
3/4d. 8½d. 7d. 11d.
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(a) Children.
(b) Number of Members in
Family.
(c) Weekly Wage of the Men.
(d) Weekly Wage of the Children.
(e) Weekly Income of the whole
Family.
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4

3

0

6

5

2

7s. 0d.
-

7s. 0d.
1/- 2/11s.
6d.
0s.
10d.
10s.
8d.
2s. 1
3/5d.

5s. 0d.
1/- 2/6

7s. 0d.

(f) Weekly Rent.

1s. 0d.

(g) Total Weekly wage after
deduction of Rent.

6s. 0d.

(h) Weekly income per head. 83

1s. 0d.

5s. 0d.
1s. 0d.
4s. 0d.
2s. 0d.

The repeal of the Corn Laws gave a marvellous impulse to English agriculture. 84Drainage on the
most extensive scale, new methods of stall-feeding, and of the artificial cultivation of green crops,
introduction of mechanical manuring apparatus, new treatment of clay soils, increased use of
mineral manures, employment of the steam-engine, and of all kinds of new machinery, more
intensive cultivation generally, characterised this epoch. Mr. Pusey, Chairman of the Royal
Agricultural Society, declares that the (relative) expenses of farming have been reduced nearly
one half by the introduction of new machinery. On the other hand, the actual return of the soil
rose rapidly. Greater outlay of capital per acre, and, as a consequence, more rapid concentration
of farms, were essential conditions of the new method. 85 At the same time, the area under
cultivation increased, from 1846 to 1856, by 464,119 acres, without reckoning the great area in
the Eastern Counties which was transformed from rabbit warrens and poor pastures into
magnificent corn-fields. It has already been seen that, at the same time, the total number of
persons employed in agriculture fell. As far as the actual agricultural labourers of both sexes and
of all ages are concerned, their number fell from 1,241,396, in 1851, to 1,163, 217 in 1861. 86 If
the English Registrar-General, therefore, rightly remarks:
“The increase of farmers and farm-labourers, since 1801, bears no kind of
proportion ... to the increase of agricultural produce,”87
this disproportion obtains much more for the last period, when a positive decrease of the
agricultural population went hand in hand with increase of the area under cultivation, with more
intensive cultivation, unheard-of accumulation of the capital incorporated with the soil, and
devoted to its working, an augmentation in the products of the soil without parallel in the history
of English agriculture, plethoric rent-rolls of landlords, and growing wealth of the capitalist
farmers. If we take this, together with the swift, unbroken extension of the markets, viz., the
towns, and the reign of Free Trade, then the agricultural labourer was at last, post tot discrimina
rerum, placed in circumstances that ought, secundum artem, to have made him drunk with
happiness.
But Professor Rogers comes to the conclusion that the lot of the English agricultural labourer of
today, not to speak of his predecessor in the last half of the 14th and in the 15th century, but only
compared with his predecessor from 1770 to 1780, has changed for the worse to an extraordinary
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extent, that “the peasant has again become a serf,” and a serf worse fed and worse clothed. 88 Dr.
Julian Hunter, in his epoch making report on the dwellings of the agricultural labourers, says:
“The cost of the hind” (a name for the agricultural labourer, inherited from the
time of serfdom) “is fixed at the lowest possible amount on which he can live ...
the supplies of wages and shelter are not calculated on the profit to be derived
from him. He is a zero in farming calculations ... 89 The means [of subsistence]
being always supposed to be a fixed quantity. 90As to any further reduction of his
income, he may say, nihil habeo nihil curo. He has no fears for the future, because
he has now only the spare supply necessary to keep him. He has reached the zero
from which are dated the calculations of the farmer. Come what will, he has no
share either in prosperity or adversity.” 91
In the year 1863, an official inquiry took place into the conditions of nourishment and labour of
the criminals condemned to transportation and penal servitude. The results are recorded in two
voluminous Blue books. Among other things it is said:
“From an elaborate comparison between the diet of convicts in the convict prisons
in England, and that of paupers in workhouses and of free labourers in the same
country ... it certainly appears that the former are much better fed than either of
the two other classes,” 92 whilst “the amount of labour required from an ordinary
convict under penal servitude is about one half of what would be done by an
ordinary day-labourer.” 93
A few characteristic depositions of witnesses: John Smith, governor of the Edinburgh prison,
deposes:
No. 5056. “The diet of the English prisons [is] superior to that of ordinary
labourers in England.” No 50. “It is the fact ... that the ordinary agricultural
labourers in Scotland very seldom get any meat at all.” Answer No. 3047. “Is
there anything that you are aware of to account for the necessity of feeding them
very much better than ordinary labourers? – Certainly not.” No. 3048. “Do you
think that further experiments ought to be made in order to ascertain whether a
dietary might not be hit upon for prisoners employed on public works nearly
approaching to the dietary of free labourers? ...”94 “He [the agricultural labourer]
might say: ‘I work hard, and have not enough to eat, and when in prison I did not
work harder where I had plenty to eat, and therefore it is better for me to be in
prison again than here.’” 95
From the tables appended to the first volume of the Report I have compiled the annexed
comparative summary.
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WEEKLY AMOUNT OF NUTRIENTS
Quantity Of Quantity Of Quantity Of TOTAL
Nitrogenous Non-Nitro- Mineral
Ingredients genous In- Matter
gredients
Ounces
Ounces
Ounces
Ounces
Portland (convict)
28.95
150.06
4.68
183.69
Sailor in the Navy
29.63
152.91
4.52
187.06
Soldier
25.55
114.49
3.94
143.98
Working Coachmaker 24.53
162.06
4.23
190.82
Compositor
21.24
100.83
3.12
125.19
Agricultural
17.73
118.06
3.29
139.08
96
labourer
The general result of the inquiry by the medical commission of 1863 on the food of the lowest fed
classes, is already known to the reader. He will remember that the diet of a great part of the
agricultural labourers’ families is below the minimum necessary “to arrest starvation diseases.”
This is especially the case in all the purely rural districts of Cornwall, Devon, Somerset, Wilts,
Stafford, Oxford, Berks, and Herts.
“The nourishment obtained by the labourer himself,” says Dr. E. Smith, “is larger
than the average quantity indicates, since he eats a larger share ... necessary to
enable him to perform his labour ... of food than the other members of the family,
including in the poorer districts nearly all the meat and bacon.... The quantity of
food obtained by the wife and also by the children at the period of rapid growth, is
in many cases, in almost every county, deficient, and particularly in nitrogen.”97
The male and female servants living with the farmers themselves are sufficiently nourished. Their
number fell from 288,277 in 1851, to 204,962 in 1861.
“The labour of women in the fields,” says Dr. Smith, “whatever may be its
disadvantages, ... is under present circumstances of great advantage to the family,
since it adds that amount of income which ... provides shoes and clothing and pays
the rent, and thus enables the family to be better fed.” 98
One of the most remarkable results of the inquiry was that the agricultural labourer of England, as
compared with other parts of the United Kingdom, “is considerably the worst fed,” as the
appended table shows:
Quantities of Carbon and Nitrogen weekly consumed by an average agricultural adult:
Carbon, Nitrogen,
grains
grains
England
46,673
1,594
Wales
48,354
2,031
Scotland
48,980
2,348
99
Ireland
43,366
2,434
“To the insufficient quantity and miserable quality of the house accommodation
generally had,” says Dr. Simon, in his official Health Report, “by our agricultural
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labourers, almost every page of Dr. Hunter’s report bears testimony. And
gradually, for many years past, the state of the labourer in these respects has been
deteriorating, house-room being now greatly more difficult for him to find, and,
when found, greatly less suitable to his needs than, perhaps, for centuries had been
the case. Especially within the last twenty or thirty years, the evil has been in very
rapid increase, and the household circumstances of the labourer are now in the
highest degree deplorable. Except in so far as they whom his labour enriches, see
fit to treat him with a kind of pitiful indulgence, he is quite peculiarly helpless in
the matter. Whether he shall find house-room on the land which he contributes to
till, whether the house-room which he gets shall be human or swinish, whether he
shall have the little space of garden that so vastly lessens the pressure of his
poverty – all this does not depend on his willingness and ability to pay reasonable
rent for the decent accommodation he requires, but depends on the use which
others may see fit to make of their ‘right to do as they will with their own.’
However large may be a farm, there is no law that a certain proportion of
labourers’ dwellings (much less of decent dwellings) shall be upon it; nor does
any law reserve for the labourer ever so little right in that soil to which his
industry is as needful as sun and rain.... An extraneous element weighs the balance
heavily against him ... the influence of the Poor Law in its provisions concerning
settlement and chargeability. 100 Under this influence, each parish has a pecuniary
interest in reducing to a minimum the number of its resident labourers: – for,
unhappily, agricultural labour instead of implying a safe and permanent
independence for the hardworking labourer and his family, implies for the most
part only a longer or shorter circuit to eventual pauperism – a pauperism which,
during the whole circuit, is so near, that any illness or temporary failure of
occupation necessitates immediate recourse to parochial relief – and thus all
residence of agricultural population in a parish is glaringly an addition to its poorrates .... Large proprietors 101 ... have but to resolve that there shall be no
labourers’ dwellings on their estates, and their estates will thenceforth be virtually
free from half their responsibility for the poor. How far it has been intended, in the
English constitution and law, that this kind of unconditional property in land
should be acquirable, and that a landlord ‘doing as he wills with his own,’ should
be able to treat the cultivators of the soil as aliens, whom he may expel from his
territory, is a question which I do not pretend to discuss.... For that (power) of
eviction ... does not exist only in theory. On a very large scale it prevails in
practice – prevails ... as a main governing condition in the household
circumstances of agricultural labour.... As regards the extent of the evil, it may
suffice to refer to the evidence which Dr. Hunter has compiled from the last
census, that destruction of houses, notwithstanding increased local demands for
them, had, during the last ten years, been in progress in 821 separate parishes or
townships of England, so that irrespectively of persons who had been forced to
become non-resident (that is in the parishes in which they work), these parishes
and townships were receiving in 1861, as compared with 1851, a population 5 1/3
per cent. greater, into houseroom 4½ per cent. less... When the process of
depopulation has completed itself, the result, says Dr. Hunter, is a show-village
where the cottages have been reduced to a few, and where none but persons who
are needed as shepherds, gardeners, or game-keepers, are allowed to live; regular
servants who receive the good treatment usual to their class.102 But the land
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requires cultivation, and it will be found that the labourers employed upon it are
not the tenants of the owner, but that they come from a neighbouring open village,
perhaps three miles off, where a numerous small proprietary had received them
when their cottages were destroyed in the close villages around. Where things are
tending to the above result, often the cottages which stand, testify, in their
unrepaired and wretched condition, to the extinction to which they are doomed.
They are seen standing in the various stages of natural decay. While the shelter
holds together, the labourer is permitted to rent it, and glad enough he will often
be to do so, even at the price of decent lodging. But no repair, no improvement
shall it receive, except such as its penniless occupants can supply. And when at
last it becomes quite uninhabitable – uninhabitable even to the humblest standard
of serfdom – it will be but one more destroyed cottage, and future poor-rates will
be somewhat lightened. While great owners are thus escaping from poor-rates
through the depopulation of lands over which they have control, the nearest town
or open village receive the evicted labourers: the nearest, I say, but this “nearest”
may mean three or four miles distant from the farm where the labourer has his
daily toil. To that daily toil there will then have to be added, as though it were
nothing, the daily need of walking six or eight miles for power of earning his
bread. And whatever farm work is done by his wife and children, is done at the
same disadvantage. Nor is this nearly all the toil which the distance occasions
him. In the open village, cottage-speculators buy scraps of land, which they throng
as densely as they can with the cheapest of all possible hovels. And into those
wretched habitations (which, even if they adjoin the open country, have some of
the worst features of the worst town residences) crowd the agricultural labourers
of England. 103.... Nor on the other hand must it be supposed that even when the
labourer is housed upon the lands which he cultivates, his household
circumstances are generally such as his life of productive industry would seem to
deserve. Even on princely estates ... his cottage ... may be of the meanest
description. There are landlords who deem any stye good enough for their
labourer and his family, and who yet do not disdain to drive with him the hardest
possible bargain for rent. 104 It may be but a ruinous one-bedroomed hut, having no
fire-grate, no privy, no opening window, no water supply but the ditch, no garden
– but the labourer is helpless against the wrong.... And the Nuisances Removal
Acts ... are ... a mere dead letter ... in great part dependent for their working on
such cottage-owners as the one from whom his (the labourer’s) hovel is rented....
From brighter, but exceptional scenes, it is requisite in the interests of justice, that
attention should again be drawn to the overwhelming preponderance of facts
which are a reproach to the civilisation of England. Lamentable indeed, must be
the case, when, notwithstanding all that is evident with regard to the quality of the
present accommodation, it is the common conclusion of competent observers that
even the general badness of dwellings is an evil infinitely less urgent than their
mere numerical insufficiency. For years the over-crowding of rural labourers’
dwellings has been a matter of deep concern, not only to persons who care for
sanitary good, but to persons who care for decent and moral life. For, again and
again in phrases so uniform that they seem stereotyped, reporters on the spread of
epidemic disease in rural districts, have insisted on the extreme importance of that
over-crowding, as an influence which renders it a quite hopeless task, to attempt
the limiting of any infection which is introduced. And again and again it has been
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pointed out that, notwithstanding the many salubrious influences which there are
in country life, the crowding which so favours the extension of contagious
disease, also favours the origination of disease which is not contagious. And those
who have denounced the over-crowded state of our rural population have not been
silent as to a further mischief. Even where their primary concern has been only
with the injury to health, often almost perforce they have referred to other
relations on the subject. In showing how frequently it happens that adult persons
of both sexes, married and unmarried, are huddled together in single small
sleeping rooms, their reports have carried the conviction that, under the
circumstances they describe, decency must always be outraged, and morality
almost of necessity must suffer. 105 Thus, for instance, in the appendix of my last
annual report, Dr. Ord, reporting on an outbreak of fever at Wing, in
Buckinghamshire, mentions how a young man who had come thither from
Wingrave with fever, “in the first days of his illness slept in a room with nine
other persons. Within a fortnight several of these persons were attacked, and in the
course of a few weeks five out of the nine had fever, and one died...” From Dr.
Harvey, of St. George’s Hospital, who, on private professional business, visited
Wing during the time of the epidemic, I received information exactly in the sense
of the above report.... “A young woman having fever, lay at night in a room
occupied by her father and mother, her bastard child, two young men (her
brothers), and her two sisters, each with a bastard child – 10 persons in all. A few
weeks ago 13 persons slept in it.” 106
Dr. Hunter investigated 5,375 cottages of agricultural labourers, not only in the purely
agricultural districts, but in all counties of England. Of these, 2,195 had only one bedroom (often
at the same time used as living-room), 2,930 only two, and 250, more than two. I will give a few
specimens culled from a dozen counties.
(1.) Bedfordshire
Wrestlingworth. Bedrooms about 12 feet long and 10 broad, although many are smaller than this.
The small, one-storied cots are often divided by partitions into two bedrooms, one bed frequently
in a kitchen, 5 feet 6 inches in height. Rent, £3 a year. The tenants have to make their own
privies, the landlord only supplies a hole. As soon as one has made a privy, it is made use of by
the whole neighbourhood. One house, belonging to a family called Richardson, was of quite
unapproachable beauty. “Its plaster walls bulged very like a lady’s dress in a curtsey. One gable
end was convex, the other concave, and on this last, unfortunately, stood the chimney, a curved
tube of clay and wood like an elephant’s trunk. A long stick served as prop to prevent the
chimney from falling. The doorway and window were rhomboidal.” Of 17 houses visited, only 4
had more than one bedroom, and those four overcrowded. The cots with one bedroom sheltered 3
adults and 3 children, a married couple with 6 children, &c.
Dunton. High rents, from £4 to £5; weekly wages of the man, 10s. They hope to pay the rent by
the straw-plaiting of the family. The higher the rent, the greater the number that must work
together to pay it. Six adults, living with 4 children in one sleeping apartment, pay £3 10s. for it.
The cheapest house in Dunton, 15 feet long externally, 10 broad, let for £3. Only one of the
houses investigated had 2 bedrooms. A little outside the village, a house whose “tenants dunged
against the house-side,” the lower 9 inches of the door eaten away through sheer rottenness; the
doorway, a single opening closed at night by a few bricks, ingeniously pushed up after shutting
and covered with some matting. Half a window, with glass and frame, had gone the way of all
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flesh. Here, without furniture, huddled together were 3 adults and 5 children. Dunton is not worse
than the rest of Biggleswade Union.
(2.) Berkshire
Beenham. In June, 1864, a man, his wife and 4 children lived in a cot (one-storied cottage). A
daughter came home from service with scarlet fever. She died. One child sickened and died. The
mother and one child were down with typhus when Dr. Hunter was called in. The father and one
child slept outside, but the difficulty of securing isolation was seen here, for in the crowded
market of the miserable village lay the linen of the fever-stricken household, waiting for the
wash. The rent of H.’s house, 1s. a-week; one bedroom for man, wife, and 6 children. One house
let for 8d. a-week, 14 feet 6 inches long, 7 feet broad, kitchen, 6 feet high; the bedroom without
window, fire-place, door, or opening, except into the lobby; no garden. A man lived here for a
little while, with two grown-up daughters and one grown-up son; father and son slept on the bed,
the girls in the passage. Each of the latter had a child while the family was living here, but one
went to the workhouse for her confinement and then came home.
(3.) Buckinghamshire
30 cottages – on 1,000 acres of land – contained here about 130-140 persons. The parish of
Bradenham comprises 1,000 acres; it numbered, in 1851, 36 houses and a population of 84 males
and 54 females. This inequality of the sexes was partly remedied in 1861, when they numbered
98 males and 87 females; increase in 10 years of 14 men and 33 women. Meanwhile, the number
of houses was one less.
Winslow. Great part of this newly built in good style; demand for houses appears very marked,
since very miserable cots let at 1s. to 1s. 3d. per week.
Water Eaton. Here the landlords, in view of the increasing population, have destroyed about 20
per cent. of the existing houses. A poor labourer, who had to go about 4 miles to his work,
answered the question, whether he could not find a cot nearer: “No; they know better than to take
a man in with my large family.”
Tinker’s End, near Winslow. A bedroom in which were 4 adults and 4 children; 11 feet long, 9
feet broad, 6 feet 5 inches high at its highest part; another 11 feet 3 inches by 9 feet, 5 feet 10
inches high, sheltered 6 persons. Each of these families had less space than is considered
necessary for a convict. No house had more than one bedroom, not one of them a back-door;
water very scarce; weekly rent from 1s. 4d. to 2s. In 16 of the houses visited, only 1 man that
earned 10s. a-week. The quantity of air for each person under the circumstances just described
corresponds to that which he would have if he were shut up in a box of 4 feet measuring each
way, the whole night. But then, the ancient dens afforded a certain amount of unintentional
ventilation.
(4.) Cambridgeshire
Gamblingay belongs to several landlords. It contains the wretchedest cots to be found anywhere.
Much straw-plaiting. “A deadly lassitude, a hopeless surrendering up to filth,” reigns in
Gamblingay. The neglect in its centre, becomes mortification at its extremities, north and south,
where the houses are rotting to pieces. The absentee landlords bleed this poor rookery too freely.
The rents are very high; 8 or 9 persons packed in one sleeping apartment, in 2 cases 6 adults, each
with 1 or 2 children in one small bedroom.
(5.) Essex
In this county, diminutions in the number of persons and of cottages go, in many parishes, hand in
hand. In not less than 22 parishes, however, the destruction of houses has not prevented increase
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of population, or has not brought about that expulsion which, under the name “migration to
towns,” generally occurs. In Fingringhoe, a parish of 3,443 acres, were in 1851, 145 houses; in
1861, only 110. But the people did not wish to go away, and managed even to increase under
these circumstances. In 1851, 252 persons inhabited 61 houses, but in 1861, 262 persons were
squeezed into 49 houses. In Basilden, in 1851, 157 persons lived on 1,827 acres, in 35 houses; at
the end of ten years, 180 persons in 27 houses. In the parishes of Fingringhoe, South Fambridge,
Widford, Basilden, and Ramsden Crags, in 1851, 1,392 persons were living on 8,449 acres in 316
houses; in 1861, on the same area, 1,473 persons in 249 houses.
(6.) Herefordshire
This little county has suffered more from the “eviction-spirit” than any other in England. At
Nadby, overcrowded cottages generally, with only 2 bedrooms, belonging for the most part to the
farmers. They easily let them for £3 or £4 a-year, and paid a weekly wage of 9s.
(7.) Huntingdon
Hartford had, in 1851, 87 houses; shortly after this, 19 cottages were destroyed in this small
parish of 1,720 acres; population in 1831, 452; in 1852, 382; and in 1861, 341. 14 cottages, each
with 1 bedroom, were visited. In one, a married couple, 3 grown-up sons, 1 grown-up daughter, 4
children – in all 10 in another, 3 adults, 6 children. One of these rooms, in which 8 people slept,
was 12 feet 10 inches long, 12 feet 2 inches broad, 6 feet 9 inches high: the average, without
making any deduction for projections into the apartment, gave about 130 cubic feet per head. In
the 14 sleeping rooms, 34 adults and 33 children. These cottages are seldom provided with
gardens, but many of the inmates are able to farm small allotments at 10s. or 12s. per rood. These
allotments are at a distance from the houses, which are without privies. The family “must either
go to the allotment to deposit their ordures,” or, as happens in this place, saving your presence,
“use a closet with a trough set like a drawer in a chest of drawers, and drawn out weekly and
conveyed to the allotment to be emptied where its contents were wanted.” In Japan, the circle of
life-conditions moves more decently than this.
(8.) Lincolnshire
Langtoft. A man lives here, in Wright’s house, with his wife, her mother, and 5 children; the
house has a front kitchen, scullery, bedroom over the front kitchen; front kitchen and bedroom, 12
feet 2 inches by 9 feet 5 inches; the whole ground floor, 21 feet 2 inches by 9 feet 5 inches. The
bedroom is a garret: the walls run together into the roof like a sugar-loaf, a dormer-window
opening in front. “Why did he live here? On account of the garden? No; it is very small. Rent?
High, 1s. 3d. per week. Near his work? No; 6 miles away, so that he walks daily, to and fro, 12
miles. He lived there, because it was a tenantable cot,” and because he wanted to have a cot for
himself alone, anywhere, at any price, and in any conditions. The following are the statistics of 12
houses in Langtoft, with 12 bedrooms, 38 adults, and 36 children.
TWELVE HOUSES IN LANGTOFT
No. No. No. No. No. No. No. No. No.
House
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Bedrooms. 1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Adults.
3
4
4
5
2
5
3
3
2
Children.
5
3
4
4
2
3
3
2
0
Number of
8
7
8
9
4
8
6
5
2
Persons.

No.
10.
1
2
3

No.
11.
1
3
3

No.
12.
1
2
4

.5

6

6
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(9.) Kent
Kennington, very seriously over-populated in 1859, when diphtheria appeared, and the parish
doctor instituted a medical inquiry into the condition of the poorer classes. He found that in this
locality, where much labour is employed, various cots had been destroyed and no new ones built.
In one district stood four houses, named birdcages; each had 4 rooms of the following dimensions
in feet and inches:
Kitchen:
Scullery:
Bedroom:
Bedroom:

9 ft. 5
8 ft. 6
8 ft. 5
8 ft. 3

by
by
by
by

8 ft. 11 by 6 ft. 6
4 ft. 6 by 6 ft. 6
5 ft. 10 by 6 ft. 3
8 ft. 4 by 6 ft. 3

(10.) Northamptonshire
Brinworth, Pickford and Floore: in these villages in the winter 20-30 men were lounging about
the streets from want of work. The farmers do not always till sufficiently the corn and turnip
lands, and the landlord has found it best to throw all his farms together into 2 or 3. Hence want of
employment. Whilst on one side of the wall, the land calls for labour, on the other side the
defrauded labourers are casting at it longing glances. Feverishly overworked in summer, and halfstarved in winter, it is no wonder if they say in their peculiar dialect, “the parson and gentlefolk
seem frit to death at them.”
At Floore, instances, in one bedroom of the smallest size, of couples with 4, 5, 6 children; 3
adults with 5 children; a couple with grandfather and 6 children down with scarlet fever, &c.; in
two houses with two bedrooms, two families of 8 and 9 adults respectively.
(11.) Wiltshire
Stratton. 31 houses visited, 8 with only one bedroom. Pentill, in the same parish: a cot let at Is.
3d. weekly with 4 adults and 4 children, had nothing good about it, except the walls, from the
floor of rough-hewn pieces of stones to the roof of worn-out thatch.
(12.) Worcestershire
House-destruction here not quite so excessive; yet from 1851 to 1861, the number of inhabitants
to each house on the average, has risen from 4.2 to 4.6.
Badsey. Many cots and little gardens here. Some of the farmers declare that the cots are “a great
nuisance here, because they bring the poor.” On the statement of one gentleman:
“The poor are none the better for them; if you build 500 they will let fast enough, in fact, the
more you build, the more they want”
(according to him the houses give birth to the inhabitants, who then by a law of Nature press on
“the means of housing”). Dr. Hunter remarks:
“Now these poor must come from somewhere, and as there is no particular attraction, such as
doles, at Badsey, it must be repulsion from some other unfit place, which will send them here. If
each could find an allotment near his work, he would not prefer Badsey, where he pays for his
scrap of ground twice as much as the farmer pays for his.”
The continual emigration to the towns, the continual formation of surplus population in the
country through the concentration of farms, conversion of arable land into pasture, machinery,
&c., and the continual eviction of the agricultural population by the destruction of their cottages,
go hand in hand. The more empty the district is of men, the greater is its “relative surplus
population,” the greater is their pressure on the means of employment, the greater is the absolute
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excess of the agricultural population over the means for housing it, the greater, therefore, in the
villages is the local surplus population and the most pestilential packing together of human
beings. The packing together of knots of men in scattered little villages and small country towns
corresponds to the forcible draining of men from the surface of the land. The continuous
superseding of the agricultural labourers, in spite of their diminishing number and the increasing
mass of their products, gives birth to their pauperism. Their pauperism is ultimately a motive to
their eviction and the chief source of their miserable housing which breaks down their last power
of resistance, and makes them more slaves of the landed proprietors and the farmers.107 Thus the
minimum of wages becomes a law of Nature to them. On the other hand, the land, in spite of its
constant “relative surplus population,” is at the same time underpopulated. This is seen, not only
locally at the points where the efflux of men to towns, mines, railroad-making, &c., is most
marked. It is to be seen everywhere, in harvest-time as well as in spring and summer, at those
frequently recurring times when English agriculture, so careful and intensive, wants extra hands.
There are always too many agricultural labourers for the ordinary, and always too few for the
exceptional or temporary needs of the cultivation of the soil.108 Hence we find in the official
documents contradictory complaints from the same places of deficiency and excess of labour
simultaneously. The temporary or local want of labour brings about no rise in wages, but a
forcing of the women and children into the fields, and exploitation at an age constantly lowered.
As soon as the exploitation of the women and children takes place on a larger scale, it becomes in
turn a new means of making a surplus population of the male agricultural labourer and of keeping
down his wage. In the east of England thrives a beautiful fruit of this vicious circle – the so-called
gang-system, to which I must briefly return here. 109
The gang-system obtains almost exclusively in the counties of Lincoln, Huntingdon, Cambridge,
Norfolk, Suffolk, and Nottingham, here and there in the neighbouring counties of Northampton,
Bedford, and Rutland. Lincolnshire will serve us as an example. A large part of this county is new
land, marsh formerly, or even, as in others of the eastern counties just named, won lately from the
sea. The steam-engine has worked wonders in the way of drainage. What were once fens and
sandbanks, bear now a luxuriant sea of corn and the highest of rents. The same thing holds of the
alluvial lands won by human endeavour, as in the island of Axholme and other parishes on the
banks of the Trent. In proportion as the new farms arose, not only were no new cottages built: old
ones were demolished, and the supply of labour had to come from open villages, miles away, by
long roads that wound along the sides of the hills. There alone had the population formerly found
shelter from the incessant floods of the winter-time. The labourers that dwell on the farms of 4001,000 acres (they are called “confined labourers”) are solely employed on such kinds of
agricultural work as is permanent, difficult, and carried on by aid of horses. For every 100 acres
there is, on an average, scarcely one cottage. A fen farmer, e.g., gave evidence before the
Commission of Inquiry:
“I farm 320 acres, all arable land. I have not one cottage on my farm. I have only
one labourer on my farm now. I have four horsemen lodging about. We get light
work done by gangs.” 110
The soil requires much light field labour, such as weeding, hoeing, certain processes of manuring,
removing of stones, &c. This is done by the gangs, or organised bands that dwell in the open
villages.
The gang consists of 10 to 40 or 50 persons, women, young persons of both sexes (13-18 years of
age, although the boys are for the most part eliminated at the age of 13), and children of both
sexes (6-13 years of age). At the head is the gang master, always an ordinary agricultural
labourer, generally what is called a bad lot, a scapegrace, unsteady, drunken, but with a dash of
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enterprise and savoir-faire. He is the recruiting-sergeant for the gang, which works under him,
not under the farmer. He generally arranges with the latter for piece-work, and his income, which
on the average is not very much above that of an ordinary agricultural labourer, 111depends almost
entirely upon the dexterity with which he manages to extract within the shortest time the greatest
possible amount of labour from his gang. The farmers have discovered that women work steadily
only under the direction of men, but that women and children, once set going, impetuously spend
their life-force – as Fourier knew – while the adult male labourer is shrewd enough to economise
his as much as he can. The gang-master goes from one farm to another, and thus employs his
gang from 6 to 8 months in the year. Employment by him is, therefore, much more lucrative and
more certain for the labouring families, than employment by the individual farmer, who only
employs children occasionally. This circumstance so completely rivets his influence in the open
villages that children are generally only to be hired through his instrumentality. The lending out
of these individually, independently of the gang, is his second trade.
The “drawbacks” of the system are the overwork of the children and young persons, the
enormous marches that they make daily to and from the farms, 5, 6, and sometimes 7 miles
distant, finally, the demoralisation of the gang. Although the gang-master, who, in some districts
is called “the driver,” is armed with a long stick, he uses it but seldom, and complaints of brutal
treatment are exceptional. He is a democratic emperor, or a kind of Pied Piper of Hamelin. He
must therefore be popular with his subjects, and he binds them to himself by the charms of the
gipsy life under his direction. Coarse freedom, a noisy jollity, and obscenest impudence give
attractions to the gang. Generally the gangmaster pays up in a public house; then he returns home
at the head of the procession reeling drunk, propped up right and left by a stalwart virago, while
children and young persons bring up the rear, boisterous, and singing chaffing and bawdy songs.
On the return journey what Fourier calls “phanerogamie,” is the order of the day. The getting with
child of girls of 13 and 14 by their male companions of the same age, is common. The open
villages which supply the contingent of the gang, become Sodoms and Gomorrahs,112 and have
twice as high a rate of illegitimate births as the rest of the kingdom. The moral character of girls
bred in these schools, when married women, was shown above. Their children, when opium does
not give them the finishing stroke, are born recruits of the gang.
The gang in its classical form just described, is called the public, common, or tramping gang. For
there are also private gangs. These are made up in the same way as the common gang, but count
fewer members, and work, not under a gang-master, but under some old farm servant, whom the
farmer does not know how to employ in any better way. The gipsy fun has vanished here, but
according to all witnesses, the payment and treatment of the children is worse.
The gang-system, which during the last years has steadily increased,113 clearly does not exist for
the sake of the gang-master. It exists for the enrichment of the large farmers, 114and indirectly of
the landlords. 115 For the farmer there is no more ingenious method of keeping his labourers well
below the normal level, and yet of always having an extra hand ready for extra work, of
extracting the greatest possible amount of labour with the least possible amount of money 116 and
of making adult male labour “redundant.” From the exposition already made, it will be
understood why, on the one hand, a greater or less lack of employment for the agricultural
labourer is admitted, while on the other, the gang-system is at the same time declared “necessary”
on account of the want of adult male labour and its migration to the towns.117 The cleanly weeded
land, and the uncleanly human weeds, of Lincolnshire, are pole and counterpole of capitalistic
production. 118
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F. Ireland
In concluding this section, we must travel for a moment to Ireland. First, the main facts of the
case.
The population of Ireland had, in 1841, reached 8,222,664; in 1851, it had dwindled to 6,623,985;
in 1861, to 5,850,309; in 1866, to 5½ millions, nearly to its level in 1801. The diminution began
with the famine year, 1846, so that Ireland, in less than twenty years, lost more than 5/16 ths of its
people. 119 Its total emigration from May, 1851, to July, 1865, numbered 1,591,487: the
emigration during the years 1861-1865 was more than half-a-million. The number of inhabited
houses fell, from 1851-1861, by 52,990. From 1851-1861, the number of holdings of 15 to 30
acres increased 61,000, that of holdings over 30 acres, 109,000, whilst the total number of all
farms fell 120,000, a fall, therefore, solely due to the suppression of farms under 15 acres – i.e., to
their centralisation.
Table A
LIVE-STOCK
Horses
Cattle
Year Total
Total
Decrease
Number
Number

Sheep

Pigs

Total
Number

Decrease Increase

–

– 3,542,080

–

1861 614,232

5,579 3,471,688 134,686

– 3,556,050

–

1862 602,894

11,338 3,254,890 216,798

– 3,456,132

99,918

1863 579,978

22,916 3,144,231 110,659

– 3,308,204 147,982

1864 562,158

17,820 3,262,294

– 118,063 3,366,941

–

1865 547,867

14,291 3,493,414

– 231,120 3,688,742

– 321,801 1,299,893

1860 619,811

– 3,606,374

Decrease Increase

Total
Number

Decrease Increase

– 1,271,072

–

–

13,970 1,102,042 169,030

–

– 1,154,324

–

52,282

– 1,067,458

86,866

–

58,737 1,058,480

8,978

–

– 241,413

The decrease of the population was naturally accompanied by a decrease in the mass of products.
For our purpose, it suffices to consider the 5 years from 1861-1865 during which over half-amillion emigrated, and the absolute number of people sank by more than 1/3 of a million. From
the above table it results: –
Horses
Cattle
Sheep
Pigs
Absolute Decrease Absolute Decrease Absolute Increase Absolute Increase
71,944
112,960
146,662
28,8211 120
Let us now turn to agriculture, which yields the means of subsistence for cattle and for men. In
the following table is calculated the decrease or increase for each separate year, as compared with
its immediate predecessor. The Cereal Crops include wheat, oats, barley, rye, beans, and peas; the
Green Crops, potatoes, turnips, marigolds, beet-root, cabbages, carrots, parsnips, vetches. &c.
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Table B
INCREASE OR DECREASE IN THE AREA UNDER CROPS AND GRASS IN ACREAGE
Total
Cereal
Green
Grass and
Cultivated
Flax
Crops
Crops
Clover
Land
Year
Decrease Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Decrease
Increase
(Acres)
(Acres) (Acres) (Acres) (Acres) (Acres)
(Acres)
(Acres)
(Acres)
1861
15,701
36,974
–
47,969
–
–
19,271
81,373
–
1862
72,734
74,785
–
–
6,623
–
2,055
138,841 –
1863
144,719 19,358
–
–
7,724
–
63,922
92,431
–
1864
122,437 2,317
–
–
47,486 –
87,761
–
10,493
1865
72,450
–
25,241 –
68,970 50,159
–
28,398
–
1861-65 428,041 108,193 –
–
82,834 –
122,8501 330,350 –

In the year 1865, 127,470 additional acres came under the heading “grass land,” chiefly because
the area under the heading of “bog and waste unoccupied,” decreased by 101,543 acres. If we
compare 1865 with 1864, there is a decrease in cereals of 246,667 qrs., of which 48,999 were
wheat, 160,605 oats, 29,892 barley, &c.: the decrease in potatoes was 446,398 tons, although the
area of their cultivation increased in 1865.
From the movement of population and the agricultural produce of Ireland, we pass to the
movement in the purse of its landlords, larger farmers, and industrial capitalists. It is reflected in
the rise and fall of the Income-tax. It may be remembered that Schedule D. (profits with the
exception of those of farmers), includes also the so-called, “professional” profits – i.e., the
incomes of lawyers, doctors, &c.; and the Schedules C. and E., in which no special details are
given, include the incomes of employees, officers, State sinecurists, State fundholders, &c.
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Table C
INCREASE OR DECREASE IN THE AREA UNDER CULTIVATION,
PRODUCT PER ACRE, AND TOTAL PRODUCT OF 1865 COMPARED WITH 1864
Product
Acres of
Product
Total Product
Cultivated Land
per Acre
Increase
or
Increase or
Increase or
Decrease,
1864
1865 Decrease, 1865 1864 1865 1865
1864
1865
Decrease, 1865
Wheat
276,483 266,989 –
9,494 cwt., 13.0 –
0.3 875,782 826,783 –
48,999
13.3
Qrs.
Qrs.
Qrs.
Oats
1,814,886 1,745,228 –
69,658 cwt., 12.3 0.2 –
7,826,332 7,659,727 –
166,605
12.1
Qrs.
Qrs.
Qrs.
Barley
172,700 177,102 4,402 –
cwt., 14.9 –
1.0 761,909 732,017 –
29,892
15.9
Qrs.
Qrs.
Qrs.
Bere
8,894
10,091
1,197 –
cwt., 14.8 –
1.6 15,160
13,989
–
1,171
16.4
Qrs.
Qrs.
Qrs.
Rye
cwt., 10.4 1.9 –
12,680
18,314
5,684 –
8.5
Qrs.
Qrs.
Qrs.
Potatoes 1,039,724 1,066,260 26,536 –
tons, 3.6 –
0.5 4,312,388 3,865,990 –
446,398
4.1
ts.
ts.
ts.
Turnips 337,355 334,212 –
3,143 tons, 9.9 –
0.4 3,467,659 3,301,683 –
165,976
10.3
ts.
ts.
ts.
Mangold- 14,073
14,389
316
–
tons, 13.3 2.8 –
147,284 191,937 44,653 –
wurzel
10.5
ts.
ts.
ts.
Cabbages 31,821
33,622
1,801 –
tons, 10.4 1.1 –
297,375 350,252 52,877 –
9.3
ts.
ts.
ts.
Flax
301,693 251,433 –
50,260 st. (14 25.2 –
9.0 64,506 st. 39,561 st. –
24,945
lb.)
st.
34.2
Hay
1,609,569 1,678,493 68,9241 –
tons, 1.8 0.2 –
2,607,153 3,068,707 461,554 –
1.6
ts.
ts.
ts.

Table D
THE INCOME-TAX ON THE SUBJOINED INCOMES IN POUNDS STERLING
(Tenth Report of the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, Lond. 1866.)
1860
1861
1862
1863
1864
1865
Schedule A.
13,893,829 13,003,554 13,398,938 13,494,091 13,470,700 13,801,616
Rent of Land
Schedule B.
2,765,387 2,773,644 2,937,899 2,938,923 2,930,874 2,946,072
Farmers’ Profits.
Schedule D.
Industrial,
4,891,652 4,836,203 4,858,800 4,846,497 4,546,147 4,850,199
&c., Profits
Total Schedules
22,962,885 22,998,394 23,597,574 23,658,631 23,236,298 23,930,340
A to E
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Under Schedule D., the average annual increase of income from 1853-1864 was only 0.93; whilst,
in the same period, in Great Britain, it was 4.58. The following table shows the distribution of the
profits (with the exception of those of farmers) for the years 1864 and 1865: –
Table E122
SCHEDULE D.
INCOME FROM PROFITS (OVER £6O) IN IRELAND
1864
1865
£
£
Total yearly
4,368,610 divided
4,669,979 divided
income of
among 17,467 persons. among 18,081 persons.
Yearly income
238,726 divided
222,575 divided
over £60
among 5,015 persons. among 4,703 persons.
and under £100
Of the yearly
1,979,066 divided
2,028,571 divided
total income
among 11,321 persons. among 12,184 persons.
Remainder of the 2,150,818 divided
2,418,833 divided
total yearly income among 1,131 persons. among 1,194 persons.

Of these

1,073,906 divided
among 1,010 persons.
1,076,912 divided
among 121 persons.
430,535 divided
among 95 persons.
646,377divided
among 26
262,819 divided
among 3

1,097,927 divided
among 1,044 persons.
1,320,906 divided
among 150 persons.
584,458 divided
among 2 persons.
736,448 divided
among 28
274,528 divided
among 3

England, a country with fully developed capitalist production, and pre-eminently industrial,
would have bled to death with such a drain of population as Ireland has suffered. But Ireland is at
present only an agricultural district of England, marked off by a wide channel from the country to
which it yields corn, wool, cattle, industrial and military recruits.
The depopulation of Ireland has thrown much of the land out of cultivation, has greatly
diminished the produce of the soil, 123 and, in spite of the greater area devoted to cattle breeding,
has brought about, in some of its branches, an absolute diminution, in others, an advance scarcely
worthy of mention, and constantly interrupted by retrogressions. Nevertheless, with the fall in
numbers of the population, rents and farmers’ profits rose, although the latter not as steadily as
the former. The reason of this is easily comprehensible. On the one hand, with the throwing of
small holdings into large ones, and the change of arable into pasture land, a larger part of the
whole produce was transformed into surplus-produce. The surplus-produce increased, although
the total produce, of which it formed a fraction, decreased. On the other hand, the money value of
this surplus-produce increased yet more rapidly than its mass, in consequence of the rise in the
English market price of meat, wool, &c., during the last 20, and especially during the last 10,
years.
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The scattered means of production that serve the producers themselves as means of employment
and of subsistence, without expanding their own value by the incorporation of the labour of
others, are no more capital than a product consumed by its own producer is a commodity. If, with
the mass of the population, that of the means of production employed in agriculture also
diminished, the mass of the capital employed in agriculture increased, because a part of the means
of production that were formerly scattered, was concentrated and turned into capital.
The total capital of Ireland outside agriculture, employed in industry and trade, accumulated
during the last two decades slowly, and with great and constantly recurring fluctuations; so much
the more rapidly did the concentration of its individual constituents develop. And, however small
its absolute increase, in proportion to the dwindling population it had increased largely.
Here, then, under our own eyes and on a large scale, a process is revealed, than which nothing
more excellent could be wished for by orthodox economy for the support of its dogma: that
misery springs from absolute surplus population, and that equilibrium is re-established by
depopulation. This is a far more important experiment than was the plague in the middle of the
14th century so belauded of Malthusians. Note further: If only the naïveté of the schoolmaster
could apply, to the conditions of production and population of the nineteenth century, the
standard of the 14th, this naïveté, into the bargain, overlooked the fact that whilst, after the plague
and the decimation that accompanied it, followed on this side of the Channel, in England,
enfranchisement and enrichment of the agricultural population, on that side, in France, followed
greater servitude and more misery. 124
The Irish famine of 1846 killed more than 1,000,000 people, but it killed poor devils only. To the
wealth of the country it did not the slightest damage. The exodus of the next 20 years, an exodus
still constantly increasing, did not, as, e.g., the Thirty Years’ War, decimate, along with the
human beings, their means of production. Irish genius discovered an altogether new way of
spiriting a poor people thousands of miles away from the scene of its misery. The exiles
transplanted to the United States, send home sums of money every year as travelling expenses for
those left behind. Every troop that emigrates one year, draws another after it the next. Thus,
instead of costing Ireland anything, emigration forms one of the most lucrative branches of its
export trade. Finally, it is a systematic process, which does not simply make a passing gap in the
population, but sucks out of it every year more people than are replaced by the births, so that the
absolute level of the population falls year by year.125
What were the consequences for the Irish labourers left behind and freed from the surplus
population? That the relative surplus population is today as great as before 1846; that wages are
just as low, that the oppression of the labourers has increased, that misery is forcing the country
towards a new crisis. The facts are simple. The revolution in agriculture has kept pace with
emigration. The production of relative surplus population has more than kept pace with the
absolute depopulation. A glance at table C. shows that the change of arable to pasture land must
work yet more acutely in Ireland than in England. In England the cultivation of green crops
increases with the breeding of cattle; in Ireland, it decreases. Whilst a large number of acres, that
were formerly tilled, lie idle or are turned permanently into grass-land, a great part of the waste
land and peat bogs that were unused formerly, become of service for the extension of cattlebreeding. The smaller and medium farmers – I reckon among these all who do not cultivate more
than 100 acres – still make up about 8/10ths of the whole number.126 They are one after the other,
and with a degree of force unknown before, crushed by the competition of an agriculture
managed by capital, and therefore they continually furnish new recruits to the class of wage
labourers. The one great industry of Ireland, linen-manufacture, requires relatively few adult men
and only employs altogether, in spite of its expansion since the price of cotton rose in 1861-1866,
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a comparatively insignificant part of the population. Like all other great modern industries, it
constantly produces, by incessant fluctuations, a relative surplus population within its own
sphere, even with an absolute increase in the mass of human beings absorbed by it. The misery of
the agricultural population forms the pedestal for gigantic shirt-factories, whose armies of
labourers are, for the most part, scattered over the country. Here, we encounter again the system
described above of domestic industry, which in underpayment and overwork, possesses its own
systematic means for creating supernumerary labourers. Finally, although the depopulation has
not such destructive consequences as would result in a country with fully developed capitalistic
production, it does not go on without constant reaction upon the home-market. The gap which
emigration causes here, limits not only the local demand for labour, but also the incomes of small
shopkeepers, artisans, tradespeople generally. Hence the diminution in incomes between £60 and
£100 in Table E.
A clear statement of the condition of the agricultural labourers in Ireland is to be found in the
Reports of the Irish Poor Law Inspectors (1870). 127Officials of a government which is
maintained only by bayonets and by a state of siege, now open, now disguised, they have to
observe all the precautions of language that their colleagues in England disdain. In spite of this,
however, they do not let their government cradle itself in illusions. According to them the rate of
wages in the country, still very low, has within the last 20 years risen 50-60 per cent., and stands
now, on the average, at 6s. to 9s. per week. But behind this apparent rise, is hidden an actual fall
in wages, for it does not correspond at all to the rise in price of the necessary means of
subsistence that has taken place in the meantime. For proof, the following extract from the
official accounts of an Irish workhouse.
AVERAGE WEEKLY COST PER HEAD
Year ended
Provisions and Clothing. TOTAL.
Necessaries.
29th Sept., 1849. 1s. 3 1/4d.
3d.
1s. 6 1/4d.
29th Sept., 1869. 2s. 7 1/4d.
6d.
3s. 1 1/4d.
The price of the necessary means of subsistence is therefore fully twice, and that of clothing
exactly twice, as much as they were 20 years before.
Even apart from this disproportion, the mere comparison of the rate of wages expressed in gold
would give a result far from accurate. Before the famine, the great mass of agricultural wages
were paid in kind, only the smallest part in money; today, payment in money is the rule. From
this it follows that, whatever the amount of the real wage, its money rate must rise.
“Previous to the famine, the labourer enjoyed his cabin ... with a rood, or half-acre
or acre of land, and facilities for ... a crop of potatoes. He was able to rear his pig
and keep fowl.... But they now have to buy bread, and they have no refuse upon
which they can feed a pig or fowl, and they have consequently no benefit from the
sale of a pig, fowl, or eggs.” 128
In fact, formerly, the agricultural labourers were but the smallest of the small farmers, and formed
for the most part a kind of rear-guard of the medium and large farms on which they found
employment. Only since the catastrophe of 1846 have they begun to form a fraction of the class
of purely wage labourers, a special class, connected with its wage-masters only by monetary
relations.
We know what were the conditions of their dwellings in 1846. Since then they have grown yet
worse. A part of the agricultural labourers, which, however, grows less day by day, dwells still on
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the holdings of the farmers in over-crowded huts, whose hideousness far surpasses the worst that
the English agricultural labourers offered us in this way. And this holds generally with the
exception of certain tracts of Ulster; in the south, in the counties of Cork, Limerick, Kilkenny,
&c.; in the east, in Wicklow, Wexford, &c.; in the centre of Ireland, in King’s and Queen’s
County, Dublin, &c.; in the west, in Sligo, Roscommon, Mayo, Galway, &c.
“The agricultural labourers’ huts,” an inspector cries out, “are a disgrace to the
Christianity and to the civilisation of this country.” 129
In order to increase the attractions of these holes for the labourers, the pieces of land belonging
thereto from time immemorial, are systematically confiscated.
“The mere sense that they exist subject to this species of ban, on the part of the
landlords and their agents, has ... given birth in the minds of the labourers to
corresponding sentiments of antagonism and dissatisfaction towards those by
whom they are thus led to regard themselves as being treated as ... a proscribed
race.” 130
The first act of the agricultural revolution was to sweep away the huts situated on the field of
labour. This was done on the largest scale, and as if in obedience to a command from on high.
Thus many labourers were compelled to seek shelter in villages and towns. There they were
thrown like refuse into garrets, holes, cellars and corners, in the worst back slums. Thousands of
Irish families, who according to the testimony of the English, eaten up as these are with national
prejudice, are notable for their rare attachment to the domestic hearth, for their gaiety and the
purity of their home-life, found themselves suddenly transplanted into hotbeds of vice. The men
are now obliged to seek work of the neighbouring farmers and are only hired by the day, and
therefore under the most precarious form of wage. Hence
“they sometimes have long distances to go to and from work, often get wet, and
suffer much hardship, not unfrequently ending in sickness, disease and want.” 131
“ The towns have had to receive from year to year what was deemed to be the
surplus labour of the rural division;” 132 and then people still wonder “there is still
a surplus of labour in the towns and villages, and either a scarcity or a threatened
scarcity in some of the country divisions.” 133 The truth is that this want only
becomes perceptible “in harvest-time, or during spring, or at such times as
agricultural operations are carried on with activity; at other periods of the year
many hands are idle;” 134 that “from the digging out of the main crop of potatoes in
October until the early spring following ... there is no employment for them;”
135
and further, that during the active times they “are subject to broken days and to
all kinds of interruptions.” 136
These results of the agricultural revolution – i.e., the change of arable into pasture land, the use of
machinery, the most rigorous economy of labour, &c., are still further aggravated by the model
landlords, who, instead of spending their rents in other countries, condescend to live in Ireland on
their demesnes. In order that the law of supply and demand may not be broken, these gentlemen
draw their
“labour-supply ... chiefly from their small tenants, who are obliged to attend when
required to do the landlord’s work, at rates of wages, in many instances,
considerably under the current rates paid to ordinary labourers, and without regard
to the inconvenience or loss to the tenant of being obliged to neglect his own
business at critical periods of sowing or reaping.” 137
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The uncertainty and irregularity of employment, the constant return and long duration of gluts of
labour, all these symptoms of a relative surplus population, figure therefore in the reports of the
Poor Law administration, as so many hardships of the agricultural proletariat. It will be
remembered that we met, in the English agricultural proletariat, with a similar spectacle. But the
difference is that in England, an industrial country, the industrial reserve recruits itself from the
country districts, whilst in Ireland, an agricultural country, the agricultural reserve recruits itself
from the towns, the cities of refuge of the expelled agricultural labourers. In the former, the
supernumeraries of agriculture are transformed into factory operatives; in the latter, those forced
into the towns, whilst at the same time they press on the wages in towns, remain agricultural
labourers, and are constantly sent back to the country districts in search of work.
The official inspectors sum up the material condition of the agricultural labourer as follows:
“Though living with the strictest frugality, his own wages are barely sufficient to
provide food for an ordinary family and pay his rent” and he depends upon other
sources for the means of clothing himself, his wife, and children.... The
atmosphere of these cabins, combined with the other privations they are subjected
to, has made this class particularly susceptible to low fever and pulmonary
consumption.” 138
After this, it is no wonder that, according to the unanimous testimony of the inspectors, a sombre
discontent runs through the ranks of this class, that they long for the return of the past, loathe the
present, despair of the future, give themselves up “to the evil influence of agitators,” and have
only one fixed idea, to emigrate to America. This is the land of Cockaigne, into which the great
Malthusian panacea, depopulation, has transformed green Erin.
What a happy life the Irish factory operative leads one example will show:
“On my recent visit to the North of Ireland,” says the English Factory Inspector,
Robert Baker, “I met with the following evidence of effort in an Irish skilled
workman to afford education to his children; and I give his evidence verbatim, as I
took it from his mouth. That he was a skilled factory hand, may be understood
when I say that he was employed on goods for the Manchester market. ‘Johnson.
– I am a beetler and work from 6 in the morning till 11 at night, from Monday to
Friday. Saturday we leave off at 6 p. m., and get three hours of it (for meals and
rest). I have five children in all. For this work I get 10s. 6d. a week; my wife
works here also, and gets 5s. a week. The oldest girl who is 12, minds the house.
She is also cook, and all the servant we have. She gets the young ones ready for
school. A girl going past the house wakes me at half past five in the morning. My
wife gets up and goes along with me. We get nothing (to eat) before we come to
work. The child of 12 takes care of the little children all the day, and we get
nothing till breakfast at eight. At eight we go home. We get tea once a week; at
other times we get stirabout, sometimes of oat-meal, sometimes of Indian meal, as
we are able to get it. In the winter we get a little sugar and water to our Indian
meal. In the summer we get a few potatoes, planting a small patch ourselves; and
when they are done we get back to stirabout. Sometimes we get a little milk as it
may be. So we go on from day to day, Sunday and week day, always the same the
year round. I am always very much tired when I have done at night. We may see a
bit of flesh meat sometimes, but very seldom. Three of our children attend school,
for whom we pay 1d. a week a head. Our rent is 9d. a week. Peat for firing costs
1s. 6d. a fortnight at the very lowest.’” 139
Such are Irish wages, such is Irish life!
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In fact the misery of Ireland is again the topic of the day in England. At the end of 1866 and the
beginning of 1867, one of the Irish land magnates, Lord Dufferin, set about its solution in The
Times. “Wie menschlich von solch grossem Herrn!”
From Table E. we saw that, during 1864, of £4,368,610 of total profits, three surplus-value
makers pocketed only £262,819; that in 1865, however, out of £4,669,979 total profits, the same
three virtuosi of “abstinence” pocketed £274,528; in 1864, 26 surplus-value makers reached to
£646,377; in 1865, 28 surplus-value makers reached to £736,448; in 1864, 121 surplus-value
makers, £1,076,912; in 1865, 150 surplus-value makers, £1,320,906; in 1864, 1,131 surplus-value
makers £2,150,818, nearly half of the total annual profit; in 1865, 1,194 surplus-value makers,
£2,418,833, more than half of the total annual profit. But the lion’s share, which an inconceivably
small number of land magnates in England, Scotland and Ireland swallow up of the yearly
national rental, is so monstrous that the wisdom of the English State does not think fit to afford
the same statistical materials about the distribution of rents as about the distribution of profits.
Lord Dufferin is one of those land magnates. That rent-rolls and profits can ever be “excessive,”
or that their plethora is in any way connected with plethora of the people’s misery is, of course,
an idea as “disreputable” as “unsound.” He keeps to facts. The fact is that, as the Irish population
diminishes, the Irish rent-rolls swell; that depopulation benefits the landlords, therefore also
benefits the soil, and, therefore, the people, that mere accessory of the soil. He declares, therefore,
that Ireland is still over-populated, and the stream of emigration still flows too lazily. To be
perfectly happy, Ireland must get rid of at least one-third of a million of labouring men. Let no
man imagine that this lord, poetic into the bargain, is a physician of the school of Sangrado, who
as often as he did not find his patient better, ordered phlebotomy and again phlebotomy, until the
patient lost his sickness at the same time as his blood. Lord Dufferin demands a new blood-letting
of one-third of a million only, instead of about two millions; in fact, without the getting rid of
these, the millennium in Erin is not to be. The proof is easily given.
NUMBER AND EXTENT OF FARMS IN IRELAND IN 1864
140

(1) Farms not
over 1 acre.
(2) Farms over 1,
not over 5 acres.
(3) Farms over 5,
not over 15 acres.
(4) Farms over 15,
not over 30 acres.
(5) Farms over 30,
not over 50 acres.
(6) Farms over 50,
not over 100 acres.
(7) Farms over
100 acres.
(8) TOTAL AREA.

No.

Acres

48,653

25,394

82,037

288,916

176,368

1,836,310

136,578

3,051,343

71,961

2,906,274

54,247

3,983,880

31,927

8,227,807

–

26,319,924
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Centralisation has from 1851 to 1861 destroyed principally farms of the first three categories,
under 1 and not over 15 acres. These above all must disappear. This gives 307,058
“supernumerary” farmers, and reckoning the families the low average of 4 persons, 1,228,232
persons. On the extravagant supposition that, after the agricultural revolution is complete onefourth of these are again absorbable, there remain for emigration 921,174 persons. Categories 4,
5, 6, of over 15 and not over 100 acres, are, as was known long since in England, too small for
capitalistic cultivation of corn, and for sheep-breeding are almost vanishing quantities. On the
same supposition as before, therefore, there are further 788,761 persons to emigrate; total,
1,709,532. And as l’appétit vient en mangeant, Rentroll’s eyes will soon discover that Ireland,
with 3½ millions, is still always miserable, and miserable because she is overpopulated.
Therefore her depopulation must go yet further, that thus she may fulfil her true destiny, that of
an English sheep-walk and cattle-pasture.” 141
Like all good things in this bad world, this profitable method has its drawbacks. With the
accumulation of rents in Ireland, the accumulation of the Irish in America keeps pace. The
Irishman, banished by sheep and ox, re-appears on the other side of the ocean as a Fenian, and
face to face with the old queen of the seas rises, threatening and more threatening, the young
giant Republic:
Acerba fata Romanos agunt
Scelusque fraternae necis.
[A cruel fate torments the Romans,
and the crime of fratricide]
1

Karl Marx, l. c., “A égalité d’oppression des masses, plus un pays a de prolétaires et plus il est
riche.” (Colins, “L’Economie Politique. Source des Révolutions et des Utopies, prétendues
Socialistes.” Paris, 1857, t. III., p. 331.) Our “prolétarian” is economically none other than the wage
labourer, who produces and increases capital, and is thrown out on the streets, as soon as he is
superfluous for the needs of aggrandisement of “Monsieur capital,” as Pecqueur calls this person.
“The sickly proletarian of the primitive forest,” is a pretty Roscherian fancy. The primitive forester is
owner of the primitive forest, and uses the primitive forest as his property with the freedom of an
orang-outang. He is not, therefore, a proletarian. This would only be the case, if the primitive forest
exploited him, instead of being exploited by him. As far as his health is concerned, such a man would
well bear comparison, not only with the modern proletarian, but also with the syphilitic and scrofulous
upper classes. But, no doubt, Herr Wilhelm Roscher, by “primitive forest” means his native heath of
Lüneburg.
2
John Bellers, l. c., p. 2.
3
Bernard de Mandeville: “The Fable of the Bees,” 5th edition, London, 1728. Remarks, pp. 212, 213,
328. “Temperate living and constant employment is the direct road, for the poor, to rational
happiness” [by which he most probably means long working days and little means of subsistence],
“and to riches and strength for the state” (viz., for the landlords, capitalists, and their political
dignitaries and agents). (“An Essay on Trade and Commerce,” London, 1770, p. 54.)
4
Eden should have asked, whose creatures then are “the civil institutions"? From his standpoint of
juridical illusion, he does not regard the law as a product of the material relations of production, but
conversely the relations of production as products of the law. Linguet overthrew Montesquieu’s
illusory “Esprit des lois” with one word: “ L’esprit des lois, c’est la propriété.” [The spirit of laws is
property]
5
Eden, l. c., Vol. 1, book I., chapter 1, pp. 1, 2, and preface, p. xx.
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If the reader reminds me of Malthus, whose “Essay on Population” appeared in 1798, I remind him
that this work in its first form is nothing more than a schoolboyish, superficial plagiary of De Foe, Sir
James Steuart, Townsend, Franklin, Wallace, &c., and does not contain a single sentence thought out
by himself. The great sensation this pamphlet caused, was due solely to party interest. The French
Revolution had found passionate defenders in the United Kingdom; the “principle of population,”
slowly worked out in the eighteenth century, and then, in the midst of a great social crisis, proclaimed
with drums and trumpets as the infallible antidote to the teachings of Condorcet, &c., was greeted with
jubilance by the English oligarchy as the great destroyer of all hankerings after human development.
Malthus, hugely astonished at his success, gave himself to stuffing into his book materials
superficially compiled, and adding to it new matter, not discovered but annexed by him. Note further:
Although Malthus was a parson of the English State Church, he had taken the monastic vow of
celibacy — one of the conditions of holding a Fellowship in Protestant Cambridge University: “Socios
collegiorum maritos esse non permittimus, sed statim postquam quis uxorem duxerit socius collegii
desinat esse.” (“Reports of Cambridge University Commission,” p. 172.) This circumstance
favourably distinguishes Malthus from the other Protestant parsons, who have shuffled off the
command enjoining celibacy of the priesthood and have taken, “Be fruitful and multiply,” as their
special Biblical mission in such a degree that they generally contribute to the increase of population to
a really unbecoming extent, whilst they preach at the same time to the labourers the “principle of
population.” It is characteristic that the economic fall of man, the Adam’s apple, the urgent appetite,
“the checks which tend to blunt the shafts of Cupid,” as Parson Townsend waggishly puts it, that this
delicate question was and is monopolised by the Reverends of Protestant Theology, or rather of the
Protestant Church. With the exception of the Venetian monk, Ortes, an original and clever writer,
most of the population theory teachers are Protestant parsons. For instance, Bruckner, “Théorie du
Système animal,” Leyde, 1767, in which the whole subject of the modern population theory is
exhausted, and to which the passing quarrel between Quesnay and his pupil, the elder Mirabeau,
furnished ideas on the same topic; then Parson Wallace, Parson Townsend, Parson Malthus and his
pupil, the arch-Parson Thomas Chalmers, to say nothing of lesser reverend scribblers in this line.
Originally, Political Economy was studied by philosophers like Hobbes, Locke, Hume; by
businessmen and statesmen, like Thomas More, Temple, Sully, De Witt, North, Law, Vanderlint,
Cantillon, Franklin; and especially, and with the greatest success, by medical men like Petty, Barbon,
Mandeville, Quesnay. Even in the middle of the eighteenth century, the Rev. Mr. Tucker, a notable
economist of his time, excused himself for meddling with the things of Mammon. Later on, and in
truth with this very “Principle of population,” struck the hour of the Protestant parsons. Petty, who
regarded the population as the basis of wealth, and was, like Adam Smith, an outspoken foe to
parsons, says, as if he had a presentiment of their bungling interference, “that Religion best flourishes
when the Priests are most mortified, as was before said of the Law, which best flourisheth when
lawyers have least to do.” He advises the Protestant priests, therefore, if they, once for all, will not
follow the Apostle Paul and “mortify” themselves by celibacy, “not to breed more Churchmen than
the Benefices, as they now stand shared out, will receive, that is to say, if there be places for about
twelve thousand in England and Wales, it will not be safe to breed up 24,000 ministers, for then the
twelve thousand which are unprovided for, will seek ways how to get themselves a livelihood, which
they cannot do more easily than by persuading the people that the twelve thousand incumbents do
poison or starve their souls, and misguide them in their way to Heaven.” (Petty: “A Treatise of Taxes
and Contributions,” London, 1667, p. 57.) Adam Smith’s position with the Protestant priesthood of his
time is shown by the following. In “A Letter to A. Smith, L.L.D. On the Life, Death, and Philosophy
of his Friend, David Hume. By one of the People called Christians,” 4th Edition, Oxford, 1784, Dr.
Horne, Bishop of Norwich, reproves Adam Smith, because in a published letter to Mr. Strahan, he
“embalmed his friend David” (sc. Hume); because he told the world how “Hume amused himself on
his deathbed with Lucian and Whist,” and because he even had the impudence to write of Hume: “I
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have always considered him, both in his life-time and since his death, as approaching as nearly to the
idea of a perfectly wise and virtuous man, as, perhaps, the nature of human frailty will permit.” The
bishop cries out, in a passion: “Is it right in you, Sir, to hold up to our view as ‘perfectly wise and
virtuous,’ the character and conduct of one, who seems to have been possessed with an incurable
antipathy to all that is called Religion; and who strained every nerve to explode, suppress and extirpate
the spirit of it among men, that its very name, if he could effect it, might no more be had in
remembrance?” (l. c., p. 8.) “But let not the lovers of truth be discouraged. Atheism cannot be of long
continuance.” (P. 17.) Adam Smith, “had the atrocious wickedness to propagate atheism through the
land (viz., by his “Theory of Moral Sentiments”). Upon the whole, Doctor, your meaning is good; but
I think you will not succeed this time. You would persuade us, by the example of David Hume, Esq.,
that atheism is the only cordial for low spirits, and the proper antidote against the fear of death.... You
may smile over Babylon in ruins and congratulate the hardened Pharaoh on his overthrow in the Red
Sea.” (l. c., pp. 21, 22.) One orthodox individual, amongst Adam Smith’s college friends, writes after
his death: “Smith’s well-placed affection for Hume ... hindered him from being a Christian.... When
he met with honest men whom he liked ... he would believe almost anything they said. Had he been a
friend of the worthy ingenious Horrox he would have believed that the moon some times disappeared
in a clear sky without the interposition of a cloud.... He approached to republicanism in his political
principles.” (“The Bee.” By James Anderson, 18 Vols., Vol. 3, pp. 166, 165, Edinburgh, 1791-93.)
Parson Thomas Chalmers has his suspicions as to Adam Smith having invented the category of
“unproductive labourers,” solely for the Protestant parsons, in spite of their blessed work in the
vineyard of the Lord.
7
“The limit, however, to the employment of both the operative and the labourer is the same; namely,
the possibility of the employer realising a profit on the produce of their industry. If the rate of wages is
such as to reduce the master’s gains below the average profit of capital, he will cease to employ them,
or he will only employ them on condition of submission to a reduction of wages.” (John Wade, l. c., p.
241.)
8
Note by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism to the Russian edition: The MS in the first case says
“little” and in the second case “much”; the correction has been introduced according to the authorised
French translation.
9
Cf. Karl Marx: “Zur Kritik der Politischen Oekonomie,” pp. 166, seq.
10
“If we now return to our first inquiry, wherein it was shown that capital itself is only the result of
human labour... it seems quite incomprehensible that man can have fallen under the domination of
capital, his own product; can be subordinated to it; and as in reality this is beyond dispute the case,
involuntarily the question arises: How has the labourer been able to pass from being master of capital
— as its creator — to being its slave?” (Von Thünen, “Der isolierte Staat” Part ii., Section ii.,
Rostock, 1863, pp. 5, 6.) It is Thünen’s merit to have asked this question. His answer is simply
childish.
11
Adam Smith, “Enquiry into the Nature of ...”, Volume I.
12
Note in the 4th German edition. — The latest English and American “trusts” are already striving to
attain this goal by attempting to unite at least all the large-scale concerns in one branch of industry
into one great joint-stock company with a practical monopoly. F. E.
13
Note in the 3rd German edition. — In Marx’s copy there is here the marginal note: “Here note for
working out later; if the extension is only quantitative, then for a greater and a smaller capital in the
same branch of business the profits are as the magnitudes of the capitals advanced. If the quantitative
extension induces qualitative change, then the rate of profit on the larger capital rises simultaneously.”
F. E.
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The census of England and Wales shows: all persons employed in agriculture (landlords, farmers,
gardeners, shepherds, &c., included): 1851, 2,011,447; 1861, 1,924,110. Fall, 87,337. Worsted
manufacture: 1851, 102,714 persons; 1861, 79,242. Silk weaving: 1851, 111,940; 1861, 101,678.
Calico-printing: 1851, 12,098; 1861, 12,556. A small rise that, in the face of the enormous extension
of this industry and implying a great fall proportionally in the number of labourers employed. Hatmaking: 1851, 15,957; 1861, 13,814. Straw-hat and bonnet-making: 1851, 20,393; 1861, 18,176.
Malting: 1851, 10,566; 1861, 10,677. Chandlery, 1851, 4,949; 1861, 4,686. This fall is due, besides
other causes, to the increase in lighting by gas. Comb-making: 1851, 2,038; 1861, 1,478. Sawyers:
1851, 30,552; 1861, 31,647 — a small rise in consequence of the increase of sawing-machines. Nailmaking: 1851, 26,940; 1861, 26,130 — fall in consequence of the competition of machinery. Tin and
copper-mining: 1851, 31,360; 1861, 32,041. On the other hand: Cotton-spinning and weaving: 1851,
371,777; 1861, 456,646. Coal-mining: 1851, 183,389, 1861, 246,613, “The increase of labourers is
generally greatest, since 1851, in such branches of industry in which machinery has not up to the
present been employed with success.” (Census of England and Wales for 1861. Vol. III. London,
1863, p. 36.)
15
Added in the 4th German edition. — The law of progressive diminution of the relative magnitude of
variable capital and its effect on the condition of the class of wage workers is conjectured rather than
understood by some of the prominent economists of the classical school. The greatest service was
rendered here by John Barton, although he, like all the rest, lumps together constant and fixed capital,
variable and circulating capital. He says:
“The demand for labour depends on the increase of circulating, and not of fixed capital. Were it true
that the proportion between these two sorts of capital is the same at all times, and in all circumstances,
then, indeed, it follows that the number of labourers employed is in proportion to the wealth of the
state. But such a proposition has not the semblance of probability. As arts are cultivated, and
civilisation is extended, fixed capital bears a larger and larger proportion to circulating capital. The
amount of fixed capital employed in the production of a piece of British muslin is at least a hundred,
probably a thousand times greater than that employed in a similar piece of Indian muslin. And the
proportion of circulating capital is a hundred or thousand times less ... the whole of the annual savings,
added to the fixed capital, would have no effect in increasing the demand for labour.” (John Barton,
“Observations on the Circumstances which Influence the Condition of the Labouring Classes of
Society.” London, 1817, pp. 16, 17.) “The same cause which may increase the net revenue of the
country may at the same time render the population redundant, and deteriorate the condition of the
labourer.” (Ricardo, l. c., p. 469.) With increase of capital, “the demand [for labour] will be in a
diminishing ratio.” (Ibid., p. 480, Note.) “The amount of capital devoted to the maintenance of labour
may vary, independently of any changes in the whole amount of capital.... Great fluctuations in the
amount of employment, and great suffering may become more frequent as capital itself becomes more
plentiful.” (Richard Jones, “An Introductory Lecture on Pol. Econ.,” Lond. 1833, p. 13) “Demand [for
labour] will rise ... not in proportion to the accumulation of the general capital. ... Every augmentation,
therefore, in the national stock destined for reproduction, comes, in the progress of society, to have
less and less influence upon the condition of the labourer.” (Ramsay, l. c., pp. 90, 91.)
16
H. Merivale. “Lectures on Colonisation and Colonies,” 1841, Vol. I , p. 146.
17
Malthus, “Principles of Political Economy,” pp. 215, 319, 320. In this work, Malthus finally
discovers, with the help of Sismondi, the beautiful Trinity of capitalistic production: over-production,
over-population, over-consumption — three very delicate monsters, indeed. Cf. F. Engels, “Umrisse
zu einer Kritik der Nationalökonomie,” l. c., p, 107, et seq.
18
Harriet Martineau, “A Manchester Strike,” 1832, p. 101.
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Even in the cotton famine of 1863 we find, in a pamphlet of the operative cotton-spinners of
Blackburn, fierce denunciations of overwork, which, in consequence of the Factory Acts, of course
only affected adult male labourers. “The adult operatives at this mill have been asked to work from 12
to 13 hours per day, while there are hundreds who are compelled to be idle who would willingly work
partial time, in order to maintain their families and save their brethren from a premature grave through
being overworked.... We,” it goes on to say, “would ask if the practice of working overtime by a
number of hands, is likely to create a good feeling between masters and servants. Those who are
worked overtime feel the injustice equally with those who are condemned to forced idleness. There is
in the district almost sufficient work to give to all partial employment if fairly distributed. We are only
asking what is right in requesting the masters generally to pursue a system of short hours, particularly
until a better state of things begins to dawn upon us, rather than to work a portion of the hands
overtime, while others, for want of work, are compelled to exist upon charity.” (“Reports of Insp. of
Fact., Oct. 31, 1863,” p. 8.) The author of the “Essay on Trade and Commerce” grasps the effect of a
relative surplus population on the employed labourers with his usual unerring bourgeois instinct.
“Another cause of idleness in this kingdom is the want of a sufficient number of labouring hands ....
Whenever from an extraordinary demand for manufactures, labour grows scarce, the labourers feel
their own consequence, and will make their masters feel it likewise — it is amazing; but so depraved
are the dispositions of these people, that in such cases a set of workmen have combined to distress the
employer by idling a whole day together.” (“Essay, &c.,” pp. 27, 28.) The fellows in fact were
hankering after a rise in wages.
20
Economist, Jan. 21. 1860.
21
Whilst during the last six months of 1866, 80-90,000 working people in London were thrown out of
work, the Factory Report for that same half year says: “It does not appear absolutely true to say that
demand will always produce supply just at the moment when it is needed. It has not done so with
labour, for much machinery has been idle last year for want of hands.” (“Rep. of Insp. of Fact., 31st
Oct., 1866,” p. 81.)
22
Opening address to the Sanitary Conference, Birmingham, January 15th, 1875, by J. Chamberlain,
Mayor of the town, now (1883) President of the Board of Trade.
23
781 towns given in the census for 1861 for England and Wales “contained 10,960,998 inhabitants,
while the villages and country parishes contained 9,105,226. In 1851, 580 towns were distinguished,
and the population in them and in the surrounding country was nearly equal. But while in the
subsequent ten years the population in the villages and the country increased half a million, the
population in the 580 towns increased by a million and a half (1,554,067). The increase of the
population of the country parishes is 6.5 per cent., and of the towns 17.3 per cent. The difference in
the rates of increase is due to the migration from country to town. Three-fourths of the total increase
of population has taken place in the towns.” (“Census. &c.,” pp. 11 and 12.)
24
“Poverty seems favourable to generation.” (A. Smith.) This is even a specially wise arrangement of
God, according to the gallant and witty Abbé Galiani “Iddio af che gli uomini che esercitano mestieri
di prima utilità nascono abbondantemente.” (Galiani, l. c., p. 78.) [God ordains that men who carry on
trades of primary utility are born in abundance] “Misery up to the extreme point of famine and
pestilence, instead of checking, tends to increase population.” (S. Laing, “National Distress,” 1844, p.
69.) After Laing has illustrated this by statistics, he continues: “If the people were all in easy
circumstances, the world would soon be depopulated.”
25
“De jour en jour il devient donc plus clair que les rapports de production dans lesquels se meut la
bourgeoisie n’ont pas un caractère un, un caractère simple, mais un caractère de duplicité; que dans les
mêmes rapports dans lesquels se produit la richesse, la misère se produit aussi; que dans les mêmes
rapports dans lesquels il y a développement des forces productives, il y a une force productive de
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répression; que ces rapports ne produisent la richesse bourgeoise, c’est-à-dire la richesse de la classe
bourgeoise, qu’en anéantissant continuellement la richesse des membres intégrants de cette classe et
en produisant un prolétariat toujours croissant.” [From day to day it thus becomes clearer that the
production relations in which the bourgeoisie moves have not a simple, uniform character, but a dual
character; that in the selfsame relations in which wealth is produced, poverty is produced also; that in
the selfsame relations in which there is a development of productive forces, there is also a force
producing repression; that there relations produce bourgeois wealth, i.e., the wealth of the bourgeois
class, only by continually annihilating the wealth of the individual members of this class and by
producing an evergrowing proletariat] (Karl Marx: “Misère de la Philosophie,” p. 116.)
26
G. Ortes: “Delia Economia Nazionale libri sei, 1777,” in Custodi, Parte Moderna, t. xxi, pp. 6, 9, 22,
25, etc. Ortes says, l. c., p. 32: “In luoco di progettar sistemi inutili per la felicità de’popoli, mi
limiterò a investigare la regione della loro infelicità.” [Instead of projecting useless systems for
achieving the happiness of people, I shall limit myself to investigating the reasons for their
unhappiness]
27
“A Dissertation on the Poor Laws. By a Well-wisher of Mankind. (The Rev. J. Townsend) 1786,”
republished Lond. 1817, pp. 15, 39, 41. This “delicate” parson, from whose work just quoted, as well
as from his “Journey through Spain,” Malthus often copies whole pages, himself borrowed the greater
part of his doctrine from Sir James Steuart, whom he however alters in the borrowing. E.g., when
Steuart says: “Here, in slavery, was a forcible method of making mankind diligent,” [for the nonworkers] ... “Men were then forced to work” [i.e.,to work gratis for others], “because they were slaves
of others; men are now forced to work” [i.e., to work gratis for non-workers] “because they are the
slaves of their necessities,” he does not thence conclude, like the fat holder of benefices, that the wage
labourer must always go fasting. He wishes, on the contrary, to increase their wants and to make the
increasing number of their wants a stimulus to their labour for the “more delicate.”
28
Storch, l. c., t. iii, p. 223.
29
Sismondi, l. c., pp. 79, 80, 85.
30
Destutt de Tracy, l. c., p. 231: “Les nations pauvres, c’est là où le peuple est à son aise; et les
nations riches, c’est là où il est ordinairement pauvre.” [The poor nations are those where the people
are comfortably off; and the rich nations, those where the people are generally poor]
31
“Tenth Report of the Commissioners of H. M. Inland Revenue.” Lond., 1866. p. 38.
32
lbidem.
33
These figures are sufficient for comparison, but, taken absolutely, are false, since, perhaps,
£100,000,000 of income are annually not declared. The complaints of the Inland Revenue
Commissioners of systematic fraud, especially on the part of the commercial and industrial classes,
are repeated in each of their reports. So e.g., “A Joint-stock company returns £6,000 as assessable
profits, the surveyor raises the amount to £88,000, and upon that sum duty is ultimately paid. Another
company which returns £190,000 is finally compelled to admit that the true return should be
£250,000.” (Ibid., p, 42.)
34
“Census, &c.,” l. c., p. 29. John Bright’s assertion that 150 landlords own half of England, and 12
half the Scotch soil, has never been refuted.
35
“Fourth Report, &c., of Inland Revenue.” Lond., 1860, p. 17.
36
hese are the net incomes after certain legally authorised abatements.
37
At this moment, March, 1867, the Indian and Chinese market is again overstocked by the
consignments of the British cotton manufacturers. In 1866 a reduction in wages of 5 per cent. took
place amongst the cotton operatives. In 1867, as consequence of a similar operation, there was a strike
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of 20,000 men at Preston. [Added in the 4th German edition. — That was the prelude to the crisis
which broke out immediately afterwards. — F. E.]
38
“Census, &c.,” l. c., P. 11.
39
Gladstone in the House of Commons, Feb. 13th, 1843. Times, Feb. 14th, 1843 — “It is one of the
most melancholy features in the social state of this country that we see, beyond the possibility of
denial, that while there is at this moment a decrease in the consuming powers of the people, an
increase of the pressure of privations and distress; there is at the same time a constant accumulation of
wealth in the upper classes, an increase of the luxuriousness of their habits, and of their means of
enjoyment.” (Hansard, 13th Feb.)
40
Gladstone in the House of Commons, April 16th, 1863. Morning Star, April 17th.
41
See the official accounts in the Blue book: “Miscellaneous Statistics of the United Kingdom,” Part
vi., London, 1866, pp. 260-273, passim. Instead of the statistics of orphan asylums, &c., the
declamations of the ministerial journals in recommending dowries for the Royal children might also
serve. The greater dearness of the means of subsistence is never forgotten there.
42
Gladstone, House of Commons, 7th April, 1864. — “The Hansard version runs: ‘Again, and yet
more at large — what is human life, but, in the majority of cases, a struggle for existence.’ The
continual crying contradictions in Gladstone’s Budget speeches of 1863 and 1864 were characterised
by an English writer by the following quotation from Boileau:
“Voilà l’homme en effet. Il va du blanc au noir,
Il condamne au matin ses sentiments du soir.
Importun à tout autre, à soi-même incommode,
Il change à tout moment d’esprit comme de mode.”
[Such is the man: he goes from black to white. / He condemns in the morning what he felt in the
evening. / A nuisance to everyone else, and an inconvenience to himself, / he changes his way of
thinking as easily as he changes his way of dressing]
(“The Theory of Exchanges, &c.,” London, 1864, p. 135.)
43
H. Fawcett, l. c., pp. 67-82. As to the increasing dependence of labourers on the retail shopkeepers,
this is the consequence of the frequent oscillations and interruptions of their employment.
44
Wales here is always included in England.
45
A peculiar light is thrown on the advance made since the time of Adam Smith, by the fact that by
him the word “workhouse” is still occasionally used as synonymous with “manufactory”; e.g., the
opening of his chapter on the division of labour; “those employed in every different branch of the
work can often be collected into the same workhouse.”
46
“Public Health. Sixth Report, 1864,” p. 13.
47
l. c., p. 17.
48
l. c., p. 13.
49
l. c., Appendix, p. 232.
50
l. c., pp. 232, 233.
51
l. c., pp. 14, 15.
52
“In no particular have the rights of persons been so avowedly and shamefully sacrificed to the rights
of property as in regard to the lodging of the labouring class. Every large town may be looked upon as
a place of human sacrifice, a shrine where thousands pass yearly through the fire as offerings to the
moloch of avarice,” S. Laing, l. c., p. 150.
53
“Public Health, Eighth Report. 1866.” p. 14, note.
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54

. c., p. 89. With reference to the children in these colonies, Dr. Hunter says: “People are not now
alive to tell us how children were brought up before this age of dense agglomerations of poor began,
and he would be a rash prophet who should tell us what future behaviour is to be expected from the
present growth of children, who, under circumstances probably never before paralleled in this country,
are now completing their education for future practice, as ’dangerous classes’ by sitting up half the
night with persons of every age, half naked, drunken, obscene, and quarrelsome.” (l. c., p. 56.)
55
l. c., p. 62.
56
“Report of the Officer of Health of St. Martins-in-the-Fields, 1865.”
57
“Public Health, Eighth Report, 1866,” p. 91.
58
l. c., p. 88.
59
l. c., p. 88.
60
l. c., p. 89.
61
l. c., p. 55 and 56.
62
l. c., p. 149.
63
l. c., p. 50.
64

COLLECTING AGENTS LIST (BRADFORD)
Houses
Vulcan Street, No. 122
1 Room
Lumiev Street, No. 13
1 Room
Bower Street, No. 41
1 Room
Portland Street. No. 112
1 Room
Hardy Street, No. 17
1 Room
North Street, No. 18
1 Room
North Street, No. 17
1 Room
Wymer Street, No. 19
1 Room
Jowett Street, No. 56
1 Room
George Street, No. 150
1 Room
Rifle Court Marygate, No. 11
1 Room
Marshall Street, No. 28
1 Room
Marshall Street, No. 49
1 Room
George Street, No. 128
1 Room
George Street, No. 130
1 Room
Edward Street, No. 4
1 Room
George Street, No. 49
1 Room
York Street, No. 34
1 Room
Salt Pie Street (bottom)
1 Room
Cellars
Regent Square
1 cellar
Acre Street
1 cellar
33 Roberts Court
1 cellar
Back Pratt Street used as a brazier’s shop
1 cellar
27 Ebenezer Street
1 cellar
l.c. p. 111 (no male over 18)
65
l. c., p. 114.

16 persons
11 persons
11 persons
10 persons
10 persons
16 persons
13 persons
8 adults
12 persons
3 families
11 persons
10 persons
3 families
18 persons
16 persons
17 persons
2 families
2 families
26 persons
8 persons
7 persons
7 persons
7 persons
6 persons
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l. c., p. 50.
“Public Health. Seventh Report. 1865,” p. 18.
68
l. c., p. 165.
69
l. c., p. 18, Note. — The Relieving Officer of the Chapel-en-le-Frith Union reported to the RegistarGeneral as follows: — “At Doveholes, a number of small excavations have been made into a large
hillock of lime ashes (the refuse of lime-kilns), and which are used as dwellings, and occupied by
labourers and others employed in the construction of a railway now in course of construction through
that neighbourhood. The excavations are small and damp, and have no drains or privies about them,
and not the slightest means of ventilation except up a hole pulled through the top, and used for a
chimney. In consequence of this defect, small-pox has been raging for some time, and some deaths
[amongst the troglodytes] have been caused by it.” (l. c., note 2.)
70
The details given at the end of Part IV. refer especially to the labourers in coal mines. On the still
worse condition in metal mines, see the very conscientious Report of the Royal Commission of 1864.
71
l. c., pp. 180, 182.
72
l. c., pp. 515, 517.
73
l. c., p. 16.
74
“Wholesale starvation of the London Poor.... Within the last few days the walls of London have
been placarded with large posters, bearing the following remarkable announcement: — ‘Fat oxen!
Starving men! The fat oxen from their palace of glass have gone to feed the rich in their luxurious
abode, while the starving men are left to rot and die in their wretched dens.’ The placards bearing
these ominous words are put up at certain intervals. No sooner has one set been defaced or covered
over, than a fresh set is placarded in the former, or some equally public place.... This ... reminds one of
the secret revolutionary associations which prepared the French people for the events of 1789.... At
this moment, while English workmen with their wives and children are dying of cold and hunger,
there are millions of English gold — the produce of English labour — being invested in Russian,
Spanish, Italian, and other foreign enterprises.” —Reynolds’ Newspaper, January 20th, 1867.
75
James E. Thorold Rogers. (Prof. of Polit. Econ. in the University of Oxford.) “A History of
Agriculture and Prices in England.” Oxford, 1866, v. 1, p. 690. This work, the fruit of patient and
diligent labour, contains in the two volumes that have so far appeared, only the period from 1259 to
1400. The second volume contains simply statistics. It is the first authentic “History of Prices” of the
time that we possess.
76
“Reasons for the Late Increase of the Poor-Rates: or a comparative view of the prices of labour and
provisions.” Lond., 1777, pp. 5, 11.
77
Dr. Richard Price: “Observations on Reversionary Payments,” 6th Ed. By W. Morgan, Lond., 1803,
v. II., pp. 158, 159. Price remarks on p. 159: “The nominal price of day-labour is at present no more
than about four times, or, at most, five times higher than it was in the year 1514. But the price of corn
is seven times, and of flesh-meat and raiment about fifteen times higher. So far, therefore, has the
price of labour been even from advancing in proportion to the increase in the expenses of living, that it
does not appear that it bears now half the proportion to those expenses that it did bear.”
78
Barton, l. c., p. 26. For the end of the 18th century cf. Eden, l. c.
79
Parry, l. c., p. 86.
80
ibid., p. 213.
81
S. Laing, l. c., p. 62.
82
“England and America.” Lond., 1833, Vol. 1, p. 47.
83
London Economist, May 29th, 1845, p. 290.
67
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The landed aristocracy advanced themselves to this end, of course per Parliament, funds from the
State Treasury, at a very low rate of interest, which the farmers have to make good at a much higher
rate.
85
The decrease of the middle-class farmers can be seen especially in the census category: “Farmer’s
son, grandson, brother, nephew, daughter, granddaughter, sister, niece"; in a word, the members of his
own family, employed by the farmer. This category numbered, in 1851, 216,851 persons; in 1861,
only 176,151. From 1851 to 1871, the farms under 20 acres fell by more than 900 in number; those
between 50 and 75 acres fell from 8,253 to 6,370; the same thing occurred with all other farms under
100 acres. On the other hand, during the same twenty years, the number of large farms increased;
those of 300-500 acres rose from 7,771 to 8,410, those of more than 500 acres from 2,755 to 3,914,
those of more than 1,000 acres from 492 to 582.
86
The number of shepherds increased from 12,517 to 25,559.
87
Census, l. c., p. 36.
88
Rogers, l. c., p. 693, p. 10. Mr. Rogers belongs to the Liberal School, is a personal friend of Cobden
and Bright, and therefore no laudator temporis acti.
89
“Public Health. Seventh Report,” 1865, p. 242. It is therefore nothing unusual either for the landlord
to raise a labourer’s rent as soon as he hears that he is earning a little more, or for the farmer to lower
the wage of the labourer, “because his wife has found a trade,” l. c.
90
l. c., p. 135.
91
l. c., p. 134.
92
“Report of the Commissioners ... relating to Transportation and Penal Servitude,” Lond., 1863, pp.
42, 50.
93
l. c., p. 77. “Memorandum by the Lord Chief Justice.”
94
l. c., Vol. II, Minutes of Evidence.
95
l. c., Vol. 1. Appendix, p. 280.
96
l. c., pp. 274, 275.
97
“Public Health, Sixth Report,” 1864, pp. 238, 249, 261, 262.
98
l. c., p. 262.
99
l. c., p. 17. The English agricultural labourer receives only 1/4 as much milk, and ½ as much bread
as the Irish. Arthur Young in his “Tour in Ireland,” at the beginning of this century, already noticed
the better nourishment of the latter. The reason is simply this, that the poor Irish farmer is
incomparably more humane than the rich English. As regards Wales, that which is said in the text
holds only for the southwest. All the doctors there agree that the increase of the death-rate through
tuberculosis, scrofula, etc., increases in intensity with the deterioration of the physical condition of the
population, and all ascribe this deterioration to poverty. “His (the farm labourer’s) keep is reckoned at
about five pence a day, but in many districts it was said to be of much less cost to the farmer” [himself
very poor].... “A morsel of the salt meat or bacon, ... salted and dried to the texture of mahogany, and
hardly worth the difficult process of assimilation ... is used to flavour a large quantity of broth or
gruel, of meal and leeks, and day after day this is the labourer’s dinner.” The advance of industry
resulted for him, in this harsh and damp climate, in “the abandonment of the solid homespun clothing
in favour of the cheap and so-called cotton goods,” and of stronger drinks for so-called tea. “The
agriculturist, after several hours’ exposure to wind and rain, pins his cottage to sit by a fire of peat or
of balls of clay and small coal kneaded together, from which volumes of carbonic and sulphurous
acids are poured forth. His walls are of mud and stones, his floor the bare earth which was there before
the hut was built, his roof a mass of loose and sodden thatch. Every crevice is topped to maintain
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warmth, and in an atmosphere of diabolic odour, with a mud floor, with his only clothes drying on his
back, he often sups and sleeps with his wife and children. Obstetricians who have passed parts of the
night in such cabins have described how they found their feet sinking in the mud of the floor, and they
were forced (easy task) to drill a hole through the wall to effect a little private respiration. It was
attested by numerous witnesses in various grades of life, that to these insanitary influences, and many
more, the underfed peasant was nightly exposed, and of the result, a debilitated and scrofulous people,
there was no want of evidence.... The statements of the relieving officers of Carmarthenshire and
Cardiganshire show in a striking way the same state of things. There is besides “a plague more
horrible still, the great number of idiots.” Now a word on the climatic conditions. “A strong southwest wind blows over the whole country for 8 or 9 months in the year, bringing with it torrents of rain,
which discharge principally upon the western slopes of the hills. Trees are rare, except in sheltered
places, and where not protected, are blown out of all shape. The cottages generally crouch under some
bank, or often in a ravine or quarry, and none but the smallest sheep and native cattle can live on the
pastures.... The young people migrate to the eastern mining districts of Glamorgan and Monmouth.
Carmarthenshire is the breeding ground of the mining population and their hospital. The population
can therefore barely maintain its numbers.” Thus in Cardiganshire:
1851
1861
Males
45,155
44,446
Females
52,459
52,955
97,614
97,401
Dr. Hunter’s Report in “Public Health, Seventh Report. 1865,” pp. 498-502, passim.
100
In 1865 this law was improved to some extent. It will soon be learnt from experience that tinkering
of this sort is of no use.
101
In order to understand that which follows, we must remember that “Close Villages” are those
whose owners are one or two large landlords. “Open villages,” those whose soil belongs to many
smaller landlords. It is in the latter that building speculators can build cottages and lodging-houses.
102
A show-village of this kind looks very nice, but is as unreal as the villages that Catherine II. saw on
her journey to the Crimea. In recent times the shepherd also has often been banished from these showvillages; e.g., near Market Harboro is sheep-farm of about 500 acres, which only employs the labour
of one man. To reduce the long trudges over these wide plains, the beautiful pastures of Leicester and
Northampton, the shepherd used to get a cottage on the farm. Now they give him a thirteenth shilling a
week for lodging, that he must find far away in an open village.
103
“The labourers’ houses (in the open villages, which, of course, are always overcrowded) are
usually in rows, built with their backs against the extreme edge of the plot of land which the builder
could call his, and on this account are not allowed light and air, except from the front.” (Dr. Hunter’s
Report, l. c., p. 135.) Very often the beerseller or grocer of the village is at the same time the letter of
its houses. In this case the agricultural labourer finds in him a second master, besides the farmer. He
must be his customer as well as his tenant. “The hind with his 10s. a week, minus a rent of £4 a year ...
is obliged to buy at the seller’s own terms, his modicum of tea, sugar, flour, soap, candles, and beer.”
(l. c., p. 132.) These open villages form, in fact, the “penal settlements” of the English agricultural
proletariat. Many of the cottages are simply lodging-houses, through which all the rabble of the
neighbourhood passes. The country labourer and his family who had often, in a way truly wonderful,
preserved, under the foulest conditions, a thoroughness and purity of character, go, in these, utterly to
the devil. It is, of course, the fashion amongst the aristocratic shylocks to shrug their shoulders
pharisaically at the building speculators, the small landlords, and the open villages. They know well
enough that their “close villages” and “show-villages” are the birth-places of the open villages, and
could not exist without them. “The labourers ... were it not for the small owners, would, for by far the
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most part, have to sleep under the trees of the farms on which they work.” (l. c., p. 135.) The system
of “open” and “closed” villages obtains in all the Midland counties and throughout the East of
England.
104
“The employer ... is ... directly or indirectly securing to himself the profit on a man employed at
10s. a week, and receiving from this poor hind £4 or £5 annual rent for houses not worth £20 in a
really free market, but maintained at their artificial value by the power of the owner to say ‘Use my
house, or go seek a hiring elsewhere without a character from me....’ Does a man wish to better
himself, to go as a plate-layer on the railway, or to begin quarry-work, the same power is ready with
‘Work for me at this low rate of wages or begone at a week’s notice; take your pig with you, and get
what you can for the potatoes growing in your garden.’ Should his interest appear to be better served
by it, an enhanced rent is sometimes preferred in these cases by the owner (i.e., the farmer) as the
penalty for leaving his service.” (Dr. Hunter, l. c., p. 132.)
105
“New married couples are no edifying study for grown-up brothers and sisters: and though
instances must not be recorded, sufficient data are remembered to warrant the remark, that great
depression and sometimes death are the lot of the female participator in the offence of incest.” (Dr.
Hunter, l. c., p. 137.) A member of the rural police who had for many years been a detective in the
worst quarters of London, says of the girls of his village: “their boldness and shamelessness I never
saw equalled during some years of police life and detective duty in the worst parts of London .... They
live like pigs, great boys and girls, mothers and fathers, all sleeping in one room, in many instances.”
(“Child. Empl. Com. Sixth Report, 1867,” p. 77 sq. 155.)
106
“Public Health. Seventh Report, 1865,” pp. 9, 14 passim.
107
“The heaven-born employment of the hind gives dignity even to his position. He is not a slave, but
a soldier of peace, and deserves his place in married men’s quarters to be provided by the landlord,
who has claimed a power of enforced labour similar to that the country demands of the soldier. He no
more receives market-price for his work than does the soldier. Like the soldier he is caught young,
ignorant, knowing only his own trade, and his own locality. Early marriage and the operation of the
various laws of settlement affect the one as enlistment and the Mutiny Act affect the other.” (Dr.
Hunter, l. c., p. 132.) Sometimes an exceptionally soft-hearted landlord relents as the solitude he has
created. “It is a melancholy thing to stand alone in one’s country,” said Lord Leicester, when
complimented on the completion of Hookham. “I look around and not a house is to be seen but mine. I
am the giant of Giant Castle, and have eat up all my neighbours.”
108
A similar movement is seen during the last ten years in France; in proportion as capitalist
production there takes possession of agriculture, it drives the “surplus” agricultural population into the
towns. Here also we find deterioration in the housing and other conditions at the source of the surplus
population. On the special “prolétariat foncier,” to which this system of parcelling out the land has
given rise, see, among others, the work of Colins, already quoted, and Karl Marx “Der Achtzehnte
Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte.” 2nd edition. Hamburg, 1869, pp. 56, &c. In 1846, the town
population in France was represented by 24.42, the agricultural by 75.58; in 1861, the town by 28.86,
the agricultural by 71.14 per cent. During the last 5 years, the diminution of the agricultural
percentage of the population has been yet more marked. As early as 1846, Pierre Dupont in his
“Ouvriers” sang:
Mal vêtus, logés dans des trous,
Sous les combles, dans les décombres,
Nous vivons avec les hiboux
Et les larrons, amis des ombres.
[Badly clothed, living in holes, under the eaves, in the ruins, with the owls and the thieves,
companions of the shadows]
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“Sixth and last Report of the Children’s Employment Commission,” published at the end of March,
1867. It deals solely with the agricultural gang-system.
110
“Child. Emp. Comm., VI. Report." Evidence 173, p. 37.
111
Some gang-masters, however, have worked themselves up to the position of farmers of 500 acres,
or proprietors of whole rows of houses.
112
“Half the girls of Ludford have been ruined by going out” (in gangs). l. c., p. 6, § 32.
113
“They (gangs) have greatly increased of late years. In some places they are said to have been
introduced at comparatively late dates; in others where gangs ... have been known for many years ...
more and younger children are employed in them.” (l. c., p. 79, § 174).
114
“Small farmers never employ gangs.” “It is not on poor land, but on land which affords rent of
from 40 to 50 shillings, that women and children are employed in the greatest numbers.” (l. c., pp. 17,
14.)
115
To one of these gentlemen the taste of his rent was so grateful that he indignantly declared to the
Commission of Inquiry that the whole hubbub was only due to the name of the system. If instead of
“gang” it were called “the Agricultural Juvenile Industrial Self-supporting Association,” everything
would be all right.
116
“Gang work is cheaper than other work; that is why they are employed,” says a former gang-master
(l. c., p. 17, § 14 )."The gang-system is decidedly the cheapest for the farmer, and decidedly the worst
for the children,” says a farmer (l. c., p. 16, § 3.)
117
“Undoubtedly much of the work now done by children in gangs used to be done by men and
women. More men are out of work now where children and women are employed than formerly.” (l.
c., p. 43, n. 202.) On the other hand, “the labour question in some agricultural districts, particularly the
arable, is becoming so serious in consequence of emigration, and the facility afforded by railways for
getting to large towns that I (the “I” is the steward of a great lord) think the services of children are
most indispensable,” (l. c., p. 80, n. 180.) For the “labour question” in English agricultural districts,
differently from the rest of the civilised world, means the landlords’ and farmers’ question, viz., how
is it possible, despite an always increasing exodus of the agricultural folk, to keep up a sufficient
relative surplus population in the country, and by means of it keep the wages of the agricultural
labourer at a minimum?
118
The “Public Health Report,” where in dealing with the subject of children’s mortality, the gangsystem is treated in passing, remains unknown to the press, and, therefore, to the English public. On
the other hand, the last report of the “Child. Empl. Comm.” afforded the press sensational copy always
welcome. Whilst the Liberal press asked how the fine gentlemen and ladies, and the well-paid clergy
of the State Church, with whom Lincolnshire swarms, could allow such a system to arise on their
estates, under their very eyes, they who send out expressly missions to the Antipodes, “for the
improvement of the morals of South Sea Islanders” — the more refined press confined itself to
reflections on the coarse degradation of the agricultural population who are capable of selling their
children into such slavery! Under the accursed conditions to which these “delicate” people condemn
the agricultural labourer, it would not be surprising if he ate his own children. What is really
wonderful is the healthy integrity of character, he has, in great part, retained. The official reports
prove that the parents, even in the gang districts, loathe the gang-system. “There is much in the
evidence that shows that the parents of the children would, in many instances, be glad to be aided by
the requirements of a legal obligation, to resist the pressure and the temptations to which they are
often subject. They are liable to be urged, at times by the parish officers, at times by employers, under
threats of being themselves discharged, to be taken to work at an age when ... school attendance ...
would be manifestly to their greater advantage.... All that time and strength wasted; all the suffering
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from extra and unprofitable fatigue produced to the labourer and to his children; every instance in
which the parent may have traced the moral ruin of his child to the undermining of delicacy by the
over-crowding of cottages, or to the contaminating influences of the public gang, must have been so
many incentives to feelings in the minds of the labouring poor which can be well understood, and
which it would be needless to particularise. They must be conscious that much bodily and mental pain
has thus been inflicted upon them from causes for which they were in no way answerable; to which,
had it been in their power, they would have in no way consented; and against which they were
powerless to struggle.” (l. c., p. xx., § 82, and xxiii., n. 96.)
119
Population of Ireland, 1801, 5,319,867 persons; 1811, 6,084,996; 1821, 6,869,544; 1831,
7,828,347; 1841, 8,222,664.
120
The result would be found yet more unfavourable if we went further back. Thus: Sheep in 1865,
3,688,742, but in 1856, 3,694,294. Pigs in 1865, 1,299,893, but in 1858, 1,409,883
121
The data of the text are put together from the materials of the “Agricultural Statistics, Ireland,
General Abstracts, Dublin,” for the years 1860, et seq., and “Agricultural Statistics, Ireland. Tables
showing the estimated average produce, &c., Dublin, 1866.” These statistics are official, and laid
before Parliament annually.
Note to 2nd edition. The official statistics for the year 1872 show, as compared with 1871, a decrease
in area under cultivation of 134,915 acres. An increase occurred in the cultivation of green crops,
turnips, mangold-wurzel, and the like; a decrease in the area under cultivation for wheat of 16,000
acres; oats, 14,000; barley and rye, 4,000; potatoes, 66,632; flax, 34,667; grass, clover, vetches, rapeseed, 30,000. The soil under cultivation for wheat shows for the last 5 years the following stages of
decrease: — 1868, 285,000 acres; 1869, 280,000; 1870, 259,000; 1871, 244,000; 1872, 228,000. For
1872 we find, in round numbers, an increase of 2,600 horses, 80,000 horned cattle, 68,609 sheep, and
a decrease of 236,000 pigs.
122
The total yearly income under Schedule D. is different in this table from that which appears in the
preceding ones, because of certain deductions allowed by law.
123
If the product also diminishes relatively per acre, it must not be forgotten that for a century and a
half England has indirectly exported the soil of Ireland, without as much as allowing its cultivators the
means for making up the constituents of the soil that had been exhausted.
124
As Ireland is regarded as the promised land of the “principle of population,” Th. Sadler, before the
publication of his work on population, issued his famous book, “Ireland, its Evils and their Remedies.”
2nd edition, London, 1829. Here, by comparison of the statistics of the individual provinces, and of
the individual counties in each province, he proves that the misery there is not, as Malthus would have
it, in proportion to the number of the population, but in inverse ratio to this.
125
Between 1851 and 1874, the total number of emigrants amounted to 2,325,922.
126
According to a table in Murphy’s “Ireland Industrial, Political and Social,” 1870, 94.6 per cent. of
the holdings do not reach 100 acres, 5.4 exceed 100 acres.
127
“Reports from the Poor Law Inspectors on the Wages of Agricultural Labourers in Dublin,” 1870.
See also “Agricultural labourers (Ireland). Return, etc.” 8 March, 1861, London, 1862.
128
l. c., pp. 29, 1.
129
l. c., p. 12.
130
l. c., p. 12.
131
l. c., p. 25.
132
l. c., p. 27.
133
l. c., p. 25
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l. c., p. 1.
l. c., pp. 31, 32.
136
l. c., p. 25.
137
l. c., p. 30.
138
l. c., pp. 21, 13.
139
“Rept. of Insp. of Fact., 31st Oct., 1866,” p. 96.
140
The total area includes also peat, bogs, and waste land.
141
How the famine and its consequences have been deliberately made the most of, both by the
individual landlords and by the English legislature, to forcibly carry out the agricultural revolution and
to thin the population of Ireland down to the proportion satisfactory to the landlords, I shall show
more fully in Vol. III. of this work, in the section on landed property. There also I return to the
condition of the small farmers and the agricultural labourers. At present, only one quotation. Nassau
W. Senior says, with other things, in his posthumous work, “Journals, Conversations and Essays
relating to Ireland.” 2 vols. London, 1868; Vol. II., p. 282. “Well,” said Dr. G., “we have got our Poor
Law and it is a great instrument for giving the victory to the landlords. Another, and a still more
powerful instrument is emigration.... No friend to Ireland can wish the war to be prolonged [between
the landlords and the small Celtic farmers] — still less, that it should end by the victory of the tenants.
The sooner it is over — the sooner Ireland becomes a grazing country, with the comparatively thin
population which a grazing country requires, the better for all classes.” The English Corn Laws of
1815 secured Ireland the monopoly of the free importation of corn into Great Britain. They favoured
artificially, therefore, the cultivation of corn. With the abolition of the Corn Laws in 1846, this
monopoly was suddenly removed. Apart from all other circumstances, this event alone was sufficient
to give a great impulse to the turning of Irish arable into pasture land, to the concentration of farms,
and to the eviction of small cultivators. After the fruitfulness of the Irish soil had been praised from
1815 to 1846, and proclaimed loudly as by Nature herself destined for the cultivation of wheat,
English agronomists, economists, politicians, discover suddenly that it is good for nothing but to
produce forage. M. Léonce de Lavergne has hastened to repeat this on the other side of the Channel. It
takes a “serious” man, à la Lavergne, to be caught by such childishness.
135
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Chapter 26: The Secret of Primitive
Accumulation
We have seen how money is changed into capital; how through capital surplus-value is made, and
from surplus-value more capital. But the accumulation of capital presupposes surplus-value;
surplus-value presupposes capitalistic production; capitalistic production presupposes the preexistence of considerable masses of capital and of labour power in the hands of producers of
commodities. The whole movement, therefore, seems to turn in a vicious circle, out of which we
can only get by supposing a primitive accumulation (previous accumulation of Adam Smith)
preceding capitalistic accumulation; an accumulation not the result of the capitalistic mode of
production, but its starting point.
This primitive accumulation plays in Political Economy about the same part as original sin in
theology. Adam bit the apple, and thereupon sin fell on the human race. Its origin is supposed to
be explained when it is told as an anecdote of the past. In times long gone by there were two sorts
of people; one, the diligent, intelligent, and, above all, frugal elite; the other, lazy rascals,
spending their substance, and more, in riotous living. The legend of theological original sin tells
us certainly how man came to be condemned to eat his bread in the sweat of his brow; but the
history of economic original sin reveals to us that there are people to whom this is by no means
essential. Never mind! Thus it came to pass that the former sort accumulated wealth, and the
latter sort had at last nothing to sell except their own skins. And from this original sin dates the
poverty of the great majority that, despite all its labour, has up to now nothing to sell but itself,
and the wealth of the few that increases constantly although they have long ceased to work. Such
insipid childishness is every day preached to us in the defence of property. M. Thiers, e.g., had
the assurance to repeat it with all the solemnity of a statesman to the French people, once so
spirituel. But as soon as the question of property crops up, it becomes a sacred duty to proclaim
the intellectual food of the infant as the one thing fit for all ages and for all stages of
development. In actual history it is notorious that conquest, enslavement, robbery, murder, briefly
force, play the great part. In the tender annals of Political Economy, the idyllic reigns from time
immemorial. Right and “labour” were from all time the sole means of enrichment, the present
year of course always excepted. As a matter of fact, the methods of primitive accumulation are
anything but idyllic.
In themselves money and commodities are no more capital than are the means of production and
of subsistence. They want transforming into capital. But this transformation itself can only take
place under certain circumstances that centre in this, viz., that two very different kinds of
commodity-possessors must come face to face and into contact; on the one hand, the owners of
money, means of production, means of subsistence, who are eager to increase the sum of values
they possess, by buying other people’s labour power; on the other hand, free labourers, the sellers
of their own labour power, and therefore the sellers of labour. Free labourers, in the double sense
that neither they themselves form part and parcel of the means of production, as in the case of
slaves, bondsmen, &c., nor do the means of production belong to them, as in the case of peasantproprietors; they are, therefore, free from, unencumbered by, any means of production of their
own. With this polarisation of the market for commodities, the fundamental conditions of
capitalist production are given. The capitalist system presupposes the complete separation of the
labourers from all property in the means by which they can realize their labour. As soon as
capitalist production is once on its own legs, it not only maintains this separation, but reproduces
it on a continually extending scale. The process, therefore, that clears the way for the capitalist
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system, can be none other than the process which takes away from the labourer the possession of
his means of production; a process that transforms, on the one hand, the social means of
subsistence and of production into capital, on the other, the immediate producers into wage
labourers. The so-called primitive accumulation, therefore, is nothing else than the historical
process of divorcing the producer from the means of production. It appears as primitive, because
it forms the prehistoric stage of capital and of the mode of production corresponding with it.
The economic structure of capitalist society has grown out of the economic structure of feudal
society. The dissolution of the latter set free the elements of the former.
The immediate producer, the labourer, could only dispose of his own person after he had ceased
to be attached to the soil and ceased to be the slave, serf, or bondsman of another. To become a
free seller of labour power, who carries his commodity wherever he finds a market, he must
further have escaped from the regime of the guilds, their rules for apprentices and journeymen,
and the impediments of their labour regulations. Hence, the historical movement which changes
the producers into wage-workers, appears, on the one hand, as their emancipation from serfdom
and from the fetters of the guilds, and this side alone exists for our bourgeois historians. But, on
the other hand, these new freedmen became sellers of themselves only after they had been robbed
of all their own means of production, and of all the guarantees of existence afforded by the old
feudal arrangements. And the history of this, their expropriation, is written in the annals of
mankind in letters of blood and fire.
The industrial capitalists, these new potentates, had on their part not only to displace the guild
masters of handicrafts, but also the feudal lords, the possessors of the sources of wealth. In this
respect, their conquest of social power appears as the fruit of a victorious struggle both against
feudal lordship and its revolting prerogatives, and against the guilds and the fetters they laid on
the free development of production and the free exploitation of man by man. The chevaliers
d’industrie, however, only succeeded in supplanting the chevaliers of the sword by making use of
events of which they themselves were wholly innocent. They have risen by means as vile as those
by which the Roman freedman once on a time made himself the master of his patronus.
The starting point of the development that gave rise to the wage labourer as well as to the
capitalist, was the servitude of the labourer. The advance consisted in a change of form of this
servitude, in the transformation of feudal exploitation into capitalist exploitation. To understand
its march, we need not go back very far. Although we come across the first beginnings of
capitalist production as early as the 14th or 15th century, sporadically, in certain towns of the
Mediterranean, the capitalistic era dates from the 16th century. Wherever it appears, the abolition
of serfdom has been long effected, and the highest development of the middle ages, the existence
of sovereign towns, has been long on the wane.
In the history of primitive accumulation, all revolutions are epoch-making that act as levers for
the capital class in course of formation; but, above all, those moments when great masses of men
are suddenly and forcibly torn from their means of subsistence, and hurled as free and
“unattached” proletarians on the labour-market. The expropriation of the agricultural producer, of
the peasant, from the soil, is the basis of the whole process. The history of this expropriation, in
different countries, assumes different aspects, and runs through its various phases in different
orders of succession, and at different periods. In England alone, which we take as our example,
has it the classic form. 1
1

In Italy, where capitalistic production developed earliest, the dissolution of serfdom also took place
earlier than elsewhere. The serf was emancipated in that country before he had acquired any
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prescriptive right to the soil. His emancipation at once transformed him into a free proletarian, who,
moreover, found his master ready waiting for him in the towns, for the most part handed down as
legacies from the Roman time. When the revolution of the world-market, about the end of the 15th
century, annihilated Northern Italy’s commercial supremacy, a movement in the reverse direction set
in. The labourers of the towns were driven en masse into the country, and gave an impulse, never
before seen, to the petite culture, carried on in the form of gardening.

Chapter 27: Expropriation of the Agricultural
Population From the Land
In England, serfdom had practically disappeared in the last part of the 14th century. The immense
majority of the population1 consisted then, and to a still larger extent, in the 15th century, of free
peasant proprietors, whatever was the feudal title under which their right of property was hidden.
In the larger seignorial domains, the old bailiff, himself a serf, was displaced by the free farmer.
The wage labourers of agriculture consisted partly of peasants, who utilised their leisure time by
working on the large estates, partly of an independent special class of wage labourers, relatively
and absolutely few in numbers. The latter also were practically at the same time peasant farmers,
since, besides their wages, they had allotted to them arable land to the extent of 4 or more acres,
together with their cottages. Besides they, with the rest of the peasants, enjoyed the usufruct of
the common land, which gave pasture to their cattle, furnished them with timber, fire-wood, turf,
&c. 2 In all countries of Europe, feudal production is characterised by division of the soil amongst
the greatest possible number of subfeudatories. The might of the feudal lord, like that of the
sovereign, depended not on the length of his rent roll, but on the number of his subjects, and the
latter depended on the number of peasant proprietors.3 Although, therefore, the English land, after
the Norman Conquest, was distributed in gigantic baronies, one of which often included some
900 of the old Anglo-Saxon lordships, it was bestrewn with small peasant properties, only here
and there interspersed with great seignorial domains. Such conditions, together with the
prosperity of the towns so characteristic of the 15th century, allowed of that wealth of the people
which Chancellor Fortescue so eloquently paints in his “Laudes legum Angliae;” but it excluded
the possibility of capitalistic wealth.
The prelude of the revolution that laid the foundation of the capitalist mode of production, was
played in the last third of the 15th, and the first decade of the 16th century. A mass of free
proletarians was hurled on the labour market by the breaking-up of the bands of feudal retainers,
who, as Sir James Steuart well says, “everywhere uselessly filled house and castle.” Although the
royal power, itself a product of bourgeois development, in its strife after absolute sovereignty
forcibly hastened on the dissolution of these bands of retainers, it was by no means the sole cause
of it. In insolent conflict with king and parliament, the great feudal lords created an incomparably
larger proletariat by the forcible driving of the peasantry from the land, to which the latter had the
same feudal right as the lord himself, and by the usurpation of the common lands. The rapid rise
of the Flemish wool manufactures, and the corresponding rise in the price of wool in England,
gave the direct impulse to these evictions. The old nobility had been devoured by the great feudal
wars. The new nobility was the child of its time, for which money was the power of all powers.
Transformation of arable land into sheep-walks was, therefore, its cry. Harrison, in his
“Description of England, prefixed to Holinshed’s Chronicles,” describes how the expropriation of
small peasants is ruining the country. “What care our great encroachers?” The dwellings of the
peasants and the cottages of the labourers were razed to the ground or doomed to decay. “If,” says
Harrison, “the old records of euerie manour be sought... it will soon appear that in some manour
seventeene, eighteene, or twentie houses are shrunk... that England was neuer less furnished with
people than at the present... Of cities and townes either utterly decaied or more than a quarter or
half diminished, though some one be a little increased here or there; of townes pulled downe for
sheepe-walks, and no more but the lordships now standing in them... I could saie somewhat.” The
complaints of these old chroniclers are always exaggerated, but they reflect faithfully the
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impression made on contemporaries by the revolution in the conditions of production. A
comparison of the writings of Chancellor Fortescue and Thomas More reveals the gulf between
the 15th and 16th century. As Thornton rightly has it, the English working class was precipitated
without any transition from its golden into its iron age.
Legislation was terrified at this revolution. It did not yet stand on that height of civilisation where
the “wealth of the nation” (i.e., the formation of capital, and the reckless exploitation and
impoverishing of the mass of the people) figure as the ultima Thule of all state-craft. In his history
of Henry VII., Bacon says: “Inclosures at that time (1489) began to be more frequent, whereby
arable land (which could not be manured without people and families) was turned into pasture,
which was easily rid by a few herdsmen; and tenancies for years, lives, and at will (whereupon
much of the yeomanry lived) were turned into demesnes. This bred a decay of people, and (by
consequence) a decay of towns, churches, tithes, and the like... In remedying of this
inconvenience the king’s wisdom was admirable, and the parliament’s at that time... they took a
course to take away depopulating enclosures, and depopulating pasturage.” An Act of Henry VII.,
1489, cap. 19, forbad the destruction of all “houses of husbandry” to which at least 20 acres of
land belonged. By an Act, 25 Henry VIII., the same law was renewed. It recites, among other
things, that many farms and large flocks of cattle, especially of sheep, are concentrated in the
hands of a few men, whereby the rent of land has much risen and tillage has fallen off, churches
and houses have been pulled down, and marvellous numbers of people have been deprived of the
means wherewith to maintain themselves and their families. The Act, therefore, ordains the
rebuilding of the decayed farmsteads, and fixes a proportion between corn land and pasture land,
&c. An Act of 1533 recites that some owners possess 24,000 sheep, and limits the number to be
owned to 2,000. 4 The cry of the people and the legislation directed, for 150 years after Henry
VII., against the expropriation of the small farmers and peasants, were alike fruitless. The secret
of their inefficiency Bacon, without knowing it, reveals to us. “The device of King Henry VII.,”
says Bacon, in his “Essays, Civil and Moral,” Essay 29, “was profound and admirable, in making
farms and houses of husbandry of a standard; that is, maintained with such a proportion of land
unto them as may breed a subject to live in convenient plenty, and no servile condition, and to
keep the plough in the hands of the owners and not mere hirelings.” 5 What the capitalist system
demanded was, on the other hand, a degraded and almost servile condition of the mass of the
people, the transformation of them into mercenaries, and of their means of labour into capital.
During this transformation period, legislation also strove to retain the 4 acres of land by the
cottage of the agricultural wage labourer, and forbad him to take lodgers into his cottage. In the
reign of James I., 1627, Roger Crocker of Front Mill, was condemned for having built a cottage
on the manor of Front Mill without 4 acres of land attached to the same in perpetuity. As late as
Charles I.’s reign, 1638, a royal commission was appointed to enforce the carrying out of the old
laws, especially that referring to the 4 acres of land. Even in Cromwell’s time, the building of a
house within 4 miles of London was forbidden unless it was endowed with 4 acres of land. As
late as the first half of the 18th century complaint is made if the cottage of the agricultural
labourer has not an adjunct of one or two acres of land. Nowadays he is lucky if it is furnished
with a little garden, or if he may rent, far away from his cottage, a few roods. “Landlords and
farmers,” says Dr. Hunter, “work here hand in hand. A few acres to the cottage would make the
labourers too independent.” 6
The process of forcible expropriation of the people received in the 16th century a new and
frightful impulse from the Reformation, and from the consequent colossal spoliation of the church
property. The Catholic church was, at the time of the Reformation, feudal proprietor of a great
part of the English land. The suppression of the monasteries, &c., hurled their inmates into the
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proletariat. The estates of the church were to a large extent given away to rapacious royal
favourites, or sold at a nominal price to speculating farmers and citizens, who drove out, en
masse, the hereditary sub-tenants and threw their holdings into one. The legally guaranteed
property of the poorer folk in a part of the church’s tithes was tacitly confiscated.7 “Pauper ubique
jacet,” cried Queen Elizabeth, after a journey through England. In the 43rd year of her reign the
nation was obliged to recognise pauperism officially by the introduction of a poor-rate. “The
authors of this law seem to have been ashamed to state the grounds of it, for [contrary to
traditional usage] it has no preamble whatever.”8 By the 16th of Charles I., ch. 4, it was declared
perpetual, and in fact only in 1834 did it take a new and harsher form. 9 These immediate results
of the Reformation were not its most lasting ones. The property of the church formed the
religious bulwark of the traditional conditions of landed property. With its fall these were no
longer tenable. 10
Even in the last decade of the 17th century, the yeomanry, the class of independent peasants, were
more numerous than the class of farmers. They had formed the backbone of Cromwell’s strength,
and, even according to the confession of Macaulay, stood in favourable contrast to the drunken
squires and to their servants, the country clergy, who had to marry their masters’ cast-off
mistresses. About 1750, the yeomanry had disappeared, 11 and so had, in the last decade of the
18th century, the last trace of the common land of the agricultural labourer. We leave on one side
here the purely economic causes of the agricultural revolution. We deal only with the forcible
means employed.
After the restoration of the Stuarts, the landed proprietors carried, by legal means, an act of
usurpation, effected everywhere on the Continent without any legal formality. They abolished the
feudal tenure of land, i.e., they got rid of all its obligations to the State, “indemnified” the State
by taxes on the peasantry and the rest of the mass of the people, vindicated for themselves the
rights of modern private property in estates to which they had only a feudal title, and, finally,
passed those laws of settlement, which, mutatis mutandis, had the same effect on the English
agricultural labourer, as the edict of the Tartar Boris Godunof on the Russian peasantry.
The “glorious Revolution” brought into power, along with William of Orange, the landlord and
capitalist appropriators of surplus-value. 12 They inaugurated the new era by practising on a
colossal scale thefts of state lands, thefts that had been hitherto managed more modestly. These
estates were given away, sold at a ridiculous figure, or even annexed to private estates by direct
seizure. 13 All this happened without the slightest observation of legal etiquette. The Crown lands
thus fraudulently appropriated, together with the robbery of the Church estates, as far as these had
not been lost again during the republican revolution, form the basis of the today princely domains
of the English oligarchy. 14 The bourgeois capitalists favoured the operation with the view, among
others, to promoting free trade in land, to extending the domain of modern agriculture on the
large farm-system, and to increasing their supply of the free agricultural proletarians ready to
hand. Besides, the new landed aristocracy was the natural ally of the new bankocracy, of the
newly-hatched haute finance, and of the large manufacturers, then depending on protective
duties. The English bourgeoisie acted for its own interest quite as wisely as did the Swedish
bourgeoisie who, reversing the process, hand in hand with their economic allies, the peasantry,
helped the kings in the forcible resumption of the Crown lands from the oligarchy. This happened
since 1604 under Charles X. and Charles XI.
Communal property – always distinct from the State property just dealt with – was an old
Teutonic institution which lived on under cover of feudalism. We have seen how the forcible
usurpation of this, generally accompanied by the turning of arable into pasture land, begins at the
end of the 15th and extends into the 16th century. But, at that time, the process was carried on by
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means of individual acts of violence against which legislation, for a hundred and fifty years,
fought in vain. The advance made by the 18th century shows itself in this, that the law itself
becomes now the instrument of the theft of the people’s land, although the large farmers make
use of their little independent methods as well.15 The parliamentary form of the robbery is that of
Acts for enclosures of Commons, in other words, decrees by which the landlords grant
themselves the people’s land as private property, decrees of expropriation of the people. Sir F. M.
Eden refutes his own crafty special pleading, in which he tries to represent communal property as
the private property of the great landlords who have taken the place of the feudal lords, when he,
himself, demands a “general Act of Parliament for the enclosure of Commons” (admitting thereby
that a parliamentary coup d’état is necessary for its transformation into private property), and
moreover calls on the legislature for the indemnification for the expropriated poor.16
Whilst the place of the independent yeoman was taken by tenants at will, small farmers on yearly
leases, a servile rabble dependent on the pleasure of the landlords, the systematic robbery of the
Communal lands helped especially, next to the theft of the State domains, to swell those large
farms, that were called in the 18th century capital farms 17 or merchant farms, 18 and to “set free”
the agricultural population as proletarians for manufacturing industry.
The 18th century, however, did not yet recognise as fully as the 19th, the identity between
national wealth and the poverty of the people. Hence the most vigorous polemic, in the economic
literature of that time, on the “enclosure of commons.” From the mass of materials that lie before
me, I give a few extracts that will throw a strong light on the circumstances of the time. “In
several parishes of Hertfordshire,” writes one indignant person, “24 farms, numbering on the
average 50-150 acres, have been melted up into three farms.”19 “In Northamptonshire and
Leicestershire the enclosure of common lands has taken place on a very large scale, and most of
the new lordships, resulting from the enclosure, have been turned into pasturage, in consequence
of which many lordships have not now 50 acres ploughed yearly, in which 1,500 were ploughed
formerly. The ruins of former dwelling-houses, barns, stables, &c.,” are the sole traces of the
former inhabitants. “An hundred houses and families have in some open-field villages dwindled
to eight or ten.... The landholders in most parishes that have been enclosed only 15 or 20 years,
are very few in comparison of the numbers who occupied them in their open-field state. It is no
uncommon thing for 4 or 5 wealthy graziers to engross a large enclosed lordship which was
before in the hands of 20 or 30 farmers, and as many smaller tenants and proprietors. All these are
hereby thrown out of their livings with their families and many other families who were chiefly
employed and supported by them.” 20 It was not only the land that lay waste, but often land
cultivated either in common or held under a definite rent paid to the community, that was
annexed by the neighbouring landlords under pretext of enclosure. “I have here in view
enclosures of open fields and lands already improved. It is acknowledged by even the writers in
defence of enclosures that these diminished villages increase the monopolies of farms, raise the
prices of provisions, and produce depopulation ... and even the enclosure of waste lands (as now
carried on) bears hard on the poor, by depriving them of a part of their subsistence, and only goes
towards increasing farms already too large.” 21 “When,” says Dr. Price, “this land gets into the
hands of a few great farmers, the consequence must be that the little farmers” (earlier designated
by him “a multitude of little proprietors and tenants, who maintain themselves and families by the
produce of the ground they occupy by sheep kept on a common, by poultry, hogs, &c., and who
therefore have little occasion to purchase any of the means of subsistence”) “will be converted
into a body of men who earn their subsistence by working for others, and who will be under a
necessity of going to market for all they want.... There will, perhaps, be more labour, because
there will be more compulsion to it.... Towns and manufactures will increase, because more will
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be driven to them in quest of places and employment. This is the way in which the engrossing of
farms naturally operates. And this is the way in which, for many years, it has been actually
operating in this kingdom.” 22 He sums up the effect of the enclosures thus: “Upon the whole, the
circumstances of the lower ranks of men are altered in almost every respect for the worse. From
little occupiers of land, they are reduced to the state of day-labourers and hirelings; and, at the
same time, their subsistence in that state has become more difficult.”23 In fact, usurpation of the
common lands and the revolution in agriculture accompanying this, told so acutely on the
agricultural labourers that, even according to Eden, between 1765 and 1780, their wages began to
fall below the minimum, and to be supplemented by official poor-law relief. Their wages, he
says, “were not more than enough for the absolute necessaries of life.”
Let us hear for a moment a defender of enclosures and an opponent of Dr. Price. “Not is it a
consequence that there must be depopulation, because men are not seen wasting their labour in
the open field.... If, by converting the little farmers into a body of men who must work for others,
more labour is produced, it is an advantage which the nation” (to which, of course, the
“converted” ones do not belong) “should wish for ... the produce being greater when their joint
labours are employed on one farm, there will be a surplus for manufactures, and by this means
manufactures, one of the mines of the nation, will increase, in proportion to the quantity of corn
produced.” 24
The stoical peace of mind with which the political economist regards the most shameless
violation of the “sacred rights of property” and the grossest acts of violence to persons, as soon as
they are necessary to lay the foundations of the capitalistic mode of production, is shown by Sir
F. M. Eden, philanthropist and tory to boot. The whole series of thefts, outrages, and popular
misery, that accompanied the forcible expropriation of the people, from the last third of the 15th
to the end of the 18th century, lead him merely to the comfortable conclusion: “The due
proportion between arable land and pasture had to be established. During the whole of the 14th
and the greater part of the 15th century, there was one acre of pasture to 2, 3, and even 4 of arable
land. About the middle of the 16th century the proportion was changed of 2 acres of pasture to 2,
later on, of 2 acres of pasture to one of arable, until at last the just proportion of 3 acres of pasture
to one of arable land was attained.”
In the 19th century, the very memory of the connexion between the agricultural labourer and the
communal property had, of course, vanished. To say nothing of more recent times, have the
agricultural population received a farthing of compensation for the 3,511,770 acres of common
land which between 1801 and 1831 were stolen from them and by parliamentary devices
presented to the landlords by the landlords?
The last process of wholesale expropriation of the agricultural population from the soil is, finally,
the so-called clearing of estates, i.e., the sweeping men off them. All the English methods hitherto
considered culminated in “clearing.” As we saw in the picture of modern conditions given in a
former chapter, where there are no more independent peasants to get rid of, the “clearing” of
cottages begins; so that the agricultural labourers do not find on the soil cultivated by them even
the spot necessary for their own housing. But what “clearing of estates” really and properly
signifies, we learn only in the promised land of modern romance, the Highlands of Scotland.
There the process is distinguished by its systematic character, by the magnitude of the scale on
which it is carried out at one blow (in Ireland landlords have gone to the length of sweeping away
several villages at once; in Scotland areas as large as German principalities are dealt with), finally
by the peculiar form of property, under which the embezzled lands were held.
The Highland Celts were organised in clans, each of which was the owner of the land on which it
was settled. The representative of the clan, its chief or “great man,” was only the titular owner of
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this property, just as the Queen of England is the titular owner of all the national soil. When the
English government succeeded in suppressing the intestine wars of these “great men,” and their
constant incursions into the Lowland plains, the chiefs of the clans by no means gave up their
time-honoured trade as robbers; they only changed its form. On their own authority they
transformed their nominal right into a right of private property, and as this brought them into
collision with their clansmen, resolved to drive them out by open force. “A king of England might
as well claim to drive his subjects into the sea,” says Professor Newman. 25 This revolution, which
began in Scotland after the last rising of the followers of the Pretender, can be followed through
its first phases in the writings of Sir James Steuart 26 and James Anderson. 27 In the 18th century
the hunted-out Gaels were forbidden to emigrate from the country, with a view to driving them by
force to Glasgow and other manufacturing towns. 28 As an example of the method 29 obtaining in
the 19th century, the “clearing” made by the Duchess of Sutherland will suffice here. This person,
well instructed in economy, resolved, on entering upon her government, to effect a radical cure,
and to turn the whole country, whose population had already been, by earlier processes of the like
kind, reduced to 15,000, into a sheep-walk. From 1814 to 1820 these 15,000 inhabitants, about
3,000 families, were systematically hunted and rooted out. All their villages were destroyed and
burnt, all their fields turned into pasturage. British soldiers enforced this eviction, and came to
blows with the inhabitants. One old woman was burnt to death in the flames of the hut, which she
refused to leave. Thus this fine lady appropriated 794,000 acres of land that had from time
immemorial belonged to the clan. She assigned to the expelled inhabitants about 6,000 acres on
the sea-shore – 2 acres per family. The 6,000 acres had until this time lain waste, and brought in
no income to their owners. The Duchess, in the nobility of her heart, actually went so far as to let
these at an average rent of 2s. 6d. per acre to the clansmen, who for centuries had shed their blood
for her family. The whole of the stolen clanland she divided into 29 great sheep farms, each
inhabited by a single family, for the most part imported English farm-servants. In the year 1835
the 15,000 Gaels were already replaced by 131,000 sheep. The remnant of the aborigines flung on
the sea-shore tried to live by catching fish. They became amphibious and lived, as an English
author says, half on land and half on water, and withal only half on both.30
But the brave Gaels must expiate yet more bitterly their idolatry, romantic and of the mountains,
for the “great men” of the clan. The smell of their fish rose to the noses of the great men. They
scented some profit in it, and let the sea-shore to the great fishmongers of London. For the second
time the Gaels were hunted out.31
But, finally, part of the sheep-walks are turned into deer preserves. Every one knows that there
are no real forests in England. The deer in the parks of the great are demurely domestic cattle, fat
as London aldermen. Scotland is therefore the last refuge of the “noble passion.” “In the
Highlands,” says Somers in 1848, “new forests are springing up like mushrooms. Here, on one
side of Gaick, you have the new forest of Glenfeshie; and there on the other you have the new
forest of Ardverikie. In the same line you have the Black Mount, an immense waste also recently
erected. From east to west – from the neighbourhood of Aberdeen to the crags of Oban – you
have now a continuous line of forests; while in other parts of the Highlands there are the new
forests of Loch Archaig, Glengarry, Glenmoriston, &c. Sheep were introduced into glens which
had been the seats of communities of small farmers; and the latter were driven to seek subsistence
on coarser and more sterile tracks of soil. Now deer are supplanting sheep; and these are once
more dispossessing the small tenants, who will necessarily be driven down upon still coarser land
and to more grinding penury. Deer-forests 32 and the people cannot co-exist. One or other of the
two must yield. Let the forests be increased in number and extent during the next quarter of a
century, as they have been in the last, and the Gaels will perish from their native soil... This
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movement among the Highland proprietors is with some a matter of ambition... with some love of
sport... while others, of a more practical cast, follow the trade in deer with an eye solely to profit.
For it is a fact, that a mountain range laid out in forest is, in many cases, more profitable to the
proprietor than when let as a sheep-walk. ... The huntsman who wants a deer-forest limits his
offers by no other calculation than the extent of his purse.... Sufferings have been inflicted in the
Highlands scarcely less severe than those occasioned by the policy of the Norman kings. Deer
have received extended ranges, while men have been hunted within a narrower and still narrower
circle.... One after one the liberties of the people have been cloven down.... And the oppressions
are daily on the increase.... The clearance and dispersion of the people is pursued by the
proprietors as a settled principle, as an agricultural necessity, just as trees and brushwood are
cleared from the wastes of America or Australia; and the operation goes on in a quiet, businesslike way, &c.” 33
The spoliation of the church’s property, the fraudulent alienation of the State domains, the
robbery of the common lands, the usurpation of feudal and clan property, and its transformation
into modern private property under circumstances of reckless terrorism, were just so many idyllic
methods of primitive accumulation. They conquered the field for capitalistic agriculture, made the
soil part and parcel of capital, and created for the town industries the necessary supply of a “free”
and outlawed proletariat.
1

“The petty proprietors who cultivated their own fields with their own hands, and enjoyed a modest
competence.... then formed a much more important part of the nation than at present. If we may trust
the best statistical writers of that age, not less than 160,000 proprietors who, with their families, must
have made up more than a seventh of the whole population, derived their subsistence from little
freehold estates. The average income of these small landlords... was estimated at between £60 and £70
a year. It was computed that the number of persons who tilled their own land was greater than the
number of those who farmed the land of others.” Macaulay: “History of England,” 10th ed., 1854, I.
pp. 333, 334. Even in the last third of the 17th century, 4/5 of the English people were agricultural. (l.
c., p. 413.) I quote Macaulay, because as systematic falsifier of history he minimises as much as
possible facts of this kind.
2
We must never forget that even the serf was not only the owner, if but a tribute-paying owner, of the
piece of land attached to his house, but also a co-possessor of the common land. “Le paysan (in
Silesia, under Frederick II.) est serf.” Nevertheless, these serfs possess common lands. “On n’a pas pu
encore engager les Silésiens au partage des communes, tandis que dans la Nouvelle Marche, il n’y a
guère de village où ce partage ne soit exécuté avec le plus grand succès.” [The peasant ... is a serf. ... It
has not yet been possible to persuade the Silesians to partition the common lands, whereas in the
Neumark there is scarcely a village where the partition has not been implemented with very great
success] (Mirabeau: “De la Monarchie Prussienne.” Londres, 1788, t. ii, pp. 125, 126.)
3
Japan, with its purely feudal organisation of landed property and its developed petite culture, gives a
much truer picture of the European middle ages than all our history books, dictated as these are, for
the most part, by bourgeois prejudices. It is very convenient to be “liberal” at the expense of the
middle ages.
4
In his “Utopia,” Thomas More says, that in England “your shepe that were wont to be so meke and
tame, and so smal eaters, now, as I heare saye, be become so great devourers and so wylde that they
eate up, and swallow downe, the very men themselfes.” “Utopia,” transl. by Robinson, ed. Arber,
Lond., 1869, p. 41.
5
Bacon shows the connexion between a free, well-to-do peasantry and good infantry. “This did
wonderfully concern the might and mannerhood of the kingdom to have farms as it were of a standard
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sufficient to maintain an able body out of penury, and did in effect amortise a great part of the lands of
the kingdom unto the hold and occupation of the yeomanry or middle people, of a condition between
gentlemen, and cottagers and peasants.... For it hath been held by the general opinion of men of best
judgment in the wars.... that the principal strength of an army consisteth in the infantry or foot. And to
make good infantry it requireth men bred, not in a servile or indigent fashion, but in some free and
plentiful manner. Therefore, if a state run most to noblemen and gentlemen, and that the husbandman
and ploughmen be but as their workfolk and labourers, or else mere cottagers (which are but hous’d
beggars), you may have a good cavalry, but never good stable bands of foot.... And this is to be seen
in France, and Italy, and some other parts abroad, where in effect all is noblesse or peasantry....
insomuch that they are inforced to employ mercenary bands of Switzers and the like, for their
battalions of foot; whereby also it comes to pass that those nations have much people and few
soldiers.” (“The Reign of Henry VII.” Verbatim reprint from Kennet’s England. Ed. 1719. Lond.,
1870, p. 308.)
6
Dr. Hunter, l. c., p. 134. “The quantity of land assigned (in the old laws) would now be judged too
great for labourers, and rather as likely to convert them into small farmers.” (George Roberts: “The
Social History of the People of the Southern Counties of England in Past Centuries.” Lond., 1856, pp.
184-185.)
7
“The right of the poor to share in the tithe, is established by the tenour of ancient statutes.” (Tuckett,
l. c., Vol. II., pg. 804-805.)
8
William Cobbett: “A History of the Protestant Reformation,” § 471.
9
The “spirit” of Protestantism may be seen from the following, among other things. In the south of
England certain landed proprietors and well-to-do farmers put their heads together and propounded ten
questions as to the right interpretation of the poor-law of Elizabeth. These they laid before a celebrated
jurist of that time, Sergeant Snigge (later a judge under James I.) for his opinion. “Question 9 — Some
of the more wealthy farmers in the parish have devised a skilful mode by which all the trouble of
executing this Act (the 43rd of Elizabeth) might be avoided. They have proposed that we shall erect a
prison in the parish, and then give notice to the neighbourhood, that if any persons are disposed to
farm the poor of this parish, they do give in sealed proposals, on a certain day, of the lowest price at
which they will take them off our hands; and that they will be authorised to refuse to any one unless
he be shut up in the aforesaid prison. The proposers of this plan conceive that there will be found in
the adjoining counties, persons, who, being unwilling to labour and not possessing substance or credit
to take a farm or ship, so as to live without labour, may be induced to make a very advantageous offer
to the parish. If any of the poor perish under the contractor’s care, the sin will lie at his door, as the
parish will have done its duty by them. We are, however, apprehensive that the present Act (43rd of
Elizabeth) will not warrant a prudential measure of this kind; but you are to learn that the rest of the
freeholders of the county, and of the adjoining county of B, will very readily join in instructing their
members to propose an Act to enable the parish to contract with a person to lock up and work the
poor; and to declare that if any person shall refuse to be so locked up and worked, he shall be entitled
to no relief. This, it is hoped, will prevent persons in distress from wanting relief, and be the means of
keeping down parishes.” (R. Blakey: “The History of Political Literature from the Earliest Times.”
Lond., 1855, Vol. II., pp. 84-85.) In Scotland, the abolition of serfdom took place some centuries later
than in England. Even in 1698, Fletcher of Saltoun, declared in the Scotch parliament, “The number of
beggars in Scotland is reckoned at not less than 200,000. The only remedy that I, a republican on
principle, can suggest, is to restore the old state of serfdom, to make slaves of all those who are unable
to provide for their own subsistence.” Eden, l. c., Book I., ch. 1, pp. 60-61, says, “The decrease of
villenage seems necessarily to have been the era of the origin of the poor. Manufactures and
commerce are the two parents of our national poor.” Eden, like our Scotch republican on principle,
errs only in this: not the abolition of villenage, but the abolition of the property of the agricultural
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labourer in the soil made him a proletarian, and eventually a pauper. In France, where the
expropriation was effected in another way, the ordonnance of Moulins, 1571, and the Edict of 1656,
correspond to the English poor-laws.
10
Professor Rogers, although formerly Professor of Political Economy in the University of Oxford,
the hotbed of Protestant orthodoxy, in his preface to the “History of Agriculture” lays stress on the
fact of the pauperisation of the mass of the people by the Reformation.
11
“A Letter to Sir T. C. Bunbury, Bart., on the High Price of Provisions. By a Suffolk Gentleman.”
Ipswich, 1795, p. 4. Even the fanatical advocate of the system of large farms, the author of the
“Inquiry into the Connexion between the Present Price of Provisions,” London, 1773, p. 139, says: “I
most lament the loss of our yeomanry, that set of men who really kept up the independence of this
nation; and sorry I am to see their lands now in the hands of monopolising lords, tenanted out to small
farmers, who hold their leases on such conditions as to be little better than vassals ready to attend a
summons on every mischievous occasion.”
12
On the private moral character of this bourgeois hero, among other things: “The large grant of lands
in Ireland to Lady Orkney, in 1695, is a public instance of the king’s affection, and the lady’s
influence... Lady Orkney’s endearing offices are supposed to have been — fœda labiorum ministeria.”
(In the Sloane Manuscript Collection, at the British Museum, No. 4224. The Manuscript is entitled:
“The character and behaviour of King William, Sunderland, etc., as represented in Original Letters to
the Duke of Shrewsbury from Somers Halifax, Oxford, Secretary Vernon, etc.” It is full of curiosa.)
13
“The illegal alienation of the Crown Estates, partly by sale and partly by gift, is a scandalous
chapter in English history... a gigantic fraud on the nation.” (F. W. Newman, “Lectures on Political
Economy.” London, 1851, pp. 129, 130.) [For details as to how the present large landed proprietors of
England came into their possessions see “Our Old Nobility. By Noblesse Oblige.” London, 1879. —
F. E.]
14
Read, e.g., E. Burke’s Pamphlet on the ducal house of Bedford, whose offshoot was Lord John
Russell, the “tomtit of Liberalism.”
15
“The farmers forbid cottagers to keep any living creatures besides themselves and children, under
the pretence that if they keep any beasts or poultry, they will steal from the farmers’ barns for their
support; they also say, keep the cottagers poor and you will keep them industrious, &c., but the real
fact I believe, is that the farmers may have the whole right of common to themselves.” (“A Political
Inquiry into the Consequences of Enclosing Waste Lands.” London, 1785, p. 75.)
16
Eden, l. c., preface.
17
“Capital Farms.” Two letters on the Flour Trade and the Dearness of Corn. By a person in business.
London, 1767, pp. 19, 20.
18
“Merchant Farms.” “An Enquiry into the Causes of the Present High Price of Provisions.” London,
1767, p. 11. Note.— This excellent work, that was published anonymously, is by the Rev. Nathaniel
Forster.
19
Thomas Wright: “A Short Address to the Public on the Monopoly of Large Farms,” 1779, pp. 2, 3.
20
Rev. Addington: “Inquiry into the Reasons for or against Enclosing Open Fields,” London, 1772,
pp. 37, 43 passim.
21
Dr. R. Price, l. c., v. ii., p. 155, Forster, Addington, Kent, Price, and James Anderson, should be
read and compared with the miserable prattle of Sycophant MacCulloch in his catalogue: “The
Literature of Political Economy,” London, 1845.
22
Price, l. c., p. 147.
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Price, l. c., p. 159. We are reminded of ancient Rome. “The rich had got possession of the greater
part of the undivided land. They trusted in the conditions of the time, that these possessions would not
be again taken from them, and bought, therefore, some of the pieces of land lying near theirs, and
belonging to the poor, with the acquiescence of their owners, and took some by force, so that they now
were cultivating widely extended domains, instead of isolated fields. Then they employed slaves in
agriculture and cattle-breeding, because freemen would have been taken from labour for military
service. The possession of slaves brought them great gain, inasmuch as these, on account of their
immunity from military service, could freely multiply and have a multitude of children. Thus the
powerful men drew all wealth to themselves, and all the land swarmed with slaves. The Italians, on
the other hand, were always decreasing in number, destroyed as they were by poverty, taxes, and
military service. Even when times of peace came, they were doomed to complete inactivity, because
the rich were in possession of the soil, and used slaves instead of freemen in the tilling of it.” (Appian:
“Civil Wars,” I.7.) This passage refers to the time before the Licinian rogations. Military service,
which hastened to so great an extent the ruin of the Roman plebeians, was also the chief means by
which, as in a forcing-house, Charlemagne brought about the transformation of free German peasants
into serfs and bondsmen.
24
“An Inquiry into the Connexion between the Present Price of Provisions, &c.,” pp. 124, 129. To the
like effect, but with an opposite tendency: “Working-men are driven from their cottages and forced
into the towns to seek for employment; but then a larger surplus is obtained, and thus capital is
augmented.” (“The Perils of the Nation,” 2nd ed. London., 1843, p. 14.)
25
l. c., p. 132.
26
Steuart says: “If you compare the rent of these lands” (he erroneously includes in this economic
category the tribute of the taskmen to the clanchief) “with the extent, it appears very small. If you
compare it with the numbers fed upon the farm, you will find that an estate in the Highlands
maintains, perhaps, ten times as many people as another of the same value in a good and fertile
province.” (l. c., vol. i., ch. xvi., p. 104.)
27
James Anderson: “Observations on the Means of Exciting a Spirit of National Industry, &c.,”
Edinburgh, 1777.
28
In 1860 the people expropriated by force were exported to Canada under false pretences. Some fled
to the mountains and neighbouring islands. They were followed by the police, came to blows with
them and escaped.
29
“In the Highlands of Scotland,” says Buchanan, the commentator on Adam Smith, 1814, “the
ancient state of property is daily subverted.... The landlord, without regard to the hereditary tenant (a
category used in error here), now offers his land to the highest bidder, who, if he is an improver,
instantly adopts a new system of cultivation. The land, formerly overspread with small tenants or
labourers, was peopled in proportion to its produce, but under the new system of improved cultivation
and increased rents, the largest possible produce is obtained at the least possible expense: and the
useless hands being, with this view, removed, the population is reduced, not to what the land will
maintain, but to what it will employ. “The dispossessed tenants either seek a subsistence in the
neighbouring towns,” &c. (David Buchanan: “Observations on, &c., A. Smith’s Wealth of Nations.”
Edinburgh, 1814, vol. iv., p. 144.) “The Scotch grandees dispossessed families as they would grub up
coppice-wood, and they treated villages and their people as Indians harassed with wild beasts do, in
their vengeance, a jungle with tigers.... Man is bartered for a fleece or a carcase of mutton, nay, held
cheaper.... Why, how much worse is it than the intention of the Moguls, who, when they had broken
into the northern provinces of China, proposed in council to exterminate the inhabitants, and convert
the land into pasture. This proposal many Highland proprietors have effected in their own country
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against their own countrymen.” (George Ensor: “An Inquiry Concerning the Population of Nations.”
Lond,. 1818, pp. 215, 216.)
30
When the present Duchess of Sutherland entertained Mrs. Beecher Stowe, authoress of “Uncle
Tom’s Cabin,” with great magnificence in London to show her sympathy for the Negro slaves of the
American republic — a sympathy that she prudently forgot, with her fellow-aristocrats, during the
civil war, in which every “noble” English heart beat for the slave-owner — I gave in the New York
Tribune the facts about the Sutherland slaves. (Epitomised in part by Carey in “The Slave Trade.”
Philadelphia, 1853, pp. 203, 204.) My article was reprinted in a Scotch newspaper, and led to a pretty
polemic between the latter and the sycophants of the Sutherlands.
31
Interesting details on this fish trade will be found in Mr. David Urquhart’s Portfolio, new series. —
Nassau W. Senior, in his posthumous work, already quoted, terms “the proceedings in Sutherlandshire
one of the most beneficent clearings since the memory of man.” (l. c.)
32
The deer-forests of Scotland contain not a single tree. The sheep are driven from, and then the deer
driven to, the naked hills, and then it is called a deer-forest. Not even timber-planting and real forest
culture.
33
Robert Somers: “Letters from the Highlands: or the Famine of 1847.” London, 1848, pp. 12-28
passim. These letters originally appeared in The Times. The English economists of course explained
the famine of the Gaels in 1847, by their over-population. At all events, they “were pressing on their
food-supply.” The “clearing of estates,” or as it is called in Germany, “Bauernlegen,” occurred in
Germany especially after the 30 years’ war, and led to peasant-revolts as late as 1790 in Kursachsen. It
obtained especially in East Germany. In most of the Prussian provinces, Frederick II. for the first time
secured right of property for the peasants. After the conquest of Silesia he forced the landlords to
rebuild the huts, barns, etc., and to provide the peasants with cattle and implements. He wanted
soldiers for his army and tax-payers for his treasury. For the rest, the pleasant life that the peasant led
under Frederick’s system of finance and hodge-podge rule of despotism, bureaucracy and feudalism,
may be seen from the following quotation from his admirer, Mirabeau: “Le lin fait donc une des
grandes richesses du cultivateur dans le Nord de l’Allemagne. Malheureusement pour l’espèce
humaine, ce n’est qu’une ressource contre la misère et non un moyen de bien-être. Les impôts directs,
les corvées, les servitudes de tout genre, écrasent le cultivateur allemand, qui paie encore des impôts
indirects dans tout ce qu’il achète.... et pour comble de ruine, il n’ose pas vendre ses productions où et
comme il le veut; il n’ose pas acheter ce dont il a besoin aux marchands qui pourraient le lui livrer au
meilleur prix. Toutes ces causes le ruinent insensiblement, et il se trouverait hors d’état de payer les
impôts directs à l’échéance sans la filerie; elle lui offre une ressource, en occupant utilement sa
femme, ses enfants, ses servants, ses valets, et lui-même; mais quelle pénible vie, même aidée de ce
secours. En été, il travaille comme un forçat au labourage et à la récolte; il se couche à 9 heures et se
lève à deux, pour suffire aux travaux; en hiver il devrait réparer ses forces par un plus grand repos;
mais il manquera de grains pour le pain et les semailles, s’il se défait des denrées qu’il faudrait vendre
pour payer les impôts. Il faut donc filer pour suppléer à ce vide.... il faut y apporter la plus grande
assiduité. Aussi le paysan se couche-t-il en hiver à minuit, une heure, et se lève à cinq ou six; ou bien
il se couche à neuf, et se lève à deux, et cela tous les jours de la vie si ce n’est le dimanche. Ces excès
de veille et de travail usent la nature humaine, et de là vient qu’hommes et femmes vieillissent
beaucoup plutôt dans les campagnes que dans les villes.” [Flax represents one of the greatest sources
of wealth for the peasant of North Germany. Unfortunately for the human race, this is only a resource
against misery and not a means towards well-being. Direct taxes, forced labour service, obligations of
all kinds crush the German peasant, especially as he still has to pay indirect taxes on everything he
buys, ... and to complete his ruin he dare not sell his produce where and as he wishes; he dare not buy
what he needs from the merhcants who could sell it to him at a cheaper price. He is slowly ruined by
all those factors, and when the dirct taxes fall due, he would find himself incapable of paying them
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without his spinning-wheel; it offers him a last resort, while providing useful occupation for his wife,
his children, his maids, his farm-hands, and himself; but what a painful life he leads, even with this
extra resource! In summer, he works like a convict with the plough and at harvest; he goes to bed at
nine o’clock and rises at two to get through all his work; in winter he ought to be recovering his
strength by sleeping longer; but he would run short of corn for his bread and next year’s sowing if he
got rid of the products that he needs to sell in order to pay the taxes. He therefore has to spin to fill up
this gap ... and indeed he must do so most assiduously. Thus the peasant goes to bed at midnight or
one o’clock in winter, and gets up at five or six; or he goes to bed at nine and gets up at two, and this
he does every day of his life except Sundays. These excessively short hours of sleep and long hours of
work consume a person’s strength and hence it happens that men and women age much more in the
country than in the towns] (Mirabeau, l. c., t.III. pp. 212 sqq.)
Note to the second edition. In April 1866, 18 years after the publication of the work of Robert Somers
quoted above, Professor Leone Levi gave a lecture before the Society of Arts on the transformation of
sheep-walks into deer-forest, in which he depicts the advance in the devastation of the Scottish
Highlands. He says, with other things: “Depopulation and transformation into sheep-walks were the
most convenient means for getting an income without expenditure... A deer-forest in place of a sheepwalk was a common change in the Highlands. The landowners turned out the sheep as they once
turned out the men from their estates, and welcomed the new tenants — the wild beasts and the
feathered birds.... One can walk from the Earl of Dalhousie’s estates in Forfarshire to John O’Groats,
without ever leaving forest land.... In many of these woods the fox, the wild cat, the marten, the
polecat, the weasel and the Alpine hare are common; whilst the rabbit, the squirrel and the rat have
lately made their way into the country. Immense tracts of land, much of which is described in the
statistical account of Scotland as having a pasturage in richness and extent of very superior
description, are thus shut out from all cultivation and improvement, and are solely devoted to the sport
of a few persons for a very brief period of the year.” The London Economist of June 2, 1866, says,
“Amongst the items of news in a Scotch paper of last week, we read... ’One of the finest sheep farms
in Sutherlandshire, for which a rent of £1,200 a year was recently offered, on the expiry of the existing
lease this year, is to be converted into a deer-forest.’ Here we see the modern instincts of feudalism ...
operating pretty much as they did when the Norman Conqueror... destroyed 36 villages to create the
New Forest.... Two millions of acres... totally laid waste, embracing within their area some of the most
fertile lands of Scotland. The natural grass of Glen Tilt was among the most nutritive in the county of
Perth. The deer-forest of Ben Aulder was by far the best grazing ground in the wide district of
Badenoch; a part of the Black Mount forest was the best pasture for black-faced sheep in Scotland.
Some idea of the ground laid waste for purely sporting purposes in Scotland may be formed from the
fact that it embraced an area larger than the whole county of Perth. The resources of the forest of Ben
Aulder might give some idea of the loss sustained from the forced desolations. The ground would
pasture 15,000 sheep, and as it was not more than one-thirtieth part of the old forest ground in
Scotland ... it might, &c., ... All that forest land is as totally unproductive.... It might thus as well have
been submerged under the waters of the German Ocean.... Such extemporised wildernesses or deserts
ought to be put down by the decided interference of the Legislature.”

Chapter 28: Bloody Legislation Against the
Expropriated, from the End of the 15th Century.
Forcing Down of Wages by Acts of Parliament
The proletariat created by the breaking up of the bands of feudal retainers and by the forcible
expropriation of the people from the soil, this “free” proletariat could not possibly be absorbed by
the nascent manufactures as fast as it was thrown upon the world. On the other hand, these men,
suddenly dragged from their wonted mode of life, could not as suddenly adapt themselves to the
discipline of their new condition. They were turned en masse into beggars, robbers, vagabonds,
partly from inclination, in most cases from stress of circumstances. Hence at the end of the 15th
and during the whole of the 16th century, throughout Western Europe a bloody legislation against
vagabondage. The fathers of the present working class were chastised for their enforced
transformation into vagabonds and paupers. Legislation treated them as “voluntary” criminals,
and assumed that it depended on their own good will to go on working under the old conditions
that no longer existed.
In England this legislation began under Henry VII.
Henry VIII. 1530: Beggars old and unable to work receive a beggar’s licence. On the other hand,
whipping and imprisonment for sturdy vagabonds. They are to be tied to the cart-tail and whipped
until the blood streams from their bodies, then to swear an oath to go back to their birthplace or to
where they have lived the last three years and to “put themselves to labour.” What grim irony! In
27 Henry VIII. the former statute is repeated, but strengthened with new clauses. For the second
arrest for vagabondage the whipping is to be repeated and half the ear sliced off; but for the third
relapse the offender is to be executed as a hardened criminal and enemy of the common weal.
Edward VI.: A statute of the first year of his reign, 1547, ordains that if anyone refuses to work,
he shall be condemned as a slave to the person who has denounced him as an idler. The master
shall feed his slave on bread and water, weak broth and such refuse meat as he thinks fit. He has
the right to force him to do any work, no matter how disgusting, with whip and chains. If the
slave is absent a fortnight, he is condemned to slavery for life and is to be branded on forehead or
back with the letter S; if he runs away thrice, he is to be executed as a felon. The master can sell
him, bequeath him, let him out on hire as a slave, just as any other personal chattel or cattle. If the
slaves attempt anything against the masters, they are also to be executed. Justices of the peace, on
information, are to hunt the rascals down. If it happens that a vagabond has been idling about for
three days, he is to be taken to his birthplace, branded with a red-hot iron with the letter V on the
breast and be set to work, in chains, in the streets or at some other labour. If the vagabond gives a
false birthplace, he is then to become the slave for life of this place, of its inhabitants, or its
corporation, and to be branded with an S. All persons have the right to take away the children of
the vagabonds and to keep them as apprentices, the young men until the 24th year, the girls until
the 20th. If they run away, they are to become up to this age the slaves of their masters, who can
put them in irons, whip them, &c., if they like. Every master may put an iron ring round the neck,
arms or legs of his slave, by which to know him more easily and to be more certain of him. 1 The
last part of this statute provides, that certain poor people may be employed by a place or by
persons, who are willing to give them food and drink and to find them work. This kind of parish
slaves was kept up in England until far into the 19th century under the name of “roundsmen.”
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Elizabeth, 1572: Unlicensed beggars above 14 years of age are to be severely flogged and
branded on the left ear unless some one will take them into service for two years; in case of a
repetition of the offence, if they are over 18, they are to be executed, unless some one will take
them into service for two years; but for the third offence they are to be executed without mercy as
felons. Similar statutes: 18 Elizabeth, c. 13, and another of 1597.2
James 1: Any one wandering about and begging is declared a rogue and a vagabond. Justices of
the peace in petty sessions are authorised to have them publicly whipped and for the first offence
to imprison them for 6 months, for the second for 2 years. Whilst in prison they are to be whipped
as much and as often as the justices of the peace think fit... Incorrigible and dangerous rogues are
to be branded with an R on the left shoulder and set to hard labour, and if they are caught begging
again, to be executed without mercy. These statutes, legally binding until the beginning of the
18th century, were only repealed by 12 Anne, c. 23.
Similar laws in France, where by the middle of the 17th century a kingdom of vagabonds
(truands) was established in Paris. Even at the beginning of Louis XVI.’s reign (Ordinance of
July 13th, 1777) every man in good health from 16 to 60 years of age, if without means of
subsistence and not practising a trade, is to be sent to the galleys. Of the same nature are the
statute of Charles V. for the Netherlands (October, 1537), the first edict of the States and Towns
of Holland (March 10, 1614), the “Plakaat” of the United Provinces (June 26, 1649), &c.
Thus were the agricultural people, first forcibly expropriated from the soil, driven from their
homes, turned into vagabonds, and then whipped, branded, tortured by laws grotesquely terrible,
into the discipline necessary for the wage system.
It is not enough that the conditions of labour are concentrated in a mass, in the shape of capital, at
the one pole of society, while at the other are grouped masses of men, who have nothing to sell
but their labour-power. Neither is it enough that they are compelled to sell it voluntarily. The
advance of capitalist production develops a working class, which by education, tradition, habit,
looks upon the conditions of that mode of production as self-evident laws of Nature. The
organisation of the capitalist process of production, once fully developed, breaks down all
resistance. The constant generation of a relative surplus-population keeps the law of supply and
demand of labour, and therefore keeps wages, in a rut that corresponds with the wants of capital.
The dull compulsion of economic relations completes the subjection of the labourer to the
capitalist. Direct force, outside economic conditions, is of course still used, but only
exceptionally. In the ordinary run of things, the labourer can be left to the “natural laws of
production,” i.e., to his dependence on capital, a dependence springing from, and guaranteed in
perpetuity by, the conditions of production themselves. It is otherwise during the historic genesis
of capitalist production. The bourgeoisie, at its rise, wants and uses the power of the state to
“regulate” wages, i.e., to force them within the limits suitable for surplus-value making, to
lengthen the working day and to keep the labourer himself in the normal degree of dependence.
This is an essential element of the so-called primitive accumulation.
The class of wage labourers, which arose in the latter half of the 14th century, formed then and in
the following century only a very small part of the population, well protected in its position by the
independent peasant proprietary in the country and the guild-organisation in the town. In country
and town master and workmen stood close together socially. The subordination of labour to
capital was only formal – i.e., the mode of production itself had as yet no specific capitalistic
character. Variable capital preponderated greatly over constant. The demand for wage labour
grew, therefore, rapidly with every accumulation of capital, whilst the supply of wage labour
followed but slowly. A large part of the national product, changed later into a fund of capitalist
accumulation, then still entered into the consumption-fund of the labourer.
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Legislation on wage labour (from the first, aimed at the exploitation of the labourer and, as it
advanced, always equally hostile to him), 3 is started in England by the Statute of Labourers, of
Edward III., 1349. The ordinance of 1350 in France, issued in the name of King John,
corresponds with it. English and French legislation run parallel and are identical in purport. So far
as the labour-statutes aim at compulsory extension of the working day, I do not return to them, as
this point was treated earlier (Chap. X., Section 5).
The Statute of Labourers was passed at the urgent instance of the House of Commons. A Tory
says naively:
“Formerly the poor demanded such high wages as to threaten industry and wealth.
Next, their wages are so low as to threaten industry and wealth equally and
perhaps more, but in another way.” 4 A tariff of wages was fixed by law for town
and country, for piece-work and day-work. The agricultural labourers were to hire
themselves out by the year, the town ones “in open market.” It was forbidden,
under pain of imprisonment, to pay higher wages than those fixed by the statute,
but the taking of higher wages was more severely punished than the giving them.
[So also in Sections 18 and 19 of the Statute of Apprentices of Elizabeth, ten
days’ imprisonment is decreed for him that pays the higher wages, but twenty-one
days for him that receives them.] A statute of 1360 increased the penalties and
authorised the masters to extort labour at the legal rate of wages by corporal
punishment. All combinations, contracts, oaths, &c., by which masons and
carpenters reciprocally bound themselves, were declared null and void. Coalition
of the labourers is treated as a heinous crime from the 14th century to 1825, the
year of the repeal of the laws against Trades’ Unions. The spirit of the Statute of
Labourers of 1349 and of its offshoots comes out clearly in the fact, that indeed a
maximum of wages is dictated by the State, but on no account a minimum.
In the 16th century, the condition of the labourers had, as we know, become much worse. The
money wage rose, but not in proportion to the depreciation of money and the corresponding rise
in the prices of commodities. Wages, therefore, in reality fell. Nevertheless, the laws for keeping
them down remained in force, together with the ear-clipping and branding of those “whom no one
was willing to take into service.” By the Statute of Apprentices 5 Elizabeth, c. 3, the justices of
the peace were empowered to fix certain wages and to modify them according to the time of the
year and the price of commodities. James I. extended these regulations of labour also to weavers,
spinners, and all possible categories of workers. 5 George II. extended the laws against coalitions
of labourers to manufactures. In the manufacturing period par excellence, the capitalist mode of
production had become sufficiently strong to render legal regulation of wages as impracticable as
it was unnecessary; but the ruling classes were unwilling in case of necessity to be without the
weapons of the old arsenal. Still, 8 George II. forbade a higher day’s wage than 2s. 7½d. for
journeymen tailors in and around London, except in cases of general mourning; still, 13 George
III., c. 68, gave the regulation of the wages of silk-weavers to the justices of the peace; still, in
1706, it required two judgments of the higher courts to decide, whether the mandates of justices
of the peace as to wages held good also for non-agricultural labourers; still, in 1799, an act of
Parliament ordered that the wages of the Scotch miners should continue to be regulated by a
statute of Elizabeth and two Scotch acts of 1661 and 1671. How completely in the meantime
circumstances had changed, is proved by an occurrence unheard-of before in the English Lower
House. In that place, where for more than 400 years laws had been made for the maximum,
beyond which wages absolutely must not rise, Whitbread in 1796 proposed a legal minimum
wage for agricultural labourers. Pitt opposed this, but confessed that the “condition of the poor
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was cruel.” Finally, in 1813, the laws for the regulation of wages were repealed. They were an
absurd anomaly, since the capitalist regulated his factory by his private legislation, and could by
the poor-rates make up the wage of the agricultural labourer to the indispensable minimum. The
provisions of the labour statutes as to contracts between master and workman, as to giving notice
and the like, which only allow of a civil action against the contract-breaking master, but on the
contrary permit a criminal action against the contract-breaking workman, are to this hour (1873)
in full force. The barbarous laws against Trades’ Unions fell in 1825 before the threatening
bearing of the proletariat. Despite this, they fell only in part. Certain beautiful fragments of the
old statute vanished only in 1859. Finally, the act of Parliament of June 29, 1871, made a
pretence of removing the last traces of this class of legislation by legal recognition of Trades’
Unions. But an act of Parliament of the same date (an act to amend the criminal law relating to
violence, threats, and molestation), re-established, in point of fact, the former state of things in a
new shape. By this Parliamentary escamotage the means which the labourers could use in a strike
or lock-out were withdrawn from the laws common to all citizens, and placed under exceptional
penal legislation, the interpretation of which fell to the masters themselves in their capacity as
justices of the peace. Two years earlier, the same House of Commons and the same Mr.
Gladstone in the well-known straightforward fashion brought in a bill for the abolition of all
exceptional penal legislation against the working class. But this was never allowed to go beyond
the second reading, and the matter was thus protracted until at last the “great Liberal party,” by an
alliance with the Tories, found courage to turn against the very proletariat that had carried it into
power. Not content with this treachery, the “great Liberal party” allowed the English judges, ever
complaisant in the service of the ruling classes, to dig up again the earlier laws against
“conspiracy,” and to apply them to coalitions of labourers. We see that only against its will and
under the pressure of the masses did the English Parliament give up the laws against Strikes and
Trades’ Unions, after it had itself, for 500 years, held, with shameless egoism, the position of a
permanent Trades’ Union of the capitalists against the labourers.
During the very first storms of the revolution, the French bourgeoisie dared to take away from the
workers the right of association but just acquired. By a decree of June 14, 1791, they declared all
coalition of the workers as “an attempt against liberty and the declaration of the rights of man,”
punishable by a fine of 500 livres, together with deprivation of the rights of an active citizen for
one year. 6 This law which, by means of State compulsion, confined the struggle between capital
and labour within limits comfortable for capital, has outlived revolutions and changes of
dynasties. Even the Reign of Terror left it untouched. It was but quite recently struck out of the
Penal Code. Nothing is more characteristic than the pretext for this bourgeois coup d’état.
“Granting,” says Chapelier, the reporter of the Select Committee on this law, “that wages ought to
be a little higher than they are, ... that they ought to be high enough for him that receives them, to
be free from that state of absolute dependence due to the want of the necessaries of life, and
which is almost that of slavery,” yet the workers must not be allowed to come to any
understanding about their own interests, nor to act in common and thereby lessen their “absolute
dependence, which is almost that of slavery;” because, forsooth, in doing this they injure “the
freedom of their cidevant masters, the present entrepreneurs,” and because a coalition against the
despotism of the quondam masters of the corporations is – guess what! – is a restoration of the
corporations abolished by the French constitution.7
1

The author of the “Essay on Trade, etc.,” 1770, says, “In the reign of Edward VI. indeed the English
seem to have set, in good earnest, about encouraging manufactures and employing the poor. This we
learn from a remarkable statute which runs thus: ‘That all vagrants shall be branded, &c.’” l. c., p. 5.
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Thomas More says in his “Utopia": “Therfore that on covetous and unsatiable cormaraunte and very
plage of his native contrey maye compasse aboute and inclose many thousand akers of grounde
together within one pale or hedge, the husbandman be thrust owte of their owne, or els either by
coneyne and fraude, or by violent oppression they be put besydes it, or by wrongs and iniuries thei be
so weried that they be compelled to sell all: by one meanes, therfore, or by other, either by hooke or
crooke they muste needes departe awaye, poore, selye, wretched soules, men, women, husbands,
wiues, fatherlesse children, widowes, wofull mothers with their yonge babes, and their whole
household smal in substance, and muche in numbre, as husbandrye requireth many handes. Awaye
thei trudge, I say, owte of their knowen accustomed houses, fyndynge no place to reste in. All their
housholde stuffe, which is very little woorthe, thoughe it might well abide the sale: yet beeynge
sodainely thruste owte, they be constrayned to sell it for a thing of nought. And when they haue
wandered abrode tyll that be spent, what cant they then els doe but steale, and then iustly pardy be
hanged, or els go about beggyng. And yet then also they be caste in prison as vagaboundes, because
they go aboute and worke not: whom no man wyl set a worke though thei neuer so willyngly profre
themselues therto.” Of these poor fugitives of whom Thomas More says that they were forced to
thieve, “7,200 great and petty thieves were put to death,” in the reign of Henry VIII. (Holinshed,
“Description of England,” Vol. 1, p. 186.) In Elizabeth’s time, “rogues were trussed up apace, and that
there was not one year commonly wherein three or four hundred were not devoured and eaten up by
the gallowes.” (Strype’s “Annals of the Reformation and Establishment of Religion and other Various
Occurrences in the Church of England during Queen Elizabeth’s Happy Reign.” Second ed., 1725,
Vol. 2.) According to this same Strype, in Somersetshire, in one year, 40 persons were executed, 35
robbers burnt in the hand, 37 whipped, and 183 discharged as “incorrigible vagabonds.” Nevertheless,
he is of opinion that this large number of prisoners does not comprise even a fifth of the actual
criminals, thanks to the negligence of the justices and the foolish compassion of the people; and the
other counties of England were not better off in this respect than Somersetshire, while some were even
worse.
3
“Whenever the legislature attempts to regulate the differences between masters and their workmen,
its counsellors are always the masters,” says A. Smith. “L’esprit des lois, c’est la propriété,” says
Linguet.
4
“Sophisms of Free Trade.” By a Barrister. Lond., 1850, p. 206. He adds maliciously: “We were
ready enough to interfere for the employer, can nothing now be done for the employed?”
5
From a clause of Statute 2 James I., c. 6, we see that certain clothmakers took upon themselves to
dictate, in their capacity of justices of the peace, the official tariff of wages in their own shops. In
Germany, especially after the Thirty Years’ War, statutes for keeping down wages were general. “The
want of servants and labourers was very troublesome to the landed proprietors in the depopulated
districts. All villagers were forbidden to let rooms to single men and women; all the latter were to be
reported to the authorities and cast into prison if they were unwilling to become servants, even if they
were employed at any other work, such as sowing seeds for the peasants at a daily wage, or even
buying and selling corn. (Imperial privileges and sanctions for Silesia, I., 25.) For a whole century in
the decrees of the small German potentates a bitter cry goes up again and again about the wicked and
impertinent rabble that will not reconcile itself to its hard lot, will not be content with the legal wage;
the individual landed proprietors are forbidden to pay more than the State had fixed by a tariff. And
yet the conditions of service were at times better after war than 100 years later; the farm servants of
Silesia had, in 1652, meat twice a week, whilst even in our century, districts are known where they
have it only three times a year. Further, wages after the war were higher than in the following
century.” (G. Freytag.)
6
Article I. of this law runs: “L’anéantissement de toute espèce de corporations du même état et
profession étant l’une des bases fondamentales de la constitution française, il est défendu de les
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rétablir de fait sous quelque prétexte et sous quelque forme que ce soit.” Article IV. declares, that if
“des citoyens attachés aux mêmes professions, arts et métiers prenaient des délibérations, faisaient
entre eux des conventions tendantes à refuser de concert ou à n’accorder qu’à un prix déterminé le
secours de leur industrie ou de leurs travaux, les dites délibérations et conventions... seront déclarées
inconstitutionnelles, attentatoires à la liberté et à la declaration des droits de l’homme, &c.;” felony,
therefore, as in the old labour-statutes. [As the abolition of any form of association between citizens of
the same estate and profession is one of the foundations of the French constitution, it is forbidden to
re-establish them under any pretext or in any form, whatever they might be. ... citizens belonging to
the same profession, craft or trade have joint discussions and make joint decisions with the intention
of refusing together to perform their trade or insisting together on providing the services of their trade
or their labours only at a particular price, then the said deliberations and agreements ... shall be
declared unconstitutional, derogatory to liberty and the declaration of the rights of man, etc.]
(“Révolutions de Paris,” Paris, 1791, t. III, p. 523.)
7
Buchez et Roux: “Histoire Parlementaire,” t. x., p. 195.

Chapter 29: Genesis of the Capitalist Farmer
Now that we have considered the forcible creation of a class of outlawed proletarians, the bloody
discipline that turned them into wage labourers, the disgraceful action of the State which
employed the police to accelerate the accumulation of capital by increasing the degree of
exploitation of labour, the question remains: whence came the capitalists originally? For the
expropriation of the agricultural population creates, directly, none but the greatest landed
proprietors. As far, however, as concerns the genesis of the farmer, we can, so to say, put our
hand on it, because it is a slow process evolving through many centuries. The serfs, as well as the
free small proprietors, held land under very different tenures, and were therefore emancipated
under very different economic conditions. In England the first form of the farmer is the bailiff,
himself a serf. His position is similar to that of the old Roman villicus, only in a more limited
sphere of action. During the second half of the 14th century he is replaced by a farmer, whom the
landlord provided with seed, cattle and implements. His condition is not very different from that
of the peasant. Only he exploits more wage labour. Soon he becomes a metayer, a half-farmer. He
advances one part of the agricultural stock, the landlord the other. The two divide the total
product in proportions determined by contract. This form quickly disappears in England, to give
the place to the farmer proper, who makes his own capital breed by employing wage labourers,
and pays a part of the surplus-product, in money or in kind, to the landlord as rent. So long,
during the 15th century, as the independent peasant and the farm-labourer working for himself as
well as for wages, enriched themselves by their own labour, the circumstances of the farmer, and
his field of production, were equally mediocre. The agricultural revolution which commenced in
the last third of the 15th century, and continued during almost the whole of the 16th (excepting,
however, its last decade), enriched him just as speedily as it impoverished the mass of the
agricultural people. 1
The usurpation of the common lands allowed him to augment greatly his stock of cattle, almost
without cost, whilst they yielded him a richer supply of manure for the tillage of the soil. To this
was added in the 16th century a very important element. At that time the contracts for farms ran
for a long time, often for 99 years. The progressive fall in the value of the precious metals, and
therefore of money, brought the farmers golden fruit. Apart from all the other circumstances
discussed above, it lowered wages. A portion of the latter was now added to the profits of the
farm. The continuous rise in the price of corn, wool, meat, in a word of all agricultural produce,
swelled the money capital of the farm without any action on his part, whilst the rent he paid
(being calculated on the old value of money) diminished in reality. 2 Thus they grew rich at the
expense both of their labourers and their landlords. No wonder, therefore, that England, at the end
of the 16th century, had a class of capitalist farmers, rich, considering the circumstances of the
time. 3
1

Harrison in his “Description of England,” says “although peradventure foure pounds of old rent be
improved to fortie, toward the end of his term, if he have not six or seven yeares rent lieng by him,
fiftie or a hundred pounds, yet will the farmer thinke his gaines verie small.”
2
On the influence of the depreciation of money in the 16th century, on the different classes of society,
see “A Compendium of Briefe Examination of Certayne Ordinary Complaints of Divers of our
Countrymen in these our Days,” by W. S. Gentleman (London 1581). The dialogue form of this work
led people for a long time to ascribe it to Shakespeare, and even in 1751, it was published under his
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name. Its author is William Stafford. In one place the knight reasons as follows: Knight: You, my
neighbor, the husbandman, you Maister Mercer, and you Goodman Cooper, with other artificers, may
save yourselves metely well. For as much as all things are dearer than they were, so much do you arise
in the pryce of your wares and occupations that ye sell agayne. But we have nothing to sell whereby
we might advance ye price there of, to countervaile those things that we must buy agayne.” In another
place, the knight asks the doctor: “I pray you, what be those sorts that ye meane. And first, of those
that ye thinke should have no losse thereby? Doctor: I mean all those that live by buying and selling,
for as they buy deare, they sell thereafter. Knight: What is the next sort that ye say would win by it?
Doctor: Marry, all such as have takings of fearmes in their owne manurance [cultivation] at the old
rent, for where they pay after the olde rate they sell after the newe — that is, they paye for theire lande
good cheape, and sell all things growing thereof deare. Knight: What sorte is that which, ye sayde
should have greater losse hereby, than these men had profit? Doctor: It is all noblemen, gentlemen,
and all other that live either by a stinted rent or stypend, or do not manure [cultivate] the ground, or
doe occupy no buying and selling.”
3
In France, the régisseur, steward, collector of dues for the feudal lords during the earlier part of the
middle ages, soon became an homme d'affaires, who by extortion, cheating, &c., swindled himself
into a capitalist. These régisseurs themselves were sometimes noblemen. E.g., “C'est li compte que
messire Jacques de Thoraine, chevalier chastelain sor Besançon rent és-seigneur tenant les comptes à
Dijon pour monseigneur le duc et comte de Bourgoigne, des rentes appartenant à la dite chastellenie,
depuis xxve jour de décembre MCCCLIX jusqu'au xxviiie jour de décembre MCCCLX.” [This is the
account given by M. Jacques de Thoraisse, knight, and Lord of a manor near Besançon, to the lord
who administers the accounts at Dijon for his highness the Duke and Count of Burgundy, of the rents
appurtenant to the above-mentioned manor, from the 25th day of December 1359 to the 28th day of
December 1360] (Alexis Monteil: “Traité de Matériaux Manuscrits etc.,” pp. 234, 235.) Already it is
evident here how in all spheres of social life the lion's share falls to the middleman. In the economic
domain, e.g., financiers, stock-exchange speculators, merchants, shopkeepers skim the cream; in civil
matters, the lawyer fleeces his clients; in politics the representative is of more importance than the
voters, the minister than the sovereign; in religion, God is pushed into the background by the
“Mediator,” and the latter again is shoved back by the priests, the inevitable middlemen between the
good shepherd and his sheep. In France, as in England, the great feudal territories were divided into
innumerable small homesteads, but under conditions incomparably more favorable for the people.
During the 14th century arose the farms or terriers. Their number grew constantly, far beyond
100,000. They paid rents varying from 1/12 to 1/5 of the product in money or in kind. These farms
were fiefs, sub-fiefs, &c., according the value and extent of the domains, many of them only
containing a few acres. But these farmers had rights of jurisdiction in some degree over the dwellers
on the soil; there were four grades. The oppression of the agricultural population under all these petty
tyrants will be understood. Monteil says that there were once in France 160,000 judges, where today,
4,000 tribunals, including justices of the peace, suffice.

Chapter 30: Reaction of the Agricultural
Revolution on Industry. Creation of the HomeMarket for Industrial Capital
The expropriation and expulsion of the agricultural population, intermittent but renewed again
and again, supplied, as we saw, the town industries with a mass of proletarians entirely
unconnected with the corporate guilds and unfettered by them; a fortunate circumstance that
makes old A. Anderson (not to be confounded with James Anderson), in his “History of
Commerce,” believe in the direct intervention of Providence. We must still pause a moment on
this element of primitive accumulation. The thinning-out of the independent, self-supporting
peasants not only brought about the crowding together of the industrial proletariat, in the way that
Geoffrey Saint Hilaire explained the condensation of cosmical matter at one place, by its
rarefaction at another. 1 In spite of the smaller number of its cultivators, the soil brought forth as
much or more produce, after as before, because the revolution in the conditions of landed
property was accompanied by improved methods of culture, greater co-operation, concentration
of the means of production, &c., and because not only were the agricultural wage labourers put
on the strain more intensely2, but the field of production on which they worked for themselves
became more and more contracted. With the setting free of a part of the agricultural population,
therefore, their former means of nourishment were also set free. They were now transformed into
material elements of variable capital. The peasant, expropriated and cast adrift, must buy their
value in the form of wages, from his new master, the industrial capitalist. That which holds good
of the means of subsistence holds with the raw materials of industry dependent upon home
agriculture. They were transformed into an element of constant capital. Suppose, e.g., a part of
the Westphalian peasants, who, at the time of Frederick II, all span flax, forcibly expropriated and
hunted from the soil; and the other part that remained, turned into day labourers of large farmers.
At the same time arise large establishments for flax-spinning and weaving, in which the men “set
free” now work for wages. The flax looks exactly as before. Not a fibre of it is changed, but a
new social soul has popped into its body. It forms now a part of the constant capital of the master
manufacturer. Formerly divided among a number of small producers, who cultivated it
themselves and with their families spun it in retail fashion, it is now concentrated in the hand of
one capitalist, who sets others to spin and weave it for him. The extra labour expended in flaxspinning realised itself formerly in extra income to numerous peasant families, or maybe, in
Frederick II’s time, in taxes pour le roi de Prusse. It realises itself now in profit for a few
capitalists. The spindles and looms, formerly scattered over the face of the country, are now
crowded together in a few great labour-barracks, together with the labourers and the raw material.
And spindles, looms, raw material, are now transformed from means of independent existence for
the spinners and weavers, into means for commanding them and sucking out of them unpaid
labour. 3 One does not perceive, when looking at the large manufactories and the large farms, that
they have originated from the throwing into one of many small centres of production, and have
been built up by the expropriation of many small independent producers. Nevertheless, the
popular intuition was not at fault. In the time of Mirabeau, the lion of the Revolution, the great
manufactories were still called manufactures réunies, workshops thrown into one, as we speak of
fields thrown into one. Says Mirabeau:
“We are only paying attention to the grand manufactories, in which hundreds of
men work under a director and which are commonly called manufactures réunies.
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Those where a very large number of labourers work, each separately and on his
own account, are hardly considered; they are placed at an infinite distance from
the others. This is a great error, as the latter alone make a really important object
of national prosperity.... The large workshop (manufacture réunie) will enrich
prodigiously one or two entrepreneurs, but the labourers will only be journeymen,
paid more or less, and will not have any share in the success of the undertaking. In
the discrete workshop (manufacture separée), on the contrary, no one will become
rich, but many labourers will be comfortable; the saving and the industrious will
be able to amass a little capital, to put by a little for a birth of a child, for an
illness, for themselves or their belongings. The number of saving and industrious
labourers will increase, because they will see in good conduct, in activity, a means
of essentially bettering their condition, and not of obtaining a small rise in wages
that can never be of any importance of the future, and whose sole result is to place
men in the position to live a little better, but only from day to day.... The large
workshops, undertakings of certain private persons who pay labourers from day to
day to work for their gain, may be able to put these private individuals at their
ease, but they will never be an object worth the attention of governments. Discrete
workshops, for the most part combined with cultivation of small holdings, are the
only free ones.” 4 The expropriation and eviction of a part of the agricultural
population not only set free for industrial capital, the labourers, their means of
subsistence, and material for labour; it also created the home-market.
In fact, the events that transformed the small peasants into wage labourers, and their means of
subsistence and of labour into material elements of capital, created, at the same time, a homemarket for the latter. Formerly, the peasant family produced the means of subsistence and the raw
materials, which they themselves, for the most part, consumed. These raw materials and means of
subsistence have now become commodities; the large farmer sells them, he finds his market in
manufactures. Yarn, linen, coarse woollen stuffs – things whose raw materials had been within
the reach of every peasant family, had been spun and woven by it for its own use – were now
transformed into articles of manufacture, to which the country districts at once served for
markets. The many scattered customers, whom stray artisans until now had found in the
numerous small producers working on their own account, concentrate themselves now into one
great market provided for by industrial capital.5 Thus, hand in hand with the expropriation of the
self-supporting peasants, with their separation from their means of production, goes the
destruction of rural domestic industry, the process of separation between manufacture and
agriculture. And only the destruction of rural domestic industry can give the internal market of a
country that extension and consistence which the capitalist mode of production requires. Still the
manufacturing period, properly so called, does not succeed in carrying out this transformation
radically and completely. It will be remembered that manufacture, properly so called, conquers
but partially the domain of national production, and always rests on the handicrafts of the town
and the domestic industry of the rural districts as its ultimate basis. If it destroys these in one
form, in particular branches, at certain points, it calls them up again elsewhere, because it needs
them for the preparation of raw material up to a certain point. It produces, therefore, a new class
of small villagers who, while following the cultivation of the soil as an accessory calling, find
their chief occupation in industrial labour, the products of which they sell to the manufacturers
directly, or through the medium of merchants. This is one, though not the chief, cause of a
phenomenon which, at first, puzzles the student of English history. 6 From the last third of the
15th century he finds continually complaints, only interrupted at certain intervals, about the
encroachment of capitalist farming in the country districts, and the progressive destruction of the
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peasantry. On the other hand, he always finds this peasantry turning up again, although in
diminished number, and always under worse conditions. The chief reason is: England is at one
time chiefly a cultivator of corn, at another chiefly a breeder of cattle, in alternate periods, and
with these the extent of peasant cultivation fluctuates. Modern Industry alone, and finally,
supplies, in machinery, the lasting basis of capitalistic agriculture, expropriates radically the
enormous majority of the agricultural population, and completes the separation between
agriculture and rural domestic industry, whose roots – spinning and weaving – it tears up. 7 It
therefore also, for the first time, conquers for industrial capital the entire home market. 8
1

In his “Notions de Philosophie Naturelle.” Paris, 1838.
A point that Sir James Steuart emphasises.
3
“Je permettrai,” says the capitalist, “que vous ayez l’honneur de me servir, à condition que vous me
donnez le peu qui vous reste pour la peine que je prends de vous commander.” [I will allow you ... to
have the honour of serving me, on condition that, in return for the pains I take in commanding you,
you give me the little that remains to you] (J. J. Rousseau: “Discours sur l’Economie Politique.”)
4
Mirabeau, l.c., t.III, pp.20-109 passim. That Mirabeau considers the separate workshops more
economical and productive than the “combined,” and sees in the latter merely artificial exotics under
government cultivation, is explained by the position at that time of a great part of the continental
manufactures.
5
“Twenty pounds of wool converted unobtrusively into yearly clothing of a labourer’s family by its
own industry in the intervals of other works — this makes no show; but bring it to market, send it to
the factory, thence to the broker, thence to the dealer, and you will have great commercial operations,
and nominal capital engaged to the amount of twenty times its value.... The working-class is thus
emersed to support a wretched factory population, a parastical shop-keeping class, and a fictitious
commercial, monetary, and financial system.” (David Urquhart, l.c., p.120.)
6
Cromwell’s time forms an exception. So long as the Republic lasted, the mass of the English people
of all grades rose from the degradation into which they had sunk under the Tudors.
7
Tuckett is aware that the modern woollen industry has sprung, with the introduction of machinery,
from manufacture proper and from the destruction of rural and domestic industries.
“The plough, the yoke, were ‘the invention of gods, and the occupation of heroes’; are the loom, the
spindle, the distaff, of less noble parentage. You sever the distaff and the plough, the spindle and the
yoke, and you get factories and poor-houses, credit and panics, two hostile nations, agriculture and
commercial.” (David Urquhart, l.c., p.122.)
But now comes Carey, and cries out upon England, surely not with unreason, that it is trying to turn
every other country into a mere agricultural nation, whose manufacturer is to be England. He pretends
that in this way Turkey has been ruined, because “the owners and occupants of land have never been
permitted by England to strengthen themselves by the formation of that natural alliance between the
plough and the loom, the hammer and the harrow.” (“The Slave Trade,” p.125.) According to him,
Urquhart himself is one of the chief agents in the ruin of Turkey, where he had made Free-trade
propaganda in the English interest. The best of it is that Carey, a great Russophile by the way, wants
to prevent the process of separation by that very system of protection which accelerates it.
8
Philanthropic English economists, like Mill, Rogers, Goldwin Smith, Fawcett, &c., and liberal
manufacturers like John Bright & Co., ask the English landed proprietors, as God asked Cain after
Abel, Where are our thousands of freeholders gone? But where do you come from, then? From the
destruction of those freeholders. Why don’t you ask further, where are the independent weavers,
spinners, and artisans gone?
2

Chapter 31: The Genesis of the Industrial
Capitalist
The genesis of the industrial * capitalist did not proceed in such a gradual way as that of the
farmer. Doubtless many small guild-masters, and yet more independent small artisans, or even
wage labourers, transformed themselves into small capitalists, and (by gradually extending
exploitation of wage labour and corresponding accumulation) into full-blown capitalists. In the
infancy of capitalist production, things often happened as in the infancy of medieval towns, where
the question, which of the escaped serfs should be master and which servant, was in great part
decided by the earlier or later date of their flight. The snail’s pace of this method corresponded in
no wise with the commercial requirements of the new world market that the great discoveries of
the end of the 15th century created. But the middle ages had handed down two distinct forms of
capital, which mature in the most different economic social formations, and which before the era
of the capitalist mode of production, are considered as capital quand même [all the same] –
usurer’s capital and merchant’s capital.
“At present, all the wealth of society goes first into the possession of the capitalist
... he pays the landowner his rent, the labourer his wages, the tax and tithe
gatherer their claims, and keeps a large, indeed the largest, and a continually
augmenting share, of the annual produce of labour for himself. The capitalist may
now be said to be the first owner of all the wealth of the community, though no
law has conferred on him the right to this property... this change has been effected
by the taking of interest on capital ... and it is not a little curious that all the lawgivers of Europe endeavoured to prevent this by statutes, viz., statutes against
usury.... The power of the capitalist over all the wealth of the country is a
complete change in the right of property, and by what law, or series of laws, was it
effected?” 2
The author should have remembered that revolutions are not made by laws.
The money capital formed by means of usury and commerce was prevented from turning into
industrial capital, in the country by the feudal constitution, in the towns by the guild
organisation. 3 These fetters vanished with the dissolution of feudal society, with the expropriation
and partial eviction of the country population. The new manufactures were established at seaports, or at inland points beyond the control of the old municipalities and their guilds. Hence in
England an embittered struggle of the corporate towns against these new industrial nurseries.
The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in
mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies,
the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of black-skins, signalised the rosy
dawn of the era of capitalist production. These idyllic proceedings are the chief momenta of
primitive accumulation. On their heels treads the commercial war of the European nations, with
the globe for a theatre. It begins with the revolt of the Netherlands from Spain, assumes giant
dimensions in England’s Anti-Jacobin War, and is still going on in the opium wars against China,
&c.

*

Industrial here in contradistinction to agricultural. In the “categoric” sense the farmer is an industrial capitalist as
much as the manufacturer.
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The different momenta of primitive accumulation distribute themselves now, more or less in
chronological order, particularly over Spain, Portugal, Holland, France, and England. In England
at the end of the 17th century, they arrive at a systematical combination, embracing the colonies,
the national debt, the modern mode of taxation, and the protectionist system. These methods
depend in part on brute force, e.g., the colonial system. But, they all employ the power of the
State, the concentrated and organised force of society, to hasten, hot-house fashion, the process of
transformation of the feudal mode of production into the capitalist mode, and to shorten the
transition. Force is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one. It is itself an
economic power.
Of the Christian colonial system, W. Howitt, a man who makes a speciality of Christianity, says:
“The barbarities and desperate outrages of the so-called Christian race, throughout
every region of the world, and upon every people they have been able to subdue,
are not to be paralleled by those of any other race, however fierce, however
untaught, and however reckless of mercy and of shame, in any age of the earth.” 4
The history of the colonial administration of Holland – and Holland was the head capitalistic
nation of the 17th century –
“is one of the most extraordinary relations of treachery, bribery, massacre, and
meanness” 5
Nothing is more characteristic than their system of stealing men, to get slaves for Java. The men
stealers were trained for this purpose. The thief, the interpreter, and the seller, were the chief
agents in this trade, native princes the chief sellers. The young people stolen, were thrown into
the secret dungeons of Celebes, until they were ready for sending to the slave-ships. An official
report says:
“This one town of Macassar, e.g., is full of secret prisons, one more horrible than
the other, crammed with unfortunates, victims of greed and tyranny fettered in
chains, forcibly torn from their families.”
To secure Malacca, the Dutch corrupted the Portuguese governor. He let them into the town in
1641. They hurried at once to his house and assassinated him, to “abstain” from the payment of
£21,875, the price of his treason. Wherever they set foot, devastation and depopulation followed.
Banjuwangi, a province of Java, in 1750 numbered over 80,000 inhabitants, in 1811 only 18,000.
Sweet commerce!
The English East India Company, as is well known, obtained, besides the political rule in India,
the exclusive monopoly of the tea-trade, as well as of the Chinese trade in general, and of the
transport of goods to and from Europe. But the coasting trade of India and between the islands, as
well as the internal trade of India, were the monopoly of the higher employés of the company.
The monopolies of salt, opium, betel and other commodities, were inexhaustible mines of wealth.
The employés themselves fixed the price and plundered at will the unhappy Hindus. The
Governor-General took part in this private traffic. His favourites received contracts under
conditions whereby they, cleverer than the alchemists, made gold out of nothing. Great fortunes
sprang up like mushrooms in a day; primitive accumulation went on without the advance of a
shilling. The trial of Warren Hastings swarms with such cases. Here is an instance. A contract for
opium was given to a certain Sullivan at the moment of his departure on an official mission to a
part of India far removed from the opium district. Sullivan sold his contract to one Binn for
£40,000; Binn sold it the same day for £60,000, and the ultimate purchaser who carried out the
contract declared that after all he realised an enormous gain. According to one of the lists laid
before Parliament, the Company and its employés from 1757-1766 got £6,000,000 from the
Indians as gifts. Between 1769 and 1770, the English manufactured a famine by buying up all the
rice and refusing to sell it again, except at fabulous prices.6
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The treatment of the aborigines was, naturally, most frightful in plantation-colonies destined for
export trade only, such as the West Indies, and in rich and well-populated countries, such as
Mexico and India, that were given over to plunder. But even in the colonies properly so called,
the Christian character of primitive accumulation did not belie itself. Those sober virtuosi of
Protestantism, the Puritans of New England, in 1703, by decrees of their assembly set a premium
of £40 on every Indian scalp and every captured red-skin: in 1720 a premium of £100 on every
scalp; in 1744, after Massachusetts-Bay had proclaimed a certain tribe as rebels, the following
prices: for a male scalp of 12 years and upwards £100 (new currency), for a male prisoner £105,
for women and children prisoners £50, for scalps of women and children £50. Some decades
later, the colonial system took its revenge on the descendants of the pious pilgrim fathers, who
had grown seditious in the meantime. At English instigation and for English pay they were
tomahawked by red-skins. The British Parliament proclaimed bloodhounds and scalping as
“means that God and Nature had given into its hand.”
The colonial system ripened, like a hot-house, trade and navigation. The “societies Monopolia” of
Luther were powerful levers for concentration of capital. The colonies secured a market for the
budding manufactures, and, through the monopoly of the market, an increased accumulation. The
treasures captured outside Europe by undisguised looting, enslavement, and murder, floated back
to the mother-country and were there turned into capital. Holland, which first fully developed the
colonial system, in 1648 stood already in the acme of its commercial greatness. It was
“in almost exclusive possession of the East Indian trade and the commerce
between the south-east and north-west of Europe. Its fisheries, marine,
manufactures, surpassed those of any other country. The total capital of the
Republic was probably more important than that of all the rest of Europe put
together.” Gülich forgets to add that by 1648, the people of Holland were more
over-worked, poorer and more brutally oppressed than those of all the rest of
Europe put together.
Today industrial supremacy implies commercial supremacy. In the period of manufacture
properly so called, it is, on the other hand, the commercial supremacy that gives industrial
predominance. Hence the preponderant rôle that the colonial system plays at that time. It was “the
strange God” who perched himself on the altar cheek by jowl with the old Gods of Europe, and
one fine day with a shove and a kick chucked them all of a heap. It proclaimed surplus-value
making as the sole end and aim of humanity.
The system of public credit, i.e., of national debts, whose origin we discover in Genoa and Venice
as early as the Middle Ages, took possession of Europe generally during the manufacturing
period. The colonial system with its maritime trade and commercial wars served as a forcinghouse for it. Thus it first took root in Holland. National debts, i.e., the alienation of the state –
whether despotic, constitutional or republican – marked with its stamp the capitalistic era. The
only part of the so-called national wealth that actually enters into the collective possessions of
modern peoples is their national debt.7 Hence, as a necessary consequence, the modern doctrine
that a nation becomes the richer the more deeply it is in debt. Public credit becomes the credo of
capital. And with the rise of national debt-making, want of faith in the national debt takes the
place of the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, which may not be forgiven.
The public debt becomes one of the most powerful levers of primitive accumulation. As with the
stroke of an enchanter’s wand, it endows barren money with the power of breeding and thus turns
it into capital, without the necessity of its exposing itself to the troubles and risks inseparable
from its employment in industry or even in usury. The state creditors actually give nothing away,
for the sum lent is transformed into public bonds, easily negotiable, which go on functioning in
their hands just as so much hard cash would. But further, apart from the class of lazy annuitants
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thus created, and from the improvised wealth of the financiers, middlemen between the
government and the nation – as also apart from the tax-farmers, merchants, private manufacturers,
to whom a good part of every national loan renders the service of a capital fallen from heaven –
the national debt has given rise to joint-stock companies, to dealings in negotiable effects of all
kinds, and to agiotage, in a word to stock-exchange gambling and the modern bankocracy.
At their birth the great banks, decorated with national titles, were only associations of private
speculators, who placed themselves by the side of governments, and, thanks to the privileges they
received, were in a position to advance money to the State. Hence the accumulation of the
national debt has no more infallible measure than the successive rise in the stock of these banks,
whose full development dates from the founding of the Bank of England in 1694. The Bank of
England began with lending its money to the Government at 8%; at the same time it was
empowered by Parliament to coin money out of the same capital, by lending it again to the public
in the form of banknotes. It was allowed to use these notes for discounting bills, making advances
on commodities, and for buying the precious metals. It was not long ere this credit-money, made
by the bank itself, became the coin in which the Bank of England made its loans to the State, and
paid, on account of the State, the interest on the public debt. It was not enough that the bank gave
with one hand and took back more with the other; it remained, even whilst receiving, the eternal
creditor of the nation down to the last shilling advanced. Gradually it became inevitably the
receptacle of the metallic hoard of the country, and the centre of gravity of all commercial credit.
What effect was produced on their contemporaries by the sudden uprising of this brood of
bankocrats, financiers, rentiers, brokers, stock-jobbers, &c., is proved by the writings of that time,
e.g., by Bolingbroke’s. 8
With the national debt arose an international credit system, which often conceals one of the
sources of primitive accumulation in this or that people. Thus the villainies of the Venetian
thieving system formed one of the secret bases of the capital-wealth of Holland to whom Venice
in her decadence lent large sums of money. So also was it with Holland and England. By the
beginning of the 18th century the Dutch manufactures were far outstripped. Holland had ceased
to be the nation preponderant in commerce and industry. One of its main lines of business,
therefore, from 1701-1776, is the lending out of enormous amounts of capital, especially to its
great rival England. The same thing is going on today between England and the United States. A
great deal of capital, which appears today in the United States without any certificate of birth, was
yesterday, in England, the capitalised blood of children.
As the national debt finds its support in the public revenue, which must cover the yearly
payments for interest, &c., the modern system of taxation was the necessary complement of the
system of national loans. The loans enable the government to meet extraordinary expenses,
without the tax-payers feeling it immediately, but they necessitate, as a consequence, increased
taxes. On the other hand, the raising of taxation caused by the accumulation of debts contracted
one after another, compels the government always to have recourse to new loans for new
extraordinary expenses. Modern fiscality, whose pivot is formed by taxes on the most necessary
means of subsistence (thereby increasing their price), thus contains within itself the germ of
automatic progression. Overtaxation is not an incident, but rather a principle. In Holland,
therefore, where this system was first inaugurated, the great patriot, DeWitt, has in his “Maxims”
extolled it as the best system for making the wage labourer submissive, frugal, industrious, and
overburdened with labour. The destructive influence that it exercises on the condition of the wage
labourer concerns us less however, here, than the forcible expropriation, resulting from it, of
peasants, artisans, and in a word, all elements of the lower middle class. On this there are not two
opinions, even among the bourgeois economists. Its expropriating efficacy is still further
heightened by the system of protection, which forms one of its integral parts.
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The great part that the public debt, and the fiscal system corresponding with it, has played in the
capitalisation of wealth and the expropriation of the masses, has led many writers, like Cobbett,
Doubleday and others, to seek in this, incorrectly, the fundamental cause of the misery of the
modern peoples.
The system of protection was an artificial means of manufacturing manufacturers, of
expropriating independent labourers, of capitalising the national means of production and
subsistence, of forcibly abbreviating the transition from the medieval to the modern mode of
production. The European states tore one another to pieces about the patent of this invention, and,
once entered into the service of the surplus-value makers, did not merely lay under contribution in
the pursuit of this purpose their own people, indirectly through protective duties, directly through
export premiums. They also forcibly rooted out, in their dependent countries, all industry, as, e.g.,
England did. with the Irish woollen manufacture. On the continent of Europe, after Colbert’s
example, the process was much simplified. The primitive industrial capital, here, came in part
directly out of the state treasury. “Why,” cries Mirabeau, “why go so far to seek the cause of the
manufacturing glory of Saxony before the war? 180,000,000 of debts contracted by the
sovereigns!” 9
Colonial system, public debts, heavy taxes, protection, commercial wars, &c., these children of
the true manufacturing period, increase gigantically during the infancy of Modem Industry. The
birth of the latter is heralded by a great slaughter of the innocents. Like the royal navy, the
factories were recruited by means of the press-gang. Blasé as Sir F. M. Eden is as to the horrors
of the expropriation of the agricultural population from the soil, from the last third of the 15th
century to his own time; with all the self-satisfaction with which he rejoices in this process,
“essential” for establishing capitalistic agriculture and “the due proportion between arable and
pasture land” – he does not show, however, the same economic insight in respect to the necessity
of child-stealing and child-slavery for the transformation of manufacturing exploitation into
factory exploitation, and the establishment of the “true relation” between capital and labourpower. He says:
“It may, perhaps, be worthy the attention of the public to consider, whether any
manufacture, which, in order to be carried on successfully, requires that cottages
and workhouses should be ransacked for poor children; that they should be
employed by turns during the greater part of the night and robbed of that rest
which, though indispensable to all, is most required by the young; and that
numbers of both sexes, of different ages and dispositions, should be collected
together in such a manner that the contagion of example cannot but lead to
profligacy and debauchery; will add to the sum of individual or national
felicity?” 10
“In the counties of Derbyshire, Nottinghamshire, and more particularly in
Lancashire,” says Fielden, “the newly-invented machinery was used in large
factories built on the sides of streams capable of turning the water-wheel.
Thousands of hands were suddenly required in these places, remote from towns;
and Lancashire, in particular, being, till then, comparatively thinly populated and
barren, a population was all that she now wanted. The small and nimble fingers of
little children being by very far the most in request, the custom instantly sprang up
of procuring apprentices from the different parish workhouses of London,
Birmingham, and elsewhere. Many, many thousands of these little, hapless
creatures were sent down into the north, being from the age of 7 to the age of 13
or 14 years old. The custom was for the master to clothe his apprentices and to
feed and lodge them in an “apprentice house” near the factory; overseers were
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appointed to see to the works, whose interest it was to work the children to the
utmost, because their pay was in proportion to the quantity of work that they could
exact. Cruelty was, of course, the consequence. ... In many of the manufacturing
districts, but particularly, I am afraid, in the guilty county to which I belong
[Lancashire], cruelties the most heart-rending were practised upon the
unoffending and friendless creatures who were thus consigned to the charge of
master-manufacturers; they were harassed to the brink of death by excess of
labour ... were flogged, fettered and tortured in the most exquisite refinement of
cruelty; ... they were in many cases starved to the bone while flogged to their
work and ... even in some instances ... were driven to commit suicide.... The
beautiful and romantic valleys of Derbyshire, Nottinghamshire and Lancashire,
secluded from the public eye, became the dismal solitudes of torture, and of many
a murder. The profits of manufacturers were enormous; but this only whetted the
appetite that it should have satisfied, and therefore the manufacturers had recourse
to an expedient that seemed to secure to them those profits without any possibility
of limit; they began the practice of what is termed “night-working,” that is, having
tired one set of hands, by working them throughout the day, they had another set
ready to go on working throughout the night; the day-set getting into the beds that
the night-set had just quitted, and in their turn again, the night-set getting into the
beds that the day-set quitted in the morning. It is a common tradition in
Lancashire, that the beds never get cold.” 11
With the development of capitalist production during the manufacturing period, the public
opinion of Europe had lost the last remnant of shame and conscience. The nations bragged
cynically of every infamy that served them as a means to capitalistic accumulation. Read, e.g., the
naïve Annals of Commerce of the worthy A. Anderson. Here it is trumpeted forth as a triumph of
English statecraft that at the Peace of Utrecht, England extorted from the Spaniards by the
Asiento Treaty the privilege of being allowed to ply the negro trade, until then only carried on
between Africa and the English West Indies, between Africa and Spanish America as well.
England thereby acquired the right of supplying Spanish America until 1743 with 4,800 negroes
yearly. This threw, at the same time, an official cloak over British smuggling. Liverpool waxed
fat on the slave trade. This was its method of primitive accumulation. And, even to the present
day, Liverpool “respectability” is the Pindar of the slave trade which – compare the work of
Aikin [1795] already quoted – “has coincided with that spirit of bold adventure which has
characterised the trade of Liverpool and rapidly carried it to its present state of prosperity; has
occasioned vast employment for shipping and sailors, and greatly augmented the demand for the
manufactures of the country” (p. 339). Liverpool employed in the slave-trade, in 1730, 15 ships;
in 1751, 53; in 1760, 74; in 1770, 96; and in 1792, 132. 12
Whilst the cotton industry introduced child-slavery in England, it gave in the United States a
stimulus to the transformation of the earlier, more or less patriarchal slavery, into a system of
commercial exploitation. In fact, the veiled slavery of the wage workers in Europe needed, for its
pedestal, slavery pure and simple in the new world.
Tantae molis erat, to establish the “eternal laws of Nature” of the capitalist mode of production, to
complete the process of separation between labourers and conditions of labour, to transform, at
one pole, the social means of production and subsistence into capital, at the opposite pole, the
mass of the population into wage labourers, into “free labouring poor,” that artificial product of
modern society. 13 If money, according to Augier, 14 “comes into the world with a congenital
blood-stain on one cheek,” capital comes dripping from head to foot, from every pore, with blood
and dirt. 15
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“The Natural and Artificial Rights of Property Contrasted.” Lond., 1832, pp. 98-99. Author of the
anonymous work: “Th. Hodgskin.”
3
Even as late as 1794, the small cloth-makers of Leeds sent a deputation to Parliament, with a petition
for a law to forbid any merchant from becoming a manufacturer. (Dr. Aikin, l. c.)
4
William Howitt: “Colonisation and Christianity: A Popular History of the Treatment of the Natives
by the Europeans in all their Colonies.” London, 1838, p. 9. On the treatment of the slaves there is a
good compilation in Charles Comte, “Traité de la Législation.” 3me éd. Bruxelles, 1837. This subject
one must study in detail, to see what the bourgeoisie makes of itself and of the labourer, wherever it
can, without restraint, model the world after its own image.
5
Thomas Stamford Raffles, late Lieut-Gov. of that island: “The History of Java,” Lond., 1817.
6
In the year 1866 more than a million Hindus died of hunger in the province of Orissa alone.
Nevertheless, the attempt was made to enrich the Indian treasury by the price at which the necessaries
of life were sold to the starving people.
7
William Cobbett remarks that in England all public institutions are designated “royal”; as
compensation for this, however, there is the “national” debt.
8
“Si les Tartares inondaient l’Europe aujourd’hui, il faudrait bien des affaires pour leur faire entendre
ce que c’est qu’un financier parmi nous.” [if the Tartars were to flood into Europe today, it would be a
difficult job to make them understand what a financier is with us] Montesquieu, “Esprit des lois,” t.
iv., p. 33, ed. Londres, 1769.
9
Mirabeau, l. c., t. vi., p. 101.
10
Eden, l. c., Vol. I., Book II., Ch. 1., p. 421.
11
John Fielden, l. c., pp. 5, 6. On the earlier infamies of the factory system, cf. Dr. Aikin (1795), l. c.,
p. 219. and Gisborne: “Enquiry into the Duties of Men,” 1795 Vol. II. When the steam-engine
transplanted the factories from the country waterfalls to the middle of towns, the “abstemious”
surplus-value maker found the child-material ready to his hand, without being forced to seek slaves
from the workhouses. When Sir R. Peel (father of the “minister of plausibility"), brought in his bill for
the protection of children, in 1815, Francis Homer, lumen of the Billion Committee and intimate
friend of Ricardo, said in the House of Commons: “It is notorious, that with a bankrupt’s effects, a
gang, if he might use the word, of these children had been put up to sale, and were advertised publicly
as part of the property. A most atrocious instance had been brought before the Court of King’s Bench
two years before, in which a number of these boys, apprenticed by a parish in London to one
manufacturer, had been transferred to another, and had been found by some benevolent persons in a
state of absolute famine. Another case more horrible had come to his knowledge while on a
[Parliamentary] Committee ... that not many years ago, an agreement had been made between a
London parish and a Lancashire manufacturer, by which it was stipulated, that with every 20 sound
children one idiot should be taken.”
12
In 1790, there were in the English West Indies ten slaves for one free man, in the French fourteen
for one, in the Dutch twenty-three for one. (Henry Brougham: “An Inquiry into the Colonial Policy of
the European Powers.” Edin. 1803, vol. II., p. 74.)
13
The phrase, “labouring poor,” is found in English legislation from the moment when the class of
wage labourers becomes noticeable. This term is used in opposition, on the one hand, to the “idle
poor,” beggars, etc., on the. out and out vulgar bourgeois. “The laws of commerce are the laws of
Nature, and therefore the laws of God.” (E. Burke, l. c., pp. 31, 32.) No wonder that, true to the laws
of God and of Nature, he always sold himself in the best market. A very good portrait of this Edmund
Burke, during his liberal time, is to be found in the writings of the Rev. Mr. Tucker. Tucker was a
parson and a Tory, but, for the rest, an honourable man and a competent political economist. In face of
the infamous cowardice of character that reigns today, and believes most devoutly in “the laws of
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commerce,” it is our bounden duty again and again to brand the Burkes, who only differ from their
successors in one thing — talent.
14
Marie Angier: “Du Crédit Public.” Paris, 1842.
15
“Capital is said by a Quarterly Reviewer to fly turbulence and strife, and to be timid, which is very
true; but this is very incompletely stating the question. Capital eschews no profit, or very small profit,
just as Nature was formerly said to abhor a vacuum. With adequate profit, capital is very bold. A
certain 10 per cent. will ensure its employment anywhere; 20 per cent. certain will produce eagerness;
50 per cent., positive audacity; 100 per cent. will make it ready to trample on all human laws; 300 per
cent., and there is not a crime at which it will scruple, nor a risk it will not run, even to the chance of
its owner being hanged. If turbulence and strife will bring a profit, it will freely encourage both.
Smuggling and the slave-trade have amply proved all that is here stated.” (T. J. Dunning, l. c., pp. 35,
36.)

Chapter 32: Historical Tendency of Capitalist
Accumulation
What does the primitive accumulation of capital, i.e., its historical genesis, resolve itself into? In
so far as it is not immediate transformation of slaves and serfs into wage labourers, and therefore
a mere change of form, it only means the expropriation of the immediate producers, i.e., the
dissolution of private property based on the labour of its owner. Private property, as the antithesis
to social, collective property, exists only where the means of labour and the external conditions of
labour belong to private individuals. But according as these private individuals are labourers or
not labourers, private property has a different character. The numberless shades, that it at first
sight presents, correspond to the intermediate stages lying between these two extremes. The
private property of the labourer in his means of production is the foundation of petty industry,
whether agricultural, manufacturing, or both; petty industry, again, is an essential condition for
the development of social production and of the free individuality of the labourer himself. Of
course, this petty mode of production exists also under slavery, serfdom, and other states of
dependence. But it flourishes, it lets loose its whole energy, it attains its adequate classical form,
only where the labourer is the private owner of his own means of labour set in action by himself:
the peasant of the land which he cultivates, the artisan of the tool which he handles as a virtuoso.
This mode of production presupposes parcelling of the soil and scattering of the other means of
production. As it excludes the concentration of these means of production, so also it excludes cooperation, division of labour within each separate process of production, the control over, and the
productive application of the forces of Nature by society, and the free development of the social
productive powers. It is compatible only with a system of production, and a society, moving
within narrow and more or less primitive bounds. To perpetuate it would be, as Pecqueur rightly
says, “to decree universal mediocrity". At a certain stage of development, it brings forth the
material agencies for its own dissolution. From that moment new forces and new passions spring
up in the bosom of society; but the old social organisation fetters them and keeps them down. It
must be annihilated; it is annihilated. Its annihilation, the transformation of the individualised and
scattered means of production into socially concentrated ones, of the pigmy property of the many
into the huge property of the few, the expropriation of the great mass of the people from the soil,
from the means of subsistence, and from the means of labour, this fearful and painful
expropriation of the mass of the people forms the prelude to the history of capital. It comprises a
series of forcible methods, of which we have passed in review only those that have been epochmaking as methods of the primitive accumulation of capital. The expropriation of the immediate
producers was accomplished with merciless Vandalism, and under the stimulus of passions the
most infamous, the most sordid, the pettiest, the most meanly odious. Self-earned private
property, that is based, so to say, on the fusing together of the isolated, independent labouring
individual with the conditions of his labour, is supplanted by capitalistic private property, which
rests on exploitation of the nominally free labour of others, i.e., on wage labour. 1
As soon as this process of transformation has sufficiently decomposed the old society from top to
bottom, as soon as the labourers are turned into proletarians, their means of labour into capital, as
soon as the capitalist mode of production stands on its own feet, then the further socialisation of
labour and further transformation of the land and other means of production into socially
exploited and, therefore, common means of production, as well as the further expropriation of
private proprietors, takes a new form. That which is now to be expropriated is no longer the
labourer working for himself, but the capitalist exploiting many labourers. This expropriation is
accomplished by the action of the immanent laws of capitalistic production itself, by the

centralisation of capital. One capitalist always kills many. Hand in hand with this centralisation,
or this expropriation of many capitalists by few, develop, on an ever-extending scale, the cooperative form of the labour process, the conscious technical application of science, the
methodical cultivation of the soil, the transformation of the instruments of labour into instruments
of labour only usable in common, the economising of all means of production by their use as
means of production of combined, socialised labour, the entanglement of all peoples in the net of
the world market, and with this, the international character of the capitalistic regime. Along with
the constantly diminishing number of the magnates of capital, who usurp and monopolise all
advantages of this process of transformation, grows the mass of misery, oppression, slavery,
degradation, exploitation; but with this too grows the revolt of the working class, a class always
increasing in numbers, and disciplined, united, organised by the very mechanism of the process of
capitalist production itself. The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of
production, which has sprung up and flourished along with, and under it. Centralisation of the
means of production and socialisation of labour at last reach a point where they become
incompatible with their capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder. The knell of
capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated.
The capitalist mode of appropriation, the result of the capitalist mode of production, produces
capitalist private property. This is the first negation of individual private property, as founded on
the labour of the proprietor. But capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a law of
Nature, its own negation. It is the negation of negation. This does not re-establish private property
for the producer, but gives him individual property based on the acquisition of the capitalist era:
i.e., on co-operation and the possession in common of the land and of the means of production.
The transformation of scattered private property, arising from individual labour, into capitalist
private property is, naturally, a process, incomparably more protracted, violent, and difficult, than
the transformation of capitalistic private property, already practically resting on socialised
production, into socialised property. In the former case, we had the expropriation of the mass of
the people by a few usurpers; in the latter, we have the expropriation of a few usurpers by the
mass of the people.
2

1

“Nous sommes dans une condition tout-à-fait nouvelle de la societé... nous tendons a séparer toute
espèce de propriété d’avec toute espèce de travail.” [We are in a situation which is entirely new for
society ... we are striving to separate every kind of property from every kind of labour] (Sismondi:
“Nouveaux Principes d’Econ. Polit.” t.II, p.434.)
2
The advance of industry, whose involuntary promoter is the bourgeoisie, replaces the isolation of the
labourers, due to competition, by their revolutionary combination, due to association. The
development of Modern Industry, therefore, cuts from under its feet the very foundation on which the
bourgeoisie produces and appropriates products. What the bourgeoisie, therefore, produces, above all,
are its own grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable.... Of all the
classes that stand face-to-face with the bourgeoisie today, the proletariat alone is a really revolutionary
class. The other classes perish and disappear in the face of Modern Industry, the proletariat is its
special and essential product.... The lower middle classes, the small manufacturers, the shopkeepers,
the artisan, the peasant, all these fight against the bourgeoisie, to save from extinction their existence
as fractions of the middle class... they are reactionary, for they try to roll back the wheel of history.
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei,” London, 1848, pp. 9, 11.

Chapter 33: The Modern Theory of Colonisation1
Political economy confuses on principle two very different kinds of private property, of which
one rests on the producers’ own labour, the other on the employment of the labour of others. It
forgets that the latter not only is the direct antithesis of the former, but absolutely grows on its
tomb only. In Western Europe, the home of Political Economy, the process of primitive
accumulation is more of less accomplished. Here the capitalist regime has either directly
conquered the whole domain of national production, or, where economic conditions are less
developed, it, at least, indirectly controls those strata of society which, though belonging to the
antiquated mode of production, continue to exist side by side with it in gradual decay. To this
ready-made world of capital, the political economist applies the notions of law and of property
inherited from a pre-capitalistic world with all the more anxious zeal and all the greater unction,
the more loudly the facts cry out in the face of his ideology. It is otherwise in the colonies. There
the capitalist regime everywhere comes into collision with the resistance of the producer, who, as
owner of his own conditions of labour, employs that labour to enrich himself, instead of the
capitalist. The contradiction of these two diametrically opposed economic systems, manifests
itself here practically in a struggle between them. Where the capitalist has at his back the power
of the mother-country, he tries to clear out of his way by force the modes of production and
appropriation based on the independent labour of the producer. The same interest, which compels
the sycophant of capital, the political economist, in the mother-country, to proclaim the
theoretical identity of the capitalist mode of production with its contrary, that same interest
compels him in the colonies to make a clean breast of it, and to proclaim aloud the antagonism of
the two modes of production. To this end, he proves how the development of the social
productive power of labour, co-operation, division of labour, use of machinery on a large scale,
&c., are impossible without the expropriation of the labourers, and the corresponding
transformation of their means of production into capital. In the interest of the so-called national
wealth, he seeks for artificial means to ensure the poverty of the people. Here his apologetic
armor crumbles off, bit by bit, like rotten touchwood. It is the great merit of E.G. Wakefield to
have discovered, not anything new about the Colonies 2, but to have discovered in the Colonies
the truth as to the conditions of capitalist production in the mother country. As the system of
protection at its origin 3 attempted to manufacture capitalists artificially in the mother-country, so
Wakefield’s colonisation theory, which England tried for a time to enforce by Acts of Parliament,
attempted to effect the manufacture of wage-workers in the Colonies. This he calls “systematic
colonisation.”
First of all, Wakefield discovered that in the Colonies, property in money, means of subsistence,
machines, and other means of production, does not as yet stamp a man as a capitalist if there be
wanting the correlative – the wage-worker, the other man who is compelled to sell himself of his
own free will. He discovered that capital is not a thing, but a social relation between persons,
established by the instrumentality of things. 4 Mr. Peel, he moans, took with him from England to
Swan River, West Australia, means of subsistence and of production to the amount of £50,000.
Mr. Peel had the foresight to bring with him, besides, 300 persons of the working class, men,
women, and children. Once arrived at his destination, “Mr. Peel was left without a servant to
make his bed or fetch him water from the river.”5 Unhappy Mr. Peel who provided for everything
except the export of English modes of production to Swan River!
For the understanding of the following discoveries of Wakefield, two preliminary remarks: We
know that the means of production and subsistence, while they remain the property of the
immediate producer, are not capital. They become capital only under circumstances in which they
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serve at the same time as means of exploitation and subjection of the labourer. But this capitalist
soul of theirs is so intimately wedded, in the head of the political economist, to their material
substance, that he christens them capital under all circumstances, even when they are its exact
opposite. Thus is it with Wakefield. Further: the splitting up of the means of production into the
individual property of many independent labourers, working on their own account, he calls equal
division of capital. It is with the political economist as with the feudal jurist. The latter stuck on to
pure monetary relations the labels supplied by feudal law.
“If,” says Wakefield, “all members of the society are supposed to possess equal portions of
capital... no man would have a motive for accumulating more capital than he could use with his
own hands. This is to some extent the case in new American settlements, where a passion for
owning land prevents the existence of a class of labourers for hire.” 6 So long, therefore, as the
labourer can accumulate for himself – and this he can do so long as he remains possessor of his
means of production – capitalist accumulation and the capitalistic mode of production are
impossible. The class of wage labourers, essential to these, is wanting. How, then, in old Europe,
was the expropriation of the labourer from his conditions of labour, i.e., the co-existence of
capital and wage labour, brought about? By a social contract of a quite original kind. “Mankind
have adopted a... simple contrivance for promoting the accumulation of capital,” which, of
course, since the time of Adam, floated in their imagination, floated in their imagination as the
sole and final end of their existence: “they have divided themselves into owners of capital and
owners of labour.... The division was the result of concert and combination.”7 In one word: the
mass of mankind expropriated itself in honour of the “accumulation of capital.” Now, one would
think that this instinct of self-denying fanaticism would give itself full fling especially in the
Colonies, where alone exist the men and conditions that could turn a social contract from a dream
to a reality. But why, then, should “systematic colonisation” be called in to replace its opposite,
spontaneous, unregulated colonisation? But - but - “In the Northern States of the American
Union; it may be doubted whether so many as a tenth of the people would fall under the
description of hired labourers.... In England... the labouring class compose the bulk of the
people.” 8 Nay, the impulse to self-expropriation on the part of labouring humanity for the glory of
capital, exists so little that slavery, according to Wakefield himself, is the sole natural basis of
Colonial wealth. His systematic colonisation is a mere pis aller, since he unfortunately has to do
with free men, not with slaves. “The first Spanish settlers in Saint Domingo did not obtain
labourers from Spain. But, without labourers, their capital must have perished, or at least, must
soon have been diminished to that small amount which each individual could employ with his
own hands. This has actually occurred in the last Colony founded by England – the Swan River
Settlement – where a great mass of capital, of seeds, implements, and cattle, has perished for want
of labourers to use it, and where no settler has preserved much more capital than he can employ
with his own hands.” 9
We have seen that the expropriation of the mass of the people from the soil forms the basis of the
capitalist mode of production. The essence of a free colony, on the contrary, consists in this – that
the bulk of the soil is still public property, and every settler on it therefore can turn part of it into
his private property and individual means of production, without hindering the later settlers in the
same operation. 10 This is the secret both of the prosperity of the colonies and of their inveterate
vice – opposition to the establishment of capital. “Where land is very cheap and all men are free,
where every one who so pleases can easily obtain a piece of land for himself, not only is labour
very dear, as respects the labourer’s share of the produce, but the difficulty is to obtain combined
labour at any price.” 11
As in the colonies the separation of the labourer from the conditions of labour and their root, the
soil, does not exist, or only sporadically, or on too limited a scale, so neither does the separation
of agriculture from industry exist, nor the destruction of the household industry of the peasantry.
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Whence then is to come the internal market for capital? “No part of the population of America is
exclusively agricultural, excepting slaves and their employers who combine capital and labour in
particular works. Free Americans, who cultivate the soil, follow many other occupations. Some
portion of the furniture and tools which they use is commonly made by themselves. They
frequently build their own houses, and carry to market, at whatever distance, the produce of their
own industry. They are spinners and weavers; they make soap and candles, as well as, in many
cases, shoes and clothes for their own use. In America the cultivation of land is often the
secondary pursuit of a blacksmith, a miller or a shopkeeper.” 12 With such queer people as these,
where is the “field of abstinence” for the capitalists?
The great beauty of capitalist production consists in this – that it not only constantly reproduces
the wage-worker as wage-worker, but produces always, in proportion to the accumulation of
capital, a relative surplus-population of wage-workers. Thus the law of supply and demand of
labour is kept in the right rut, the oscillation of wages is penned within limits satisfactory to
capitalist exploitation, and lastly, the social dependence of the labourer on the capitalist, that
indispensable requisite, is secured; an unmistakable relation of dependence, which the smug
political economist, at home, in the mother-country, can transmogrify into one of free contract
between buyer and seller, between equally independent owners of commodities, the owner of the
commodity capital and the owner of the commodity labour. But in the colonies, this pretty fancy
is torn asunder. The absolute population here increases much more quickly than in the mothercountry, because many labourers enter this world as ready-made adults, and yet the labour-market
is always understocked. The law of supply and demand of labour falls to pieces. On the one hand,
the old world constantly throws in capital, thirsting after exploitation and “abstinence”; on the
other, the regular reproduction of the wage labourer as wage labourer comes into collision with
impediments the most impertinent and in part invincible. What becomes of the production of
wage-labourers, supernumerary in proportion to the accumulation of capital? The wage-worker of
to-day is to-morrow an independent peasant, or artisan, working for himself. He vanishes from
the labour-market, but not into the workhouse. This constant transformation of the wagelabourers into independent producers, who work for themselves instead of for capital, and enrich
themselves instead of the capitalist gentry, reacts in its turn very perversely on the conditions of
the labour-market. Not only does the degree of exploitation of the wage labourer remain
indecently low. The wage labourer loses into the bargain, along with the relation of dependence,
also the sentiment of dependence on the abstemious capitalist. Hence all the inconveniences that
our E. G. Wakefield pictures so doughtily, so eloquently, so pathetically. The supply of wage
labour, he complains, is neither constant, nor regular, nor sufficient. “The supply of labour is
always not only small but uncertain.” 13 “Though the produce divided between the capitalist and
the labourer be large, the labourer takes so great a share that he soon becomes a capitalist.... Few,
even those whose lives are unusually long, can accumulate great masses of wealth.”14 The
labourers most distinctly decline to allow the capitalist to abstain from the payment of the greater
part of their labour. It avails him nothing, if he is so cunning as to import from Europe, with his
own capital, his own wage-workers. They soon “cease... to be labourers for hire; they... become
independent landowners, if not competitors with their former masters in the labour-market.” 15
Think of the horror! The excellent capitalist has imported bodily from Europe, with his own good
money, his own competitors! The end of the world has come! No wonder Wakefield laments the
absence of all dependence and of all sentiment of dependence on the part of the wage-workers in
the colonies. On account of the high wages, says his disciple, Merivale, there is in the colonies
“the urgent desire for cheaper and more subservient labourers – for a class to whom the capitalist
might dictate terms, instead of being dictated to by them.... In ancient civilised countries the
labourer, though free, is by a law of Nature dependent on capitalists; in colonies this dependence
must be created by artificial means.” 16
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What is now, according to Wakefield, the consequence of this unfortunate state of things in the
colonies? A “barbarising tendency of dispersion” of producers and national wealth.17 The
parcelling-out of the means of production among innumerable owners, working on their own
account, annihilates, along with the centralisation of capital, all the foundation of combined
labour. Every long-winded undertaking, extending over several years and demanding outlay of
fixed capital, is prevented from being carried out. In Europe, capital invests without hesitating a
moment, for the working class constitutes its living appurtenance, always in excess, always at
disposal. But in the colonies! Wakefield tells an extremely doleful anecdote. He was talking with
some capitalists of Canada and the state of New York, where the immigrant wave often becomes
stagnant and deposits a sediment of “supernumerary” labourers. “Our capital,” says one of the
characters in the melodrama, "was ready for many operations which require a considerable period
of time for their completion; but we could not begin such operations with labour which, we knew,
would soon leave us. If we had been sure of retaining the labour of such emigrants, we should
have been glad to have engaged it at once, and for a high price: and we should have engaged it,
even though we had been sure it would leave us, provided we had been sure of a fresh supply
whenever we might need it.” 18
After Wakefield has constructed the English capitalist agriculture and its “combined” labour with
the scattered cultivation of American peasants, he unwittingly gives us a glimpse at the reverse of
the medal. He depicts the mass of the American people as well-to-do, independent, enterprising,
and comparatively cultured, whilst “the English agricultural labourer is miserable wretch, a
pauper.... In what country, except North America and some new colonies, do the wages of free
labour employed in agriculture much exceed a bare subsistence for the labourer? ... Undoubtedly ,
farm-horses in England, being a valuable property, are better fed than English peasants.”19 But,
never mind, national wealth is, once again, by its very nature, identical with misery of the people.
How, then, to heal the anti-capitalistic cancer of the colonies? If men were willing, at a blow, to
turn all the soil from public into private property, they would destroy certainly the root of the evil,
but also – the colonies. The trick is how to kill two birds with one stone. Let the Government put
upon the virgin soil an artificial price, independent of the law of supply and demand, a price that
compels the immigrant to work a long time for wages before he can earn enough money to buy
land, and turn himself into an independent peasant.20 The fund resulting from the sale of land at a
price relatively prohibitory for the wage-workers, this fund of money extorted from the wages of
labour by violation of the sacred law of supply and demand, the Government is to employ, on the
other hand, in proportion as it grows; to import have-nothings from Europe into the colonies, and
thus keep the wage labour market full for the capitalists. Under these circumstances, tout sera
pour le mieux dans le meilleur des mondes possibles. This is the great secret of “systematic
colonisation.” By this plan, Wakefield cries in triumph, “the supply of labour must be constant
and regular, because, first, as no labourer would be able to procure land until he had worked for
money, all immigrant labourers, working for a time for wages and in combination, would produce
capital for the employment of more labourers; secondly, because every labourer who left off
working for wages and became a landowner would, by purchasing land, provide a fund for
bringing fresh labour to the colony.” 21The price of the soil imposed by the State must, of course,
be a “sufficient price” – i.e., so high “as to prevent the labourers from becoming independent
landowners until others had followed to take their place.”22 This “sufficient price for the land” is
nothing but a euphemistic circumlocution for the ransom which the labourer pays to the capitalist
for leave to retire from the wage labour market to the land. First, he must create for the capitalist
“capital,” with which the latter may be able to exploit more labourers; then he must place, at his
own expense, a locum tenens [placeholder] on the labour market, whom the Government
forwards across the sea for the benefit of his old master, the capitalist.
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It is very characteristic that the English Government for years practised this method of “primitive
accumulation” prescribed by Mr. Wakefield expressly for the use of the colonies. The fiasco was,
of course, as complete as that of Sir Robert Peel’s Bank Act. The stream of emigration was only
diverted from the English colonies to the United States. Meanwhile, the advance of capitalistic
production in Europe, accompanied by increasing Government pressure, has rendered
Wakefield’s recipe superfluous. On the one hand, the enormous and ceaseless stream of men,
year after year driven upon America, leaves behind a stationary sediment in the east of the United
States, the wave of immigration from Europe throwing men on the labour-market there more
rapidly than the wave of emigration westwards can wash them away. On the other hand, the
American Civil War brought in its train a colossal national debt, and, with it, pressure of taxes,
the rise of the vilest financial aristocracy, the squandering of a huge part of the public land on
speculative companies for the exploitation of railways, mines, &c., in brief, the most rapid
centralisation of capital. The great republic has, therefore, ceased to be the promised land for
emigrant labourers. Capitalistic production advances there with giant strides, even though the
lowering of wages and the dependence of the wage-worker are yet far from being brought down
to the normal European level. The shameless lavishing of uncultivated colonial land on aristocrats
and capitalists by the Government, so loudly denounced even by Wakefield, has produced,
especially in Australia 23, in conjunction with the stream of men that the gold diggings attract, and
with the competition that the importation of English-commodities causes even to the smallest
artisan, an ample “relative surplus labouring population,” so that almost every mail brings the
Job’s news of a “glut of the Australia labour-market,” and the prostitution in some places
flourishes as wantonly as in the London Haymarket.
However, we are not concerned here with the conditions of the colonies. The only thing that
interests us is the secret discovered in the new world by the Political Economy of the old world,
and proclaimed on the housetops: that the capitalist mode of production and accumulation, and
therefore capitalist private property, have for their fundamental condition the annihilation of selfearned private property; in other words, the expropriation of the labourer.

End of Book I

1

We treat here of real Colonies, virgins soils, colonized by free immigrants. The United States are,
speaking economically, still only a Colony of Europe. Besides, to this category belong such old
plantations as those in which the abolition of slavery has completely altered the earlier conditions.
2
Wakefield’s few glimpses on the subject of Modern Colonisation are fully anticipated by Mirabeau
Pere, the physiocrat, and even much earlier by English economists.
3
Later, it became a temporary necessity in the international competitive struggle. But, whatever its
motive, the consequences remain the same.
4
“A negro is a negro. In certain circumstances he becomes a slave. A mule is a machine for spinning
cotton. Only under certain circumstances does it become capital. Outside these circumstances, it is no
more capital than gold is intrinsically money, or sugar is the price of sugar.... Capital is a social
relation of production. It is a historical relation of production.” (Karl Marx, “Lohnarbeit und Kapital,”
N. Rh. Z., No.266, April 7, 1849.)
5
E. G. Wakefield: “England and America,” vol.ii. p.33.
6
l.c., p.17.
7
l.c., vol.i, p.18.
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l.c., pp.42, 43, 44.
l.c., vol.ii, p.5.
10
“Land, to be an element of colonisation, must not only be waste, but it must be public property,
liable to be converted into private property.” (l.c., Vol.II, p.125.)
11
l.c., Vol.I, p.247.
12
l.c., pp.21, 22.
13
l.c., Vol.II, p.116
14
l.c., Vol.I, p.131.
15
l.c., Vol.II, p.5.
16
Merivale, l.c., Vol.II, pp.235-314 passim. Even the mild, Free Trade, vulgar economist, Molinari,
says: “Dans les colonies où l’esclavage a été aboli sans que le travail forcé se trouvait remplacé par
une quantité équivalente de travail libre, on a vu s’opérer la contre-partie du fait qui se réalise tous les
jours sous nos yeux. On a vu les simples travailleurs exploiter à leur tour les entrepreneurs d’industrie,
exiger d’eux des salaires hors de toute proportion avec la part légitime qui leur revenait dans le
produit. Les planteurs, ne pouvant obtenir de leurs sucres un prix suffisant pour couvrir la hausse de
salaire, ont été obligés de fournir l’excédant, d’abord sur leurs profits, ensuite sur leurs capitaux
mêmes. Une foule de planteurs ont été ruinés de la sorte, d’autres ont fermé leurs ateliers pour
échapper à une ruine imminente.... Sans doute, il vaut mieux voir périr des accumulations de capitaux
que des générations d’hommes [how generous Mr. Molinari!]: mais ne vaudrait-il pas mieux que ni les
uns ni les autres périssent? [In the colonies where slavery has been abolished without the compulsory
labour being replaced with an equivalent quantity of free labour, there has occurred the opposite of
what happens every day before our eyes. Simple workers have been seen to exploit in their turn the
industrial entrepreneurs, demanding from them wages which bear absolutely no relation to the
legitimate share in the product which they ought to receive. The planters were unable to obtain for
their sugar for a sufficent price to cover the increase in wages, and were obliged to furnish the extra
amount, at first out of their profits, and then out of their very capital. A considerable amount of
planters have been ruined as a result, while others have closed down their businesses in order to avoid
the ruin which threatened them ... It is doubtless better that these accumulations of capital should be
destroyed than that generations of men should perish ... but would it not be better if both survived?]
(Molinari, l.c., pp.51,52.) Mr. Molinari, Mr. Molinari! What then becomes of the ten commandments,
of Moses and the prophets, of the law of supply and demand, if in Europe the “entrepreneur” can cut
down the labourer’s legitimate part, and in the West Indies, the labourer can cut down the
entrepreneur’s? And what, if you please, is this “legitimate part,” which on your own showing the
capitalist in Europe daily neglects to pay? Over yonder, in the colonies where the labourers are so
“simple” as to “exploit” the capitalist, Mr. Molinari feels a strong itching to set the law of supply and
demand, that works elsewhere automatically, on the right road by means of the police.
17
Wakefield, l.c., Vol.II, p.52.
18
l.c., pp.191, 192.
19
l.c., Vol.I, p.47, 246.
20
“C’est, ajoutez-vous, grâce à l’appropriation du sol et des capitaux que l’homme, qui n’a que ses
bras, trouve de l’occupation et se fait un revenu... c’est au contraire, grâce à l’appropriation
individuelle du sol qu’il se trouve des hommes n’ayant que leurs bras.... Quand vous mettez un
homme dans le vide, vous vous emparez de l’atmosphère. Ainsi faites-vous, quand vous vous emparez
du sol.... C’est le mettre dans le vide le richesses, pour ne la laisser vivre qu’à votre volonté.” [It is,
you add, a result of the appropriation of the soil and of capital that the man who has nothing but the
strength of his arms finds employment and creates an income for himself ... but the opposite is true, it
is thanks to the individual appropriation of the soil that there exist men who only possess the strength
9
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of their arms. ... When you put a man in a vacuum, you rob him of the air. You do the same, when you
take away the soil from him ... for you are putting him in a space void of wealth, so as to leave him no
way of living except according to your wishes] (Collins, l.c. t.III, pp.268-71, passim.)
21
Wakefield, l.c., Vol.II, p.192.
22
l.c., p.45.
23
As soon as Australia became her own law-giver, she passed, of course, laws favorable to the
settlers, but the squandering of the land, already accomplished by the English Government, stands in
the way. “The first and main object at which new Land Act of 1862 aims is to give increased facilities
for the settlement of the people.” (“The Land Law of Victoria,” by the Hon. C. G. Duffy, Minister of
Public Lands, Lond., 1862.)
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PREFACE
Reader, thou hast here the beginning and end of a discourse concerning
government; what fate has otherwise disposed of the papers that should
have filled up the middle, and were more than all the rest, it is not worth
while to tell thee. These, which remain, I hope are sufficient to establish the
throne of our great restorer, our present King William; to make good his
title, in the consent of the people, which being the only one of all lawful
governments, he has more fully and clearly, than any prince in
Christendom; and to justify to the world the people of England, whose love
of their just and natural rights, with their resolution to preserve them, saved
the nation when it was on the very brink of slavery and ruin. If these papers
have that evidence, I flatter myself is to be found in them, there will be no
great miss of those which are lost, and my reader may be satisfied without
them: for I imagine, I shall have neither the time, nor inclination to repeat
my pains, and fill up the wanting part of my answer, by tracing Sir Robert
again, through all the windings and obscurities, which are to be met with in
the several branches of his wonderful system. The king, and body of the
nation, have since so thoroughly confuted his Hypothesis, that I suppose no
body hereafter will have either the confidence to appear against our
common safety, and be again an advocate for slavery; or the weakness to be
deceived with contradictions dressed up in a popular stile, and well-turned
periods: for if any one will be at the pains, himself, in those parts, which are
here untouched, to strip Sir Robert's discourses of the flourish of doubtful
expressions, and endeavour to reduce his words to direct, positive,
intelligible propositions, and then compare them one with another, he will
quickly be satisfied, there was never so much glib nonsense put together in
well-sounding English. If he think it not worth while to examine his works
all thro', let him make an experiment in that part, where he treats of
usurpation; and let him try, whether he can, with all his skill, make Sir
Robert intelligible, and consistent with himself, or common sense. I should
not speak so plainly of a gentleman, long since past answering, had not the
pulpit, of late years, publicly owned his doctrine, and made it the current
divinity of the times. It is necessary those men, who taking on them to be
teachers, have so dangerously misled others, should be openly shewed of
what authority this their Patriarch is, whom they have so blindly followed,
that so they may either retract what upon so ill grounds they have vented,

and cannot be maintained; or else justify those principles which they
preached up for gospel; though they had no better an author than an English
courtier: for I should not have writ against Sir Robert, or taken the pains to
shew his mistakes, inconsistencies, and want of (what he so much boasts of,
and pretends wholly to build on) scripture-proofs, were there not men
amongst us, who, by crying up his books, and espousing his doctrine, save
me from the reproach of writing against a dead adversary. They have been
so zealous in this point, that, if I have done him any wrong, I cannot hope
they should spare me. I wish, where they have done the truth and the public
wrong, they would be as ready to redress it, and allow its just weight to this
reflection, viz. that there cannot be done a greater mischief to prince and
people, than the propagating wrong notions concerning government; that so
at last all times might not have reason to complain of the Drum Ecclesiastic.
If any one, concerned really for truth, undertake the confutation of my
Hypothesis, I promise him either to recant my mistake, upon fair
conviction; or to answer his difficulties. But he must remember two things.
First, That cavilling here and there, at some expression, or little incident of
my discourse, is not an answer to my book.
Secondly, That I shall not take railing for arguments, nor think either of
these worth my notice, though I shall always look on myself as bound to
give satisfaction to any one, who shall appear to be conscientiously
scrupulous in the point, and shall shew any just grounds for his scruples.
I have nothing more, but to advertise the reader, that Observations stands
for Observations on Hobbs, Milton, &c. and that a bare quotation of pages
always means pages of his Patriarcha, Edition 1680.

Book II

CHAPTER. I.
AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT AND
END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT
Sect. 1. It having been shewn in the foregoing discourse,
(1). That Adam had not, either by natural right of fatherhood, or by
positive donation from God, any such authority over his children, or
dominion over the world, as is pretended:
(2). That if he had, his heirs, yet, had no right to it:
(3). That if his heirs had, there being no law of nature nor positive law of
God that determines which is the right heir in all cases that may arise, the
right of succession, and consequently of bearing rule, could not have been
certainly determined:
(4). That if even that had been determined, yet the knowledge of which is
the eldest line of Adam's posterity, being so long since utterly lost, that in
the races of mankind and families of the world, there remains not to one
above another, the least pretence to be the eldest house, and to have the
right of inheritance:
All these premises having, as I think, been clearly made out, it is
impossible that the rulers now on earth should make any benefit, or derive
any the least shadow of authority from that, which is held to be the fountain
of all power, Adam's private dominion and paternal jurisdiction; so that he
that will not give just occasion to think that all government in the world is
the product only of force and violence, and that men live together by no
other rules but that of beasts, where the strongest carries it, and so lay a
foundation for perpetual disorder and mischief, tumult, sedition and
rebellion, (things that the followers of that hypothesis so loudly cry out
against) must of necessity find out another rise of government, another
original of political power, and another way of designing and knowing the
persons that have it, than what Sir Robert Filmer hath taught us.
Sect. 2. To this purpose, I think it may not be amiss, to set down what I
take to be political power; that the power of a MAGISTRATE over a

subject may be distinguished from that of a FATHER over his children, a
MASTER over his servant, a HUSBAND over his wife, and a LORD over
his slave. All which distinct powers happening sometimes together in the
same man, if he be considered under these different relations, it may help us
to distinguish these powers one from wealth, a father of a family, and a
captain of a galley.
Sect. 3. POLITICAL POWER, then, I take to be a RIGHT of making laws
with penalties of death, and consequently all less penalties, for the
regulating and preserving of property, and of employing the force of the
community, in the execution of such laws, and in the defence of the
commonwealth from foreign injury; and all this only for the public good.

CHAPTER. II.
OF THE STATE OF NATURE.
Sect. 4. TO understand political power right, and derive it from its
original, we must consider, what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a
state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their
possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of
nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man.
A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is
reciprocal, no one having more than another; there being nothing more
evident, than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously
born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of the same faculties,
should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or
subjection, unless the lord and master of them all should, by any manifest
declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on him, by an
evident and clear appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and
sovereignty.

Sect. 5. This equality of men by nature, the judicious Hooker looks upon
as so evident in itself, and beyond all question, that he makes it the
foundation of that obligation to mutual love amongst men, on which he
builds the duties they owe one another, and from whence he derives the
great maxims of justice and charity. His words are,
The like natural inducement hath brought men to know that it is no
less their duty, to love others than themselves; for seeing those
things which are equal, must needs all have one measure; if I cannot
but wish to receive good, even as much at every man's hands, as any
man can wish unto his own soul, how should I look to have any part
of my desire herein satisfied, unless myself be careful to satisfy the
like desire, which is undoubtedly in other men, being of one and the
same nature? To have any thing offered them repugnant to this
desire, must needs in all respects grieve them as much as me; so that
if I do harm, I must look to suffer, there being no reason that others
should shew greater measure of love to me, than they have by me
shewed unto them: my desire therefore to be loved of my equals in
nature as much as possible may be, imposeth upon me a natural duty
of bearing to them-ward fully the like affection; from which relation
of equality between ourselves and them that are as ourselves, what
several rules and canons natural reason hath drawn, for direction of
life, no man is ignorant, Eccl. Pol. Lib. 1.
Sect. 6. But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of licence:
though man in that state have an uncontroulable liberty to dispose of his
person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or so much
as any creature in his possession, but where some nobler use than its bare
preservation calls for it. The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it,
which obliges every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind,
who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought
to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions: for men being all
the workmanship of one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker; all the
servants of one sovereign master, sent into the world by his order, and about
his business; they are his property, whose workmanship they are, made to
last during his, not one another's pleasure: and being furnished with like

faculties, sharing all in one community of nature, there cannot be supposed
any such subordination among us, that may authorize us to destroy one
another, as if we were made for one another's uses, as the inferior ranks of
creatures are for our's. Every one, as he is bound to preserve himself, and
not to quit his station wilfully, so by the like reason, when his own
preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to
preserve the rest of mankind, and may not, unless it be to do justice on an
offender, take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of
the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.
Sect. 7. And that all men may be restrained from invading others rights,
and from doing hurt to one another, and the law of nature be observed,
which willeth the peace and preservation of all mankind, the execution of
the law of nature is, in that state, put into every man's hands, whereby every
one has a right to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree, as
may hinder its violation: for the law of nature would, as all other laws that
concern men in this world be in vain, if there were no body that in the state
of nature had a power to execute that law, and thereby preserve the innocent
and restrain offenders. And if any one in the state of nature may punish
another for any evil he has done, every one may do so: for in that state of
perfect equality, where naturally there is no superiority or jurisdiction of
one over another, what any may do in prosecution of that law, every one
must needs have a right to do.
Sect. 8. And thus, in the state of nature, one man comes by a power over
another; but yet no absolute or arbitrary power, to use a criminal, when he
has got him in his hands, according to the passionate heats, or boundless
extravagancy of his own will; but only to retribute to him, so far as calm
reason and conscience dictate, what is proportionate to his transgression,
which is so much as may serve for reparation and restraint: for these two
are the only reasons, why one man may lawfully do harm to another, which
is that we call punishment. In transgressing the law of nature, the offender
declares himself to live by another rule than that of reason and common
equity, which is that measure God has set to the actions of men, for their
mutual security; and so he becomes dangerous to mankind, the tye, which is
to secure them from injury and violence, being slighted and broken by him.
Which being a trespass against the whole species, and the peace and safety
of it, provided for by the law of nature, every man upon this score, by the

right he hath to preserve mankind in general, may restrain, or where it is
necessary, destroy things noxious to them, and so may bring such evil on
any one, who hath transgressed that law, as may make him repent the doing
of it, and thereby deter him, and by his example others, from doing the like
mischief. And in the case, and upon this ground, EVERY MAN HATH A
RIGHT TO PUNISH THE OFFENDER, AND BE EXECUTIONER OF
THE LAW OF NATURE.
Sect. 9. I doubt not but this will seem a very strange doctrine to some
men: but before they condemn it, I desire them to resolve me, by what right
any prince or state can put to death, or punish an alien, for any crime he
commits in their country. It is certain their laws, by virtue of any sanction
they receive from the promulgated will of the legislative, reach not a
stranger: they speak not to him, nor, if they did, is he bound to hearken to
them. The legislative authority, by which they are in force over the subjects
of that commonwealth, hath no power over him. Those who have the
supreme power of making laws in England, France or Holland, are to an
Indian, but like the rest of the world, men without authority: and therefore,
if by the law of nature every man hath not a power to punish offences
against it, as he soberly judges the case to require, I see not how the
magistrates of any community can punish an alien of another country;
since, in reference to him, they can have no more power than what every
man naturally may have over another.
Sect, 10. Besides the crime which consists in violating the law, and
varying from the right rule of reason, whereby a man so far becomes
degenerate, and declares himself to quit the principles of human nature, and
to be a noxious creature, there is commonly injury done to some person or
other, and some other man receives damage by his transgression: in which
case he who hath received any damage, has, besides the right of punishment
common to him with other men, a particular right to seek reparation from
him that has done it: and any other person, who finds it just, may also join
with him that is injured, and assist him in recovering from the offender so
much as may make satisfaction for the harm he has suffered.
Sect. 11. From these two distinct rights, the one of punishing the crime for
restraint, and preventing the like offence, which right of punishing is in
every body; the other of taking reparation, which belongs only to the

injured party, comes it to pass that the magistrate, who by being magistrate
hath the common right of punishing put into his hands, can often, where the
public good demands not the execution of the law, remit the punishment of
criminal offences by his own authority, but yet cannot remit the satisfaction
due to any private man for the damage he has received. That, he who has
suffered the damage has a right to demand in his own name, and he alone
can remit: the damnified person has this power of appropriating to himself
the goods or service of the offender, by right of self-preservation, as every
man has a power to punish the crime, to prevent its being committed again,
by the right he has of preserving all mankind, and doing all reasonable
things he can in order to that end: and thus it is, that every man, in the state
of nature, has a power to kill a murderer, both to deter others from doing the
like injury, which no reparation can compensate, by the example of the
punishment that attends it from every body, and also to secure men from the
attempts of a criminal, who having renounced reason, the common rule and
measure God hath given to mankind, hath, by the unjust violence and
slaughter he hath committed upon one, declared war against all mankind,
and therefore may be destroyed as a lion or a tyger, one of those wild
savage beasts, with whom men can have no society nor security: and upon
this is grounded that great law of nature, Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by
man shall his blood be shed. And Cain was so fully convinced, that every
one had a right to destroy such a criminal, that after the murder of his
brother, he cries out, Every one that findeth me, shall slay me; so plain was
it writ in the hearts of all mankind.
Sect. 12. By the same reason may a man in the state of nature punish the
lesser breaches of that law. It will perhaps be demanded, with death? I
answer, each transgression may be punished to that degree, and with so
much severity, as will suffice to make it an ill bargain to the offender, give
him cause to repent, and terrify others from doing the like. Every offence,
that can be committed in the state of nature, may in the state of nature be
also punished equally, and as far forth as it may, in a commonwealth: for
though it would be besides my present purpose, to enter here into the
particulars of the law of nature, or its measures of punishment; yet, it is
certain there is such a law, and that too, as intelligible and plain to a rational
creature, and a studier of that law, as the positive laws of commonwealths;
nay, possibly plainer; as much as reason is easier to be understood, than the

fancies and intricate contrivances of men, following contrary and hidden
interests put into words; for so truly are a great part of the municipal laws of
countries, which are only so far right, as they are founded on the law of
nature, by which they are to be regulated and interpreted.
Sect. 13. To this strange doctrine, viz. That in the state of nature every one
has the executive power of the law of nature, I doubt not but it will be
objected, that it is unreasonable for men to be judges in their own cases,
that self-love will make men partial to themselves and their friends: and on
the other side, that ill nature, passion and revenge will carry them too far in
punishing others; and hence nothing but confusion and disorder will follow,
and that therefore God hath certainly appointed government to restrain the
partiality and violence of men. I easily grant, that civil government is the
proper remedy for the inconveniencies of the state of nature, which must
certainly be great, where men may be judges in their own case, since it is
easy to be imagined, that he who was so unjust as to do his brother an
injury, will scarce be so just as to condemn himself for it: but I shall desire
those who make this objection, to remember, that absolute monarchs are but
men; and if government is to be the remedy of those evils, which
necessarily follow from men's being judges in their own cases, and the state
of nature is therefore not to be endured, I desire to know what kind of
government that is, and how much better it is than the state of nature, where
one man, commanding a multitude, has the liberty to be judge in his own
case, and may do to all his subjects whatever he pleases, without the least
liberty to any one to question or controul those who execute his pleasure?
and in whatsoever he doth, whether led by reason, mistake or passion, must
be submitted to? much better it is in the state of nature, wherein men are not
bound to submit to the unjust will of another: and if he that judges, judges
amiss in his own, or any other case, he is answerable for it to the rest of
mankind.
Sect. 14. It is often asked as a mighty objection, where are, or ever were
there any men in such a state of nature? To which it may suffice as an
answer at present, that since all princes and rulers of independent
governments all through the world, are in a state of nature, it is plain the
world never was, nor ever will be, without numbers of men in that state. I
have named all governors of independent communities, whether they are, or
are not, in league with others: for it is not every compact that puts an end to

the state of nature between men, but only this one of agreeing together
mutually to enter into one community, and make one body politic; other
promises, and compacts, men may make one with another, and yet still be in
the state of nature. The promises and bargains for truck, &c. between the
two men in the desert island, mentioned by Garcilasso de la Vega, in his
history of Peru; or between a Swiss and an Indian, in the woods of America,
are binding to them, though they are perfectly in a state of nature, in
reference to one another: for truth and keeping of faith belongs to men, as
men, and not as members of society.
Sect. 15. To those that say, there were never any men in the state of nature,
I will not only oppose the authority of the judicious Hooker, Eccl. Pol. lib. i.
sect. 10, where he says,
The laws which have been hitherto mentioned, i.e. the laws of
nature, do bind men absolutely, even as they are men, although they
have never any settled fellowship, never any solemn agreement
amongst themselves what to do, or not to do: but forasmuch as we
are not by ourselves sufficient to furnish ourselves with competent
store of things, needful for such a life as our nature doth desire, a
life fit for the dignity of man; therefore to supply those defects and
imperfections which are in us, as living single and solely by
ourselves, we are naturally induced to seek communion and
fellowship with others: this was the cause of men's uniting
themselves at first in politic societies.
But I moreover affirm, that all men are naturally in that state, and remain
so, till by their own consents they make themselves members of some
politic society; and I doubt not in the sequel of this discourse, to make it
very clear.

CHAPTER. III.

OF THE STATE OF WAR.
Sect. 16. THE state of war is a state of enmity and destruction: and
therefore declaring by word or action, not a passionate and hasty, but a
sedate settled design upon another man's life, puts him in a state of war with
him against whom he has declared such an intention, and so has exposed his
life to the other's power to be taken away by him, or any one that joins with
him in his defence, and espouses his quarrel; it being reasonable and just, I
should have a right to destroy that which threatens me with destruction: for,
by the fundamental law of nature, man being to be preserved as much as
possible, when all cannot be preserved, the safety of the innocent is to be
preferred: and one may destroy a man who makes war upon him, or has
discovered an enmity to his being, for the same reason that he may kill a
wolf or a lion; because such men are not under the ties of the commonlaw
of reason, have no other rule, but that of force and violence, and so may be
treated as beasts of prey, those dangerous and noxious creatures, that will be
sure to destroy him whenever he falls into their power.
Sect. 17. And hence it is, that he who attempts to get another man into his
absolute power, does thereby put himself into a state of war with him; it
being to be understood as a declaration of a design upon his life: for I have
reason to conclude, that he who would get me into his power without my
consent, would use me as he pleased when he had got me there, and destroy
me too when he had a fancy to it; for no body can desire to have me in his
absolute power, unless it be to compel me by force to that which is against
the right of my freedom, i.e. make me a slave. To be free from such force is
the only security of my preservation; and reason bids me look on him, as an
enemy to my preservation, who would take away that freedom which is the
fence to it; so that he who makes an attempt to enslave me, thereby puts
himself into a state of war with me. He that, in the state of nature, would
take away the freedom that belongs to any one in that state, must
necessarily be supposed to have a design to take away every thing else, that
freedom being the foundation of all the rest; as he that, in the state of
society, would take away the freedom belonging to those of that society or
commonwealth, must be supposed to design to take away from them every
thing else, and so be looked on as in a state of war.

Sect. 18. This makes it lawful for a man to kill a thief, who has not in the
least hurt him, nor declared any design upon his life, any farther than, by
the use of force, so to get him in his power, as to take away his money, or
what he pleases, from him; because using force, where he has no right, to
get me into his power, let his pretence be what it will, I have no reason to
suppose, that he, who would take away my liberty, would not, when he had
me in his power, take away every thing else. And therefore it is lawful for
me to treat him as one who has put himself into a state of war with me, i.e.
kill him if I can; for to that hazard does he justly expose himself, whoever
introduces a state of war, and is aggressor in it.
Sect. 19. And here we have the plain difference between the state of
nature and the state of war, which however some men have confounded, are
as far distant, as a state of peace, good will, mutual assistance and
preservation, and a state of enmity, malice, violence and mutual destruction,
are one from another. Men living together according to reason, without a
common superior on earth, with authority to judge between them, is
properly the state of nature. But force, or a declared design of force, upon
the person of another, where there is no common superior on earth to appeal
to for relief, is the state of war: and it is the want of such an appeal gives a
man the right of war even against an aggressor, tho' he be in society and a
fellow subject. Thus a thief, whom I cannot harm, but by appeal to the law,
for having stolen all that I am worth, I may kill, when he sets on me to rob
me but of my horse or coat; because the law, which was made for my
preservation, where it cannot interpose to secure my life from present force,
which, if lost, is capable of no reparation, permits me my own defence, and
the right of war, a liberty to kill the aggressor, because the aggressor allows
not time to appeal to our common judge, nor the decision of the law, for
remedy in a case where the mischief may be irreparable. Want of a common
judge with authority, puts all men in a state of nature: force without right,
upon a man's person, makes a state of war, both where there is, and is not, a
common judge.
Sect. 20. But when the actual force is over, the state of war ceases between
those that are in society, and are equally on both sides subjected to the fair
determination of the law; because then there lies open the remedy of appeal
for the past injury, and to prevent future harm: but where no such appeal is,
as in the state of nature, for want of positive laws, and judges with authority

to appeal to, the state of war once begun, continues, with a right to the
innocent party to destroy the other whenever he can, until the aggressor
offers peace, and desires reconciliation on such terms as may repair any
wrongs he has already done, and secure the innocent for the future; nay,
where an appeal to the law, and constituted judges, lies open, but the
remedy is denied by a manifest perverting of justice, and a barefaced
wresting of the laws to protect or indemnify the violence or injuries of some
men, or party of men, there it is hard to imagine any thing but a state of
war: for wherever violence is used, and injury done, though by hands
appointed to administer justice, it is still violence and injury, however
coloured with the name, pretences, or forms of law, the end whereof being
to protect and redress the innocent, by an unbiassed application of it, to all
who are under it; wherever that is not bona fide done, war is made upon the
sufferers, who having no appeal on earth to right them, they are left to the
only remedy in such cases, an appeal to heaven.
Sect. 21. To avoid this state of war (wherein there is no appeal but to
heaven, and wherein every the least difference is apt to end, where there is
no authority to decide between the contenders) is one great reason of men's
putting themselves into society, and quitting the state of nature: for where
there is an authority, a power on earth, from which relief can be had by
appeal, there the continuance of the state of war is excluded, and the
controversy is decided by that power. Had there been any such court, any
superior jurisdiction on earth, to determine the right between Jephtha and
the Ammonites, they had never come to a state of war: but we see he was
forced to appeal to heaven. The Lord the Judge (says he) be judge this day
between the children of Israel and the children of Ammon, Judg. xi. 27. and
then prosecuting, and relying on his appeal, he leads out his army to battle:
and therefore in such controversies, where the question is put, who shall be
judge? It cannot be meant, who shall decide the controversy; every one
knows what Jephtha here tells us, that the Lord the Judge shall judge.
Where there is no judge on earth, the appeal lies to God in heaven. That
question then cannot mean, who shall judge, whether another hath put
himself in a state of war with me, and whether I may, as Jephtha did, appeal
to heaven in it? of that I myself can only be judge in my own conscience, as
I will answer it, at the great day, to the supreme judge of all men.

CHAPTER. IV.
OF SLAVERY.
Sect. 22. THE natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior power
on earth, and not to be under the will or legislative authority of man, but to
have only the law of nature for his rule. The liberty of man, in society, is to
be under no other legislative power, but that established, by consent, in the
commonwealth; nor under the dominion of any will, or restraint of any law,
but what that legislative shall enact, according to the trust put in it. Freedom
then is not what Sir Robert Filmer tells us, Observations, A. 55. a liberty for
every one to do what he lists, to live as he pleases, and not to be tied by any
laws: but freedom of men under government is, to have a standing rule to
live by, common to every one of that society, and made by the legislative
power erected in it; a liberty to follow my own will in all things, where the
rule prescribes not; and not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain,
unknown, arbitrary will of another man: as freedom of nature is, to be under
no other restraint but the law of nature.
Sect. 23. This freedom from absolute, arbitrary power, is so necessary to,
and closely joined with a man's preservation, that he cannot part with it, but
by what forfeits his preservation and life together: for a man, not having the
power of his own life, cannot, by compact, or his own consent, enslave
himself to any one, nor put himself under the absolute, arbitrary power of
another, to take away his life, when he pleases. No body can give more
power than he has himself; and he that cannot take away his own life,
cannot give another power over it. Indeed, having by his fault forfeited his
own life, by some act that deserves death; he, to whom he has forfeited it,
may (when he has him in his power) delay to take it, and make use of him
to his own service, and he does him no injury by it: for, whenever he finds
the hardship of his slavery outweigh the value of his life, it is in his power,
by resisting the will of his master, to draw on himself the death he desires.
Sect. 24. This is the perfect condition of slavery, which is nothing else, but
the state of war continued, between a lawful conqueror and a captive: for, if
once compact enter between them, and make an agreement for a limited
power on the one side, and obedience on the other, the state of war and

slavery ceases, as long as the compact endures: for, as has been said, no
man can, by agreement, pass over to another that which he hath not in
himself, a power over his own life.
I confess, we find among the Jews, as well as other nations, that men did
sell themselves; but, it is plain, this was only to drudgery, not to slavery:
for, it is evident, the person sold was not under an absolute, arbitrary,
despotical power: for the master could not have power to kill him, at any
time, whom, at a certain time, he was obliged to let go free out of his
service; and the master of such a servant was so far from having an
arbitrary power over his life, that he could not, at pleasure, so much as
maim him, but the loss of an eye, or tooth, set him free, Exod. xxi.

CHAPTER. V.
OF PROPERTY.
Sect. 25. Whether we consider natural reason, which tells us, that men,
being once born, have a right to their preservation, and consequently to
meat and drink, and such other things as nature affords for their subsistence:
or revelation, which gives us an account of those grants God made of the
world to Adam, and to Noah, and his sons, it is very clear, that God, as king
David says, Psal. cxv. 16. has given the earth to the children of men; given
it to mankind in common. But this being supposed, it seems to some a very
great difficulty, how any one should ever come to have a property in any
thing: I will not content myself to answer, that if it be difficult to make out
property, upon a supposition that God gave the world to Adam, and his
posterity in common, it is impossible that any man, but one universal
monarch, should have any property upon a supposition, that God gave the
world to Adam, and his heirs in succession, exclusive of all the rest of his
posterity. But I shall endeavour to shew, how men might come to have a

property in several parts of that which God gave to mankind in common,
and that without any express compact of all the commoners.
Sect. 26. God, who hath given the world to men in common, hath also
given them reason to make use of it to the best advantage of life, and
convenience. The earth, and all that is therein, is given to men for the
support and comfort of their being. And tho' all the fruits it naturally
produces, and beasts it feeds, belong to mankind in common, as they are
produced by the spontaneous hand of nature; and no body has originally a
private dominion, exclusive of the rest of mankind, in any of them, as they
are thus in their natural state: yet being given for the use of men, there must
of necessity be a means to appropriate them some way or other, before they
can be of any use, or at all beneficial to any particular man. The fruit, or
venison, which nourishes the wild Indian, who knows no enclosure, and is
still a tenant in common, must be his, and so his, i.e. a part of him, that
another can no longer have any right to it, before it can do him any good for
the support of his life.
Sect. 27. Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all
men, yet every man has a property in his own person: this no body has any
right to but himself. The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we
may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that
nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and
joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It
being by him removed from the common state nature hath placed it in, it
hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right
of other men: for this labour being the unquestionable property of the
labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at
least where there is enough, and as good, left in common for others.
Sect. 28. He that is nourished by the acorns he picked up under an oak, or
the apples he gathered from the trees in the wood, has certainly
appropriated them to himself. No body can deny but the nourishment is his.
I ask then, when did they begin to be his? when he digested? or when he
eat? or when he boiled? or when he brought them home? or when he picked
them up? and it is plain, if the first gathering made them not his, nothing
else could. That labour put a distinction between them and common: that
added something to them more than nature, the common mother of all, had

done; and so they became his private right. And will any one say, he had no
right to those acorns or apples, he thus appropriated, because he had not the
consent of all mankind to make them his? Was it a robbery thus to assume
to himself what belonged to all in common? If such a consent as that was
necessary, man had starved, notwithstanding the plenty God had given him.
We see in commons, which remain so by compact, that it is the taking any
part of what is common, and removing it out of the state nature leaves it in,
which begins the property; without which the common is of no use. And the
taking of this or that part, does not depend on the express consent of all the
commoners. Thus the grass my horse has bit; the turfs my servant has cut;
and the ore I have digged in any place, where I have a right to them in
common with others, become my property, without the assignation or
consent of any body. The labour that was mine, removing them out of that
common state they were in, hath fixed my property in them.
Sect. 29. By making an explicit consent of every commoner, necessary to
any one's appropriating to himself any part of what is given in common,
children or servants could not cut the meat, which their father or master had
provided for them in common, without assigning to every one his peculiar
part. Though the water running in the fountain be every one's, yet who can
doubt, but that in the pitcher is his only who drew it out? His labour hath
taken it out of the hands of nature, where it was common, and belonged
equally to all her children, and hath thereby appropriated it to himself.
Sect. 30. Thus this law of reason makes the deer that Indian's who hath
killed it; it is allowed to be his goods, who hath bestowed his labour upon it,
though before it was the common right of every one. And amongst those
who are counted the civilized part of mankind, who have made and
multiplied positive laws to determine property, this original law of nature,
for the beginning of property, in what was before common, still takes place;
and by virtue thereof, what fish any one catches in the ocean, that great and
still remaining common of mankind; or what ambergrise any one takes up
here, is by the labour that removes it out of that common state nature left it
in, made his property, who takes that pains about it. And even amongst us,
the hare that any one is hunting, is thought his who pursues her during the
chase: for being a beast that is still looked upon as common, and no man's
private possession; whoever has employed so much labour about any of that

kind, as to find and pursue her, has thereby removed her from the state of
nature, wherein she was common, and hath begun a property.
Sect. 31. It will perhaps be objected to this, that if gathering the acorns, or
other fruits of the earth, &c. makes a right to them, then any one may
ingross as much as he will. To which I answer, Not so. The same law of
nature, that does by this means give us property, does also bound that
property too. God has given us all things richly, 1 Tim. vi. 12. is the voice
of reason confirmed by inspiration. But how far has he given it us? To
enjoy. As much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before
it spoils, so much he may by his labour fix a property in: whatever is
beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs to others. Nothing was
made by God for man to spoil or destroy. And thus, considering the plenty
of natural provisions there was a long time in the world, and the few
spenders; and to how small a part of that provision the industry of one man
could extend itself, and ingross it to the prejudice of others; especially
keeping within the bounds, set by reason, of what might serve for his use;
there could be then little room for quarrels or contentions about property so
established.
Sect. 32. But the chief matter of property being now not the fruits of the
earth, and the beasts that subsist on it, but the earth itself; as that which
takes in and carries with it all the rest; I think it is plain, that property in that
too is acquired as the former. As much land as a man tills, plants, improves,
cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his property. He by his
labour does, as it were, inclose it from the common. Nor will it invalidate
his right, to say every body else has an equal title to it; and therefore he
cannot appropriate, he cannot inclose, without the consent of all his fellowcommoners, all mankind. God, when he gave the world in common to all
mankind, commanded man also to labour, and the penury of his condition
required it of him. God and his reason commanded him to subdue the earth,
i.e. improve it for the benefit of life, and therein lay out something upon it
that was his own, his labour. He that in obedience to this command of God,
subdued, tilled and sowed any part of it, thereby annexed to it something
that was his property, which another had no title to, nor could without injury
take from him.

Sect. 33. Nor was this appropriation of any parcel of land, by improving it,
any prejudice to any other man, since there was still enough, and as good
left; and more than the yet unprovided could use. So that, in effect, there
was never the less left for others because of his enclosure for himself: for he
that leaves as much as another can make use of, does as good as take
nothing at all. No body could think himself injured by the drinking of
another man, though he took a good draught, who had a whole river of the
same water left him to quench his thirst: and the case of land and water,
where there is enough of both, is perfectly the same.
Sect. 34. God gave the world to men in common; but since he gave it them
for their benefit, and the greatest conveniencies of life they were capable to
draw from it, it cannot be supposed he meant it should always remain
common and uncultivated. He gave it to the use of the industrious and
rational, (and labour was to be his title to it;) not to the fancy or
covetousness of the quarrelsome and contentious. He that had as good left
for his improvement, as was already taken up, needed not complain, ought
not to meddle with what was already improved by another's labour: if he
did, it is plain he desired the benefit of another's pains, which he had no
right to, and not the ground which God had given him in common with
others to labour on, and whereof there was as good left, as that already
possessed, and more than he knew what to do with, or his industry could
reach to.
Sect. 35. It is true, in land that is common in England, or any other
country, where there is plenty of people under government, who have
money and commerce, no one can inclose or appropriate any part, without
the consent of all his fellow-commoners; because this is left common by
compact, i.e. by the law of the land, which is not to be violated. And though
it be common, in respect of some men, it is not so to all mankind; but is the
joint property of this country, or this parish. Besides, the remainder, after
such enclosure, would not be as good to the rest of the commoners, as the
whole was when they could all make use of the whole; whereas in the
beginning and first peopling of the great common of the world, it was quite
otherwise. The law man was under, was rather for appropriating. God
commanded, and his wants forced him to labour. That was his property
which could not be taken from him where-ever he had fixed it. And hence
subduing or cultivating the earth, and having dominion, we see are joined

together. The one gave title to the other. So that God, by commanding to
subdue, gave authority so far to appropriate: and the condition of human
life, which requires labour and materials to work on, necessarily introduces
private possessions.
Sect. 36. The measure of property nature has well set by the extent of
men's labour and the conveniencies of life: no man's labour could subdue,
or appropriate all; nor could his enjoyment consume more than a small part;
so that it was impossible for any man, this way, to intrench upon the right of
another, or acquire to himself a property, to the prejudice of his neighbour,
who would still have room for as good, and as large a possession (after the
other had taken out his) as before it was appropriated. This measure did
confine every man's possession to a very moderate proportion, and such as
he might appropriate to himself, without injury to any body, in the first ages
of the world, when men were more in danger to be lost, by wandering from
their company, in the then vast wilderness of the earth, than to be straitened
for want of room to plant in. And the same measure may be allowed still
without prejudice to any body, as full as the world seems: for supposing a
man, or family, in the state they were at first peopling of the world by the
children of Adam, or Noah; let him plant in some inland, vacant places of
America, we shall find that the possessions he could make himself, upon
the measures we have given, would not be very large, nor, even to this day,
prejudice the rest of mankind, or give them reason to complain, or think
themselves injured by this man's incroachment, though the race of men
have now spread themselves to all the corners of the world, and do
infinitely exceed the small number was at the beginning. Nay, the extent of
ground is of so little value, without labour, that I have heard it affirmed, that
in Spain itself a man may be permitted to plough, sow and reap, without
being disturbed, upon land he has no other title to, but only his making use
of it. But, on the contrary, the inhabitants think themselves beholden to him,
who, by his industry on neglected, and consequently waste land, has
increased the stock of corn, which they wanted. But be this as it will, which
I lay no stress on; this I dare boldly affirm, that the same rule of propriety,
(viz.) that every man should have as much as he could make use of, would
hold still in the world, without straitening any body; since there is land
enough in the world to suffice double the inhabitants, had not the invention
of money, and the tacit agreement of men to put a value on it, introduced

(by consent) larger possessions, and a right to them; which, how it has done,
I shall by and by shew more at large.
Sect. 37. This is certain, that in the beginning, before the desire of having
more than man needed had altered the intrinsic value of things, which
depends only on their usefulness to the life of man; or had agreed, that a
little piece of yellow metal, which would keep without wasting or decay,
should be worth a great piece of flesh, or a whole heap of corn; though men
had a right to appropriate, by their labour, each one of himself, as much of
the things of nature, as he could use: yet this could not be much, nor to the
prejudice of others, where the same plenty was still left to those who would
use the same industry. To which let me add, that he who appropriates land
to himself by his labour, does not lessen, but increase the common stock of
mankind: for the provisions serving to the support of human life, produced
by one acre of inclosed and cultivated land, are (to speak much within
compass) ten times more than those which are yielded by an acre of land of
an equal richness lying waste in common. And therefore he that incloses
land, and has a greater plenty of the conveniencies of life from ten acres,
than he could have from an hundred left to nature, may truly be said to give
ninety acres to mankind: for his labour now supplies him with provisions
out of ten acres, which were but the product of an hundred lying in
common. I have here rated the improved land very low, in making its
product but as ten to one, when it is much nearer an hundred to one: for I
ask, whether in the wild woods and uncultivated waste of America, left to
nature, without any improvement, tillage or husbandry, a thousand acres
yield the needy and wretched inhabitants as many conveniencies of life, as
ten acres of equally fertile land do in Devonshire, where they are well
cultivated?
Before the appropriation of land, he who gathered as much of the wild
fruit, killed, caught, or tamed, as many of the beasts, as he could; he that so
imployed his pains about any of the spontaneous products of nature, as any
way to alter them from the state which nature put them in, by placing any of
his labour on them, did thereby acquire a propriety in them: but if they
perished, in his possession, without their due use; if the fruits rotted, or the
venison putrified, before he could spend it, he offended against the common
law of nature, and was liable to be punished; he invaded his neighbour's

share, for he had no right, farther than his use called for any of them, and
they might serve to afford him conveniencies of life.
Sect. 38. The same measures governed the possession of land too:
whatsoever he tilled and reaped, laid up and made use of, before it spoiled,
that was his peculiar right; whatsoever he enclosed, and could feed, and
make use of, the cattle and product was also his. But if either the grass of
his enclosure rotted on the ground, or the fruit of his planting perished
without gathering, and laying up, this part of the earth, notwithstanding his
enclosure, was still to be looked on as waste, and might be the possession of
any other. Thus, at the beginning, Cain might take as much ground as he
could till, and make it his own land, and yet leave enough to Abel's sheep to
feed on; a few acres would serve for both their possessions. But as families
increased, and industry inlarged their stocks, their possessions inlarged with
the need of them; but yet it was commonly without any fixed property in
the ground they made use of, till they incorporated, settled themselves
together, and built cities; and then, by consent, they came in time, to set out
the bounds of their distinct territories, and agree on limits between them and
their neighbours; and by laws within themselves, settled the properties of
those of the same society: for we see, that in that part of the world which
was first inhabited, and therefore like to be best peopled, even as low down
as Abraham's time, they wandered with their flocks, and their herds, which
was their substance, freely up and down; and this Abraham did, in a country
where he was a stranger. Whence it is plain, that at least a great part of the
land lay in common; that the inhabitants valued it not, nor claimed property
in any more than they made use of. But when there was not room enough in
the same place, for their herds to feed together, they by consent, as
Abraham and Lot did, Gen. xiii. 5. separated and inlarged their pasture,
where it best liked them. And for the same reason Esau went from his
father, and his brother, and planted in mount Seir, Gen. xxxvi. 6.
Sect. 39. And thus, without supposing any private dominion, and property
in Adam, over all the world, exclusive of all other men, which can no way
be proved, nor any one's property be made out from it; but supposing the
world given, as it was, to the children of men in common, we see how
labour could make men distinct titles to several parcels of it, for their
private uses; wherein there could be no doubt of right, no room for quarrel.

Sect. 40. Nor is it so strange, as perhaps before consideration it may
appear, that the property of labour should be able to over-balance the
community of land: for it is labour indeed that puts the difference of value
on every thing; and let any one consider what the difference is between an
acre of land planted with tobacco or sugar, sown with wheat or barley, and
an acre of the same land lying in common, without any husbandry upon it,
and he will find, that the improvement of labour makes the far greater part
of the value. I think it will be but a very modest computation to say, that of
the products of the earth useful to the life of man nine tenths are the effects
of labour: nay, if we will rightly estimate things as they come to our use,
and cast up the several expences about them, what in them is purely owing
to nature, and what to labour, we shall find, that in most of them ninety-nine
hundredths are wholly to be put on the account of labour.
Sect. 41. There cannot be a clearer demonstration of any thing, than
several nations of the Americans are of this, who are rich in land, and poor
in all the comforts of life; whom nature having furnished as liberally as any
other people, with the materials of plenty, i.e. a fruitful soil, apt to produce
in abundance, what might serve for food, raiment, and delight; yet for want
of improving it by labour, have not one hundredth part of the conveniencies
we enjoy: and a king of a large and fruitful territory there, feeds, lodges,
and is clad worse than a day-labourer in England.
Sect. 42. To make this a little clearer, let us but trace some of the ordinary
provisions of life, through their several progresses, before they come to our
use, and see how much they receive of their value from human industry.
Bread, wine and cloth, are things of daily use, and great plenty; yet
notwithstanding, acorns, water and leaves, or skins, must be our bread,
drink and cloathing, did not labour furnish us with these more useful
commodities: for whatever bread is more worth than acorns, wine than
water, and cloth or silk, than leaves, skins or moss, that is wholly owing to
labour and industry; the one of these being the food and raiment which
unassisted nature furnishes us with; the other, provisions which our industry
and pains prepare for us, which how much they exceed the other in value,
when any one hath computed, he will then see how much labour makes the
far greatest part of the value of things we enjoy in this world: and the
ground which produces the materials, is scarce to be reckoned in, as any, or
at most, but a very small part of it; so little, that even amongst us, land that

is left wholly to nature, that hath no improvement of pasturage, tillage, or
planting, is called, as indeed it is, waste; and we shall find the benefit of it
amount to little more than nothing.
This shews how much numbers of men are to be preferred to largeness of
dominions; and that the increase of lands, and the right employing of them,
is the great art of government: and that prince, who shall be so wise and
godlike, as by established laws of liberty to secure protection and
encouragement to the honest industry of mankind, against the oppression of
power and narrowness of party, will quickly be too hard for his neighbours:
but this by the by.
To return to the argument in hand.
Sect. 43. An acre of land, that bears here twenty bushels of wheat, and
another in America, which, with the same husbandry, would do the like, are,
without doubt, of the same natural intrinsic value: but yet the benefit
mankind receives from the one in a year, is worth 5l. and from the other
possibly not worth a penny, if all the profit an Indian received from it were
to be valued, and sold here; at least, I may truly say, not one thousandth. It
is labour then which puts the greatest part of value upon land, without
which it would scarcely be worth any thing: it is to that we owe the greatest
part of all its useful products; for all that the straw, bran, bread, of that acre
of wheat, is more worth than the product of an acre of as good land, which
lies waste, is all the effect of labour: for it is not barely the plough-man's
pains, the reaper's and thresher's toil, and the baker's sweat, is to be counted
into the bread we eat; the labour of those who broke the oxen, who digged
and wrought the iron and stones, who felled and framed the timber
employed about the plough, mill, oven, or any other utensils, which are a
vast number, requisite to this corn, from its being feed to be sown to its
being made bread, must all be charged on the account of labour, and
received as an effect of that: nature and the earth furnished only the almost
worthless materials, as in themselves. It would be a strange catalogue of
things, that industry provided and made use of, about every loaf of bread,
before it came to our use, if we could trace them; iron, wood, leather, bark,
timber, stone, bricks, coals, lime, cloth, dying drugs, pitch, tar, masts, ropes,
and all the materials made use of in the ship, that brought any of the

commodities made use of by any of the workmen, to any part of the work;
all which it would be almost impossible, at least too long, to reckon up.
Sect. 44. From all which it is evident, that though the things of nature are
given in common, yet man, by being master of himself, and proprietor of
his own person, and the actions or labour of it, had still in himself the great
foundation of property; and that, which made up the great part of what he
applied to the support or comfort of his being, when invention and arts had
improved the conveniencies of life, was perfectly his own, and did not
belong in common to others.
Sect. 45. Thus labour, in the beginning, gave a right of property, wherever
any one was pleased to employ it upon what was common, which remained
a long while the far greater part, and is yet more than mankind makes use
of. Men, at first, for the most part, contented themselves with what
unassisted nature offered to their necessities: and though afterwards, in
some parts of the world, (where the increase of people and stock, with the
use of money, had made land scarce, and so of some value) the several
communities settled the bounds of their distinct territories, and by laws
within themselves regulated the properties of the private men of their
society, and so, by compact and agreement, settled the property which
labour and industry began; and the leagues that have been made between
several states and kingdoms, either expresly or tacitly disowning all claim
and right to the land in the others possession, have, by common consent,
given up their pretences to their natural common right, which originally
they had to those countries, and so have, by positive agreement, settled a
property amongst themselves, in distinct parts and parcels of the earth; yet
there are still great tracts of ground to be found, which (the inhabitants
thereof not having joined with the rest of mankind, in the consent of the use
of their common money) lie waste, and are more than the people who dwell
on it do, or can make use of, and so still lie in common; tho' this can scarce
happen amongst that part of mankind that have consented to the use of
money.
Sect. 46. The greatest part of things really useful to the life of man, and
such as the necessity of subsisting made the first commoners of the world
look after, as it doth the Americans now, are generally things of short
duration; such as, if they are not consumed by use, will decay and perish of

themselves: gold, silver and diamonds, are things that fancy or agreement
hath put the value on, more than real use, and the necessary support of life.
Now of those good things which nature hath provided in common, every
one had a right (as hath been said) to as much as he could use, and property
in all that he could effect with his labour; all that his industry could extend
to, to alter from the state nature had put it in, was his. He that gathered a
hundred bushels of acorns or apples, had thereby a property in them, they
were his goods as soon as gathered. He was only to look, that he used them
before they spoiled, else he took more than his share, and robbed others.
And indeed it was a foolish thing, as well as dishonest, to hoard up more
than he could make use of. If he gave away a part to any body else, so that
it perished not uselesly in his possession, these he also made use of. And if
he also bartered away plums, that would have rotted in a week, for nuts that
would last good for his eating a whole year, he did no injury; he wasted not
the common stock; destroyed no part of the portion of goods that belonged
to others, so long as nothing perished uselesly in his hands. Again, if he
would give his nuts for a piece of metal, pleased with its colour; or
exchange his sheep for shells, or wool for a sparkling pebble or a diamond,
and keep those by him all his life he invaded not the right of others, he
might heap up as much of these durable things as he pleased; the exceeding
of the bounds of his just property not lying in the largeness of his
possession, but the perishing of any thing uselesly in it.
Sect. 47. And thus came in the use of money, some lasting thing that men
might keep without spoiling, and that by mutual consent men would take in
exchange for the truly useful, but perishable supports of life.
Sect. 48. And as different degrees of industry were apt to give men
possessions in different proportions, so this invention of money gave them
the opportunity to continue and enlarge them: for supposing an island,
separate from all possible commerce with the rest of the world, wherein
there were but an hundred families, but there were sheep, horses and cows,
with other useful animals, wholsome fruits, and land enough for corn for a
hundred thousand times as many, but nothing in the island, either because
of its commonness, or perishableness, fit to supply the place of money;
what reason could any one have there to enlarge his possessions beyond the
use of his family, and a plentiful supply to its consumption, either in what
their own industry produced, or they could barter for like perishable, useful

commodities, with others? Where there is not some thing, both lasting and
scarce, and so valuable to be hoarded up, there men will not be apt to
enlarge their possessions of land, were it never so rich, never so free for
them to take: for I ask, what would a man value ten thousand, or an hundred
thousand acres of excellent land, ready cultivated, and well stocked too with
cattle, in the middle of the inland parts of America, where he had no hopes
of commerce with other parts of the world, to draw money to him by the
sale of the product? It would not be worth the enclosing, and we should see
him give up again to the wild common of nature, whatever was more than
would supply the conveniencies of life to be had there for him and his
family.
Sect. 49. Thus in the beginning all the world was America, and more so
than that is now; for no such thing as money was any where known. Find
out something that hath the use and value of money amongst his
neighbours, you shall see the same man will begin presently to enlarge his
possessions.
Sect. 50. But since gold and silver, being little useful to the life of man in
proportion to food, raiment, and carriage, has its value only from the
consent of men, whereof labour yet makes, in great part, the measure, it is
plain, that men have agreed to a disproportionate and unequal possession of
the earth, they having, by a tacit and voluntary consent, found out, a way
how a man may fairly possess more land than he himself can use the
product of, by receiving in exchange for the overplus gold and silver, which
may be hoarded up without injury to any one; these metals not spoiling or
decaying in the hands of the possessor. This partage of things in an
inequality of private possessions, men have made practicable out of the
bounds of society, and without compact, only by putting a value on gold
and silver, and tacitly agreeing in the use of money: for in governments, the
laws regulate the right of property, and the possession of land is determined
by positive constitutions.
Sect. 51. And thus, I think, it is very easy to conceive, without any
difficulty, how labour could at first begin a title of property in the common
things of nature, and how the spending it upon our uses bounded it. So that
there could then be no reason of quarrelling about title, nor any doubt about
the largeness of possession it gave. Right and conveniency went together;

for as a man had a right to all he could employ his labour upon, so he had
no temptation to labour for more than he could make use of. This left no
room for controversy about the title, nor for encroachment on the right of
others; what portion a man carved to himself, was easily seen; and it was
useless, as well as dishonest, to carve himself too much, or take more than
he needed.

CHAPTER. VI.
OF PATERNAL POWER.
Sect. 52. IT may perhaps be censured as an impertinent criticism, in a
discourse of this nature, to find fault with words and names, that have
obtained in the world: and yet possibly it may not be amiss to offer new
ones, when the old are apt to lead men into mistakes, as this of paternal
power probably has done, which seems so to place the power of parents
over their children wholly in the father, as if the mother had no share in it;
whereas, if we consult reason or revelation, we shall find, she hath an equal
title. This may give one reason to ask, whether this might not be more
properly called parental power? for whatever obligation nature and the right
of generation lays on children, it must certainly bind them equal to both the
concurrent causes of it. And accordingly we see the positive law of God
every where joins them together, without distinction, when it commands the
obedience of children, Honour thy father and thy mother, Exod. xx. 12.
Whosoever curseth his father or his mother, Lev. xx. 9. Ye shall fear every
man his mother and his father, Lev. xix. 3. Children, obey your parents, &c.
Eph. vi. 1. is the stile of the Old and New Testament.
Sect. 53. Had but this one thing been well considered, without looking any
deeper into the matter, it might perhaps have kept men from running into
those gross mistakes, they have made, about this power of parents; which,
however it might, without any great harshness, bear the name of absolute

dominion, and regal authority, when under the title of paternal power it
seemed appropriated to the father, would yet have founded but oddly, and in
the very name shewn the absurdity, if this supposed absolute power over
children had been called parental; and thereby have discovered, that it
belonged to the mother too: for it will but very ill serve the turn of those
men, who contend so much for the absolute power and authority of the
fatherhood, as they call it, that the mother should have any share in it; and it
would have but ill supported the monarchy they contend for, when by the
very name it appeared, that that fundamental authority, from whence they
would derive their government of a single person only, was not placed in
one, but two persons jointly. But to let this of names pass.
Sect. 54. Though I have said above, Chap. II. That all men by nature are
equal, I cannot be supposed to understand all sorts of equality: age or virtue
may give men a just precedency: excellency of parts and merit may place
others above the common level: birth may subject some, and alliance or
benefits others, to pay an observance to those to whom nature, gratitude, or
other respects, may have made it due: and yet all this consists with the
equality, which all men are in, in respect of jurisdiction or dominion one
over another; which was the equality I there spoke of, as proper to the
business in hand, being that equal right, that every man hath, to his natural
freedom, without being subjected to the will or authority of any other man.
Sect. 55. Children, I confess, are not born in this full state of equality,
though they are born to it. Their parents have a sort of rule and jurisdiction
over them, when they come into the world, and for some time after; but it is
but a temporary one. The bonds of this subjection are like the swaddling
clothes they are wrapt up in, and supported by, in the weakness of their
infancy: age and reason as they grow up, loosen them, till at length they
drop quite off, and leave a man at his own free disposal.
Sect. 56. Adam was created a perfect man, his body and mind in full
possession of their strength and reason, and so was capable, from the first
instant of his being to provide for his own support and preservation, and
govern his actions according to the dictates of the law of reason which God
had implanted in him. From him the world is peopled with his descendants,
who are all born infants, weak and helpless, without knowledge or
understanding: but to supply the defects of this imperfect state, till the

improvement of growth and age hath removed them, Adam and Eve, and
after them all parents were, by the law of nature, under an obligation to
preserve, nourish, and educate the children they had begotten; not as their
own workmanship, but the workmanship of their own maker, the Almighty,
to whom they were to be accountable for them.
Sect. 57. The law, that was to govern Adam, was the same that was to
govern all his posterity, the law of reason. But his offspring having another
way of entrance into the world, different from him, by a natural birth, that
produced them ignorant and without the use of reason, they were not
presently under that law; for no body can be under a law, which is not
promulgated to him; and this law being promulgated or made known by
reason only, he that is not come to the use of his reason, cannot be said to be
under this law; and Adam's children, being not presently as soon as born
under this law of reason, were not presently free: for law, in its true notion,
is not so much the limitation as the direction of a free and intelligent agent
to his proper interest, and prescribes no farther than is for the general good
of those under that law: could they be happier without it, the law, as an
useless thing, would of itself vanish; and that ill deserves the name of
confinement which hedges us in only from bogs and precipices. So that,
however it may be mistaken, the end of law is not to abolish or restrain, but
to preserve and enlarge freedom: for in all the states of created beings
capable of laws, where there is no law, there is no freedom: for liberty is, to
be free from restraint and violence from others; which cannot be, where
there is no law: but freedom is not, as we are told, a liberty for every man to
do what he lists: (for who could be free, when every other man's humour
might domineer over him?) but a liberty to dispose, and order as he lists, his
person, actions, possessions, and his whole property, within the allowance
of those laws under which he is, and therein not to be subject to the
arbitrary will of another, but freely follow his own.

Sect. 58. The power, then, that parents have over their children, arises
from that duty which is incumbent on them, to take care of their off-spring,
during the imperfect state of childhood. To inform the mind, and govern the
actions of their yet ignorant nonage, till reason shall take its place, and ease
them of that trouble, is what the children want, and the parents are bound
to: for God having given man an understanding to direct his actions, has
allowed him a freedom of will, and liberty of acting, as properly belonging
thereunto, within the bounds of that law he is under. But whilst he is in an
estate, wherein he has not understanding of his own to direct his will, he is
not to have any will of his own to follow: he that understands for him, must
will for him too; he must prescribe to his will, and regulate his actions; but
when he comes to the estate that made his father a freeman, the son is a
freeman too.
Sect. 59. This holds in all the laws a man is under, whether natural or civil.
Is a man under the law of nature? What made him free of that law? what
gave him a free disposing of his property, according to his own will, within
the compass of that law? I answer, a state of maturity wherein he might be
supposed capable to know that law, that so he might keep his actions within
the bounds of it. When he has acquired that state, he is presumed to know
how far that law is to be his guide, and how far he may make use of his
freedom, and so comes to have it; till then, some body else must guide him,
who is presumed to know how far the law allows a liberty. If such a state of
reason, such an age of discretion made him free, the same shall make his
son free too. Is a man under the law of England? What made him free of
that law? that is, to have the liberty to dispose of his actions and possessions
according to his own will, within the permission of that law? A capacity of
knowing that law; which is supposed by that law, at the age of one and
twenty years, and in some cases sooner. If this made the father free, it shall
make the son free too. Till then we see the law allows the son to have no
will, but he is to be guided by the will of his father or guardian, who is to
understand for him. And if the father die, and fail to substitute a deputy in
his trust; if he hath not provided a tutor, to govern his son, during his
minority, during his want of understanding, the law takes care to do it; some
other must govern him, and be a will to him, till he hath attained to a state
of freedom, and his understanding be fit to take the government of his will.
But after that, the father and son are equally free as much as tutor and pupil

after nonage; equally subjects of the same law together, without any
dominion left in the father over the life, liberty, or estate of his son, whether
they be only in the state and under the law of nature, or under the positive
laws of an established government.
Sect. 60. But if, through defects that may happen out of the ordinary
course of nature, any one comes not to such a degree of reason, wherein he
might be supposed capable of knowing the law, and so living within the
rules of it, he is never capable of being a free man, he is never let loose to
the disposure of his own will (because he knows no bounds to it, has not
understanding, its proper guide) but is continued under the tuition and
government of others, all the time his own understanding is uncapable of
that charge. And so lunatics and ideots are never set free from the
government of their parents;
children, who are not as yet come unto those years whereat they
may have; and innocents which are excluded by a natural defect
from ever having; thirdly, madmen, which for the present cannot
possibly have the use of right reason to guide themselves, have for
their guide, the reason that guideth other men which are tutors over
them, to seek and procure their good for them,
says Hooker, Eccl. Pol. lib. i. sec. 7. All which seems no more than that
duty, which God and nature has laid on man, as well as other creatures, to
preserve their offspring, till they can be able to shift for themselves, and
will scarce amount to an instance or proof of parents regal authority.
Sect. 61. Thus we are born free, as we are born rational; not that we have
actually the exercise of either: age, that brings one, brings with it the other
too. And thus we see how natural freedom and subjection to parents may
consist together, and are both founded on the same principle. A child is free
by his father's title, by his father's understanding, which is to govern him till
he hath it of his own. The freedom of a man at years of discretion, and the
subjection of a child to his parents, whilst yet short of that age, are so
consistent, and so distinguishable, that the most blinded contenders for
monarchy, by right of fatherhood, cannot miss this difference; the most
obstinate cannot but allow their consistency: for were their doctrine all true,

were the right heir of Adam now known, and by that title settled a monarch
in his throne, invested with all the absolute unlimited power Sir Robert
Filmer talks of; if he should die as soon as his heir were born, must not the
child, notwithstanding he were never so free, never so much sovereign, be
in subjection to his mother and nurse, to tutors and governors, till age and
education brought him reason and ability to govern himself and others? The
necessities of his life, the health of his body, and the information of his
mind, would require him to be directed by the will of others, and not his
own; and yet will any one think, that this restraint and subjection were
inconsistent with, or spoiled him of that liberty or sovereignty he had a right
to, or gave away his empire to those who had the government of his
nonage? This government over him only prepared him the better and sooner
for it. If any body should ask me, when my son is of age to be free? I shall
answer, just when his monarch is of age to govern. But at what time, says
the judicious Hooker, Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 6. a man may be said to have
attained so far forth the use of reason, as sufficeth to make him capable of
those laws whereby he is then bound to guide his actions: this is a great deal
more easy for sense to discern, than for any one by skill and learning to
determine.
Sect. 62. Common-wealths themselves take notice of, and allow, that there
is a time when men are to begin to act like free men, and therefore till that
time require not oaths of fealty, or allegiance, or other public owning of, or
submission to the government of their countries.
Sect. 63. The freedom then of man, and liberty of acting according to his
own will, is grounded on his having reason, which is able to instruct him in
that law he is to govern himself by, and make him know how far he is left to
the freedom of his own will. To turn him loose to an unrestrained liberty,
before he has reason to guide him, is not the allowing him the privilege of
his nature to be free; but to thrust him out amongst brutes, and abandon him
to a state as wretched, and as much beneath that of a man, as their's. This is
that which puts the authority into the parents hands to govern the minority
of their children. God hath made it their business to employ this care on
their offspring, and hath placed in them suitable inclinations of tenderness
and concern to temper this power, to apply it, as his wisdom designed it, to
the children's good, as long as they should need to be under it.

Sect. 64. But what reason can hence advance this care of the parents due
to their off-spring into an absolute arbitrary dominion of the father, whose
power reaches no farther, than by such a discipline, as he finds most
effectual, to give such strength and health to their bodies, such vigour and
rectitude to their minds, as may best fit his children to be most useful to
themselves and others; and, if it be necessary to his condition, to make them
work, when they are able, for their own subsistence. But in this power the
mother too has her share with the father.
Sect. 65. Nay, this power so little belongs to the father by any peculiar
right of nature, but only as he is guardian of his children, that when he quits
his care of them, he loses his power over them, which goes along with their
nourishment and education, to which it is inseparably annexed; and it
belongs as much to the foster-father of an exposed child, as to the natural
father of another. So little power does the bare act of begetting give a man
over his issue; if all his care ends there, and this be all the title he hath to the
name and authority of a father. And what will become of this paternal
power in that part of the world, where one woman hath more than one
husband at a time? or in those parts of America, where, when the husband
and wife part, which happens frequently, the children are all left to the
mother, follow her, and are wholly under her care and provision? If the
father die whilst the children are young, do they not naturally every where
owe the same obedience to their mother, during their minority, as to their
father were he alive? and will any one say, that the mother hath a legislative
power over her children? that she can make standing rules, which shall be
of perpetual obligation, by which they ought to regulate all the concerns of
their property, and bound their liberty all the course of their lives? or can
she inforce the observation of them with capital punishments? for this is the
proper power of the magistrate, of which the father hath not so much as the
shadow. His command over his children is but temporary, and reaches not
their life or property: it is but a help to the weakness and imperfection of
their nonage, a discipline necessary to their education: and though a father
may dispose of his own possessions as he pleases, when his children are out
of danger of perishing for want, yet his power extends not to the lives or
goods, which either their own industry, or another's bounty has made their's;
nor to their liberty neither, when they are once arrived to the
infranchisement of the years of discretion. The father's empire then ceases,

and he can from thence forwards no more dispose of the liberty of his son,
than that of any other man: and it must be far from an absolute or perpetual
jurisdiction, from which a man may withdraw himself, having license from
divine authority to leave father and mother, and cleave to his wife.
Sect. 66. But though there be a time when a child comes to be as free from
subjection to the will and command of his father, as the father himself is
free from subjection to the will of any body else, and they are each under no
other restraint, but that which is common to them both, whether it be the
law of nature, or municipal law of their country; yet this freedom exempts
not a son from that honour which he ought, by the law of God and nature, to
pay his parents. God having made the parents instruments in his great
design of continuing the race of mankind, and the occasions of life to their
children; as he hath laid on them an obligation to nourish, preserve, and
bring up their offspring; so he has laid on the children a perpetual obligation
of honouring their parents, which containing in it an inward esteem and
reverence to be shewn by all outward expressions, ties up the child from
any thing that may ever injure or affront, disturb or endanger, the happiness
or life of those from whom he received his; and engages him in all actions
of defence, relief, assistance and comfort of those, by whose means he
entered into being, and has been made capable of any enjoyments of life:
from this obligation no state, no freedom can absolve children. But this is
very far from giving parents a power of command over their children, or an
authority to make laws and dispose as they please of their lives or liberties.
It is one thing to owe honour, respect, gratitude and assistance; another to
require an absolute obedience and submission. The honour due to parents, a
monarch in his throne owes his mother; and yet this lessens not his
authority, nor subjects him to her government.
Sect. 67. The subjection of a minor places in the father a temporary
government, which terminates with the minority of the child: and the
honour due from a child, places in the parents a perpetual right to respect,
reverence, support and compliance too, more or less, as the father's care,
cost, and kindness in his education, has been more or less. This ends not
with minority, but holds in all parts and conditions of a man's life. The want
of distinguishing these two powers, viz. that which the father hath in the
right of tuition, during minority, and the right of honour all his life, may
perhaps have caused a great part of the mistakes about this matter: for to

speak properly of them, the first of these is rather the privilege of children,
and duty of parents, than any prerogative of paternal power. The
nourishment and education of their children is a charge so incumbent on
parents for their children's good, that nothing can absolve them from taking
care of it: and though the power of commanding and chastising them go
along with it, yet God hath woven into the principles of human nature such
a tenderness for their off-spring, that there is little fear that parents should
use their power with too much rigour; the excess is seldom on the severe
side, the strong byass of nature drawing the other way. And therefore God
almighty when he would express his gentle dealing with the Israelites, he
tells them, that though he chastened them, he chastened them as a man
chastens his son, Deut. viii. 5. i.e. with tenderness and affection, and kept
them under no severer discipline than what was absolutely best for them,
and had been less kindness to have slackened. This is that power to which
children are commanded obedience, that the pains and care of their parents
may not be increased, or ill rewarded.
Sect. 68. On the other side, honour and support, all that which gratitude
requires to return for the benefits received by and from them, is the
indispensable duty of the child, and the proper privilege of the parents. This
is intended for the parents advantage, as the other is for the child's; though
education, the parents duty, seems to have most power, because the
ignorance and infirmities of childhood stand in need of restraint and
correction; which is a visible exercise of rule, and a kind of dominion. And
that duty which is comprehended in the word honour, requires less
obedience, though the obligation be stronger on grown, than younger
children: for who can think the command, Children obey your parents,
requires in a man, that has children of his own, the same submission to his
father, as it does in his yet young children to him; and that by this precept
he were bound to obey all his father's commands, if, out of a conceit of
authority, he should have the indiscretion to treat him still as a boy?
Sect. 69. The first part then of paternal power, or rather duty, which is
education, belongs so to the father, that it terminates at a certain season;
when the business of education is over, it ceases of itself, and is also
alienable before: for a man may put the tuition of his son in other hands;
and he that has made his son an apprentice to another, has discharged him,
during that time, of a great part of his obedience both to himself and to his

mother. But all the duty of honour, the other part, remains never the less
entire to them; nothing can cancel that: it is so inseparable from them both,
that the father's authority cannot dispossess the mother of this right, nor can
any man discharge his son from honouring her that bore him. But both these
are very far from a power to make laws, and enforcing them with penalties,
that may reach estate, liberty, limbs and life. The power of commanding
ends with nonage; and though, after that, honour and respect, support and
defence, and whatsoever gratitude can oblige a man to, for the highest
benefits he is naturally capable of, be always due from a son to his parents;
yet all this puts no scepter into the father's hand, no sovereign power of
commanding. He has no dominion over his son's property, or actions; nor
any right, that his will should prescribe to his son's in all things; however it
may become his son in many things, not very inconvenient to him and his
family, to pay a deference to it.
Sect. 70. A man may owe honour and respect to an ancient, or wise man;
defence to his child or friend; relief and support to the distressed; and
gratitude to a benefactor, to such a degree, that all he has, all he can do,
cannot sufficiently pay it: but all these give no authority, no right to any
one, of making laws over him from whom they are owing. And it is plain,
all this is due not only to the bare title of father; not only because, as has
been said, it is owing to the mother too; but because these obligations to
parents, and the degrees of what is required of children, may be varied by
the different care and kindness, trouble and expence, which is often
employed upon one child more than another.
Sect. 71. This shews the reason how it comes to pass, that parents in
societies, where they themselves are subjects, retain a power over their
children, and have as much right to their subjection, as those who are in the
state of nature. Which could not possibly be, if all political power were only
paternal, and that in truth they were one and the same thing: for then, all
paternal power being in the prince, the subject could naturally have none of
it. But these two powers, political and paternal, are so perfectly distinct and
separate; are built upon so different foundations, and given to so different
ends, that every subject that is a father, has as much a paternal power over
his children, as the prince has over his: and every prince, that has parents,
owes them as much filial duty and obedience, as the meanest of his subjects

do to their's; and can therefore contain not any part or degree of that kind of
dominion, which a prince or magistrate has over his subject.
Sect. 72. Though the obligation on the parents to bring up their children,
and the obligation on children to honour their parents, contain all the power
on the one hand, and submission on the other, which are proper to this
relation, yet there is another power ordinarily in the father, whereby he has
a tie on the obedience of his children; which tho' it be common to him with
other men, yet the occasions of shewing it, almost constantly happening to
fathers in their private families, and the instances of it elsewhere being rare,
and less taken notice of, it passes in the world for a part of paternal
jurisdiction. And this is the power men generally have to bestow their
estates on those who please them best; the possession of the father being the
expectation and inheritance of the children, ordinarily in certain
proportions, according to the law and custom of each country; yet it is
commonly in the father's power to bestow it with a more sparing or liberal
hand, according as the behaviour of this or that child hath comported with
his will and humour.
Sect. 73. This is no small tie on the obedience of children: and there being
always annexed to the enjoyment of land, a submission to the government
of the country, of which that land is a part; it has been commonly supposed,
that a father could oblige his posterity to that government, of which he
himself was a subject, and that his compact held them; whereas, it being
only a necessary condition annexed to the land, and the inheritance of an
estate which is under that government, reaches only those who will take it
on that condition, and so is no natural tie or engagement, but a voluntary
submission: for every man's children being by nature as free as himself, or
any of his ancestors ever were, may, whilst they are in that freedom, choose
what society they will join themselves to, what commonwealth they will put
themselves under. But if they will enjoy the inheritance of their ancestors,
they must take it on the same terms their ancestors had it, and submit to all
the conditions annexed to such a possession. By this power indeed fathers
oblige their children to obedience to themselves, even when they are past
minority, and most commonly too subject them to this or that political
power: but neither of these by any peculiar right of fatherhood, but by the
reward they have in their hands to inforce and recompence such a
compliance; and is no more power than what a French man has over an

English man, who by the hopes of an estate he will leave him, will certainly
have a strong tie on his obedience: and if, when it is left him, he will enjoy
it, he must certainly take it upon the conditions annexed to the possession of
land in that country where it lies, whether it be France or England.
Sect. 74. To conclude then, tho' the father's power of commanding extends
no farther than the minority of his children, and to a degree only fit for the
discipline and government of that age; and tho' that honour and respect, and
all that which the Latins called piety, which they indispensably owe to their
parents all their life-time, and in all estates, with all that support and
defence is due to them, gives the father no power of governing, i.e. making
laws and enacting penalties on his children; though by all this he has no
dominion over the property or actions of his son: yet it is obvious to
conceive how easy it was, in the first ages of the world, and in places still,
where the thinness of people gives families leave to separate into
unpossessed quarters, and they have room to remove or plant themselves in
yet vacant habitations, for the father of the family to become the prince of
it;* he had been a ruler from the beginning of the infancy of his children:
and since without some government it would be hard for them to live
together, it was likeliest it should, by the express or tacit consent of the
children when they were grown up, be in the father, where it seemed
without any change barely to continue; when indeed nothing more was
required to it, than the permitting the father to exercise alone, in his family,
that executive power of the law of nature, which every free man naturally
hath, and by that permission resigning up to him a monarchical power,
whilst they remained in it. But that this was not by any paternal right, but
only by the consent of his children, is evident from hence, that no body
doubts, but if a stranger, whom chance or business had brought to his
family, had there killed any of his children, or committed any other fact, he
might condemn and put him to death, or other-wise have punished him, as
well as any of his children; which it was impossible he should do by virtue
of any paternal authority over one who was not his child, but by virtue of
that executive power of the law of nature, which, as a man, he had a right
to: and he alone could punish him in his family, where the respect of his
children had laid by the exercise of such a power, to give way to the dignity
and authority they were willing should remain in him, above the rest of his
family.

(*It is no improbable opinion therefore, which the archphilosopher was of,
that the chief person in every houshold was always, as it were, a king: so
when numbers of housholds joined themselves in civil societies together,
kings were the first kind of governors amongst them, which is also, as it
seemeth, the reason why the name of fathers continued still in them, who,
of fathers, were made rulers; as also the ancient custom of governors to do
as Melchizedec, and being kings, to exercise the office of priests, which
fathers did at the first, grew perhaps by the same occasion. Howbeit, this is
not the only kind of regiment that has been received in the world. The
inconveniences of one kind have caused sundry others to be devised; so that
in a word, all public regiment, of what kind soever, seemeth evidently to
have risen from the deliberate advice, consultation and composition
between men, judging it convenient and behoveful; there being no
impossibility in nature considered by itself, but that man might have lived
without any public regiment, Hooker's Eccl. Pol. lib. i. sect. 10.)
Sect. 75. Thus it was easy, and almost natural for children, by a tacit, and
scarce avoidable consent, to make way for the father's authority and
government. They had been accustomed in their childhood to follow his
direction, and to refer their little differences to him, and when they were
men, who fitter to rule them? Their little properties, and less covetousness,
seldom afforded greater controversies; and when any should arise, where
could they have a fitter umpire than he, by whose care they had every one
been sustained and brought up, and who had a tenderness for them all? It is
no wonder that they made no distinction betwixt minority and full age; nor
looked after one and twenty, or any other age that might make them the free
disposers of themselves and fortunes, when they could have no desire to be
out of their pupilage: the government they had been under, during it,
continued still to be more their protection than restraint; and they could no
where find a greater security to their peace, liberties, and fortunes, than in
the rule of a father.
Sect. 76. Thus the natural fathers of families, by an insensible change,
became the politic monarchs of them too: and as they chanced to live long,
and leave able and worthy heirs, for several successions, or otherwise; so
they laid the foundations of hereditary, or elective kingdoms, under several
constitutions and manners, according as chance, contrivance, or occasions
happened to mould them. But if princes have their titles in their fathers

right, and it be a sufficient proof of the natural right of fathers to political
authority, because they commonly were those in whose hands we find, de
facto, the exercise of government: I say, if this argument be good, it will as
strongly prove, that all princes, nay princes only, ought to be priests, since it
is as certain, that in the beginning, the father of the family was priest, as
that he was ruler in his own houshold.

CHAPTER. VII.
OF POLITICAL OR CIVIL SOCIETY.
Sect. 77. GOD having made man such a creature, that in his own
judgment, it was not good for him to be alone, put him under strong
obligations of necessity, convenience, and inclination to drive him into
society, as well as fitted him with understanding and language to continue
and enjoy it. The first society was between man and wife, which gave
beginning to that between parents and children; to which, in time, that
between master and servant came to be added: and though all these might,
and commonly did meet together, and make up but one family, wherein the
master or mistress of it had some sort of rule proper to a family; each of
these, or all together, came short of political society, as we shall see, if we
consider the different ends, ties, and bounds of each of these.
Sect. 78. Conjugal society is made by a voluntary compact between man
and woman; and tho' it consist chiefly in such a communion and right in
one another's bodies as is necessary to its chief end, procreation; yet it
draws with it mutual support and assistance, and a communion of interests
too, as necessary not only to unite their care and affection, but also
necessary to their common off-spring, who have a right to be nourished, and
maintained by them, till they are able to provide for themselves.

Sect. 79. For the end of conjunction, between male and female, being not
barely procreation, but the continuation of the species; this conjunction
betwixt male and female ought to last, even after procreation, so long as is
necessary to the nourishment and support of the young ones, who are to be
sustained by those that got them, till they are able to shift and provide for
themselves. This rule, which the infinite wise maker hath set to the works of
his hands, we find the inferior creatures steadily obey. In those viviparous
animals which feed on grass, the conjunction between male and female lasts
no longer than the very act of copulation; because the teat of the dam being
sufficient to nourish the young, till it be able to feed on grass, the male only
begets, but concerns not himself for the female or young, to whose
sustenance he can contribute nothing. But in beasts of prey the conjunction
lasts longer: because the dam not being able well to subsist herself, and
nourish her numerous off-spring by her own prey alone, a more laborious,
as well as more dangerous way of living, than by feeding on grass, the
assistance of the male is necessary to the maintenance of their common
family, which cannot subsist till they are able to prey for themselves, but by
the joint care of male and female. The same is to be observed in all birds,
(except some domestic ones, where plenty of food excuses the cock from
feeding, and taking care of the young brood) whose young needing food in
the nest, the cock and hen continue mates, till the young are able to use their
wing, and provide for themselves.
Sect. 80. And herein I think lies the chief, if not the only reason, why the
male and female in mankind are tied to a longer conjunction than other
creatures, viz. because the female is capable of conceiving, and de facto is
commonly with child again, and brings forth too a new birth, long before
the former is out of a dependency for support on his parents help, and able
to shift for himself, and has all the assistance is due to him from his parents:
whereby the father, who is bound to take care for those he hath begot, is
under an obligation to continue in conjugal society with the same woman
longer than other creatures, whose young being able to subsist of
themselves, before the time of procreation returns again, the conjugal bond
dissolves of itself, and they are at liberty, till Hymen at his usual
anniversary season summons them again to chuse new mates. Wherein one
cannot but admire the wisdom of the great Creator, who having given to
man foresight, and an ability to lay up for the future, as well as to supply

the present necessity, hath made it necessary, that society of man and wife
should be more lasting, than of male and female amongst other creatures;
that so their industry might be encouraged, and their interest better united,
to make provision and lay up goods for their common issue, which
uncertain mixture, or easy and frequent solutions of conjugal society would
mightily disturb.
Sect. 81. But tho' these are ties upon mankind, which make the conjugal
bonds more firm and lasting in man, than the other species of animals; yet it
would give one reason to enquire, why this compact, where procreation and
education are secured, and inheritance taken care for, may not be made
determinable, either by consent, or at a certain time, or upon certain
conditions, as well as any other voluntary compacts, there being no
necessity in the nature of the thing, nor to the ends of it, that it should
always be for life; I mean, to such as are under no restraint of any positive
law, which ordains all such contracts to be perpetual.
Sect. 82. But the husband and wife, though they have but one common
concern, yet having different understandings, will unavoidably sometimes
have different wills too; it therefore being necessary that the last
determination, i. e. the rule, should be placed somewhere; it naturally falls
to the man's share, as the abler and the stronger. But this reaching but to the
things of their common interest and property, leaves the wife in the full and
free possession of what by contract is her peculiar right, and gives the
husband no more power over her life than she has over his; the power of the
husband being so far from that of an absolute monarch, that the wife has in
many cases a liberty to separate from him, where natural right, or their
contract allows it; whether that contract be made by themselves in the state
of nature, or by the customs or laws of the country they live in; and the
children upon such separation fall to the father or mother's lot, as such
contract does determine.
Sect. 83. For all the ends of marriage being to be obtained under politic
government, as well as in the state of nature, the civil magistrate doth not
abridge the right or power of either naturally necessary to those ends, viz.
procreation and mutual support and assistance whilst they are together; but
only decides any controversy that may arise between man and wife about
them. If it were otherwise, and that absolute sovereignty and power of life

and death naturally belonged to the husband, and were necessary to the
society between man and wife, there could be no matrimony in any of those
countries where the husband is allowed no such absolute authority. But the
ends of matrimony requiring no such power in the husband, the condition of
conjugal society put it not in him, it being not at all necessary to that state.
Conjugal society could subsist and attain its ends without it; nay,
community of goods, and the power over them, mutual assistance and
maintenance, and other things belonging to conjugal society, might be
varied and regulated by that contract which unites man and wife in that
society, as far as may consist with procreation and the bringing up of
children till they could shift for themselves; nothing being necessary to any
society, that is not necessary to the ends for which it is made.
Sect. 84. The society betwixt parents and children, and the distinct rights
and powers belonging respectively to them, I have treated of so largely, in
the foregoing chapter, that I shall not here need to say any thing of it. And I
think it is plain, that it is far different from a politic society.
Sect. 85. Master and servant are names as old as history, but given to those
of far different condition; for a freeman makes himself a servant to another,
by selling him, for a certain time, the service he undertakes to do, in
exchange for wages he is to receive: and though this commonly puts him
into the family of his master, and under the ordinary discipline thereof; yet
it gives the master but a temporary power over him, and no greater than
what is contained in the contract between them. But there is another sort of
servants, which by a peculiar name we call slaves, who being captives taken
in a just war, are by the right of nature subjected to the absolute dominion
and arbitrary power of their masters. These men having, as I say, forfeited
their lives, and with it their liberties, and lost their estates; and being in the
state of slavery, not capable of any property, cannot in that state be
considered as any part of civil society; the chief end whereof is the
preservation of property.
Sect. 86. Let us therefore consider a master of a family with all these
subordinate relations of wife, children, servants, and slaves, united under
the domestic rule of a family; which, what resemblance soever it may have
in its order, offices, and number too, with a little commonwealth, yet is very
far from it, both in its constitution, power and end: or if it must be thought a

monarchy, and the paterfamilias the absolute monarch in it, absolute
monarchy will have but a very shattered and short power, when it is plain,
by what has been said before, that the master of the family has a very
distinct and differently limited power, both as to time and extent, over those
several persons that are in it; for excepting the slave (and the family is as
much a family, and his power as paterfamilias as great, whether there be
any slaves in his family or no) he has no legislative power of life and death
over any of them, and none too but what a mistress of a family may have as
well as he. And he certainly can have no absolute power over the whole
family, who has but a very limited one over every individual in it. But how
a family, or any other society of men, differ from that which is properly
political society, we shall best see, by considering wherein political society
itself consists.
Sect. 87. Man being born, as has been proved, with a title to perfect
freedom, and an uncontrouled enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of
the law of nature, equally with any other man, or number of men in the
world, hath by nature a power, not only to preserve his property, that is, his
life, liberty and estate, against the injuries and attempts of other men; but to
judge of, and punish the breaches of that law in others, as he is persuaded
the offence deserves, even with death itself, in crimes where the
heinousness of the fact, in his opinion, requires it. But because no political
society can be, nor subsist, without having in itself the power to preserve
the property, and in order thereunto, punish the offences of all those of that
society; there, and there only is political society, where every one of the
members hath quitted this natural power, resigned it up into the hands of the
community in all cases that exclude him not from appealing for protection
to the law established by it. And thus all private judgment of every
particular member being excluded, the community comes to be umpire, by
settled standing rules, indifferent, and the same to all parties; and by men
having authority from the community, for the execution of those rules,
decides all the differences that may happen between any members of that
society concerning any matter of right; and punishes those offences which
any member hath committed against the society, with such penalties as the
law has established: whereby it is easy to discern, who are, and who are not,
in political society together. Those who are united into one body, and have a
common established law and judicature to appeal to, with authority to

decide controversies between them, and punish offenders, are in civil
society one with another: but those who have no such common appeal, I
mean on earth, are still in the state of nature, each being, where there is no
other, judge for himself, and executioner; which is, as I have before shewed
it, the perfect state of nature.
Sect. 88. And thus the commonwealth comes by a power to set down what
punishment shall belong to the several transgressions which they think
worthy of it, committed amongst the members of that society, (which is the
power of making laws) as well as it has the power to punish any injury done
unto any of its members, by any one that is not of it, (which is the power of
war and peace;) and all this for the preservation of the property of all the
members of that society, as far as is possible. But though every man who
has entered into civil society, and is become a member of any
commonwealth, has thereby quitted his power to punish offences, against
the law of nature, in prosecution of his own private judgment, yet with the
judgment of offences, which he has given up to the legislative in all cases,
where he can appeal to the magistrate, he has given a right to the
commonwealth to employ his force, for the execution of the judgments of
the commonwealth, whenever he shall be called to it; which indeed are his
own judgments, they being made by himself, or his representative. And
herein we have the original of the legislative and executive power of civil
society, which is to judge by standing laws, how far offences are to be
punished, when committed within the commonwealth; and also to
determine, by occasional judgments founded on the present circumstances
of the fact, how far injuries from without are to be vindicated; and in both
these to employ all the force of all the members, when there shall be need.
Sect. 89. Where-ever therefore any number of men are so united into one
society, as to quit every one his executive power of the law of nature, and to
resign it to the public, there and there only is a political, or civil society.
And this is done, where-ever any number of men, in the state of nature,
enter into society to make one people, one body politic, under one supreme
government; or else when any one joins himself to, and incorporates with
any government already made: for hereby he authorizes the society, or
which is all one, the legislative thereof, to make laws for him, as the public
good of the society shall require; to the execution whereof, his own
assistance (as to his own decrees) is due. And this puts men out of a state of

nature into that of a commonwealth, by setting up a judge on earth, with
authority to determine all the controversies, and redress the injuries that
may happen to any member of the commonwealth; which judge is the
legislative, or magistrates appointed by it. And where-ever there are any
number of men, however associated, that have no such decisive power to
appeal to, there they are still in the state of nature.
Sect. 90. Hence it is evident, that absolute monarchy, which by some men
is counted the only government in the world, is indeed inconsistent with
civil society, and so can be no form of civil-government at all: for the end
of civil society, being to avoid, and remedy those inconveniencies of the
state of nature, which necessarily follow from every man's being judge in
his own case, by setting up a known authority, to which every one of that
society may appeal upon any injury received, or controversy that may arise,
and which every one of the society ought to obey;* where-ever any persons
are, who have not such an authority to appeal to, for the decision of any
difference between them, there those persons are still in the state of nature;
and so is every absolute prince, in respect of those who are under his
dominion.
(*The public power of all society is above every soul contained in the
same society; and the principal use of that power is, to give laws unto all
that are under it, which laws in such cases we must obey, unless there be
reason shewed which may necessarily inforce, that the law of reason, or of
God, doth enjoin the contrary, Hook. Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 16.)
Sect. 91. For he being supposed to have all, both legislative and executive
power in himself alone, there is no judge to be found, no appeal lies open to
any one, who may fairly, and indifferently, and with authority decide, and
from whose decision relief and redress may be expected of any injury or
inconviency, that may be suffered from the prince, or by his order: so that
such a man, however intitled, Czar, or Grand Seignior, or how you please, is
as much in the state of nature, with all under his dominion, as he is with the
rest of mankind: for where-ever any two men are, who have no standing
rule, and common judge to appeal to on earth, for the determination of
controversies of right betwixt them, there they are still in the state of*
nature, and under all the inconveniencies of it, with only this woful
difference to the subject, or rather slave of an absolute prince: that whereas,

in the ordinary state of nature, he has a liberty to judge of his right, and
according to the best of his power, to maintain it; now, whenever his
property is invaded by the will and order of his monarch, he has not only no
appeal, as those in society ought to have, but as if he were degraded from
the common state of rational creatures, is denied a liberty to judge of, or to
defend his right; and so is exposed to all the misery and inconveniencies,
that a man can fear from one, who being in the unrestrained state of nature,
is yet corrupted with flattery, and armed with power.
(*To take away all such mutual grievances, injuries and wrongs, i.e. such
as attend men in the state of nature, there was no way but only by growing
into composition and agreement amongst themselves, by ordaining some
kind of govemment public, and by yielding themselves subject thereunto,
that unto whom they granted authority to rule and govem, by them the
peace, tranquillity and happy estate of the rest might be procured. Men
always knew that where force and injury was offered, they might be
defenders of themselves; they knew that however men may seek their own
commodity, yet if this were done with injury unto others, it was not to be
suffered, but by all men, and all good means to be withstood. Finally, they
knew that no man might in reason take upon him to determine his own
right, and according to his own determination proceed in maintenance
thereof, in as much as every man is towards himself, and them whom he
greatly affects, partial; and therefore that strifes and troubles would be
endless, except they gave their common consent, all to be ordered by some,
whom they should agree upon, without which consent there would be no
reason that one man should take upon him to be lord or judge over another,
Hooker's Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 10.)
Sect. 92. For he that thinks absolute power purifies men's blood, and
corrects the baseness of human nature, need read but the history of this, or
any other age, to be convinced of the contrary. He that would have been
insolent and injurious in the woods of America, would not probably be
much better in a throne; where perhaps learning and religion shall be found
out to justify all that he shall do to his subjects, and the sword presently
silence all those that dare question it: for what the protection of absolute
monarchy is, what kind of fathers of their countries it makes princes to be
and to what a degree of happiness and security it carries civil society, where

this sort of government is grown to perfection, he that will look into the late
relation of Ceylon, may easily see.
Sect. 93. In absolute monarchies indeed, as well as other governments of
the world, the subjects have an appeal to the law, and judges to decide any
controversies, and restrain any violence that may happen betwixt the
subjects themselves, one amongst another. This every one thinks necessary,
and believes he deserves to be thought a declared enemy to society and
mankind, who should go about to take it away. But whether this be from a
true love of mankind and society, and such a charity as we owe all one to
another, there is reason to doubt: for this is no more than what every man,
who loves his own power, profit, or greatness, may and naturally must do,
keep those animals from hurting, or destroying one another, who labour and
drudge only for his pleasure and advantage; and so are taken care of, not out
of any love the master has for them, but love of himself, and the profit they
bring him: for if it be asked, what security, what fence is there, in such a
state, against the violence and oppression of this absolute ruler? the very
question can scarce be borne. They are ready to tell you, that it deserves
death only to ask after safety. Betwixt subject and subject, they will grant,
there must be measures, laws and judges, for their mutual peace and
security: but as for the ruler, he ought to be absolute, and is above all such
circumstances; because he has power to do more hurt and wrong, it is right
when he does it. To ask how you may be guarded from harm, or injury, on
that side where the strongest hand is to do it, is presently the voice of
faction and rebellion: as if when men quitting the state of nature entered
into society, they agreed that all of them but one, should be under the
restraint of laws, but that he should still retain all the liberty of the state of
nature, increased with power, and made licentious by impunity. This is to
think, that men are so foolish, that they take care to avoid what mischiefs
may be done them by pole-cats, or foxes; but are content, nay, think it
safety, to be devoured by lions.
Sect. 94. But whatever flatterers may talk to amuse people's
understandings, it hinders not men from feeling; and when they perceive,
that any man, in what station soever, is out of the bounds of the civil society
which they are of, and that they have no appeal on earth against any harm,
they may receive from him, they are apt to think themselves in the state of
nature, in respect of him whom they find to be so; and to take care, as soon

as they can, to have that safety and security in civil society, for which it was
first instituted, and for which only they entered into it. And therefore,
though perhaps at first, (as shall be shewed more at large hereafter in the
following part of this discourse) some one good and excellent man having
got a pre-eminency amongst the rest, had this deference paid to his
goodness and virtue, as to a kind of natural authority, that the chief rule,
with arbitration of their differences, by a tacit consent devolved into his
hands, without any other caution, but the assurance they had of his
uprightness and wisdom; yet when time, giving authority, and (as some men
would persuade us) sacredness of customs, which the negligent, and
unforeseeing innocence of the first ages began, had brought in successors of
another stamp, the people finding their properties not secure under the
government, as then it was, (whereas government has no other end but the
preservation of* property) could never be safe nor at rest, nor think
themselves in civil society, till the legislature was placed in collective
bodies of men, call them senate, parliament, or what you please. By which
means every single person became subject, equally with other the meanest
men, to those laws, which he himself, as part of the legislative, had
established; nor could any one, by his own authority; avoid the force of the
law, when once made; nor by any pretence of superiority plead exemption,
thereby to license his own, or the miscarriages of any of his dependents.**
No man in civil society can be exempted from the laws of it: for if any man
may do what he thinks fit, and there be no appeal on earth, for redress or
security against any harm he shall do; I ask, whether he be not perfectly still
in the state of nature, and so can be no part or member of that civil society;
unless any one will say, the state of nature and civil society are one and the
same thing, which I have never yet found any one so great a patron of
anarchy as to affirm.
(*At the first, when some certain kind of regiment was once appointed, it
may be that nothing was then farther thought upon for the manner of
goveming, but all permitted unto their wisdom and discretion, which were
to rule, till by experience they found this for all parts very inconvenient, so
as the thing which they had devised for a remedy, did indeed but increase
the sore, which it should have cured. They saw, that to live by one man's
will, became the cause of all men's misery. This constrained them to come

unto laws, wherein all men might see their duty beforehand, and know the
penalties of transgressing them. Hooker's Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 10.)
(**Civil law being the act of the whole body politic, doth therefore overrule each several part of the same body. Hooker, ibid.)

CHAPTER. VIII.
OF THE BEGINNING OF POLITICAL SOCIETIES.
Sect. 95. MEN being, as has been said, by nature, all free, equal, and
independent, no one can be put out of this estate, and subjected to the
political power of another, without his own consent. The only way whereby
any one divests himself of his natural liberty, and puts on the bonds of civil
society, is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community
for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a
secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security against any, that
are not of it. This any number of men may do, because it injures not the
freedom of the rest; they are left as they were in the liberty of the state of
nature. When any number of men have so consented to make one
community or government, they are thereby presently incorporated, and
make one body politic, wherein the majority have a right to act and
conclude the rest.
Sect. 96. For when any number of men have, by the consent of every
individual, made a community, they have thereby made that community one
body, with a power to act as one body, which is only by the will and
determination of the majority: for that which acts any community, being
only the consent of the individuals of it, and it being necessary to that which
is one body to move one way; it is necessary the body should move that
way whither the greater force carries it, which is the consent of the
majority: or else it is impossible it should act or continue one body, one

community, which the consent of every individual that united into it, agreed
that it should; and so every one is bound by that consent to be concluded by
the majority. And therefore we see, that in assemblies, impowered to act by
positive laws, where no number is set by that positive law which impowers
them, the act of the majority passes for the act of the whole, and of course
determines, as having, by the law of nature and reason, the power of the
whole.
Sect. 97. And thus every man, by consenting with others to make one
body politic under one government, puts himself under an obligation, to
every one of that society, to submit to the determination of the majority, and
to be concluded by it; or else this original compact, whereby he with others
incorporates into one society, would signify nothing, and be no compact, if
he be left free, and under no other ties than he was in before in the state of
nature. For what appearance would there be of any compact? what new
engagement if he were no farther tied by any decrees of the society, than he
himself thought fit, and did actually consent to? This would be still as great
a liberty, as he himself had before his compact, or any one else in the state
of nature hath, who may submit himself, and consent to any acts of it if he
thinks fit.
Sect. 98. For if the consent of the majority shall not, in reason, be received
as the act of the whole, and conclude every individual; nothing but the
consent of every individual can make any thing to be the act of the whole:
but such a consent is next to impossible ever to be had, if we consider the
infirmities of health, and avocations of business, which in a number, though
much less than that of a commonwealth, will necessarily keep many away
from the public assembly. To which if we add the variety of opinions, and
contrariety of interests, which unavoidably happen in all collections of men,
the coming into society upon such terms would be only like Cato's coming
into the theatre, only to go out again. Such a constitution as this would
make the mighty Leviathan of a shorter duration, than the feeblest creatures,
and not let it outlast the day it was born in: which cannot be supposed, till
we can think, that rational creatures should desire and constitute societies
only to be dissolved: for where the majority cannot conclude the rest, there
they cannot act as one body, and consequently will be immediately
dissolved again.

Sect. 99. Whosoever therefore out of a state of nature unite into a
community, must be understood to give up all the power, necessary to the
ends for which they unite into society, to the majority of the community,
unless they expresly agreed in any number greater than the majority. And
this is done by barely agreeing to unite into one political society, which is
all the compact that is, or needs be, between the individuals, that enter into,
or make up a commonwealth. And thus that, which begins and actually
constitutes any political society, is nothing but the consent of any number of
freemen capable of a majority to unite and incorporate into such a society.
And this is that, and that only, which did, or could give beginning to any
lawful government in the world.
Sect. 100. To this I find two objections made. First, That there are no
instances to be found in story, of a company of men independent, and equal
one amongst another, that met together, and in this way began and set up a
government.
Secondly, It is impossible of right, that men should do so, because all men
being born under government, they are to submit to that, and are not at
liberty to begin a new one.
Sect. 101. To the first there is this to answer, That it is not at all to be
wondered, that history gives us but a very little account of men, that lived
together in the state of nature. The inconveniences of that condition, and the
love and want of society, no sooner brought any number of them together,
but they presently united and incorporated, if they designed to continue
together. And if we may not suppose men ever to have been in the state of
nature, because we hear not much of them in such a state, we may as well
suppose the armies of Salmanasser or Xerxes were never children, because
we hear little of them, till they were men, and imbodied in armies.
Government is every where antecedent to records, and letters seldom come
in amongst a people till a long continuation of civil society has, by other
more necessary arts, provided for their safety, ease, and plenty: and then
they begin to look after the history of their founders, and search into their
original, when they have outlived the memory of it: for it is with
commonwealths as with particular persons, they are commonly ignorant of
their own births and infancies: and if they know any thing of their original,
they are beholden for it, to the accidental records that others have kept of it.

And those that we have, of the beginning of any polities in the world,
excepting that of the Jews, where God himself immediately interposed, and
which favours not at all paternal dominion, are all either plain instances of
such a beginning as I have mentioned, or at least have manifest footsteps of
it.
Sect. 102. He must shew a strange inclination to deny evident matter of
fact, when it agrees not with his hypothesis, who will not allow, that the
beginning of Rome and Venice were by the uniting together of several men
free and independent one of another, amongst whom there was no natural
superiority or subjection. And if Josephus Acosta's word may be taken, he
tells us, that in many parts of America there was no government at all.
There are great and apparent conjectures, says he, that these men,
speaking of those of Peru, for a long time had neither kings nor
commonwealths, but lived in troops, as they do this day in Florida, the
Cheriquanas, those of Brazil, and many other nations, which have no
certain kings, but as occasion is offered, in peace or war, they choose their
captains as they please, 1. i. c. 25.
If it be said, that every man there was born subject to his father, or the
head of his family; that the subjection due from a child to a father took not
away his freedom of uniting into what political society he thought fit, has
been already proved. But be that as it will, these men, it is evident, were
actually free; and whatever superiority some politicians now would place in
any of them, they themselves claimed it not, but by consent were all equal,
till by the same consent they set rulers over themselves. So that their politic
societies all began from a voluntary union, and the mutual agreement of
men freely acting in the choice of their governors, and forms of
government.
Sect. 103. And I hope those who went away from Sparta with Palantus,
mentioned by Justin, 1. iii. c. 4. will be allowed to have been freemen
independent one of another, and to have set up a government over
themselves, by their own consent. Thus I have given several examples, out
of history, of people free and in the state of nature, that being met together
incorporated and began a commonwealth. And if the want of such instances
be an argument to prove that government were not, nor could not be so

begun, I suppose the contenders for paternal empire were better let it alone,
than urge it against natural liberty: for if they can give so many instances,
out of history, of governments begun upon paternal right, I think (though at
best an argument from what has been, to what should of right be, has no
great force) one might, without any great danger, yield them the cause. But
if I might advise them in the case, they would do well not to search too
much into the original of governments, as they have begun de facto, lest
they should find, at the foundation of most of them, something very little
favourable to the design they promote, and such a power as they contend
for.
Sect. 104. But to conclude, reason being plain on our side, that men are
naturally free, and the examples of history shewing, that the governments of
the world, that were begun in peace, had their beginning laid on that
foundation, and were made by the consent of the people; there can be little
room for doubt, either where the right is, or what has been the opinion, or
practice of mankind, about the first erecting of governments.
Sect. 105. I will not deny, that if we look back as far as history will direct
us, towards the original of commonwealths, we shall generally find them
under the government and administration of one man. And I am also apt to
believe, that where a family was numerous enough to subsist by itself, and
continued entire together, without mixing with others, as it often happens,
where there is much land, and few people, the government commonly
began in the father: for the father having, by the law of nature, the same
power with every man else to punish, as he thought fit, any offences against
that law, might thereby punish his transgressing children, even when they
were men, and out of their pupilage; and they were very likely to submit to
his punishment, and all join with him against the offender, in their turns,
giving him thereby power to execute his sentence against any transgression,
and so in effect make him the law-maker, and governor over all that
remained in conjunction with his family. He was fittest to be trusted;
paternal affection secured their property and interest under his care; and the
custom of obeying him, in their childhood, made it easier to submit to him,
rather than to any other. If therefore they must have one to rule them, as
government is hardly to be avoided amongst men that live together; who so
likely to be the man as he that was their common father; unless negligence,
cruelty, or any other defect of mind or body made him unfit for it? But

when either the father died, and left his next heir, for want of age, wisdom,
courage, or any other qualities, less fit for rule; or where several families
met, and consented to continue together; there, it is not to be doubted, but
they used their natural freedom, to set up him, whom they judged the ablest,
and most likely, to rule well over them. Conformable hereunto we find the
people of America, who (living out of the reach of the conquering swords,
and spreading domination of the two great empires of Peru and Mexico)
enjoyed their own natural freedom, though, caeteris paribus, they
commonly prefer the heir of their deceased king; yet if they find him any
way weak, or uncapable, they pass him by, and set up the stoutest and
bravest man for their ruler.
Sect. 106. Thus, though looking back as far as records give us any account
of peopling the world, and the history of nations, we commonly find the
government to be in one hand; yet it destroys not that which I affirm, viz.
that the beginning of politic society depends upon the consent of the
individuals, to join into, and make one society; who, when they are thus
incorporated, might set up what form of government they thought fit. But
this having given occasion to men to mistake, and think, that by nature
government was monarchical, and belonged to the father, it may not be
amiss here to consider, why people in the beginning generally pitched upon
this form, which though perhaps the father's pre-eminency might, in the first
institution of some commonwealths, give a rise to, and place in the
beginning, the power in one hand; yet it is plain that the reason, that
continued the form of government in a single person, was not any regard, or
respect to paternal authority; since all petty monarchies, that is, almost all
monarchies, near their original, have been commonly, at least upon
occasion, elective.
Sect. 107. First then, in the beginning of things, the father's government of
the childhood of those sprung from him, having accustomed them to the
rule of one man, and taught them that where it was exercised with care and
skill, with affection and love to those under it, it was sufficient to procure
and preserve to men all the political happiness they sought for in society. It
was no wonder that they should pitch upon, and naturally run into that form
of government, which from their infancy they had been all accustomed to;
and which, by experience, they had found both easy and safe. To which, if
we add, that monarchy being simple, and most obvious to men, whom

neither experience had instructed in forms of government, nor the ambition
or insolence of empire had taught to beware of the encroachments of
prerogative, or the inconveniences of absolute power, which monarchy in
succession was apt to lay claim to, and bring upon them, it was not at all
strange, that they should not much trouble themselves to think of methods
of restraining any exorbitances of those to whom they had given the
authority over them, and of balancing the power of government, by placing
several parts of it in different hands. They had neither felt the oppression of
tyrannical dominion, nor did the fashion of the age, nor their possessions, or
way of living, (which afforded little matter for covetousness or ambition)
give them any reason to apprehend or provide against it; and therefore it is
no wonder they put themselves into such a frame of government, as was not
only, as I said, most obvious and simple, but also best suited to their present
state and condition; which stood more in need of defence against foreign
invasions and injuries, than of multiplicity of laws. The equality of a simple
poor way of living, confining their desires within the narrow bounds of each
man's small property, made few controversies, and so no need of many laws
to decide them, or variety of officers to superintend the process, or look
after the execution of justice, where there were but few trespasses, and few
offenders. Since then those, who like one another so well as to join into
society, cannot but be supposed to have some acquaintance and friendship
together, and some trust one in another; they could not but have greater
apprehensions of others, than of one another: and therefore their first care
and thought cannot but be supposed to be, how to secure themselves against
foreign force. It was natural for them to put themselves under a frame of
government which might best serve to that end, and chuse the wisest and
bravest man to conduct them in their wars, and lead them out against their
enemies, and in this chiefly be their ruler.
Sect. 108. Thus we see, that the kings of the Indians in America, which is
still a pattern of the first ages in Asia and Europe, whilst the inhabitants
were too few for the country, and want of people and money gave men no
temptation to enlarge their possessions of land, or contest for wider extent
of ground, are little more than generals of their armies; and though they
command absolutely in war, yet at home and in time of peace they exercise
very little dominion, and have but a very moderate sovereignty, the
resolutions of peace and war being ordinarily either in the people, or in a

council. Tho' the war itself, which admits not of plurality of governors,
naturally devolves the command into the king's sole authority.
Sect. 109. And thus in Israel itself, the chief business of their judges, and
first kings, seems to have been to be captains in war, and leaders of their
armies; which (besides what is signified by going out and in before the
people, which was, to march forth to war, and home again in the heads of
their forces) appears plainly in the story of Jephtha. The Ammonites
making war upon Israel, the Gileadites in fear send to Jephtha, a bastard of
their family whom they had cast off, and article with him, if he will assist
them against the Ammonites, to make him their ruler; which they do in
these words, And the people made him head and captain over them, Judg.
xi, 11. which was, as it seems, all one as to be judge. And he judged Israel,
judg. xii. 7. that is, was their captain-general six years. So when Jotham
upbraids the Shechemites with the obligation they had to Gideon, who had
been their judge and ruler, he tells them, He fought for you, and adventured
his life far, and delivered you out of the hands of Midian, Judg. ix. 17.
Nothing mentioned of him but what he did as a general: and indeed that is
all is found in his history, or in any of the rest of the judges. And Abimelech
particularly is called king, though at most he was but their general. And
when, being weary of the ill conduct of Samuel's sons, the children of Israel
desired a king, like all the nations to judge them, and to go out before them,
and to fight their battles, I. Sam viii. 20. God granting their desire, says to
Samuel, I will send thee a man, and thou shalt anoint him to be captain over
my people Israel, that he may save my people out of the hands of the
Philistines, ix. 16. As if the only business of a king had been to lead out
their armies, and fight in their defence; and accordingly at his inauguration
pouring a vial of oil upon him, declares to Saul, that the Lord had anointed
him to be captain over his inheritance, x. 1. And therefore those, who after
Saul's being solemnly chosen and saluted king by the tribes at Mispah, were
unwilling to have him their king, made no other objection but this, How
shall this man save us? v. 27. as if they should have said, this man is unfit to
be our king, not having skill and conduct enough in war, to be able to
defend us. And when God resolved to transfer the government to David, it
is in these words, But now thy kingdom shall not continue: the Lord hath
sought him a man after his own heart, and the Lord hath commanded him to
be captain over his people, xiii. 14. As if the whole kingly authority were

nothing else but to be their general: and therefore the tribes who had stuck
to Saul's family, and opposed David's reign, when they came to Hebron
with terms of submission to him, they tell him, amongst other arguments
they had to submit to him as to their king, that he was in effect their king in
Saul's time, and therefore they had no reason but to receive him as their
king now. Also (say they) in time past, when Saul was king over us, thou
wast he that reddest out and broughtest in Israel, and the Lord said unto
thee, Thou shalt feed my people Israel, and thou shalt be a captain over
Israel.
Sect. 110. Thus, whether a family by degrees grew up into a
commonwealth, and the fatherly authority being continued on to the elder
son, every one in his turn growing up under it, tacitly submitted to it, and
the easiness and equality of it not offending any one, every one acquiesced,
till time seemed to have confirmed it, and settled a right of succession by
prescription: or whether several families, or the descendants of several
families, whom chance, neighbourhood, or business brought together,
uniting into society, the need of a general, whose conduct might defend
them against their enemies in war, and the great confidence the innocence
and sincerity of that poor but virtuous age, (such as are almost all those
which begin governments, that ever come to last in the world) gave men
one of another, made the first beginners of commonwealths generally put
the rule into one man's hand, without any other express limitation or
restraint, but what the nature of the thing, and the end of government
required: which ever of those it was that at first put the rule into the hands
of a single person, certain it is no body was intrusted with it but for the
public good and safety, and to those ends, in the infancies of
commonwealths, those who had it commonly used it. And unless they had
done so, young societies could not have subsisted; without such nursing
fathers tender and careful of the public weal, all governments would have
sunk under the weakness and infirmities of their infancy, and the prince and
the people had soon perished together.
Sect. 111. But though the golden age (before vain ambition, and amor
sceleratus habendi, evil concupiscence, had corrupted men's minds into a
mistake of true power and honour) had more virtue, and consequently better
governors, as well as less vicious subjects, and there was then no stretching
prerogative on the one side, to oppress the people; nor consequently on the

other, any dispute about privilege, to lessen or restrain the power of the
magistrate, and so no contest betwixt rulers and people about governors or
government: yet, when ambition and luxury in future ages* would retain
and increase the power, without doing the business for which it was given;
and aided by flattery, taught princes to have distinct and separate interests
from their people, men found it necessary to examine more carefully the
original and rights of government; and to find out ways to restrain the
exorbitances, and prevent the abuses of that power, which they having
intrusted in another's hands only for their own good, they found was made
use of to hurt them.
(*At first, when some certain kind of regiment was once approved, it may
be nothing was then farther thought upon for the manner of governing, but
all permitted unto their wisdom and discretion which were to rule, till by
experience they found this for all parts very inconvenient, so as the thing
which they had devised for a remedy, did indeed but increase the sore which
it should have cured. They saw, that to live by one man's will, became the
cause of all men's misery. This constrained them to come unto laws wherein
all men might see their duty before hand, and know the penalties of
transgressing them. Hooker's Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 10.)
Sect. 112. Thus we may see how probable it is, that people that were
naturally free, and by their own consent either submitted to the government
of their father, or united together out of different families to make a
government, should generally put the rule into one man's hands, and chuse
to be under the conduct of a single person, without so much as by express
conditions limiting or regulating his power, which they thought safe enough
in his honesty and prudence; though they never dreamed of monarchy being
lure Divino, which we never heard of among mankind, till it was revealed
to us by the divinity of this last age; nor ever allowed paternal power to
have a right to dominion, or to be the foundation of all government. And
thus much may suffice to shew, that as far as we have any light from
history, we have reason to conclude, that all peaceful beginnings of
government have been laid in the consent of the people. I say peaceful,
because I shall have occasion in another place to speak of conquest, which
some esteem a way of beginning of governments.

The other objection I find urged against the beginning of polities, in the
way I have mentioned, is this, viz.
Sect. 113. That all men being born under government, some or other, it is
impossible any of them should ever be free, and at liberty to unite together,
and begin a new one, or ever be able to erect a lawful government.
If this argument be good; I ask, how came so many lawful monarchies into
the world? for if any body, upon this supposition, can shew me any one man
in any age of the world free to begin a lawful monarchy, I will be bound to
shew him ten other free men at liberty, at the same time to unite and begin a
new government under a regal, or any other form; it being demonstration,
that if any one, born under the dominion of another, may be so free as to
have a right to command others in a new and distinct empire, every one that
is born under the dominion of another may be so free too, and may become
a ruler, or subject, of a distinct separate government. And so by this their
own principle, either all men, however born, are free, or else there is but
one lawful prince, one lawful government in the world. And then they have
nothing to do, but barely to shew us which that is; which when they have
done, I doubt not but all mankind will easily agree to pay obedience to him.
Sect. 114. Though it be a sufficient answer to their objection, to shew that
it involves them in the same difficulties that it doth those they use it against;
yet I shall endeavour to discover the weakness of this argument a little
farther. All men, say they, are born under government, and therefore they
cannot be at liberty to begin a new one. Every one is born a subject to his
father, or his prince, and is therefore under the perpetual tie of subjection
and allegiance. It is plain mankind never owned nor considered any such
natural subjection that they were born in, to one or to the other that tied
them, without their own consents, to a subjection to them and their heirs.
Sect. 115. For there are no examples so frequent in history, both sacred
and profane, as those of men withdrawing themselves, and their obedience,
from the jurisdiction they were born under, and the family or community
they were bred up in, and setting up new governments in other places; from
whence sprang all that number of petty commonwealths in the beginning of
ages, and which always multiplied, as long as there was room enough, till
the stronger, or more fortunate, swallowed the weaker; and those great ones

again breaking to pieces, dissolved into lesser dominions. All which are so
many testimonies against paternal sovereignty, and plainly prove, that it
was not the natural right of the father descending to his heirs, that made
governments in the beginning, since it was impossible, upon that ground,
there should have been so many little kingdoms; all must have been but
only one universal monarchy, if men had not been at liberty to separate
themselves from their families, and the government, be it what it will, that
was set up in it, and go and make distinct commonwealths and other
governments, as they thought fit.

Sect. 116. This has been the practice of the world from its first beginning
to this day; nor is it now any more hindrance to the freedom of mankind,
that they are born under constituted and ancient polities, that have
established laws, and set forms of government, than if they were born in the
woods, amongst the unconfined inhabitants, that run loose in them: for
those, who would persuade us, that by being born under any government,
we are naturally subjects to it, and have no more any title or pretence to the
freedom of the state of nature, have no other reason (bating that of paternal
power, which we have already answered) to produce for it, but only,
because our fathers or progenitors passed away their natural liberty, and
thereby bound up themselves and their posterity to a perpetual subjection to
the government, which they themselves submitted to. It is true, that
whatever engagements or promises any one has made for himself, he is
under the obligation of them, but cannot, by any compact whatsoever, bind
his children or posterity: for his son, when a man, being altogether as free
as the father, any act of the father can no more give away the liberty of the
son, than it can of any body else: he may indeed annex such conditions to
the land, he enjoyed as a subject of any commonwealth, as may oblige his
son to be of that community, if he will enjoy those possessions which were
his father's; because that estate being his father's property, he may dispose,
or settle it, as he pleases.
Sect. 117. And this has generally given the occasion to mistake in this
matter; because commonwealths not permitting any part of their dominions
to be dismembered, nor to be enjoyed by any but those of their community,
the son cannot ordinarily enjoy the possessions of his father, but under the
same terms his father did, by becoming a member of the society; whereby
he puts himself presently under the government he finds there established,
as much as any other subject of that commonwealth. And thus the consent
of freemen, born under government, which only makes them members of it,
being given separately in their turns, as each comes to be of age, and not in
a multitude together; people take no notice of it, and thinking it not done at
all, or not necessary, conclude they are naturally subjects as they are men.
Sect. 118. But, it is plain, governments themselves understand it
otherwise; they claim no power over the son, because of that they had over
the father; nor look on children as being their subjects, by their fathers

being so. If a subject of England have a child, by an English woman in
France, whose subject is he? Not the king of England's; for he must have
leave to be admitted to the privileges of it: nor the king of France's; for how
then has his father a liberty to bring him away, and breed him as he pleases?
and who ever was judged as a traytor or deserter, if he left, or warred
against a country, for being barely born in it of parents that were aliens
there? It is plain then, by the practice of governments themselves, as well as
by the law of right reason, that a child is born a subject of no country or
government. He is under his father's tuition and authority, till he comes to
age of discretion; and then he is a freeman, at liberty what government he
will put himself under, what body politic he will unite himself to: for if an
Englishman's son, born in France, be at liberty, and may do so, it is evident
there is no tie upon him by his father's being a subject of this kingdom; nor
is he bound up by any compact of his ancestors. And why then hath not his
son, by the same reason, the same liberty, though he be born any where
else? Since the power that a father hath naturally over his children, is the
same, where-ever they be born, and the ties of natural obligations, are not
bounded by the positive limits of kingdoms and commonwealths.
Sect. 119. Every man being, as has been shewed, naturally free, and
nothing being able to put him into subjection to any earthly power, but only
his own consent; it is to be considered, what shall be understood to be a
sufficient declaration of a man's consent, to make him subject to the laws of
any government. There is a common distinction of an express and a tacit
consent, which will concern our present case. No body doubts but an
express consent, of any man entering into any society, makes him a perfect
member of that society, a subject of that government. The difficulty is, what
ought to be looked upon as a tacit consent, and how far it binds, i.e. how far
any one shall be looked on to have consented, and thereby submitted to any
government, where he has made no expressions of it at all. And to this I say,
that every man, that hath any possessions, or enjoyment, of any part of the
dominions of any government, doth thereby give his tacit consent, and is as
far forth obliged to obedience to the laws of that government, during such
enjoyment, as any one under it; whether this his possession be of land, to
him and his heirs for ever, or a lodging only for a week; or whether it be
barely travelling freely on the highway; and in effect, it reaches as far as the
very being of any one within the territories of that government.

Sect. 120. To understand this the better, it is fit to consider, that every
man, when he at first incorporates himself into any commonwealth, he, by
his uniting himself thereunto, annexed also, and submits to the community,
those possessions, which he has, or shall acquire, that do not already belong
to any other government: for it would be a direct contradiction, for any one
to enter into society with others for the securing and regulating of property;
and yet to suppose his land, whose property is to be regulated by the laws of
the society, should be exempt from the jurisdiction of that government, to
which he himself, the proprietor of the land, is a subject. By the same act
therefore, whereby any one unites his person, which was before free, to any
commonwealth, by the same he unites his possessions, which were before
free, to it also; and they become, both of them, person and possession,
subject to the government and dominion of that commonwealth, as long as
it hath a being. Whoever therefore, from thenceforth, by inheritance,
purchase, permission, or otherways, enjoys any part of the land, so annexed
to, and under the government of that commonwealth, must take it with the
condition it is under; that is, of submitting to the government of the
commonwealth, under whose jurisdiction it is, as far forth as any subject of
it.
Sect. 121. But since the government has a direct jurisdiction only over the
land, and reaches the possessor of it, (before he has actually incorporated
himself in the society) only as he dwells upon, and enjoys that; the
obligation any one is under, by virtue of such enjoyment, to submit to the
government, begins and ends with the enjoyment; so that whenever the
owner, who has given nothing but such a tacit consent to the government,
will, by donation, sale, or otherwise, quit the said possession, he is at liberty
to go and incorporate himself into any other commonwealth; or to agree
with others to begin a new one, in vacuis locis, in any part of the world,
they can find free and unpossessed: whereas he, that has once, by actual
agreement, and any express declaration, given his consent to be of any
commonwealth, is perpetually and indispensably obliged to be, and remain
unalterably a subject to it, and can never be again in the liberty of the state
of nature; unless, by any calamity, the government he was under comes to
be dissolved; or else by some public act cuts him off from being any longer
a member of it.

Sect. 122. But submitting to the laws of any country, living quietly, and
enjoying privileges and protection under them, makes not a man a member
of that society: this is only a local protection and homage due to and from
all those, who, not being in a state of war, come within the territories
belonging to any government, to all parts whereof the force of its laws
extends. But this no more makes a man a member of that society, a
perpetual subject of that commonwealth, than it would make a man a
subject to another, in whose family he found it convenient to abide for some
time; though, whilst he continued in it, he were obliged to comply with the
laws, and submit to the government he found there. And thus we see, that
foreigners, by living all their lives under another government, and enjoying
the privileges and protection of it, though they are bound, even in
conscience, to submit to its administration, as far forth as any denison; yet
do not thereby come to be subjects or members of that commonwealth.
Nothing can make any man so, but his actually entering into it by positive
engagement, and express promise and compact. This is that, which I think,
concerning the beginning of political societies, and that consent which
makes any one a member of any commonwealth.

CHAPTER. IX.
OF THE ENDS OF POLITICAL SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT.
Sect. 123. IF man in the state of nature be so free, as has been said; if he
be absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest,
and subject to no body, why will he part with his freedom? why will he give
up this empire, and subject himself to the dominion and controul of any
other power? To which it is obvious to answer, that though in the state of
nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and
constantly exposed to the invasion of others: for all being kings as much as
he, every man his equal, and the greater part no strict observers of equity
and justice, the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe,

very unsecure. This makes him willing to quit a condition, which, however
free, is full of fears and continual dangers: and it is not without reason, that
he seeks out, and is willing to join in society with others, who are already
united, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives,
liberties and estates, which I call by the general name, property.
Sect. 124. The great and chief end, therefore, of men's uniting into
commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the
preservation of their property. To which in the state of nature there are many
things wanting.
First, There wants an established, settled, known law, received and
allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong, and the
common measure to decide all controversies between them: for though the
law of nature be plain and intelligible to all rational creatures; yet men
being biassed by their interest, as well as ignorant for want of study of it,
are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to them in the application of it to
their particular cases.
Sect. 125. Secondly, In the state of nature there wants a known and
indifferent judge, with authority to determine all differences according to
the established law: for every one in that state being both judge and
executioner of the law of nature, men being partial to themselves, passion
and revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and with too much heat, in
their own cases; as well as negligence, and unconcernedness, to make them
too remiss in other men's.
Sect. 126. Thirdly, In the state of nature there often wants power to back
and support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution, They who
by any injustice offended, will seldom fail, where they are able, by force to
make good their injustice; such resistance many times makes the
punishment dangerous, and frequently destructive, to those who attempt it.
Sect. 127. Thus mankind, notwithstanding all the privileges of the state of
nature, being but in an ill condition, while they remain in it, are quickly
driven into society. Hence it comes to pass, that we seldom find any number
of men live any time together in this state. The inconveniencies that they
are therein exposed to, by the irregular and uncertain exercise of the power
every man has of punishing the transgressions of others, make them take

sanctuary under the established laws of government, and therein seek the
preservation of their property. It is this makes them so willingly give up
every one his single power of punishing, to be exercised by such alone, as
shall be appointed to it amongst them; and by such rules as the community,
or those authorized by them to that purpose, shall agree on. And in this we
have the original right and rise of both the legislative and executive power,
as well as of the governments and societies themselves.
Sect. 128. For in the state of nature, to omit the liberty he has of innocent
delights, a man has two powers.
The first is to do whatsoever he thinks fit for the preservation of himself,
and others within the permission of the law of nature: by which law,
common to them all, he and all the rest of mankind are one community,
make up one society, distinct from all other creatures. And were it not for
the corruption and vitiousness of degenerate men, there would be no need
of any other; no necessity that men should separate from this great and
natural community, and by positive agreements combine into smaller and
divided associations.
The other power a man has in the state of nature, is the power to punish
the crimes committed against that law. Both these he gives up, when he
joins in a private, if I may so call it, or particular politic society, and
incorporates into any commonwealth, separate from the rest of mankind.
Sect. 129. The first power, viz. of doing whatsoever he thought for the
preservation of himself, and the rest of mankind, he gives up to be regulated
by laws made by the society, so far forth as the preservation of himself, and
the rest of that society shall require; which laws of the society in many
things confine the liberty he had by the law of nature.
Sect. 130. Secondly, The power of punishing he wholly gives up, and
engages his natural force, (which he might before employ in the execution
of the law of nature, by his own single authority, as he thought fit) to assist
the executive power of the society, as the law thereof shall require: for
being now in a new state, wherein he is to enjoy many conveniencies, from
the labour, assistance, and society of others in the same community, as well
as protection from its whole strength; he is to part also with as much of his
natural liberty, in providing for himself, as the good, prosperity, and safety

of the society shall require; which is not only necessary, but just, since the
other members of the society do the like.
Sect. 131. But though men, when they enter into society, give up the
equality, liberty, and executive power they had in the state of nature, into
the hands of the society, to be so far disposed of by the legislative, as the
good of the society shall require; yet it being only with an intention in every
one the better to preserve himself, his liberty and property; (for no rational
creature can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to be
worse) the power of the society, or legislative constituted by them, can
never be supposed to extend farther, than the common good; but is obliged
to secure every one's property, by providing against those three defects
above mentioned, that made the state of nature so unsafe and uneasy. And
so whoever has the legislative or supreme power of any commonwealth, is
bound to govern by established standing laws, promulgated and known to
the people, and not by extemporary decrees; by indifferent and upright
judges, who are to decide controversies by those laws; and to employ the
force of the community at home, only in the execution of such laws, or
abroad to prevent or redress foreign injuries, and secure the community
from inroads and invasion. And all this to be directed to no other end, but
the peace, safety, and public good of the people.

CHAPTER. X.
OF THE FORMS OF A COMMON-WEALTH.
Sect. 132. THE majority having, as has been shewed, upon men's first
uniting into society, the whole power of the community naturally in them,
may employ all that power in making laws for the community from time to
time, and executing those laws by officers of their own appointing; and then
the form of the government is a perfect democracy: or else may put the
power of making laws into the hands of a few select men, and their heirs or

successors; and then it is an oligarchy: or else into the hands of one man,
and then it is a monarchy: if to him and his heirs, it is an hereditary
monarchy: if to him only for life, but upon his death the power only of
nominating a successor to return to them; an elective monarchy. And so
accordingly of these the community may make compounded and mixed
forms of government, as they think good. And if the legislative power be at
first given by the majority to one or more persons only for their lives, or
any limited time, and then the supreme power to revert to them again; when
it is so reverted, the community may dispose of it again anew into what
hands they please, and so constitute a new form of government: for the
form of government depending upon the placing the supreme power, which
is the legislative, it being impossible to conceive that an inferior power
should prescribe to a superior, or any but the supreme make laws, according
as the power of making laws is placed, such is the form of the
commonwealth.
Sect. 133. By commonwealth, I must be understood all along to mean, not
a democracy, or any form of government, but any independent community,
which the Latines signified by the word civitas, to which the word which
best answers in our language, is commonwealth, and most properly
expresses such a society of men, which community or city in English does
not; for there may be subordinate communities in a government; and city
amongst us has a quite different notion from commonwealth: and therefore,
to avoid ambiguity, I crave leave to use the word commonwealth in that
sense, in which I find it used by king James the first; and I take it to be its
genuine signification; which if any body dislike, I consent with him to
change it for a better.

CHAPTER. XI.
OF THE EXTENT OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWER.

Sect. 134. THE great end of men's entering into society, being the
enjoyment of their properties in peace and safety, and the great instrument
and means of that being the laws established in that society; the first and
fundamental positive law of all commonwealths is the establishing of the
legislative power; as the first and fundamental natural law, which is to
govern even the legislative itself, is the preservation of the society, and (as
far as will consist with the public good) of every person in it. This
legislative is not only the supreme power of the commonwealth, but sacred
and unalterable in the hands where the community have once placed it; nor
can any edict of any body else, in what form soever conceived, or by what
power soever backed, have the force and obligation of a law, which has not
its sanction from that legislative which the public has chosen and appointed:
for without this the law could not have that, which is absolutely necessary
to its being a law,* the consent of the society, over whom no body can have
a power to make laws, but by their own consent, and by authority received
from them; and therefore all the obedience, which by the most solemn ties
any one can be obliged to pay, ultimately terminates in this supreme power,
and is directed by those laws which it enacts: nor can any oaths to any
foreign power whatsoever, or any domestic subordinate power, discharge
any member of the society from his obedience to the legislative, acting
pursuant to their trust; nor oblige him to any obedience contrary to the laws
so enacted, or farther than they do allow; it being ridiculous to imagine one
can be tied ultimately to obey any power in the society, which is not the
supreme.
(*The lawful power of making laws to command whole politic societies of
men, belonging so properly unto the same intire societies, that for any
prince or potentate of what kind soever upon earth, to exercise the same of
himself, and not by express commission immediately and personally
received from God, or else by authority derived at the first from their
consent, upon whose persons they impose laws, it is no better than mere
tyranny. Laws they are not therefore which public approbation hath not
made so. Hooker's Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 10.
Of this point therefore we are to note, that such men naturally have no full
and perfect power to command whole politic multitudes of men, therefore
utterly without our consent, we could in such sort be at no man's
commandment living. And to be commanded we do consent, when that

society, whereof we be a part, hath at any time before consented, without
revoking the same after by the like universal agreement. Laws therefore
human, of what kind so ever, are available by consent. Ibid.)
Sect. 135. Though the legislative, whether placed in one or more, whether
it be always in being, or only by intervals, though it be the supreme power
in every commonwealth; yet:
First, It is not, nor can possibly be absolutely arbitrary over the lives and
fortunes of the people: for it being but the joint power of every member of
the society given up to that person, or assembly, which is legislator; it can
be no more than those persons had in a state of nature before they entered
into society, and gave up to the community: for no body can transfer to
another more power than he has in himself; and no body has an absolute
arbitrary power over himself, or over any other, to destroy his own life, or
take away the life or property of another. A man, as has been proved, cannot
subject himself to the arbitrary power of another; and having in the state of
nature no arbitrary power over the life, liberty, or possession of another, but
only so much as the law of nature gave him for the preservation of himself,
and the rest of mankind; this is all he doth, or can give up to the
commonwealth, and by it to the legislative power, so that the legislative can
have no more than this. Their power, in the utmost bounds of it, is limited to
the public good of the society. It is a power, that hath no other end but
preservation, and therefore can never have a right to destroy, enslave, or
designedly to impoverish the subjects.* The obligations of the law of nature
cease not in society, but only in many cases are drawn closer, and have by
human laws known penalties annexed to them, to inforce their observation.
Thus the law of nature stands as an eternal rule to all men, legislators as
well as others. The rules that they make for other men's actions, must, as
well as their own and other men's actions, be conformable to the law of
nature, i.e. to the will of God, of which that is a declaration, and the
fundamental law of nature being the preservation of mankind, no human
sanction can be good, or valid against it.
(*Two foundations there are which bear up public societies; the one a
natural inclination, whereby all men desire sociable life and fellowship; the
other an order, expresly or secretly agreed upon, touching the manner of
their union in living together: the latter is that which we call the law of a

common-weal, the very soul of a politic body, the parts whereof are by law
animated, held together, and set on work in such actions as the common
good requireth. Laws politic, ordained for external order and regiment
amongst men, are never framed as they should be, unless presuming the
will of man to be inwardly obstinate, rebellious, and averse from all
obedience to the sacred laws of his nature; in a word, unless presuming man
to be, in regard of his depraved mind, little better than a wild beast, they do
accordingly provide, notwithstanding, so to frame his outward actions, that
they be no hindrance unto the common good, for which societies are
instituted. Unless they do this, they are not perfect. Hooker's Eccl. Pol. l. i.
sect. 10.)
Sect. 136. Secondly, The legislative, or supreme authority, cannot assume
to its self a power to rule by extemporary arbitrary decrees, but is bound to
dispense justice, and decide the rights of the subject by promulgated
standing laws, and known authorized judges:* for the law of nature being
unwritten, and so no where to be found but in the minds of men, they who
through passion or interest shall miscite, or misapply it, cannot so easily be
convinced of their mistake where there is no established judge: and so it
serves not, as it ought, to determine the rights, and fence the properties of
those that live under it, especially where every one is judge, interpreter, and
executioner of it too, and that in his own case: and he that has right on his
side, having ordinarily but his own single strength, hath not force enough to
defend himself from injuries, or to punish delinquents. To avoid these
inconveniences, which disorder men's propperties in the state of nature,
men unite into societies, that they may have the united strength of the whole
society to secure and defend their properties, and may have standing rules
to bound it, by which every one may know what is his. To this end it is that
men give up all their natural power to the society which they enter into, and
the community put the legislative power into such hands as they think fit,
with this trust, that they shall be governed by declared laws, or else their
peace, quiet, and property will still be at the same uncertainty, as it was in
the state of nature.
(*Human laws are measures in respect of men whose actions they must
direct, howbeit such measures they are as have also their higher rules to be
measured by, which rules are two, the law of God, and the law of nature; so
that laws human must be made according to the general laws of nature, and

without contradiction to any positive law of scripture, otherwise they are ill
made. Hooker's Eccl. Pol. l. iii. sect. 9.
To constrain men to any thing inconvenient doth seem unreasonable. Ibid.
l. i. sect. 10.)
Sect. 137. Absolute arbitrary power, or governing without settled standing
laws, can neither of them consist with the ends of society and government,
which men would not quit the freedom of the state of nature for, and tie
themselves up under, were it not to preserve their lives, liberties and
fortunes, and by stated rules of right and property to secure their peace and
quiet. It cannot be supposed that they should intend, had they a power so to
do, to give to any one, or more, an absolute arbitrary power over their
persons and estates, and put a force into the magistrate's hand to execute his
unlimited will arbitrarily upon them. This were to put themselves into a
worse condition than the state of nature, wherein they had a liberty to
defend their right against the injuries of others, and were upon equal terms
of force to maintain it, whether invaded by a single man, or many in
combination. Whereas by supposing they have given up themselves to the
absolute arbitrary power and will of a legislator, they have disarmed
themselves, and armed him, to make a prey of them when he pleases; he
being in a much worse condition, who is exposed to the arbitrary power of
one man, who has the command of 100,000, than he that is exposed to the
arbitrary power of 100,000 single men; no body being secure, that his will,
who has such a command, is better than that of other men, though his force
be 100,000 times stronger. And therefore, whatever form the
commonwealth is under, the ruling power ought to govern by declared and
received laws, and not by extemporary dictates and undetermined
resolutions: for then mankind will be in a far worse condition than in the
state of nature, if they shall have armed one, or a few men with the joint
power of a multitude, to force them to obey at pleasure the exorbitant and
unlimited decrees of their sudden thoughts, or unrestrained, and till that
moment unknown wills, without having any measures set down which may
guide and justify their actions: for all the power the government has, being
only for the good of the society, as it ought not to be arbitrary and at
pleasure, so it ought to be exercised by established and promulgated laws;
that both the people may know their duty, and be safe and secure within the
limits of the law; and the rulers too kept within their bounds, and not be

tempted, by the power they have in their hands, to employ it to such
purposes, and by such measures, as they would not have known, and own
not willingly.
Sect. 138. Thirdly, The supreme power cannot take from any man any part
of his property without his own consent: for the preservation of property
being the end of government, and that for which men enter into society, it
necessarily supposes and requires, that the people should have property,
without which they must be supposed to lose that, by entering into society,
which was the end for which they entered into it; too gross an absurdity for
any man to own. Men therefore in society having property, they have such a
right to the goods, which by the law of the community are their's, that no
body hath a right to take their substance or any part of it from them, without
their own consent: without this they have no property at all; for I have truly
no property in that, which another can by right take from me, when he
pleases, against my consent. Hence it is a mistake to think, that the supreme
or legislative power of any commonwealth, can do what it will, and dispose
of the estates of the subject arbitrarily, or take any part of them at pleasure.
This is not much to be feared in governments where the legislative consists,
wholly or in part, in assemblies which are variable, whose members, upon
the dissolution of the assembly, are subjects under the common laws of their
country, equally with the rest. But in governments, where the legislative is
in one lasting assembly always in being, or in one man, as in absolute
monarchies, there is danger still, that they will think themselves to have a
distinct interest from the rest of the community; and so will be apt to
increase their own riches and power, by taking what they think fit from the
people: for a man's property is not at all secure, tho' there be good and
equitable laws to set the bounds of it between him and his fellow subjects, if
he who commands those subjects have power to take from any private man,
what part he pleases of his property, and use and dispose of it as he thinks
good.
Sect. 139. But government, into whatsoever hands it is put, being, as I
have before shewed, intrusted with this condition, and for this end, that men
might have and secure their properties; the prince, or senate, however it
may have power to make laws, for the regulating of property between the
subjects one amongst another, yet can never have a power to take to
themselves the whole, or any part of the subjects property, without their

own consent: for this would be in effect to leave them no property at all.
And to let us see, that even absolute power, where it is necessary, is not
arbitrary by being absolute, but is still limited by that reason, and confined
to those ends, which required it in some cases to be absolute, we need look
no farther than the common practice of martial discipline: for the
preservation of the army, and in it of the whole commonwealth, requires an
absolute obedience to the command of every superior officer, and it is justly
death to disobey or dispute the most dangerous or unreasonable of them;
but yet we see, that neither the serjeant, that could command a soldier to
march up to the mouth of a cannon, or stand in a breach, where he is almost
sure to perish, can command that soldier to give him one penny of his
money; nor the general, that can condemn him to death for deserting his
post, or for not obeying the most desperate orders, can yet, with all his
absolute power of life and death, dispose of one farthing of that soldier's
estate, or seize one jot of his goods; whom yet he can command any thing,
and hang for the least disobedience; because such a blind obedience is
necessary to that end, for which the commander has his power, viz. the
preservation of the rest; but the disposing of his goods has nothing to do
with it.
Sect. 140. It is true, governments cannot be supported without great
charge, and it is fit every one who enjoys his share of the protection, should
pay out of his estate his proportion for the maintenance of it. But still it
must be with his own consent, i.e. the consent of the majority, giving it
either by themselves, or their representatives chosen by them: for if any one
shall claim a power to lay and levy taxes on the people, by his own
authority, and without such consent of the people, he thereby invades the
fundamental law of property, and subverts the end of government: for what
property have I in that, which another may by right take, when he pleases,
to himself?
Sect. 141. Fourthly, The legislative cannot transfer the power of making
laws to any other hands: for it being but a delegated power from the people,
they who have it cannot pass it over to others. The people alone can appoint
the form of the commonwealth, which is by constituting the legislative, and
appointing in whose hands that shall be. And when the people have said,
We will submit to rules, and be governed by laws made by such men, and in
such forms, no body else can say other men shall make laws for them; nor

can the people be bound by any laws, but such as are enacted by those
whom they have chosen, and authorized to make laws for them. The power
of the legislative, being derived from the people by a positive voluntary
grant and institution, can be no other than what that positive grant
conveyed, which being only to make laws, and not to make legislators, the
legislative can have no power to transfer their authority of making laws, and
place it in other hands.
Sect. 142. These are the bounds which the trust, that is put in them by the
society, and the law of God and nature, have set to the legislative power of
every commonwealth, in all forms of government.
First, They are to govern by promulgated established laws, not to be
varied in particular cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the
favourite at court, and the country man at plough.
Secondly, These laws also ought to be designed for no other end
ultimately, but the good of the people.
Thirdly, They must not raise taxes on the property of the people, without
the consent of the people, given by themselves, or their deputies. And this
properly concerns only such governments where the legislative is always in
being, or at least where the people have not reserved any part of the
legislative to deputies, to be from time to time chosen by themselves.
Fourthly, The legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of
making laws to any body else, or place it any where, but where the people
have.

CHAPTER. XII.
OF THE LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, AND FEDERATIVE
POWER OF THE COMMON-WEALTH.

Sect. 143. THE legislative power is that, which has a right to direct how
the force of the commonwealth shall be employed for preserving the
community and the members of it. But because those laws which are
constantly to be executed, and whose force is always to continue, may be
made in a little time; therefore there is no need, that the legislative should
be always in being, not having always business to do. And because it may
be too great a temptation to human frailty, apt to grasp at power, for the
same persons, who have the power of making laws, to have also in their
hands the power to execute them, whereby they may exempt themselves
from obedience to the laws they make, and suit the law, both in its making,
and execution, to their own private advantage, and thereby come to have a
distinct interest from the rest of the community, contrary to the end of
society and government: therefore in wellordered commonwealths, where
the good of the whole is so considered, as it ought, the legislative power is
put into the hands of divers persons, who duly assembled, have by
themselves, or jointly with others, a power to make laws, which when they
have done, being separated again, they are themselves subject to the laws
they have made; which is a new and near tie upon them, to take care, that
they make them for the public good.
Sect. 144. But because the laws, that are at once, and in a short time made,
have a constant and lasting force, and need a perpetual execution, or an
attendance thereunto; therefore it is necessary there should be a power
always in being, which should see to the execution of the laws that are
made, and remain in force. And thus the legislative and executive power
come often to be separated.
Sect. 145. There is another power in every commonwealth, which one
may call natural, because it is that which answers to the power every man
naturally had before he entered into society: for though in a commonwealth
the members of it are distinct persons still in reference to one another, and
as such as governed by the laws of the society; yet in reference to the rest of
mankind, they make one body, which is, as every member of it before was,
still in the state of nature with the rest of mankind. Hence it is, that the
controversies that happen between any man of the society with those that
are out of it, are managed by the public; and an injury done to a member of
their body, engages the whole in the reparation of it. So that under this

consideration, the whole community is one body in the state of nature, in
respect of all other states or persons out of its community.
Sect. 146. This therefore contains the power of war and peace, leagues and
alliances, and all the transactions, with all persons and communities without
the commonwealth, and may be called federative, if any one pleases. So the
thing be understood, I am indifferent as to the name.
Sect. 147. These two powers, executive and federative, though they be
really distinct in themselves, yet one comprehending the execution of the
municipal laws of the society within its self, upon all that are parts of it; the
other the management of the security and interest of the public without,
with all those that it may receive benefit or damage from, yet they are
always almost united. And though this federative power in the well or ill
management of it be of great moment to the commonwealth, yet it is much
less capable to be directed by antecedent, standing, positive laws, than the
executive; and so must necessarily be left to the prudence and wisdom of
those, whose hands it is in, to be managed for the public good: for the laws
that concern subjects one amongst another, being to direct their actions,
may well enough precede them. But what is to be done in reference to
foreigners, depending much upon their actions, and the variation of designs
and interests, must be left in great part to the prudence of those, who have
this power committed to them, to be managed by the best of their skill, for
the advantage of the commonwealth.
Sect. 148. Though, as I said, the executive and federative power of every
community be really distinct in themselves, yet they are hardly to be
separated, and placed at the same time, in the hands of distinct persons: for
both of them requiring the force of the society for their exercise, it is almost
impracticable to place the force of the commonwealth in distinct, and not
subordinate hands; or that the executive and federative power should be
placed in persons, that might act separately, whereby the force of the public
would be under different commands: which would be apt some time or
other to cause disorder and ruin.

CHAPTER. XIII.
OF THE SUBORDINATION OF THE POWERS OF THE
COMMON-WEALTH.
Sect. 149. THOUGH in a constituted commonwealth, standing upon its
own basis, and acting according to its own nature, that is, acting for the
preservation of the community, there can be but one supreme power, which
is the legislative, to which all the rest are and must be subordinate, yet the
legislative being only a fiduciary power to act for certain ends, there
remains still in the people a supreme power to remove or alter the
legislative, when they find the legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in
them: for all power given with trust for the attaining an end, being limited
by that end, whenever that end is manifestly neglected, or opposed, the trust
must necessarily be forfeited, and the power devolve into the hands of those
that gave it, who may place it anew where they shall think best for their
safety and security. And thus the community perpetually retains a supreme
power of saving themselves from the attempts and designs of any body,
even of their legislators, whenever they shall be so foolish, or so wicked, as
to lay and carry on designs against the liberties and properties of the
subject: for no man or society of men, having a power to deliver up their
preservation, or consequently the means of it, to the absolute will and
arbitrary dominion of another; when ever any one shall go about to bring
them into such a slavish condition, they will always have a right to
preserve, what they have not a power to part with; and to rid themselves of
those, who invade this fundamental, sacred, and unalterable law of selfpreservation, for which they entered into society. And thus the community
may be said in this respect to be always the supreme power, but not as
considered under any form of government, because this power of the people
can never take place till the government be dissolved.
Sect. 150. In all cases, whilst the government subsists, the legislative is
the supreme power: for what can give laws to another, must needs be
superior to him; and since the legislative is no otherwise legislative of the
society, but by the right it has to make laws for all the parts, and for every
member of the society, prescribing rules to their actions, and giving power
of execution, where they are transgressed, the legislative must needs be the

supreme, and all other powers, in any members or parts of the society,
derived from and subordinate to it.
Sect. 151. In some commonwealths, where the legislative is not always in
being, and the executive is vested in a single person, who has also a share in
the legislative; there that single person in a very tolerable sense may also be
called supreme: not that he has in himself all the supreme power, which is
that of law-making; but because he has in him the supreme execution, from
whom all inferior magistrates derive all their several subordinate powers, or
at least the greatest part of them: having also no legislative superior to him,
there being no law to be made without his consent, which cannot be
expected should ever subject him to the other part of the legislative, he is
properly enough in this sense supreme. But yet it is to be observed, that tho'
oaths of allegiance and fealty are taken to him, it is not to him as supreme
legislator, but as supreme executor of the law, made by a joint power of him
with others; allegiance being nothing but an obedience according to law,
which when he violates, he has no right to obedience, nor can claim it
otherwise than as the public person vested with the power of the law, and so
is to be considered as the image, phantom, or representative of the
commonwealth, acted by the will of the society, declared in its laws; and
thus he has no will, no power, but that of the law. But when he quits this
representation, this public will, and acts by his own private will, he
degrades himself, and is but a single private person without power, and
without will, that has any right to obedience; the members owing no
obedience but to the public will of the society.
Sect. 152. The executive power, placed any where but in a person that has
also a share in the legislative, is visibly subordinate and accountable to it,
and may be at pleasure changed and displaced; so that it is not the supreme
executive power, that is exempt from subordination, but the supreme
executive power vested in one, who having a share in the legislative, has no
distinct superior legislative to be subordinate and accountable to, farther
than he himself shall join and consent; so that he is no more subordinate
than he himself shall think fit, which one may certainly conclude will be but
very little. Of other ministerial and subordinate powers in a commonwealth,
we need not speak, they being so multiplied with infinite variety, in the
different customs and constitutions of distinct commonwealths, that it is
impossible to give a particular account of them all. Only thus much, which

is necessary to our present purpose, we may take notice of concerning them,
that they have no manner of authority, any of them, beyond what is by
positive grant and commission delegated to them, and are all of them
accountable to some other power in the commonwealth.
Sect. 153. It is not necessary, no, nor so much as convenient, that the
legislative should be always in being; but absolutely necessary that the
executive power should, because there is not always need of new laws to be
made, but always need of execution of the laws that are made. When the
legislative hath put the execution of the laws, they make, into other hands,
they have a power still to resume it out of those hands, when they find
cause, and to punish for any maladministration against the laws. The same
holds also in regard of the federative power, that and the executive being
both ministerial and subordinate to the legislative, which, as has been
shewed, in a constituted commonwealth is the supreme. The legislative also
in this case being supposed to consist of several persons, (for if it be a
single person, it cannot but be always in being, and so will, as supreme,
naturally have the supreme executive power, together with the legislative)
may assemble, and exercise their legislature, at the times that either their
original constitution, or their own adjournment, appoints, or when they
please; if neither of these hath appointed any time, or there be no other way
prescribed to convoke them: for the supreme power being placed in them by
the people, it is always in them, and they may exercise it when they please,
unless by their original constitution they are limited to certain seasons, or
by an act of their supreme power they have adjourned to a certain time; and
when that time comes, they have a right to assemble and act again.
Sect. 154. If the legislative, or any part of it, be made up of representatives
chosen for that time by the people, which afterwards return into the
ordinary state of subjects, and have no share in the legislature but upon a
new choice, this power of chusing must also be exercised by the people,
either at certain appointed seasons, or else when they are summoned to it;
and in this latter case the power of convoking the legislative is ordinarily
placed in the executive, and has one of these two limitations in respect of
time: that either the original constitution requires their assembling and
acting at certain intervals, and then the executive power does nothing but
ministerially issue directions for their electing and assembling, according to
due forms; or else it is left to his prudence to call them by new elections,

when the occasions or exigencies of the public require the amendment of
old, or making of new laws, or the redress or prevention of any
inconveniencies, that lie on, or threaten the people.
Sect. 155. It may be demanded here, What if the executive power, being
possessed of the force of the commonwealth, shall make use of that force to
hinder the meeting and acting of the legislative, when the original
constitution, or the public exigencies require it? I say, using force upon the
people without authority, and contrary to the trust put in him that does so, is
a state of war with the people, who have a right to reinstate their legislative
in the exercise of their power: for having erected a legislative, with an
intent they should exercise the power of making laws, either at certain set
times, or when there is need of it, when they are hindered by any force from
what is so necessary to the society, and wherein the safety and preservation
of the people consists, the people have a right to remove it by force. In all
states and conditions, the true remedy of force without authority, is to
oppose force to it. The use of force without authority, always puts him that
uses it into a state of war, as the aggressor, and renders him liable to be
treated accordingly.
Sect. 156. The power of assembling and dismissing the legislative, placed
in the executive, gives not the executive a superiority over it, but is a
fiduciary trust placed in him, for the safety of the people, in a case where
the uncertainty and variableness of human affairs could not bear a steady
fixed rule: for it not being possible, that the first framers of the government
should, by any foresight, be so much masters of future events, as to be able
to prefix so just periods of return and duration to the assemblies of the
legislative, in all times to come, that might exactly answer all the exigencies
of the commonwealth; the best remedy could be found for this defect, was
to trust this to the prudence of one who was always to be present, and
whose business it was to watch over the public good. Constant frequent
meetings of the legislative, and long continuations of their assemblies,
without necessary occasion, could not but be burdensome to the people, and
must necessarily in time produce more dangerous inconveniencies, and yet
the quick turn of affairs might be sometimes such as to need their present
help: any delay of their convening might endanger the public; and
sometimes too their business might be so great, that the limited time of their
sitting might be too short for their work, and rob the public of that benefit

which could be had only from their mature deliberation. What then could be
done in this case to prevent the community from being exposed some time
or other to eminent hazard, on one side or the other, by fixed intervals and
periods, set to the meeting and acting of the legislative, but to intrust it to
the prudence of some, who being present, and acquainted with the state of
public affairs, might make use of this prerogative for the public good? and
where else could this be so well placed as in his hands, who was intrusted
with the execution of the laws for the same end? Thus supposing the
regulation of times for the assembling and sitting of the legislative, not
settled by the original constitution, it naturally fell into the hands of the
executive, not as an arbitrary power depending on his good pleasure, but
with this trust always to have it exercised only for the public weal, as the
occurrences of times and change of affairs might require. Whether settled
periods of their convening, or a liberty left to the prince for convoking the
legislative, or perhaps a mixture of both, hath the least inconvenience
attending it, it is not my business here to inquire, but only to shew, that
though the executive power may have the prerogative of convoking and
dissolving such conventions of the legislative, yet it is not thereby superior
to it.
Sect. 157. Things of this world are in so constant a flux, that nothing
remains long in the same state. Thus people, riches, trade, power, change
their stations, flourishing mighty cities come to ruin, and prove in times
neglected desolate corners, whilst other unfrequented places grow into
populous countries, filled with wealth and inhabitants. But things not
always changing equally, and private interest often keeping up customs and
privileges, when the reasons of them are ceased, it often comes to pass, that
in governments, where part of the legislative consists of representatives
chosen by the people, that in tract of time this representation becomes very
unequal and disproportionate to the reasons it was at first established upon.
To what gross absurdities the following of custom, when reason has left it,
may lead, we may be satisfied, when we see the bare name of a town, of
which there remains not so much as the ruins, where scarce so much
housing as a sheepcote, or more inhabitants than a shepherd is to be found,
sends as many representatives to the grand assembly of law-makers, as a
whole county numerous in people, and powerful in riches. This strangers
stand amazed at, and every one must confess needs a remedy; tho' most

think it hard to find one, because the constitution of the legislative being the
original and supreme act of the society, antecedent to all positive laws in it,
and depending wholly on the people, no inferior power can alter it. And
therefore the people, when the legislative is once constituted, having, in
such a government as we have been speaking of, no power to act as long as
the government stands; this inconvenience is thought incapable of a remedy.
Sect. 158. Salus populi suprema lex, is certainly so just and fundamental a
rule, that he, who sincerely follows it, cannot dangerously err. If therefore
the executive, who has the power of convoking the legislative, observing
rather the true proportion, than fashion of representation, regulates, not by
old custom, but true reason, the number of members, in all places that have
a right to be distinctly represented, which no part of the people however
incorporated can pretend to, but in proportion to the assistance which it
affords to the public, it cannot be judged to have set up a new legislative,
but to have restored the old and true one, and to have rectified the disorders
which succession of time had insensibly, as well as inevitably introduced:
For it being the interest as well as intention of the people, to have a fair and
equal representative; whoever brings it nearest to that, is an undoubted
friend to, and establisher of the government, and cannot miss the consent
and approbation of the community; prerogative being nothing but a power,
in the hands of the prince, to provide for the public good, in such cases,
which depending upon unforeseen and uncertain occurrences, certain and
unalterable laws could not safely direct; whatsoever shall be done
manifestly for the good of the people, and the establishing the government
upon its true foundations, is, and always will be, just prerogative, The
power of erecting new corporations, and therewith new representatives,
carries with it a supposition, that in time the measures of representation
might vary, and those places have a just right to be represented which
before had none; and by the same reason, those cease to have a right, and be
too inconsiderable for such a privilege, which before had it. 'Tis not a
change from the present state, which perhaps corruption or decay has
introduced, that makes an inroad upon the government, but the tendency of
it to injure or oppress the people, and to set up one part or party, with a
distinction from, and an unequal subjection of the rest. Whatsoever cannot
but be acknowledged to be of advantage to the society, and people in
general, upon just and lasting measures, will always, when done, justify

itself; and whenever the people shall chuse their representatives upon just
and undeniably equal measures, suitable to the original frame of the
government, it cannot be doubted to be the will and act of the society,
whoever permitted or caused them so to do.

CHAPTER. XIV.
OF PREROGATIVE.
Sect. 159. WHERE the legislative and executive power are in distinct
hands, (as they are in all moderated monarchies, and well-framed
governments) there the good of the society requires, that several things
should be left to the discretion of him that has the executive power: for the
legislators not being able to foresee, and provide by laws, for all that may
be useful to the community, the executor of the laws having the power in
his hands, has by the common law of nature a right to make use of it for the
good of the society, in many cases, where the municipal law has given no
direction, till the legislative can conveniently be assembled to provide for it.
Many things there are, which the law can by no means provide for; and
those must necessarily be left to the discretion of him that has the executive
power in his hands, to be ordered by him as the public good and advantage
shall require: nay, it is fit that the laws themselves should in some cases
give way to the executive power, or rather to this fundamental law of nature
and government, viz. That as much as may be, all the members of the
society are to be preserved: for since many accidents may happen, wherein
a strict and rigid observation of the laws may do harm; (as not to pull down
an innocent man's house to stop the fire, when the next to it is burning) and
a man may come sometimes within the reach of the law, which makes no
distinction of persons, by an action that may deserve reward and pardon; 'tis
fit the ruler should have a power, in many cases, to mitigate the severity of
the law, and pardon some offenders: for the end of government being the

preservation of all, as much as may be, even the guilty are to be spared,
where it can prove no prejudice to the innocent.
Sect. 160. This power to act according to discretion, for the public good,
without the prescription of the law, and sometimes even against it, is that
which is called prerogative: for since in some governments the lawmaking
power is not always in being, and is usually too numerous, and so too slow,
for the dispatch requisite to execution; and because also it is impossible to
foresee, and so by laws to provide for, all accidents and necessities that may
concern the public, or to make such laws as will do no harm, if they are
executed with an inflexible rigour, on all occasions, and upon all persons
that may come in their way; therefore there is a latitude left to the executive
power, to do many things of choice which the laws do not prescribe.
Sect. 161. This power, whilst employed for the benefit of the community,
and suitably to the trust and ends of the government, is undoubted
prerogative, and never is questioned: for the people are very seldom or
never scrupulous or nice in the point; they are far from examining
prerogative, whilst it is in any tolerable degree employed for the use it was
meant, that is, for the good of the people, and not manifestly against it: but
if there comes to be a question between the executive power and the people,
about a thing claimed as a prerogative; the tendency of the exercise of such
prerogative to the good or hurt of the people, will easily decide that
question.
Sect. 162. It is easy to conceive, that in the infancy of governments, when
commonwealths differed little from families in number of people, they
differed from them too but little in number of laws: and the governors,
being as the fathers of them, watching over them for their good, the
government was almost all prerogative. A few established laws served the
turn, and the discretion and care of the ruler supplied the rest. But when
mistake or flattery prevailed with weak princes to make use of this power
for private ends of their own, and not for the public good, the people were
fain by express laws to get prerogative determined in those points wherein
they found disadvantage from it: and thus declared limitations of
prerogative were by the people found necessary in cases which they and
their ancestors had left, in the utmost latitude, to the wisdom of those

princes who made no other but a right use of it, that is, for the good of their
people.
Sect. 163. And therefore they have a very wrong notion of government,
who say, that the people have encroached upon the prerogative, when they
have got any part of it to be defined by positive laws: for in so doing they
have not pulled from the prince any thing that of right belonged to him, but
only declared, that that power which they indefinitely left in his or his
ancestors hands, to be exercised for their good, was not a thing which they
intended him when he used it otherwise: for the end of government being
the good of the community, whatsoever alterations are made in it, tending to
that end, cannot be an encroachment upon any body, since no body in
government can have a right tending to any other end: and those only are
encroachments which prejudice or hinder the public good. Those who say
otherwise, speak as if the prince had a distinct and separate interest from the
good of the community, and was not made for it; the root and source from
which spring almost all those evils and disorders which happen in kingly
governments. And indeed, if that be so, the people under his government
are not a society of rational creatures, entered into a community for their
mutual good; they are not such as have set rulers over themselves, to guard,
and promote that good; but are to be looked on as an herd of inferior
creatures under the dominion of a master, who keeps them and works them
for his own pleasure or profit. If men were so void of reason, and brutish, as
to enter into society upon such terms, prerogative might indeed be, what
some men would have it, an arbitrary power to do things hurtful to the
people.
Sect. 164. But since a rational creature cannot be supposed, when free, to
put himself into subjection to another, for his own harm; (though, where he
finds a good and wise ruler, he may not perhaps think it either necessary or
useful to set precise bounds to his power in all things) prerogative can be
nothing but the people's permitting their rulers to do several things, of their
own free choice, where the law was silent, and sometimes too against the
direct letter of the law, for the public good; and their acquiescing in it when
so done: for as a good prince, who is mindful of the trust put into his hands,
and careful of the good of his people, cannot have too much prerogative,
that is, power to do good; so a weak and ill prince, who would claim that
power which his predecessors exercised without the direction of the law, as

a prerogative belonging to him by right of his office, which he may exercise
at his pleasure, to make or promote an interest distinct from that of the
public, gives the people an occasion to claim their right, and limit that
power, which, whilst it was exercised for their good, they were content
should be tacitly allowed.
Sect. 165. And therefore he that will look into the history of England, will
find, that prerogative was always largest in the hands of our wisest and best
princes; because the people, observing the whole tendency of their actions
to be the public good, contested not what was done without law to that end:
or, if any human frailty or mistake (for princes are but men, made as others)
appeared in some small declinations from that end; yet 'twas visible, the
main of their conduct tended to nothing but the care of the public. The
people therefore, finding reason to be satisfied with these princes, whenever
they acted without, or contrary to the letter of the law, acquiesced in what
they did, and, without the least complaint, let them inlarge their prerogative
as they pleased, judging rightly, that they did nothing herein to the prejudice
of their laws, since they acted conformable to the foundation and end of all
laws, the public good.
Sect. 166. Such god-like princes indeed had some title to arbitrary power
by that argument, that would prove absolute monarchy the best government,
as that which God himself governs the universe by; because such kings
partake of his wisdom and goodness. Upon this is founded that saying, That
the reigns of good princes have been always most dangerous to the liberties
of their people: for when their successors, managing the government with
different thoughts, would draw the actions of those good rulers into
precedent, and make them the standard of their prerogative, as if what had
been done only for the good of the people was a right in them to do, for the
harm of the people, if they so pleased; it has often occasioned contest, and
sometimes public disorders, before the people could recover their original
right, and get that to be declared not to be prerogative, which truly was
never so; since it is impossible that any body in the society should ever
have a right to do the people harm; though it be very possible, and
reasonable, that the people should not go about to set any bounds to the
prerogative of those kings, or rulers, who themselves transgressed not the
bounds of the public good: for prerogative is nothing but the power of doing
public good without a rule.

Sect. 167. The power of calling parliaments in England, as to precise time,
place, and duration, is certainly a prerogative of the king, but still with this
trust, that it shall be made use of for the good of the nation, as the
exigencies of the times, and variety of occasions, shall require: for it being
impossible to foresee which should always be the fittest place for them to
assemble in, and what the best season; the choice of these was left with the
executive power, as might be most subservient to the public good, and best
suit the ends of parliaments.
Sect. 168. The old question will be asked in this matter of prerogative, But
who shall be judge when this power is made a right use of one answer:
between an executive power in being, with such a prerogative, and a
legislative that depends upon his will for their convening, there can be no
judge on earth; as there can be none between the legislative and the people,
should either the executive, or the legislative, when they have got the power
in their hands, design, or go about to enslave or destroy them. The people
have no other remedy in this, as in all other cases where they have no judge
on earth, but to appeal to heaven: for the rulers, in such attempts, exercising
a power the people never put into their hands, (who can never be supposed
to consent that any body should rule over them for their harm) do that
which they have not a right to do. And where the body of the people, or any
single man, is deprived of their right, or is under the exercise of a power
without right, and have no appeal on earth, then they have a liberty to
appeal to heaven, whenever they judge the cause of sufficient moment. And
therefore, though the people cannot be judge, so as to have, by the
constitution of that society, any superior power, to determine and give
effective sentence in the case; yet they have, by a law antecedent and
paramount to all positive laws of men, reserved that ultimate determination
to themselves which belongs to all mankind, where there lies no appeal on
earth, viz. to judge, whether they have just cause to make their appeal to
heaven. And this judgment they cannot part with, it being out of a man's
power so to submit himself to another, as to give him a liberty to destroy
him; God and nature never allowing a man so to abandon himself, as to
neglect his own preservation: and since he cannot take away his own life,
neither can he give another power to take it. Nor let any one think, this lays
a perpetual foundation for disorder; for this operates not, till the
inconveniency is so great, that the majority feel it, and are weary of it, and

find a necessity to have it amended. But this the executive power, or wise
princes, never need come in the danger of: and it is the thing, of all others,
they have most need to avoid, as of all others the most perilous.

CHAPTER. XV.
OF PATERNAL, POLITICAL, AND DESPOTICAL POWER,
CONSIDERED TOGETHER.
Sect. 169. THOUGH I have had occasion to speak of these separately
before, yet the great mistakes of late about government, having, as I
suppose, arisen from confounding these distinct powers one with another, it
may not, perhaps, be amiss to consider them here together.
Sect. 170. First, then, Paternal or parental power is nothing but that which
parents have over their children, to govern them for the children's good, till
they come to the use of reason, or a state of knowledge, wherein they may
be supposed capable to understand that rule, whether it be the law of nature,
or the municipal law of their country, they are to govern themselves by:
capable, I say, to know it, as well as several others, who live as freemen
under that law. The affection and tenderness which God hath planted in the
breast of parents towards their children, makes it evident, that this is not
intended to be a severe arbitrary government, but only for the help,
instruction, and preservation of their offspring. But happen it as it will,
there is, as I have proved, no reason why it should be thought to extend to
life and death, at any time, over their children, more than over any body
else; neither can there be any pretence why this parental power should keep
the child, when grown to a man, in subjection to the will of his parents, any
farther than having received life and education from his parents, obliges
him to respect, honour, gratitude, assistance and support, all his life, to both
father and mother. And thus, 'tis true, the paternal is a natural government,
but not at all extending itself to the ends and jurisdictions of that which is

political. The power of the father doth not reach at all to the property of the
child, which is only in his own disposing.
Sect. 171. Secondly, Political power is that power, which every man
having in the state of nature, has given up into the hands of the society, and
therein to the governors, whom the society hath set over itself, with this
express or tacit trust, that it shall be employed for their good, and the
preservation of their property: now this power, which every man has in the
state of nature, and which he parts with to the society in all such cases
where the society can secure him, is to use such means, for the preserving
of his own property, as he thinks good, and nature allows him; and to
punish the breach of the law of nature in others, so as (according to the best
of his reason) may most conduce to the preservation of himself, and the rest
of mankind. So that the end and measure of this power, when in every man's
hands in the state of nature, being the preservation of all of his society, that
is, all mankind in general, it can have no other end or measure, when in the
hands of the magistrate, but to preserve the members of that society in their
lives, liberties, and possessions; and so cannot be an absolute, arbitrary
power over their lives and fortunes, which are as much as possible to be
preserved; but a power to make laws, and annex such penalties to them, as
may tend to the preservation of the whole, by cutting off those parts, and
those only, which are so corrupt, that they threaten the sound and healthy,
without which no severity is lawful. And this power has its original only
from compact and agreement, and the mutual consent of those who make up
the community.
Sect. 172. Thirdly, Despotical power is an absolute, arbitrary power one
man has over another, to take away his life, whenever he pleases. This is a
power, which neither nature gives, for it has made no such distinction
between one man and another; nor compact can convey: for man not having
such an arbitrary power over his own life, cannot give another man such a
power over it; but it is the effect only of forfeiture, which the aggressor
makes of his own life, when he puts himself into the state of war with
another: for having quitted reason, which God hath given to be the rule
betwixt man and man, and the common bond whereby human kind is united
into one fellowship and society; and having renounced the way of peace
which that teaches, and made use of the force of war, to compass his unjust
ends upon another, where he has no right; and so revolting from his own

kind to that of beasts, by making force, which is their's, to be his rule of
right, he renders himself liable to be destroyed by the injured person, and
the rest of mankind, that will join with him in the execution of justice, as
any other wild beast, or noxious brute, with whom mankind can have
neither society nor security*. And thus captives, taken in a just and lawful
war, and such only, are subject to a despotical power, which, as it arises not
from compact, so neither is it capable of any, but is the state of war
continued: for what compact can be made with a man that is not master of
his own life? what condition can he perform? and if he be once allowed to
be master of his own life, the despotical, arbitrary power of his master
ceases. He that is master of himself, and his own life, has a right too to the
means of preserving it; so that as soon as compact enters, slavery ceases,
and he so far quits his absolute power, and puts an end to the state of war,
who enters into conditions with his captive.
(*Another copy corrected by Mr. Locke, has it thus, Noxious brute that is
destructive to their being.)
Sect. 173. Nature gives the first of these, viz. paternal power to parents for
the benefit of their children during their minority, to supply their want of
ability, and understanding how to manage their property. (By property I
must be understood here, as in other places, to mean that property which
men have in their persons as well as goods.) Voluntary agreement gives the
second, viz. political power to governors for the benefit of their subjects, to
secure them in the possession and use of their properties. And forfeiture
gives the third despotical power to lords for their own benefit, over those
who are stripped of all property.
Sect. 174. He, that shall consider the distinct rise and extent, and the
different ends of these several powers, will plainly see, that paternal power
comes as far short of that of the magistrate, as despotical exceeds it; and
that absolute dominion, however placed, is so far from being one kind of
civil society, that it is as inconsistent with it, as slavery is with property.
Paternal power is only where minority makes the child incapable to manage
his property; political, where men have property in their own disposal; and
despotical, over such as have no property at all.

CHAPTER. XVI.
OF CONQUEST.
Sect. 175. THOUGH governments can originally have no other rise than
that before mentioned, nor polities be founded on any thing but the consent
of the people; yet such have been the disorders ambition has filled the world
with, that in the noise of war, which makes so great a part of the history of
mankind, this consent is little taken notice of: and therefore many have
mistaken the force of arms for the consent of the people, and reckon
conquest as one of the originals of government. But conquest is as far from
setting up any government, as demolishing an house is from building a new
one in the place. Indeed, it often makes way for a new frame of a
commonwealth, by destroying the former; but, without the consent of the
people, can never erect a new one.
Sect. 176. That the aggressor, who puts himself into the state of war with
another, and unjustly invades another man's right, can, by such an unjust
war, never come to have a right over the conquered, will be easily agreed by
all men, who will not think, that robbers and pyrates have a right of empire
over whomsoever they have force enough to master; or that men are bound
by promises, which unlawful force extorts from them. Should a robber
break into my house, and with a dagger at my throat make me seal deeds to
convey my estate to him, would this give him any title? Just such a title, by
his sword, has an unjust conqueror, who forces me into submission. The
injury and the crime is equal, whether committed by the wearer of a crown,
or some petty villain. The title of the offender, and the number of his
followers, make no difference in the offence, unless it be to aggravate it.
The only difference is, great robbers punish little ones, to keep them in their
obedience; but the great ones are rewarded with laurels and triumphs,
because they are too big for the weak hands of justice in this world, and
have the power in their own possession, which should punish offenders.
What is my remedy against a robber, that so broke into my house? Appeal

to the law for justice. But perhaps justice is denied, or I am crippled and
cannot stir, robbed and have not the means to do it. If God has taken away
all means of seeking remedy, there is nothing left but patience. But my son,
when able, may seek the relief of the law, which I am denied: he or his son
may renew his appeal, till he recover his right. But the conquered, or their
children, have no court, no arbitrator on earth to appeal to. Then they may
appeal, as Jephtha did, to heaven, and repeat their appeal till they have
recovered the native right of their ancestors, which was, to have such a
legislative over them, as the majority should approve, and freely acquiesce
in. If it be objected, This would cause endless trouble; I answer, no more
than justice does, where she lies open to all that appeal to her. He that
troubles his neighbour without a cause, is punished for it by the justice of
the court he appeals to: and he that appeals to heaven must be sure he has
right on his side; and a right too that is worth the trouble and cost of the
appeal, as he will answer at a tribunal that cannot be deceived, and will be
sure to retribute to every one according to the mischiefs he hath created to
his fellow subjects; that is, any part of mankind: from whence it is plain,
that he that conquers in an unjust war can thereby have no title to the
subjection and obedience of the conquered.
Sect. 177. But supposing victory favours the right side, let us consider a
conqueror in a lawful war, and see what power he gets, and over whom.
First, It is plain he gets no power by his conquest over those that
conquered with him. They that fought on his side cannot suffer by the
conquest, but must at least be as much freemen as they were before. And
most commonly they serve upon terms, and on condition to share with their
leader, and enjoy a part of the spoil, and other advantages that attend the
conquering sword; or at least have a part of the subdued country bestowed
upon them. And the conquering people are not, I hope, to be slaves by
conquest, and wear their laurels only to shew they are sacrifices to their
leaders triumph. They that found absolute monarchy upon the title of the
sword, make their heroes, who are the founders of such monarchies, arrant
Draw-can-sirs, and forget they had any officers and soldiers that fought on
their side in the battles they won, or assisted them in the subduing, or
shared in possessing, the countries they mastered. We are told by some, that
the English monarchy is founded in the Norman conquest, and that our
princes have thereby a title to absolute dominion: which if it were true, (as

by the history it appears otherwise) and that William had a right to make
war on this island; yet his dominion by conquest could reach no farther than
to the Saxons and Britons, that were then inhabitants of this country. The
Normans that came with him, and helped to conquer, and all descended
from them, are freemen, and no subjects by conquest; let that give what
dominion it will. And if I, or any body else, shall claim freedom, as derived
from them, it will be very hard to prove the contrary: and it is plain, the law,
that has made no distinction between the one and the other, intends not
there should be any difference in their freedom or privileges.
Sect. 178. But supposing, which seldom happens, that the conquerors and
conquered never incorporate into one people, under the same laws and
freedom; let us see next what power a lawful conqueror has over the
subdued: and that I say is purely despotical. He has an absolute power over
the lives of those who by an unjust war have forfeited them; but not over
the lives or fortunes of those who engaged not in the war, nor over the
possessions even of those who were actually engaged in it.
Sect. 179. Secondly, I say then the conqueror gets no power but only over
those who have actually assisted, concurred, or consented to that unjust
force that is used against him: for the people having given to their
governors no power to do an unjust thing, such as is to make an unjust war,
(for they never had such a power in themselves) they ought not to be
charged as guilty of the violence and unjustice that is committed in an
unjust war, any farther than they actually abet it; no more than they are to
be thought guilty of any violence or oppression their governors should use
upon the people themselves, or any part of their fellow subjects, they
having empowered them no more to the one than to the other. Conquerors,
it is true, seldom trouble themselves to make the distinction, but they
willingly permit the confusion of war to sweep all together: but yet this
alters not the right; for the conquerors power over the lives of the
conquered, being only because they have used force to do, or maintain an
injustice, he can have that power only over those who have concurred in
that force; all the rest are innocent; and he has no more title over the people
of that country, who have done him no injury, and so have made no
forfeiture of their lives, than he has over any other, who, without any
injuries or provocations, have lived upon fair terms with him.

Sect. 180. Thirdly, The power a conqueror gets over those he overcomes
in a just war, is perfectly despotical: he has an absolute power over the lives
of those, who, by putting themselves in a state of war, have forfeited them;
but he has not thereby a right and title to their possessions. This I doubt not,
but at first sight will seem a strange doctrine, it being so quite contrary to
the practice of the world; there being nothing more familiar in speaking of
the dominion of countries, than to say such an one conquered it; as if
conquest, without any more ado, conveyed a right of possession. But when
we consider, that the practice of the strong and powerful, how universal
soever it may be, is seldom the rule of right, however it be one part of the
subjection of the conquered, not to argue against the conditions cut out to
them by the conquering sword.
Sect. 181. Though in all war there be usually a complication of force and
damage, and the aggressor seldom fails to harm the estate, when he uses
force against the persons of those he makes war upon; yet it is the use of
force only that puts a man into the state of war: for whether by force he
begins the injury, or else having quietly, and by fraud, done the injury, he
refuses to make reparation, and by force maintains it, (which is the same
thing, as at first to have done it by force) it is the unjust use of force that
makes the war: for he that breaks open my house, and violently turns me
out of doors; or having peaceably got in, by force keeps me out, does in
effect the same thing; supposing we are in such a state, that we have no
common judge on earth, whom I may appeal to, and to whom we are both
obliged to submit: for of such I am now speaking. It is the unjust use of
force then, that puts a man into the state of war with another; and thereby he
that is guilty of it makes a forfeiture of his life: for quitting reason, which is
the rule given between man and man, and using force, the way of beasts, he
becomes liable to be destroyed by him he uses force against, as any savage
ravenous beast, that is dangerous to his being.
Sect. 182. But because the miscarriages of the father are no faults of the
children, and they may be rational and peaceable, notwithstanding the
brutishness and injustice of the father; the father, by his miscarriages and
violence, can forfeit but his own life, but involves not his children in his
guilt or destruction. His goods, which nature, that willeth the preservation
of all mankind as much as is possible, hath made to belong to the children
to keep them from perishing, do still continue to belong to his children: for

supposing them not to have joined in the war, either thro' infancy, absence,
or choice, they have done nothing to forfeit them: nor has the conqueror any
right to take them away, by the bare title of having subdued him that by
force attempted his destruction; though perhaps he may have some right to
them, to repair the damages he has sustained by the war, and the defence of
his own right; which how far it reaches to the possessions of the conquered,
we shall see by and by. So that he that by conquest has a right over a man's
person to destroy him if he pleases, has not thereby a right over his estate to
possess and enjoy it: for it is the brutal force the aggressor has used, that
gives his adversary a right to take away his life, and destroy him if he
pleases, as a noxious creature; but it is damage sustained that alone gives
him title to another man's goods: for though I may kill a thief that sets on
me in the highway, yet I may not (which seems less) take away his money,
and let him go: this would be robbery on my side. His force, and the state of
war he put himself in, made him forfeit his life, but gave me no title to his
goods. The right then of conquest extends only to the lives of those who
joined in the war, not to their estates, but only in order to make reparation
for the damages received, and the charges of the war, and that too with
reservation of the right of the innocent wife and children.
Sect. 183. Let the conqueror have as much justice on his side, as could be
supposed, he has no right to seize more than the vanquished could forfeit:
his life is at the victor's mercy; and his service and goods he may
appropriate, to make himself reparation; but he cannot take the goods of his
wife and children; they too had a title to the goods he enjoyed, and their
shares in the estate he possessed: for example, I in the state of nature (and
all commonwealths are in the state of nature one with another) have injured
another man, and refusing to give satisfaction, it comes to a state of war,
wherein my defending by force what I had gotten unjustly, makes me the
aggressor. I am conquered: my life, it is true, as forfeit, is at mercy, but not
my wife's and children's. They made not the war, nor assisted in it. I could
not forfeit their lives; they were not mine to forfeit. My wife had a share in
my estate; that neither could I forfeit. And my children also, being born of
me, had a right to be maintained out of my labour or substance. Here then is
the case: the conqueror has a title to reparation for damages received, and
the children have a title to their father's estate for their subsistence: for as to
the wife's share, whether her own labour, or compact, gave her a title to it, it

is plain, her husband could not forfeit what was her's. What must be done in
the case? I answer; the fundamental law of nature being, that all, as much as
may be, should be preserved, it follows, that if there be not enough fully to
satisfy both, viz, for the conqueror's losses, and children's maintenance, he
that hath, and to spare, must remit something of his full satisfaction, and
give way to the pressing and preferable title of those who are in danger to
perish without it.
Sect. 184. But supposing the charge and damages of the war are to be
made up to the conqueror, to the utmost farthing; and that the children of
the vanquished, spoiled of all their father's goods, are to be left to starve and
perish; yet the satisfying of what shall, on this score, be due to the
conqueror, will scarce give him a title to any country he shall conquer: for
the damages of war can scarce amount to the value of any considerable tract
of land, in any part of the world, where all the land is possessed, and none
lies waste. And if I have not taken away the conqueror's land, which, being
vanquished, it is impossible I should; scarce any other spoil I have done
him can amount to the value of mine, supposing it equally cultivated, and of
an extent any way coming near what I had overrun of his. The destruction
of a year's product or two (for it seldom reaches four or five) is the utmost
spoil that usually can be done: for as to money, and such riches and treasure
taken away, these are none of nature's goods, they have but a fantastical
imaginary value: nature has put no such upon them: they are of no more
account by her standard, than the wampompeke of the Americans to an
European prince, or the silver money of Europe would have been formerly
to an American. And five years product is not worth the perpetual
inheritance of land, where all is possessed, and none remains waste, to be
taken up by him that is disseized: which will be easily granted, if one do but
take away the imaginary value of money, the disproportion being more than
between five and five hundred; though, at the same time, half a year's
product is more worth than the inheritance, where there being more land
than the inhabitants possess and make use of, any one has liberty to make
use of the waste: but there conquerors take little care to possess themselves
of the lands of the vanquished, No damage therefore, that men in the state
of nature (as all princes and governments are in reference to one another)
suffer from one another, can give a conqueror power to dispossess the
posterity of the vanquished, and turn them out of that inheritance, which

ought to be the possession of them and their descendants to all generations.
The conqueror indeed will be apt to think himself master: and it is the very
condition of the subdued not to be able to dispute their right. But if that be
all, it gives no other title than what bare force gives to the stronger over the
weaker: and, by this reason, he that is strongest will have a right to
whatever he pleases to seize on.
Sect. 185. Over those then that joined with him in the war, and over those
of the subdued country that opposed him not, and the posterity even of
those that did, the conqueror, even in a just war, hath, by his conquest, no
right of dominion: they are free from any subjection to him, and if their
former government be dissolved, they are at liberty to begin and erect
another to themselves.
Sect. 186. The conqueror, it is true, usually, by the force he has over them,
compels them, with a sword at their breasts, to stoop to his conditions, and
submit to such a government as he pleases to afford them; but the enquiry
is, what right he has to do so? If it be said, they submit by their own
consent, then this allows their own consent to be necessary to give the
conqueror a title to rule over them. It remains only to be considered,
whether promises extorted by force, without right, can be thought consent,
and how far they bind. To which I shall say, they bind not at all; because
whatsoever another gets from me by force, I still retain the right of, and he
is obliged presently to restore. He that forces my horse from me, ought
presently to restore him, and I have still a right to retake him. By the same
reason, he that forced a promise from me, ought presently to restore it, i.e.
quit me of the obligation of it; or I may resume it myself, i.e. chuse whether
I will perform it: for the law of nature laying an obligation on me only by
the rules she prescribes, cannot oblige me by the violation of her rules: such
is the extorting any thing from me by force. Nor does it at all alter the case
to say, I gave my promise, no more than it excuses the force, and passes the
right, when I put my hand in my pocket, and deliver my purse myself to a
thief, who demands it with a pistol at my breast.
Sect. 187. From all which it follows, that the government of a conqueror,
imposed by force on the subdued, against whom he had no right of war, or
who joined not in the war against him, where he had right, has no obligation
upon them.

Sect. 188. But let us suppose, that all the men of that community, being all
members of the same body politic, may be taken to have joined in that
unjust war wherein they are subdued, and so their lives are at the mercy of
the conqueror.
Sect. 189. I say this concerns not their children who are in their minority:
for since a father hath not, in himself, a power over the life or liberty of his
child, no act of his can possibly forfeit it. So that the children, whatever
may have happened to the fathers, are freemen, and the absolute power of
the conqueror reaches no farther than the persons of the men that were
subdued by him, and dies with them: and should he govern them as slaves,
subjected to his absolute arbitrary power, he has no such right of dominion
over their children. He can have no power over them but by their own
consent, whatever he may drive them to say or do; and he has no lawfull
authority, whilst force, and not choice, compels them to submission.
Sect. 190. Every man is born with a double right: first, a right of freedom
to his person, which no other man has a power over, but the free disposal of
it lies in himself. Secondly, a right, before any other man, to inherit with his
brethren his father's goods.
Sect. 191. By the first of these, a man is naturally free from subjection to
any government, tho' he be born in a place under its jurisdiction; but if he
disclaim the lawful government of the country he was born in, he must also
quit the right that belonged to him by the laws of it, and the possessions
there descending to him from his ancestors, if it were a government made
by their consent.
Sect. 192. By the second, the inhabitants of any country, who are
descended, and derive a title to their estates from those who are subdued,
and had a government forced upon them against their free consents, retain a
right to the possession of their ancestors, though they consent not freely to
the government, whose hard conditions were by force imposed on the
possessors of that country: for the first conqueror never having had a title to
the land of that country, the people who are the descendants of, or claim
under those who were forced to submit to the yoke of a government by
constraint, have always a right to shake it off, and free themselves from the
usurpation or tyranny which the sword hath brought in upon them, till their

rulers put them under such a frame of government as they willingly and of
choice consent to. Who doubts but the Grecian Christians, descendants of
the ancient possessors of that country, may justly cast off the Turkish yoke,
which they have so long groaned under, whenever they have an opportunity
to do it? For no government can have a right to obedience from a people
who have not freely consented to it; which they can never be supposed to
do, till either they are put in a full state of liberty to chuse their government
and governors, or at least till they have such standing laws, to which they
have by themselves or their representatives given their free consent, and
also till they are allowed their due property, which is so to be proprietors of
what they have, that no body can take away any part of it without their own
consent, without which, men under any government are not in the state of
freemen, but are direct slaves under the force of war.
Sect. 193. But granting that the conqueror in a just war has a right to the
estates, as well as power over the persons, of the conquered; which, it is
plain, he hath not: nothing of absolute power will follow from hence, in the
continuance of the government; because the descendants of these being all
freemen, if he grants them estates and possessions to inhabit his country,
(without which it would be worth nothing) whatsoever he grants them, they
have, so far as it is granted, property in. The nature whereof is, that without
a man's own consent it cannot be taken from him.
Sect. 194. Their persons are free by a native right, and their properties, be
they more or less, are their own, and at their own dispose, and not at his; or
else it is no property. Supposing the conqueror gives to one man a thousand
acres, to him and his heirs for ever; to another he lets a thousand acres for
his life, under the rent of 50£. or 500£. per ann. has not the one of these a
right to his thousand acres for ever, and the other, during his life, paying the
said rent? and hath not the tenant for life a property in all that he gets over
and above his rent, by his labour and industry during the said term,
supposing it be double the rent? Can any one say, the king, or conqueror,
after his grant, may by his power of conqueror take away all, or part of the
land from the heirs of one, or from the other during his life, he paying the
rent? or can he take away from either the goods or money they have got
upon the said land, at his pleasure? If he can, then all free and voluntary
contracts cease, and are void in the world; there needs nothing to dissolve
them at any time, but power enough: and all the grants and promises of men

in power are but mockery and collusion: for can there be any thing more
ridiculous than to say, I give you and your's this for ever, and that in the
surest and most solemn way of conveyance can be devised; and yet it is to
be understood, that I have right, if I please, to take it away from you again
to morrow?
Sect. 195. I will not dispute now whether princes are exempt from the
laws of their country; but this I am sure, they owe subjection to the laws of
God and nature. No body, no power, can exempt them from the obligations
of that eternal law. Those are so great, and so strong, in the case of
promises, that omnipotency itself can be tied by them. Grants, promises,
and oaths, are bonds that hold the Almighty: whatever some flatterers say to
princes of the world, who all together, with all their people joined to them,
are, in comparison of the great God, but as a drop of the bucket, or a dust on
the balance, inconsiderable, nothing!
Sect. 196. The short of the case in conquest is this: the conqueror, if he
have a just cause, has a despotical right over the persons of all, that actually
aided, and concurred in the war against him, and a right to make up his
damage and cost out of their labour and estates, so he injure not the right of
any other. Over the rest of the people, if there were any that consented not
to the war, and over the children of the captives themselves, or the
possessions of either, he has no power; and so can have, by virtue of
conquest, no lawful title himself to dominion over them, or derive it to his
posterity; but is an aggressor, if he attempts upon their properties, and
thereby puts himself in a state of war against them, and has no better a right
of principality, he, nor any of his successors, than Hingar, or Hubba, the
Danes, had here in England; or Spartacus, had he conquered Italy, would
have had; which is to have their yoke cast off, as soon as God shall give
those under their subjection courage and opportunity to do it. Thus,
notwithstanding whatever title the kings of Assyria had over Judah, by the
sword, God assisted Hezekiah to throw off the dominion of that conquering
empire. And the lord was with Hezekiah, and he prospered; wherefore he
went forth, and he rebelled against the king of Assyria, and served him not,
2 Kings xviii. 7. Whence it is plain, that shaking off a power, which force,
and not right, hath set over any one, though it hath the name of rebellion,
yet is no offence before God, but is that which he allows and countenances,
though even promises and covenants, when obtained by force, have

intervened: for it is very probable, to any one that reads the story of Ahaz
and Hezekiah attentively, that the Assyrians subdued Ahaz, and deposed
him, and made Hezekiah king in his father's lifetime; and that Hezekiah by
agreement had done him homage, and paid him tribute all this time.

CHAPTER. XVII.
OF USURPATION.
Sect. 197. AS conquest may be called a foreign usurpation, so usurpation
is a kind of domestic conquest, with this difference, that an usurper can
never have right on his side, it being no usurpation, but where one is got
into the possession of what another has right to. This, so far as it is
usurpation, is a change only of persons, but not of the forms and rules of the
government: for if the usurper extend his power beyond what of right
belonged to the lawful princes, or governors of the commonwealth, it is
tyranny added to usurpation.
Sect. 198. In all lawful governments, the designation of the persons, who
are to bear rule, is as natural and necessary a part as the form of the
government itself, and is that which had its establishment originally from
the people; the anarchy being much alike, to have no form of government at
all; or to agree, that it shall be monarchical, but to appoint no way to design
the person that shall have the power, and be the monarch. Hence all
commonwealths, with the form of government established, have rules also
of appointing those who are to have any share in the public authority, and
settled methods of conveying the right to them: for the anarchy is much
alike, to have no form of government at all; or to agree that it shall be
monarchical, but to appoint no way to know or design the person that shall
have the power, and be the monarch. Whoever gets into the exercise of any
part of the power, by other ways than what the laws of the community have
prescribed, hath no right to be obeyed, though the form of the

commonwealth be still preserved; since he is not the person the laws have
appointed, and consequently not the person the people have consented to.
Nor can such an usurper, or any deriving from him, ever have a title, till the
people are both at liberty to consent, and have actually consented to allow,
and confirm in him the power he hath till then usurped.

CHAPTER. XVIII.
OF TYRANNY.
Sect. 199. AS usurpation is the exercise of power, which another hath a
right to; so tyranny is the exercise of power beyond right, which no body
can have a right to. And this is making use of the power any one has in his
hands, not for the good of those who are under it, but for his own private
separate advantage. When the governor, however intitled, makes not the
law, but his will, the rule; and his commands and actions are not directed to
the preservation of the properties of his people, but the satisfaction of his
own ambition, revenge, covetousness, or any other irregular passion.
Sect. 200. If one can doubt this to be truth, or reason, because it comes
from the obscure hand of a subject, I hope the authority of a king will make
it pass with him. King James the first, in his speech to the parliament, 1603,
tells them thus,
I will ever prefer the weal of the public, and of the whole
commonwealth, in making of good laws and constitutions, to any
particular and private ends of mine; thinking ever the wealth and
weal of the commonwealth to be my greatest weal and worldly
felicity; a point wherein a lawful king doth directly differ from a
tyrant: for I do acknowledge, that the special and greatest point of
difference that is between a rightful king and an usurping tyrant, is
this, that whereas the proud and ambitious tyrant doth think his

kingdom and people are only ordained for satisfaction of his desires
and unreasonable appetites, the righteous and just king doth by the
contrary acknowledge himself to be ordained for the procuring of
the wealth and property of his people.
And again, in his speech to the parliament, 1609, he hath these words:
The king binds himself by a double oath, to the observation of the
fundamental laws of his kingdom; tacitly, as by being a king, and so
bound to protect as well the people, as the laws of his kingdom; and
expressly, by his oath at his coronation, so as every just king, in a
settled kingdom, is bound to observe that paction made to his
people, by his laws, in framing his government agreeable thereunto,
according to that paction which God made with Noah after the
deluge. Hereafter, seed-time and harvest, and cold and heat, and
summer and winter, and day and night, shall not cease while the
earth remaineth. And therefore a king governing in a settled
kingdom, leaves to be a king, and degenerates into a tyrant, as soon
as he leaves off to rule according to his laws.
And a little after,
Therefore all kings that are not tyrants, or perjured, will be glad to
bound themselves within the limits of their laws; and they that
persuade them the contrary, are vipers, and pests both against them
and the commonwealth.
Thus that learned king, who well understood the notion of things, makes
the difference betwixt a king and a tyrant to consist only in this, that one
makes the laws the bounds of his power, and the good of the public, the end
of his government; the other makes all give way to his own will and
appetite.
Sect. 201. It is a mistake, to think this fault is proper only to monarchies;
other forms of government are liable to it, as well as that: for wherever the
power, that is put in any hands for the government of the people, and the

preservation of their properties, is applied to other ends, and made use of to
impoverish, harass, or subdue them to the arbitrary and irregular commands
of those that have it; there it presently becomes tyranny, whether those that
thus use it are one or many. Thus we read of the thirty tyrants at Athens, as
well as one at Syracuse; and the intolerable dominion of the Decemviri at
Rome was nothing better.
Sect. 202. Where-ever law ends, tyranny begins, if the law be transgressed
to another's harm; and whosoever in authority exceeds the power given him
by the law, and makes use of the force he has under his command, to
compass that upon the subject, which the law allows not, ceases in that to
be a magistrate; and, acting without authority, may be opposed, as any other
man, who by force invades the right of another. This is acknowledged in
subordinate magistrates. He that hath authority to seize my person in the
street, may be opposed as a thief and a robber, if he endeavours to break
into my house to execute a writ, notwithstanding that I know he has such a
warrant, and such a legal authority, as will impower him to arrest me
abroad. And why this should not hold in the highest, as well as in the most
inferior magistrate, I would gladly be informed. Is it reasonable, that the
eldest brother, because he has the greatest part of his father's estate, should
thereby have a right to take away any of his younger brothers portions? or
that a rich man, who possessed a whole country, should from thence have a
right to seize, when he pleased, the cottage and garden of his poor
neighbour? The being rightfully possessed of great power and riches,
exceedingly beyond the greatest part of the sons of Adam, is so far from
being an excuse, much less a reason, for rapine and oppression, which the
endamaging another without authority is, that it is a great aggravation of it:
for the exceeding the bounds of authority is no more a right in a great, than
in a petty officer; no more justifiable in a king than a constable; but is so
much the worse in him, in that he has more trust put in him, has already a
much greater share than the rest of his brethren, and is supposed, from the
advantages of his education, employment, and counsellors, to be more
knowing in the measures of right and wrong.
Sect. 203. May the commands then of a prince be opposed? may he be
resisted as often as any one shall find himself aggrieved, and but imagine he
has not right done him? This will unhinge and overturn all polities, and,
instead of government and order, leave nothing but anarchy and confusion.

Sect. 204. To this I answer, that force is to be opposed to nothing, but to
unjust and unlawful force; whoever makes any opposition in any other case,
draws on himself a just condemnation both from God and man; and so no
such danger or confusion will follow, as is often suggested: for,
Sect. 205. First, As, in some countries, the person of the prince by the law
is sacred; and so, whatever he commands or does, his person is still free
from all question or violence, not liable to force, or any judicial censure or
condemnation. But yet opposition may be made to the illegal acts of any
inferior officer, or other commissioned by him; unless he will, by actually
putting himself into a state of war with his people, dissolve the government,
and leave them to that defence which belongs to every one in the state of
nature: for of such things who can tell what the end will be? and a
neighbour kingdom has shewed the world an odd example. In all other
cases the sacredness of the person exempts him from all inconveniencies,
whereby he is secure, whilst the government stands, from all violence and
harm whatsoever; than which there cannot be a wiser constitution: for the
harm he can do in his own person not being likely to happen often, nor to
extend itself far; nor being able by his single strength to subvert the laws,
nor oppress the body of the people, should any prince have so much
weakness, and ill nature as to be willing to do it, the inconveniency of some
particular mischiefs, that may happen sometimes, when a heady prince
comes to the throne, are well recompensed by the peace of the public, and
security of the government, in the person of the chief magistrate, thus set
out of the reach of danger: it being safer for the body, that some few private
men should be sometimes in danger to suffer, than that the head of the
republic should be easily, and upon slight occasions, exposed.
Sect. 206. Secondly, But this privilege, belonging only to the king's
person, hinders not, but they may be questioned, opposed, and resisted, who
use unjust force, though they pretend a commission from him, which the
law authorizes not; as is plain in the case of him that has the king's writ to
arrest a man, which is a full commission from the king; and yet he that has
it cannot break open a man's house to do it, nor execute this command of
the king upon certain days, nor in certain places, though this commission
have no such exception in it; but they are the limitations of the law, which if
any one transgress, the king's commission excuses him not: for the king's
authority being given him only by the law, he cannot impower any one to

act against the law, or justify him, by his commission, in so doing; the
commission, or command of any magistrate, where he has no authority,
being as void and insignificant, as that of any private man; the difference
between the one and the other, being that the magistrate has some authority
so far, and to such ends, and the private man has none at all: for it is not the
commission, but the authority, that gives the right of acting; and against the
laws there can be no authority. But, notwithstanding such resistance, the
king's person and authority are still both secured, and so no danger to
governor or government.
Sect. 207. Thirdly, Supposing a government wherein the person of the
chief magistrate is not thus sacred; yet this doctrine of the lawfulness of
resisting all unlawful exercises of his power, will not upon every slight
occasion indanger him, or imbroil the government: for where the injured
party may be relieved, and his damages repaired by appeal to the law, there
can be no pretence for force, which is only to be used where a man is
intercepted from appealing to the law: for nothing is to be accounted hostile
force, but where it leaves not the remedy of such an appeal; and it is such
force alone, that puts him that uses it into a state of war, and makes it lawful
to resist him. A man with a sword in his hand demands my purse in the
high-way, when perhaps I have not twelve pence in my pocket: this man I
may lawfully kill. To another I deliver 100 pounds to hold only whilst I
alight, which he refuses to restore me, when I am got up again, but draws
his sword to defend the possession of it by force, if I endeavour to retake it.
The mischief this man does me is a hundred, or possibly a thousand times
more than the other perhaps intended me (whom I killed before he really
did me any); and yet I might lawfully kill the one, and cannot so much as
hurt the other lawfully. The reason whereof is plain; because the one using
force, which threatened my life, I could not have time to appeal to the law
to secure it: and when it was gone, it was too late to appeal. The law could
not restore life to my dead carcass: the loss was irreparable; which to
prevent, the law of nature gave me a right to destroy him, who had put
himself into a state of war with me, and threatened my destruction. But in
the other case, my life not being in danger, I may have the benefit of
appealing to the law, and have reparation for my 100 pounds that way.
Sect. 208. Fourthly, But if the unlawful acts done by the magistrate be
maintained (by the power he has got), and the remedy which is due by law,

be by the same power obstructed; yet the right of resisting, even in such
manifest acts of tyranny, will not suddenly, or on slight occasions, disturb
the government: for if it reach no farther than some private men's cases,
though they have a right to defend themselves, and to recover by force what
by unlawful force is taken from them; yet the right to do so will not easily
engage them in a contest, wherein they are sure to perish; it being as
impossible for one, or a few oppressed men to disturb the government,
where the body of the people do not think themselves concerned in it, as for
a raving mad-man, or heady malcontent to overturn a well settled state; the
people being as little apt to follow the one, as the other.
Sect. 209. But if either these illegal acts have extended to the majority of
the people; or if the mischief and oppression has lighted only on some few,
but in such cases, as the precedent, and consequences seem to threaten all;
and they are persuaded in their consciences, that their laws, and with them
their estates, liberties, and lives are in danger, and perhaps their religion too;
how they will be hindered from resisting illegal force, used against them, I
cannot tell. This is an inconvenience, I confess, that attends all governments
whatsoever, when the governors have brought it to this pass, to be generally
suspected of their people; the most dangerous state which they can possibly
put themselves in, wherein they are the less to be pitied, because it is so
easy to be avoided; it being as impossible for a governor, if he really means
the good of his people, and the preservation of them, and their laws
together, not to make them see and feel it, as it is for the father of a family,
not to let his children see he loves, and takes care of them.
Sect. 210. But if all the world shall observe pretences of one kind, and
actions of another; arts used to elude the law, and the trust of prerogative
(which is an arbitrary power in some things left in the prince's hand to do
good, not harm to the people) employed contrary to the end for which it was
given: if the people shall find the ministers and subordinate magistrates
chosen suitable to such ends, and favoured, or laid by, proportionably as
they promote or oppose them: if they see several experiments made of
arbitrary power, and that religion underhand favoured, (tho' publicly
proclaimed against) which is readiest to introduce it; and the operators in it
supported, as much as may be; and when that cannot be done, yet approved
still, and liked the better: if a long train of actions shew the councils all
tending that way; how can a man any more hinder himself from being

persuaded in his own mind, which way things are going; or from casting
about how to save himself, than he could from believing the captain of the
ship he was in, was carrying him, and the rest of the company, to Algiers,
when he found him always steering that course, though cross winds, leaks
in his ship, and want of men and provisions did often force him to turn his
course another way for some time, which he steadily returned to again, as
soon as the wind, weather, and other circumstances would let him?

CHAPTER. XIX.
OF THE DISSOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT.
Sect. 211. HE that will with any clearness speak of the dissolution of
government, ought in the first place to distinguish between the dissolution
of the society and the dissolution of the government. That which makes the
community, and brings men out of the loose state of nature, into one politic
society, is the agreement which every one has with the rest to incorporate,
and act as one body, and so be one distinct commonwealth. The usual, and
almost only way whereby this union is dissolved, is the inroad of foreign
force making a conquest upon them: for in that case, (not being able to
maintain and support themselves, as one intire and independent body) the
union belonging to that body which consisted therein, must necessarily
cease, and so every one return to the state he was in before, with a liberty to
shift for himself, and provide for his own safety, as he thinks fit, in some
other society. Whenever the society is dissolved, it is certain the
government of that society cannot remain. Thus conquerors swords often
cut up governments by the roots, and mangle societies to pieces, separating
the subdued or scattered multitude from the protection of, and dependence
on, that society which ought to have preserved them from violence. The
world is too well instructed in, and too forward to allow of, this way of
dissolving of governments, to need any more to be said of it; and there
wants not much argument to prove, that where the society is dissolved, the

government cannot remain; that being as impossible, as for the frame of an
house to subsist when the materials of it are scattered and dissipated by a
whirl-wind, or jumbled into a confused heap by an earthquake.
Sect. 212. Besides this over-turning from without, governments are
dissolved from within.
First, When the legislative is altered. Civil society being a state of peace,
amongst those who are of it, from whom the state of war is excluded by the
umpirage, which they have provided in their legislative, for the ending all
differences that may arise amongst any of them, it is in their legislative, that
the members of a commonwealth are united, and combined together into
one coherent living body. This is the soul that gives form, life, and unity, to
the commonwealth: from hence the several members have their mutual
influence, sympathy, and connexion: and therefore, when the legislative is
broken, or dissolved, dissolution and death follows: for the essence and
union of the society consisting in having one will, the legislative, when
once established by the majority, has the declaring, and as it were keeping
of that will. The constitution of the legislative is the first and fundamental
act of society, whereby provision is made for the continuation of their
union, under the direction of persons, and bonds of laws, made by persons
authorized thereunto, by the consent and appointment of the people, without
which no one man, or number of men, amongst them, can have authority of
making laws that shall be binding to the rest. When any one, or more, shall
take upon them to make laws, whom the people have not appointed so to
do, they make laws without authority, which the people are not therefore
bound to obey; by which means they come again to be out of subjection,
and may constitute to themselves a new legislative, as they think best, being
in full liberty to resist the force of those, who without authority would
impose any thing upon them. Every one is at the disposure of his own will,
when those who had, by the delegation of the society, the declaring of the
public will, are excluded from it, and others usurp the place, who have no
such authority or delegation.
Sect. 213. This being usually brought about by such in the commonwealth
who misuse the power they have; it is hard to consider it aright, and know
at whose door to lay it, without knowing the form of government in which it

happens. Let us suppose then the legislative placed in the concurrence of
three distinct persons.
(1). A single hereditary person, having the constant, supreme, executive
power, and with it the power of convoking and dissolving the other two
within certain periods of time.
(2). An assembly of hereditary nobility.
(3). An assembly of representatives chosen, pro tempore, by the people.
Such a form of government supposed, it is evident,
Sect. 214. First, That when such a single person, or prince, sets up his own
arbitrary will in place of the laws, which are the will of the society, declared
by the legislative, then the legislative is changed: for that being in effect the
legislative, whose rules and laws are put in execution, and required to be
obeyed; when other laws are set up, and other rules pretended, and inforced,
than what the legislative, constituted by the society, have enacted, it is plain
that the legislative is changed. Whoever introduces new laws, not being
thereunto authorized by the fundamental appointment of the society, or
subverts the old, disowns and overturns the power by which they were
made, and so sets up a new legislative.
Sect. 215. Secondly, When the prince hinders the legislative from
assembling in its due time, or from acting freely, pursuant to those ends for
which it was constituted, the legislative is altered: for it is not a certain
number of men, no, nor their meeting, unless they have also freedom of
debating, and leisure of perfecting, what is for the good of the society,
wherein the legislative consists: when these are taken away or altered, so as
to deprive the society of the due exercise of their power, the legislative is
truly altered; for it is not names that constitute governments, but the use and
exercise of those powers that were intended to accompany them; so that he,
who takes away the freedom, or hinders the acting of the legislative in its
due seasons, in effect takes away the legislative, and puts an end to the
government.
Sect. 216. Thirdly, When, by the arbitrary power of the prince, the
electors, or ways of election, are altered, without the consent, and contrary
to the common interest of the people, there also the legislative is altered:

for, if others than those whom the society hath authorized thereunto, do
chuse, or in another way than what the society hath prescribed, those
chosen are not the legislative appointed by the people.
Sect. 217. Fourthly, The delivery also of the people into the subjection of
a foreign power, either by the prince, or by the legislative, is certainly a
change of the legislative, and so a dissolution of the government: for the
end why people entered into society being to be preserved one intire, free,
independent society, to be governed by its own laws; this is lost, whenever
they are given up into the power of another.
Sect. 218. Why, in such a constitution as this, the dissolution of the
government in these cases is to be imputed to the prince, is evident; because
he, having the force, treasure and offices of the state to employ, and often
persuading himself, or being flattered by others, that as supreme magistrate
he is uncapable of controul; he alone is in a condition to make great
advances toward such changes, under pretence of lawful authority, and has
it in his hands to terrify or suppress opposers, as factious, seditious, and
enemies to the government: whereas no other part of the legislative, or
people, is capable by themselves to attempt any alteration of the legislative,
without open and visible rebellion, apt enough to be taken notice of, which,
when it prevails, produces effects very little different from foreign
conquest. Besides, the prince in such a form of government, having the
power of dissolving the other parts of the legislative, and thereby rendering
them private persons, they can never in opposition to him, or without his
concurrence, alter the legislative by a law, his consent being necessary to
give any of their decrees that sanction. But yet, so far as the other parts of
the legislative any way contribute to any attempt upon the government, and
do either promote, or not, what lies in them, hinder such designs, they are
guilty, and partake in this, which is certainly the greatest crime which men
can partake of one towards another.
Sec. 219.There is one way more whereby such a government may be
dissolved, and that is: When he who has the supreme executive power,
neglects and abandons that charge, so that the laws already made can no
longer be put in execution. This is demonstratively to reduce all to anarchy,
and so effectually to dissolve the government: for laws not being made for
themselves, but to be, by their execution, the bonds of the society, to keep

every part of the body politic in its due place and function; when that totally
ceases, the government visibly ceases, and the people become a confused
multitude, without order or connexion. Where there is no longer the
administration of justice, for the securing of men's rights, nor any remaining
power within the community to direct the force, or provide for the
necessities of the public, there certainly is no government left. Where the
laws cannot be executed, it is all one as if there were no laws; and a
government without laws is, I suppose, a mystery in politics, unconceivable
to human capacity, and inconsistent with human society.
Sect. 220. In these and the like cases, when the government is dissolved,
the people are at liberty to provide for themselves, by erecting a new
legislative, differing from the other, by the change of persons, or form, or
both, as they shall find it most for their safety and good: for the society can
never, by the fault of another, lose the native and original right it has to
preserve itself, which can only be done by a settled legislative, and a fair
and impartial execution of the laws made by it. But the state of mankind is
not so miserable that they are not capable of using this remedy, till it be too
late to look for any. To tell people they may provide for themselves, by
erecting a new legislative, when by oppression, artifice, or being delivered
over to a foreign power, their old one is gone, is only to tell them, they may
expect relief when it is too late, and the evil is past cure. This is in effect no
more than to bid them first be slaves, and then to take care of their liberty;
and when their chains are on, tell them, they may act like freemen. This, if
barely so, is rather mockery than relief; and men can never be secure from
tyranny, if there be no means to escape it till they are perfectly under it: and
therefore it is, that they have not only a right to get out of it, but to prevent
it.
Sect. 221. There is therefore, secondly, another way whereby governments
are dissolved, and that is, when the legislative, or the prince, either of them,
act contrary to their trust.
First, The legislative acts against the trust reposed in them, when they
endeavour to invade the property of the subject, and to make themselves, or
any part of the community, masters, or arbitrary disposers of the lives,
liberties, or fortunes of the people.

Sect. 222. The reason why men enter into society, is the preservation of
their property; and the end why they chuse and authorize a legislative, is,
that there may be laws made, and rules set, as guards and fences to the
properties of all the members of the society, to limit the power, and
moderate the dominion, of every part and member of the society: for since
it can never be supposed to be the will of the society, that the legislative
should have a power to destroy that which every one designs to secure, by
entering into society, and for which the people submitted themselves to
legislators of their own making; whenever the legislators endeavour to take
away, and destroy the property of the people, or to reduce them to slavery
under arbitrary power, they put themselves into a state of war with the
people, who are thereupon absolved from any farther obedience, and are left
to the common refuge, which God hath provided for all men, against force
and violence. Whensoever therefore the legislative shall transgress this
fundamental rule of society; and either by ambition, fear, folly or
corruption, endeavour to grasp themselves, or put into the hands of any
other, an absolute power over the lives, liberties, and estates of the people;
by this breach of trust they forfeit the power the people had put into their
hands for quite contrary ends, and it devolves to the people, who have a
right to resume their original liberty, and, by the establishment of a new
legislative, (such as they shall think fit) provide for their own safety and
security, which is the end for which they are in society. What I have said
here, concerning the legislative in general, holds true also concerning the
supreme executor, who having a double trust put in him, both to have a part
in the legislative, and the supreme execution of the law, acts against both,
when he goes about to set up his own arbitrary will as the law of the society.
He acts also contrary to his trust, when he either employs the force,
treasure, and offices of the society, to corrupt the representatives, and gain
them to his purposes; or openly preengages the electors, and prescribes to
their choice, such, whom he has, by sollicitations, threats, promises, or
otherwise, won to his designs; and employs them to bring in such, who have
promised before-hand what to vote, and what to enact. Thus to regulate
candidates and electors, and new-model the ways of election, what is it but
to cut up the government by the roots, and poison the very fountain of
public security? for the people having reserved to themselves the choice of
their representatives, as the fence to their properties, could do it for no other
end, but that they might always be freely chosen, and so chosen, freely act,

and advise, as the necessity of the commonwealth, and the public good
should, upon examination, and mature debate, be judged to require. This,
those who give their votes before they hear the debate, and have weighed
the reasons on all sides, are not capable of doing. To prepare such an
assembly as this, and endeavour to set up the declared abettors of his own
will, for the true representatives of the people, and the law-makers of the
society, is certainly as great a breach of trust, and as perfect a declaration of
a design to subvert the government, as is possible to be met with. To which,
if one shall add rewards and punishments visibly employed to the same end,
and all the arts of perverted law made use of, to take off and destroy all that
stand in the way of such a design, and will not comply and consent to
betray the liberties of their country, it will be past doubt what is doing.
What power they ought to have in the society, who thus employ it contrary
to the trust went along with it in its first institution, is easy to determine;
and one cannot but see, that he, who has once attempted any such thing as
this, cannot any longer be trusted.
Sect. 223. To this perhaps it will be said, that the people being ignorant,
and always discontented, to lay the foundation of government in the
unsteady opinion and uncertain humour of the people, is to expose it to
certain ruin; and no government will be able long to subsist, if the people
may set up a new legislative, whenever they take offence at the old one. To
this I answer, Quite the contrary. People are not so easily got out of their old
forms, as some are apt to suggest. They are hardly to be prevailed with to
amend the acknowledged faults in the frame they have been accustomed to.
And if there be any original defects, or adventitious ones introduced by
time, or corruption; it is not an easy thing to get them changed, even when
all the world sees there is an opportunity for it. This slowness and aversion
in the people to quit their old constitutions, has, in the many revolutions
which have been seen in this kingdom, in this and former ages, still kept us
to, or, after some interval of fruitless attempts, still brought us back again to
our old legislative of king, lords and commons: and whatever provocations
have made the crown be taken from some of our princes heads, they never
carried the people so far as to place it in another line.
Sect. 224. But it will be said, this hypothesis lays a ferment for frequent
rebellion. To which I answer,

First, No more than any other hypothesis: for when the people are made
miserable, and find themselves exposed to the ill usage of arbitrary power,
cry up their governors, as much as you will, for sons of Jupiter; let them be
sacred and divine, descended, or authorized from heaven; give them out for
whom or what you please, the same will happen. The people generally ill
treated, and contrary to right, will be ready upon any occasion to ease
themselves of a burden that sits heavy upon them. They will wish, and seek
for the opportunity, which in the change, weakness and accidents of human
affairs, seldom delays long to offer itself. He must have lived but a little
while in the world, who has not seen examples of this in his time; and he
must have read very little, who cannot produce examples of it in all sorts of
governments in the world.
Sect. 225. Secondly, I answer, such revolutions happen not upon every
little mismanagement in public affairs. Great mistakes in the ruling part,
many wrong and inconvenient laws, and all the slips of human frailty, will
be born by the people without mutiny or murmur. But if a long train of
abuses, prevarications and artifices, all tending the same way, make the
design visible to the people, and they cannot but feel what they lie under,
and see whither they are going; it is not to be wondered, that they should
then rouze themselves, and endeavour to put the rule into such hands which
may secure to them the ends for which government was at first erected; and
without which, ancient names, and specious forms, are so far from being
better, that they are much worse, than the state of nature, or pure anarchy;
the inconveniencies being all as great and as near, but the remedy farther off
and more difficult.
Sect. 226. Thirdly, I answer, that this doctrine of a power in the people of
providing for their safety a-new, by a new legislative, when their legislators
have acted contrary to their trust, by invading their property, is the best
fence against rebellion, and the probablest means to hinder it: for rebellion
being an opposition, not to persons, but authority, which is founded only in
the constitutions and laws of the government; those, whoever they be, who
by force break through, and by force justify their violation of them, are truly
and properly rebels: for when men, by entering into society and civilgovernment, have excluded force, and introduced laws for the preservation
of property, peace, and unity amongst themselves, those who set up force
again in opposition to the laws, do rebellare, that is, bring back again the

state of war, and are properly rebels: which they who are in power, (by the
pretence they have to authority, the temptation of force they have in their
hands, and the flattery of those about them) being likeliest to do; the
properest way to prevent the evil, is to shew them the danger and injustice
of it, who are under the greatest temptation to run into it.
Sect. 227. In both the fore-mentioned cases, when either the legislative is
changed, or the legislators act contrary to the end for which they were
constituted; those who are guilty are guilty of rebellion: for if any one by
force takes away the established legislative of any society, and the laws by
them made, pursuant to their trust, he thereby takes away the umpirage,
which every one had consented to, for a peaceable decision of all their
controversies, and a bar to the state of war amongst them. They, who
remove, or change the legislative, take away this decisive power, which no
body can have, but by the appointment and consent of the people; and so
destroying the authority which the people did, and no body else can set up,
and introducing a power which the people hath not authorized, they actually
introduce a state of war, which is that of force without authority: and thus,
by removing the legislative established by the society, (in whose decisions
the people acquiesced and united, as to that of their own will) they untie the
knot, and expose the people a-new to the state of war, And if those, who by
force take away the legislative, are rebels, the legislators themselves, as has
been shewn, can be no less esteemed so; when they, who were set up for the
protection, and preservation of the people, their liberties and properties,
shall by force invade and endeavour to take them away; and so they putting
themselves into a state of war with those who made them the protectors and
guardians of their peace, are properly, and with the greatest aggravation,
rebellantes, rebels.
Sect. 228. But if they, who say it lays a foundation for rebellion, mean that
it may occasion civil wars, or intestine broils, to tell the people they are
absolved from obedience when illegal attempts are made upon their
liberties or properties, and may oppose the unlawful violence of those who
were their magistrates, when they invade their properties contrary to the
trust put in them; and that therefore this doctrine is not to be allowed, being
so destructive to the peace of the world: they may as well say, upon the
same ground, that honest men may not oppose robbers or pirates, because
this may occasion disorder or bloodshed. If any mischief come in such

cases, it is not to be charged upon him who defends his own right, but on
him that invades his neighbours. If the innocent honest man must quietly
quit all he has, for peace sake, to him who will lay violent hands upon it, I
desire it may be considered, what a kind of peace there will be in the world,
which consists only in violence and rapine; and which is to be maintained
only for the benefit of robbers and oppressors. Who would not think it an
admirable peace betwix the mighty and the mean, when the lamb, without
resistance, yielded his throat to be torn by the imperious wolf?
Polyphemus's den gives us a perfect pattern of such a peace, and such a
government, wherein Ulysses and his companions had nothing to do, but
quietly to suffer themselves to be devoured. And no doubt Ulysses, who
was a prudent man, preached up passive obedience, and exhorted them to a
quiet submission, by representing to them of what concernment peace was
to mankind; and by shewing the inconveniences might happen, if they
should offer to resist Polyphemus, who had now the power over them.
Sect. 229. The end of government is the good of mankind; and which is
best for mankind, that the people should be always exposed to the
boundless will of tyranny, or that the rulers should be sometimes liable to
be opposed, when they grow exorbitant in the use of their power, and
employ it for the destruction, and not the preservation of the properties of
their people?
Sect. 230. Nor let any one say, that mischief can arise from hence, as often
as it shall please a busy head, or turbulent spirit, to desire the alteration of
the government. It is true, such men may stir, whenever they please; but it
will be only to their own just ruin and perdition: for till the mischief be
grown general, and the ill designs of the rulers become visible, or their
attempts sensible to the greater part, the people, who are more disposed to
suffer than right themselves by resistance, are not apt to stir. The examples
of particular injustice, or oppression of here and there an unfortunate man,
moves them not. But if they universally have a persuation, grounded upon
manifest evidence, that designs are carrying on against their liberties, and
the general course and tendency of things cannot but give them strong
suspicions of the evil intention of their governors, who is to be blamed for
it? Who can help it, if they, who might avoid it, bring themselves into this
suspicion? Are the people to be blamed, if they have the sense of rational
creatures, and can think of things no otherwise than as they find and feel

them? And is it not rather their fault, who put things into such a posture,
that they would not have them thought to be as they are? I grant, that the
pride, ambition, and turbulency of private men have sometimes caused
great disorders in commonwealths, and factions have been fatal to states
and kingdoms. But whether the mischief hath oftener begun in the peoples
wantonness, and a desire to cast off the lawful authority of their rulers, or in
the rulers insolence, and endeavours to get and exercise an arbitrary power
over their people; whether oppression, or disobedience, gave the first rise to
the disorder, I leave it to impartial history to determine. This I am sure,
whoever, either ruler or subject, by force goes about to invade the rights of
either prince or people, and lays the foundation for overturning the
constitution and frame of any just government, is highly guilty of the
greatest crime, I think, a man is capable of, being to answer for all those
mischiefs of blood, rapine, and desolation, which the breaking to pieces of
governments bring on a country. And he who does it, is justly to be
esteemed the common enemy and pest of mankind, and is to be treated
accordingly.
Sect. 231. That subjects or foreigners, attempting by force on the
properties of any people, may be resisted with force, is agreed on all hands.
But that magistrates, doing the same thing, may be resisted, hath of late
been denied: as if those who had the greatest privileges and advantages by
the law, had thereby a power to break those laws, by which alone they were
set in a better place than their brethren: whereas their offence is thereby the
greater, both as being ungrateful for the greater share they have by the law,
and breaking also that trust, which is put into their hands by their brethren.
Sect. 232. Whosoever uses force without right, as every one does in
society, who does it without law, puts himself into a state of war with those
against whom he so uses it; and in that state all former ties are cancelled, all
other rights cease, and every one has a right to defend himself, and to resist
the aggressor. This is so evident, that Barclay himself, that great assertor of
the power and sacredness of kings, is forced to confess, That it is lawful for
the people, in some cases, to resist their king; and that too in a chapter,
wherein he pretends to shew, that the divine law shuts up the people from
all manner of rebellion. Whereby it is evident, even by his own doctrine,
that, since they may in some cases resist, all resisting of princes is not
rebellion. His words are these. Quod siquis dicat, Ergone populus

tyrannicae crudelitati & furori jugulum semper praebebit? Ergone multitude
civitates suas fame, ferro, & flamma vastari, seque, conjuges, & liberos
fortunae ludibrio & tyranni libidini exponi, inque omnia vitae pericula
omnesque miserias & molestias a rege deduci patientur? Num illis quod
omni animantium generi est a natura tributum, denegari debet, ut sc. vim vi
repellant, seseq; ab injuria, tueantur? Huic breviter responsum sit, Populo
universo negari defensionem, quae juris naturalis est, neque ultionem quae
praeter naturam est adversus regem concedi debere. Quapropter si rex non
in singulares tantum personas aliquot privatum odium exerceat, sed corpus
etiam reipublicae, cujus ipse caput est, i.e. totum populum, vel insignem
aliquam ejus partem immani & intoleranda saevitia seu tyrannide divexet;
populo, quidem hoc casu resistendi ac tuendi se ab injuria potestas
competit, sed tuendi se tantum, non enim in principem invadendi: &
restituendae injuriae illatae, non recedendi a debita reverentia propter
acceptam injuriam. Praesentem denique impetum propulsandi non vim
praeteritam ulciscenti jus habet. Horum enim alterum a natura est, ut vitam
scilicet corpusque tueamur. Alterum vero contra naturam, ut inferior de
superiori supplicium sumat. Quod itaque populus malum, antequam factum
sit, impedire potest, ne fiat, id postquam factum est, in regem authorem
sceleris vindicare non potest: populus igitur hoc amplius quam privatus
quispiam habet: quod huic, vel ipsis adversariis judicibus, excepto
Buchanano, nullum nisi in patientia remedium superest. Cum ille si
intolerabilis tyrannus est (modicum enim ferre omnino debet) resistere cum
reverentia possit, Barclay contra Monarchom. 1. iii. c. 8.
In English thus:
Sect. 233. But if any one should ask, Must the people then always lay
themselves open to the cruelty and rage of tyranny? Must they see their
cities pillaged, and laid in ashes, their wives and children exposed to the
tyrant's lust and fury, and themselves and families reduced by their king to
ruin, and all the miseries of want and oppression, and yet sit still? Must men
alone be debarred the common privilege of opposing force with force,
which nature allows so freely to all other creatures for their preservation
from injury? I answer: Self-defence is a part of the law of nature; nor can it
be denied the community, even against the king himself: but to revenge
themselves upon him, must by no means be allowed them; it being not
agreeable to that law. Wherefore if the king shall shew an hatred, not only

to some particular persons, but sets himself against the body of the
commonwealth, whereof he is the head, and shall, with intolerable ill usage,
cruelly tyrannize over the whole, or a considerable part of the people, in this
case the people have a right to resist and defend themselves from injury: but
it must be with this caution, that they only defend themselves, but do not
attack their prince: they may repair the damages received, but must not for
any provocation exceed the bounds of due reverence and respect. They may
repulse the present attempt, but must not revenge past violences: for it is
natural for us to defend life and limb, but that an inferior should punish a
superior, is against nature. The mischief which is designed them, the people
may prevent before it be done; but when it is done, they must not revenge it
on the king, though author of the villany. This therefore is the privilege of
the people in general, above what any private person hath; that particular
men are allowed by our adversaries themselves (Buchanan only excepted)
to have no other remedy but patience; but the body of the people may with
respect resist intolerable tyranny; for when it is but moderate, they ought to
endure it.
Sect. 234. Thus far that great advocate of monarchical power allows of
resistance.
Sect. 235. It is true, he has annexed two limitations to it, to no purpose:
First, He says, it must be with reverence.
Secondly, It must be without retribution, or punishment; and the reason he
gives is, because an inferior cannot punish a superior. First, How to resist
force without striking again, or how to strike with reverence, will need
some skill to make intelligible. He that shall oppose an assault only with a
shield to receive the blows, or in any more respectful posture, without a
sword in his hand, to abate the confidence and force of the assailant, will
quickly be at an end of his resistance, and will find such a defence serve
only to draw on himself the worse usage. This is as ridiculous a way of
resisting, as juvenal thought it of fighting; ubi tu pulsas, ego vapulo tantum.
And the success of the combat will be unavoidably the same he there
describes it:
——-Libertas pauperis haec est:
Pulsatus rogat, et pugnis concisus, adorat,

Ut liceat paucis cum dentibus inde reverti.
This will always be the event of such an imaginary resistance, where men
may not strike again. He therefore who may resist, must be allowed to
strike. And then let our author, or any body else, join a knock on the head,
or a cut on the face, with as much reverence and respect as he thinks fit. He
that can reconcile blows and reverence, may, for aught I know, desire for his
pains, a civil, respectful cudgeling where-ever he can meet with it.
Secondly, As to his second, An inferior cannot punish a superior; that is
true, generally speaking, whilst he is his superior. But to resist force with
force, being the state of war that levels the parties, cancels all former
relation of reverence, respect, and superiority: and then the odds that
remains, is, that he, who opposes the unjust agressor, has this superiority
over him, that he has a right, when he prevails, to punish the offender, both
for the breach of the peace, and all the evils that followed upon it. Barclay
therefore, in another place, more coherently to himself, denies it to be
lawful to resist a king in any case. But he there assigns two cases, whereby
a king may un-king himself. His words are,
Quid ergo, nulline casus incidere possunt quibus populo sese erigere atque
in regem impotentius dominantem arma capere & invadere jure suo suaque
authoritate liceat? Nulli certe quamdiu rex manet. Semper enim ex divinis
id obstat, Regem honorificato; & qui potestati resistit, Dei ordinationi
resisit: non alias igitur in eum populo potestas est quam si id committat
propter quod ipso jure rex esse desinat. Tunc enim se ipse principatu exuit
atque in privatis constituit liber: hoc modo populus & superior efficitur,
reverso ad eum sc. jure illo quod ante regem inauguratum in interregno
habuit. At sunt paucorum generum commissa ejusmodi quae hunc effectum
pariunt. At ego cum plurima animo perlustrem, duo tantum invenio, duos,
inquam, casus quibus rex ipso facto ex rege non regem se facit & omni
honore & dignitate regali atque in subditos potestate destituit; quorum etiam
meminit Winzerus. Horum unus est, Si regnum disperdat, quemadmodum
de Nerone fertur, quod is nempe senatum populumque Romanum, atque
adeo urbem ipsam ferro flammaque vastare, ac novas sibi sedes quaerere
decrevisset. Et de Caligula, quod palam denunciarit se neque civem neque
principem senatui amplius fore, inque animo habuerit interempto utriusque
ordinis electissimo quoque Alexandriam commigrare, ac ut populum uno

ictu interimeret, unam ei cervicem optavit. Talia cum rex aliquis meditator
& molitur serio, omnem regnandi curam & animum ilico abjicit, ac proinde
imperium in subditos amittit, ut dominus servi pro derelicto habiti
dominium.
Sect. 236. Alter casus est, Si rex in alicujus clientelam se contulit, ac
regnum quod liberum a majoribus & populo traditum accepit, alienae
ditioni mancipavit. Nam tunc quamvis forte non ea mente id agit populo
plane ut incommodet: tamen quia quod praecipuum est regiae dignitatis
amifit, ut summus scilicet in regno secundum Deum sit, & solo Deo
inferior, atque populum etiam totum ignorantem vel invitum, cujus
libertatem sartam & tectam conservare debuit, in alterius gentis ditionem &
potestatem dedidit; hac velut quadam regni ab alienatione effecit, ut nec
quod ipse in regno imperium habuit retineat, nec in eum cui collatum voluit,
juris quicquam transferat; atque ita eo facto liberum jam & suae potestatis
populum relinquit, cujus rei exemplum unum annales Scotici suppeditant.
Barclay contra Monarchom. 1. iii. c. 16.

Which in English runs thus:
Sect. 237. What then, can there no case happen wherein the people may of
right, and by their own authority, help themselves, take arms, and set upon
their king, imperiously domineering over them? None at all, whilst he
remains a king. Honour the king, and he that resists the power, resists the
ordinance of God; are divine oracles that will never permit it, The people
therefore can never come by a power over him, unless he does something
that makes him cease to be a king: for then he divests himself of his crown
and dignity, and returns to the state of a private man, and the people become
free and superior, the power which they had in the interregnum, before they
crowned him king, devolving to them again. But there are but few
miscarriages which bring the matter to this state. After considering it well
on all sides, I can find but two. Two cases there are, I say, whereby a king,
ipso facto, becomes no king, and loses all power and regal authority over
his people; which are also taken notice of by Winzerus.
The first is, If he endeavour to overturn the government, that is, if he have
a purpose and design to ruin the kingdom and commonwealth, as it is
recorded of Nero, that he resolved to cut off the senate and people of Rome,
lay the city waste with fire and sword, and then remove to some other place.
And of Caligula, that he openly declared, that he would be no longer a head
to the people or senate, and that he had it in his thoughts to cut off the
worthiest men of both ranks, and then retire to Alexandria: and he wisht
that the people had but one neck, that he might dispatch them all at a blow,
Such designs as these, when any king harbours in his thoughts, and
seriously promotes, he immediately gives up all care and thought of the
commonwealth; and consequently forfeits the power of governing his
subjects, as a master does the dominion over his slaves whom he hath
abandoned.
Sect. 238. The other case is, When a king makes himself the dependent of
another, and subjects his kingdom which his ancestors left him, and the
people put free into his hands, to the dominion of another: for however
perhaps it may not be his intention to prejudice the people; yet because he
has hereby lost the principal part of regal dignity, viz. to be next and
immediately under God, supreme in his kingdom; and also because he

betrayed or forced his people, whose liberty he ought to have carefully
preserved, into the power and dominion of a foreign nation. By this, as it
were, alienation of his kingdom, he himself loses the power he had in it
before, without transferring any the least right to those on whom he would
have bestowed it; and so by this act sets the people free, and leaves them at
their own disposal. One example of this is to be found in the Scotch Annals.
Sect. 239. In these cases Barclay, the great champion of absolute
monarchy, is forced to allow, that a king may be resisted, and ceases to be a
king. That is, in short, not to multiply cases, in whatsoever he has no
authority, there he is no king, and may be resisted: for wheresoever the
authority ceases, the king ceases too, and becomes like other men who have
no authority. And these two cases he instances in, differ little from those
above mentioned, to be destructive to governments, only that he has omitted
the principle from which his doctrine flows: and that is, the breach of trust,
in not preserving the form of government agreed on, and in not intending
the end of government itself, which is the public good and preservation of
property. When a king has dethroned himself, and put himself in a state of
war with his people, what shall hinder them from prosecuting him who is
no king, as they would any other man, who has put himself into a state of
war with them, Barclay, and those of his opinion, would do well to tell us.
This farther I desire may be taken notice of out of Barclay, that he says, The
mischief that is designed them, the people may prevent before it be done:
whereby he allows resistance when tyranny is but in design. Such designs
as these (says he) when any king harbours in his thoughts and seriously
promotes, he immediately gives up all care and thought of the
commonwealth; so that, according to him, the neglect of the public good is
to be taken as an evidence of such design, or at least for a sufficient cause
of resistance. And the reason of all, he gives in these words, Because he
betrayed or forced his people, whose liberty he ought carefully to have
preserved. What he adds, into the power and dominion of a foreign nation,
signifies nothing, the fault and forfeiture lying in the loss of their liberty,
which he ought to have preserved, and not in any distinction of the persons
to whose dominion they were subjected. The peoples right is equally
invaded, and their liberty lost, whether they are made slaves to any of their
own, or a foreign nation; and in this lies the injury, and against this only
have they the right of defence. And there are instances to be found in all

countries, which shew, that it is not the change of nations in the persons of
their governors, but the change of government, that gives the offence.
Bilson, a bishop of our church, and a great stickler for the power and
prerogative of princes, does, if I mistake not, in his treatise of Christian
subjection, acknowledge, that princes may forfeit their power, and their title
to the obedience of their subjects; and if there needed authority in a case
where reason is so plain, I could send my reader to Bracton, Fortescue, and
the author of the Mirrour, and others, writers that cannot be suspected to be
ignorant of our government, or enemies to it. But I thought Hooker alone
might be enough to satisfy those men, who relying on him for their
ecclesiastical polity, are by a strange fate carried to deny those principles
upon which he builds it. Whether they are herein made the tools of
cunninger workmen, to pull down their own fabric, they were best look.
This I am sure, their civil policy is so new, so dangerous, and so destructive
to both rulers and people, that as former ages never could bear the
broaching of it; so it may be hoped, those to come, redeemed from the
impositions of these Egyptian under-task-masters, will abhor the memory of
such servile flatterers, who, whilst it seemed to serve their turn, resolved all
government into absolute tyranny, and would have all men born to, what
their mean souls fitted them for, slavery.
Sect. 240. Here, it is like, the common question will be made, Who shall
be judge, whether the prince or legislative act contrary to their trust? This,
perhaps, ill-affected and factious men may spread amongst the people,
when the prince only makes use of his due prerogative. To this I reply, The
people shall be judge; for who shall be judge whether his trustee or deputy
acts well, and according to the trust reposed in him, but he who deputes
him, and must, by having deputed him, have still a power to discard him,
when he fails in his trust? If this be reasonable in particular cases of private
men, why should it be otherwise in that of the greatest moment, where the
welfare of millions is concerned, and also where the evil, if not prevented,
is greater, and the redress very difficult, dear, and dangerous?
Sect. 241. But farther, this question, (Who shall be judge?) cannot mean,
that there is no judge at all: for where there is no judicature on earth, to
decide controversies amongst men, God in heaven is judge. He alone, it is
true, is judge of the right. But every man is judge for himself, as in all other

cases, so in this, whether another hath put himself into a state of war with
him, and whether he should appeal to the Supreme Judge, as Jeptha did.
Sect. 242. If a controversy arise betwixt a prince and some of the people,
in a matter where the law is silent, or doubtful, and the thing be of great
consequence, I should think the proper umpire, in such a case, should be the
body of the people: for in cases where the prince hath a trust reposed in
him, and is dispensed from the common ordinary rules of the law; there, if
any men find themselves aggrieved, and think the prince acts contrary to, or
beyond that trust, who so proper to judge as the body of the people, (who, at
first, lodged that trust in him) how far they meant it should extend? But if
the prince, or whoever they be in the administration, decline that way of
determination, the appeal then lies no where but to heaven; force between
either persons, who have no known superior on earth, or which permits no
appeal to a judge on earth, being properly a state of war, wherein the appeal
lies only to heaven; and in that state the injured party must judge for
himself, when he will think fit to make use of that appeal, and put himself
upon it.
Sect. 243. To conclude, The power that every individual gave the society,
when he entered into it, can never revert to the individuals again, as long as
the society lasts, but will always remain in the community; because without
this there can be no community, no commonwealth, which is contrary to the
original agreement: so also when the society hath placed the legislative in
any assembly of men, to continue in them and their successors, with
direction and authority for providing such successors, the legislative can
never revert to the people whilst that government lasts; because having
provided a legislative with power to continue for ever, they have given up
their political power to the legislative, and cannot resume it. But if they
have set limits to the duration of their legislative, and made this supreme
power in any person, or assembly, only temporary; or else, when by the
miscarriages of those in authority, it is forfeited; upon the forfeiture, or at
the determination of the time set, it reverts to the society, and the people
have a right to act as supreme, and continue the legislative in themselves; or
erect a new form, or under the old form place it in new hands, as they think
good.
FINIS.
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INTRODUCTION
For the study of the great writers and thinkers of the past, historical
imagination is the first necessity. Without mentally referring to the
environment in which they lived, we cannot hope to penetrate below the
inessential and temporary to the absolute and permanent value of their
thought. Theory, no less than action, is subject to these necessities; the form
in which men cast their speculations, no less than the ways in which they
behave, are the result of the habits of thought and action which they find
around them. Great men make, indeed, individual contributions to the
knowledge of their times; but they can never transcend the age in which
they live. The questions they try to answer will always be those their
contemporaries are asking; their statement of fundamental problems will
always be relative to the traditional statements that have been handed down
to them. When they are stating what is most startlingly new, they will be
most likely to put it in an old-fashioned form, and to use the inadequate
ideas and formulae of tradition to express the deeper truths towards which
they are feeling their way. They will be most the children of their age, when
they are rising most above it.
Rousseau has suffered as much as any one from critics without a sense of
history. He has been cried up and cried down by democrats and oppressors
with an equal lack of understanding and imagination. His name, a hundred
and fifty years after the publication of the Social Contract, is still a
controversial watchword and a party cry. He is accepted as one of the
greatest writers France has produced; but even now men are inclined, as
political bias prompts them, to accept or reject his political doctrines as a
whole, without sifting them or attempting to understand and discriminate.
He is still revered or hated as the author who, above all others, inspired the
French Revolution.
At the present day, his works possess a double significance. They are
important historically, alike as giving us an insight into the mind of the

eighteenth century, and for the actual influence they have had on the course
of events in Europe. Certainly no other writer of the time has exercised such
an influence as his. He may fairly be called the parent of the romantic
movement in art, letters and life; he affected profoundly the German
romantics and Goethe himself; he set the fashion of a new introspection
which has permeated nineteenth century literature; he began modern
educational theory; and, above all, in political thought he represents the
passage from a traditional theory rooted in the Middle Ages to the modern
philosophy of the State. His influence on Kant's moral philosophy and on
Hegel's philosophy of Right are two sides of the same fundamental
contribution to modern thought. He is, in fact, the great forerunner of
German and English Idealism.
It would not be possible, in the course of a short introduction, to deal both
with the positive content of Rousseau's thought and with the actual
influence he has had on practical affairs. The statesmen of the French
Revolution, from Robespierre downwards, were throughout profoundly
affected by the study of his works. Though they seem often to have
misunderstood him, they had on the whole studied him with the attention he
demands. In the nineteenth century, men continued to appeal to Rousseau,
without, as a rule, knowing him well or penetrating deeply into his
meaning. "The Social Contract," says M. Dreyfus-Brisac, "is the book of all
books that is most talked of and least read." But with the great revival of
interest in political philosophy there has come a desire for the better
understanding of Rousseau's work. He is again being studied more as a
thinker and less as an ally or an opponent; there is more eagerness to sift the
true from the false, and to seek in the Social Contract the "principles of
political right," rather than the great revolutionary's ipse dixit in favour of
some view about circumstances which he could never have contemplated.
The Social Contract, then, may be regarded either as a document of the
French Revolution, or as one of the greatest books dealing with political
philosophy. It is in the second capacity, as a work of permanent value
containing truth, that it finds a place among the world's great books. It is in
that capacity also that it will be treated in this introduction. Taking it in this
aspect, we have no less need of historical insight than if we came to it as
historians pure and simple. To understand its value we must grasp its
limitations; when the questions it answers seem unnaturally put, we must

not conclude that they are meaningless; we must see if the answer still holds
when the question is put in a more up-to-date form.
First, then, we must always remember that Rousseau is writing in the
eighteenth century, and for the most part in France. Neither the French
monarchy nor the Genevese aristocracy loved outspoken criticism, and
Rousseau had always to be very careful what he said. This may seem a
curious statement to make about a man who suffered continual persecution
on account of his subversive doctrines; but, although Rousseau was one of
the most daring writers of his time, he was forced continually to moderate
his language and, as a rule, to confine himself to generalisation instead of
attacking particular abuses. Rousseau's theory has often been decried as too
abstract and metaphysical. This is in many ways its great strength; but
where it is excessively so, the accident of time is to blame. In the eighteenth
century it was, broadly speaking, safe to generalise and unsafe to
particularise. Scepticism and discontent were the prevailing temper of the
intellectual classes, and a short-sighted despotism held that, as long as they
were confined to these, they would do little harm. Subversive doctrines
were only regarded as dangerous when they were so put as to appeal to the
masses; philosophy was regarded as impotent. The intellectuals of the
eighteenth century therefore generalised to their hearts' content, and as a
rule suffered little for their lèse-majesté: Voltaire is the typical example of
such generalisation. The spirit of the age favoured such methods, and it was
therefore natural for Rousseau to pursue them. But his general remarks had
such a way of bearing very obvious particular applications, and were so
obviously inspired by a particular attitude towards the government of his
day, that even philosophy became in his hands unsafe, and he was attacked
for what men read between the lines of his works. It is owing to this faculty
of giving his generalisations content and actuality that Rousseau has
become the father of modern political philosophy. He uses the method of
his time only to transcend it; out of the abstract and general he creates the
concrete and universal.
Secondly, we must not forget that Rousseau's theories are to be studied in a
wider historical environment. If he is the first of modern political theorists,
he is also the last of a long line of Renaissance theorists, who in turn inherit
and transform the concepts of mediæval thought. So many critics have
spent so much wasted time in proving that Rousseau was not original only

because they began by identifying originality with isolation: they studied
first the Social Contract by itself, out of relation to earlier works, and then,
having discovered that these earlier works resembled it, decided that
everything it had to say was borrowed. Had they begun their study in a truly
historical spirit, they would have seen that Rousseau's importance lies just
in the new use he makes of old ideas, in the transition he makes from old to
new in the general conception of politics. No mere innovator could have
exercised such an influence or hit on so much truth. Theory makes no great
leaps; it proceeds to new concepts by the adjustment and renovation of old
ones. Just as theological writers on politics, from Hooker to Bossuet, make
use of Biblical terminology and ideas; just as more modern writers, from
Hegel to Herbert Spencer, make use of the concept of evolution, Rousseau
uses the ideas and terms of the Social Contract theory. We should feel,
throughout his work, his struggle to free himself from what is lifeless and
outworn in that theory, while he develops out of it fruitful conceptions that
go beyond its scope. A too rigid literalism in the interpretation of
Rousseau's thought may easily reduce it to the possession of a merely
"historical interest": if we approach it in a truly historical spirit, we shall be
able to appreciate at once its temporary and its lasting value, to see how it
served his contemporaries, and at the same time to disentangle from it what
may be serviceable to us and for all time.
Rousseau's Emile, the greatest of all works on education, has already been
issued in this series. In this volume are contained the most important of his
political works. Of these the Social Contract, by far the most significant, is
the latest in date. It represents the maturity of his thought, while the other
works only illustrate his development. Born in 1712, he issued no work of
importance till 1750; but he tells us, in the Confessions, that in 1743, when
he was attached to the Embassy at Venice, he had already conceived the
idea of a great work on Political Institutions, "which was to put the seal on
his reputation." He seems, however, to have made little progress with this
work, until in 1749 he happened to light on the announcement of a prize
offered by the Academy of Dijon for an answer to the question, "Has the
progress of the arts and sciences tended to the purification or to the
corruption of morality?" His old ideas came thronging back, and sick at
heart of the life he had been leading among the Paris lumières, he composed
a violent and rhetorical diatribe against civilisation generally. In the
following year, this work, having been awarded the prize by the Academy,

was published by its author. His success was instantaneous; he became at
once a famous man, the "lion" of Parisian literary circles. Refutations of his
work were issued by professors, scribblers, outraged theologians and even
by the King of Poland. Rousseau endeavoured to answer them all, and in
the course of argument his thought developed. From 1750 to the publication
of the Social Contract and Emile in 1762 he gradually evolved his views: in
those twelve years he made his unique contribution to political thought.
The Discourse on the Arts and Sciences, the earliest of the works
reproduced in this volume, is not in itself of very great importance.
Rousseau has given his opinion of it in the Confessions. "Full of warmth
and force, it is wholly without logic or order; of all my works it is the
weakest in argument and the least harmonious. But whatever gifts a man
may be born with, he cannot learn the art of writing in a moment." This
criticism is just. The first Discourse neither is, nor attempts to be, a
reasoned or a balanced production. It is the speech of an advocate, wholly
one-sided and arbitrary, but so obviously and naively one-sided, that it is
difficult for us to believe in its entire seriousness. At the most, it is only a
rather brilliant but flimsy rhetorical effort, a sophistical improvisation, but
not a serious contribution to thought. Yet it is certain that this declamation
made Rousseau's name, and established his position as a great writer in
Parisian circles. D'Alembert even devoted the preface of the Encyclopædia
to a refutation. The plan of the first Discourse is essentially simple: it sets
out from the badness, immorality and misery of modern nations, traces all
these ills to the departure from a "natural" state, and then credits the
progress of the arts and sciences with being the cause of that departure. In
it, Rousseau is already in possession of his idea of "nature" as an ideal; but
he has at present made no attempt to discriminate, in what is unnatural,
between good and bad. He is merely using a single idea, putting it as
strongly as he can, and neglecting all its limitations. The first Discourse is
important not for any positive doctrine it contains, but as a key to the
development of Rousseau's mind. Here we see him at the beginning of the
long journey which was to lead on at last to the theory of the Social
Contract.
In 1755 appeared the Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of Inequality
among Men, which is the second of the works given in this volume. With
this essay, Rousseau had unsuccessfully competed in 1753 for a second

prize offered by the Academy of Dijon, and he now issued it prefaced by a
long Dedication to the Republic of Geneva. In this work, which Voltaire, in
thanking him for a presentation copy, termed his "second book against the
human race," his style and his ideas have made a great advance; he is no
longer content merely to push a single idea to extremes: while preserving
the broad opposition between the state of nature and the state of society,
which runs through all his work, he is concerned to present a rational
justification of his views and to admit that a little at any rate may be said on
the other side. Moreover, the idea of "nature" has already undergone a great
development; it is no longer an empty opposition to the evils of society; it
possesses a positive content. Thus half the Discourse on Inequality is
occupied by an imaginary description of the state of nature, in which man is
shown with ideas limited within the narrowest range, with little need of his
fellows, and little care beyond provision for the necessities of the moment.
Rousseau declares explicitly that he does not suppose the "state of nature"
ever to have existed: it is a pure "idea of reason," a working concept
reached by abstraction from the "state of society." The "natural man," as
opposed to "man's man," is man stripped of all that society confers upon
him, a creature formed by a process of abstraction, and never intended for a
historical portrait. The conclusion of the Discourse favours not this purely
abstract being, but a state of savagery intermediate between the "natural"
and the "social" conditions, in which men may preserve the simplicity and
the advantages of nature and at the same time secure the rude comforts and
assurances of early society. In one of the long notes appended to the
Discourse, Rousseau further explains his position. He does not wish, he
says, that modern corrupt society should return to a state of nature:
corruption has gone too far for that; he only desires now that men should
palliate, by wiser use of the fatal arts, the mistake of their introduction. He
recognises society as inevitable and is already feeling his way towards a
justification of it. The second Discourse represents a second stage in his
political thought: the opposition between the state of nature and the state of
society is still presented in naked contrast; but the picture of the former has
already filled out, and it only remains for Rousseau to take a nearer view of
the fundamental implications of the state of society for his thought to reach
maturity.
Rousseau is often blamed, by modern critics, for pursuing in the Discourses
a method apparently that of history, but in reality wholly unhistorical. But it

must be remembered that he himself lays no stress on the historical aspect
of his work; he gives himself out as constructing a purely ideal picture, and
not as depicting any actual stages in human history. The use of false
historical concepts is characteristic of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, and Rousseau is more to be congratulated on having escaped
from giving them too much importance than criticised for employing them
at all.
It is doubtful whether the Discourse on Political Economy, first printed in
the great Encyclopædia in 1755, was composed before or after the
Discourse on Inequality. At first sight the former seems to be far more in
the manner of the Social Contract and to contain views belonging
essentially to Rousseau's constructive period. It would not, however, be safe
to conclude from this that its date is really later. The Discourse on
Inequality still has about it much of the rhetorical looseness of the prize
essay; it aims not so much at close reasoning as at effective and popular
presentation of a case. But, by reading between the lines, an attentive
student can detect in it a great deal of the positive doctrine afterwards
incorporated in the Social Contract. Especially in the closing section, which
lays down the plan of a general treatment of the fundamental questions of
politics, we are already to some extent in the atmosphere of the later works.
It is indeed almost certain that Rousseau never attempted to put into either
of the first two Discourses any of the positive content of his political theory.
They were intended, not as final expositions of his point of view, but as
partial and preliminary studies, in which his aim was far more destructive
than constructive. It is clear that in first conceiving the plan of a work on
Political Institutions, Rousseau cannot have meant to regard all society as
in essence bad. It is indeed evident that he meant, from the first, to study
human society and institutions in their rational aspect, and that he was
rather diverted from his main purpose by the Academy of Dijon's
competition than first induced by it to think about political questions. It
need, therefore, cause no surprise that a work probably written before the
Discourse on Inequality should contain the germs of the theory given in full
in the Social Contract. The Discourse on Political Economy is important as
giving the first sketch of the theory of the "General Will." It will readily be
seen that Rousseau does not mean by "political economy" exactly what we
mean nowadays. He begins with a discussion of the fundamental nature of
the State, and the possibility of reconciling its existence with human liberty,

and goes on with an admirable short study of the principles of taxation. He
is thinking throughout of "political" in the sense of "public" economy, of the
State as the public financier, and not of the conditions governing industry.
He conceives the State as a body aiming at the well-being of all its
members and subordinates all his views of taxation to that end. He who has
only necessaries should not be taxed at all; superfluities should be
supertaxed; there should be heavy imposts on every sort of luxury. The first
part of the article is still more interesting. Rousseau begins by demolishing
the exaggerated parallel so often drawn between the State and the family;
he shows that the State is not, and cannot be, patriarchal in nature, and goes
on to lay down his view that its real being consists in the General Will of its
members. The essential features of the Social Contract are present in this
Discourse almost as if they were commonplaces, certainly not as if they
were new discoveries on which the author had just hit by some happy
inspiration. There is every temptation, after reading the Political Economy,
to suppose that Rousseau's political ideas really reached maturity far earlier
than has generally been allowed.
The Social Contract finally appeared, along with Emile, in 1762. This year,
therefore, represents in every respect the culmination of Rousseau's career.
Henceforth, he was to write only controversial and confessional works; his
theories were now developed, and, simultaneously, he gave to the world his
views on the fundamental problems of politics and education. It is now time
to ask what Rousseau's system, in its maturity, finally amounted to. The
Social Contract contains practically the whole of his constructive political
theory; it requires to be read, for full understanding, in connection with his
other works, especially Emile and the Letters on the Mount (1764), but in
the main it is self-contained and complete. The title sufficiently defines its
scope. It is called The Social Contract or Principles of Political Right, and
the second title explains the first. Rousseau's object is not to deal, in a
general way, like Montesquieu, with the actual institutions of existing
States, but to lay down the essential principles which must form the basis of
every legitimate society. Rousseau himself, in the fifth book of the Emile,
has stated the difference clearly. "Montesquieu," he says, "did not intend to
treat of the principles of political right; he was content to treat of the
positive right (or law) of established governments; and no two studies could
be more different than these." Rousseau then conceives his object as being
something very different from that of the Spirit of the Laws, and it is a

wilful error to misconstrue his purpose. When he remarks that "the facts,"
the actual history of political societies, "do not concern him," he is not
contemptuous of facts; he is merely asserting the sure principle that a fact
can in no case give rise to a right. His desire is to establish society on a
basis of pure right, so as at once to disprove his attack on society generally
and to reinforce his criticism of existing societies.
Round this point centres the whole dispute about the methods proper to
political theory. There are, broadly speaking, two schools of political
theorists, if we set aside the psychologists. One school, by collecting facts,
aims at reaching broad generalisations about what actually happens in
human societies! the other tries to penetrate to the universal principles at the
root of all human combination. For the latter purpose facts may be useful,
but in themselves they can prove nothing. The question is not one of fact,
but one of right.
Rousseau belongs essentially to this philosophical school. He is not, as his
less philosophic critics seem to suppose, a purely abstract thinker
generalising from imaginary historical instances; he is a concrete thinker
trying to get beyond they inessential and changing to the permanent and
invariable basis of human society. Like Green, he is in search of the
principle of political obligation, and beside this quest all others fall into
their place as secondary and derivative. It is required to find a form of
association able to defend and protect with the whole common force the
person and goods of every associate, and of such a nature, that each, uniting
himself with all, may still obey only himself, and remain as free as before.
This is the fundamental problem of which the Social Contract provides the
solution. The problem of political obligation is seen as including all other
political problems, which fall into place in a system based upon it. How,
Rousseau asks, can the will of the State help being for me a merely external
will, imposing itself upon my own? How can the existence of the State be
reconciled with human freedom? How can man, who is born free, rightly
come to be everywhere in chains?
No-one could help understanding the central problem of the Social Contract
immediately, were it not that its doctrines often seem to be strangely
formulated. We have seen that this strangeness is due to Rousseau's
historical position, to his use of the political concepts current in his own
age, and to his natural tendency to build on the foundations laid by his

predecessors. There are a great many people whose idea of Rousseau
consists solely of the first words of the opening chapter of the Social
Contract, "Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains." But, they tell
you, man is not born free, even if he is everywhere in chains. Thus at the
very outset we are faced with the great difficulty in appreciating Rousseau.
When we should naturally say "man ought to be free," or perhaps "man is
born for freedom," he prefers to say "man is born free," by which he means
exactly the same thing. There is doubtless, in his way of putting it, an
appeal to a "golden age"; but this golden age is admittedly as imaginary as
the freedom to which men are born is bound, for most of them, to be.
Elsewhere Rousseau puts the point much as we might put it ourselves.
"Nothing is more certain than that every man born in slavery is born for
slavery.... But if there are slaves by nature, it is because there have been
slaves against nature" (Social Contract, Book I, chap. ii).
We have seen that the contrast between the "state of nature" and the "state
of society" runs through all Rousseau's work. The Emile is a plea for
"natural" education; the Discourses are a plea for a "naturalisation" of
society; the New Héloïse is the romantic's appeal for more "nature" in
human relationships. What then is the position of this contrast in Rousseau's
mature political thought? It is clear that the position is not merely that of the
Discourses. In them, he envisaged only the faults of actual societies; now,
he is concerned with the possibility of a rational society. His aim is to
justify the change from "nature" to "society," although it has left men in
chains. He is in search of the true society, which leaves men "as free as
before." Altogether, the space occupied by the idea of nature in the Social
Contract is very small. It is used of necessity in the controversial chapters,
in which Rousseau is refuting false theories of social obligation; but when
once he has brushed aside the false prophets, he lets the idea of nature go
with them, and concerns himself solely with giving society the rational
sanction he has promised. It becomes clear that, in political matters at any
rate, the "state of nature" is for him only a term of controversy. He has in
effect abandoned, in so far as he ever held it, the theory of a human golden
age; and where, as in the Emile, he makes use of the idea of nature, it is
broadened and deepened out of all recognition. Despite many passages in
which the old terminology cleaves to him, he means by "nature" in this
period not the original state of a thing, nor even its reduction to the simplest
terms: he is passing over to the conception of "nature" as identical with the

full development of capacity, with the higher! idea of human freedom. This
view may be seen in germ even in the Discourse on Inequality, where,
distinguishing self-respect (amour de soi) from egoism (amour-propre),
Rousseau makes the former, the property of the "natural" man, consist not
in the desire for self-aggrandisement, but in the seeking of satisfaction for
reasonable desire accompanied by benevolence; whereas egoism is the
preference of our own interests to those of others, self-respect merely puts
us on an equal footing with our fellows. It is true that in the Discourse
Rousseau is pleading against the development of many human faculties; but
he is equally advocating the fullest development of those he regards as
"natural," by which he means merely "good." The "state of society," as
envisaged in the Social Contract, is no longer in contradiction to the "state
of nature" upheld in the Emile, where indeed the social environment is of
the greatest importance, and, though the pupil is screened from it, he is
none the less being trained for it. Indeed the views given in the Social
Contract are summarised in the fifth book of the Emile, and by this
summary the essential unity of Rousseau's system is emphasised.
Rousseau's object, then, in the first words of the Social Contract, "is to
inquire if, in the civil order, there can be any sure and certain, rule of
administration, taking men as they are and laws as they might be."
Montesquieu took laws as they were, and saw what sort of men they made:
Rousseau, founding his whole system on human freedom, takes man as the
basis, and regards him as giving himself what laws he pleases. He takes his
stand on the nature of human freedom: on this he bases his whole system,
making the will of the members the sole basis of every society.
In working out his theory, Rousseau makes use throughout of three general
and, to some extent, alternative conceptions. These are the Social Contract,
Sovereignty and the General Will. We shall now have to examine each of
these in turn.
The Social Contract theory is as old as the sophists of Greece (see Plato,
Republic, Book II and the Gorgias), and as I elusive. It has been adapted to
the most opposite points of view, and used, in different forms, on both sides
of every question to which it could conceivably be applied. It is frequent in
mediæval writers, a commonplace with the theorists of the Renaissance,
and in the eighteenth century already nearing its fall before a wider
conception. It would be a long, as well as a thankless, task to trace its

history over again: it may be followed best in D. G. Ritchie's admirable
essay on it in Darwin and Hegel and Other Studies. For us, it is important
only to regard it in its most general aspect, before studying the special use
made of it by Rousseau. Obviously, in one form or another, it is a theory
very easily arrived at. Wherever any form of government apart from the
merest tyranny exists, reflection on the basis of the State cannot but lead to
the notion that, in one sense or another, it is based on the consent, tacit or
expressed, past or present, of its members. In this alone, the greater part of
the Social Contract theory is already latent. Add the desire to find actual
justification for a theory in facts, and, especially in an age possessed only of
the haziest historical sense, this doctrine of consent will inevitably be given
a historical setting. If in addition there is a tendency to regard society as
something unnatural to humanity, the tendency will become irresistible. By
writers of almost all schools, the State will be represented as having arisen,
in some remote age, out of a compact or, in more legal phrase, contract
between two or more parties. The only class that will be able to resist the
doctrine is that which maintains the divine right of kings, and holds that all
existing governments were were imposed on the people by the direct
interposition of God. All who are not prepared to maintain that will be
partisans of some form or other of the Social Contract theory.
It is, therefore, not surprising that we find among its advocates writers of
the most opposite points of view. Barely stated, it is a mere formula, which
may be filled in with any content from absolutism to pure republicanism.
And, in the hands of some at least of its supporters, it turns out to be a
weapon that cuts both ways. We shall be in a better position to judge of its
usefulness when we have seen its chief varieties at work.
All Social Contract theories that are at all definite fall under one or other of
two heads. They represent society as based on an original contract either
between the people and the government, or between all the individuals
composing the State. Historically, modern theory passes from the first to the
second of these forms.
The doctrine that society is founded on a contract between the people and
the government is of mediæval origin. It was often supported by references
to the Old Testament, which contains a similar view in an unreflective form.
It is found in most of the great political writers of the sixteenth century; in
Buchanan, and in the writings of James I: it persists into the seventeenth in

the works of Grotius and Puffendorf. Grotius is sometimes held to have
stated the theory so as to admit both forms of contract; but it is clear that he
is only thinking of the first form as admitting democratic as well as
monarchical government. We find it put very clearly by the Convention
Parliament of 1688, which accuses James II of having "endeavoured to
subvert the constitution of the kingdom by breaking the original contract
between king and people." While Hobbes, on the side of the royalists, is
maintaining the contract theory in its second form, the Parliamentarian
Algernon Sidney adheres to the idea of a contract between the people and
the government.
In this form, the theory clearly admits of opposite interpretations. It may be
held that the people, having given itself up once for all to its rulers, has
nothing more to ask of them, and is bound to submit to any usage they may
choose to inflict. This, however, is not the implication most usually drawn
from it. The theory, in this form, originated with theologians who were also
lawyers. Their view of a contract implied mutual obligations; they regarded
the ruler as bound, by its terms, to govern constitutionally. The old idea that
a king must not violate the sacred customs of the realm passes easily into
the doctrine that he must not violate the terms of the original contract
between himself and his people. Just as in the days of the Norman kings,
every appeal on the part of the people for more liberties was couched in the
form of a demand that the customs of the "good old times" of Edward the
Confessor should be respected, so in the seventeenth century every act of
popular assertion or resistance was stated as an appeal to the king not to
violate the contract. The demand was a good popular cry, and it seemed to
have the theorists behind it. Rousseau gives his refutation of this view,
which he had, in the Discourse on Inequality, maintained in passing, in the
sixteenth chapter of the third book of the Social Contract. (See also Book I,
chap, iv, init.) His attack is really concerned also with the theory of Hobbes,
which in some respects resembles, as we shall see, this first view; but, in
form at least, it is directed against this form of contract. It will be possible
to examine it more closely, when the second view has been considered.
The second view, which may be called the Social Contract theory proper,
regards society as originating in, or based on, an agreement between the
individuals composing it. It seems to be found first, rather vaguely, in
Richard Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity, from which Locke largely

borrowed: and it reappears, in varying forms, in Milton's Tenure of Kings
and Magistrates, in Hobbes's Leviathan, in Locke's Treatises on Civil
Government, and in Rousseau. The best-known instance of its actual use is
by the Pilgrim Fathers on the Mayflower in 1620, in whose declaration
occurs the phrase, "We do solemnly and mutually, in the presence of God
and of one another, covenant and combine ourselves together into a civil
body politic." The natural implication of this view would seem to be the
corollary of complete popular Sovereignty which Rousseau draws. But
before Rousseau's time it had been used to support views as diverse as those
which rested on the first form. We saw that, in Grotius's great work, De Jure
Belli et Pacis, it was already possible to doubt which of the two theories
was being advocated. The first theory was, historically, a means of popular
protest against royal aggression. As soon as popular government was taken
into account, the act of contract between people and government became in
effect merely a contract between the individuals composing the society, and
readily passed over into the second form.
The second theory, in its ordinary form, expresses only the view that the
people is everywhere Sovereign, and that, in the phrase of Milton's treatise,
"the power of kings and magistrates is only derivative." Before, however,
this view had been worked up into a philosophical theory, it had already
been used by Hobbes to support precisely opposite principles. Hobbes
agrees that the original contract is one between all the individuals
composing the State, and that the government is no party to it; but he
regards the people as agreeing, not merely to form a State, but to invest a
certain person or certain persons with the government of it. He agrees that
the people is naturally supreme, but regards it as alienating its Sovereignty
by the contract itself, and delegating its power, wholly and for ever, to the
government. As soon, therefore, as the State is set up, the government
becomes for Hobbes the Sovereign; there is no more question of popular
Sovereignty, but only of passive obedience: the people is bound, by the
contract, to obey its ruler, no matter whether he governs well or ill. It has
alienated all its rights to the Sovereign, who is, therefore, absolute master.
Hobbes, living in a time of civil wars, regards the worst government as
better than anarchy, and is, therefore, at pains to find arguments in support
of any form of absolutism. It is easy to pick holes in this system, and to see
into what difficulties a conscientious Hobbist might be led by a revolution.
For as soon as the revolutionaries get the upper hand, he will have to

sacrifice one of his principles: he will have to side against either the actual
or the legitimate Sovereign. It is easy also to see that alienation of liberty,
even if possible for an individual, which Rousseau denies, cannot bind his
posterity. But, with all its faults, the view of Hobbes is on the whole
admirably, if ruthlessly, logical, and to it Rousseau owes a great deal.
The special shape given to the second Social Contract theory by Hobbes
looks, at first sight, much like a combination, into a single act, of both the
contracts. This, however, is not the view he adopts. The theory of a contract
between government and people had, as we have seen, been used mainly as
a support for popular liberties, a means of assertion against the government.
Hobbes, whose whole aim is to make his government Sovereign, can only
do this by leaving the government outside the contract: he thus avoids the
necessity of submitting it to any obligation whatsoever, and leaves it
absolute and irresponsible. He secures, in fact, not merely a State which has
unbounded rights against the individual, but a determinate authority with
the right to enforce those rights. His theory is not merely Statism (étatisme);
it is pure despotism.
It is clear that, if such a theory is to be upheld, it can stand only by the view,
which Hobbes shares with Grotius, that a man can alienate not merely his
own liberty, but also that of his descendants, and that, consequently, a
people as a whole can do the same. This is the point at which both Locke
and Rousseau attack it. Locke, whose aim is largely to justify the
Revolution of 1688, makes government depend, not merely at its institution,
but always, on the consent of the governed, and regards all rulers as liable
to be displaced if they govern tyrannically. He omits, however, to provide
any machinery short of revolution for the expression of popular opinion,
and, on the whole, seems to regard the popular consent as something
essentially tacit and assumed. He regards the State as existing mainly to
protect life and property, and is, in all his assertions of popular rights, so
cautious as to reduce them almost to nothing. It is not till we come to
Rousseau that the second form of the contract theory is stated in its purest
and most logical form.
Rousseau sees clearly the necessity, if popular consent in government is to
be more than a name, of giving it some constitutional means of expression.
For Locke's theory of tacit consent, he substitutes an active agreement
periodically renewed. He looks back with admiration to the city-states of

ancient Greece and, in his own day, reserves his admiration for the Swiss
free cities, Berne and, above all, Geneva, his native place. Seeing in the
Europe of his day no case in which representative government was working
at all democratically, he was unable to conceive that means might be found
of giving effect to this active agreement in a nation-state; he therefore held
that self-government was impossible except for a city. He wished to break
up the nation-states of Europe, and create instead federative leagues of
independent city-states.
It matters, however, comparatively little, for the appreciation of Rousseau's
political theory in general, that he failed to become the theorist of the
modern State. By taking the State, which must have, in essentials,
everywhere the same basis, at its simplest, he was able, far better than his
predecessors, to bring out the real nature of the "social tie," an alternative
name which he often uses for the Social Contract. His doctrine I of the
underlying principle of political obligation is that of all great modern
writers, from Kant to Mr. Bosanquet. This fundamental unity has been
obscured only because critics have failed to put the Social Contract theory
in its proper place in Rousseau's system.
This theory was, we have seen, a commonplace. The amount of historical
authenticity assigned to the contract almost universally presupposed varied
enormously. Generally, the weaker a writer's rational basis, the more he
appealed to history—and invented it. It was, therefore, almost inevitable
that Rousseau should cast his theory into the contractual form. There were,
indeed, writers of his time who laughed at the contract, but they were not
writers who constructed a general system of political philosophy. From
Cromwell to Montesquieu and Bentham, it was the practically minded man,
impatient of unactual hypotheses, who refused to accept the idea of
contract. The theorists were as unanimous in its favour as the Victorians
were in favour of the "organic" theory. But we, criticising them in the light
of later events, are in a better position for estimating the position the Social
Contract really took in their political system. We see that Locke's doctrine
of tacit consent made popular control so unreal that he was forced, if the
State was to have any hold, to make his contract historical and actual,
binding posterity for all time, and that he was also led to admit a quasicontract between people and government, as a second vindication of
popular liberties. Rousseau, on the other hand, bases no vital argument on

the historical nature of the contract, in which, indeed, he clearly does not
believe. "How," he asks, "did this change [from nature to society] come
about?" And he answers that he does not know. Moreover, his aim is to find
"a sure and legitimate rule of administration, taking men as they are and
laws as they might be"; that is to say, his Social Contract is something
which will be found at work in every legitimate society, but which will be
in abeyance in all forms of despotism. He clearly means by it no more and
no less than the fundamental principle of political association, the basis of
the unity which enables us, in the State, to realise political liberty by giving
up lawlessness and license. The presentation of this doctrine in the quasihistorical form of the Social Contract theory is due to the accident of the
time and place in which Rousseau wrote. At the same time, the importance
of the conception is best to be seen in the hard death it dies. Though no-one,
for a hundred years or so, has thought of regarding it as historical, it has
been found so hard to secure any other phrase explaining as well or better
the basis of political union that, to this day, the phraseology of the contract
theory largely persists. A conception so vital cannot have been barren.
It is indeed, in Rousseau's own thought, only one of the three different ways
in which the basis of political union is stated, according to the
preoccupation of his mind. When he is thinking quasi-historically, he
describes his doctrine as that of the Social Contract. Modern anthropology,
in its attempts to explain the complex by means of the simple, often strays
further from the straight paths of history and reason. In a semi-legal aspect,
using the terminology, if not the standpoint, of jurisprudence, he restates the
same doctrine in the form of popular Sovereignty. This use tends
continually to pass over into the more philosophical form which comes
third. "Sovereignty is the exercise of the general will." Philosophically,
Rousseau's doctrine finds its expression in the view that the State is based
not on any original convention, not on, any determinate power, but on the
living and sustaining rational will of its members. We have now to examine
first Sovereignty and then the General Will, which is ultimately Rousseau's
guiding conception.
Sovereignty is, first and foremost, a legal term, and it has often been held
that its use in political philosophy merely leads to confusion. In
jurisprudence, we are told, it has the perfectly plain meaning given to it in
Austin's famous definition. The Sovereign is "a determinate human

superior, not in a habit of obedience to a like superior, but receiving
habitual obedience from the bulk of a given society." Where Sovereignty is
placed is, on this view, a question purely of fact, and never of right. We
have only to seek out the determinate human superior in a given society,
and we shall have the Sovereign. In answer to this theory, it is not enough,
though it is a valuable point, to show that such a determinate superior is
rarely to be found. Where, for instance, is the Sovereign of England or of
the British Empire? Is it the King, who is called the Sovereign? Or is it the
Parliament, which is the legislature (for Austin's Sovereign is regarded as
the source of law)? Or is it the electorate, or the whole mass of the
population, with or without the right of voting? Clearly all these exercise a
certain influence in the making of laws. Or finally, is it now the Cabinet?
For Austin, one of these bodies would be ruled out as indeterminate (the
mass of the population) and another as responsible (the Cabinet). But are
we to regard the House of Commons or those who elect it as forming part of
the Sovereign? The search for a determinate Sovereign may be a valuable
legal conception; but it has evidently nothing to do with political theory.
It is, therefore, essential to distinguish between the legal Sovereign of
jurisprudence, and the political Sovereign of political science and
philosophy. Even so, it does not at once become clear what this political
Sovereign may be. Is it the body or bodies of persons in whom political
power in a State actually resides? Is it merely the complex of actual
institutions regarded as embodying the will of the society? This would leave
us still in the realm of mere fact, outside both right and philosophy. The
Sovereign, in the philosophical sense, is neither the nominal Sovereign, nor
the legal Sovereign, nor the political Sovereign of fact and common sense:
it is the consequence of the fundamental bond of union, the restatement of
the doctrine of Social Contract, the foreshadowing of that of General Will.
The Sovereign is that body in the State in which political power ought
always to reside, and in which the right to such power does always reside.
The idea at the back of the philosophical conception of Sovereignty is,
therefore, essentially the same as that we found to underlie the Social
Contract theory. It is the view that the people, whether it can alienate its
right or not, is the ultimate director of its own destinies, the final power
from which there is no appeal. In a sense, this is recognised even by
Hobbes, who makes the power of his absolute Sovereign, the predecessor of

Austin's "determinate human superior," issue first of all from the Social
Contract, which is essentially a popular act. The difference between Hobbes
and Rousseau on this point is solely that Rousseau regards as inalienable a
supreme power which Hobbes makes the people alienate in its first
corporate action. That is to say, Hobbes in fact accepts the theory of popular
supremacy in name only to destroy it in fact; Rousseau asserts the theory in
its only logical form, and is under no temptation to evade it by means of
false historical assumptions. In Locke, a distinction is already drawn
between the legal and the actual Sovereign, which Locke calls "supreme
power"; Rousseau unites the absolute Sovereignty of Hobbes and the
"popular consent" of Locke into the philosophic doctrine of popular
Sovereignty, which has since been the established form of the theory. His
final view represents a return from the perversions of Hobbes to a doctrine
already familiar to mediæval and Renaissance writers; but it is not merely a
return. In its passage the view has fallen into its place in a complete system
of political philosophy.
In a second important respect Rousseau differentiates himself from Hobbes.
For Hobbes, the Sovereign is identical with the government. He is so hot for
absolutism largely because he regards revolution, the overthrow of the
existing government, as at the same time the dissolution of the body politic,
and a return to complete anarchy or to the "state of nature." Rousseau and,
to some extent, Locke meet this view by sharp division between the
supreme power and the government. For Rousseau, they are so clearly
distinct that even a completely democratic government is not at the same
time the Sovereign; its members are sovereign only in a different capacity
and as a different corporate body, just as two different societies may exist
for different purposes with exactly the same members. Pure democracy,
however, the government of the State by all the people in every detail, is
not, as Rousseau says, a possible human institution. All governments are
really mixed in character; and what we call a democracy is only a more or
less democratic government. Government, therefore, will always be to some
extent in the hands of selected persons. Sovereignty, on the other hand, is in
his view absolute, inalienable, indivisible, and indestructible. It cannot be
limited, abandoned, shared or destroyed. It is an essential part of all social
life that the right to control the destinies of the State belongs in the last
resort to the whole people. There clearly must in the end be somewhere in
the society an ultimate court of appeal, whether determinate or not; but,

unless Sovereignty is distinguished from government, the government,
passing under the name of Sovereign, will inevitably be regarded as
absolute. The only way to avoid the conclusions of Hobbes is, therefore, to
establish a clear separation between them.
Rousseau tries to do this by an adaptation of the doctrine of the "three
powers." But instead of three independent powers sharing the supreme
authority, he gives only two, and makes one of these wholly dependent on
the other. He substitutes for the co-ordination of the legislative, the
executive, and the judicial authorities, a system in which the legislative
power, or Sovereign, is always supreme, the executive, or government,
always secondary and derivative, and the judicial power merely a function
of government. This division he makes, naturally, one of will and power.
The government is merely to carry out the decrees, or acts of will, of the
Sovereign people. Just as the human will transfers a command to its
members for execution, so the body politic may give its decisions force by
setting up authority which, like the brain, may command its members. In
delegating the power necessary for the execution of its will, it is abandoning
none of its supreme authority. It remains Sovereign, and can at any moment
recall the grants it has made. Government, therefore, exists only at the
Sovereign's pleasure, and is always revocable by the sovereign will.
It will be seen, when we come to discuss the nature of the General Will, that
this doctrine really contains the most valuable part of Rousseau's theory.
Here, we are concerned rather with its limitations. The distinction between
legislative and executive functions is in practice very hard to draw. In
Rousseau's case, it is further complicated by the presence of a second
distinction. The legislative power, the Sovereign, is concerned only with
what is general, the executive only with what is particular. This distinction,
the full force of which can only be seen in connection with the General
Will, means roughly that a matter is general when it concerns the whole
community equally, and makes no mention of any particular class; as soon
as it refers to any class or person, it becomes particular, and can no longer
form the subject matter of an act of Sovereignty. However just this
distinction may seem in the abstract, it is clear that its effect is to place all
the power in the hands of the executive: modern legislation is almost
always concerned with particular classes and interests. It is not, therefore, a
long step from the view of Rousseau to the modern theory of democratic

government, in which the people has little power beyond that of removing
its rulers if they displease it. As long, however, as we confine our view to
the city-state of which Rousseau is thinking, his distinction is capable of
preserving for the people a greater actual exercise of will. A city can often
generalise where a nation must particularise.
It is in the third book of the Social Contract, where Rousseau is discussing
the problem of government, that it is most essential to remember that his
discussion has in view mainly the city-state and not the nation. Broadly put,
his principle of government is that democracy is possible only in small
States, aristocracy in those of medium extent, and monarchy in great States
(Book III, chap. iii). In considering this view, we have to take into account
two things. First, he rejects representative government; will being, in his
theory, inalienable, representative Sovereignty is impossible. But, as he
regards all general acts as functions of Sovereignty, this means that no
general act can be within the competence of a representative assembly. In
judging this theory, we must take into account all the circumstances of
Rousseau's time. France, Geneva and England were the three States he took
most into account. In France, representative government was practically
non-existent; in Geneva, it was only partially necessary; in England, it was
a mockery, used to support a corrupt oligarchy against a debased monarchy.
Rousseau may well be pardoned for not taking the ordinary modern view of
it. Nor indeed is it, even in the modern world, so satisfactory an instrument
of the popular will that we can afford wholly to discard his criticism. It is
one of the problems of the day to find some means of securing effective
popular control over a weakened Parliament and a despotic Cabinet.
The second factor is the immense development of local government. It
seemed to Rousseau that, in the nation-state, all authority must necessarily
pass, as it had in France, to the central power. Devolution was hardly
dreamed of; and Rousseau saw the only means of securing effective popular
government in a federal system, starting from the small unit as Sovereign.
The nineteenth century has proved the falsehood of much of his theory of
government; but there are still many wise comments and fruitful
suggestions to be found in the third book of the Social Contract and in the
treatise on the Government of Poland, as well as in his adaptation and
criticism of the Polysynodie of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, a scheme of local
government for France, born out of its due time.

The point in Rousseau's theory of Sovereignty that offers most difficulty is
his view (Book II, chap, vii) that, for every State, a Legislator is necessary.
We shall understand the section only by realising that the legislator is, in
fact, in Rousseau's system, the spirit of institutions personified; his place, in
a developed society, is taken by the whole complex of social custom,
organisation and tradition that has grown up with the State. This is made
clearer by the fact that the legislator is not to exercise legislative power; he
is merely to submit his suggestions for popular approval. Thus Rousseau
recognises that, in the case of institutions and traditions as elsewhere, will,
and not force, is the basis of the State.
This may be seen in his treatment of law as a whole (Book II, chap, vi),
which deserves very careful attention. He defines laws as "acts of the
general will," and, agreeing with Montesquieu in making law the "condition
of civil association," goes beyond him only in tracing it more definitely to
its origin in an act of will. The Social Contract renders law necessary, and at
the same time makes it quite clear that laws can proceed only from the body
of citizens who have constituted the State. "Doubtless," says Rousseau,
"there is a universal justice emanating from reason alone; but this justice, to
be admitted among us, must be mutual. Humbly speaking, in default of
natural sanctions, the laws of justice are ineffective among men." Of the
law which set up among men this reign of mutual justice the General Will is
the source.
We thus come at last to the General Will, the most disputed, and certainly
the most fundamental, of all Rousseau's political concepts. No critic of the
Social Contract has found it easy to say either what precisely its author
meant by it, or what is its final value for political philosophy. The difficulty
is increased because Rousseau himself sometimes halts in the sense which
he assigns to it, and even seems to suggest by it two different ideas. Of its
broad meaning, however, there can be no doubt. The effect of the Social
Contract is the creation of a new individual. When it has taken place, "at
once, in place of the individual personality of each contracting party, the act
of association creates a moral and collective body, composed of as many
members as the assembly contains voters, and receiving from the act its
unity, its common identity (moi commun), its life and its will" (Book I,
chap. vi). The same doctrine had been stated earlier, in the Political
Economy, without the historical setting. "The body politic is also a moral

being, possessed of a will, and this general will, which tends always to the
preservation and welfare of the whole and of every part, and is the source of
the laws, constitutes for all the members of the State, in their relations to
one another and to it, the rule of what is just or unjust." It will be seen at
once that the second statement, which could easily be fortified by others
from the Social Contract, says more than the first. It is not apparent that the
common will, created by the institution of society, need "tend always to the
welfare of the whole." Is not the common will at least as fallible as the will
of a single individual? May it not equally be led away from its true interests
to the pursuit of pleasure or of something which is really harmful to it?
And, if the whole society may vote what conduces to the momentary
pleasure of all the members and at the same time to the lasting damage of
the State as a whole, is it not still more likely that some of the members will
try to secure their private interests in opposition to those of the whole and
of others? All these questions, and others like them, have been asked by
critics of the conception of the General Will.
Two main points are involved, to one of which Rousseau gives a clear and
definite answer. "There is often," he says, "a great deal of difference
between the will of all and the general will; the latter takes account only of
the common interest, while the former takes private interest into account,
and is no more than a sum of particular wills." "The agreement of all
interests is formed by opposition to that of each" (Book II, chap. iii). It is
indeed possible for a citizen, when an issue is presented to him, to vote not
for the good of the State, but for his own good; but, in such a case, his vote,
from the point of view of the General Will, is merely negligible. But "does
it follow that the general will is exterminated or corrupted? Not at all: it is
always constant, unalterable, and pure; but it is subordinated to other wills
which encroach upon its sphere.... The fault [each man] commits [in
detaching his interest from the common interest] is that of changing the
state of the question, and answering something different from what he is
asked. Instead of saying by his vote 'It is to the advantage of the State,' he
says, 'It is to the advantage of this or that man or party that this or that view
should prevail.' Thus the law of public order in assemblies is not so much to
maintain in them the general will as to secure that the question be always
put to it, and the answer always given by it" (Book IV, chap. i). These
passages, with many others that may be found in the text, make it quite
clear that by the General Will Rousseau means something quite distinct

from the Will of All, with which it should never have been confused. The
only excuse for such confusion lies in his view that when, in a city-state, all
particular associations are avoided, votes guided by individual self-interest
will always cancel one another, so that majority voting will always result in
the General Will. This is clearly not the case, and in this respect we may
charge him with pushing the democratic argument too far. The point,
however, can be better dealt with at a later stage. Rousseau makes no
pretence that the mere voice of a majority is infallible; he only says, at the
most, that, given his ideal conditions, it would be so.
The second main point raised by critics of the General Will is whether in
defining it as a will directed solely to the common interest, Rousseau means
to exclude acts of public immorality and short-sightedness. He answers the
questions in different ways. First, an act of public immorality would be
merely an unanimous instance of selfishness, different in no particular, from
similar acts less unanimous, and therefore forming no part of a General
Will. Secondly, a mere ignorance of our own and the State's good, entirely
unprompted by selfish desires, does not make our will anti-social or
individual. "The general will is always right and tends to the public
advantage; but it does not follow that the deliberations of the people are
always equally correct. Our will is always for our own good, but we do not
always see what that is: the people is never corrupted, but it is often
deceived, and on such occasions only does it seem to will what is bad"
(Book II, chap. iii). It is impossible to acquit Rousseau in some of the
passages in which he treats of the General Will, of something worse than
obscurity—positive contradiction. It is probable, indeed, that he never quite
succeeded in getting his view clear in his own mind; there is nearly always,
in his treatment of it, a certain amount of muddle and fluctuation. These
difficulties the student must be left to worry out for himself; it is only
possible to present, in outline, what Rousseau meant to convey.
The treatment of the General Will in the Political Economy is brief and
lucid, and furnishes the best guide to his meaning. The definition of it in
this work, which has already been quoted, is followed by a short account of
the nature of general wills as a whole. "Every political society is composed
of other smaller societies of various kinds, each of which has its interest and
rules of conduct; but those societies which everybody perceives, because
they have an external or authorised form, are not the only ones that actually

exist in the State: all individuals who are united by a common interest
compose as many others, either temporary or permanent, whose influence is
none the less real because it is less apparent.... The influence of all these
tacit or formal associations causes by the influence of their will as many
modifications of the public will. The will of these particular societies has
always two relations; for the members of the association, it is a general will;
for the great society, it is a particular will; and it is often right with regard to
the first object and wrong as to the second. The most general will is always
the most just, and the voice of the people is, in fact, the voice of God."
The General Will, Rousseau continues in substance, is always for the
common good; but it is sometimes divided into smaller general wills, which
are wrong in relation to it. The supremacy of the great General Will is "the
first principle of public economy and the fundamental rule of government."
In this passage, which differs only in clearness and simplicity from others in
the Social Contract itself, it is easy to see how far Rousseau had in his mind
a perfectly definite idea. Every association of several persons creates a new
common will; every association of a permanent character has already a
"personality" of its own, and in consequence a "general" will; the State, the
highest known form of association, is a fully developed moral and
collective being with a common will which is, in the highest sense yet
known to us, general. All such wills are general only for the members of the
associations Which exercise them; for outsiders, or rather for other
associations, they are purely particular wills. This applies even to the State;
"for, in relation to what is outside it, the State becomes a simple being, an
individual" (Social Contract, Book I. chap. vii). In certain passages in the
Social Contract, in his criticism of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre's Project of
Perpetual Peace, and in the second chapter of the original draft of the
Social Contract, Rousseau takes into account the possibility of a still higher
individual, "the federation of the world." In the Political Economy, thinking
of the nation-state, he affirms what in the Social Contract (Book II, chap,
iii) he denies of the city, and recognises that the life of a nation is made up
of the whole complex of its institutions, and that the existence of lesser
general wills is not necessarily a menace to the General Will of the State. In
the Social Contract, he only treats of these lesser wills in relation to the
government, which, he shows, has a will of its own, general for its
members, but particular for the State as a whole (Book III, chap. ii). This
governmental will he there prefers to call corporate will, and by this name

it will be convenient to distinguish the lesser general wills from the General
Will of the State that is over them all.
So far, there is no great difficulty; but in discussing the infallibility of the
General Will we are on more dangerous ground. Rousseau's treatment here
clearly oscillates between regarding it as a purely ideal conception, to
which human institutions can only approximate, and holding it to be
realised actually in every republican State, i.e. wherever the people is the
Sovereign in fact as well as in right. Book IV, chap, ii is the most startling
passage expressing the latter view. "When in the popular assembly a law is
proposed, what the people is asked is not exactly whether it accepts or
rejects the proposal, but whether it is in conformity with the general will,
which is its will.... When, therefore, the opinion that is contrary to my own
prevails, this proves neither more nor less than that I was mistaken, and that
what I thought to be the general will was not so." On his own principles laid
down elsewhere, Rousseau would have to admit that it proves nothing of
the sort, except in so far as the other voters have been guided by the general
interest. Though he sometimes affirms the opposite, there is no security on
his principles that the will of the majority will be the General Will. At the
most it can only be said that there is a greater chance of its being general
than of the will of any selected class of persons not being led away by
corporate interests. The justification of democracy is not that it is always
right, even in intention, but that it is more general than any other kind of
supreme power.
Fundamentally, however, the doctrine of the General Will is independent of
these contradictions. Apart from Kant's narrow and rigid logic, it is
essentially one with his doctrine of the autonomy of the will. Kant takes
Rousseau's political theory, and applies it to ethics as a whole. The germ of
mis application is already found in Rousseau's own work; for he protests
more than once against attempts to treat moral and political philosophy
apart, as distinct studies, and asserts their absolute unity. This is brought out
clearly in the Social Contract (Book I, chap, viii), where he is speaking of
the change brought about by the establishment of society. "The passage
from the state of nature to the civil state produces a very remarkable change
in man, by substituting justice for instinct in his conduct, and giving his
actions the morality they had hitherto lacked.... What man loses by the
social contract is his natural liberty and an unlimited right to everything he

tries to get and succeeds in getting; what he gains is civil liberty ... which is
limited by the general will.... We might, over and above all this, add to what
man acquires in the civil state moral liberty, which alone makes him truly
master of himself; for the mere impulse of appetite is slavery, while
obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves is liberty."
This one chapter contains the gist of the Kantian moral philosophy, and
makes it quite clear that Rousseau perceived its application to ethics as well
as to politics. The morality of our acts consists in their being directed in
accordance with universal law; acts in which we are guided merely by our
passions are not moral. Further, man can only possess freedom when his
whole being is unified in the pursuit of a single end; and, as his whole being
can be unified only in pursuit of a rational end, which alone excludes
contradiction, only moral acts, only men directing their lives by universal
law, are free. In Kantian language, the will is autonomous (i.e. prescribes to
itself its own law) only when it is directed to a universal end; when it is
guided by selfish passions, or particular considerations, it is heteronomous
(i.e. receives its law from something external to itself), and in bondage.
Rousseau, as he says (Book I, chap, viii), was not directly concerned with
the ethical sense of the word "liberty," and Kant was, therefore, left to
develop the doctrine into a system; but the phrases of this chapter prove
false the view that the doctrine of a Real Will arises first in connection with
politics, and is only transferred thence to moral philosophy. Rousseau bases
his political doctrine throughout on his view of human freedom; it is
because man is a free agent capable of being determined by a universal law
prescribed by himself that the State is in like manner capable of realising
the General Will, that is, of prescribing to itself and its members a similar
universal law.
The General Will, then, is the application of human freedom to political
institutions. Before the value of this conception can be determined, there is
a criticism to be met. The freedom which is realised in the General Will, we
are told, is the freedom of the State as a whole; but the State exists to secure
individual freedom for its members. A free State may be tyrannical; a
despot may allow his subjects every freedom. What guarantee is there that
the State, in freeing itself, will not enslave its members? This criticism has
been made with such regularity that it has to be answered in some detail.

"The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect
with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and
in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone,
and remain as free as before." "The clauses of the contract ... are
everywhere the same and everywhere tacitly admitted and recognised....
These clauses, properly understood, may be reduced to one—the total
alienation of each associate, together with all his rights, to the whole
community...; for, if the individuals retained certain rights, as there would
be no common superior to decide between them and the public, each, being
on one point his own judge, would ask to be so on all, and the state of
nature would continue" (Book I, chap. vi). Rousseau sees clearly that it is
impossible to place any limits upon the power of the State; when the people
combine into a State, they must in the end submit to be guided in all things
by the will of the effective majority. Limited Sovereignty is a contradiction
in terms; the Sovereign has a right to all that reason allows it, and as soon as
reason demands that the State shall interfere, no appeal to individual rights
can be made. What is best for the State must be suffered by the individual.
This, however, is very far from meaning that the ruling power ought, or has
the moral right, to interfere in every particular case. Rousseau has been
subjected to much foolish criticism because, after upholding the State's
absolute supremacy, he goes on (Book II, chap, iv) to speak of "the limits of
the sovereign power." There is no contradiction whatsoever. Wherever State
intervention is for the best, the State has a right to intervene; but it has no
moral right, though it must have a legal right, to intervene where it is not for
the best. The General Will, being always in the right, will intervene only
when intervention is proper. "The Sovereign," therefore, "cannot impose
upon its subjects any fetters that are useless to the community, nor can it
even wish to do so." As, however, the infallibility of the General Will is not
enough to make the State infallible, there still remains an objection. Since
the General Will cannot always be arrived at, who is to judge whether an act
of intervention is justified? Rousseau's answer fails to satisfy many of his
critics. "Each man alienates, I admit, by the social compact, only such part
of his powers, goods and liberty as it is important for the community to
control; but it must also be granted that the Sovereign is sole judge of what
is important." This, we are told, is mere State tyranny over again. But how
is it possible to avoid such a conclusion? Rousseau has already given his
reasons for objecting to a limited Sovereignty (Book I, chap, vi): it follows

absolutely that we must take the best machinery we can find for the
execution of the State's functions. No doubt the machinery will be
imperfect; but we can only try to get as near the General Will as possible,
without hoping to realise it fully.
The answer, therefore, to the critics who hold that, in securing civil liberty
Rousseau has sacrificed the individual may be put after this fashion. Liberty
is not a merely negative conception; it does not consist solely in the absence
of restraint. The purest individualist, Herbert Spencer for example, would
grant that a certain amount of State interference is necessary to secure
liberty; but as soon as this idea of securing liberty is admitted in the
smallest degree, the whole idea has undergone profound modification. It
can no longer be claimed that every interference on the part of the State
lessens the liberty of the individual; the "liberty-fund" theory is as
untenable as that of the "wages-fund": the members of a State may be more
free when all are restrained from doing one another mutual damage than
when any one is left "free" to enslave another or be himself enslaved. This
principle once admitted, the precise amount of State interference that is
necessary to secure freedom will be always a matter for particular
discussion; every case must be decided on its own merits, and, in right, the
Sovereign will be omnipotent, or subject only to the law of reason.

It has often been held that Rousseau cannot really have inspired the French
Revolution because this view is totally inconsistent with the "rights of
man," which the revolutionaries so fervently proclaimed. If every right is
alienated in the Social Contract, what sense can there be in talking of
"natural rights" afterwards? This, however, is to misrepresent Rousseau's
position. The rights of man as they are preached by the modern
individualist, are not the rights of which Rousseau and the revolutionaries
were thinking. We have seen that the theory of the Social Contract is
founded on human freedom: this freedom carries with it, in Rousseau's
view, the guarantee of its own permanence; it is inalienable and
indestructible. When, therefore, government becomes despotic, it has no
more right over its subjects than the master has over his slave (Book I,
chap, iv); the question is then purely one of might. In such cases, appeal
may be made either to the terms of the Social Contract, or, putting the same
idea another way, to the "natural right" of human freedom. This natural
right is in no sense inconsistent with the complete alienation supposed in
the Contract; for the Contract itself reposes on it and guarantees its
maintenance. The Sovereign must, therefore, treat all its members alike;
but, so long as it does this, it remains omnipotent. If it leaves the general for
the particular, and treats one man better than another, it ceases to be
Sovereign; but equality is already presupposed in the terms of the Contract.
It is more profitable to attack Rousseau for his facile identification of the
interests of each of the citizens with those of all; but here, too, most of the
critics have abused their opportunity. He does not maintain that there can be
no opposition between a man's particular interests and the General Will as
present in him; on the contrary, he explicitly and consistently affirms the
presence of such opposition (Book I, chap. vii). What he asserts is, first,
that the Sovereign, as such, cannot have any interest contrary to the interest
of the citizens as a whole—that is obvious; and, secondly, that it cannot
have an interest contrary to that of any individual. The second point
Rousseau proves by showing that the omnipotence of the Sovereign is
essential to the preservation of society, which in turn is necessary for the
individual. His argument, however, really rests on the fundamental
character of the General Will. He would admit that, in any actual State, the
apparent interest of the many might often conflict with that of the few; but
he would contend that the real interest of State and individual alike, being

subject to universal law could not be such as to conflict with any other real
interest. The interest of the State, in so far as it is directed by the General
Will, must be the interest of every individual, in so far as he is guided by his
real will, that is, in so far as he is acting universally, rationally and
autonomously.
Thus the justification of Rousseau's theory of liberty returns to the point
from which it set out—the omnipotence of the real will in State and
individual. It is in this sense that he speaks of man in the State as "forced to
be free" by the General Will, much as Kant might speak of a man's lower
nature as forced to be free by the universal mandate of his higher, more real
and more rational will. It is in this recognition of the State as a moral being,
with powers of determination similar to the powers of the individual mind,
that the significance of the General Will ultimately lies. Even, however,
among those who have recognised its meaning, there are some who deny its
value as a conception of political philosophy. If, they say, the General Will
is not the Will of All, if it cannot be arrived at by a majority vote or by any
system of voting whatsoever, then it is nothing; it is a mere abstraction,
neither general, nor a I will. This is, of course, precisely the criticism to
which Kant's "real will" is often subjected. Clearly, it must be granted at
once that the General Will does not form the whole actual content of the
will of every citizen. Regarded as actual, it must always be qualified by "in
so far as" or its equivalent. This, however, is so far from destroying the
value of the conception that therein lies its whole value. In seeking the
universal basis of society, we are not seeking anything that is wholly
actualised in any State, though we must be seeking something which exists,
more or less perfectly, in every State.
The point of the Social Contract theory, as Rousseau states it, is that
legitimate society exists by the consent of the people, and acts by popular
will. Active will, and not force or even mere consent, is the basis of the
"republican" State, which can only possess this character because individual
wills are not really self-sufficient and separate, but complementary and
inter-dependent. The answer to the question "Why ought I to obey the
General Will?" is that the General Will exists in me and not outside me. I
am "obeying only myself," as Rousseau says. The State is not a mere
accident of human history, a mere device for the protection of life and
property; it responds to a fundamental need of human nature, and is rooted

in the character of the individuals who compose it. The whole complex of
human institutions is not a mere artificial structure; it is the expression of
the mutual dependence and fellowship of men. If it means anything, the
theory of the General Will means that the State is natural, and the "state of
nature" an abstraction. Without this basis of will and natural need, no
society could for a moment subsist; the State exists and claims our
obedience because it is a natural extension of our personality.
The problem, however, still remains of making the General Will, in any
particular State, active and conscious. It is clear that there are States in
which visible and recognised institutions hardly answer in any respect to its
requirements. Even in such States, however, there is a limit to tyranny; deep
down, in immemorial customs with which the despot dare not interfere, the
General Will is still active and important. It does not reside merely in the
outward and visible organisation of social institutions, in that complex of
formal associations which we may call the State; its roots go deeper and its
branches spread further. It is realised, in greater or less degree, in the whole
life of the community, in the entire complex of private and public relations
which, in the widest sense, may be called Society. We may recognise it not
only in a Parliament, a Church, a University or a Trade Union, but also in
the most intimate human relationships, and the most trivial, as well as the
most vital, social customs.
But, if all these things go to the making of the General Will in every
community, the General Will has, for politics, primarily a narrower sense.
The problem here is to secure its supremacy in the official institutions and
public councils of the nation. This is the question to which Rousseau chiefly
addressed himself. Here, too, we shall find the General Will the best
possible conception for the guidance of political endeavour For the General
Will is realised not when that is done which is best for the community, but
when, in addition, the community as a whole has willed the doing of it. The
General Will demands not only good government, but also self-government
—not only rational conduct, but good-will. This is what some of Rousseau's
admirers are apt to forget when they use his argument, as he himself was
sometimes inclined to use it, in support of pure aristocracy. Rousseau said
that aristocracy was the best of all governments, but he said also that it was
the worst of all usurpers of Sovereignty. Nor must it be forgotten that he
expressly specified elective aristocracy. There is no General Will unless the

people wills the good. General Will may be embodied in one man willing
universally; but it can only be embodied in the State when the mass of the
citizens so wills. The will must be "general" in two senses: in the sense in
which Rousseau used the word, it must be general in its object, i.e.
universal; but it must also be generally held, i.e. common to all or to the
majority.[1]
The General Will is, then, above all a universal and, in the Kantian sense, a
"rational" will. It would be possible to find in Rousseau many more
anticipations of the views of Kant; but it is better here to confine comment
to an important difference between them. It is surprising to find in Kant, the
originator of modern "intellectualism," and in Rousseau, the great apostle of
"sentiment," an essentially similar view on the nature and function of the
will. Their views, however, present a difference; for, whereas the moving
force of Kant's moral imperative is purely "rational," Rousseau finds the
sanction of his General Will in human feeling itself. As we can see from a
passage in the original draft of the Social Contract, the General Will
remains purely rational. "No-one will dispute that the General Will is in
each individual a pure act of the understanding, which reasons while the
passions are silent on what a man may demand of his neighbour and on
what his neighbour has a right to demand of him." The will remains purely
rational, but Rousseau feels that it needs an external motive power. "If
natural law," he writes, "were written only on the tablets of human reason it
would be incapable of guiding the greater part of our actions; but it is also
graven on the heart of man in characters that cannot be effaced, and it is
there it speaks to him more strongly than all the precepts of the
philosophers" (from an unfinished essay on The State of War). The nature of
this guiding sentiment is explained in the Discourse on Inequality (p. 197,
note 2), where egoism (amour-propre) is contrasted with self-respect
(amour de soi). Naturally, Rousseau holds, man does not want everything
for himself, and nothing for others. "Egoism" and "altruism" are both onesided qualities arising out of the perversion of man's, "natural goodness."
"Man is born good," that is, man's nature really makes him desire only to be
treated as one among others, to share equally. This natural love of equality
(amour de soi) includes love of others as well as love of self, and egoism,
loving one's self at the expense of others, is an unnatural and perverted
condition. The "rational" precepts of the General Will, therefore, find an
echo in the heart of the "natural" man, and, if we can only secure the human

being against perversion by existing societies, the General Will can be made
actual.
This is the meeting-point of Rousseau's educational with his political
theory. His view as a whole can be studied only by taking together the
Social Contract and the Emile as explained by the Letters on the Mount and
other works. The fundamental dogma of the natural goodness of man finds
no place directly in the Social Contract; but it lurks behind the whole of his
political theory, and is indeed, throughout, his master-conception. His
educational, his religious, his political and his ethical ideas are all inspired
by a single consistent attitude. Here we have been attending only to his
political theory; in the volume which is to follow, containing the Letters on
the Mount and other works, some attempt will be made to draw the various
threads together and estimate his work as a whole. The political works,
however, can be read separately, and the Social Contract itself is still by far
the best of all text-books of political philosophy. Rousseau's political
influence, so far from being dead, is every day increasing; and as new
generations and new classes of men come to the study of his work, his
conceptions, often hazy and undeveloped, but nearly always of lasting
value, will assuredly form the basis of a new political philosophy, in which
they will be taken up and transformed. This new philosophy is the work of
the future; but, rooted upon the conception of Rousseau, it will stretch far
back into the past. Of our time, it will be for all time; its solutions will be at
once relatively permanent and ceaselessly progressive.
G. D. H. COLE.

[1] The term "general" will means, in Rousseau, not so much "will held by several persons," as will
having a general (universal) object. This is often misunderstood; but the mistake matters the less,
because the General Will must, in fact, be both.

A NOTE ON BOOKS
There are few good books in English on Rousseau's politics. By far the best
treatment is to be found in Mr. Bernard Bosanquet's Philosophical Theory
of the State. Viscount Morley's Rousseau is a good life, but is not of much

use as a criticism of views; Mr. W. Boyd's The Educational Theory of
Rousseau contains some fairly good chapters on the political views. D. G.
Ritchie's Darwin and Hegel includes an admirable essay on The Social
Contract Theory and another on Sovereignty. The English translation of
Professor Gran's Rousseau is an interesting biography.
In French, there is a good cheap edition of Rousseau's complete works
published by Hachette in thirteen volumes. M. Dreyfus-Brisac's great
edition of the Contrat Social is indispensable, and there is a good small
edition with notes by M. Georges Beaulavon. M. Faguet's study of
Rousseau in his Dix-huitième siècle—études littéraires and his Politique
comparée de Montesquieu, Voltaire et Rousseau are useful, though I am
seldom in agreement with them. M. Henri Rodet's Le Contrat Social et les
idées politiques de J. J. Rousseau is useful, if not inspired, and there are
interesting works by MM. Chuquet, Fabre and Lemaître. The French
translation of Professor Höffding's little volume on Rousseau: sa vie et sa
philosophie is admirable.
Miss Foxley's translation of the Emile, especially of Book V, should be
studied in connection with the Social Contract. A companion volume,
containing the Letters on the Mount and other works, will be issued shortly.
G. D. H. C.
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THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
OR

PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL
RIGHT

Fœderis æquas
Dicamus leges. (Vergil, Æneid XI.)

FOREWORD

This little treatise is part of a longer work which I began years ago without
realising my limitations, and long since abandoned. Of the various
fragments that might have been extracted from what I wrote, this is the

most considerable, and, I think, the least unworthy of being offered to the
public. The rest no longer exists.

BOOK I
I mean to inquire if, in the civil order, there can be any sure and legitimate
rule of administration, men being taken as they are and laws as they might
be. In this inquiry I shall endeavour always to unite what right sanctions
with what is prescribed by interest, in order that justice and utility may in
no case be divided.
I enter upon my task without proving the importance of the subject I shall
be asked if I am a prince or a legislator, to write on politics. I answer that I
am neither, and that is why I do so. If I were a prince or a legislator, I
should not waste time in saying what wants doing; I should do it, or hold
my peace.
As I was born a citizen of a free State, and a member of the Sovereign, I
feel that, however feeble the influence my voice can have on public affairs,
the right of voting on them makes it my duty to study them: and I am happy,
when I reflect upon governments, to find my inquiries always furnish me
with new reasons for loving that of my own country.

CHAPTER I

SUBJECT OF THE FIRST BOOK
Man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains. One thinks himself the
master of others, and still remains a greater slave than they. How did this
change come about? I do not know. What can make it legitimate? That
question I think I can answer.

If I took into account only force, and the effects derived from it, I should
say: "As long as a people is compelled to obey, and obeys, it does well; as
soon as it can shake off the yoke, and shakes it off, it does still better; for,
regaining its liberty by the same right as took it away, either it is justified in
resuming it, or there was no justification for those who took it away." But
the social order is a sacred right which is the basis of all other rights.
Nevertheless, this right does not come from nature, and must therefore be
founded on conventions. Before coming to that, I have to prove what I have
just asserted.

CHAPTER II

THE FIRST SOCIETIES
The most ancient of all societies, and the only one that is natural is the
family: and even so the children remain attached to the father only so long
as they need him for their preservation. As soon as this need ceases, the
natural bond is dissolved. The children, released from the obedience they
owed to the father, and the father, released from the care he owed his
children, return equally to independence. If they remain united, they
continue so no longer naturally, but voluntarily; and the family itself is then
maintained only by convention.
This common liberty results from the nature of man. His first law is to
provide for his own preservation, his first cares are those which he owes to
himself; and, as soon as he reaches years of discretion, he is the sole judge
of the proper means of preserving himself, and consequently becomes his
own master.
The family then may be called the first model of political societies: the ruler
corresponds to the father, and the people to the children; and all, being born
free and equal, alienate their liberty only for their own advantage. The
whole difference is that, in the family, the love of the father for his children
repays him for the care he takes of them, while, in the State, the pleasure of

commanding takes the place of the love which the chief cannot have for the
peoples under him.
Grotius denies that all human power is established in favour of the
governed, and quotes slavery as an example. His usual method of reasoning
is constantly to establish right by fact.[1] It would be possible to employ a
more logical method, but none could be more favourable to tyrants.
It is then, according to Grotius, doubtful whether the human race belongs to
a hundred men, or that hundred men to the human race: and, throughout his
book, he seems to incline to the former alternative, which is also the view
of Hobbes. On this showing, the human species is divided into so many
herds of cattle, each with its ruler, who keeps guard over them for the
purpose of devouring them.
As a shepherd is of a nature superior to that of his flock, the shepherds of
men, i.e. their rulers, are of a nature superior to that of the peoples under
them. Thus, Philo tells us, the Emperor Caligula reasoned, concluding
equally well either that kings were gods, or that men were beasts.
The reasoning of Caligula agrees with that of Hobbes and Grotius.
Aristotle, before any of them, had said that men are by no means equal
naturally, but that some are born for slavery, and others for dominion.
Aristotle was right; but he took the effect for the cause. Nothing can be
more certain than that every man born in slavery is born for slavery. Slaves
lose everything in their chains, even the desire of escaping from them: they
love their servitude, as the comrades of Ulysses loved their brutish
condition.[2] If then there are slaves by nature, it is because there have been
slaves against nature. Force made the first slaves, and their cowardice
perpetuated the condition.
I have said nothing of King Adam, or Emperor Noah, father of the three
great monarchs who shared out the universe, like the children of Saturn,
whom some scholars have recognised in them. I trust to getting due thanks
for my moderation; for, being a direct descendant of one of these princes,
perhaps of the eldest branch, how do I know that a verification of titles
might not leave me the legitimate king of the human race? In any case,
there can be no doubt that Adam was sovereign of the world, as Robinson
Crusoe was of his island, as long as he was its only inhabitant; and this

empire had the advantage that the monarch, safe on his throne, had no
rebellions, wars, or conspirators to fear.
[1] "Learned inquiries into public right are often only the history of past abuses; and troubling to
study them too deeply is a profitless infatuation" (Essay on the Interests of France in Relation to its
Neighbours, by the Marquis d'Argenson). This is exactly what Grotius has done.
[2] See a short treatise of Plutarch's entitled "That Animals Reason."

CHAPTER III

THE RIGHT OF THE STRONGEST
The strongest is never strong enough to be always the master, unless he
transforms strength into right, and obedience into duty. Hence the right of
the strongest, which, though to all seeming meant ironically, is really laid
down as a fundamental principle. But are we never to have an explanation
of this phrase? Force is a physical power, and I fail to see what moral effect
it can have. To yield to force is an act of necessity, not of will—at the most,
an act of prudence. In what sense can it be a duty?
Suppose for a moment that this so-called "right" exists. I maintain that the
sole result is a mass of inexplicable nonsense. For, if force creates right, the
effect changes with the cause: every force that is greater than the first
succeeds to its right. As soon as it is possible to disobey with impunity,
disobedience is legitimate; and, the strongest being always in the right, the
only thing that matters is to act so as to become the strongest. But what kind
of right is that which perishes when force fails? If we must obey perforce,
there is no need to obey because we ought; and if we are not forced to obey,
we are under no obligation to do so. Clearly, the word "right" adds nothing
to force: in this connection, it means absolutely nothing.
Obey the powers that be. If this means yield to force, it is a good precept,
but superfluous: I can answer for its never being violated. All power comes
from God, I admit; but so does all sickness: does that mean that we are
forbidden to call in the doctor? A brigand surprises me at the edge of a

wood: must I not merely surrender my purse on compulsion; but, even if I
could withhold it, am I in conscience bound to give it up? For certainly the
pistol he holds is also a power.
Let us then admit that force does not create right, and that we are obliged to
obey only legitimate powers. In that case, my original question recurs.

CHAPTER IV

SLAVERY
Since no man has a natural authority over his fellow, and force creates no
right, we must conclude that conventions form the basis of all legitimate
authority among men.
If an individual, says Grotius, can alienate his liberty and make himself the
slave of a master, why could not a whole people do the same and make
itself subject to a king? There are in this passage plenty of ambiguous
words which would need explaining; but let us confine ourselves to the
word alienate. To alienate is to give or to sell. Now, a man who becomes
the slave of another does not give himself; he sells himself, at the least for
his subsistence: but for what does a people sell itself? A king is so far from
furnishing his subjects with their subsistence that he gets his own only from
them; and, according to Rabelais, kings do not live on nothing. Do subjects
then give their persons on condition that the king takes their goods also? I
fail to see what they have left to preserve.
It will be said that the despot assures his subjects civil tranquillity. Granted;
but what do they gain, if the wars his ambition brings down upon them, his
insatiable avidity, and the vexatious conduct of his ministers press harder on
them than their own dissensions would have done? What do they gain, if
the very tranquillity they enjoy is one of their miseries? Tranquillity is
found also in dungeons; but is that enough to make them desirable places to
live in? The Greeks imprisoned in the cave of the Cyclops lived there very
tranquilly, while they were awaiting their turn to be devoured.

To say that a man gives himself gratuitously, is to say what is absurd and
inconceivable; such an act is null and illegitimate, from the mere fact that
he who does it is out of his mind. To say the same of a whole people is to
suppose a people of madmen; and madness creates no right.
Even if each man could alienate himself, he could not alienate his children:
they are born men and free; their liberty belongs to them, and no one but
they has the right to dispose of it. Before they come to years of discretion,
the father can, in their name, lay down conditions for their preservation and
well-being, but he cannot give them, irrevocably and without conditions:
such a gift is contrary to the ends of nature, and exceeds the rights of
paternity. It would therefore be necessary, in order to legitimise an arbitrary
government, that in every generation the people should be in a position to
accept or reject it; but, were this so, the government would be no longer
arbitrary.
To renounce liberty is to renounce being a man, to surrender the rights of
humanity and even its duties. For him who renounces everything no
indemnity is possible. Such a renunciation is incompatible with man's
nature; to remove all liberty from his will is to remove all morality from his
acts. Finally, it is an empty and contradictory convention that sets up, on the
one side, absolute authority, and, on the other, unlimited obedience. Is it not
clear that we can be under no obligation to a person from whom we have
the right to exact everything? Does not this condition alone, in the absence
of equivalence or exchange, in itself involve the nullity of the act? For what
right can my slave have against me, when all that he has belongs to me,
and, his right being mine, this right of mine against myself is a phrase
devoid of meaning?
Grotius and the rest find in war another origin for the so-called right of
slavery. The victor having, as they hold, the right of killing the vanquished,
the latter can buy back his life at the price of his liberty; and this convention
is the more legitimate because it is to the advantage of both parties.
But it is clear that this supposed right to kill the conquered is by no means
deducible from the state of war. Men, from the mere fact that, while they
are living in their primitive independence, they have no mutual relations
stable enough to constitute either the state of peace or the state of war,
cannot be naturally enemies. War is constituted by a relation between

things, and not between persons; and, as the state of war cannot arise out of
simple personal relations, but only out of real relations, private war, or war
of man with man, can exist neither in the state of nature, where there is no
constant property, nor in the social state, where everything is under the
authority of the laws.
Individual combats, duels and encounters, are acts which cannot constitute
a state; while the private wars, authorised by the Establishments of Louis
IX, King of France, and suspended by the Peace of God, are abuses of
feudalism, in itself an absurd system if ever there was one, and contrary to
the principles of natural right and to all good polity.
War then is a relation, not between man and man, but between State and
State, and individuals are enemies only accidentally, not as men, nor even
as citizens,[1] but as soldiers; not as members of their country, but as its
defenders. Finally, each State can have for enemies only other States, and
not men; for between things disparate in nature there can be no real relation.
Furthermore, this principle is in conformity with the established rules of all
times and the constant practice of all civilised peoples. Declarations of war
are intimations less to powers than to their subjects. The foreigner, whether
king, individual, or people, who robs, kills or detains the subjects, without
declaring war on the prince, is not an enemy, but a brigand. Even in real
war, a just prince, while laying hands, in the enemy's country, on all that
belongs to the public, respects the lives and goods of individuals: he
respects rights on which his own are founded. The object of the war being
the destruction of the hostile State, the other side has a right to kill its
defenders, while they are bearing arms; but as soon as they lay them down
and surrender, they cease to be enemies or instruments of the enemy, and
become once more merely men, whose life no one has any right to take.
Sometimes it is possible to kill the State without killing a single one of its
members; and war gives no right which is not necessary to the gaining of its
object. These principles are not those of Grotius: they are not based on the
authority of poets, but derived from the nature of reality and based on
reason.
The right of conquest has no foundation other than the right of the
strongest. If war does not give the conqueror the right to massacre the
conquered peoples, the right to enslave them cannot be based upon a right

which does not exist No one has a right to kill an enemy except when he
cannot make him a slave, and the right to enslave him cannot therefore be
derived from the right to kill him. It is accordingly an unfair exchange to
make him buy at the price of his liberty his life, over which the victor holds
no right. Is it not clear that there is a vicious circle in founding the right of
life and death on the right of slavery, and the right of slavery on the right of
life and death?
Even if we assume this terrible right to kill everybody, I maintain that a
slave made in war, or a conquered people, is under no obligation to a
master, except to obey him as far as he is compelled to do so. By taking an
equivalent for his life, the victor has not done him a favour; instead of
killing him without profit, he has killed him usefully. So far then is he from
acquiring over him any authority in addition to that of force, that the state of
war continues to subsist between them: their mutual relation is the effect of
it, and the usage of the right of war does not imply a treaty of peace. A
convention has indeed been made; but this convention, so far from
destroying the state of war, presupposes its continuance.
So, from whatever aspect we regard the question, the right of slavery is null
and void, not only as being illegitimate, but also because it is absurd and
meaningless. The words slave and right contradict each other, and are
mutually exclusive. It will always be equally foolish for a man to say to a
man or to a people: "I make with you a convention wholly at your expense
and wholly to my advantage; I shall keep it as long as I like, and you will
keep it as long as I like."

[1] The Romans, who understood and respected the right of war more than any other nation on earth,
carried their scruples on this head so far that a citizen was not allowed to serve as a volunteer without
engaging himself expressly against the enemy, and against such and such an enemy by name. A
legion in which the younger Cato was seeing his first service under Popilius having been
reconstructed, the elder Cato wrote to Popilius that, if he wished his son to continue serving under
him, he must administer to him a new military oath, because, the first having been annulled, he was
no longer able to bear arms against the enemy. The same Cato wrote to his son telling him to take
great care not to go into battle before taking this new oath. I know that the siege of Clusium and other
isolated events can be quoted against me; but I am citing laws and customs. The Romans are the
people that least often transgressed its laws; and no other people has had such good ones.

CHAPTER V

THAT WE MUST ALWAYS GO BACK TO A FIRST CONVENTION
Even if I granted all that I have been refuting, the friends of despotism
would be no better off. There will always be a great difference between
subduing a multitude and ruling a society. Even if scattered individuals
were successively enslaved by one man, however numerous they might be,
I still see no more than a master and his slaves, and certainly not a people
and its ruler; I see what may be termed an aggregation, but not an
association; there is as yet neither public good nor body politic. The man in
question, even if he has enslaved half the world, is still only an individual;
his interest, apart from that of others, is still a purely private interest. If this
same man comes to die, his empire, after him, remains scattered and
without unity, as an oak falls and dissolves into a heap of ashes when the
fire has consumed it.
A people, says Grotius, can give itself to a king. Then, according to Grotius,
a people is a people before it gives itself. The gift is itself a civil act, and
implies public deliberation. It would be better, before examining the act by
which a people gives itself to a king, to examine that by which it has
become a people; for this act, being necessarily prior to the other, is the true
foundation of society.
Indeed, if there were no prior convention, where, unless the election were
unanimous, would be the obligation on the minority to submit to the choice
of the majority? How have a hundred men who wish for a master the right

to vote on behalf of ten who do not? The law of majority voting is itself
something established by convention, and presupposes unanimity, on one
occasion at least.

CHAPTER VI

THE SOCIAL COMPACT
I suppose men to have reached the point at which the obstacles in the way
of their preservation in the state of nature show their power of resistance to
be greater than the resources at the disposal of each individual for his
maintenance in that state. That primitive condition can then subsist no
longer; and the human race would perish unless it changed its manner of
existence.
But, as men cannot engender new forces, but only unite and direct existing
ones, they have no other means of preserving themselves than the
formation, by aggregation, of a sum of forces great enough to overcome the
resistance. These they have to bring into play by means of a single motive
power, and cause to act in concert.
This sum of forces can arise only where several persons come together: but,
as the force and liberty of each man are the chief instruments of his selfpreservation, how can he pledge them without harming his own interests,
and neglecting the care he owes to himself? This difficulty, in its bearing on
my present subject, may be stated in the following terms—
"The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect
with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and
in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone,
and remain as free as before." This is the fundamental problem of which the
Social Contract provides the solution.
The clauses of this contract are so determined by the nature of the act that
the slightest modification would make them vain and ineffective; so that,
although they have perhaps never been formally set forth, they are
everywhere the same and everywhere tacitly admitted and recognised, until,

on the violation of the social compact, each regains his original rights and
resumes his natural liberty, while losing the conventional liberty in favour
of which he renounced it.
These clauses, properly understood, may be reduced to one—the total
alienation of each associate, together with all his rights, to the whole
community for, in the first place, as each gives himself absolutely, the
conditions are the same for all; and, this being so, no one has any interest in
making them burdensome to others.
Moreover, the alienation being without reserve, the union is as perfect as it
can be, and no associate has anything more to demand: for, if the
individuals retained certain rights, as there would be no common superior to
decide between them and the public, each, being on one point his own
judge, would ask to be so on all; the state of nature would thus continue,
and the association would necessarily become inoperative or tyrannical.
Finally, each man, in giving himself to all, gives himself to nobody; and as
there is no associate over whom he does not acquire the same right as he
yields others over himself, he gains an equivalent for everything he loses,
and an increase of force for the preservation of what he has.
If then we discard from the social compact what is not of its essence, we
shall find that it reduces itself to the following terms—
"Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme
direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive
each member as an indivisible part of the whole."
At once, in place of the individual personality of each contracting party, this
act of association creates a moral and collective body, composed of as many
members as the assembly contains votes, and receiving from this act its
unity, its common identity, its life and its will. This public person, so
formed by the union of all other persons, formerly took the name of city,[1]
and now takes that of Republic or body politic; it is called by its members
State when passive, Sovereign when active, and Power when compared
with others like itself. Those who are associated in it take collectively the
name of people, and severally are called citizens, as sharing in the sovereign
power, and subjects, as being under the laws of the State. But these terms

are often confused and taken one for another: it is enough to know how to
distinguish them when they are being used with precision.
[1] The real meaning of this word has been almost wholly lost in modern times; most people mistake
a town for a city, and a townsman for a citizen. They do not know that houses make a town, but
citizens a city. The same mistake long ago cost the Carthaginians dear. I have never read of the title
of citizens being given to the subjects of any prince, not even the ancient Macedonians or the English
of to-day, though they are nearer liberty than any one else. The French alone everywhere familiarly
adopt the name of citizens, because, as can be seen from their dictionaries, they have no idea of its
meaning; otherwise they would be guilty in usurping it, of the crime of lèse-majesté: among them,
the name expresses a virtue, and not a right. When Bodin spoke of our citizens and townsmen, he fell
into a bad blunder in taking the one class for the other. M. d'Alembert has avoided the error, and, in
his article on Geneva, has clearly distinguished the four orders of men (or even five, counting mere
foreigners) who dwell in our town, of which two only compose the Republic. No other French writer,
to my knowledge, has understood the real meaning of the word citizen.

CHAPTER VII

THE SOVEREIGN
This formula shows us that the act of association comprises a mutual
undertaking between the public and the individuals, and that each
individual, in making a contract, as we may say, with himself, is bound in a
double capacity; as a member of the Sovereign he is bound to the
individuals, and as a member of the State to the Sovereign. But the maxim
of civil right, that no one is bound by undertakings made to himself, does
not apply in this case; for there is a great difference between incurring an
obligation to yourself and incurring one to a whole of which you form a
part.
Attention must further be called to the fact that public deliberation, while
competent to bind all the subjects to the Sovereign, because of the two
different capacities in which each of them may be regarded, cannot, for the
opposite reason, bind the Sovereign to itself; and that it is consequently
against the nature of the body politic for the Sovereign to impose on itself a
law which it cannot infringe. Being able to regard itself in only one
capacity, it is in the position of an individual who makes a contract with

himself; and this makes it clear that there neither is nor can be any kind of
fundamental law binding on the body of the people—not even the social
contract itself. This does not mean that the body politic cannot enter into
undertakings with others, provided the contract is not infringed by them; for
in relation to what is external to it, it becomes a simple being, an individual.
But the body politic or the Sovereign, drawing its being wholly from the
sanctity of the contract, can never bind itself, even to an outsider, to do
anything derogatory to the original act, for instance, to alienate any part of
itself, or to submit to another Sovereign. Violation of the act by which it
exists would be self-annihilation; and that which is itself nothing can create
nothing.
As soon as this multitude is so united in one body, it is impossible to offend
against one of the members without attacking the body, and still more to
offend against the body without the members resenting it. Duty and interest
therefore equally oblige the two contracting parties to give each other help;
and the same men should seek to combine, in their double capacity, all the
advantages dependent upon that capacity.
Again, the Sovereign, being formed wholly of the individuals who compose
it, neither has nor can have any interest contrary to theirs; and consequently
the sovereign power need give no guarantee to its subjects, because it is
impossible for the body to wish to hurt all its members. We shall also see
later on that It cannot hurt any in particular. The Sovereign, merely by
virtue of what it is, is is always what it should be.
This, however, is not the case with the relation of the subjects to the
Sovereign, which, despite the common interest, would have no security that
they would fulfil their undertakings, unless it found means to assure itself of
their fidelity.
In fact, each individual, as a man, may have a particular will contrary or
dissimilar to the general will which he has as a citizen. His particular
interest may speak to him quite differently from the common interest: his
absolute and naturally independent existence may make him look upon
what he owes to the common cause as a gratuitous contribution, the loss of
which will do less harm to others than the payment of it is burdensome to
himself; and, regarding the moral person which constitutes the State as a
persona ficta, because not a man, he may wish to enjoy the rights of

citizenship without being ready to fulfil the duties of a subject. The
continuance of such an injustice could not but prove the undoing of the
body politic.
In order then that the social compact may not be an empty formula, it tacitly
includes the undertaking, which alone can give force to the rest, that
whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to do so by the
whole body. This means nothing less than that he will be forced to be free;
for this is the condition which, by giving each citizen to his country, secures
him against all personal dependence. In this lies the key to the working of
the political machine; this alone legitimizes civil undertakings, which,
without it, would be absurd, tyrannical, and liable to the most frightful
abuses.

CHAPTER VIII

THE CIVIL STATE
The passage from the state of nature to the civil state produces a very
remarkable change in man, by substituting justice, for instinct in his
conduct, and giving his actions the morality they had formerly lacked. Then
only, when the voice of duty takes the place of physical impulses and right
of appetite, does man, who so far had considered only himself, find that he
is forced to act on different principles, and to consult his reason before
listening to his inclinations. Although, in this state, he deprives himself of
some advantages which he got from nature, he gains in return others so
great, his faculties are so stimulated and developed, his ideas so extended,
his feelings so ennobled, and his whole soul so uplifted, that, did not the
abuses of this new condition often degrade him below that which he left, he
would be bound to bless continually the happy moment which took him
from it for ever, and, instead of a stupid and unimaginative animal, made
him an intelligent being and a man.
Let us draw up the whole account in terms easily commensurable. What
man loses by the social contract in his natural liberty and an unlimited right

to everything he tries to get and succeeds in getting; what he gains is civil
liberty and the proprietorship of all he possesses. If we are to avoid mistake
in weighing one against the other, we must clearly distinguish natural
liberty, which is bounded only by the strength of the individual, from civil
liberty, which is limited by the general will; and possession, which is
merely the effect of force or the right of the first occupier, from property,
which can be founded only on a positive title.
We might, over and above all this, add, to what man acquires in the civil
state, moral liberty, which alone makes him truly master of himself; for the
mere impulse of appetite is slavery, while obedience to a law which we
prescribe to ourselves is liberty. But I have already said too much on this
head, and the philosophical meaning of the word liberty does not now
concern us.

CHAPTER IX

REAL PROPERTY
Each member of the community gives himself to it, at the moment of its
foundation, just as he is, with all the resources at his command, including
the goods he possesses. This act does not make possession, in changing
hands, change its nature, and becomes property in the hands of the
Sovereign; but, as the forces of the city are incomparably greater than those
of an individual, public possession is also, in fact, stronger and more
irrevocable, without being any more legitimate, at any rate from the point of
view of foreigners. For the State, in relation to its members, is master of all
their goods by the social contract, which, within the State, is the basis of all
rights; but, in relation to other powers, it is so only by the right of the first
occupier, which it holds from its members.
The right of the first occupier, though more real than the right of the
strongest, becomes a real right only when the right of property has already
been established. Every man has naturally a right to everything he needs;
but the positive act which makes him proprietor of one thing excludes him

from everything else. Having his share, he ought to keep to it, and can have
no further right against the community. This is why the right of the first
occupier, which in the state of nature is so weak, claims the respect of every
man in civil society. In this right we are respecting not so much what
belongs to another as what does not belong to ourselves.
In general, to establish the right of the first occupier over a plot of ground,
the following conditions are necessary: first, the land must not yet be
inhabited; secondly, a man must occupy only the amount he needs for his
subsistence; and, in the third place, possession must be taken, not by an
empty ceremony, but by labour and cultivation, the only sign of
proprietorship that should be respected by others, in default of a legal title.
In granting the right of first occupancy to necessity and labour, are we not
really stretching it as far as it can go? Is it possible to leave such a right
unlimited? Is it to be enough to set foot on a plot of common ground, in
order to be able to call yourself at once the master of it? Is it to be enough
that a man has the strength to expel others for a moment, in order to
establish his right to prevent them from ever returning? How can a man or a
people seize an immense territory and keep it from the rest of the world
except by a punishable usurpation, since all others are being robbed, by
such an act, of the place of habitation and the means of subsistence which
nature gave them in common? When Nuñez Balbao, standing on the seashore, took possession of the South Seas and the whole of South America in
the name of the crown of Castille, was that enough to dispossess all their
actual inhabitants, and to shut out from them all the princes of the world?
On such a showing, these ceremonies are idly multiplied, and the Catholic
King need only take possession all at once, from his apartment, of the
whole universe, merely making a subsequent reservation about what was
already in the possession of other princes.
We can imagine how the lands of individuals, where they were contiguous
and came to be united, became the public territory, and how the right of
Sovereignty, extending from the subjects over the lands they held, became
at once real and personal. The possessors were thus made more dependent,
and the forces at their command used to guarantee their fidelity. The
advantage of this does not seem to have been felt by ancient monarchs, who
called themselves King of the Persians, Scythians, or Macedonians, and
seemed to regard themselves more as rulers of men than as masters of a

country. Those of the present day more cleverly call themselves Kings of
France, Spain, England, etc.: thus holding the land, they are quite confident
of holding the inhabitants.
The peculiar fact about this alienation is that, in taking over the goods of
individuals, the community, so far from despoiling them, only assures them
legitimate possession, and changes usurpation into a true right and
enjoyment into proprietorship. Thus the possessors, being regarded as
depositaries of the public good, and having their rights, respected by all the
members of the State and maintained against foreign aggression by all its
forces, have, by a cession which benefits both the public and still more
themselves, acquired, so to speak, all that they gave up. This paradox may
easily be explained by the distinction between the rights which the
Sovereign and the proprietor have over the same estate, as we shall see later
on. It may also happen that men begin to unite one with another before they
possess anything, and that, subsequently occupying a tract of country which
is enough for all, they enjoy it in common, or share it out among
themselves, either equally or according to a scale fixed by they Sovereign.
However the acquisition be made, the right which each individual has to his
own estate is always subordinate to the right which the community has over
all: without this, there would be neither stability in the social tie, nor real
force in the exercise of Sovereignty.
I shall end this chapter and this book by remarking on a fact on which the
whole social system should rest: i.e. that, instead of destroying natural
inequality, the fundamental compact substitutes, for such physical
inequality as nature may have set up between men, an equality that is moral
and legitimate, and that men, who may be unequal in strength or
intelligence, become every one equal by convention and legal right.[1]
[1] Under bad governments, this equality is only apparent and illusory: it serves only to keep the
pauper in his poverty and the rich man in the position he has usurped. In fact, laws are always of use
to those who possess and harmful to those who have nothing: from which it follows that the social
state is advantageous to men only when all have something and none too much.

BOOK II

CHAPTER I

THAT SOVEREIGNTY IS INALIENABLE
The first and most important deduction from the principles we have so far
laid down is that the general will alone can direct the State according to the
object for which it was instituted, i.e. the common good: for if the clashing
of particular interests made the establishment of societies necessary, the
agreement of these very interests made it possible. The common element in
these different interests is what forms the social tie; and, were there no point
of agreement between them all, no society could exist. It is solely on the
basis of this common interest that every society should be governed.
I hold then that Sovereignty, being nothing less than the exercise of the
general will, can never be alienated, and that the Sovereign, who is no less
than a collective being, cannot be represented except by himself: the power
indeed may be transmitted, but not the will.
In reality, if it is not impossible for a particular will to agree on some point
with the general will, it is at least impossible for the agreement to be lasting
and constant; for the particular will tends, by its very nature, to partiality,
while the general will tends to equality. It is even more impossible to have
any guarantee of this agreement; for even if it should always exist, it would
be the effect not of art, but of chance. The Sovereign may indeed say: "I
now will actually what this man wills, or at least what he says he wills"; but
it cannot say: "What he wills tomorrow, I too shall will" because it is absurd
for the will to bind itself for the future, nor is it incumbent on any will to
consent to anything that is not for the good of the being who wills. If then
the people promises simply to obey, by that very act it dissolves itself and
loses what makes it a people; the moment a master exists, there is no longer
a Sovereign, and from that moment the body politic has ceased to exist.
This does not mean that the commands of the rulers cannot pass for general
wills, so long as the Sovereign, being free to oppose them, offers no
opposition. In such a case, universal silence is taken to imply the consent of
the people. This will be explained later on.

CHAPTER II

THAT SOVEREIGNTY IS INDIVISIBLE
Sovereignty, for the same reason as makes it inalienable, is indivisible; for
will either is, or is not, general;[1] it is the will either of the body of the
people, or only of a part of it. In the first case, the will, when declared, is an
act of Sovereignty and constitutes law: in the second, it is merely a
particular will, or act of magistracy—at the most a decree.
But our political theorists, unable to divide Sovereignty in principle, divide
it according to its object: into force and will; into legislative power and
executive power; into rights of taxation, justice and war; into internal
administration and power of foreign treaty. Sometimes they confuse all
these sections, and sometimes they distinguish them; they turn the
Sovereign into a fantastic being composed of several connected pieces: it is
as if they were making man of several bodies, one with eyes, one with arms,
another with feet, and each with nothing besides. We are told that the
jugglers of Japan dismember a child before the eyes of the spectators; then
they throw all the members into the air one after another, and the child falls
down alive and whole. The conjuring tricks of our political theorists are
very like that; they first dismember the body politic by an illusion worthy of
a fair, and then join it together again we know not how.
This error is due to a lack of exact notions concerning the Sovereign
authority, and to taking for parts of it what are only emanations from it.
Thus, for example, the acts of declaring war and making peace have been
regarded as acts of Sovereignty; but this is not the case, as these acts do not
constitute law, but merely the application of a law, a particular act which
decides how the law applies, as we shall see clearly when the idea attached
to the word law has been defined.
If we examined the other divisions in the same manner, we should find that,
whenever Sovereignty seems to be divided, there is an illusion: the rights
which are taken as being part of Sovereignty are really all subordinate, and
always imply supreme wills of which they only sanction the execution.
It would be impossible to estimate the obscurity this lack of exactness has
thrown over the decisions of writers who have dealt with political right,

when they have used the principles laid down by them to pass judgment on
the respective rights of kings and peoples. Every one can see, in Chapters
III and IV of the First Book of Grotius, how the learned man and his
translator, Barbeyrac, entangle and tie themselves up in their own
sophistries, for fear of saying too little or too much of what they think, and
so offending the interests they have to conciliate. Grotius, a refugee in
France, ill-content with his own country, and desirous of paying his court to
Louis XIII, to whom his book is dedicated, spares no pains to rob the
peoples of all their rights and invest kings with them by every conceivable
artifice. This would also have been much to the taste of Barbeyrac, who
dedicated his translation to George I of England. But unfortunately the
expulsion of James II, which he called his "abdication," compelled him to
use all reserve, to shuffle and to tergiversate, in order to avoid making
William out a usurper. If these two writers had adopted the true principles,
all difficulties would have been removed, and they would have been always
consistent; but it would have been a sad truth for them to tell, and would
have paid court for them to no-one save the people. Moreover, truth is no
road to fortune, and the people dispenses neither ambassadorships, nor
professorships, nor pensions.
[1] To be general, a will need not always be unanimous; but every vote—must be counted: any
exclusion is a breach of generality.

CHAPTER III

WHETHER THE GENERAL WILL IS FALLIBLE
It follows from what has gone before that the general will is always right
and tends to the public advantage; but it does not follow that the
deliberations of the people are always equally correct. Our will is always
for our own good, but we do not always see what that is; the people is never
corrupted, but it is often deceived, and on such occasions only does it seem
to will what is bad.

There is often a great deal of difference between the will of all and the
general will; the latter considers only the common interest, while the former
takes private interest into account, and is no more than a sum of particular
wills: but take away from these same wills the pluses and minuses that
cancel one another,[1] and the general will remains as the sum of the
differences.
If, when the people, being furnished with adequate information, held its
deliberations, the citizens had no communication one with another, the
grand total of the small differences would always give the general will, and
the decision would always be good. But when factions arise, and partial
associations are formed at the expense of the great association, the will of
each of these associations becomes general in relation to its members, while
it remains particular in relation to the State: it may then be said that there
are no longer as many votes as there are men, but only as many as there are
associations. The differences become less numerous and give a less general
result. Lastly, when one of these associations is so great as to prevail over
all the rest, the result is no longer a sum of small differences, but a single
difference; in this case there is no longer a general will, and the opinion
which prevails is purely particular.
It is therefore essential, if the general will is to be able to express itself, that
there should be no partial society within the State, and that each citizen
should think only his own thoughts:[2] which was indeed the sublime and
unique system established by the great Lycurgus. But if there are partial
societies, it is best to have as many as possible and to prevent them from
being unequal, as was done by Solon, Numa and Servius. These precautions
are the only ones that can guarantee that the general will shall be always
enlightened, and that the people shall in no way deceive itself.
[1] "Every interest," says the Marquis d'Argenson, "has different principles. The agreement of two
particular interests is formed by opposition to a third." He might have added that the agreement of all
interests is formed by opposition to that of each. If there were no different interests, the common
interest would be barely felt, as it would encounter no obstacle; all would go on of its own accord,
and politics would cease to be an art.
[2] "In fact," says Macchiavelli, "there are some divisions that are harmful to a Republic and some
that are advantageous. Those which stir up sects and parties are harmful; those attended by neither
are advantageous. Since, then, the founder of a Republic cannot help enmities arising, he ought at

least to prevent them from growing into sects" (History of Florence, Book vii). Rousseau quotes the
Italian.

CHAPTER IV

THE LIMITS OF THE SOVEREIGN POWER
If the State is a moral person whose life is in the union of its members, and
if the most important of its cares is the care for its own preservation, it must
have a universal and compelling force, in order to move and dispose each
part as may be most advantageous to the whole. As nature gives each man
absolute power over all his members, the social compact gives the body
politic absolute power over all its members also; and it is this power which,
under the direction of the general will, bears, as I have said, the name of
Sovereignty.
But, besides the public person, we have to consider the private persons
composing it, whose life and liberty are naturally independent of it. We are
bound then to distinguish clearly between the respective rights of the
citizens and the Sovereign,[1] and between the duties the former have to
fulfil as subjects, and the natural rights they should enjoy as men.
Each man alienates, I admit, by the social compact, only such part of his
powers, goods and liberty as it is important for the community to control;
but it must also be granted that the Sovereign is sole judge of what is
important.
Every service a citizen can render the State he ought to render as soon as
the Sovereign demands it; but the Sovereign, for its part, cannot impose
upon its subjects any fetters that are useless to the community, nor can it
even wish to do so; for no more by the law of reason than by the law of
nature can anything occur without a cause.
The undertakings which bind us to the social body are obligatory only
because they are mutual; and their nature is such that in fulfilling them we
cannot work for others without working for ourselves. Why is it that the
general will is always in the right, and that all continually will the happiness

of each one, unless it is because there is not a man who does not think of
"each" as meaning him, and consider himself in voting for all? This proves
that equality of rights and the idea of justice which such equality creates
originate in the preference each man gives to himself, and accordingly in
the very nature of man. It proves that the general will, to be really such,
must be general in its object as well as its essence; that it must both come
from all and apply to all; and that it loses its natural rectitude when it is
directed to some particular and determinate object, because in such a case
we are judging of something foreign to us, and have no true principle of
equity to guide us.
Indeed, as soon as a question of particular fact or right arises on a point not
previously regulated by a general convention, the matter becomes
contentious. It is a case in which the individuals concerned are one party,
and the public the other, but in which I can see neither the law that ought to
be followed nor the judge who ought to give the decision. In such a case, it
would be absurd to propose to refer the question to an express decision of
the general will, which can be only the conclusion reached by one of the
parties and in consequence will be, for the other party, merely an external
and particular will, inclined on this occasion to injustice and subject to
error. Thus, just as a particular will cannot stand for the general will, the
general will, in turn, changes its nature, when its object is particular, and, as
general, cannot pronounce on a man or a fact. When, for instance, the
people of Athens nominated or displaced its rulers, decreed honours to one,
and imposed penalties on another, and, by a multitude of particular decrees,
exercised all the functions of government indiscriminately, it had in such
cases no longer a general will in the strict sense; it was acting no longer as
Sovereign, but as magistrate. This will seem contrary to current views; but I
must be given time to expound my own.
It should be seen from the foregoing that what makes the will general is less
the number of voters than the common interest uniting them; for under this
system, each necessarily submits to the conditions he imposes on others;
and this admirable agreement between interest and justice gives to the
common deliberations an equitable character which at once vanishes when
any particular question is discussed, in the absence of a common interest to
unite and identify the ruling of the judge with that of the party.

From whatever side we approach our principle, we reach the same
conclusion, that the social compact sets up among the citizens an equality of
such a kind, that they all bind themselves to observe the same conditions
and should therefore all enjoy the same rights. Thus, from the very nature of
the compact, every "act of Sovereignty", i.e. every authentic act of the
general will, binds or favours all the citizens equally; so that the Sovereign
recognises only the body of the nation, and draws no distinctions between
those of whom it is made up. What, then, strictly speaking is an act of
Sovereignty? It is not a convention between a superior and an inferior, but a
convention between the body and each of its members. It is legitimate,
because based on the social contract, and, equitable, because common to
all; useful, because it can have no other object than the general good, and
stable, because guaranteed by the public force and the supreme power. So
long as the subjects have to submit only to conventions of this sort, they
obey no-one but their own will; and to ask how far the respective rights of
the Sovereign and the citizens extend, is to ask up to what point the latter
can enter into undertakings with themselves, each with all, and all with
each.
We can see from this that the sovereign power, absolute, sacred and
inviolable as it is, does not and cannot exceed the limits of general
conventions, and that every man may dispose at will of such goods and
liberty as these conventions leave him; so that the Sovereign never has a
right to lay more charges on one subject than on another, because, in that
case, the question becomes particular, and ceases to be within its
competency.
When these distinctions have once been admitted, it is seen to be so untrue
that there is, in the social contract, any real renunciation on the part of the
individuals, that the position in which they find themselves as a result of the
contract is really preferable to that in which they were before. Instead of a
renunciation, they have made an advantageous exchange: instead of an
uncertain and precarious way of living they have got one that is better and
more secure; instead of natural independence they have got liberty, instead
of the power to harm others security for themselves, and instead of their
strength, which others might overcome, a right which social union makes
invincible. Their very life, which they have devoted to the State, is by it
constantly protected; and when they risk it in the State's defence, what more

are they doing than giving back what they have received from it? What are
they doing that they would not do more often and with greater danger in the
state of nature, in which they would inevitably have to fight battles at the
peril of their lives in defence of that which is the means of their
preservation? All have indeed to fight when their country needs them; but
then no one has ever to fight for himself. Do we not gain something by
running, on behalf of what gives us our security, only some of the risks we
should have to run for ourselves, as soon as we lost it?
[1] Attentive readers, do not, I pray, be in a hurry to charge me with contradicting myself. The
terminology made it unavoidable, considering the poverty of the language; but wait and see.

CHAPTER V

THE RIGHT OF LIFE AND DEATH
The question is often asked how individuals, having no right to dispose of
their own lives, can transfer to the Sovereign a right which they do not
possess. The difficulty of answering this question seems to me to lie in its
being wrongly stated. Every man has a right to risk his own life in order to
preserve it. Has it ever, been said that a man who throws himself out of the
window to escape from a fire is guilty of suicide? Has such a crime ever
been laid to the charge of him who perishes in a storm because, when he
went on board, he knew of the danger?
The social treaty has for its end the preservation of the contracting parties.
He who wills the end wills the means also, and the means must involve
some risks, and even some losses. He who wishes to preserve his life at
others expense should also, when it is necessary, be ready to give it up for
their sake. Furthermore, the citizen is no longer the judge of the dangers to
which the law desires him to expose himself; and when the prince says to
him: "It is expedient for the State that you should die," he ought to die,
because it is only on that condition that he has been living in security up to
the present, and because his life is no longer a mere bounty of nature, but a
gift made conditionally by the State.

The death-penalty inflicted upon criminals may be looked on in much the
same light: it is in order that we may not fall victims to an assassin that we
consent to die if we ourselves turn assassins. In this treaty, so far from
disposing of our own lives, we think only of securing them, and it is not to
be assumed that any of the parties then expects to get hanged.
Again, every malefactor, by attacking social rights, becomes on forfeit a
rebel and a traitor to his country; by violating its laws he ceases to be a
member of it; he even makes war upon it. In such a case the preservation of
the State is inconsistent with his own, and one or the other must perish; in
putting the guilty to death, we slay not so much the citizen as an enemy.
The trial and the judgment are the proofs that he has broken the social
treaty, and is in consequence no longer a member of the State. Since, then,
he has recognised himself to be such by living there, he must be removed
by exile as a violator of the compact, or by death as a public enemy; for
such an enemy is not a moral person, but merely a man; and in such a case
the right of war is to kill the vanquished.
But, it will be said, the condemnation of a criminal is a particular act. I
admit it: but such condemnation is not a function of the Sovereign; it is a
right the Sovereign can confer without being able itself to exert it. All my
ideas are consistent, but I cannot expound them all at once.
We may add that frequent punishments are always a sign of weakness or
remissness on the part of the government. There is not a single ill-doer who
could not be turned to some good. The State has no right to put to death,
even for the sake of making an example, any one whom it can leave alive
without danger.
The right of pardoning or exempting the guilty from a penalty imposed by
the law and pronounced by the judge belongs only to the authority which is
superior to both judge and law, i.e. the Sovereign; even its right in this
matter is far from clear, and the cases for exercising it are extremely rare. In
a well-governed State, there are few punishments, not because there are
many pardons, but because criminals are rare; it is when a State is in decay
that the multitude of crimes is a guarantee of impunity. Under the Roman
Republic, neither the Senate nor the Consuls ever attempted to pardon; even
the people never did so, though it sometimes revoked its own decision.
Frequent pardons mean that crime will soon need them no longer, and no-

one can help seeing whither that leads. But I feel my heart protesting and
restraining my pen; let us leave these questions to the just man who has
never offended, and would himself stand in no need of pardon.

CHAPTER VI

LAW
By the social compact we have given the body politic existence and life: we
have now by legislation to give it movement and will. For the original act
by which the body is formed and united still in no respect determines what
it ought to do for its preservation.
What is well and in conformity with order is so by the nature of things and
independently of human conventions. All justice comes from God, who is
its sole source; but if we knew how to receive so high an inspiration, we
should need neither government nor laws. Doubtless, there is a universal
justice emanating from reason alone; but this justice, to be admitted among
us, must be mutual. Humanly speaking, in default of natural sanctions, the
laws of justice are ineffective among men: they merely make for the good
of the wicked and the undoing of the just, when the just man observes them
towards everybody and nobody observes them towards him. Conventions
and laws are therefore needed to join rights to duties and refer justice to its
object. In the state of nature, where everything is common, I owe nothing to
him whom I nave promised nothing; I recognise as belonging to others only
what is of no use to me. In the state of society all rights are fixed by law,
and the case becomes different.
But what, after all, is a law? As long as we remain satisfied with attaching
purely metaphysical ideas to the word, we shall go on arguing without
arriving at an understanding; and when we have defined a law of nature, we
shall be no nearer the definition of a law of the State.
I have already said that there can be no general will directed to a particular
object. Such an object must be either within or outside the State. If outside,
a will which is alien to it cannot be, in relation to it, general; if within, it is

part of the State, and in that case there arises a relation between whole and
part which makes them two separate beings, of which the part is one, and
the whole minus the part the other. But the whole minus a part cannot be the
whole; and while this relation persists, there can be no whole, but only two
unequal parts; and it follows that the will of one is no longer in any respect
general in relation to the other.
But when the whole people decrees for the whole people, it is considering
only itself; and if a relation is then formed, it is between two aspects of the
entire object, without there being any division of the whole. In that case the
matter about which the decree is made is, like the decreeing will general.
This act is what I call a law.
When I say that the object of laws is always general, I mean that law
considers subjects en masse and actions in the abstract, and never a
particular person or action. Thus the law may indeed decree that there shall
be privileges, but cannot confer them on anybody by name. It may set up
several classes of citizens, and even lay down the qualifications for
membership of these classes, but it cannot nominate such and such persons
as belonging to them; it may establish a monarchical government and
hereditary succession, but it cannot choose a king, or nominate a royal
family. In a word, no function which has a particular object belongs to the
legislative power.
On this view, we at once see that it can no longer be asked whose business
it is to make laws, since they are acts of the general will: nor whether the
prince is above the law, since he is a member of the State; nor whether the
law can be unjust, since no one is unjust to himself; nor how we can be both
free and subject to the laws since they are but registers of our wills.
We see further that, as the law unites universality of will with universality
of object, what a man, whoever he be, commands of his own motion cannot
be a law; and even what the Sovereign commands with regard to a
particular matter is no nearer being a law, but is a decree, an act, not of
sovereignty, but of magistracy.
I therefore give the name 'Republic' to every State that is governed by laws,
no matter what the form of its administration may be: for only in such a
case does the public interest govern, and the res publica rank as a reality.

Every legitimate government is republican;[1] what government is I will
explain later on.
Laws are, properly speaking, only the conditions of civil association. The
people, being subject to the laws, ought to be their author: the conditions of
the society ought to be regulated solely by those who come together to form
it. But how are they to regulate them? Is it to be by common agreement, by
a sudden inspiration? Has the body politic an organ to declare its will? Who
can give it the foresight to formulate and announce its acts in advance? Or
how is it to announce them in the hour of need? How can a blind multitude,
which often does not know what it wills, because it rarely knows what is
good for it, carry out for itself so great and difficult an enterprise as a
system of legislation? Of itself the people wills always the good, but of
itself it by no means always sees it. The general will is always in the right,
but the judgment which guides it is not always enlightened. It must be got
to see objects as they are, and sometimes as they ought to appear to it; it
must be shown the good road it is in search of, secured from the seductive
influences of individual wills, taught to see times and spaces as a series, and
made to weigh the attractions of present and sensible advantages against the
danger of distant and hidden evils. The individuals see the good they reject;
the public wills the good it does not see. All stand equally in need of
guidance. The former must be compelled to bring their wills into
conformity with their reason; the latter must be taught to know what it
wills. If that is done, public enlightenment leads to the union of
understanding and will in the social body: the parts are made to work
exactly together, and the whole is raised to its highest power. This makes a
legislator necessary.

[1] I understand by this word, not merely an aristocracy or a democracy, but generally any
government directed by the general will, which is the law. To be legitimate, the government must be,
not one with the Sovereign, but its minister. In such a case even a monarchy is a Republic. This will
be made clearer in the following book.

CHAPTER VII

THE LEGISLATOR
In order to discover the rules of society best suited to nations, a superior
intelligence beholding all the passions of men without experiencing any of
them would be needed. This intelligence would have to be wholly unrelated
to our nature, while knowing it through and through; its happiness would
have to be independent of us, and yet ready to occupy itself with ours; and
lastly, it would have, in the march of time, to look forward to a distant
glory, and, working in one century, to be able to enjoy in the next.[1] It
would take gods to give men laws.
What Caligula argued from the facts, Plato, in the dialogue called the
Politicus, argued in defining the civil or kingly man, on the basis of right.
But if great princes are rare, how much more so are great legislators? The
former have only to follow the pattern which the latter have to lay down.
The legislator is the engineer who invents the machine, the prince merely
the mechanic who sets it up and makes it go. "At the birth of societies,"
says Montesquieu, "the rulers of Republics establish institutions, and
afterwards the institutions mould the rulers."[2]
He who dares to undertake the making of a people's institutions ought to
feel himself capable, so to speak, of changing human nature, of
transforming each individual, who is by himself a complete and solitary
whole, into part of a greater whole from which he in a manner receives his
life and being; of altering man's constitution for the purpose of
strengthening it; and of substituting a partial and moral existence for the
physical and independent existence nature has conferred on us all. He must,
in a word, take away from man his own resources and give him instead new
ones alien to him, and incapable of being made use of without the help of

other men. The more completely these natural resources are annihilated, the
greater and the more lasting are those which he acquires, and the more
stable and perfect the new institutions; so that if each citizen is nothing and
can do nothing without the rest, and the resources acquired by the whole are
equal or superior to the aggregate of the resources of all the individuals, it
may be said that legislation is at the highest possible point of perfection.
The legislator occupies in every respect an extraordinary position in the
State. If he should do so by reason of his genius, he does so no less by
reason of his office, which is neither magistracy, nor Sovereignty. This
office, which sets up the Republic, nowhere enters into its constitution; it is
an individual and superior function, which has nothing in common with
human empire; for if he who holds command over men ought not to have
command over the laws, he who has command over the laws ought not any
more to have it over men; or else his laws would be the ministers of his
passions and would often merely serve to perpetuate his injustices: his
private aims would inevitably mar the sanctity of his work.
When Lycurgus gave laws to his country, he began by resigning the throne.
It was the custom of most Greek towns to entrust the establishment of their
laws to foreigners. The Republics of modern Italy in many cases followed
this example; Geneva did the same and profited by it.[3] Rome, when it was
most prosperous, suffered a revival of all the crimes of tyranny, and was
brought to the verge of destruction, because it put the legislative authority
and the sovereign power into the same hands.
Nevertheless, the decemvirs themselves never claimed the right to pass any
law merely on their own authority. "Nothing we propose to you," they said
to the people, "can pass into law without your consent. Romans, be
yourselves the authors of the laws which are to make you happy."
He, therefore, who draws up the laws has, or should have, no right of
legislation, and the people cannot, even if it wishes, deprive itself of this
incommunicable right, because, according to the fundamental compact,
only the general will can bind the individuals, and there can be no assurance
that a particular will is in conformity with the general will, until it has been
put to the free vote of the people. This I have said already; but it is worth
while to repeat it.

Thus in the task of legislation we find together two things which appear to
be incompatible: an enterprise too difficult for human powers, and, for its
execution, an authority that is no authority.
There is a further difficulty that deserves attention. Wise men, if they try to
speak their language to the common herd instead of its own, cannot
possibly make themselves understood. There are a thousand kinds of ideas
which it is impossible to translate into popular language. Conceptions that
are too general and objects that are too remote are equally out of its range:
each individual, having no taste for any other plan of government than that
which suits his particular interest, finds it difficult to realise the advantages
he might hope to draw from the continual privations good laws impose. For
a young people to be able to relish sound principles of political theory and
follow the fundamental rules of statecraft, the effect would have to become
the cause; the social spirit, which should be created by these institutions,
would have to preside over their very foundation; and men would have to
be before law what they should become by means of law. The legislator
therefore, being unable to appeal to either force or reason, must have
recourse to an authority of a different order capable of constraining without
violence and persuading without convincing.
This is what has, in all ages, compelled the fathers of nations to have
recourse to divine intervention and credit the gods with their own wisdom,
in order that the peoples, submitting to the laws of the State as to those of
nature, and recognising the same power in the formation of the city as in
that of man, might obey freely, and bear with docility the yoke of the public
happiness.
This sublime reason, far above the range of the common herd, is that whose
decisions the legislator puts into the mouth of the immortals, in order to
constrain by divine authority those whom human prudence could not move.
[4] But it is not anybody who can make the gods speak, or get himself
believed when he proclaims himself their interpreter. The great soul of the
legislator is the only miracle that can prove his mission. Any man may
grave tablets of stone, or buy an oracle; or feign secret intercourse with
some divinity, or train a bird to whisper in his ear, or find other vulgar ways
of imposing on the people. He whose knowledge goes no further may
perhaps gather round him a band of fools; but he will never found an
empire, and his extravagances will quickly perish with him. Idle tricks form

a passing tie; only wisdom can make it lasting. The Judaic law, which still
subsists, and that of the child of Ishmael, which, for ten centuries, has ruled
half the world, still proclaim the great men who laid them down; and, while
the pride of philosophy or the blind spirit of faction sees in them no more
than lucky impostures, the true political theorist admires, in the institutions
they set up, the great and powerful genius which presides over things made
to endure.
We should not, with Warburton, conclude from this that politics and religion
have among us a common object, but that, in the first periods of nations, the
one is used as an instrument for the other.
[1] A people becomes famous only when its legislation begins to decline. We do not know for how
many centuries the system of Lycurgus made the Spartans happy before the rest of Greece took any
notice of it.
[2] Montesquieu, The Greatness and Decadence of the Romans, ch. i.
[3] Those who know Calvin only as a theologian much underestimate the extent of his genius. The
codification of our wise edicts, in which he played a large part, does him no less honour than his
Institute. Whatever revolution time may bring in our religion, so long as the spirit of patriotism and
liberty still lives among us, the memory of this great man will be for ever blessed.
[4] "In truth," says Macchiavelli, "there has never been, in any country, an extraordinary legislator
who has not had recourse to God; for otherwise his laws would not have been accepted: there are, in
fact, many useful truths of which a wise man may have knowledge without their having in
themselves such clear reasons for their being so as to be able to convince others" (Discourses on
Livy, Bk. v, ch. xi). (Rousseau quotes the Italian.)

CHAPTER VIII

THE PEOPLE
As, before putting up a large building, the architect surveys and sounds the
site to see if it will bear the weight, the wise legislator does not begin by
laying down laws good in themselves, but by investigating the fitness of the
people, for which they are destined, to receive them. Plato refused to
legislate for the Arcadians and the Cyrenæans, because he knew that both
peoples were rich and could not put up with equality; and good laws and

bad men were found together in Crete, because Minos had inflicted
discipline on a people already burdened with vice.
A thousand nations have achieved earthly greatness, that could never have
endured good laws; even such as could have endured them could have done
so only for a very brief period of their long history. Most peoples, like most
men, are docile only in youth; as they grow old they become incorrigible.
When once customs have become established and prejudices inveterate, it is
dangerous and useless to attempt their reformation; the people, like the
foolish and cowardly patients who rave at sight of the doctor, can no longer
bear that any one should lay hands on its faults to remedy them.
There are indeed times in the history of States when, just as some kinds of
illness turn men's heads and make them forget the past, periods of violence
and revolutions do to peoples what these crises do to individuals: horror of
the past takes the place of forgetfulness, and the State, set on fire by civil
wars, is born again, so to speak, from its ashes, and takes on anew, fresh
from the jaws of death, the vigour of youth. Such were Sparta at the time of
Lycurgus, Rome after the Tarquins, and, in modern times, Holland and
Switzerland after the expulsion of the tyrants.
But such events are rare; they are exceptions, the cause of which is always
to be found in the particular constitution of the State concerned. They
cannot even happen twice to the same people, for it can make itself free as
long as it remains barbarous, but not when the civic impulse has lost its
vigour. Then disturbances may destroy it, but revolutions cannot mend it: it
needs a master, and not a liberator. Free peoples, be mindful of maxim;
"Liberty may be gained, but can never be recovered."
Youth is not infancy. There is for nations, as for men, a period of youth, or,
shall we say, maturity, before which they should not be made subject to
laws; but the maturity of a people is not always easily recognisable, and, if
it is anticipated, the work is spoilt. One people is amenable to discipline
from the beginning; another, not after ten centuries. Russia will never be
really civilised, because it was civilised too soon. Peter had a genius for
imitation; but he lacked true genius, which is creative and makes all from
nothing. He did some good things, but most of what he did was out of
place. He saw that his people was barbarous, but did not see that it was not
ripe for civilisation: he wanted to civilise it when it needed only hardening.

His first wish was to make Germans or Englishmen, when he ought to have
been making Russians; and he prevented his subjects from ever becoming
what they might have been by persuading them that they were what they are
not. In this fashion too a French teacher turns out his pupil to be an infant
prodigy, and for the rest of his life to be nothing whatsoever. The empire of
Russia will aspire to conquer Europe, and will itself be conquered. The
Tartars, its subjects or neighbours, will become its masters and ours, by a
revolution which I regard as inevitable. Indeed, all the kings of Europe are
working in concert to hasten its coming.

CHAPTER IX

THE PEOPLE (continued)
As nature has set bounds to the stature of a well-made man, and, outside
those limits, makes nothing but giants or dwarfs, similarly, for the
constitution of a State to be at its best, it is possible to fix limits that will
make it neither too large for good government, nor too small for selfmaintenance. In every body politic there is a maximum strength which it
cannot exceed and which it only loses by increasing in size. Every
extension of the social tie means its relaxation; and, generally speaking, a
small State is stronger in proportion than a great one.
A thousand arguments could be advanced in favour of this principle. First,
long distances make administration more difficult, just as a weight becomes
heavier at the end of a longer lever. Administration therefore becomes more
and more burdensome as the distance grows greater; for, in the first place,
each city has its own, which is paid for by the people: each district its own,
still paid for by the people: then comes each province, and then the great
governments, satrapies, and vice-royalties, always costing more the higher
you go, and always at the expense of the unfortunate people. Last of all
comes the supreme administration, which eclipses all the rest. All these
overcharges are a continual drain upon the subjects; so far from being better
governed by all these different orders, they are worse governed than if there
were only a single authority over them. In the meantime, there scarce

remain resources enough to meet emergencies; and, when recourse must be
had to these, the State is always on the eve of destruction.
This is not all; not only has the government less vigour and promptitude for
securing the observance of the laws, preventing nuisances, correcting
abuses, and guarding against seditious undertakings begun in distant places;
the people has less affection for its rulers, whom it never sees, for its
country, which, to its eyes, seems like the world, and for its fellow-citizens,
most of whom are unknown to it. The same laws cannot suit so many
diverse provinces with different customs, situated in the most various
climates, and incapable of enduring a uniform government. Different laws
lead only to trouble and confusion among peoples which, living under the
same rulers and in constant communication one with another, intermingle
and intermarry, and, coming under the sway of new customs, never know if
they can call their very patrimony their own. Talent is buried, virtue
unknown and vice unpunished, among such a multitude of men who do not
know one another, gathered together in one place at the seat of the central
administration. The leaders, overwhelmed with business, see nothing for
themselves; the State is governed by clerks. Finally, the measures which
have to be taken to, maintain the general authority, which all these distant
officials wish to escape or to impose upon, absorb all the energy of the
public, so that there is none left for the happiness of the people. There is
hardly enough to defend it when need arises, and thus a body which is too
big for its constitution gives way and falls crushed under its own weight.
Again, the State must assure itself a safe foundation, if it is to have stability,
and to be able to resist the shocks it cannot help experiencing, as well as the
efforts it will be forced to make for its maintenance; for all peoples have a
kind of centrifugal force that makes them continually act one against
another, and tend to aggrandise themselves at their neighbours' expense,
like the vortices of Descartes. Thus the weak run the risk of being soon
swallowed up; and it is almost impossible for any one to preserve itself
except by putting itself in a state of equilibrium with all, so that the pressure
is on all sides practically equal.
It may therefore be seen that there are reasons for expansion and reasons for
contraction; and it is no small part of the statesman's skill to hit between
them the mean that is most favourable to the preservation of the State. It
may be said that the reason for expansion, being merely external and

relative, ought to be subordinate to the reasons for contraction, which are
internal and absolute. A strong and healthy constitution is the first thing to
look for; and it is better to count on the vigour which comes of good
government than on the resources a great territory furnishes.
It may be added that there have been known States so constituted that the
necessity of making conquests entered into their very constitution, and that,
in order to maintain themselves, they were forced to expand ceaselessly. It
may be that they congratulated themselves greatly on this fortunate
necessity, which none the less indicated to them, along with the limits of
their greatness, the inevitable moment of their fall.

CHAPTER X

THE PEOPLE (continued)
A body politic may be measured in two ways—either by the extent of its
territory, or by the number of its people; and there is, between these two
measurements, a right relation which makes the State really great. The men
make the State, and the territory sustains the men; the right relation
therefore is that the land should suffice for the maintenance of the
inhabitants, and that there should be as many inhabitants as the land can
maintain. In this proportion lies the maximum strength of a given number of
people; for if there is too much land, it is troublesome to guard and
inadequately cultivated, produces more than is needed, and soon gives rise
to wars of defence; if there is not enough, the State depends on its
neighbours for what it needs over and above, and this soon gives rise to
wars of offence. Every people, to which its situation gives no choice save
that between commerce and war, is weak in itself: it depends on its
neighbours, and on circumstances; its existence can never be more than
short and uncertain. It either conquers others, and changes its situation, or it
is conquered and becomes nothing. Only insignificance or greatness can
keep it free.

No fixed relation can be stated between the extent of the territory and the
population that are adequate one to the other, both because of the
differences in the quality of land, in its fertility, in the nature of its products,
and in the influence of climate, and because of the different tempers of
those who inhabit it; for some in a fertile country consume little, and others
on an ungrateful soil much. The greater or less fecundity of women, the
conditions that are more or less favourable in each country to the growth of
population, and the influence the legislator can hope to exercise by his
institutions, must also be taken into account. The legislator therefore should
not go by what he sees, but by what he foresees; he should stop not so much
at the state in which he actually finds the population, as at that to which it
ought naturally to attain. Lastly, there are countless cases in which the
particular local circumstances demand or allow the acquisition of a greater
territory than seems necessary. Thus, expansion will be great in a
mountainous country, where the natural products, i.e. woods and pastures,
need less labour, where we know from experience that women are more
fertile than in the plains, and where a great expanse of slope affords only a
small level tract that can be counted on for vegetation. On the other hand,
contraction is possible on the coast, even in lands of rocks and nearly barren
sands, because there fishing makes up to a great extent for the lack of landproduce, because the inhabitants have to congregate together more in order
to repel pirates, and further because it is easier to unburden the country of
its superfluous inhabitants by means of colonies.
To these conditions of law-giving must be added one other which, though it
cannot take the place of the rest, renders them all useless when it is absent.
This is the enjoyment of peace and plenty; for the moment at which a State
sets its house in order is, like the moment when a battalion is forming up,
that when its body is least capable of offering resistance and easiest to
destroy. A better resistance could be made at a time of absolute
disorganisation than at a moment of fermentation, when each is occupied
with his own position and not with the danger. If war, famine, or sedition
arises at this time of crisis, the State will inevitably be overthrown.
Not that many governments have not been set up during such storms; but in
such cases these governments are themselves the State's destroyers.
Usurpers always bring about or select troublous times to get passed, under
cover of the public terror, destructive laws, which the people would never

adopt in cold blood. The moment chosen is one of the surest means of
distinguishing the work of the legislator from that of the tyrant.
What people, then, is a fit subject for legislation? One which, already bound
by some unity of origin, interest, or convention, has never yet felt the real
yoke of law; one that has neither customs nor superstitions deeply
ingrained, one which stands in no fear of being overwhelmed by sudden
invasion; one which, without entering into its neighbours' quarrels, can
resist each of them single-handed, or get the help of one to repel another;
one in which every member may be known by every other, and there is no
need to lay on any man burdens too heavy for a man to bear; one which can
do without other peoples, and without which all others can do;[1] one which
is neither rich nor poor, but self-sufficient; and, lastly, one which unites the
consistency of an ancient people with the docility of a new one. Legislation
is made difficult less by what it is necessary to build up than by what has to
be destroyed; and what makes success so rare is the impossibility of finding
natural simplicity together with social requirements. All these conditions
are indeed rarely found united, and therefore few States have good
constitutions.
There is still in Europe one country capable of being given laws—Corsica.
The valour and persistency with which that brave people has regained and
defended its liberty well deserves that some wise man should teach it how
to preserve what it has won. I have a feeling that some day that little island
will astonish Europe.
[1] If there were two neighbouring peoples, one of which could not do without the other, it would be
very hard on the former, and very dangerous for the latter. Every wise nation, in such a case, would
make haste to free the other from dependence. The Republic of Thlascala, enclosed by the Mexican
Empire, preferred doing without salt to buying from the Mexicans, or even getting it from them as a
gift The Thlascalans were wise enough to see the snare hidden under such liberality. They kept their
freedom, and that little State, shut up in that great Empire, was finally the instrument of its ruin.

CHAPTER XI

THE VARIOUS SYSTEMS OF LEGISLATION

If we ask in what precisely consists the greatest good of all, which should
be the end of every system of legislation, we shall find it reduce itself to
two main objects, liberty and equality—liberty, because all particular
dependence means so much force taken from the body of the State, and
equality, because liberty cannot exist without it.
I have already defined civil liberty; by equality, we should understand, not
that the degrees of power and riches are to be absolutely identical for
everybody; but that power shall never be great enough for violence, and
shall always be exercised by virtue of rank and law; and that, in respect of
riches, no citizen shall ever be wealthy enough to buy another, and none
poor enough to be forced to sell himself:[1] which implies, on the part of the
great, moderation in goods and position, and, on the side of the common
sort, moderation in avarice and covetousness.
Such equality, we are told, is an unpractical ideal that cannot actually exist.
But if its abuse is inevitable, does it follow that we should not at least make
regulations concerning it? It is precisely because the force of circumstances
tends continually to destroy equality that the force of legislation should
always tend to its maintenance.
But these general objects of every good legislative system need modifying
in every country in accordance with the local situation and the temper of the
inhabitants; and these circumstances should determine, in each case, the
particular system of institutions which is best, not perhaps in itself, but for
the State for which it is destined. If, for instance, the soil is barren and
unproductive, or the land too crowded for its inhabitants, the people should
turn to industry and the crafts, and exchange what they produce for the
commodities they lack. If, on the other hand, a people dwells in rich plains
and fertile slopes, or, in a good land, lacks inhabitants, it should give all its
attention to agriculture, which causes men to multiply, and should drive out
the crafts, which would only result in depopulation, by grouping in a few
localities the few inhabitants there are.[2] If a nation dwells on an extensive
and convenient coast-line, let it cover the sea with ships and foster
commerce and navigation. It will have a life that will be short and glorious.
If, on its coasts, the sea washes nothing but almost inaccessible rocks, let it
remain barbarous and ichthyophagous: it will have a quieter, perhaps a
better, and certainly a happier life. In a word, besides the principles that are
common to all, every nation has in itself something that gives them a

particular application, and makes its legislation peculiarly its own. Thus,
among the Jews long ago and more recently among the Arabs, the chief
object was religion, among the Athenians letters, at Carthage and Tyre
commerce, at Rhodes shipping, at Sparta war, at Rome virtue. The author of
The Spirit of the Laws has shown with many examples by what art the
legislator directs the constitution towards each of these objects.
What makes the constitution of a State really solid and lasting is the due
observance of what is proper, so that the natural relations are always in
agreement with the laws on every point, and law only serves, so to speak, to
assure, accompany and rectify them. But if the legislator mistakes his object
and adopts a principle other than circumstances naturally direct; if his
principle makes for servitude while they make for liberty, or if it makes for
riches, while they make for populousness, or if it makes for peace, while
they make for conquest—the laws will insensibly lose their influence, the
constitution will alter, and the State will have no rest from trouble till it is
either destroyed or changed, and nature has resumed her invincible sway.
[1] If the object is to give the State consistency, bring the two extremes as near to each other as
possible; allow neither rich men nor beggars. These two estates, which are naturally inseparable, are
equally fatal to the common good; from the one come the friends of tyranny, and from the other
tyrants. It is always between them that public liberty is put up to auction; the one buys, and the other
sells.
[2] "Any branch of foreign commerce," says M. d'Argenson, "creates on the whole only apparent
advantage for the kingdom in general; it may enrich some individuals, or even some towns; but the
nation as a whole gains nothing by it, and the people is no better off."

CHAPTER XII

THE DIVISION OF THE LAWS
If the whole is to be set in order, and the commonwealth put into the best
possible shape, there are various relations to be considered. First, there is
the action of the complete body upon itself, the relation of the whole to the
whole, of the Sovereign to the State; and this relation, as we shall see, is
made up of the relations of the intermediate terms.

The laws which regulate this relation bear the name of political laws, and
are also called fundamental laws, not without reason if they are wise. For, if
there is, in each State, only one good system, the people that is in
possession of it should hold fast to this; but if the established order is bad,
why should laws that prevent men from being good be regarded as
fundamental? Besides, in any case, a people is always in a position to
change its laws, however good; for, if it choose to do itself harm, who can
have a right to stop it?
The second relation is that of the members one to another, or to the body as
a whole; and this relation should be in the first respect as unimportant, and
in the second as important, as possible. Each citizen would then be perfectly
independent of all the rest, and at the same time very dependent on the city;
which is brought about always by the same means, as the strength of the
State can alone secure the liberty of its members. From this second relation
arise civil laws.
We may consider also a third kind of relation between the individual and
the law, a relation of disobedience to its penalty. This gives rise to the
setting up of criminal laws, which, at bottom, are less a particular class of
law than the sanction behind all the rest.
Along with these three kinds of law goes a fourth, most important of all,
which is not graven on tablets of marble or brass, but on the hearts of the
citizens. This forms the real constitution of the State, takes on every day
new powers, when other laws decay or die out, restores them or takes their
place, keeps a people in the ways in which it was meant to go, and
insensibly replaces authority by the force of habit. I am speaking of
morality, of custom, above all of public opinion; a power unknown to
political thinkers, on which none the less success in everything else
depends. With this the great legislator concerns himself in secret, though he
seems to confine himself to particular regulations; for these are only the arc
of the arch, while manners and morals, slower to arise, form in the end its
immovable keystone.
Among the different classes of laws, the political, which determine the form
of the government, are alone relevant to my subject.

BOOK III
Before speaking of the different forms of
government, let us try to fix the exact sense of
the word, which has not yet been very clearly
explained.
CHAPTER I

GOVERNMENT IN GENERAL
I warn the reader that this chapter requires careful reading, and that I am
unable to make myself clear to those who refuse to be attentive.
Every free action is produced by the concurrence of two causes; one moral,
i.e. the will which determines the act; the other physical, i.e. the power
which executes it. When I walk towards an object, it is necessary first that I
should will to go there, and, in the second place, that my feet should carry
me. If a paralytic wills to run and an active man wills not to, they will both
stay where they are. The body politic has the same motive powers; here too
force and will are distinguished, will under the name of legislative power
and force under that of executive power. Without their concurrence, nothing
is, or should be, done.
We have seen that the legislative power belongs to the people, and can
belong to it alone. It may, on the other hand, readily be seen, from the
principles laid down above, that the executive power cannot belong to the
generality as legislature or Sovereign, because it consists wholly of
particular acts which fall outside the competency of the law, and
consequently of the Sovereign, whose acts must always be laws.
The public force therefore needs an agent of its own to bind it together and
set it to work under the direction of the general will, to serve as a means of
communication between the State and the Sovereign, and to do for the
collective person more or less what the union of soul and body does for
man. Here we have what is, in the State, the basis of government, often
wrongly confused with the Sovereign, whose minister it is.

What then is government? An intermediate body set up between the
subjects and the Sovereign, to secure their mutual correspondence, charged
with the execution of the laws and the maintenance of liberty, both civil and
political.
The members of this body are called magistrates or kings, that is to say
governors, and the whole body bears the name prince.[1] Thus those who
hold that the act, by which a people puts itself under a prince, is not a
contract, are certainly right. It is simply and solely a commission, an
employment, in which the rulers, mere officials of the Sovereign, exercise
in their own name the power of which it makes them depositaries. This
power it can limit, modify or recover at pleasure; for the alienation of such
a right is incompatible with the nature of the social body, and contrary to
the end of association.
I call then government, or supreme administration, the legitimate exercise
of the executive power, and prince or magistrate the man or the body
entrusted with that administration.
In government reside the intermediate forces whose relations make up that
of the whole to the whole, or of the Sovereign to the State. This last relation
may be represented as that between the extreme terms of a continuous
proportion, which has government as its mean proportional. The
government gets from the Sovereign the orders it gives the people, and, for
the State to be properly balanced, there must, when everything is reckoned
in, be equality between the product or power of the government taken in
itself, and the product or power of the citizens, who are on the one hand
sovereign and on the other subject.
Furthermore, none of these three terms can be altered without the equality
being instantly destroyed. If the Sovereign desires to govern, or the
magistrate to give laws, or if the subjects refuse to obey, disorder takes the
place of regularity, force and will no longer act together, and the State is
dissolved and falls into despotism or anarchy. Lastly, as there is only one
mean proportional between each relation, there is also only one good
government possible for a State. But, as countless events may change the
relations of a people, not only may different governments be good for
different peoples, but also for the same people at different times.

In attempting to give some idea of the various relations that may hold
between these two extreme terms, I shall take as an example the number of
a people, which is the most easily expressible.
Suppose the State is composed of ten thousand citizens. The Sovereign can
only be considered collectively and as a body; but each member, as being a
subject, is regarded as an individual: thus the Sovereign is to the subject as
ten thousand to one, i.e. each member of the State has as his share only a
ten-thousandth part of the sovereign authority, although he is wholly under
its control. If the people numbers a hundred thousand, the condition of the
subject undergoes no change, and each equally is under the whole authority
of the laws, while his vote, being reduced to one hundred thousandth part,
has ten times less influence in drawing them up. The subject therefore
remaining always a unit, the relation between him and the Sovereign
increases with the number of the citizens. From this it follows that, the
larger the State, the less the liberty.
When I say the relation increases, I mean that it grows more unequal. Thus
the greater it is in the geometrical sense, the less relation there is in the
ordinary sense of the word. In the former sense, the relation, considered
according to quantity, is expressed by the quotient; in the latter, considered
according to identity, it is reckoned by similarity.
Now, the less relation the particular wills have to the general will, that is,
morals and manners to laws, the more should the repressive force be
increased. The government, then, to be good, should be proportionately
stronger as the people is more numerous.
On the other hand, as the growth of the State gives the depositaries of the
public authority more temptations and chances of abusing their power, the
greater the force with which the government ought to be endowed for
keeping the people in hand, the greater too should be the force at the
disposal of the Sovereign for keeping the government in hand. I am
speaking, not of absolute force, but of the relative force of the different
parts of the State.
It follows from this double relation that the continuous proportion between
the Sovereign, the prince and the people, is by no means an arbitrary idea,
but a necessary consequence of the nature of the body politic. It follows
further that, one of the extreme terms, viz. the people, as subject, being

fixed and represented by unity, whenever the duplicate ratio increases or
diminishes, the simple ratio does the same, and is changed accordingly.
From this we see that there is not a single unique and absolute form of
government, but as many governments differing in nature as there are States
differing in size.
If, ridiculing this system, any one were to say that, in order to find the mean
proportional and give form to the body of the government, it is only
necessary, according to me, to find the square root of the number of the
people, I should answer that I am here taking this number only as an
instance; that the relations of which I am speaking are not measured by the
number of men alone, but generally by the amount of action, which is a
combination of a multitude of causes; and that, further, if, to save words, I
borrow for a moment the terms of geometry, I am none the less well aware
that moral quantities do not allow of geometrical accuracy.
The government is on a small scale what the body politic which includes it
is on a great one. It is a moral person endowed with certain faculties, active
like the Sovereign and passive like the State, and capable of being resolved
into other similar relations. This accordingly gives rise to a new proportion,
within which there is yet another, according to the arrangement of the
magistracies, till an indivisible middle term is reached, i.e. a single ruler or
supreme magistrate, who may be represented, in the midst of this
progression, as the unity between the fractional and the ordinal series.
Without encumbering ourselves with this multiplication of terms, let us rest
content with regarding government as a new body within the State, distinct
from the people and the Sovereign, and intermediate between them.
There is between these two bodies this essential difference, that the State
exists by itself, and the government only through the Sovereign. Thus the
dominant will of the prince is, or should be, nothing but the general will or
the law; his force is only the public force concentrated in his hands, and, as
soon as he tries to base any absolute and independent act on his own
authority, the tie that binds the whole together begins to be loosened. If
finally the prince should come to have a particular will more active than the
will of the Sovereign, and should employ the public force in his hands in
obedience to this particular will, there would be, so to speak, two

Sovereigns, one rightful and the other actual, the social union would
evaporate instantly, and the body politic would be dissolved.
However, in order that the government may have a true existence and a real
life distinguishing it from the body of the State, and in order that all its
members may be able to act in concert and fulfil the end for which it was
set up, it must have a particular personality, a sensibility common to its
members, and a force and will of its own making for its preservation. This
particular existence implies assemblies, councils, power of deliberation and
decision, rights, titles, and privileges belonging exclusively to the prince
and making the office of magistrate more honourable in proportion as it is
more troublesome. The difficulties lie in the manner of so ordering this
subordinate whole within the whole, that it in no way alters the general
constitution by affirmation of its own, and always distinguishes the
particular force it possesses, which is destined to aid in its preservation,
from the public force, which is destined to the preservation of the State;
and, in a word, is always ready to sacrifice the government to the people,
and never to sacrifice the people to the government.
Furthermore, although the artificial body of the government is the work of
another artificial body, and has, we may say, only a borrowed and
subordinate life, this does not prevent it from being able to act with more or
less vigour or promptitude, or from being, so to speak, in more or less
robust health. Finally, without departing directly from the end for which it
was instituted, it may deviate more or less from it, according to the manner
of its constitution.
From all these differences arise the various relations which the government
ought to bear to the body of the State, according to the accidental and
particular relations by which the State itself is modified, for often the
government that is best in itself will become the most pernicious, if the
relations in which it stands have altered according to the defects of the body
politic to which it belongs.
[1] Thus at Venice the College, even in the absence of the Doge, is called "Most Serene Prince."

CHAPTER II

THE CONSTITUENT PRINCIPLE IN THE VARIOUS FORMS OF
GOVERNMENT
To set forth the general cause of the above differences, we must here
distinguish between government and its principle, as we did before between
the State and the Sovereign.
The body of the magistrate may be composed of a greater or a less number
of members. We said that the relation of the Sovereign to the subjects was
greater in proportion as the people was more numerous, and, by a clear
analogy, we may say the same of the relation of the government to the
magistrates.
But the total force of the government, being always that of the State, is
invariable; so that, the more of this force it expends on its own members,
the less it has left to employ on the whole people.
The more numerous the magistrates, therefore, the weaker the government.
This principle being fundamental, we must do our best to make it clear.
In the person of the magistrate we can distinguish three essentially different
wills: first, the private will of the individual, tending only to his personal
advantage; secondly, the common will of the magistrates, which is relative
solely to the advantage of the prince, and may be called corporate will,
being general in relation to the government, and particular in relation to the
State, of which the government forms part; and, in the third place, the will
of the people or the sovereign will, which is general both in relation to the
State regarded as the whole, and to the government regarded as a part of the
whole.
In a perfect act of legislation, the individual or particular will should be at
zero; the corporate will belonging to the government should occupy a very
subordinate position; and, consequently, the general or sovereign will
should always predominate and should be the sole guide of all the rest.
According to the natural order, on the other hand, these different wills
become more active in proportion as they are concentrated. Thus, the
general will is always the weakest, the corporate will second, and the

individual will strongest of all: so that, in the government, each member is
first of all himself, then a magistrate, and then a citizen —in an order
exactly the reverse of what the social system requires.
This granted, if the whole government is in the hands of one man, the
particular and the corporate will are wholly united, and consequently the
latter is at its highest possible degree of intensity. But, as the use to which
the force is put depends on the degree reached by the will, and as the
absolute force of the government is invariable, it follows that the most
active government is that of one man.
Suppose, on the other hand, we unite the government with the legislative
authority, and make the Sovereign prince also, and all the citizens so many
magistrates: then the corporate will, being confounded with the general
will, can possess no greater activity than that will, and must leave the
particular will as strong as it can possibly be. Thus, the government, having
always the same absolute force, will be at the lowest point of its relative
force or activity.
These relations are incontestable, and there are other considerations which
still further confirm them. We can see, for instance, that each magistrate is
more active in the body to which he belongs than each citizen in that to
which he belongs, and that consequently the particular will has much more
influence on the acts of the government than on those of the Sovereign; for
each magistrate is almost always charged with some governmental function,
while each citizen, taken singly, exercises no function of Sovereignty.
Furthermore, the bigger the State grows, the more its real force increases,
though not in direct proportion to its growth; but, the State remaining the
same, the number of magistrates may increase to any extent, without the
government gaining any greater real force; for its force is that of the State,
the dimension of which remains equal. Thus the relative force or activity of
the government decreases, while its absolute or real force cannot increase.
Moreover, it is a certainty that promptitude in execution diminishes as more
people are put in charge of it: where prudence is made too much of, not
enough is made of fortune; opportunity is let slip, and deliberation results in
the loss of its object.
I have just proved that the government grows remiss in proportion as the
number of the magistrates increases; and I previously proved that, the more

numerous the people, the greater should be the repressive force. From this it
follows that the relation of the magistrates to the government should vary
inversely to the relation of the subjects to the Sovereign; that is to say, the
larger the State, the more should the government be tightened, so that the
number of the rulers diminish in proportion to the increase of that of the
people.
It should be added that I am here speaking of the relative strength of the
government, and not of its rectitude: for, on the other hand, the more
numerous the magistracy, the nearer the corporate will comes to the general
will; while, under a single magistrate, the corporate will is, as I said, merely
a particular will. Thus, what may be gained on one side is lost on the other,
and the art of the legislator is to know how to fix the point at which the
force and the will of the government, which are always in inverse
proportion, meet in the relation that is most to the advantage of the State.

CHAPTER III

THE DIVISION OF GOVERNMENTS
We saw in the last chapter what causes the various kinds or forms of
government to be distinguished according to the number of the members
composing them: it remains in this to discover how the division is made.
In the first place, the Sovereign may commit the charge of the government
to the whole people or to the majority of the people, so that more citizens
are magistrates than are mere private individuals. This form of government
is called democracy.
Or it may restrict the government to a small number; so that there are more
private citizens than magistrates; and this is named aristocracy.
Lastly, it may concentrate the whole government in the hands of a single
magistrate from whom all others hold their power. This third form is the
most usual, and is called monarchy, or royal government.

It should be remarked that all these forms, or at least the first two, admit of
degree, and even of very wide differences; for democracy may include the
whole people, or may be restricted to half. Aristocracy, in its turn, may be
restricted indefinitely from half the people down to the smallest possible
number. Even royalty is susceptible of a measure of distribution. Sparta
always had two kings, as its constitution provided; and the Roman Empire
saw as many as eight emperors at once, without it being possible to say that
the Empire was split up. Thus there is a point at which each form of
government passes into the next, and it becomes clear that, under three
comprehensive denominations, government is really susceptible of as many
diverse forms as the State has citizens.
There are even more: for, as the government may also, in certain aspects, be
subdivided into other parts, one administered in one fashion and one in
another, the combination of the three forms may result in a multitude of
mixed forms, each of which admits of multiplication by all the simple
forms.
There has been at all times much dispute concerning the best form of
government, without consideration of the fact that each is in some cases the
best, and in others the worst.
If, in the different States, the number of supreme magistrates should be in
inverse ratio to the number of citizens, it follows that, generally, democratic
government suits small States, aristocratic government those of middle size,
and monarchy great ones. This rule is immediately deducible from the
principle laid down. But it is impossible to count the innumerable
circumstances which may furnish exceptions.

CHAPTER IV

DEMOCRACY
He who makes the law knows better than any one else how it should be
executed and interpreted. It seems then impossible to have a better
constitution than that in which the executive and legislative powers are

united; but this very fact renders the government in certain respects
inadequate, because things which should be distinguished are confounded,
and the prince and the Sovereign, being the same person, form, so to speak,
no more than a government without government.
It is not good for him who makes the laws to execute them, or for the body
of the people to turn its attention away from a general standpoint and devote
it to particular objects. Nothing is more dangerous than the influence of
private interests in public affairs, and the abuse of the laws by the
government is a less evil than the corruption of the legislator, which is the
inevitable sequel to a particular standpoint. In such a case, the State being
altered in substance, all reformation becomes impossible. A people that
would never misuse governmental powers would never misuse
independence; a people that would always govern well would not need to
be governed.
If we take the term in the strict sense, there never has been a real
democracy, and there never will be. It is against the natural order for the
many to govern and the few to be governed. It is unimaginable that the
people should remain continually assembled to devote their time to public
affairs, and it is clear that they cannot set up commissions for that purpose
without the form of administration being changed.
In fact, I can confidently lay down as a principle that, when the functions of
government are shared by several tribunals, the less numerous sooner or
later acquire the greatest authority, if only because they are in a position to
expedite affairs, and power thus naturally comes into their hands.
Besides, how many conditions that are difficult to unite does such a
government presuppose! First, a very small State, where the people can
readily be got together and where each citizen can with ease know all the
rest; secondly, great simplicity of manners, to prevent business from
multiplying and raising thorny problems; next, a large measure of equality
in rank and fortune, without which equality of rights and authority cannot
long subsist; lastly, little or no luxury—for luxury either comes of riches or
makes them necessary; it corrupts at once rich and poor, the rich by
possession and the poor by covetousness; it sells the country to softness and
vanity, and takes away from the State all its citizens, to make them slaves
one to another, and one and all to public opinion.

This is why a famous writer has made virtue the fundamental principle of
Republics; for all these conditions could not exist without virtue. But, for
want of the necessary distinctions, that great thinker was often inexact, and
sometimes obscure, and did not see that, the sovereign authority being
everywhere the same, the same principle should be found in every wellconstituted State, in a greater or less degree, it is true, according to the form
of the government.
It may be added that there is no government so subject to civil wars and
intestine agitations as democratic or popular government, because there is
none which has so strong and continual a tendency to change to another
form, or which demands more vigilance and courage for its maintenance as
it is. Under such a constitution above all, the citizen should arm himself
with strength and constancy, and say, every day of his life, what a virtuous
Count Palatine[1] said in the Diet of Poland: Malo periculosam libertatem
quam quietum servitium.
Were there a people of gods, their government would be democratic. So
perfect a government is not for men.

[1] The Palatine of Posen, father of the King of Poland, Duke of Lorraine. I prefer liberty with danger
to peace with slavery.

CHAPTER V

ARISTOCRACY
We have here two quite distinct moral persons, the government and the
Sovereign, and in consequence two general wills, one general in relation to
all the citizens, the other only for the members of the administration. Thus,
although the government may regulate its internal policy as it pleases, it can
never speak to the people save in the name of the Sovereign, that is, of the
people itself, a fact which must not be forgotten.
The first societies governed themselves aristocratically. The heads of
families took counsel together on public affairs. The young bowed without
question to the authority of experience. Hence such names as priests,
elders, senate, and gerontes. The savages of North America govern
themselves in this way even now, and their government is admirable.
But, in proportion as artificial inequality produced by institutions became
predominant over natural inequality, riches or power[1] were put before age,
and aristocracy became elective. Finally, the transmission of the father's
power along with his goods to his children, by creating patrician families,
made government hereditary, and there came to be senators of twenty.
There are then three sorts of aristocracy—natural, elective and hereditary.
The first is only for simple peoples; the third is the worst of all
governments; the second is the best, and is aristocracy properly so called.
Besides the advantage that lies in the distinction between the two powers, it
presents that of its members being chosen; for, in popular government, all
the citizens are born magistrates; but here magistracy is confined to a few,
who become such only by election.[2] By this means uprightness,
understanding, experience and all other claims to pre-eminence and public
esteem become so many further guarantees of wise government.

Moreover, assemblies are more easily held, affairs better discussed and
carried out with more order and diligence, and the credit of the State is
better sustained abroad by venerable senators than by a multitude that is
unknown or despised.
In a word, it is the best and most natural arrangement that the wisest should
govern the many, when it is assured that they will govern for its profit, and
not for their own. There is no need to multiply instruments, or get twenty
thousand men to do what a hundred picked men can do even better, but it
must not be forgotten mat corporate interest here begins to direct the public
power less under the regulation of the general will, and that a further
inevitable propensity takes away from the laws part of the executive power.
If we are to speak of what is individually desirable, neither should the State
be so small, nor a people so simple and upright, that the execution of the
laws follows immediately from the public will, as it does in a good
democracy. Nor should the nation be so great that the rulers have to scatter
in order to govern it and are able to play the Sovereign each in his own
department, and, beginning by making themselves independent, end by
becoming masters.
But if aristocracy does not demand all the virtues needed by popular
government, it demands others which are peculiar to itself; for instance,
moderation on the side of the rich and contentment on that of the poor; for it
seems that thorough-going equality would be out of place, as it was not
found even at Sparta.
Furthermore, if this form of government carries with it a certain inequality
of fortune, this is justifiable in order that as a rule the administration of
public affairs may be entrusted to those who are most able to give them
their whole time, but not, as Aristotle maintains, in order that the rich may
always be put first. On the contrary, it is of importance that an opposite
choice should occasionally teach the people that the deserts of men offer
claims to pre-eminence more important than those of riches.
[1] It is clear that the word optimates meant, among the ancients, not the best, but the most powerful.
[2] It is of great importance that the form of the election of magistrates should be regulated by law;
for if it is left at the discretion of the prince, it is impossible to avoid falling into hereditary
aristocracy, as the Republics of Venice and Berne actually did. The first of these has therefore long

been a State dissolved; the second, however, is maintained by the extreme wisdom of the senate, and
forms an honourable and highly dangerous exception.

CHAPTER VI

MONARCHY
So far, we have considered the prince as a moral and collective person,
unified by the force of the laws, and the depositary in the State of the
executive power. We have now to consider this power when it is gathered
together into the hands of a natural person, a real man, who alone has the
right to dispose of it in accordance with the laws. Such a person is called a
monarch or king.
In contrast with other forms of administration, in which a collective being
stands for an individual, in this form an individual stands for a collective
being; so that the moral unity that constituted the prince is at the same time
a physical unity, and all the qualities, which in the other case are only with
difficulty brought together by the law, are found naturally united.
Thus the will of the people, the will of the prince, the public force of the
State, and the particular force of the government, all answer to a single
motive power; all the springs of the machine are in the same hands, the
whole moves towards the same end; there are no conflicting movements to
cancel one another, and no kind of constitution can be imagined in which a
less amount of effort produces a more considerable amount of action.
Archimedes, seated quietly on the bank and easily drawing a great vessel
afloat, stands to my mind for a skilful monarch, governing vast states from
his study, and moving everything while he seems himself unmoved.
But if no government is more vigorous than this, there is also none in which
the particular will holds more sway and rules the rest more easily.
Everything moves towards the same end indeed, but this end is by no means
that of the public happiness, and even the force of the administration
constantly shows itself prejudicial to the State.

Kings desire to be absolute, and men are always crying out to them from
afar that the best means of being so is to get themselves loved by their
people. This precept is all very well, and even in some respects very true.
Unfortunately, it will always be derided at court. The power which comes
of a people's love is no doubt the greatest; but it is precarious and
conditional, and princes will never rest content with it. The best kings
desire to be in a position to be wicked, if they please, without forfeiting
their mastery: political sermonisers may tell them to their hearts' content
that, the people's strength being their own, their first interest is that the
people should be prosperous, numerous and formidable; they are well aware
that this is Untrue. Their first personal interest is that the people should be
weak, wretched, and unable to resist them. I admit that, provided the
subjects remained always in submission, the prince's interest would indeed
be that it should be powerful, in order that its power, being his own, might
make him formidable to his neighbours; but, this interest being merely
secondary and subordinate, and strength being incompatible with
submission, princes naturally give the preference always to the principle
that is more to their immediate advantage. This is what Samuel put strongly
before the Hebrews, and what Macchiavelli has clearly shown. He
professed to teach kings; but it was the people he really taught. His Prince
is the book of Republicans.[1]
We found, on general grounds, that monarchy is suitable only for great
States, and this is confirmed when we examine it in itself. The more
numerous the public administration, the smaller becomes the relation
between the prince and the subjects, and the nearer it comes to equality, so
that in democracy the ratio is unity, or absolute equality. Again, as the
government is restricted in numbers the ratio increases and reaches its
maximum when the government is in the hands of a single person. There is
then too great a distance between prince and people and the State lacks a
bond of union. To form such a bond, there must be intermediate orders, and
princes, personages and nobility to compose them. But no such things suit a
small State, to which all class differences mean ruin.
If, however, it is hard for a great State to be well governed, it is much
harder for it to be so by a single man; and every one knows what happens
when kings substitute others for themselves.

An essential and inevitable defect, which will always rank monarchical
below republican government, is that in a republic the public voice hardly
ever raises to the highest positions men who are not enlightened and
capable, and such as to fill them with honour; while in monarchies these
who rise to the top are most often merely petty blunderers petty swindlers,
and petty intriguers, whose petty talents cause them to get into the highest
positions at Court, but, as soon as they have got there, serve only to make
their ineptitude clear to the public. The people is far less often mistaken in
its choice than the prince; and a man of real worth among the king's
ministers is almost as rare as a fool at the head of a republican government.
Thus, when, by some fortunate chance, one of these born governors takes
the helm of State in some monarchy that has been nearly overwhelmed by
swarms of 'gentlemanly' administrators, there is nothing but amazement at
the resources he discovers, and his coming marks an era in his country's
history.
For a monarchical State to have a chance of being well governed, its
population and extent must be proportionate to the abilities of its governor.
If is easier to conquer than to rule. With a long enough lever, the world
could be moved with a single finger; to sustain it needs the shoulders of
Hercules. However small a State may be, the prince is hardly ever big
enough for it. When, on the other hand, it happens that the State is too small
for its ruler, in these rare cases too it is ill governed, because the ruler,
constantly pursuing his great designs, forgets the interests of the people, and
makes it no less wretched by misusing the talents he has, than a ruler of less
capacity would make it for want of those he had not. A kingdom should, so
to speak, expand or contract with each reign, according to the prince's
capabilities; but, the abilities of a senate being more constant in quantity,
the State can then have permanent frontiers without the administration
suffering.
The disadvantage that is most felt in monarchical government is the want of
the continuous succession which, in both the other forms, provides an
unbroken bond of union. When one king dies, another is needed; elections
leave dangerous intervals and are full of storms; and unless the citizens are
disinterested and upright to a degree which very seldom goes with this kind
of government, intrigue and corruption abound. He to whom the State has
sold itself can hardly help selling it in his turn and repaying himself, at the

expense of the weak, the money the powerful have wrung from him. Under
such an administration, venality sooner or later spreads through every part,
and peace so enjoyed under a king is worse than the disorders of an
interregnum.
What has been done to prevent these evils? Crowns have been made
hereditary in certain families, and an order of succession has been set up, to
prevent disputes from arising on the death of kings. That is to say, the
disadvantages of regency have been put in place of those of election,
apparent tranquillity has been preferred to wise administration, and men
have chosen rather to risk having children, monstrosities, or imbeciles as
rulers to having disputes over the choice of good kings. It has not been
taken into account that, in so exposing ourselves to the risks this possibility
entails, we are setting almost all the chances against us. There was sound
sense in what the younger Dionysius said to his father, who reproached him
for doing some shameful deed by asking, "Did I set you the example?"
"No," answered his son, "but your father was not king."
Everything conspires to take away from a man who is set in authority over
others the sense of justice and reason. Much trouble, we are told, is taken to
teach young princes the art of reigning; but their education seems to do
them no good. It would be better to begin by teaching them the art of
obeying. The greatest kings whose praises history tells were not brought up
to reign: reigning is a science we are never so far from possessing as when
we have learnt too much of it, and one we acquire better by obeying than by
commanding. "Nam utilissimus idem ac brevissimus bonarum malarumque
rerum delectus cogitare quid aut nolueris sub alio principe, aut volueris."[2]
One result of this lack of coherence is the inconstancy of royal government,
which, regulated now on one scheme and now on another, according to the
character of the reigning prince or those who reign for him, cannot for long
have a fixed object or a consistent policy—and this variability, not found in
the other forms of government, where the prince is always the same, causes
the State to be always shifting from principle to principle and from project
to project. Thus we may say that generally, if a court is more subtle in
intrigue, there is more wisdom in a senate, and Republics advance towards
their ends by more consistent and better considered policies; while every
revolution in a royal ministry creates a revolution in the State; for the

principle common to all ministers and nearly all kings is to do in every
respect the reverse of what was done by their predecessors.
This incoherence further clears up a sophism that is very familiar to royalist
political writers; not only is civil government likened to domestic
government, and the prince to the father of a family—this error has already
been refuted—but the prince is also freely credited with all the virtues he
ought to possess, and is supposed to be always what he should be. This
supposition once made, royal government is clearly preferable to all others,
because it is incontestably the strongest, and, to be the best also, wants only
a corporate will more in conformity with the general will.
But if, according to Plato,[3] the "king by nature" is such a rarity, how often
will nature and fortune conspire to give him a crown? And, if royal
education necessarily corrupts those who receive it, what is to be hoped
from a series of men brought up to reign? It is, then, wanton self-deception
to confuse royal government with government by a good king. To see such
government as it is in itself, we must consider it as it is under princes who
are incompetent or wicked: for either they will come to the throne wicked
or incompetent, or the throne will make them so.
These difficulties have not escaped our writers, who, all the same, are not
troubled by them. The remedy, they say, is to obey without a murmur: God
sends bad kings in His wrath, and they must be borne as the scourges of
Heaven. Such talk is doubtless edifying; but it would be more in place in a
pulpit than in a political book. What are we to think of a doctor who
promises miracles, and whose whole art is to exhort the sufferer to
patience? We know for ourselves that we must put up with a bad
government when it is there; the question is how to find a good one.
[1] Macchiavelli was a proper man and a good citizen; but, being attached to the court of the Medici,
he could not help veiling his love of liberty in the midst of his country's oppression. The choice of his
detestable hero, Cæsar Borgia, clearly enough shows his hidden aim; and the contradiction between
the teaching of the Prince and that of the Discourses on Livy and the History of Florence shows that
this profound political thinker has so far been studied only by superficial or corrupt readers. The
Court of Rome sternly prohibited his book. I can well believe it; for it is that Court it most clearly
portrays.
[2] Tacitus, Histories, i. 16. "For the best, and also the shortest way of finding out what is good and
what is bad is to consider what you would have wished to happen or not to happen, had another than
you been Emperor."

[3] In the Politicus.

CHAPTER VII

MIXED GOVERNMENTS
Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as a simple government. An
isolated ruler must have subordinate magistrates; a popular government
must have a head. There is therefore, in the distribution of the executive
power, always a gradation from the greater to the lesser number, with the
difference that sometimes the greater number is dependent on the smaller,
and sometimes the smaller on the greater.
Sometimes the distribution is equal, when either the constituent parts are in
mutual dependence, as in the government of England, or the authority of
each section is independent, but imperfect, as in Poland. This last form is
bad; for it secures no unity in the government, and the State is left without a
bond of union.
Is a simple or a mixed government the better? Political writers are always
debating the question, which must be answered as we have already
answered a question about all forms of government.
Simple government is better in itself, just because it is simple. But when the
executive power is not sufficiently dependent upon the legislative power,
i.e. when the prince is more closely related to the Sovereign than the people
to the prince, this lack of proportion must be cured by the division of the
government; for all the parts have then no less authority over the subjects,
while their division makes them all together less strong against the
Sovereign.
The same disadvantage is also prevented by the appointment of
intermediate magistrates, who leave the government entire, and have the
effect only of balancing the two powers and maintaining their respective
rights. Government is then not mixed, but moderated.

The opposite disadvantages may be similarly cured, and, when the
government is too lax, tribunals may be set up to concentrate it. This is
done in all democracies. In the first case, the government is divided to make
it weak; in the second, to make it strong: for the maxima of both strength
and weakness are found in simple governments, while the mixed forms
result in a mean strength.

CHAPTER VIII

THAT ALL FORMS OF GOVERNMENT DO NOT SUIT ALL
COUNTRIES
Liberty not being a fruit of all climates, is not within the reach of all
peoples. The more this principle, laid down by Montesquieu, is considered,
the more its truth is felt; the more it is combated, the more chance is given
to confirm it by new proofs.
In all the governments that there are, the public person consumes without
producing. Whence then does it get what it consumes? From the labour of
its members. The necessities of the public are supplied out of the
superfluities of individuals. It follows that the civil State can subsist only so
long as men's labour brings them a return greater than their needs.
The amount of this excess is not the same in all countries. In some it is
considerable, in others middling, in yet others nil, in some even negative.
The relation of product to subsistence depends on the fertility of the
climate, on the sort of labour the land demands, on the nature of its
products, on the strength of its inhabitants, on the greater or less
consumption they find necessary, and on several further considerations of
which the whole relation is made up.
On the other side, all governments are not of the same nature: some are less
voracious than others, and the differences between them are based on this
second principle, that the further from their source the public contributions
are removed, the more burdensome they become.

The charge should be measured not by the amount of the impositions, but
by the path they have to travel in order to get back to those from whom they
came. When the circulation is prompt and well-established, it does not
matter whether much or little is paid; the people is always rich and,
financially speaking, all is well. On the contrary, however little the people
gives, if that little does not return to it, it is soon exhausted by giving
continually: the State is then never rich, and the people is always a people
of beggars.
It follows that, the more the distance between people and government
increases, the more burdensome tribute becomes: thus, in a democracy, the
people bears the least charge; in an aristocracy, a greater charge; and, in
monarchy, the weight becomes heaviest. Monarchy therefore suits only
wealthy nations; aristocracy, States of middling size and wealth; and
democracy, States that are small and poor.
In fact, the more we reflect, the more we find the difference between free
and monarchical States to be this: in the former, everything is used for the
public advantage; in the latter, the public forces and those of individuals are
affected by each other, and either increases as the other grows weak; finally,
instead of governing subjects to make them happy, despotism makes them
wretched in order to govern them.
We find then, in every climate, natural causes according to which the form
of government which it requires can be assigned, and we can even say what
sort of inhabitants it should have.
Unfriendly and barren lands, where the product does; not repay the labour,
should remain desert and uncultivated, or peopled only by savages; lands
where men's labour brings in no more than the exact minimum necessary to
subsistence should be inhabited by barbarous peoples: in such places all
polity is impossible. Lands where the surplus of product over labour is only
middling are suitable for free peoples; those in which the soil is abundant
and fertile and gives a great product for a little labour call for monarchical
government, in order that the surplus of superfluities among the subjects
may be consumed by the luxury of the prince: for it is better for this excess
to be absorbed by the government than dissipated among the individuals. I
am aware that there are exceptions; but these exceptions themselves

confirm the rule, in that sooner or later they produce revolutions which
restore things to the natural order.
General laws should always be distinguished from individual causes that
may modify their effects. If all the South were covered with Republics and
all the North with despotic States, it would be none the less true that, in
point of climate, despotism is suitable to hot countries, barbarism to cold
countries, and good polity to temperate regions. I see also that, the principle
being granted, there may be disputes on its application; it may be said that
there are cold countries that are very fertile, and tropical countries that are
very unproductive. But this difficulty exists only for those who do not
consider the question in all its aspects. We must, as I have already said, take
labour, strength, consumption, etc., into account.
Take two tracts of equal extent, one of which brings in five and the other
ten. If the inhabitants of the first consume four and those of the second nine,
the surplus of the first product will be a fifth and that of the second a tenth.
The ratio of these two surpluses will then be inverse to that of the products,
and the tract which produces only five will give a surplus double that of the
tract which produces ten.
But there is no question of a double product, and I think no one would put
the fertility of cold countries, as a general rule, on an equality with that of
hot ones. Let us, however, suppose this equality to exist: let us, if you will,
regard England as on the same level as Sicily, and Poland as Egypt—further
south, we shall have Africa and the Indies; further north, nothing at all. To
get this equality of product, what a difference there must be in tillage: in
Sicily, there is only need to scratch the ground; in England, how men must
toil! But, where more hands are needed to get the same product, the
superfluity must necessarily be less.
Consider, besides, that the same number of men consume much less in hot
countries. The climate requires sobriety for the sake of health; and
Europeans who try to live there as they would at home all perish of
dysentery and indigestion. "We are," says Chardin, "carnivorous animals,
wolves, in comparison with the Asiatics. Some attribute the sobriety of the
Persians to the fact that their country is less cultivated; but it is my belief
that their country abounds less in commodities because the inhabitants need
less. If their frugality," he goes on, "were the effect of the nakedness of the

land, only the poor would eat little; but everybody does so. Again, less or
more would be eaten in various provinces, according to the land's fertility;
but the same sobriety is found throughout the kingdom. They are very
proud of their manner of life, saying that you have only to look at their hue
to recognise how far it excels that of the Christians. In fact, the Persians are
of an even hue; their skins are fair, fine and smooth; while the hue of their
subjects, the Armenians, who live after the European fashion, is rough and
blotchy, and their bodies are gross and unwieldy."
The nearer you get to the equator, the less people live on. Meat they hardly
touch; rice, maize, curcur, millet and cassava are their ordinary food. There
are in the Indies millions of men whose subsistence does not cost a
halfpenny a day. Even in Europe we find considerable differences of
appetite between Northern and Southern peoples. A Spaniard will live for a
week on a German's dinner. In the countries in which men are more
voracious, luxury therefore turns in the direction of consumption. In
England, luxury appears in a well-filled table; in Italy, you feast on sugar
and flowers.
Luxury in clothes shows similar differences. In climates in which the
changes of season are prompt and violent, men have better and simpler
clothes; where they clothe themselves only for adornment, what is striking
is more thought of than what is useful; clothes themselves are then a luxury.
At Naples, you may see daily walking in the Pausilippeum men in goldembroidered upper garments and nothing else. It is the same with buildings;
magnificence is the sole consideration where there is nothing to fear from
the air. In Paris and London, you desire to be lodged warmly and
comfortably; in Madrid, you have superb salons, but not a window that
closes, and you go to bed in a mere hole.
In hot countries foods are much more substantial and succulent; and the
third difference cannot but have an influence on the second. Why are so
many vegetables eaten in Italy? Because there they are good, nutritious and
excellent in taste. In France, where they are nourished only on water, they
are far from nutritious and are thought nothing of at table. They take up all
the same no less ground, and cost at least as much pains to cultivate. It is a
proved fact that the wheat of Barbary, in other respects inferior to that of
France, yields much more flour, and that the wheat of France in turn yields
more than that of northern countries; from which it may be inferred that a

like gradation in the same direction, from equator to pole, is found
generally. But is it not an obvious disadvantage for an equal product to
contain less nourishment?
To all these points may be added another, which at once depends on and
strengthens them. Hot countries need inhabitants less than cold countries,
and can support more of them. There is thus a double surplus, which is all
to the advantage of despotism. The greater the territory occupied by a fixed
number of inhabitants, the more difficult revolt becomes, because rapid or
secret concerted action is impossible, and the government can easily
unmask projects and cut communications; but the more a numerous people
is gathered together, the less can the government usurp the Sovereign's
place: the people's leaders can deliberate as safely in their houses as the
prince in council, and the crowd gathers as rapidly in the squares as the
prince's troops in their quarters. The advantage of tyrannical government
therefore lies in acting at great distances. With the help of the rallyingpoints it establishes, its strength, like that of the lever,[1] grows with
distance. The strength of the people, on the other hand, acts only when
concentrated: when spread abroad, it evaporates and is lost, like powder
scattered on the ground, which catches fire only grain by grain. The least
populous countries are thus the fittest for tyranny: fierce animals reign only
in deserts.
[1] This does not contradict what I said before (Book ii, ch. ix) about the disadvantages of great
States; for we were then dealing with the authority of the government over the members, while here
we are dealing with its force against the subjects. Its scattered members serve it as rallying-points for
action against the people at a distance, but it has no rallying-point for direct action on its members
themselves. Thus the length of the lever is its weakness in the one case, and its strength in the other.

CHAPTER IX

THE MARKS OF A GOOD GOVERNMENT
The question "What absolutely is the best government?" is unanswerable as
well as indeterminate; or rather, there are as many good answers as there are

possible combinations in the absolute and relative situations of all nations.
But if it is asked by what sign we may know that a given people is well or
ill governed, that is another matter, and the question, being one of fact,
admits of an answer.
It is not, however, answered, because every-one wants to answer it in his
own way. Subjects extol public tranquillity, citizens individual liberty; the
one class prefers security of possessions, the other that of person; the one
regards as the best government that which is most severe, the other
maintains that the mildest is the best; the one wants crimes punished, the
other wants them prevented; the one wants the State to be feared by its
neighbours, the other prefers that it should be ignored; the one is content if
money circulates, the other demands that the people shall have bread. Even
if an agreement were come to on these and similar points, should we have
got any further? As moral qualities do not admit of exact measurement,
agreement about the mark does not mean agreement about the valuation.
For my part, I am continually astonished that a mark so simple is not
recognised, or that men are of so bad faith as not to admit it. What is the
end of political association? The preservation and prosperity of its
members. And what is the surest mark of their preservation and prosperity?
Their numbers and population. Seek then nowhere else this mark that is in
dispute. The rest being equal, the government under which, without external
aids, without naturalisation or colonies, the citizens increase and multiply
most, is beyond question the best. The government under which a people
wanes and diminishes is worst. Calculators, it is left for you to count, to
measure, to compare.[1]
[1] On the same principle it should be judged what centuries deserve the preference for human
prosperity. Those in which letters and arts have flourished have been too much admired, because the
hidden object of their culture has not been fathomed, and their fatal effects not taken into account.
"Idque apud imperitos humanitas vocabatur, cum pars servitutis esset." ["Fools called 'humanity'
what was a part of slavery," Tacitus, Agricola, 31.] Shall we never see in the maxims books lay down
the vulgar interest that makes their writers speak? No, whatever they may say, when, despite its
renown, a country is depopulated, it is not true that all is well, and it is not enough that a poet should
have an income of 100,000 francs to make his age the best of all. Less attention should be paid to the
apparent repose and tranquillity of the rulers than to the well-being of their nations as wholes, and
above all of the most numerous States. A hail-storm lays several cantons waste, but it rarely makes a
famine. Outbreaks and civil wars give rulers rude shocks, but they are not the real ills of peoples,
who may even get a respite, while there is a dispute as to who shall tyrannise over them. Their true

prosperity and calamities come from their permanent condition: it is when the whole remains crushed
beneath the yoke, that decay sets in, and that the rulers destroy them at will, and "ubi solitudinem
faciunt, pacem appellant" ["Where they create solitude, they call it peace," Tacitus, Agricola, 31.]
When the bickerings of the great disturbed the kingdom of France, and the Coadjutor of Paris took a
dagger in his pocket to the Parliament, these things did not prevent the people of France from
prospering and multiplying in dignity, ease and freedom. Long ago Greece flourished in the midst of
the most savage wars; blood ran in torrents, and yet the whole country was covered with inhabitants.
It appeared, says Macchiavelli, that in the midst of murder, proscription and civil war, our republic
only throve: the virtue, morality and independence of the citizens did more to strengthen it than all
their dissensions had done to enfeeble it A little disturbance gives the soul elasticity; what makes the
race truly prosperous is not so much peace as liberty.

CHAPTER X

THE ABUSE OF GOVERNMENT AND ITS TENDENCY TO
DEGENERATE
As the particular will acts constantly in opposition to the general will, the
government continually exerts itself against the Sovereignty. The greater
this exertion becomes, the more the constitution changes; and, as there is in
this case no other corporate will to create an equilibrium by resisting the
will of the prince, sooner or later the prince must inevitably suppress the
Sovereign and break the social treaty. This is the unavoidable and inherent
defect which, from the very birth of the body politic, tends ceaselessly to
destroy it, as age and death end by destroying the human body.
There are two general courses by which government degenerates: i.e. when
it undergoes contraction, or when the State is dissolved.
Government undergoes contraction when it passes from the many to the
few, that is, from democracy to aristocracy, and from aristocracy to royalty.
To do so is its natural propensity.[1] If it took the backward course from the
few to the many, it could be said that it was relaxed; by this inverse
sequence is impossible.
Indeed, governments never change their form except when their energy is
exhausted and leaves them too weak to keep what they have. If a
government at once extended its sphere and relaxed its stringency, its force
would become absolutely nil, and it would persist still less. It is therefore

necessary to wind up the spring and tighten the hold as it gives way: or else
the State it sustains will come to grief.
The dissolution of the State may come about in either of two ways.
First, when the prince ceases to administer the State in accordance with the
laws, and usurps the Sovereign power. A remarkable change then occurs:
not the government, but the State, undergoes contraction; I mean that the
great State is dissolved, and another is formed within it, composed solely of
the members of the government, which becomes for the rest of the people
merely master and tyrant. So that the moment the government usurps the
Sovereignty, the social compact is broken and all private citizens recover by
right their natural liberty, and are forced, but not bound, to obey.
The same thing happens when the members of the government severally
usurp the power they should exercise only as a body; this is as great an
infraction of the laws, and results in even greater disorders. There are then,
so to speak, as many princes as there are magistrates, and the State, no less
divided than the government, either perishes or changes its form.
When the State is dissolved, the abuse of government, whatever it is, bears
the common name of anarchy. To distinguish, democracy degenerates into
ochlocracy and aristocracy into oligarchy and I would add that royalty
degenerates into tyranny; but this last word is ambiguous and needs
explanation.
In vulgar usage, a tyrant is a king who governs violently and without regard
for justice and law. In the exact sense, a tyrant is an individual who
arrogates to himself the royal authority without having a right to it. This is
how the Greeks understood the word "tyrant": they applied it indifferently
to good and bad princes whose authority was not legitimate.[2] Tyrant and
usurper are thus perfectly synonymous terms.
In order that I may give different things different names, I call him who
usurps the royal authority tyrant, and him who usurps the sovereign power a
despot. The tyrant is he who thrusts himself in contrary to the laws to
govern in accordance with the laws; the despot is he who sets himself above
the laws themselves. Thus the tyrant cannot be a despot, but the despot is
always a tyrant.

[1] The slow formation and the progress of the Republic of Venice in its lagoons are a notable
instance of this sequence; and it is most astonishing that, after more than twelve hundred years'
existence, the Venetians seem to be still at the second stage, which they reached with the Serrar di
Consiglio in 1198. As for the ancient Dukes who are brought up against them, it is proved, whatever
the Squittinio della libertà veneta may say of them, that they were in no sense Sovereigns.
A case certain to be cited against my view is that of the Roman Republic, which, it will be said,
followed exactly the opposite course, and passed from monarchy to aristocracy and from aristocracy
to democracy. I by no means take this view of it.
What Romulus first set up was a mixed government, which soon deteriorated into despotism. From
special causes, the State died an untimely death, as new-born children sometimes perish without
reaching manhood. The expulsion of the Tarquins was the real period of the birth of the Republic.
But at first it took on no constant form, because, by not abolishing the patriciate, it left half its work
undone. For, by this means, hereditary aristocracy, the worst of all legitimate forms of administration,
remained in conflict with democracy, and the form of the government, as Macchiavelli has proved,
was only fixed on the establishment of the tribunate: only then was there a true government and a
veritable democracy. In fact, the people was then not only Sovereign, but also magistrate and judge;
the senate was only a subordinate tribunal, to temper and concentrate the government, and the
consuls themselves, though they were patricians, first magistrates, and absolute generals in war, were
in Rome itself no more than presidents of the people.
From that point, the government followed its natural tendency, and inclined strongly to aristocracy.
The patriciate, we may say, abolished itself, and the aristocracy was found no longer in the body of
patricians as at Venice and Genoa, but in the body of the senate, which was composed of patricians
and plebeians, and even in the body of tribunes when they began to usurp an active function: for
names do not affect facts, and, when the people has rulers who govern for it, whatever name they
bear, the government is an aristocracy.
The abuse of aristocracy led to the civil wars and the triumvirate. Sulla, Julius Cæsar and Augustus
became in fact real monarchs; and finally, under the despotism of Tiberius, the State was dissolved.
Roman history then confirms, instead of invalidating, the principle I have laid down.
[2] Omnes enim et habentur et dicuntur tyranni, qui potestate utuntur perpetua in ea civitate quæ
libertate usa est (Cornelius Nepos, Life of Miltiades). [For all those are called and considered tyrants,
who hold perpetual power in a State that has known liberty.] It is true that Aristotle (Nicomachean
Ethics, Book viii, chapter x) distinguishes the tyrant from the king by the fact that the former governs
in his own interest, and the latter only for the good of his subjects; but not only did all Greek authors
in general use the word tyrant in a different sense, as appears most clearly in Xenophon's Hiero, but
also it would follow from Aristotle's distinction that, from the very beginning of the world, there has
not yet been a single king.

CHAPTER XI

THE DEATH OF THE BODY POLITIC

Such is the natural and inevitable tendency of the best constituted
governments. If Sparta and Rome perished, what State can hope to endure
for ever? If we would set up a long-lived form of government, let us not
even dream of making it eternal. If we are to succeed, we must not attempt
the impossible, or flatter ourselves that we are endowing the work of man
with a stability of which human conditions do not permit.
The body politic, as well as the human body, begins to die as soon as it is
born, and carries in itself the causes of its destruction. But both may have a
constitution that is more or less robust and suited to preserve them a longer
or a shorter time. The constitution of man is the work of nature; that of the
State the work of art. It is not in men's power to prolong their own lives; but
it is for them to prolong as much as possible the life of the State, by giving
it the best possible constitution. The best constituted State will have an end;
but it will end later than any other, unless some unforeseen accident brings
about its untimely destruction.
The life-principle of the body politic lies in the sovereign authority. The
legislative power is the heart of the State; the executive power is its brain,
which causes the movement of all the parts. The brain may become
paralysed and the individual still live. A man may remain an imbecile and
live; but as soon as the heart ceases to perform its functions, the animal is
dead.
The State subsists by means not of the laws, but of the legislative power.
Yesterday's law is not binding to-day; but silence is taken for tacit consent,
and the Sovereign is held to confirm incessantly the laws it does not
abrogate as it might. All that it has once declared itself to will it wills
always, unless it revokes its declaration.
Why then is so much respect paid to old laws? For this very reason. We
must believe that nothing but the excellence of old acts of will can have
preserved them so long: if the Sovereign had not recognised them as
throughout salutary, it would have revoked them a thousand times. This is
why, so far from growing weak, the laws continually gain new strength in
any well constituted State; the precedent of antiquity makes them daily
more venerable: while wherever the laws grow weak as they become old,
this proves that there is no longer a legislative power, and that the State is
dead.

CHAPTER XII

HOW THE SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY MAINTAINS ITSELF
The Sovereign, having no force other than the legislative power, acts only
by means of the laws; and the laws being solely the authentic acts of the
general will, the Sovereign cannot act save when the people is assembled.
The people in assembly, I shall be told, is a mere chimera. It is so to-day,
but two thousand years ago it was not so. Has man's nature changed?
The bounds of possibility, in moral matters, are less narrow than we
imagine: it is our weaknesses, our vices and our prejudices that confine
them. Base souls have no belief in great men; vile slaves smile in mockery
at the name of liberty.
Let us judge of what can be done by what has been done. I shall say nothing
of the Republics of ancient Greece; but the Roman Republic was, to my
mind, a great State, and the town of Rome a great town. The last census
showed that there were in Rome four hundred thousand citizens capable of
bearing arms, and the last computation of the population of the Empire
showed over four million citizens, excluding subjects, foreigners, women,
children and slaves.
What difficulties might not be supposed to stand in the way of the frequent
assemblage of the vast population of this capital and its neighbourhood. Yet
few weeks passed without the Roman people being in assembly, and even
being so several times. It exercised not only the rights of Sovereignty, but
also a part of those of government. It dealt with certain matters, and judged
certain cases, and this whole people was found in the public meeting-place
hardly less often as magistrates than as citizens.
If we went back to the earliest history of nations, we should find that most
ancient governments, even those of monarchical form, such as the
Macedonian and the Frankish, had similar councils. In any case, the one
incontestable fact I have given is an answer to all difficulties; it is good
logic to reason from the actual to the possible.

CHAPTER XIII

THE SAME (continued)
It is not enough for the assembled people to have once fixed the constitution
of the State by giving its sanction to a body of law; it is not enough for it to
have set up a perpetual government, or provided once for all for the election
of magistrates. Besides the extraordinary assemblies unforeseen
circumstances may demand, there must be fixed periodical assemblies
which cannot be abrogated or prorogued, so that on the proper day the
people is legitimately called together by law, without need of any formal
summoning.
But, apart from these assemblies authorised by their date alone, every
assembly of the people not summoned by the magistrates appointed for that
purpose, and in accordance with the prescribed forms, should be regarded
as unlawful, and all its acts as null and void, because the command to
assemble should itself proceed from the law.
The greater or less frequency with which lawful assemblies should occur
depends on so many considerations that no exact rules about them can be
given. It can only be said generally that the stronger the government the
more often should the Sovereign show itself.
This, I shall be told, may do for a single town; but what is to be done when
the State includes several? Is the sovereign authority to be divided? Or is it
to be concentrated in a single town to which all the rest are made subject?
Neither the one nor the other, I reply. First, the sovereign authority is one
and simple, and cannot be divided without being destroyed. In the second
place, one town cannot, any more than one nation, legitimately be made
subject to another, because the essence of the body politic lies in the
reconciliation of obedience and liberty, and the words subject and
Sovereign are identical correlatives the idea of which meets in the single
word "citizen."
I answer further that the union of several towns in a single city is always
bad, and that, if we wish to make such a union, we should not expect to

avoid its natural disadvantages. It is useless to bring up abuses that belong
to great States against one who desires to see only small ones; but how can
small States be given the strength to resist great ones, as formerly the Greek
towns resisted the Great King, and more recently Holland and Switzerland
have resisted the House of Austria?
Nevertheless, if the State cannot be reduced to the right limits, there
remains still one resource; this is, to allow no capital, to make the seat of
government move from town to town, and to assemble by turn in each the
Provincial Estates of the country.
People the territory evenly, extend everywhere the same rights, bear to
every place in it abundance and life: by these means will the State become
at once as strong and as well governed as possible. Remember that the walls
of towns are built of the ruins of the houses of the countryside. For every
palace I see raised in the capital, my mind's eye sees a whole country made
desolate.

CHAPTER XIV

THE SAME (continued)
The moment the people is legitimately assembled as a sovereign body, the
jurisdiction of the government wholly lapses, the executive power is
suspended, and the person of the meanest citizen is as sacred and inviolable
as that of the first magistrate; for in the presence of the person represented,
representatives no longer exist. Most of the tumults that arose in the comitia
at Rome were due to ignorance or neglect of this rule. The consuls were in
them merely the presidents of the people; the tribunes were mere speakers;
[1] the senate was nothing at all.
These intervals of suspension, during which the prince recognises or ought
to recognise an actual superior, have always been viewed by him with
alarm; and these assemblies of the people, which are the aegis of the body
politic and the curb on the government, have at all times been the horror of
rulers: who therefore never spare pains, objections, difficulties, and

promises, to stop the citizens from having them. When the citizens are
greedy, cowardly, and pusillanimous, and love ease more than liberty, they
do not long hold out against the redoubled efforts of the government; and
thus, as the resisting force incessantly grows, the sovereign authority ends
by disappearing, and most cities fall and perish before their time.
But between the sovereign authority and arbitrary government there
sometimes intervenes a mean power of which something must be said.

[1] In nearly the same sense as this word has in the English Parliament. The similarity of these
functions would have brought the consuls and the tribunes into conflict, even had all jurisdiction been
suspended.

CHAPTER XV

DEPUTIES OR REPRESENTATIVES
As soon as public service ceases to be the chief business of the citizens, and
they would rather serve with their money than with their persons, the State
is not far from its fall. When it is necessary to march out to war, they pay
troops and stay at home: when it is necessary to meet in council, they name
deputies and stay at home. By reason of idleness and money, they end by
having soldiers to enslave their country and representatives to sell it.
It is through the hustle of commerce and the arts, through the greedy selfinterest of profit, and through softness and love of amenities that personal
services are replaced by money payments. Men surrender a part of their
profits in order to have time to increase them at leisure. Make gifts of
money, and you will not be long without chains. The word finance is a
slavish word, unknown in the city-state. In a country that is truly free, the
citizens do everything with their own arms and nothing by means of money;
so far from paying to be exempted from their duties, they would even pay
for the privilege of fulfilling them themselves. I am far from taking the
common view: I hold enforced labour to be less opposed to liberty than
taxes.
The better the constitution of a State is, the more do public affairs encroach
on private in the minds of the citizens. Private affairs are even of much less
importance, because the aggregate of the common happiness furnishes a
greater proportion of that of each individual, so that there is less for him to
seek in particular cares. In a well-ordered city every man flies to the
assemblies: under a bad government no one cares to stir a step to get to
them, because no one is interested in what happens there, because it is
foreseen that the general will will not prevail, and lastly because domestic
cares are all-absorbing. Good laws lead to the making of better ones; bad

ones bring about worse. As soon as any man says of the affairs of the State
What does it matter to me? the State may be given up for lost.
The lukewarmness of patriotism, the activity of private interest, the vastness
of States, conquest and the abuse of government suggested the method of
having deputies or representatives of the people in the national assemblies.
These are what, in some countries, men have presumed to call the Third
Estate. Thus the individual interest of two orders is put first and second; the
public interest occupies only the third place.
Sovereignty, for the same reason as makes it inalienable, cannot be
represented; it lies essentially in the general will, and will does not admit of
representation: it is either the same, or other; there is no intermediate
possibility. The deputies of the people, therefore, are not and cannot be its
representatives: they are merely its stewards, and can carry through no
definitive acts. Every law the people has not ratified in person is null and
void—is, in fact, not a law. The people of England regards itself as free; but
it is grossly mistaken; it is free only during the election of members of
parliament. As soon as they are elected, slavery overtakes it, and it is
nothing. The use it makes of the short moments of liberty it enjoys shows
indeed that it deserves to lose them.
The idea of representation is modern; it comes to us from feudal
government, from that iniquitous and absurd system which degrades
humanity and dishonours the name of man. In ancient republics and even in
monarchies, the people never had representatives; the word itself was
unknown. It is very singular that in Rome, where the tribunes were so
sacrosanct, it was never even imagined that they could usurp the functions
of the people, and that in the midst of so great a multitude they never
attempted to pass on their own authority a single plebiscitum. We can,
however, form an idea of the difficulties caused sometimes by the people
being so numerous, from what happened in the time of the Gracchi, when
some of the citizens had to cast their votes from the roofs of buildings.
Where right and liberty are everything, disadvantages count for nothing.
Among this wise people everything was given its just value, its lictors were
allowed to do what its tribunes would never have dared to attempt; for it
had no fear that its lictors would try to represent it.

To explain, however, in what way the tribunes did sometimes represent it, it
is enough to conceive how the government represents the Sovereign. Law
being purely the declaration of the general will, it is clear that, in the
exercise of the legislative power, the people cannot be represented; but in
that of the executive power, which is only the force that is applied to give
the law effect, it both can and should be represented. We thus see that if we
looked closely into the matter we should find that very few nations have
any laws. However that may be, it is certain that the tribunes, possessing no
executive power, could never represent the Roman people by right of the
powers entrusted to them, but only by usurping those of the senate.
In Greece, all that the people had to do, it did for itself; it was constantly
assembled in the public square. The Greeks lived in a mild climate; they
had no natural greed; slaves did their work for them; their great concern
was with liberty. Lacking the same advantages, how can you preserve the
same rights? Your severer climates add to your needs;[1] for half the year
your public squares are uninhabitable; the flatness of your languages unfits
them for being heard in the open air; you sacrifice more for profit than for
liberty, and fear slavery less than poverty.
What then? Is liberty maintained only by the help of slavery? It may be so.
Extremes meet. Everything that is not in the course of nature has its
disadvantages, civil society most of all. There are some unhappy
circumstances in which we can only keep our liberty at others' expense, and
where the citizen can be perfectly free only when the slave is most a slave.
Such was the case with Sparta. As for you, modern peoples, you have no
slaves, but you are slaves yourselves; you pay for their liberty with your
own. It is in vain that you boast of this preference; I find in it more
cowardice than humanity.
I do not mean by all this that it is necessary to have slaves, or that the right
of slavery is legitimate: I am merely giving the reasons why modern
peoples, believing themselves to be free, have representatives, while ancient
peoples had none. In any case, the moment a people allows itself to be
represented, it is no longer free: it no longer exists.
All things considered, I do not see that it is possible henceforth for the
Sovereign to preserve among us the exercise of its rights, unless the city is
very small. But if it is very small, it will be conquered? No. I will show

later on how the external strength of a great people[2] may be combined
with the convenient polity and good order of a small State.
[1] To adopt in cold countries the luxury and effeminacy of the East is to desire to submit to its
chains; it is indeed to bow to them far more inevitably in our case than in theirs.
[2] I had intended to do this in the sequel to this work, when in dealing with external relations I came
to the subject of confederations. The subject is quite new, and its principles have still to be laid down.

CHAPTER XVI

THAT THE INSTITUTION OF GOVERNMENT IS NOT A
CONTRACT
The legislative power once well established, the next thing is to establish
similarly the executive power; for this latter, which operates only by
particular acts, not being of the essence of the former, is naturally separate
from it. Were it possible for the Sovereign, as such, to possess the executive
power, right and fact would be so confounded that no one could tell what
was law and what was not; and the body politic, thus disfigured, would
soon fall a prey to the violence it was instituted to prevent.
As the citizens, by the social contract, are all equal, all can prescribe what
all should do, but no one has a right to demand that another shall do what he
does not do himself. It is strictly this right, which is indispensable for giving
the body politic life and movement, that the Sovereign, in instituting the
government, confers upon the prince.
It has been held that this act of establishment was a contract between the
people and the rulers it sets over itself.—a contract in which conditions
were laid down between the two parties binding the one to command and
the other to obey. It will be admitted, I am sure, that this is an odd kind of
contract to enter into. But let us see if this view can be upheld.
First, the supreme authority can no more be modified than it can be
alienated; to limit it is to destroy it. It is absurd and contradictory for the

Sovereign to set a superior over itself; to bind itself to obey a master would
be to return to absolute liberty.
Moreover, it is clear that this contract between the people and such and such
persons would be a particular act; and from this it follows that it can be
neither a law nor an act of Sovereignty, and that consequently it would be
illegitimate.
It is plain too that the contracting parties in relation to each other would be
under the law of nature alone and wholly without guarantees of their mutual
undertakings, a position wholly at variance with the civil state. He who has
force at his command being always in a position to control execution, it
would come to the same thing if the name "contract" were given to the act
of one man who said to another; "I give you all my goods, on condition that
you give me back as much of them as you please."
There is only one contract in the State, and that is the act of association,
which in itself excludes the existence of a second. It is impossible to
conceive of any public contract that would not be a violation of the first.

CHAPTER XVII

THE INSTITUTION OF GOVERNMENT
Under what general idea then should the act by which government is
instituted be conceived as falling? I will begin by stating that the act is
complex, as being composed of two others—the establishment' of the law
and its execution.
By the former, the Sovereign decrees that there shall be a governing body
established in this or that form; this act is clearly a law.
By the latter, the people nominates the rulers who are to be entrusted with
the government that has been established. This nomination, being a
particular act, is clearly not a second law, but merely a consequence of the
first and a function of government.

The difficulty is to understand how there can be a governmental act before
government exists, and how the people, which is only Sovereign or subject,
can, under certain circumstances, become a prince or magistrate.
It is at this point that there is revealed one of the astonishing properties of
the body politic, by means of which it reconciles apparently contradictory
operations; for this is accomplished by a sudden conversion of Sovereignty
into democracy, so that, without sensible change, and merely by virtue of a
new relation of all to all, the citizens become magistrates and pass from
general to particular acts, from legislation to the execution of the law.
This changed relation is no speculative subtlety without instances in
practice: it happens every day in the English Parliament, where, on certain
occasions, the Lower House resolves itself into Grand Committee, for the
better discussion of affairs, and thus, from being at one moment a sovereign
court, becomes at the next a mere commission; so that subsequently it
reports to itself, as House of Commons, the result of its proceedings in
Grand Committee, and debates over again under one name what it has
already settled under another.
It is, indeed, the peculiar advantage of democratic government that it can be
established in actuality by a simple act of the general will. Subsequently,
this provisional government remains in power, if this form is adopted, or
else establishes in the name of the Sovereign the government that is
prescribed by law; and thus the whole proceeding is regular. It is impossible
to set up government in any other manner legitimately and in accordance
with the principles so far laid down.

CHAPTER XVIII

HOW TO CHECK THE USURPATIONS OF GOVERNMENT
What we have just said confirms Chapter XVI, and makes it clear that the
institution of government is not a contract, but a law; that the depositaries
of the executive power are not the people's masters, but its officers; that it
can set them up and pull them down when it likes; that for them there is no

question of contract, but of obedience; and that in taking charge of the
functions the State imposes on them they are doing no more than fulfilling
their duty as citizens, without having the remotest right to argue about the
conditions.
When therefore the people sets up an hereditary government, whether it be
monarchical and confined to one family, or aristocratic and confined to a
class, what it enters into is not an undertaking; the administration is given a
provisional form, until the people chooses to order it otherwise.
It is true that such changes are always dangerous, and that the established
government should never be touched except when it comes to be
incompatible with the public good; but the circumspection this involves is a
maxim of policy and not a rule of right, and the State is no more bound to
leave civil authority in the hands of its rulers than military authority in the
hands of its generals.
It is also true that it is impossible to be too careful to observe, in such cases,
all the formalities necessary to distinguish a regular and legitimate act from
a seditious tumult, and the will of a whole people from the clamour of a
faction. Here above all no further concession should be made to the
untoward possibility than cannot, in the strictest logic, be refused it. From
this obligation the prince derives a great advantage in preserving his power
despite the people, without it being possible to say he has usurped it; for,
seeming to avail himself only of his rights, he finds it very easy to extend
them, and to prevent, under the pretext of keeping the peace, assemblies
that are destined to the re-establishment of order; with the result that he
takes advantage of a silence he does not allow to be broken, or of
irregularities he causes to be committed, to assume that he has the support
of those whom fear prevents from speaking, and to punish those who dare
to speak. Thus it was that the decemvirs, first elected for one year and then
kept on in office for a second, tried to perpetuate their power by forbidding
the comitia to assemble; and by this easy method every government in the
world, once clothed with the public power, sooner or later usurps the
sovereign authority.
The periodical assemblies of which I have already spoken are designed to
prevent or postpone this calamity, above all when they need no formal

summoning; for in that case, the prince cannot stop them without openly
declaring himself a law-breaker and an enemy of the State.
The opening of these assemblies, whose sole object is the maintenance of
the social treaty, should always take the form of putting two propositions
that may not be suppressed, which should be voted on separately.
The first is: "Does it please the Sovereign to preserve the present form of
government?"
The second is: "Does it please the people to leave its administration in the
hands of those who are actually in charge of it?"
I am here assuming what I think I have shown; that there is in the State no
fundamental law that cannot be revoked, not excluding the social compact
itself; for if all the citizens assembled of one accord to break the compact, it
is impossible to doubt that it would be very legitimately broken. Grotius
even thinks that each man can renounce his membership of his own State,
and recover his natural liberty and his goods on leaving the country.[1] It
would be indeed absurd if all the citizens in assembly could not do what
each can do by himself.
[1] Provided, of course, he does not leave to escape his obligations and avoid having to serve his
country in the hour of need. Flight in such a case would be criminal and punishable, and would be,
not withdrawal, but desertion.

BOOK IV

CHAPTER I

THAT THE GENERAL WILL IS INDESTRUCTIBLE
As long as several men in assembly regard themselves as a single body,
they have only a single will which is concerned with their common
preservation and general well-being. In this case, all the springs of the State

are vigorous and simple and its rules clear and luminous; there are no
embroilments or conflicts of interests; the common good is everywhere
clearly apparent, and only good sense is needed to perceive it. Peace, unity
and equality are the enemies of political subtleties. Men who are upright
and simple are difficult to deceive because of their simplicity; lures and
ingenious pretexts fail to impose upon them, and they are not even subtle
enough to be dupes. When, among the happiest people in the world, bands
of peasants are seen regulating affairs of State under an oak, and always
acting wisely, can we help scorning the ingenious methods of other nations,
which make themselves illustrious and wretched with so much art and
mystery?
A State so governed needs very few laws; and, as it becomes necessary to
issue new ones, the necessity is universally seen. The first man to propose
them merely says what all have already felt, and there is no question of
factions or intrigues or eloquence in order to secure the passage into law of
what every one has already decided to do, as soon as he is sure that the rest
will act with him.
Theorists are led into error because, seeing only States that have been from
the beginning wrongly constituted, they are struck by the impossibility of
applying such a policy to them. They make great game of all the absurdities
a clever rascal or an insinuating speaker might get the people of Paris or
London to believe. They do not know that Cromwell would have been put
to "the bells" by the people of Berne, and the Due de Beaufort on the
treadmill by the Genevese.
But when the social bond begins to be relaxed and the State to grow weak,
when particular interests begin to make themselves felt and the smaller
societies to exercise an influence over the larger, the common interest
changes and finds opponents: opinion is no longer unanimous; the general
will ceases to be the will of all; contradictory views and debates arise; and
the best advice is not taken without question.
Finally, when the State, on the eve of ruin, maintains only a vain, illusory
and formal existence, when in every heart the social bond is broken, and the
meanest interest brazenly lays hold of the sacred name of "public good," the
general will becomes mute: all men, guided by secret motives, no more give
their views as citizens than if the State had never been; and iniquitous

decrees directed solely to private interest get passed under the name of
laws.
Does it follow from this that the general will is exterminated or corrupted?
Not at all: it is always constant, unalterable and pure; but it is subordinated
to other wills which encroach upon its sphere. Each man, in detaching, his
interest from the common interest, sees clearly that he cannot entirely
separate them; but his share in the public mishaps seems to him negligible
beside the exclusive good he aims at making his own. Apart from this
particular good, he wills the general good in his own interest, as strongly as
any one else. Even in selling his vote for money, he does not extinguish in
himself the general will, but only eludes it. The fault he commits is that of
changing the state of the question, and answering something different from
what he is asked. Instead of saying, by his vote, "It is to the advantage of
the State," he says, "It is of advantage to this or that man or party that this
or that view should prevail." Thus the law of public order in assemblies is
not so much to maintain in them the general will as to secure that the
question be always put to it, and the answer always given by it.
I could here set down many reflections on the simple right of voting in
every act of Sovereignty—a right which no-one can take from the citizens
—and also on the right of stating views, making proposals, dividing and
discussing, which the government is always most careful to leave solely to
its members; but this important subject would need a treatise to itself, and it
is impossible to say everything in a single work.

CHAPTER II

VOTING
It may be seen, from the last chapter, that the way in which general business
is managed may give a clear enough indication of the actual state of morals
and the health of the body politic. The more concert reigns in the
assemblies, that is, the nearer opinion approaches unanimity, the greater is
the dominance of the general will. On the other hand, long debates,

dissensions and tumult proclaim the ascendancy of particular interests and
the decline of the State.
This seems less clear when two or more orders enter into the constitution,
as patricians and plebeians did at Rome; for quarrels between these two
orders often disturbed the comitia, even in the best days of the Republic.
But the exception is rather apparent than real; for then, through the defect
that is inherent in the body politic, there were, so to speak, two States in
one, and what is not true of the two together is true of either separately.
Indeed, even in the most stormy times, the plebiscita of the people, when
the Senate did not interfere with them, always went through quietly and by
large majorities. The citizens having but one interest, the people had but a
single will.
At the other extremity of the circle, unanimity recurs; this is the case when
the citizens, having fallen into servitude, have lost both liberty and will.
Fear and flattery then change votes into acclamation; deliberation ceases,
and only worship or malediction is left. Such was the vile manner in which
the senate expressed its views under the Emperors. It did so sometimes with
absurd precautions. Tacitus observes that, under Otho, the senators, while
they heaped curses on Vitellius, contrived at the same time to make a
deafening noise, in order that, should he ever become their master, he might
not know what each of them had said.
On these various considerations depend the rules by which the methods of
counting votes and comparing opinions should be regulated, according as
the general will is more or less easy to discover, and the State more or less
in its decline.
There is but one law which, from its nature, needs unanimous consent. This
is the social compact; for civil association is the most voluntary of all acts.
Every man being born free and his own master, no-one, under any pretext
whatsoever, can make any man subject without his consent. To decide that
the son of a slave is born a slave is to decide that he is not born a man.
If then there are opponents when the social compact is made, their
opposition does not invalidate the contract, but merely prevents them from
being included in it. They are foreigners among citizens. When the State is
instituted, residence constitutes consent; to dwell within its territory is to
submit to the Sovereign.[1]

Apart from this primitive contract, the vote of the majority always binds all
the rest. This follows from the contract itself. But it is asked how a man can
be both free and forced to conform to wills that are not his own. How are
the opponents at once free and subject to laws they have not agreed to?
I retort that the question is wrongly put. The citizen gives his consent to all
the laws, including those which are passed in spite of his opposition, and
even those which punish him when he dares to break any of them. The
constant will of all the members of the State is the general will; by virtue of
it they are citizens and free.[2] When in the popular assembly a law is
proposed, what the people is asked is not exactly whether it approves or
rejects the proposal, but whether it is in conformity with the general will,
which is their will. Each man, in giving his vote, states his opinion on that
point; and the general will is found by counting votes. When therefore the
opinion that is contrary to my own prevails, this proves neither more nor
less than that I was mistaken, and that what I thought to be the general will
was not so. If my particular opinion had carried the day I should have
achieved the opposite of what was my will and it is in that case that I should
not have been free.
This presupposes, indeed, that all the qualities of the general will still reside
in the majority: when they cease to do so, whatever side a man may take,
liberty is no longer possible.
In my earlier demonstration of how particular wills are substituted for the
general will in public deliberation, I have adequately pointed out the
practicable methods of avoiding this abuse; and I shall have more to say of
them later on. I have also given the principles for determining the
proportional number of votes for declaring that will. A difference of one
vote destroys equality; a single opponent destroys unanimity; but between
equality and unanimity, there are several grades of unequal division, at each
of which this proportion may be fixed in accordance with the condition and
the needs of the body politic.
There are two general rules that may serve to regulate this relation. First,
the more grave and important the questions discussed, the nearer should the
opinion that is to prevail approach unanimity. Secondly, the more the matter
in hand calls for speed, the smaller the prescribed difference in the numbers
of votes may be allowed to become: where an instant decision has to be

reached, a majority of one vote should be enough. The first of these two
rules seems more in harmony with the laws, and the second with practical
affairs. In any case, it is the combination of them that gives the best
proportions for determining the majority necessary.
[1] This should of course be understood as applying to a free State; for elsewhere family, goods, lack
of a refuge, necessity, or violence may detain a man in a country against his will; and then his
dwelling there no longer by itself implies his consent to the contract or to its violation.
[2] At Genoa, the word Liberty may be read over the front of the prisons and on the chains of the
galley-slaves. This application of the device is good and just It is indeed only malefactors of all
estates who prevent the citizen from being free. In the country in which all such men were in the
galleys, the most perfect liberty would be enjoyed.

CHAPTER III

ELECTIONS
In the elections of the prince and the magistrates, which are, as I have said,
complex acts, there are two possible methods of procedure, choice and lot.
Both have been employed in various republics, and a highly complicated
mixture of the two still survives in the election of the Doge at Venice.
"Election by lot," says Montesquieu, "is democratic in nature." I agree that
it is so; but in what sense? "The lot," he goes on, "is a way of making
choice that is unfair to nobody; it leaves each citizen a reasonable hope of
serving his country." These are not reasons.
If we bear in mind that the election of rulers is a function of government,
and not of Sovereignty, we shall see why the lot is the method more natural
to democracy, in which the administration is better in proportion as the
number of its acts is small.
In every real democracy, magistracy is not an advantage, but a burdensome
charge which cannot justly be imposed on one individual rather than
another. The law alone can lay the charge on him on whom the lot falls. For,
the conditions being then the same for all, and the choice not depending on

any human will, there is no particular application to alter the universality of
the law.
In an aristocracy, the prince chooses the prince, the government is preserved
by itself, and voting is rightly ordered.
The instance of the election of the Doge of Venice confirms, instead of
destroying, this distinction; the mixed form suits a mixed government. For
it is an error to take the government of Venice for a real aristocracy. If the
people has no share in the government, the nobility is itself the people. A
host of poor Barnabotes never gets near any magistracy, and its nobility
consists merely in the empty title of Excellency, and in the right to sit in the
Great Council. As this Great Council is as numerous as our General Council
at Geneva, its illustrious members have no more privileges than our plain
citizens. It is indisputable that, apart from the extreme disparity between the
two republics, the bourgeoisie of Geneva is exactly equivalent to the
patriciate of Venice; our natives and inhabitants correspond to the
townsmen and the people of Venice; our peasants correspond to the subjects
on the mainland; and, however that republic be regarded, if its size be left
out of account, its government is no more aristocratic than our own. The
whole difference is that, having no life-ruler, we do not, like Venice, need to
use the lot.
Election by lot would have few disadvantages in a real democracy, in
which, as equality would everywhere exist in morals and talents as well as
in principles and fortunes, it would become almost a matter of indifference
who was chosen. But I have already said that a real democracy is only an
ideal.
When choice and lot are combined, positions that require special talents,
such as military posts, should be filled by the former; the latter does for
cases, such as judicial offices, in which good sense, justice, and integrity are
enough, because in a State that is well constituted, these qualities are
common to all the citizens.
Neither lot nor vote has any place in monarchical government. The
monarch being by right sole prince and only magistrate, the choice of his
lieutenants belongs to none but him. When the Abbé de Saint-Pierre
proposed that the Councils of the King of France should be multiplied, and

their members elected by ballot, he did not see that he was proposing to
change the form of government.
I should now speak of the methods of giving and counting opinions in the
assembly of the people; but perhaps an account of this aspect of the Roman
constitution will more forcibly illustrate all the rules I could lay down. It is
worth the while of a judicious reader to follow in some detail the working
of public and private affairs in a Council consisting of two hundred
thousand men.

CHAPTER IV

THE ROMAN COMITIA
We are without well-certified records of the first period of Rome's
existence; it even appears very probable that most of the stories told about it
are fables; indeed, generally speaking, the most instructive part of the
history of peoples, that which deals with their foundation, is what we have
least of. Experience teaches us every day what causes lead to the
revolutions of empires; but, as no new peoples are now formed, we have
almost nothing beyond conjecture to go upon in explaining how they were
created.
The customs we find established show at least that these customs had an
origin. The traditions that go back to those origins, that have the greatest
authorities behind them, and that are confirmed by the strongest proofs,
should pass for the most certain. These are the rules I have tried to follow in
inquiring how the freest and most powerful people on earth exercised its
supreme power.
After the foundation of Rome, the new-born republic, that is, the army of its
founder, composed of Albans, Sabines and foreigners, was divided into
three classes, which, from this division, took the name of tribes. Each of
these tribes was subdivided into ten curiæ, and each curia into decuriæ,
headed by leaders called curiones and decuriones.

Besides this, out of each tribe was taken a body of one hundred Equites or
Knights, called a century, which shows that these divisions, being
unnecessary in a town, were at first merely military. But an instinct for
greatness seems to have led the little township of Rome to provide itself in
advance with a political system suitable for the capital of the world.
Out of this original division an awkward situation soon arose. The tribes of
the Albans (Ramnenses) and the Sabines (Tatienses) remained always in the
same condition, while that of the foreigners (Luceres) continually grew as
more and more foreigners came to live at Rome, so that it soon surpassed
the others in strength. Servius remedied this dangerous fault by changing
the principle of cleavage, and substituting for the racial division, which he
abolished, a new one based on the quarter of the town inhabited by each
tribe. Instead of three tribes he created four, each occupying and named
after one of the hills of Rome. Thus, while redressing the inequality of the
moment, he also provided for the future; and in order that the division
might be one of persons as well as localities, he forbade the inhabitants of
one quarter to migrate to another, and so prevented the mingling of the
races.
He also doubled the three old centuries of Knights and added twelve more,
still keeping the old names, and by this simple and prudent method,
succeeded in making a distinction between the body of Knights and the
people, without a murmur from the latter.
To the four urban tribes Servius added fifteen others called rural tribes,
because they consisted of those who lived in the country, divided into
fifteen cantons. Subsequently, fifteen more were created, and the Roman
people finally found itself divided into thirty-five tribes, as it remained
down to the end of the Republic.
The distinction between urban and rural tribes had one effect which is worth
mention, both because it is without parallel elsewhere, and because to it
Rome owed the preservation of her morality and the enlargement of her
empire. We should have expected that the urban tribes would soon
monopolise power and honours, and lose no time in bringing the rural tribes
into disrepute; but what happened was exactly the reverse. The taste of the
early Romans for country life is well known. This taste they owed to their
wise founder, who made rural and military labours go along with liberty,

and, so to speak, relegated to the town arts, crafts, intrigue, fortune and
slavery.
Since therefore all Rome's most illustrious citizens lived in the fields and
tilled the earth, men grew used to seeking there alone the mainstays of the
republic. This condition, being that of the best patricians, was honoured by
all men; the simple and laborious life of the villager was preferred to the
slothful and idle life of the bourgeoisie of Rome; and he who, in the town,
would have been but a wretched proletarian, became, as a labourer in the
fields, a respected citizen. Not without reason, says Varro, did our greatsouled ancestors establish in the village the nursery of the sturdy and valiant
men who defended them in time of war and provided for their Sustenance in
time of peace. Pliny states positively that the country tribes were honoured
because of the men of whom they were composed; while cowards men
wished to dishonour were transferred, as a public disgrace, to the town
tribes. The Sabine Appius Claudius, when he had come to settle in Rome,
was loaded with honours and enrolled in a rural tribe, which subsequently
took his family name. Lastly, freedmen always entered the urban, and never
the rural, tribes: nor is there a single example, throughout the Republic, of a
freedman, though he had become a citizen, reaching any magistracy.
This was an excellent rule; but it was carried so far that in the end it led to a
change and certainly to an abuse in the political system.
First the censors, after having for a long time claimed the right of
transferring citizens arbitrarily from one tribe to another, allowed most
persons to enrol themselves in whatever tribe they pleased. This permission
certainly did no good, and further robbed the censorship of one of its
greatest resources. Moreover, as the great and powerful all got themselves
enrolled in the country tribes, while the freedmen who had become citizens
remained with the populace in the town tribes, both soon ceased to have any
local or territorial meaning, and all were so confused that the members of
one could not be told from those of another except by the registers; so that
the idea of the word tribe became personal instead of real, or rather came to
be little more than a chimera.
It happened in addition that the town tribes, being more on the spot, were
often the stronger in the comitia and sold the State to those who stooped to
buy the votes of the rabble composing them.

As the founder had set up ten curiæ in each tribe, the whole Roman people,
which was then contained within the walls, consisted of thirty curia, each
with its temples, its gods, its officers, its priests and its festivals, which
were called compitalia and corresponded to the paganalia, held in later
times by the rural tribes.
When Servius made his new division, as the thirty curiæ could not be
shared equally between his four tribes, and as he was unwilling to interfere
with them, they became a further division of the inhabitants of Rome, quite
independent of the tribes: but in the case of the rural tribes and their
members there was no question of curiæ as the tribes had then become a
purely civil institution, and, a new system of levying troops having been
introduced, the military divisions of Romulus were superfluous. Thus,
although every citizen was enrolled in a tribe, there were very many who
were not members of a curia.
Servius made yet a third division, quite distinct from the two we have
mentioned, which became, in its effects, the most important of all. He
distributed the whole Roman people into six classes, distinguished neither
by place nor by person, but by wealth; the first classes included the rich, the
last the poor, and those between persons of moderate means. These six
classes were subdivided into one hundred and ninety-three other bodies,
called centuries, which were so divided that the first class alone comprised
more than half of them, while the last comprised only one. Thus the class
that had the smallest number of members had the largest number of
centuries, and the whole of the last class only counted as a single
subdivision, although it alone included more than half the inhabitants of
Rome.
In order that the people might have the less insight into the results of this
arrangement, Servius tried to give it a military tone: in the second class he
inserted two centuries of armourers, and in the fourth two of makers of
instruments of war: in each class, except the last, he distinguished young
and old, that is, those who were under an obligation to bear arms and those
whose age gave them legal exemption. It was this distinction, rather than
that of wealth, which required frequent repetition of the census or counting.
Lastly, he ordered that the assembly should be held in the Campus Martius,
and that all who were of age to serve should come there armed.

The reason for his not making in the last class also the division of young
and old was that the populace, of whom it was composed, was not given the
right to bear arms for its country: a man had to possess a hearth to acquire
the right to defend it, and of all the troops of beggars who to-day lend lustre
to the armies of kings, there is perhaps not one who would not have been
driven with scorn out of a Roman cohort, at a time when soldiers were the
defenders of liberty.
In this last class, however, proletarians were distinguished from capite
censi. The former, not quite reduced to nothing, at least gave the State
citizens, and sometimes, when the need was pressing, even soldiers. Those
who had nothing at all, and could be numbered only by counting heads,
were regarded as of absolutely no account, and Marius was the first who
stooped to enrol them.
Without deciding now whether this third arrangement was good or bad in
itself, I think I may assert that it could have been made practicable only by
the simple morals, the disinterestedness, the liking for agriculture and the
scorn for commerce and for love of gain which characterised the early
Romans. Where is the modern people among whom consuming greed,
unrest, intrigue, continual removals, and perpetual changes of fortune, could
let such a system last for twenty years without turning the State upside
down? We must indeed observe that morality and the censorship, being
stronger than this institution, corrected its defects at Rome, and that the rich
man found himself degraded to the class of the poor for making too much
display of his riches.
From all this it is easy to understand why only five classes are almost
always mentioned, though there were really six. The sixth, as it furnished
neither soldiers to the army nor votes in the Campus Martius,[1] and was
almost without function in the State, was seldom regarded as of any
account.
These were the various ways in which the Roman people was divided. Let
us now see the effect on the assemblies. When lawfully summoned, these
were called comitia: they were usually held in the public square at Rome or
in the Campus Martius, and were distinguished as Comitia Curiata, Comitia
Centuriata, and Comitia Tributa, according to the form under which they
were convoked. The Comitia Curiata were founded by Romulus; the

Centuriata by Servius; and the Tributa by the tribunes of the people. No
law received its sanction and no magistrate was elected, save in the comitia;
and as every citizen was enrolled in a curia, a century, or a tribe, it follows
that no citizen was excluded from the right of voting, and that the Roman
people was truly sovereign both de jure and de facto.
For the comitia to be lawfully assembled, and for their acts to have the force
of law, three conditions were necessary. First, the body or magistrate
convoking them had to possess the necessary authority; secondly, the
assembly had to be held on a day allowed by law; and thirdly, the auguries
had to be favourable.
The reason for the first regulation needs no explanation; the second is a
matter of policy. Thus, the comitia might not be held on festivals or marketdays, when the country-folk, coming to Rome on business, had not time to
spend the day in the public square. By means of the third, the senate held in
check the proud and restive people, and meetly restrained the ardour of
seditious tribunes, who, however, found more than one way of escaping this
hindrance.
Laws and the election of rulers were not the only questions submitted to the
judgment of the comitia: as the Roman people had taken on itself the most
important functions of government, it may be said that the lot of Europe
was regulated in its assemblies. The variety of their objects gave rise to the
various forms these took, according to the matters on which they had to
pronounce.
In order to judge of these various forms, it is enough to compare them.
Romulus, when he set up curiæ, had in view the checking of the senate by
the people, and of the people by the senate, while maintaining his
ascendancy over both alike. He therefore gave the people, by means of this
assembly, all the authority of numbers to balance that of power and riches,
which he left to the patricians. But, after the spirit of monarchy, he left all
the same a greater advantage to the patricians in the influence of their
clients on the majority of votes. This excellent institution of patron and
client was a masterpiece of statesmanship and humanity without which the
patriciate, being flagrantly in contradiction to the republican spirit, could
not have survived. Rome alone has the honour of having given to the world

this great example, which never led to any abuse, and yet has never been
followed.
As the assemblies by curiæ persisted under the kings till the time of
Servius, and the reign of the later Tarquin was not regarded as legitimate,
royal laws were called generally leges curiatæ.
Under the Republic, the curiæ still confined to the four urban tribes, and
including only the populace of Rome, suited neither the senate, which led
the patricians, nor the tribunes, who, though plebeians, were at the head of
the well-to-do citizens. They therefore fell into disrepute, and their
degradation was such, that thirty lictors used to assemble and do what the
Comitia Curiata should have done.
The division by centuries was so favourable to the aristocracy that it is hard
to see at first how the senate ever failed to carry the day in the comitia
bearing their name, by which the consuls, the censors and the other curule
magistrates were elected. Indeed, of the hundred and ninety-three centuries
into which the six classes of the whole Roman people were divided, the first
class contained ninety-eight; and, as voting went solely by centuries, this
class alone had a majority over all the rest. When all these centuries were in
agreement, the rest of the votes were not even taken; the decision of the
smallest number passed for that of the multitude, and it may be said that, in
the Comitia Centuriata, decisions were regulated far more by depth of
purses than by the number of votes.
But this extreme authority was modified in two ways. First, the tribunes as a
rule, and always a great number of plebeians, belonged to the class of the
rich, and so counterbalanced the influence of the patricians in the first class.
The second way was this. Instead of causing the centuries to vote
throughout in order, which would have meant beginning always with the
first, the Romans always chose one by lot which proceeded alone to the
election; after this all the centuries were summoned another day according
to their rank, and the same election was repeated, and as a rule confirmed.
Thus the authority of example was taken away from rank, and given to the
lot on a democratic principle.
From this custom resulted a further advantage. The citizens from the
country had time, between the two elections, to inform themselves of the

merits of the candidate who had been provisionally nominated, and did not
have to vote without knowledge of the case. But, under the pretext of
hastening matters, the abolition of this custom was achieved, and both
elections were held on the same day.
The Comitia Tributa were properly the council of the Roman people. They
were convoked by the tribunes alone; at them the tribunes were elected and
passed their plebiscita. The senate not only had no standing in them, but
even no right to be present; and the senators, being forced to obey laws on
which they could not vote, were in this respect less free than the meanest
citizens. This injustice was altogether ill-conceived, and was alone enough
to invalidate the decrees of a body to which all its members were not
admitted. Had all the patricians attended the comitia by virtue of the right
they had as citizens, they would not, as mere private individuals, have had
any considerable influence on a vote reckoned by counting heads, where the
meanest proletarian was as good as the princeps senatus.
It may be seen, therefore, that besides the order which was achieved by
these various ways of distributing so great a people and taking its votes, the
various methods were not reducible to forms indifferent in themselves, but
the results of each were relative to the objects which caused it to be
preferred.
Without going here into further details, we may gather from what has been
said above that the Comitia Tributa were the most favourable to popular
government, and the Comitia Centuriata to aristocracy. The Comitia
Curiata, in which the populace of Rome formed the majority, being fitted
only to further tyranny and evil designs, naturally fell into disrepute, and
even seditious persons abstained from using a method which too clearly
revealed their projects. It is indisputable that the whole majesty of the
Roman people lay solely in the Comitia Centuriata, which alone included
all; for the Comitia Curiata excluded the rural tribes, and the Comitia
Tributa the senate and the patricians.
As for the method of taking the vote, it was among the ancient Romans as
simple as their morals, although not so simple as at Sparta. Each man
declared his vote aloud, and a clerk duly wrote it down; the majority in each
tribe determined the vote of the tribe, the majority of the tribes that of the
people, and so with curiæ and centuries. This custom was good as long as

honesty was triumphant among the citizens, and each man was ashamed to
vote publicly in favour of an unjust proposal or an unworthy subject; but,
when the people grew corrupt and votes were bought, it was fitting that
voting should be secret in order that purchasers might be restrained by
mistrust, and rogues be given the means of not being traitors.
I know that Cicero attacks this change, and attributes partly to it the ruin of
the Republic. But though I feel the weight Cicero's authority must carry on
such a point, I cannot agree with him; I hold, on the contrary, that, for want
of enough such changes, the destruction of the State must be hastened. Just
as the regimen of health does riot suit the sick, we should not wish to
govern a people that has been corrupted by the laws that a good people
requires. There is no better proof of this rule than the long life of the
Republic of Venice, of which the shadow still exists, solely because its laws
are suitable only for men who are wicked.
The citizens were provided, therefore, with tablets by means of which each
man could vote without any one knowing how he voted: new methods were
also introduced for collecting the tablets, for counting voices, for comparing
numbers, etc.; but all these precautions did not prevent the good faith of the
officers charged with these functions[2] from being often suspect. Finally, to
prevent intrigues and trafficking in votes, edicts were issued; but their very
number proves how useless they were.
Towards the close of the Republic, it was often necessary to have recourse
to extraordinary expedients in order to supplement the inadequacy of the
laws. Sometimes miracles were supposed; but this method, while it might
impose on the people, could not impose on those who governed. Sometimes
an assembly was hastily called together, before the candidates had time to
form their factions: sometimes a whole sitting was occupied with talk, when
it was seen that the people had been won over and was on the point of
taking up a wrong position. But in the end ambition eluded all attempts to
check it; and the most incredible fact of all is that, in the midst of all these
abuses, the vast people, thanks to its ancient regulations, never ceased to
elect magistrates, to pass laws, to judge cases, and to carry through business
both public and private, almost as easily as the senate itself could have
done.

[1] I say "in the Campus Martius" because it was there that the comitia assembled by centuries; in its
two other forms the people assembled in the forum or elsewhere; and then the capite censi had as
much influence and authority as the foremost citizens.
[2] Custodes, diribitores, rogatores suffragiorum.

CHAPTER V

THE TRIBUNATE
When an exact proportion cannot be established between the constituent
parts of the State, or when causes that cannot be removed continually alter
the relation of one part to another, recourse is had to the institution of a
peculiar magistracy that enters into no corporate unity with the rest. This
restores to each term its right relation to the others, and provides a link or
middle term between either prince and people, or prince and Sovereign, or,
if necessary, both at once.
This body, which I shall call the tribunate, is the preserver of the laws and
of the legislative power. It serves sometimes to protect the Sovereign
against the government, as the tribunes of the people did at Rome;
sometimes to uphold the government against the people, as the Council of
Ten now does at Venice; and sometimes to maintain the balance between
the two, as the Ephors did at Sparta.
The tribunate is not a constituent part of the city, and should have no share
in either legislative or executive power; but this very fact makes its own
power the greater: for, while it can do nothing, it can prevent anything from
being done. It is more sacred and more revered, as the defender of the laws,
than the prince who executes them, or than the Sovereign which ordains
them. This was seen very clearly at Rome, when the proud patricians, for all
their scorn of the people, were forced to bow before one of its officers, who
had neither auspices nor jurisdiction.
The tribunate, wisely tempered, is the strongest support a good constitution
can have; but if its strength is ever so little excessive, it upsets the whole

State. Weakness, on the other hand, is not natural to it: provided it is
something, it is never less than it should be.
It degenerates into tyranny when it usurps the executive power, which it
should confine itself to restraining, and when it tries to dispense with the
laws, which it should confine itself to protecting. The immense power of
the Ephors, harmless as long as Sparta preserved its morality, hastened
corruption when once it had begun. The blood of Agis, slaughtered by these
tyrants, was avenged by his successor; the crime and the punishment of the
Ephors alike hastened the destruction of the republic, and after Cleomenes
Sparta ceased to be of any account. Rome perished in the same way: the
excessive power of the tribunes, which they had usurped by degrees, finally
served, with the help of laws made to secure liberty, as a safeguard for the
emperors who destroyed it. As for the Venetian Council of Ten, it is a
tribunal of blood, an object of horror to patricians and people alike; and, so
far from giving a lofty protection to the laws, it does nothing, now they
have become degraded, but strike in the darkness blows of which no one
dare take note.
The tribunate, like the government, grows weak as the number of its
members increases. When the tribunes of the Roman people, who first
numbered only two, and then five, wished to double that number, the senate
let them do so, in the confidence that it could use one to check another, as
indeed it afterwards freely did.
The best method of preventing usurpations by so formidable a body, though
no government has yet made use of it, would be not to make it permanent,
but to regulate the periods during which it should remain in abeyance.
These intervals, which should not be long enough to give abuses time to
grow strong, may be so fixed by law that they can easily be shortened at
need by extraordinary commissions.
This method seems to me to have no disadvantages, because, as I have said,
the tribunate, which forms no part of the constitution, can be removed
without the constitution being affected. It seems to be also efficacious,
because a newly restored magistrate starts not with the power his
predecessor exercised, but with that which the law allows him.

CHAPTER VI

THE DICTATORSHIP
The inflexibility of the laws, which prevents them from adapting
themselves to circumstances, may, in certain cases, render them disastrous,
and make them bring about, at a time of crisis, the ruin of the State. The
order and slowness of the forms they enjoin require a space of time which
circumstances sometimes withhold. A thousand cases against which the
legislator has made no provision may present themselves, and it is a highly
necessary part of foresight to be conscious that everything cannot be
foreseen.
It is wrong therefore to wish to make political institutions so strong as to
render it impossible to suspend their operation. Even Sparta allowed its
laws to lapse.
However, none but the greatest dangers can counter-balance that of
changing the public order, and the sacred power of the laws should never be
arrested save when the existence of the country is at stake. In these rare and
obvious cases, provision is made for the public security by a particular act
entrusting it to him who is most worthy. This commitment may be carried
out in either of two ways, according to the nature of the danger.
If increasing the activity of the government is a sufficient remedy, power is
concentrated in the hands of one or two of its members: in this case the
change is not in the authority of the laws, but only in the form of
administering them. If, on the other hand, the peril is of such a kind that the
paraphernalia of the laws are an obstacle to their preservation, the method is
to nominate a supreme ruler, who shall silence all the laws and suspend for
a moment the sovereign authority. In such a case, there is no doubt about
the general will, and it is clear that the people's first intention is that the
State shall not perish. Thus the suspension of the legislative authority is in
no sense its abolition; the magistrate who silences it cannot make it speak;
he dominates it, but cannot represent it. He can do anything, except make
laws.
The first method was used by the Roman senate when, in a consecrated
formula, it charged the consuls to provide for the safety of the Republic.

The second was employed when one of the two consuls nominated a
dictator:[1] a custom Rome borrowed from Alba.
During the first period of the Republic, recourse was very often had to the
dictatorship, because the State had not yet a firm enough basis to be able to
maintain itself by the strength of its constitution alone. As the state of
morality then made superfluous many of the precautions which would have
been necessary at other times, there was no fear that a dictator would abuse
his authority, or try to keep it beyond his term of office. On the contrary, so
much power appeared to be burdensome to him who was clothed with it,
and he made all speed to lay it down, as if taking the place of the laws had
been too troublesome and too perilous a position to retain.
It is therefore the danger not of its abuse, but of its cheapening, that makes
me attack the indiscreet use of this supreme magistracy in the earliest times.
For as long as it was freely employed at elections, dedications and purely
formal functions, there was danger of its becoming less formidable in time
of need, and of men growing accustomed to regarding as empty a title that
was used only on occasions of empty ceremonial.
Towards the end of the Republic, the Romans, having grown more
circumspect, were as unreasonably sparing in the use of the dictatorship as
they had formerly been lavish. It is easy to see that their fears were without
foundation, that the weakness of the capital secured it against the
magistrates who were in its midst; that a dictator might, in certain cases,
defend the public liberty, but could never endanger it; and that the chains of
Rome would be forged, not in Rome itself, but in her armies. The weak
resistance offered by Marius to Sulla, and by Pompey to Cæsar, clearly
showed what was to be expected from authority at home against force from
abroad.
This misconception led the Romans to make great mistakes; such, for
example, as the failure to nominate a dictator in the Catilinarian conspiracy.
For, as only the city itself, with at most some province in Italy, was
concerned, the unlimited authority the laws gave to the dictator would have
enabled him to make short work of the conspiracy, which was, in fact,
stifled only by a combination of lucky chances human prudence had no
right to expect.

Instead, the senate contented itself with entrusting its whole power to the
consuls, so that Cicero, in order to take effective action, was compelled on a
capital point to exceed his powers; and if, in the first transports of joy, his
conduct was approved, he was justly called, later on, to account for the
blood of citizens spilt in violation of the laws. Such a reproach could never
have been levelled at a dictator. But the consul's eloquence carried the day;
and he himself, Roman though he was, loved his own glory better than his
country, and sought, not so much the most lawful and secure means of
saving the State, as to get for himself the whole honour of having done so.
[2] He was therefore justly honoured as the liberator of Rome, and also
justly punished as a law-breaker. However brilliant his recall may have
been, it was undoubtedly an act of pardon.
However this important trust be conferred, it is important that its duration
should be fixed at a very brief period, incapable of being ever prolonged. In
the crises which lead to its adoption, the State is either soon lost, or soon
saved; and, the present need passed, the dictatorship becomes either
tyrannical or idle. At Rome, where dictators held office for six months only,
most of them abdicated before their time was up. If their term had been
longer, they might well have tried to prolong it still further, as the
decemvirs did when chosen for a year. The dictator had only time to
provide against the need that had caused him to be chosen; he had none to
think of further projects.
[1] The nomination was made secretly by night, as if there were something shameful in setting a man
above the laws.
[2] That is what he could not be sure of, if he proposed a dictator; for he dared not nominate himself,
and could not be certain that his colleague would nominate him.

CHAPTER VII

THE CENSORSHIP
As the law is the declaration of the general will, the censorship is the
declaration of the public judgment: public opinion is the form of law which

the censor administers, and, like the prince, only applies to particular cases.
The censorial tribunal, so far from being the arbiter of the people's opinion,
only declares it, and, as soon as the two part company, its decisions are null
and void.
It is useless to distinguish the morality of a nation from the objects of its
esteem; both depend on the same principle and are necessarily
indistinguishable. There is no people on earth the choice of whose pleasures
is not decided by opinion rather than nature. Right men's opinions, and their
morality will purge itself. Men always love what is good or what they find
good; it is in judging what is good that they go wrong. This judgment,
therefore, is what must be regulated. He who judges of morality judges of
honour; and he who judges of honour finds his law in opinion.
The opinions of a people are derived from its constitution; although the law
does not regulate morality, it is legislation that gives it birth. When
legislation grows weak, morality degenerates; but in such cases the
judgment of the censors will not do what the force of the laws has failed to
effect.
From this it follows that the censorship may be useful for the preservation
of morality, but can never be so for its restoration. Set up censors while the
laws are vigorous; as soon as they have lost their vigour, all hope is gone;
no legitimate power can retain force when the laws have lost it.
The censorship upholds morality by preventing opinion from growing
corrupt, by preserving its rectitude by means of wise applications, and
sometimes even by fixing it when it is still uncertain. The employment of
seconds in duels, which had been carried to wild extremes in the kingdom
of France, was done away with merely by these words in a royal edict: "As
for those who are cowards enough to call upon seconds." This judgment, in
anticipating that of the public, suddenly decided it. But when edicts from
the same source tried to pronounce duelling itself an act of cowardice, as
indeed it is, then, since common opinion does not regard it as such, the
public took no notice of a decision on a point on which its mind was already
made up.
I have stated elsewhere[1] that as public opinion is not subject to any
constraint, there need be no trace of it in the tribunal set up to represent it. It

is impossible to admire too much the art with which this resource, which we
moderns have wholly lost, was employed by the Romans, and still more by
the Lacedæmonians.
A man of bad morals having made a good proposal in the Spartan Council,
the Ephors neglected it, and caused the same proposal to be made by a
virtuous citizen. What an honour for the one, and what a disgrace for the
other, without praise or blame of either! Certain drunkards from Samos[2]
polluted the tribunal of the Ephors: the next day, a public edict gave
Samians permission to be filthy. An actual punishment would not have been
so severe as such an impunity. When Sparta has pronounced on what is or is
not right, Greece makes no appeal from her judgments.
[1] I merely call attention in this chapter to a subject with which I have dealt at greater length in my
Letter to M. d'Alembert.
[2] They were from another island, which the delicacy of our language forbids me to name on this
occasion.

CHAPTER VIII

CIVIL RELIGION
At first men had no kings save the gods, and no government save theocracy.
They reasoned like Caligula, and, at that period, reasoned aright. It takes a
long time for feeling so to change that men can make up their minds to take
their equals as masters, in the hope that they will profit by doing so.
From the mere fact that God was set over every political society, it followed
that there were as many gods as peoples. Two peoples that were strangers
the one to the other, and almost always enemies, could not long recognise
the same master: two armies giving battle could not obey the same leader.
National divisions thus led to polytheism, and this in turn gave rise to
theological and civil intolerance, which, as we shall see hereafter, are by
nature the same.

The fancy the Greeks had for rediscovering their gods among the barbarians
arose from the way they had of regarding themselves as the natural
Sovereigns of such peoples. But there is nothing so absurd as the erudition
which in our days identifies and confuses gods of different nations. As if
Moloch, Saturn and Chronos could be the same god! As if the Phœnician
Baal, the Greek Zeus, and the Latin Jupiter could be the same! As if there
could still be anything common to imaginary beings with different names!
If it is asked how in pagan times, where each State had its cult and its gods,
there were no wars of religion, I answer that it was precisely because each
State, having its own cult as well as its own government, made no
distinction between its gods and its laws. Political war was also theological;
the provinces of the gods were, so to speak, fixed by the boundaries of
nations. The god of one people had no right over another. The gods of the
pagans were not jealous gods; they shared among themselves the empire of
the world: even Moses and the Hebrews sometimes lent themselves to this
view by speaking of the God of Israel. It is true, they regarded as powerless
the gods of the Canaanites, a proscribed people condemned to destruction,
whose place they were to take; but remember how they spoke of the
divisions of the neighbouring peoples they were forbidden to attack! "Is not
the possession of what belongs to your god Chamos lawfully your due?"
said Jephthah to the Ammonites. "We have the same title to the lands our
conquering God has made his own."[1] Here, I think, there is a recognition
that the rights of Chamos and those of the God of Israel are of the same
nature.
But when the Jews, being subject to the kings of Babylon, and,
subsequently, to those of Syria, still obstinately refused to recognise any
god save their own, their refusal was regarded as rebellion against their
conqueror, and drew down on them the persecutions we read of in their
history, which are without parallel till the coming of Christianity.[2]
Every religion, therefore, being attached solely to the laws of the State
which prescribed it, there was no way of converting a people except by
enslaving it, and there could be no missionaries save conquerors. The
obligation to change cults being the law to which the vanquished yielded, it
was necessary to be victorious before suggesting such a change. So far from
men fighting for the gods, the gods, as in Homer, fought for men; each
asked his god for victory, and repayed him with new altars. The Romans,

before taking a city, summoned its gods to quit it; and, in leaving the
Tarentines their outraged gods, they regarded them as subject to their own
and compelled to do them homage. They left the vanquished their gods as
they left them their laws. A wreath to the Jupiter of the Capitol was often
the only tribute they imposed.
Finally, when, along with their empire, the Romans had spread their cult
and their gods, and had themselves often adopted those of the vanquished,
by granting to both alike the rights of the city, the peoples of that vast
empire insensibly found themselves with multitudes of gods and cults,
everywhere almost the same; and thus paganism throughout the known
world finally came to be one and the same religion.
It was in these circumstances that Jesus came to set up on earth a spiritual
kingdom, which, by separating the theological from the political system,
made the State no longer one, and brought about the internal divisions
which have never ceased to trouble Christian peoples. As the new idea of a
kingdom of the other world could never have occurred to pagans, they
always looked on the Christians as really rebels, who, while feigning to
submit, were only waiting for the chance to make themselves independent
and their masters, and to usurp by guile the authority they pretended in their
weakness to respect. This was the cause of the persecutions.
What the pagans had feared took place. Then everything changed its aspect:
the humble Christians changed their language, and soon this so-called
kingdom of the other world turned, under a visible leader, into the most
violent of earthly despotisms.
However, as there have always been a prince and civil laws, this double
power and conflict of jurisdiction have made all good polity impossible in
Christian States; and men have never succeeded in finding out whether they
were bound to obey the master or the priest.
Several peoples, however, even in Europe and its neighbourhood, have
desired without success to preserve or restore the old system: but the spirit
of Christianity has everywhere prevailed. The sacred cult has always
remained or again become independent of the Sovereign, and there has been
no necessary link between it and the body of the State. Mahomet held very
sane views, and linked his political system well together; and, as long as the
form of his government continued under the caliphs who succeeded him,

that government was indeed one, and so far good. But the Arabs, having
grown prosperous, lettered, civilised, slack and cowardly, were conquered
by barbarians: the division between the two powers began again; and,
although it is less apparent among the Mahometans than among the
Christians, it none the less exists, especially in the sect of Ali, and there are
States, such as Persia, where it is continually making itself felt.
Among us, the Kings of England have made themselves heads of the
Church, and the Czars have done the same: but this title has made them less
its masters than its ministers; they have gained not so much the right to
change it, as the power to maintain it: they are not its legislators, but only
its princes. Wherever the clergy is a corporate body,[3] it is master and
legislator in its own country. There are thus two powers, two Sovereigns, in
England and in Russia, as well as elsewhere.
Of all Christian writers, the philosopher Hobbes alone has seen the evil and
how to remedy it, and has dared to propose the reunion of the two heads of
the eagle, and the restoration throughout of political unity, without which no
State or government will ever be rightly constituted. But he should have
seen that the masterful spirit of Christianity is incompatible with his system,
and that the priestly interest would always be stronger than that of the State.
It is not so much what is false and terrible in his political theory, as what is
just and true, that has drawn down hatred on it.[4]
I believe that if the study of history were developed from this point of view,
it would be easy to refute the contrary opinions of Bayle and Warburton,
one of whom holds that religion can be of no use to the body politic, while
the other, on the contrary, maintains that Christianity is its strongest
support. We should demonstrate to the former that no State has ever been
founded without a religious basis, and to the latter, that the law of
Christianity at bottom does more harm by weakening than good by
strengthening the constitution of the State. To make myself understood, I
have only to make a little more exact the too vague ideas of religion as
relating to this subject.
Religion, considered in relation to society, which is either general or
particular, may also be divided into two kinds: the religion of man, and that
of the citizen. The first, which has neither temples, nor altars, nor rites, and
is confined to the purely internal cult of the supreme God and the eternal

obligations of morality, is the religion of the Gospel pure and simple, the
true theism, what may be called natural divine right or law. The other,
which is codified in a single country, gives it its gods, its own tutelary
patrons; it has its dogmas, its rites, and its external cult prescribed by law;
outside the single nation that follows it, all the world is in its sight infidel,
foreign and barbarous; the duties and rights of man extend for it only as far
as its own altars. Of this kind were all the religions of early peoples, which
we may define as civil or positive divine right or law.
There is a third sort of religion of a more singular kind, which gives men
two codes of legislation, two rulers, and two countries, renders them subject
to contradictory duties, and makes it impossible for them to be faithful both
to religion and to citizenship. Such are the religions of the Lamas and of the
Japanese, and such is Roman Christianity, which may be called the religion
of the priest. It leads to a sort of mixed and anti-social code which has no
name.
In their political aspect, all these three kinds of religion have their defects.
The third is so clearly bad, that it is waste of time to stop to prove it such.
All that destroys social unity is worthless; all institutions that set man in
contradiction to himself are worthless.
The second is good in that it unites the divine cult with love of the laws,
and, making country the object of the citizens' adoration, teaches them that
service done to the State is service done to its tutelary god. It is a form of
theocracy, in which there can be no pontiff save the prince, and no priests
save the magistrates. To die for one's country then becomes martyrdom;
violation of its laws, impiety; and to subject one who is guilty to public
execration is to condemn him to the anger of the gods: Sacer estod.
On the other hand, it is bad in that, being founded on lies and error, it
deceives men, makes them credulous and superstitious, and drowns the true
cult of the Divinity in empty ceremonial. It is bad, again, when it becomes
tyrannous and exclusive, and makes a people bloodthirsty and intolerant, so
that it breathes fire and slaughter, and regards as a sacred act the killing of
every one who does not believe in its gods. The result is to place such a
people in a natural state of war with all others, so that its security is deeply
endangered.

There remains therefore the religion of man or Christianity—not the
Christianity of to-day, but that of the Gospel, which is entirely different. By
means of this holy, sublime, and real religion all men, being children of one
God, recognise one another as brothers, and the society that unites them is
not dissolved even at death.
But this religion, having no particular relation to the body politic, leaves the
laws in possession of the force they have in themselves without making any
addition to it; and thus one of the great bonds that unite society considered
in severalty fails to operate. Nay, more, so far from binding the hearts of the
citizens to the State, it has the effect of taking them away from all earthly
things. I know of nothing more contrary to the social spirit.
We are told that a people of true Christians would form the most perfect
society imaginable. I see in this supposition only one great difficulty: that a
society of true Christians would not be a society of men.
I say further that such a society, with all its perfection, would be neither the
strongest nor the most lasting: the very fact that it was perfect would rob it
of its bond of union; the flaw that would destroy it would lie in its very
perfection.
Every one would do his duty; the people would be law-abiding, the rulers
just and temperate; the magistrates upright and incorruptible; the soldiers
would scorn death; there would be neither vanity nor luxury. So far, so
good; but let us hear more.
Christianity as a religion is entirely spiritual, occupied solely with heavenly
things; the country of the Christian is not of this world. He does his duty,
indeed, but does it with profound indifference to the good or ill success of
his cares. Provided he has nothing to reproach himself with, it matters little
to him whether things go well or ill here on earth. If the State is prosperous,
he hardly dares to share in the public happiness, for fear he may grow proud
of his country's glory; if the State is languishing, he blesses the hand of God
that is hard upon His people.
For the State to be peaceable and for harmony to be maintained, all the
citizens without exception would have to be good Christians; if by ill hap
there should be a single self-seeker or hypocrite, a Catiline or a Cromwell,
for instance, he would certainly get the better of his pious compatriots.

Christian charity does not readily allow a man to think hardly of his
neighbours. As soon as, by some trick, he has discovered the art of
imposing on them and getting hold of a share in the public authority, you
have a man established in dignity; it is the will of God that he be respected:
very soon you have a power; it is God's will that it be obeyed: and if the
power is abused by him who wields it, it is the scourge wherewith God
punishes His children. There would be scruples about driving out the
usurper: public tranquillity would have to be disturbed, violence would
have to be employed, and blood spilt; all this accords ill with Christian
meekness; and after all, in this vale of sorrows, what does it matter whether
we are free men or serfs? The essential thing is to get to heaven, and
resignation is only an additional means of doing so.
If war breaks out with another State, the citizens march readily out to battle;
not one of them thinks of flight; they do their duty, but they have no passion
for victory; they know better how to die than how to conquer. What does it
matter whether they win or lose? Does not Providence know better than
they what is meet for them? Only think to what account a proud, impetuous
and passionate enemy could turn their stoicism! Set over against them those
generous peoples who were devoured by ardent love of glory and of their
country, imagine your Christian republic face to face with Sparta or Rome:
the pious Christians will be beaten, crushed and destroyed, before they
know where they are, or will owe their safety only to the contempt their
enemy will conceive for them. It was to my mind a fine oath that was taken
by the soldiers of Fabius, who swore, not to conquer or die, but to come
back victorious—and kept their oath. Christians, would never have taken
such an oath; they would have looked on it as tempting God.
But I am mistaken in speaking of a Christian republic; the terms are
mutually exclusive. Christianity preaches only servitude and dependence.
Its spirit is so favourable to tyranny that it always profits by such a régime.
True Christians are made to be slaves, and they know it and do not much
mind: this short life counts for too little in their eyes.
I shall be told that Christian troops are excellent. I deny it. Show me an
instance. For my part, I know of no Christian troops. I shall be told of the
Crusades. Without disputing the valour of the Crusaders, I answer that, so
far from being Christians, they were the priests' soldiery, citizens of the
Church. They fought for their spiritual country, which the Church had,

somehow or other, made temporal. Well understood, this goes back to
paganism: as the Gospel sets up no national religion, a holy war is
impossible among Christians.
Under the pagan emperors, the Christian soldiers were brave; every
Christian writer affirms it, and I believe it: it was a case of honourable
emulation of the pagan troops. As soon as the emperors were Christian, this
emulation no longer existed, and, when the Cross had driven out the eagle,
Roman valour wholly disappeared.
But, setting aside political considerations, let us come back to what is right,
and settle our principles on this important point. The right which the social
compact gives the Sovereign over the subjects does not, we have seen,
exceed the limits of public expediency.[5] The subjects then owe the
Sovereign an account of their opinions only to such an extent as they matter
to the community. Now, it matters very much to the community that each
citizen should have a religion. That will make him love his duty; but the
dogmas of that religion concern the State and its members only so far as
they have reference to morality and to the duties which he who professes
them is bound to do to others. Each man may have, over and above, what
opinions he pleases, without it being the Sovereign's business to take
cognisance of them; for, as the Sovereign has no authority in the other
world, whatever the lot of its subjects may be in the life to come, that is not
its business, provided they are good citizens in this life.
There is therefore a purely civil profession of faith of which the Sovereign
should fix the articles, not exactly as religious dogmas, but as social
sentiments without which a man cannot be a good citizen or a faithful
subject.[6] While it can compel no one to believe them, it can banish from
the State whoever does not believe them—it can banish him, not for
impiety, but as an anti-social being, incapable of truly loving the laws and
justice, and of sacrificing, at need, his life to his duty. If any one, after
publicly recognising these dogmas, behaves as if he does not believe them,
let him be punished by death: he has committed the worst of all crimes, that
of lying before the law.
The dogmas of civil religion ought to be few, simple, and exactly worded,
without explanation or commentary. The existence of a mighty, intelligent
and beneficent Divinity, possessed of foresight and providence, the life to

come, the happiness of the just, the punishment of the wicked, the sanctity
of the social contract and the laws: these are its positive dogmas. Its
negative dogmas I confine to one, intolerance, which is a part of the cults
we have rejected.
Those who distinguish civil from theological intolerance are, to my mind,
mistaken. The two forms are inseparable. It is impossible to live at peace
with those we regard as damned; to love them would be to hate God who
punishes them: we positively must either reclaim or torment them.
Wherever theological intolerance is admitted, it must inevitably have some
civil effect;[7] and as soon as it has such an effect, the Sovereign is no
longer Sovereign even in the temporal sphere: thenceforth priests are the
real masters, and kings only their ministers.
Now that there is and can be no longer an exclusive national religion,
tolerance should be given to all religions that tolerate others, so long as
their dogmas contain nothing contrary to the duties of citizenship. But
whoever dares to say: Outside the Church is no salvation, ought to be
driven from the State, unless the State is the Church, and the prince the
pontiff. Such a dogma is good only in a theocratic government; in any other,
it is fatal. The reason for which Henry IV is said to have embraced the
Roman religion ought to make every honest man leave it, and still more any
prince who knows how to reason.
[1] Nonne ea quæ possidet Chamos deus tuus, tibi jure debentur? (Judges xi. 24). Such is the text in
the Vulgate. Father de Carrières translates: "Do you not regard yourselves as having a right to what
your god possesses?" I do not know the force of the Hebrew text: but I perceive that, in the Vulgate,
Jephthah positively recognises the right of the god Chamos, and that the French translator weakened
this admission by inserting an "according to you," which is not in the Latin.
[2] It is quite clear that the Phocian war, which was called "the Sacred War," was not a war of
religion. Its object was the punishment of acts of sacrilege, and not the conquest of unbelievers.
[3] It should be noted that the clergy find their bond of union not so much in formal assemblies, as in
the communion of Churches. Communion and ex-communication are the social compact of the
clergy, a compact which will always make them masters of peoples and kings. All priests who
communicate together are fellow-citizens, even if they come from opposite ends of the earth. This
invention is a masterpiece of statesmanship: there is nothing like it among pagan priests; who have
therefore never formed a clerical corporate body.
[4] See, for instance, in a letter from Grotius to his brother (April 11, 1643), what that learned man
found to praise and to blame in the De Cive. It is true that, with a bent for indulgence, he seems to
pardon the writer the good for the sake of the bad; but all men are not so forgiving.

[5] "In the republic," says the Marquis d'Argenson, "each man is perfectly free in what does not harm
others." This is the invariable limitation, which it is impossible to define more exactly. I have not
been able to deny myself the pleasure of occasionally quoting from this manuscript, though it is
unknown to the public, in order to do honour to the memory of a good and illustrious man, who had
kept even in the Ministry the heart of a good citizen, and views on the government of his country that
were sane and right.
[6] Cæsar, pleading for Catiline, tried to establish the dogma that the soul is mortal: Cato and Cicero,
in refutation, did not waste time in philosophising. They were content to show that Cæsar spoke like
a bad citizen, and brought forward a doctrine that would have a bad effect on the State. This, in fact,
and not a problem of theology, was what the Roman senate had to judge.
[7] Marriage, for instance, being a civil contract, has civil effects without which society cannot even
subsist Suppose a body of clergy should claim the sole right of permitting this act, a right which
every intolerant religion must of necessity claim, is it not clear that in establishing the authority of the
Church in this respect, it will be destroying that of the prince, who will have thenceforth only as
many subjects as the clergy choose to allow him? Being in a position to marry or not to marry people,
according to their acceptance of such and such a doctrine, their admission or rejection of such and
such a formula, their greater or less piety, the Church alone, by the exercise of prudence and
firmness, will dispose of all inheritances, offices and citizens, and even of the State itself, which
could not subsist if it were composed entirely of bastards? But, I shall be told, there will be appeals
on the ground of abuse, summonses and decrees; the temporalities will be seized. How sad! The
clergy, however little, I will not say courage, but sense it has, will take no notice and go its way: it
will quietly allow appeals, summonses, decrees and seizures, and, in the end, will remain the master.
It is not, I think, a great sacrifice to give up a part, when one is sure of securing all.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION
Now that I have laid down the true principles of political right, and tried to
give the State a basis of its own to rest on, I ought next to strengthen it by
its external relations, which would include the law of nations, commerce,
the right of war and conquest, public right, leagues, negotiations, treaties,
etc. But all this forms a new subject that is far too vast for my narrow
scope. I ought throughout to have kept to a more limited sphere.

A DISCOURSE
WHICH WON THE PRIZE AT THE ACADEMY OF DIJON IN 1750,
ON THIS QUESTION PROPOSED BY THE ACADEMY:

HAS THE RESTORATION OF THE ARTS AND SCIENCES
HAD A PURIFYING EFFECT UPON MORALS?
Barbaras his ego sum, qui non intelligor illis.—OVID.[1]

PREFACE

The following pages contain a discussion of one of the most sublime and
interesting of all moral questions. It is not concerned, however, with those
metaphysical subtleties, which of late have found their way into every
department of literature, and from which even our academic curricula are
not always free. We have now to do with one of those truths on which the
happiness of mankind depends.
I foresee that I shall not readily be forgiven for having taken up the position
I have adopted. Setting myself up against all that is nowadays most
admired, I can expect no less than a universal outcry against me: nor is the
approbation of a few sensible men enough to make me count on that of the
public. But I have taken my stand, and I shall be at no pains to please either
intellectuals or men of the world. There are in all ages men born to be in
bondage to the opinions of the society in which they live. There are not a
few, who to-day play the free-thinker and the philosopher, who would, if
they had lived in the time of the League, have been no more than fanatics.
No author, who has a mind to outlive his own age, should write for such
readers.
A word more and I have done. As I did not expect the honour conferred on
me, I had, since sending in my Discourse, so altered and enlarged it as
almost to make it a new work; but in the circumstances I have felt bound to
publish it just as it was when it received the prize. I have only added a few
notes, and left two alterations which are easily recognisable, of which the

Academy possibly might not have approved. The respect, gratitude and
even justice I owe to that body seemed to me to demand this
acknowledgment.
[1] Here I am, a barbarian, because men understand me not.

MORAL EFFECTS
OF THE ARTS AND SCIENCES
Decipimur specie recti.—HORACE.

The question before me is, "Whether the Restoration of the arts and
sciences has had the effect of purifying or corrupting morals." Which side
am I to take? That, gentlemen, which becomes an honest man, who is
sensible of his own ignorance, and thinks himself none the worse for it.
I feel the difficulty of treating this subject fittingly, before the tribunal
which is to judge of what I advance. How can I presume to belittle the
sciences before one of the most learned assemblies in Europe, to commend
ignorance in a famous Academy, and reconcile my contempt for study with
the respect due to the truly learned?
I was aware of these inconsistencies, but not discouraged by them. It is not
science, I said to myself, that I am attacking; it is virtue that I am defending,
and that before virtuous men—and goodness is even dearer to the good than
learning to the learned.
What then have I to fear? The sagacity of the assembly before which I am
pleading? That, I acknowledge, is to be feared; but rather on account of
faults of construction than of the views I hold. Just sovereigns have never
hesitated to decide against themselves in doubtful cases; and indeed the
most advantageous situation in which a just claim can be, is that of being
laid before a just and enlightened arbitrator, who is judge in his own case.

To this motive, which encouraged me, I may add another which finally
decided me. And this is, that as I have upheld the cause of truth to the best
of my natural abilities, whatever my apparent success, there is one reward
which cannot fail me. That reward I shall find in the bottom of my heart.

THE FIRST PART
It is a noble and beautiful spectacle to see man raising himself, so to speak,
from nothing by his own exertions; dissipating, by the light of reason, all
the thick clouds in which he was by nature enveloped; mounting above
himself; soaring in thought even to the celestial regions; like the sun,
encompassing with giant strides the vast extent of the universe; and, what is
still grander and more wonderful, going back into himself, there to study
man and get to know his own nature, his duties and his end. All these
miracles we have seen renewed within the last few generations.
Europe had relapsed into the barbarism of the earliest ages; the inhabitants
of this part of the world, which is at present so highly enlightened, were
plunged, some centuries ago, in a state still-worse than ignorance. A
scientific jargon, more despicable than mere ignorance, had usurped the
name of knowledge, and opposed an almost invincible obstacle to its
restoration.
Things had come to such a pass, that it required a complete revolution to
bring men back to common sense. This came at last from the quarter from
which it was least to be expected. It was the stupid Mussulman, the eternal
scourge of letters, who was the immediate cause of their revival among us.
The fall of the throne of Constantine brought to Italy the relics of ancient
Greece; and with these precious spoils France in turn was enriched. The
sciences soon followed literature, and the art of thinking joined that of
writing: an order which may seem strange, but is perhaps only too natural.
The world now began to perceive the principal advantage of an intercourse
with the Muses, that of rendering mankind more sociable by inspiring them
with the desire to please one another with performances worthy of their
mutual approbation.

The mind, as well as the body, has its needs: those of the body are the basis
of society, those of the mind its ornaments.
So long as government and law provide for the security and well-being of
men in their common life, the arts, literature and the sciences, less despotic
though perhaps more powerful, fling garlands of flowers over the chains
which weigh them down. They stifle in men's breasts that sense of original
liberty, for which they seem to have been born; cause them to love their
own slavery, and so make of them what is called a civilised people.
Necessity raised up thrones; the arts and sciences have made them strong.
Powers of the earth, cherish all talents and protect those who cultivate them.
[1] Civilised peoples, cultivate such pursuits: to them, happy slaves, you
owe that delicacy and exquisiteness of taste, which is so much your boast,
that sweetness of disposition and urbanity of manners which make
intercourse so easy and agreeable among you—in a word, the appearance of
all the virtues, without being in possession of one of them.
It was for this sort of accomplishment, which is by so much the more
captivating as it seems less affected, that Athens and Rome were so much
distinguished in the boasted times of their splendour and magnificence: and
it is doubtless in the same respect that our own age and nation will excel all
periods and peoples. An air of philosophy without pedantry; an address at
once natural and engaging, distant equally from Teutonic clumsiness and
Italian pantomime; these are the effects of a taste acquired by liberal studies
and improved by conversation with the world. What happiness would it be
for those who live among us, if our external appearance were always a true
mirror of our hearts; if decorum were but virtue; if the maxims we
professed were the rules of our conduct; and if real philosophy were
inseparable from the title of a philosopher! But so many good qualities too
seldom go together; virtue rarely appears in so much pomp and state.
Richness of apparel may proclaim the man of fortune, and elegance the man
of taste; but true health and manliness are known by different signs. It is
under the home-spun of the labourer, and not beneath the gilt and tinsel of
the courtier, that we should look for strength and vigour of body.
External ornaments are no less foreign to virtue, which is the strength and
activity of the mind. The honest man is an athlete, who loves to wrestle
stark naked; he scorns all those vile trappings, which prevent the exertion of

his strength, and were, for the most part, invented only to conceal some
deformity.
Before art had moulded our behaviour, and taught our passions to speak an
artificial language, our morals were rude but natural; and the different ways
in which we behaved proclaimed at the first glance the difference of our
dispositions. Human nature was not at bottom better then than now; but
men found their security in the ease with which they could see through one
another, and this advantage, of which we no longer feel the value, prevented
their having many vices.
In our day, now that more subtle study and a more refined taste have
reduced the art of pleasing to a system, there prevails in modern manners a
servile and deceptive conformity; so that one would think every mind had
been cast in the same mould. Politeness requires this thing; decorum that;
ceremony has its forms, and fashion its laws, and these we must always
follow, never the promptings of our own nature.
We no longer dare seem what we really are, but lie under a perpetual
restraint; in the meantime the herd of men, which we call society, all act
under the same circumstances exactly alike, unless very particular and
powerful motives prevent them. Thus we never know with whom we have
to deal; and even to know our friends we must wait for some critical and
pressing occasion; that is, till it is too late; for it is on those very occasions
that such knowledge is of use to us.
What a train of vices must attend this uncertainty! Sincere friendship, real
esteem, and perfect confidence are banished from among men. Jealousy,
suspicion, fear, coldness, reserve, hate and fraud lie constantly concealed
under that uniform and deceitful veil of politeness; that boasted candour and
urbanity, for which we are indebted to the light and leading of this age. We
shall no longer take in vain by our oaths the name of our Creator; but we
shall insult Him with our blasphemies, and our scrupulous ears will take no
offence. We have grown too modest to brag of our own deserts; but we do
not scruple to decry those of others. We do not grossly outrage even our
enemies, but artfully calumniate them. Our hatred of other nations
diminishes, but patriotism dies with it. Ignorance is held in contempt; but a
dangerous scepticism has succeeded it. Some vices indeed are condemned
and others grown dishonourable; but we have still many that are honoured

with the names of virtues, and it is become necessary that we should either
have, or at least pretend to have them. Let who will extol the moderation of
our modern sages, I see nothing in it but a refinement of intemperance as
unworthy of my commendation as their artificial simplicity.[2]
Such is the purity to which our morals have attained; this is the virtue we
have made our own. Let the arts and sciences claim the share they have had
in this salutary work. I shall add but one reflection more; suppose an
inhabitant of some distant country should endeavour to form an idea of
European morals from the state of the sciences, the perfection of the arts,
the propriety of our public entertainments, the politeness of our behaviour,
the affability of our conversation, our constant professions of benevolence,
and from those tumultuous assemblies of people of all ranks, who seem,
from morning till night, to have no other care than to oblige one another.
Such a stranger, I maintain, would arrive at a totally false view of our
morality.
Where there is no effect, it is idle to look for a cause: but here the effect is
certain and the depravity actual; our minds have been corrupted in
proportion as the arts and sciences have improved. Will it be said, that this
is a misfortune peculiar to the present age? No, gentlemen, the evils
resulting from our vain curiosity are as old as the world. The daily ebb and
flow of the tides are not more regularly influenced by the moon, than the
morals of a people by the progress of the arts and sciences. As their light
has risen above our horizon, virtue has taken flight, and the same
phenomenon has been constantly observed in all times and places.
Take Egypt, the first school of mankind, that ancient country, famous for its
fertility under a brazen sky; the spot from which Sesostris once set out to
conquer the world. Egypt became the mother of philosophy and the fine
arts; soon she was conquered by Cambyses, and then successively by the
Greeks, the Romans, the Arabs, and finally the Turks.
Take Greece, once peopled by heroes, who twice vanquished Asia. Letters,
as yet in their infancy, had not corrupted the disposition of its inhabitants;
but the progress of the sciences soon produced a dissoluteness of manners,
and the imposition of the Macedonian yoke: from which time Greece,
always learned, always voluptuous and always a slave, has experienced
amid all its revolutions no more than a change of masters. Not all the

eloquence of Demosthenes could breathe life into a body which luxury and
the arts had once enervated.
It was not till the days of Ennius and Terence that Rome, founded by a
shepherd, and made illustrious by I peasants, began to degenerate. But after
the appearance of an Ovid, a Catullus, a Martial, and the rest of those
numerous obscene authors, whose very names are enough to put modesty to
the blush, Rome, once the shrine of virtue, became the theatre of vice, a
scorn among the nations, and an object of derision even to barbarians. Thus
the capital of the world at length submitted to the yoke of slavery it had
imposed on others, and the very day of its fall was the eve of that on which
it conferred on one of its citizens the title of Arbiter of Good Taste.
What shall I say of that metropolis of the Eastern Empire, which, by its
situation, seemed destined to be the capital of the world; that refuge of the
arts and sciences, when they were banished from the rest of Europe, more
perhaps by wisdom than barbarism? The most profligate debaucheries, the
most abandoned villainies, the most atrocious crimes, plots, murders and
assassinations form the warp and woof of the history of Constantinople.
Such is the pure source from which have flowed to us the floods of
knowledge on which the present age so prides itself.
But wherefore should we seek, in past ages, for proofs of a truth, of which
the present affords us ample evidence? There is in Asia a vast empire,
where learning is held in honour, and leads to the highest dignities in the
state. If the sciences improved our morals, if they inspired us with courage
and taught us to lay down our lives for the good of our country, the Chinese
should be wise, free and invincible. But, if there be no vice they do not
practise, no crime with which they are not familiar; if the sagacity of their
ministers, the supposed wisdom of their laws, and the multitude of
inhabitants who people that vast empire, have alike failed to preserve them
from the yoke of the rude and ignorant Tartars, of what use were their men
of science and literature? What advantage has that country reaped from the
honours bestowed on its learned men? Can it be that of being peopled by a
race of scoundrels and slaves?
Contrast with these instances the morals of those few nations which, being
preserved from the contagion of useless knowledge, have by their virtues
become happy in themselves and afforded an example to the rest of the

world. Such were the first inhabitants of Persia, a nation so singular that
virtue was taught among them in the same manner as the sciences are with
us. They very easily subdued Asia, and possess the exclusive glory of
having had the history of their political institutions regarded as a
philosophical romance. Such were the Scythians, of whom such wonderful
eulogies have come down to us. Such were the Germans, whose simplicity,
innocence and virtue, afforded a most delightful contrast to the pen of an
historian, weary of describing the baseness and villainies of an enlightened,
opulent and voluptuous nation. Such had been even Rome in the days of its
poverty and ignorance. And such has shown itself to be, even in our own
times, that rustic nation, whose justly renowned courage not even adversity
could conquer, and whose fidelity no example could corrupt.[3]
It is not through stupidity that the people have preferred other activities to
those of the mind. They were not ignorant that in other countries there were
men who spent their time in disputing idly about the sovereign good, and
about vice and virtue. They knew that these useless thinkers were lavish in
their own praises, and stigmatised other nations contemptuously as
barbarians. But they noted the morals of these people, and so learnt what to
think of their learning.[4]
Can it be forgotten that, in the very heart of Greece, there arose a city as
famous for the happy ignorance of its inhabitants, as for the wisdom of its
laws; a republic of demi-gods rather than of men, so greatly superior their
virtues seemed to those of mere humanity? Sparta, eternal proof of the
vanity of science, while the vices, under the conduct of the fine arts, were
being introduced into Athens, even while its tyrant was carefully collecting
together the works of the prince of poets, was driving from her walls artists
and the arts, the learned and their learning!
The difference was seen in the outcome. Athens became the seat of
politeness and taste, the country of orators and philosophers. The elegance
of its buildings equalled that of its language; on every side might be seen
marble and canvas, animated by the hands of the most skilful artists. From
Athens we derive those astonishing performances, which will serve as
models to every corrupt age. The picture of Lacedæmon is not so highly
coloured. There, the neighbouring nations used to say, "men were born
virtuous, their native air seeming to inspire them with virtue." But its
inhabitants have left us nothing but the memory of their heroic actions:

monuments that should not count for less in our eyes than the most curious
relics of Athenian marble.
It is true that, among the Athenians, there were some few wise men who
withstood the general torrent, and preserved their integrity even in the
company of the muses. But hear the judgment which the principal, and most
unhappy of them, passed on the artists and learned men of his day.
"I have considered the poets," says he, "and I look upon them as people
whose talents impose both on themselves and on others; they give
themselves out for wise men, and are taken for such; but in reality they are
anything sooner than that."
"From the poets," continues Socrates, "I turned to the artists. Nobody was
more ignorant of the arts than myself; nobody was more fully persuaded
that the artists were possessed of amazing knowledge. I soon discovered,
however, that they were in as bad a way as the poets, and that both had
fallen into the same misconception. Because the most skilful of them excel
others in their particular jobs, they think themselves wiser than all the rest
of mankind. This arrogance spoilt all their skill in my eyes, so that, putting
myself in the place of the oracle, and asking myself whether I would rather
be what I am or what they are, know what they know, or know that I know
nothing, I very readily answered, for myself and the god, that I had rather
remain as I am.
"None of us, neither the sophists, nor the poets, nor the orators, nor the
artists, nor I, know what is the nature of the true, the good, or the beautiful.
But there is this difference between us; that, though none of these people
know anything, they all think they know something; whereas for my part, if
I know nothing, I am at least in no doubt of my ignorance. So the
superiority of wisdom, imputed to me by the oracle, is reduced merely to
my being fully convinced that I am ignorant of what I do not know."
Thus we find Socrates, the wisest of men in the judgment of the god, and
the most learned of all the Athenians in the opinion of all Greece, speaking
in praise of ignorance. Were he alive now, there is little reason to think that
our modern scholars and artists would induce him to change his mind. No,
gentlemen, that honest man would still persist in despising our vain
sciences. He would lend no aid to swell the flood of books that flows from
every quarter: he would leave to us, as he did to his disciples, only the

example and memory of his virtues; that is the noblest method of
instructing mankind.
Socrates had begun at Athens, and the elder Cato proceeded at Rome, to
inveigh against those seductive and subtle Greeks, who corrupted the virtue
and destroyed the courage of their fellow-citizens: culture, however,
prevailed. Rome was filled with philosophers and orators, military
discipline was neglected, agriculture was held in contempt, men formed
sects, and forgot their country. To the sacred names of liberty,
disinterestedness and obedience to law, succeeded those of Epicurus, Zeno
and Arcesilaus. It was even a saying among their own philosophers that
since learned men appeared among them, honest men had been in eclipse.
Before that time the Romans were satisfied with the practice of virtue; they
were undone when they began to study it.
What would the great soul of Fabricius have felt, if it had been his
misfortune to be called back to life, when he saw the pomp and
magnificence of that Rome, which his arm had saved from ruin, and his
honourable name made more illustrious than all its conquests. "Ye gods!"
he would have said, "what has become of those thatched roofs and rustic
hearths, which were formerly the habitations of temperance and virtue?
What fatal splendour has succeeded the ancient Roman simplicity? What is
this foreign language, this effeminacy of manners? What is the meaning of
these statues, paintings and buildings? Fools, what have you done? You, the
lords of the earth, have made yourselves the slaves of the frivolous nations
you have subdued. You are governed by rhetoricians, and it has been only to
enrich architects, painters, sculptors and stage-players that you have
watered Greece and Asia with your blood. Even the spoils of Carthage are
the prize of a flute-player. Romans! Romans! make haste to demolish those
amphitheatres, break to pieces those statues, burn those paintings; drive
from among you those slaves who keep you in subjection, and whose fatal
arts are corrupting your morals. Let other hands make themselves illustrious
by such vain talents; the only talent worthy of Rome is that of conquering
the world and making virtue its ruler. When Cyneas took the Roman senate
for an assembly of kings, he was not struck by either useless pomp or
studied elegance. He heard there none of that futile eloquence, which is
now the study and the charm of frivolous orators. What then was the
majesty that Cyneas beheld? Fellow citizens, he saw the noblest sight that

ever existed under heaven, a sight which not all your riches or your arts can
show; an assembly of two hundred virtuous men, worthy to command in
Rome, and to govern the world."
But let pass the distance of time and place, and let us see what has
happened in our own time and country; or rather let us banish odious
descriptions that might offend our delicacy, and spare ourselves the pains of
repeating the same tilings under different names. It was not for nothing that
I invoked the Manes of Fabricius; for what have I put into his mouth, that
might not have come with as much propriety from Louis the Twelfth or
Henry the Fourth? It is true that in France Socrates would not have drunk
the hemlock, but he would have drunk of a potion infinitely more bitter, of
insult, mockery and contempt a hundred times worse than death.
Thus it is that luxury, profligacy and slavery, have been, in all ages, the
scourge of the efforts of our pride to emerge from that happy state of
ignorance, in which the wisdom of providence had placed us. That thick
veil with which it has covered all its operations seems to be a sufficient
proof that it never designed us for such fruitless researches. But is there,
indeed, one lesson it has taught us, by which we have rightly profited, or
which we have neglected with impunity? Let men learn for once that nature
would have preserved them from science, as a mother snatches a dangerous
weapon from the hands of her child. Let them know that all the secrets she
hides are so many evils from which she protects them, and that the very
difficulty they find in acquiring knowledge is not the least of her bounty
towards them. Men are perverse; but they would have been far worse, if
they had had the misfortune to be born learned.
How humiliating are these reflections to humanity, and how mortified by
them our pride should be! What! it will be asked, is uprightness the child of
ignorance? Is virtue inconsistent with learning? What consequences might
not be drawn from such suppositions? But to reconcile these apparent
contradictions, we need only examine closely the emptiness and vanity of
those pompous titles, which are so liberally bestowed on human knowledge,
and which so blind our judgment. Let us consider, therefore, the arts and
sciences in themselves. Let us see what must result from their advancement,
and let us not hesitate to admit the truth of all those points on which our
arguments coincide with the inductions we can make from history.

[1] Sovereigns always see with, pleasure a taste for the arts of amusement and superfluity, which do
not result in the exportation of bullion, increase among their subjects. They very well know that,
besides nourishing that littleness of mind which is proper to slavery, the increase of artificial wants
only binds so many more chains upon the people. Alexander, wishing to keep the Ichthyophages in a
state of dependence, compelled them to give up fishing, and subsist on the customary food of
civilised nations. The American savages, who go naked, and live entirely on the products of the
chase, have been always impossible to subdue. What yoke, indeed, can be imposed on men who
stand in need of nothing?
[2] "I love," said Montaigne, "to converse and hold an argument; but only with very few people, and
that for my own gratification. For to do so, by way of affording amusement for the great, or of
making a parade of one's talents, is, in my opinion, a trade very ill-becoming a man of honour." It is
the trade of all our intellectuals, save one.
[3] I dare not speak of those happy nations, who did not even know the name of many vices, which
we find it difficult to suppress; the savages of America, whose simple and natural mode of
government Montaigne preferred, without hesitation, not only to the laws of Plato, but to the most
perfect visions of government philosophy can ever suggest He cites many examples, striking for
those who are capable of appreciating them. But, what of all that, says he, they can't run to a pair of
breeches!
[4] What are we to think was the real opinion of the Athenians themselves about eloquence, when
they were so very careful to banish declamation from that upright tribunal, against whose decision
even their gods made no appeal? What did the Romans think of physicians, when they expelled
medicine from the republic? And when the relics of humanity left among the Spaniards induced them
to forbid their lawyers to set foot in America, what must they have thought of jurisprudence? May it
not be said that they thought, by this single expedient, to make reparation for all the outrages they
had committed against the unhappy Indians?

THE SECOND PART
An ancient tradition passed out of Egypt into Greece, that some god, who
was an enemy to the repose of mankind, was the inventor of the sciences.[1]
What must the Egyptians, among whom the sciences first arose, have
thought of them? And they beheld, near at hand, the sources from which
they sprang. In fact, whether we turn to the annals of the world, or eke out
with philosophical investigations the uncertain chronicles of history, we
shall not find for human knowledge an origin answering to the idea we are
pleased to entertain of it at present. Astronomy was born of superstition,
eloquence of ambition, hatred, falsehood and flattery; geometry of avarice;
physics of an idle curiosity; and even moral philosophy of human pride.

Thus the arts and sciences owe their birth to our vices; we should be less
doubtful of their advantages, if they had sprung from our virtues.
Their evil origin is, indeed, but too plainly reproduced in their objects.
What would become of the arts, were they not cherished by luxury? If men
were not unjust, of what use were jurisprudence? What would become of
history, if there were no tyrants, wars, or conspiracies? In a word, who
would pass his life in barren speculations, if everybody, attentive only to the
obligations of humanity and the necessities of nature, spent his whole life in
serving his country, obliging his friends, and relieving the unhappy? Are we
then made to live and die on the brink of that well at the bottom of which
Truth lies hid? This reflection alone is, in my opinion, enough to discourage
at first setting out every man who seriously endeavours to instruct himself
by the study of philosophy.
What a variety of dangers surrounds us! What a number of wrong paths
present themselves in the investigation of the sciences! Through how many
errors, more perilous than truth itself is useful, must we not pass to arrive at
it? The disadvantages we lie under are evident; for falsehood is capable of
an infinite variety of combinations; but the truth has only one manner of
being. Besides, where is the man who sincerely desires to find it? Or even
admitting his good will, by what characteristic marks is he sure of knowing
it? Amid the infinite diversity of opinions where is the criterion[2] by which
we may certainly judge of it? Again, what is still more difficult, should we
even be fortunate enough to discover it, who among us will know how to
make right use of it?
If our sciences are futile in the objects they propose, they are no less
dangerous in the effects they produce. Being the effect of idleness, they
generate idleness in their turn; and an irreparable loss of time is the first
prejudice which they must necessarily cause to society. To live without
doing some good is a great evil as well in the political as in the moral
world; and hence every useless citizen should be regarded as a pernicious
person. Tell me then, illustrious philosophers, of whom we learn the ratios
in which attraction acts in vacuo; and in the revolution of the planets, the
relations of spaces traversed in equal times; by whom we are taught what
curves have conjugate points, points of inflexion, and cusps; how the soul
and body correspond, like two clocks, without actual communication; what
planets may be inhabited; and what insects reproduce in an extraordinary

manner. Answer me, I say, you from whom we receive all this sublime
information, whether we should have been less numerous, worse governed,
less formidable, less flourishing, or more perverse, supposing you had
taught us none of all these fine things.
Reconsider therefore the importance of your productions; and, since the
labours of the most enlightened of our learned men and the best of our
citizens are of so little utility, tell us what we ought to think of that
numerous herd of obscure writers and useless litterateurs, who devour
without any return the substance of the State.
Useless, do I say? Would God they were! Society would be more peaceful,
and morals less corrupt. But these vain and futile declaimers go forth on all
sides, armed with their fatal paradoxes, to sap the foundations of our faith,
and nullify virtue. They smile contemptuously at such old names as
patriotism and religion, and consecrate their talents and philosophy to the
destruction; and defamation of all that men hold sacred. Not that they bear
any real hatred to virtue or dogma; they are the enemies of public opinion
alone; to bring them to the foot of the altar, it would be enough to banish
them to a land of atheists. What extravagancies will not the rage of
singularity induce men to commit!
The waste of time is certainly a great evil; but still greater evils attend upon
literature and the arts. One is luxury, produced like them by indolence and
vanity. Luxury is seldom unattended by the arts and sciences; and they are
always attended by luxury. I know that our philosophy, fertile in paradoxes,
pretends, in contradiction to the experience of all ages, that luxury
contributes to the splendour of States. But, without insisting on the
necessity of sumptuary laws, can it be denied that rectitude of morals is
essential to the duration of empires, and that luxury is diametrically
opposed to such rectitude? Let it be admitted that luxury is a certain
indication of wealth; that it even serves, if you will, to increase such wealth:
what conclusion is to be drawn from this paradox, so worthy of the times?
And what will become of virtue if riches are to be acquired at any cost? The
politicians of the ancient world were always talking of morals and virtue;
ours speak of nothing but commerce and money. One of them will tell you
that in such a country a man is worth just as much as he will sell for at
Algiers: another, pursuing the same mode of calculation, finds that in some
countries a man is worth nothing, and in others still less than nothing; they

value men as they do droves of oxen. According to them, a man is worth no
more to the State, than the amount he consumes; and thus a Sybarite would
be worth at least thirty Lacedæmonians. Let these writers tell me, however,
which of the two republics, Sybaris or Sparta, was subdued by a handful of
peasants, and which became the terror of Asia.
The monarchy of Cyrus was conquered by thirty thousand men, led by a
prince poorer than the meanest of Persian Satraps: in like manner the
Scythians, the poorest of all nations, were able to resist the most powerful
monarchs of the universe. When two famous republics contended for the
empire of the world, the one rich and the other poor, the former was
subdued by the latter. The Roman empire in its turn, after having engulfed
all the riches of the universe, fell a prey to peoples who knew not even what
riches were. The Franks conquered the Gauls, and the Saxons England,
without any other treasures than their bravery and their poverty. A band of
poor mountaineers, whose whole cupidity was confined to the possession of
a few sheep-skins, having first given a check to the arrogance of Austria,
went on to crush the opulent and formidable house of Burgundy, which at
that time made the potentates of Europe tremble. In short, all the power and
wisdom of the heir of Charles the Fifth, backed by all the treasures of the
Indies, broke before a few herring-fishers. Let our politicians condescend to
lay aside their calculations for a moment, to reflect on these examples; let
them learn for once that money, though it buys everything else, cannot buy
morals and citizens. What then is the precise point in dispute about luxury?
It is to know which is most advantageous to empires, that their existence
should be brilliant and momentary, or virtuous and lasting? I say brilliant,
but with what lustre! A taste for ostentation never prevails in the same
minds as a taste for honesty. No, it is impossible that understandings,
degraded by a multitude of futile cares, should ever rise to what is truly
great and noble; even if they had the strength, they would want the courage.
Every artist loves applause. The praise of his contemporaries is the most
valuable part of his recompense. What then will he do to obtain it, if he
have the misfortune to be born among a people, and at a time, when
learning is in vogue, and the superficiality of youth is in a position to lead
the fashion; when men have sacrificed their taste to those who tyrannise
over their liberty, and one sex dare not approve anything but what is
proportionate to the pusillanimity of the other;[3] when the greatest

masterpieces of dramatic poetry are condemned, and the noblest of musical
productions neglected? This is what he will do. He will lower his genius to
the level of the age, and will rather submit to compose mediocre works, that
will be admired during his life-time, than labour at sublime achievements
which will not be admired till long after he is dead. Let the famous Voltaire
tell us how many nervous and masculine beauties he has sacrificed to our
false delicacy, and how much that is great and noble, that spirit of gallantry,
which delights in what is frivolous and petty, has cost him.
It is thus that the dissolution of morals, the necessary consequence of
luxury, brings with it in its turn the corruption of taste. Further, if by chance
there be found among men of average ability, an individual with enough
strength of mind to refuse to comply with the spirit of the age, and to
debase himself by puerile productions, his lot will be hard. He will die in
indigence and oblivion. This is not so much a prediction, as a fact already
confirmed by experience! Yes, Carle and Pierre Vanloo, the time is already
come when your pencils, destined to increase the majesty of our temples by
sublime and holy images, must fall from your hands, or else be prostituted
to adorn the panels of a coach with lascivious paintings. And you,
inimitable Pigal, rival of Phidias and Praxiteles, whose chisel the ancients
would have employed to carve them gods, whose images almost excuse
their idolatry in our eyes; even your hand must condescend to fashion the
belly of an ape, or else remain idle.
We cannot reflect on the morality of mankind without contemplating with
pleasure the picture of the simplicity which prevailed in the earliest times.
This image may be justly compared to a beautiful coast, adorned only by
the hands of nature; towards which our eyes are constantly turned, and
which we see receding with regret. While men were innocent and virtuous
and loved to have the gods for witnesses of their actions, they dwelt
together in the same huts; but when they became vicious, they grew tired of
such inconvenient onlookers, and banished them to magnificent temples.
Finally, they expelled their deities even from these, in order to dwell there
themselves; or at least the temples of the gods were no longer more
magnificent than the palaces of the citizens. This was the height of
degeneracy; nor could vice ever be carried to greater lengths than when it
was seen, supported, as it were, at the doors of the great, on columns of
marble, and graven on Corinthian capitals.

As the conveniences of life increase, as the arts are brought to perfection,
and luxury spreads, true courage flags, the virtues disappear; and all this is
the effect of the sciences and of those arts which are exercised in the
privacy of men's dwellings. When the Goths ravaged Greece, the libraries
only escaped the flames owing to an opinion that was set on foot among
them, that it was best to leave the enemy with a possession so calculated to
divert their attention from military exercises, and keep them engaged in
indolent and sedentary occupations.
Charles the Eighth found himself master of Tuscany and the kingdom of
Naples, almost without drawing sword; and all his court attributed this
unexpected success to the fact that the princes and nobles of Italy applied
themselves with greater earnestness to the cultivation of their
understandings than to active and martial pursuits. In fact, says the sensible
person who records these characteristics, experience plainly tells us, that in
military matters and all that resemble them application to the sciences tends
rather to make men effeminate and cowardly than resolute and vigorous.
The Romans confessed that military virtue was extinguished among them,
in proportion as they became connoisseurs in the arts of the painter, the
engraver and the goldsmith, and began to cultivate the fine arts. Indeed, as
if this famous country was to be for ever an example to other nations, the
rise of the Medici and the revival of letters has once more destroyed, this
time perhaps for ever, the martial reputation which Italy seemed a few
centuries ago to have recovered.
The ancient republics of Greece, with that wisdom which was so
conspicuous in most of their institutions, forbade their citizens to pursue all
those inactive and sedentary occupations, which by enervating and
corrupting the body diminish also the vigour of the mind. With what
courage, in fact, can it be thought that hunger and thirst, fatigues, dangers
and death, can be faced by men whom the smallest want overwhelms and
the slightest difficulty repels? With what resolution can soldiers support the
excessive toils of war, when they are entirely unaccustomed to them? With
what spirits can they make forced marches under officers who have not
even the strength to travel on horseback? It is no answer to cite the reputed
valour of all the modern warriors who are so scientifically trained. I hear
much of their bravery in a day's battle; but I am told nothing of how they
support excessive fatigue, how they stand the severity of the seasons and

the inclemency of the weather. A little sunshine or snow, or the want of a
few superfluities, is enough to cripple and destroy one of our finest armies
in a few days. Intrepid warriors I permit me for once to tell you the truth,
which you seldom hear. Of your bravery I am fully satisfied. I have no
doubt that you would have triumphed with Hannibal at Cannæ, and at
Trasimene: that you would have passed the Rubicon with Cæsar, and
enabled him to enslave his country; but you never would have been able to
cross the Alps with the former, or with the latter to subdue your own
ancestors, the Gauls.
A war does not always depend on the events of battle: there is in
generalship an art superior to that of gaining victories. A man may behave
with great intrepidity under fire, and yet be a very had officer. Even in the
common soldier, a little more Strength and vigour would perhaps be more
useful than so much courage, which after all is no protection from death.
And what does it matter to the State whether its troops perish by cold and
fever, or by the sword of the enemy?
If the cultivation of the sciences is prejudicial to military qualities, it is still
more so to moral qualities. Even from our infancy an absurd system of
education serves to adorn our wit and corrupt our judgment. We see, on
every side, huge institutions, where our youth are educated at great expense,
and instructed in everything but their duty. Your children will be ignorant of
their own language, when they can talk others which are not spoken
anywhere. They will be able to compose verses which they can hardly
understand; and, without being capable of distinguishing truth from error,
they will possess the art of making them unrecognisable by specious
arguments. But magnanimity, equity, temperance, humanity and courage
will be words of which they know not the meaning. The dear name of
country will never strike on their ears; and if they ever hear speak of God,[4]
it will be less to fear, than to be frightened of Him. I would as soon, said a
wise man, that my pupil had spent his time in the tennis court as in this
manner; for there his body at least would have got exercise.
I well know that children ought to be kept employed, and that idleness is for
them the danger most to be feared. But what should they be taught? This is
undoubtedly an important question. Let them be taught what they are to
practise when they come to be men;[5] not what they ought to forget.

Our gardens are adorned with statues and our galleries with pictures. What
would you imagine these masterpieces of art, thus exhibited to public
admiration, represent? The great men, who have defended their country, or
the still greater men who have enriched it by their virtues? Far from it. They
are the images of every perversion of heart and mind, carefully selected
from ancient mythology, and presented to the early curiosity of our
children, doubtless that they may have before their eyes the representations
of vicious actions, even before they are able to read.
Whence arise all those abuses, unless it be from that fatal inequality
introduced among men by the difference of talents and the cheapening of
virtue? This is the most evident effect of all our studies, and the most
dangerous of all their consequences. The question is no longer whether a
man is honest, but whether he is clever. We do not ask whether a book is
useful, but whether it is well-written. Rewards are lavished on wit and
ingenuity, while virtue is left unhonoured. There are a thousand prizes for
fine discourses, and none for good actions. I should be glad, however, to
know whether the honour attaching to the best discourse that ever wins the
prize in this Academy is comparable with the merit of having founded the
prize.
A wise man does not go in chase of fortune; but he is by no means
insensible to glory, and when he sees it so ill distributed, his virtue, which
might have been animated by a little emulation, and turned to the advantage
of society, droops and dies away in obscurity and indigence. It is for this
reason that the agreeable arts must in time everywhere be preferred to the
useful; and this truth has been but too much confirmed since the revival of
the arts and sciences. We have physicists, geometricians, chemists,
astronomers, poets, musicians, and painters in plenty; but we have no
longer a citizen among us; or if there be found a few scattered over our
abandoned countryside, they are left to perish there unnoticed and
neglected. Such is the condition to which we are reduced, and such are our
feelings towards those who give us our daily bread, and our children milk.
I confess, however, that the evil is not so great as it might have become.
The eternal providence, in placing salutary simples beside noxious plants,
and making poisonous animals contain their own antidote, has taught the
sovereigns of the earth, who are its ministers, to imitate its wisdom. It is by
following this example that the truly great monarch, to whose glory every

age will add new lustre, drew from the very bosom of the arts and sciences,
the very fountains of a thousand lapses from rectitude, those famous
societies, which, while they are depositaries of the dangerous trust of
human knowledge, are yet the sacred guardians of morals, by the attention
they pay to their maintenance among themselves in all their purity, and by
the demands which they make on every member whom they admit.
These wise institutions, confirmed by his august successor and imitated by
all the kings of Europe, will serve at least to restrain men of letters, who, all
aspiring to the honour of being admitted into these Academies, will keep
watch over themselves, and endeavour to make themselves worthy of such
honour by useful performances and irreproachable morals. Those
Academies also, which, in proposing prizes for literary merit, make choice
of such subjects as are calculated to arouse the love of virtue in the hearts of
citizens, prove that it prevails in themselves, and must give men the rare
and real pleasure of finding learned societies devoting themselves to the
enlightenment of mankind, not only by agreeable exercises of the intellect,
but also by useful instructions.
An objection which may be made is, in fact, only an additional proof of my
argument. So much precaution proves but too evidently the need for it. We
never seek remedies for evils that do not exist. Why, indeed, must these
bear all the marks of ordinary remedies, on account of their inefficacy? The
numerous establishments in favour of the learned are only adapted to make
men mistake the objects of the sciences, and turn men's attention to the
cultivation of them. One would be inclined to think, from the precautions
everywhere taken, that we are overstocked with husbandmen, and are afraid
of a shortage of philosophers. I will not venture here to enter into a
comparison between agriculture and philosophy, as they would not bear it. I
shall only ask What is philosophy? What is contained in the writings of the
most celebrated philosophers? What are the lessons of these friends of
wisdom. To hear them, should we not take them for so many mountebanks,
exhibiting themselves in public, and crying out, Here, Here, come to me, I
am the only true doctor? One of them teaches that there is no such thing as
matter, but that everything exists only in representation. Another declares
that there is no other substance than matter, and no other God than the
world itself. A third tells you that there are no such things as virtue and
vice, and that moral good and evil are chimeras; while a fourth informs you

that men are only beasts of prey, and may conscientiously devour one
another. Why, my great philosophers, do you not reserve these wise and
profitable lessons for your friends and children? You would soon reap the
benefit of them, nor should we be under any apprehension of our own
becoming your disciples.
Such are the wonderful men, whom their contemporaries held in the highest
esteem during their lives, and to whom immortality has been attributed
since their decease. Such are the wise maxims we have received from them,
and which are transmitted, from age to age, to our descendants. Paganism,
though given over to all the extravagances of human reason, has left
nothing to compare with the shameful monuments which have been
prepared by the art of printing, during the reign of the gospel. The impious
writings of Leucippus and Diagoras perished with their authors. The world,
in their days, was ignorant of the art of immortalising the errors and
extravagancies of the human mind. But thanks to the art of printing[6] and
the use we make of it, the pernicious reflections of Hobbes and Spinoza will
last for ever. Go, famous writings, of which the ignorance and rusticity of
our forefathers would have been incapable. Go to our descendants, along
with those still more pernicious works which reek of the corrupted manners
of the present age! Let them together convey to posterity a faithful history
of the progress and advantages of our arts and sciences. If they are read,
they will leave not a doubt about the question we are now discussing, and
unless mankind should then be still more foolish than we, they will lift up
their hands to Heaven and exclaim in bitterness of heart: "Almighty God!
thou who holdest in Thy hand the minds of men, deliver us from the fatal
arts and sciences of our forefathers; give us back ignorance, innocence and
poverty, which alone can make us happy and are precious in Thy sight."
But if the progress of the arts and sciences has added nothing to our real
happiness; if it has corrupted our morals, and if that corruption has vitiated
our taste, what are we to think of the herd of text-book authors, who have
removed those impediments which nature purposely laid in the way to the
Temple of the Muses, in order to guard its approach and try the powers of
those who might be tempted to seek knowledge? What are we to think of
those compilers who have indiscreetly broken open the door of the sciences,
and introduced into their sanctuary a populace unworthy to approach it,
when it was greatly to be wished that all who should be found incapable of

making a considerable progress in the career of learning should have been
repulsed at the entrance, and thereby cast upon those arts which are useful
to society. A man who will be all his life a bad versifier, or a third-rate
geometrician, might have made nevertheless an excellent clothier. Those
whom nature intended for her disciples have not needed masters. Bacon,
Descartes and Newton, those teachers of mankind, had themselves no
teachers. What guide indeed could have taken them so far as their sublime
genius directed them? Ordinary masters would only have cramped their
intelligence, by confining it within the narrow limits of their own capacity.
It was from the obstacles they met with at first, that they learned to exert
themselves, and bestirred themselves to traverse the vast field which they
covered. If it be proper to allow some men to apply themselves to the study
of the arts and sciences, it is only those who feel themselves able to walk
alone in their footsteps and to outstrip them. It belongs only to these few to
raise monuments to the glory of the human understanding. But if we are
desirous that nothing should be above their genius, nothing should be
beyond their hopes. This is the only encouragement they require. The soul
insensibly adapts itself to the objects on which it is employed, and thus it is
that great occasions produce great men. The greatest orator in the world was
Consul of Rome, and perhaps the greatest of philosophers Lord Chancellor
of England. Can it be conceived that, if the former had only been a
professor at some University, and the latter a pensioner of some Academy,
their works would not have suffered from their situation. Let not princes
disdain to admit into their councils those who are most capable of giving
them good advice. Let them renounce the old prejudice, which was invented
by the pride of the great, that the art of governing mankind is more difficult
than that of instructing them; as if it was easier to induce men to do good
voluntarily, than to compel them to it by force. Let the learned of the first
rank find an honourable refuge in their courts; let them there enjoy the only
recompense worthy of them, that of promoting by their influence the
happiness of the peoples they have enlightened by their wisdom. It is by
this means only that we are likely to see what virtue, science and authority
can do, when animated by the noblest emulation, and working unanimously
for the happiness of mankind.
But so long as power alone is on one side, and knowledge and
Understanding alone on the other, the learned will seldom make great

objects their study, princes will still more rarely do great actions, and the
peoples will continue to be, as they are, mean, corrupt and miserable.
As for us, ordinary men, on whom Heaven has not been pleased to bestow
such great talents; as we are not destined to reap such glory, let us remain in
our obscurity. Let us not covet a reputation we should never attain, and
which, in the present state of things, would never make up to us for the
trouble it would have cost us, even if we were fully qualified to obtain it.
Why should we build our happiness on the opinions of others, when we can
find it in our own hearts? Let us leave to others the task of instructing
mankind in their duty, and confine ourselves to the discharge of our own.
We have no occasion for greater knowledge than this.
Virtue! sublime science of simple minds, are such industry and preparation
needed if we are to know you? Are not your principles graven on every
heart? Need we do more, to learn your laws, than examine ourselves, and
listen to the voice of conscience, when the passions are silent?
This is the true philosophy, with which we must learn to be content, without
envying the fame of those celebrated men, whose names are immortal in the
republic of letters. Let us, instead of envying them, endeavour to make,
between them and us, that honourable distinction which was formerly seen
to exist between two great peoples, that the one knew how to speak, and the
other how to act, aright.
[1] It is easy to see the allegory in the fable of Prometheus: and it does not appear that the Greeks,
who chained him to the Caucasus, had a better opinion of him than the Egyptians had of their god
Theutus. The Satyr, says an ancient fable, the first time he saw a fire, was going to kiss and embrace
it; but Prometheus cried out to him to forbear, or his beard would rue it. It burns, says he, everything
that touches it.
[2] The less we know, the more we think we know. The peripatetics doubted of nothing. Did not
Descartes construct the universe with cubes and vortices? And is there in all Europe one single
physicist who does not boldly explain the inexplicable mysteries of electricity, which will, perhaps,
be for ever the despair of real philosophers?
[3] I am far from thinking that the ascendancy which women have obtained over men is an evil in
itself. It is a present which nature has made them for the good of mankind. If better directed, it might
be productive of as much good, as it is now of evil. We are not sufficiently sensible of what
advantage it would be to society to give a better education to that half of our species which governs
the other. Men will always be what women choose to make them. If you wish then that they should
be noble and virtuous, let women be taught what greatness of soul and virtue are. The reflections
which this subject arouses, and which Plato formerly made, deserve to be more fully developed by a
pen worthy of following so great a master, and defending so great a cause.

[4] Pensées philosophiques (Diderot).
[5] Such was the education of the Spartans with regard to one of the greatest of their-kings. It is well
worthy of notice, says Montaigne, that the excellent institutions of Lycurgus, which were in truth
miraculously perfect, paid as much attention to the bringing up of youth as if this were their principal
object, and yet, at the very seat of the Muses, they make so little mention of learning that it seems as
if their generous-spirited youth disdained every other restraint, and required, instead of masters of the
sciences, instructors in valour, prudence and justice alone.
Let us hear next what the same writer says of the ancient Persians. Plato, says he, relates that the heir
to the throne was thus brought up. At his birth he was committed, not to the care of women, but to
eunuchs in the highest authority and near the person of the king, on account of their virtue. These
undertook to render his body beautiful and healthy. At seven years of age they taught him to ride and
go hunting. At fourteen he was placed in the hands of four, the wisest, the most just, the most
temperate and the bravest persons in the kingdom. The first instructed him in religion, the second
taught him to adhere inviolably to truth, the third to conquer his passions, and the fourth to be afraid
of nothing. All, I may add, taught him to be a good man; but not one taught him to be learned.
Astyages, in Xenophon, desires Cyrus to give him an account of his last lesson. It was this, answered
Cyrus, one of the big boys, of the school having a small coat, gave it to a little boy and took away
from him his coat, which was larger. Our master having appointed me arbiter in the dispute, I ordered
that matters should stand as they were, as each boy seemed to be better suited than before. The
master, however, remonstrated with me, saying that I considered only convenience, whereas justice
ought to have been the first concern, and justice teaches that no one should suffer forcible
interference with what belongs to him. He added that he was punished for his wrong decision, just as
boys are punished in our country schools when they forget the first aorist of τύπτω. My tutor must
make me a fine harangue, in genere demonstrative, before he will persuade me that his school is as
good as this.
[6] If we consider the frightful disorders which printing has already caused in Europe, and judge of
the future by the progress of its evils from day to day, it is easy to foresee that sovereigns will
hereafter take as much pains to banish this dreadful art from their dominions, as they ever took to
encourage it The Sultan Achmet, yielding to the importunities of certain pretenders to taste,
consented to have a press erected at Constantinople; but it was hardly set to work before they were
obliged to destroy it, and throw the plant into a well.
It is related that the Caliph Omar, being asked what should be done with the library at Alexandria,
answered in these words. "If the books in the library contain anything contrary to the Alcoran, they
are evil and ought to be burnt; if they contain only what the Alcoran teaches, they are superfluous."
This reasoning has been cited by oar men of letters as the height of absurdity; but if Gregory the
Great had been in the place of Omar, and the Gospel in the place of the Alcoran, the library would
still have been burnt, and it would have been perhaps the finest action of his life.

A DISCOURSE
ON A SUBJECT PROPOSED BY THE ACADEMY OF DIJON:

WHAT IS THE ORIGIN OF INEQUALITY AMONG MEN,
AND IS IT AUTHORISED BY NATURAL LAW?

Non in depravatis, sed in his qua bene secundum naturam
se habent, considerandum est quid sit naturale.
Aristotle, Politics, Bk. i, ch. 2.
[We should consider what is natural not in things which are depraved
but in those which are rightly ordered according to nature.]

DEDICATION
TO THE

REPUBLIC OF GENEVA
MOST HONOURABLE, MAGNIFICENT AND SOVEREIGN LORDS,

convinced that only
a virtuous citizen can confer on his country honours which it can accept, I
have been for thirty years past working to make myself worthy to offer you
some public homage; and, this fortunate opportunity supplementing in some
degree the insufficiency of my efforts, I have thought myself entitled to
follow in embracing it the dictates of the zeal which inspires me, rather than
the right which should have been my authorisation. Having had the
happiness to be born among you, how could I reflect on the equality which
nature has ordained between men, and the inequality which they have
introduced, without reflecting on the profound wisdom by which both are in
this State happily combined and made to coincide, in the manner that is
most in conformity with natural law, and most favourable to society, to the
maintenance of public order and to the happiness of individuals? In my
researches after the best rules common sense can lay down for the
constitution of a government, I have been so struck at finding them all in
actuality in your own, that even had I not been born within your walls I
should have thought it indispensable for me to offer this picture of human
society to that people, which of all others seems to be possessed of its
greatest advantages, and to have best guarded against its abuses.

If I had had to make choice of the place of my birth, I should have preferred
a society which had an extent proportionate to the limits of the human
faculties; that is, to the possibility of being well governed: in which every
person being equal to his occupation, no one should be obliged to commit
to others the functions with which he was entrusted: a State, in which all the
individuals being well known to one another, neither the secret
machinations of vice, nor the modesty of virtue should be able to escape the
notice and judgment of the public; and in which the pleasant custom of
seeing and knowing one another should make the love of country rather a
love of the citizens than of its soil.
I should have wished to be born in a country in which the interest of the
Sovereign and that of the people must be single and identical; to the end
that all the movements of the machine might tend always to the general
happiness. And as this could not be the case, unless the Sovereign and the
people were one and the same person, it follows that I should have wished
to be born under a democratic government, wisely tempered.
I should have wished to live and die free: that is, so far subject to the laws
that neither I, nor anybody else, should be able to cast off their honourable
yoke: the easy and salutary yoke which the haughtiest necks bear with the
greater docility, as they are made to bear no other.
I should have wished then that no one within the State should be able to say
he was above the law; and that no one without should be able to dictate so
that the State should be obliged to recognise his authority. For, be the
constitution of a government what it may, if there be within its jurisdiction a
single man who is not subject to the law, all the rest are necessarily at his
discretion. And if there be a national ruler within, and a foreign ruler
without, however they may divide their authority, it is impossible that both
should be duly obeyed, or that the State should be well governed.
I should not have chosen to live in a republic of recent institution, however
excellent its laws; for fear the government, being perhaps otherwise framed
than the circumstances of the moment might require, might disagree with
the new citizens, or they with it, and the State run the risk of overthrow and
destruction almost as soon as it came into being. For it is with liberty as it is
with those solid and succulent foods, or with those generous wines which
are well adapted to nourish and fortify robust constitutions that are used to

them, but ruin and intoxicate weak and delicate constitutions to which they
are not suited. Peoples once accustomed to masters are not in a condition to
do without them. If they attempt to shake off the yoke, they still more
estrange themselves from freedom, as, by mistaking for it an unbridled
license to which it is diametrically opposed, they nearly always manage, by
their revolutions, to hand themselves over to seducers, who only make their
chains heavier than before. The Roman people itself, a model for all free
peoples, was wholly incapable of governing itself when it escaped from the
oppression of the Tarquins. Debased by slavery, and the ignominious tasks
which had been imposed upon it, it was at first no better than a stupid mob,
which it was necessary to control and govern with the greatest wisdom; in
order that, being accustomed by degrees to breathe the health-giving air of
liberty, minds which had been enervated or rather brutalised under tyranny,
might gradually acquire that severity of morals and spirit of fortitude which
made it at length the people of all most worthy of respect. I should, then,
have sought out for my country some peaceful and happy Republic, of an
antiquity that lost itself, as it were, in the night of time: which had
experienced only such shocks as served to manifest and strengthen the
courage and patriotism of its subjects; and whose citizens, long accustomed
to a wise independence, were not only free, but worthy to be so.
I should have wished to choose myself a country, diverted, by a fortunate
impotence, from the brutal love of conquest, and secured, by a still more
fortunate situation, from the fear of becoming itself the conquest of other
States: a free city situated between several nations, none of which should
have any interest in attacking it, while each had an interest in preventing it
from being attacked by the others; in short, a Republic which should have
nothing to tempt the ambition of its neighbours, but might reasonably
depend on their assistance in case of need. It follows that a republican State
so happily situated could have nothing to fear but from itself; and that, if its
members trained themselves to the use of arms, it would be rather to keep
alive that military ardour and courageous spirit which are so proper among
free-men, and tend to keep up their taste for liberty, than from the necessity
of providing for their defence.
I should have sought a country, in which the right of legislation was vested
in all the citizens; for who can judge better than they of the conditions
under which they had best dwell together in the same society? Not that I

should have approved of Plebiscita, like those among the Romans; in which
the rulers in the State, and those most interested in its preservation, were
excluded from the deliberations on which in many cases its security
depended; and in which, by the most absurd inconsistency, the magistrates
were deprived of rights which the meanest citizens enjoyed.
On the contrary, I should have desired that, in order to prevent selfinterested and ill-conceived projects, and all such dangerous innovations as
finally ruined the Athenians, each man should not be at liberty to propose
new laws at pleasure; but that this right should belong exclusively to the
magistrates; and that even they should use it with so much caution, the
people, on its side, be so reserved in giving its consent to such laws, and the
promulgation of them be attended with so much solemnity, that before the
constitution could be upset by them, there might be time enough for all to
be convinced, that it is above all the great antiquity of the laws which
makes them sacred and venerable, that men soon learn to despise laws
which they see daily altered, and that States, by accustoming themselves to
neglect their ancient customs under the pretext of improvement, often
introduce greater evils than those they endeavour to remove.
I should have particularly avoided, as necessarily ill-governed, a Republic
in which the people, imagining themselves in a position to do without
magistrates, or at least to leave them with only a precarious authority,
should imprudently have kept for themselves the administration of civil
affairs and the execution of their own laws. Such must have been the rude
constitution of primitive governments, directly emerging from a state of
nature; and this was another of the vices that contributed to the downfall of
the Republic of Athens.
But I should have chosen a community in which the individuals, content
with sanctioning their laws, and deciding the most important public affairs
in general assembly and on the motion of the rulers, had established
honoured tribunals, carefully distinguished the several departments, and
elected year by year some of the most capable and upright of their fellowcitizens to administer justice and govern the State; a community, in short, in
which the virtue of the magistrates thus bearing witness to the wisdom of
the people, each class reciprocally did the other honour. If in such a case
any fatal misunderstandings arose to disturb the public peace, even these
intervals of blindness and error would bear the marks of moderation, mutual

esteem, and a common respect for the laws; which are sure signs and
pledges of a reconciliation as lasting as sincere. Such are the advantages,
most honourable, magnificent and sovereign lords, which I should have
sought in the country in which I should have chosen to be born. And if
providence had added to all these a delightful situation, a temperate climate,
a fertile soil, and the most beautiful countryside under Heaven, I should
have desired only, to complete my felicity, the peaceful enjoyment of all
these blessings, in the bosom of this happy country; to live at peace in the
sweet society of my fellow-citizens, and practising towards them, from their
own example, the duties of friendship, humanity, and every other virtue, to
leave behind me the honourable memory of a good man, and an upright and
virtuous patriot.
But, if less fortunate or too late grown wise, I had seen myself reduced to
end an infirm and languishing life in other climates, vainly regretting that
peaceful repose which I had forfeited in the imprudence of youth, I should
at least have entertained the same feelings in my heart, though denied the
opportunity of making use of them in my native country. Filled with a
tender and disinterested love for my distant fellow-citizens, I should have
addressed them from my heart, much in the following terms.
"My dear fellow-citizens, or rather my brothers, since the ties of blood, as
well as the laws, unite almost all of us, it gives me pleasure that I cannot
think of you, without thinking, at the same time, of all the blessings you
enjoy, and of which none of you, perhaps, more deeply feels the value than
I who have lost them. The more I reflect on your civil and political
condition, the less can I conceive that the nature of human affairs could
admit of a better. In all other governments, when there is a question of
ensuring the greatest good of the State, nothing gets beyond projects and
ideas, or at best bare possibilities. But as for you, your happiness is
complete, and you have nothing to do but enjoy it; you require nothing
more to be made perfectly happy, than to know how to be satisfied with
being so. Your sovereignty, acquired or recovered by the sword, and
maintained for two centuries past by your valour and wisdom, is at length
fully and universally acknowledged. Your boundaries are fixed, your rights
confirmed and your repose secured by honourable treaties. Your
constitution is excellent, being not only dictated by the profoundest
wisdom, but guaranteed by great and friendly powers. Your State enjoys

perfect tranquillity; you have neither wars nor conquerors to fear; you have
no other master than the wise laws you have yourselves made; and these are
administered by upright magistrates of your own choosing. You are neither
so wealthy as to be enervated by effeminacy, and thence to lose, in the
pursuit of frivolous pleasures, the taste for real happiness and solid virtue;
nor poor enough to require more assistance from abroad than your own
industry is sufficient to procure you. In the meantime the precious privilege
of liberty, which in great nations is maintained only by submission to the
most exorbitant impositions, costs you hardly anything for its preservation.
May a Republic, so wisely and happily constituted, last for ever, for an
example to other nations, and for the felicity of its own citizens! This is the
only prayer you have left to make, the only precaution that remains to be
taken. It depends, for the future, on yourselves alone (not to make you
happy, for your ancestors have saved you that trouble), but to render that
happiness lasting, by your wisdom in its enjoyment. It is on your constant
union, your obedience to the laws, and your respect for their ministers, that
your preservation depends. If there remains among you the smallest trace of
bitterness or distrust, hasten to destroy it, as an accursed leaven which
sooner or later must bring misfortune and ruin on the State. I conjure you all
to look into your hearts, and to hearken to the secret voice of conscience. Is
there any among you who can find, throughout the universe, a more upright,
more enlightened and more honourable body than your magistracy? Do not
all its members set you an example of moderation, of simplicity of manners,
of respect for the laws, and of the most sincere harmony? Place, therefore,
without reserve, in such wise superiors, that salutary confidence which
reason ever owes to virtue. Consider that they are your own choice, that
they justify that choice, and that the honours due to those whom you have
dignified are necessarily yours by reflexion. Not one of you is so ignorant
as not to know that, when the laws lose their, force and those who defend
them their authority, security and liberty are universally impossible. Why,
therefore, should you hesitate to do that cheerfully and with just confidence
which you would all along have been bound to do by your true interest,
your duty and reason itself?
Let not a culpable and pernicious indifference to the maintenance of the
constitution ever induce you to neglect, in case of need, the prudent advice
of the most enlightened and zealous of your fellow-citizens; but let equity,

moderation and firmness of resolution continue to regulate all your
proceedings, and to exhibit you to the whole universe as the example of a
valiant and modest people, jealous equally of their honour and of their
liberty. Beware particularly, as the last piece of advice I shall give you, of
sinister constructions and venomous rumours, the secret motives of which
are often more dangerous than the actions at which they are levelled. A
whole house will be awake and take the first alarm given by a good and
trusty watch-dog, who barks only at the approach of thieves; but we hate
the importunity of those noisy curs, which are perpetually disturbing the
public repose, and whose continual ill-timed warnings prevent our attending
to them, when they may perhaps be necessary."
And you, most honourable and magnificent lords, the worthy and revered
magistrates of a free people, permit me to offer you in particular my duty
and homage. If there is in the world a station capable of conferring honour
on those who fill it, it is undoubtedly that which virtue and talents combine
to bestow, that of which you have made yourselves worthy, and to which
you have been promoted by your fellow-citizens. Their worth adds a new
lustre to your own; while, as you have been chosen, by men capable of
governing others, to govern themselves, I cannot but hold you as much
superior to all other magistrates, as a free people, and particularly that over
which you have the honour to preside, is by its wisdom and its reason
superior to the populace of other States.
Be it permitted me to cite an example of which there ought to have existed
better records, and one which will be ever near to my heart. I cannot recall
to mind, without the sweetest emotions, the memory of that virtuous citizen,
to whom I owe my being, and by whom I was often instructed, in my
infancy, in the respect which is due to you. I see him still, living by the
work of his hands, and feeding his soul on the sublimest truths. I see the
works of Tacitus, Plutarch and Grotius, lying before him in the midst of the
tools of his trade. At his side stands his dear son, receiving, alas with too
little profit, the tender instructions of the best of fathers. But, if the follies of
youth made me for a while forget his wise lessons, I have at length the
happiness to be conscious that, whatever propensity one may have to vice,
it is not easy for an education, with which love has mingled, to be entirely
thrown away.

Such, my most honourable and magnificent lords, are the citizens, and even
the common inhabitants of the State which you govern; such are those
intelligent and sensible men, of whom, under the name of workmen and the
people, it is usual, in other nations, to have a low and false opinion. My
father, I own with pleasure, was in no way distinguished among his fellowcitizens. He was only such as they all are; and yet, such as he was, there is
no country, in which his acquaintance would not have been coveted, and
cultivated even with advantage by men of the highest character. It would
not become me, nor is it, thank Heaven, at all necessary for me to remind
you of the regard which such men have a right to expect of their
magistrates, to whom they are equal both by education and by the rights of
nature and birth, and inferior only, by their own will, by that preference
which they owe to your merit, and, for giving you, can claim some sort of
acknowledgment on your side. It is with a lively satisfaction I understand
that the greatest candour and condescension attend, in all your behaviour
towards them, on that gravity which becomes the ministers of the law; and
that you so well repay them, by your esteem and attention, the respect and
obedience which they owe to you. This conduct is not only just but prudent;
as it happily tends to obliterate the memory of many unhappy events, which
ought to be buried in eternal oblivion. It is also so much the more judicious,
as it tends to make this generous and equitable people find a pleasure in
their duty; to make them naturally love to do you honour, and to cause those
who are the most zealous in the maintenance of their own rights to be at the
same time the most disposed to respect yours.
It ought not to be thought surprising that the rulers of a civil society should
have the welfare and glory of their communities at heart: but it is
uncommonly fortunate for the peace of men, when those persons who look
upon themselves as the magistrates, or rather the masters of a more holy
and sublime country, show some love for the earthly country which
maintains them. I am happy in having it in my power to make so singular an
exception in our favour, and to be able to rank, among its best citizens,
those zealous depositaries of the sacred articles of faith established by the
laws, those venerable shepherds of souls whose powerful and captivating
eloquence are so much the better calculated to bear to men's hearts the
maxims of the gospel, as they are themselves the first to put them into
practice. All the world knows of the great success with which the art of the
pulpit is cultivated at Geneva; but men are so used to hearing divines preach

one thing and practise another, that few have a chance of knowing how far
the spirit of Christianity, holiness of manners, severity towards themselves
and indulgence towards their neighbours, prevail throughout the whole
body of our ministers. It is, perhaps, given to the city of Geneva alone, to
produce the edifying example of so perfect a union between its clergy and
men of letters. It is in great measure on their wisdom, their known
moderation, and their zeal for the prosperity of the State that I build my
hopes of its perpetual tranquillity. At the same time, I notice, with a
pleasure mingled with surprise and veneration, how much they detest the
frightful maxims of those accursed and barbarous men, of whom history
furnishes us with more than one example; who, in order to support the
pretended rights of God, that is to say their own interests, have been so
much the less greedy of human blood, as they were more hopeful their own
in particular would be always respected.
I must not forget that precious half of the Republic, which makes the
happiness of the other; and whose sweetness and prudence preserve its
tranquillity and virtue. Amiable and virtuous daughters of Geneva, it will be
always the lot of your sex to govern ours. Happy are we, so long as your
chaste influence, solely exercised within the limits of conjugal union, is
exerted only for the glory of the State and the happiness of the public. It
was thus the female sex commanded at Sparta; and thus you deserve to
command at Geneva. What man can be such a barbarian as to resist the
voice of honour and reason, coming from the lips of an affectionate wife?
Who would not despise; the vanities of luxury, on beholding the simple and
modest attire which, from the lustre it derives from you, seems the most
favourable to beauty? It is your task to perpetuate, by your insinuating
influence and your innocent and amiable rule, a respect for the laws of the
State, and harmony among the citizens. It is yours to reunite divided
families by happy marriages; and, above all things, to correct, by the
persuasive sweetness of your lessons and the modest graces of your
conversation, those extravagancies which our young people pick up in other
countries, whence, instead of many useful things by which they might
profit, they bring home hardly anything, besides a puerile air and a
ridiculous manner, acquired among loose women, but an admiration for I
know not what so-called grandeur, and paltry recompenses for being slaves,
which can never come near the real greatness of liberty. Continue, therefore,
always to be what you are, the chaste guardians of our morals, and the

sweet security for our peace, exerting on every occasion the privileges of
the heart and of nature, in the interests of duty and virtue.
I flatter myself that I shall never be proved to have been mistaken, in
building on such a foundation my hopes of the general happiness of the
citizens and the glory of the Republic. It must be confessed, however, that
with all these advantages, it will not shine with that lustre, by which the
eyes of most men are dazzled; a puerile and fatal taste for which is the most
mortal enemy of happiness and liberty.
Let our dissolute youth seek elsewhere light pleasures and long repentances.
Let our pretenders to taste admire elsewhere the grandeur of palaces, the
beauty of equipages, sumptuous furniture, the pomp of public
entertainments, and all the refinements of luxury and effeminacy. Geneva
boasts nothing but men; such a sight has nevertheless a value of its own,
and those who have a taste for it are well worth the admirers of all the rest.
Deign, most honourable, magnificent and sovereign lords, to receive, and
with equal goodness, this respectful testimony of the interest I take in your
common prosperity. And, if I have been so unhappy as to be guilty of any
indiscreet transport in this glowing effusion of my heart, I beseech you to
pardon me, and to attribute it to the tender affection of a true patriot, and to
the ardent and legitimate zeal of a man, who can imagine for himself no
greater felicity than to see you happy.
Most honourable, magnificent and sovereign lords, I am, with the most
profound respect,
Your most humble and obedient servant and fellow-citizen.
J. J. ROUSSEAU.

Chambéry,
June 12, 1754.

PREFACE
Of all human sciences the most useful and most imperfect appears to me to
be that of mankind: and I will venture to say, the single inscription on the

Temple of Delphi contained a precept more difficult and more important
than is to be found in all the huge volumes that moralists have ever written.
I consider the subject of the following discourse as one of the most
interesting questions philosophy can propose, and unhappily for us, one of,
the most thorny that philosophers can have to solve. For how shall we know
the source of inequality between men, if we do not begin by knowing
mankind? And how shall man hope to see himself as nature made him,
across all the changes which the succession of place and time must have
produced in his original constitution? How can he distinguish what is
fundamental in his nature from the changes and additions which his
circumstances and the advances he has made have introduced to modify his
primitive condition? Like the statue of Glaucus, which was so disfigured by
time, seas and tempests, that it looked more like a wild beast than a god, the
human soul, altered in society by a thousand causes perpetually recurring,
by the acquisition of a multitude of truths and errors, by the changes
happening to the constitution of the body, and by the continual jarring of the
passions, has, so to speak, changed in appearance, so as to be hardly
recognisable. Instead of a being, acting constantly from fixed and invariable
principles, instead of that celestial and majestic simplicity, impressed on it
by its divine Author, we find in it only the frightful contrast of passion
mistaking itself for reason, and of understanding grown delirious.
It is still more cruel that, as every advance made by the human species
removes it still farther from its primitive state, the more discoveries we
make, the more we deprive ourselves of the means of making the most
important of all. Thus it is, in one sense, by our very study of man, that the
knowledge of him is put out of our power.
It is easy to perceive that it is in these successive changes in the constitution
of man that we must look for the origin of those differences which now
distinguish men, who, it is allowed, are as equal among themselves as were
the animals of every kind, before physical causes had introduced those
varieties which are now observable among some of them.
It is, in fact, not to be conceived that these primary changes, however they
may have arisen, could have altered, all at once and in the same manner,
every individual of the species. It is natural to think that, while the
condition of some of them grew better or worse, and they were acquiring
various good or bad qualities not inherent in their nature, there were others

who continued a longer time in their original condition. Such was doubtless
the first source of the inequality of mankind, which it is much easier to
point out thus in general terms, than to assign with precision to its actual
causes.
Let not my readers therefore imagine that I flatter myself with having seen
what it appears to me so difficult to discover. I have here entered upon
certain arguments, and risked some conjectures, less in the hope of solving
the difficulty, than with a view to throwing some light upon it, and reducing
the question to its proper form. Others may easily proceed farther on the
same road, and yet no one find it very easy to get to the end. For it is by no
means a light undertaking to distinguish properly between what is original
and what is artificial in the actual nature of man, or to form a true idea of a
state which no longer exists, perhaps never did exist, and probably never
will exist; and of which, it is, nevertheless, necessary to have true ideas, in
order to form a proper judgment of our present state. It requires, indeed,
more philosophy than can be imagined to enable any one to determine
exactly what precautions he ought to take, in order to make solid
observations on this subject; and it appears to me that a good solution of the
following problem would be not unworthy of the Aristotles and Plinys of
the present age. What experiments would have to be made, to discover the
natural man? And how are those experiments to be made in a state of
society?
So far am I from undertaking to solve this problem, that I think I have
sufficiently, considered the subject, to venture to declare beforehand that
our greatest philosophers would not be too good to direct such experiments,
and our most powerful sovereigns to make them. Such a combination we
have very little reason to expect, especially attended with the perseverance,
or rather succession of intelligence and good-will necessary on both sides to
success.
These investigations, which are so difficult to make, and have been hitherto
so little thought of, are, nevertheless, the only means that remain of
obviating a multitude of difficulties which deprive us of the knowledge of
the real foundations of human society. It is this ignorance of the nature of
man, which casts so much uncertainty and obscurity on the true definition
of natural right: for, the idea of right, says Burlamaqui, and more
particularly that of natural right, are ideas manifestly relative to the nature

of man. It is then from this very nature itself, he goes on, from the
constitution and state of man, that we must deduce the first principles of
this science.
We cannot see without surprise and disgust how little agreement there is
between the different authors who have treated this great subject. Among
the more important writers there are scarcely two of the same mind about it.
Not to speak of the ancient philosophers, who seem to have done their best
purposely to contradict one another on the most fundamental principles, the
Roman jurists subjected man and the other animals indiscriminately to the
same natural law, because they considered, under that name, rather the law
which nature imposes on herself than that which she prescribes to others; or
rather because of the particular acceptation of the term law among those
jurists; who seem on this occasion to have understood nothing more by it
than the general relations established by nature between all animated
beings, for their common preservation. The moderns, understanding, by the
term law, merely a rule prescribed to a moral being, that is to say intelligent,
free and considered in his relations to other beings, consequently confine
the jurisdiction of natural law to man, an the only animal endowed with
reason. But, defining this law, each after his own fashion, they have
established it on such metaphysical principles, that there are very few
persons among us capable of comprehending them, much less of
discovering them for themselves. So that the definitions of these learned
men, all differing in everything else, agree only in this, that it is impossible
to comprehend the law of nature, and consequently to obey it, without being
a very subtle casuist and a profound metaphysician. All which is as much as
to say that mankind must have employed, in the establishment of society, a
capacity which is acquired only with great difficulty, and by very few
persons, even in a state of society.
Knowing so little of nature, and agreeing so ill about the meaning of the
word law, it would be difficult for us to fix on a good definition of natural
law. Thus all the definitions we meet with in books, setting: aside their
defect in point of uniformity, have yet another fault, in that they are derived
from many kinds of knowledge, which men do not possess naturally, and
from advantages of which they can have no idea until they have already
departed from that state. Modern writers begin by inquiring what rules it
would be expedient for men to agree on for their common interest, and then

give the name of natural law to a collection of these rules, without any other
proof than the good that would result from their being universally practised.
This is undoubtedly a simple way of making definitions, and of explaining
the nature of things by almost arbitrary conveniences.
But as long as we are ignorant of the natural man, it is in vain for us to
attempt to determine either the law originally prescribed to him, or that
which is best adapted to his constitution. All we can know with any
certainty respecting this law is that, if it is to be a law, not only the wills of
those it obliges must be sensible of their submission to it; but also, to be
natural, it must come directly from the voice of nature.
Throwing aside, therefore, all those scientific books, which teach us only to
see men such as they have made themselves, and contemplating the first
and most simple operations of the human soul, I think I can perceive in it
two principles prior to reason, one of them deeply interesting us in our own
welfare and preservation, and the other exciting a natural repugnance at
seeing any other sensible being, and particularly any of our own species,
suffer pain or death. It is from the agreement and combination which the
understanding is in a position to establish between these two principles,
without its being necessary to introduce that of sociability, that all the rules
of natural right appear to me to be derived—rules which our reason is
afterwards obliged to establish on other foundations, when by its successive
developments it has been led to suppress nature itself.
In proceeding thus, we shall not be obliged to make man a philosopher
before he is a man. His duties toward others are not dictated to him only by
the later lessons of wisdom and, so long as he does not resist the internal
impulse of compassion, he will never hurt any other man, nor even any
sentient being; except on those lawful occasions on which his own
preservation is concerned and he is obliged to give himself the preference.
By this method also we put an end to the time-honoured disputes
concerning the participation of animals in natural law: for it is clear that,
being destitute of intelligence and liberty, they cannot recognise that law; as
they partake, however, in some measure of our nature, in consequence of
the sensibility with which they are endowed, they ought to partake of
natural rights so that mankind is subjected to a kind of obligation even
toward the brutes. It appears, in fact, that if I am bound to do no injury to
my fellow-creatures, this is less because they are rational than because they

are sentient beings: and this quality, being common both to men and beasts,
ought to entitle the latter at least to the privilege of not being wantonly illtreated by the former.
The very study of the original man, of his real wants, and the fundamental
principles of his duty, is besides the only proper method we can adopt to
obviate all the difficulties which the origin of moral inequality presents, on
the true foundations of the body politic, on the reciprocal rights of its
members, and on many other similar topics equally important and obscure.
If we look at human society with a calm and disinterested eye, it seems, at
first, to show us only the violence of the powerful and the oppression of the
weak. The mind is shocked at the cruelty of the one, or is induced to lament
the blindness of the other; and as nothing is less permanent in life than
those external relations, which are more frequently produced by accident
than wisdom, and which are called weakness or power, riches or poverty, all
human institutions seem at first glance to be founded merely on banks of
shifting sand. It is only by taking a closer look, and removing the dust and
sand that surround the edifice, that we perceive the immovable basis on
which it is raised, and learn to respect its foundations. Now, without a
serious study of man, his natural faculties and their successive
development, we shall never be able to make these necessary distinctions,
or to separate, in the actual constitution of things, that which is the effect of
the divine will, from the innovations attempted by human art. The political
and moral investigations, therefore, to which the important question before
us leads, are in every respect useful; while the hypothetical history of
governments affords a lesson equally instructive to mankind.
In considering what we should have become, had we been left to ourselves,
we should learn to bless Him, whose gracious hand, correcting our
institutions, and giving them an immovable basis, has prevented those
disorders which would otherwise have arisen from them, and caused our
happiness to come from those very sources which seemed likely to involve
us in misery.
Quem te deus esse
Jussit, et humanâ quâ parte locatus es in re,
Disce.
Persius, Satire iii, 71.

A DISSERTATION
ON THE ORIGIN AND FOUNDATION OF THE INEQUALITY OF
MANKIND
It is of man that I have to speak; and the question I am investigating shows
me that it is to men that I must address myself: for questions of this sort are
not asked by those who are afraid to honour truth. I shall then confidently
uphold the cause of humanity before the wise men who invite me to do so,
and shall not be dissatisfied if I acquit myself in a manner worthy of my
subject and of my judges.
I conceive that there are two kinds of inequality among the human species;
one, which I call natural or physical, because it is established by nature, and
consists in a difference of age, health, bodily strength, and the qualities of
the mind or of the soul: and another, which may be called moral or political
inequality, because it depends on a kind of convention, and is established,
or at least authorised by the consent of men. This latter consists of the
different privileges, which some men enjoy to the prejudice of others; such
as that of being more rich, more honoured, more powerful or even in a
position to exact obedience.

It is useless to ask what is the source of natural inequality, because that
question is answered by the simple definition of the word. Again, it is still
more useless to inquire whether there is any essential connection between
the two inequalities; for this would be only asking, in other words, whether
those who command are necessarily better than those who obey, and if
strength of body or of mind, wisdom or virtue are always found in
particular individuals, in proportion to their power or wealth: a question fit
perhaps to be discussed by slaves in the hearing of their masters, but highly
unbecoming to reasonable and free men in search of the truth.
The subject of the present discourse, therefore, is more precisely this. To
mark, in the progress of things, the moment at which right took the place of
violence and nature became subject to law, and to explain by what sequence
of miracles the strong came to submit to serve the weak, and the people to
purchase imaginary repose at the expense of real felicity.
The philosophers, who have inquired into the foundations of society, have
all felt the necessity of going back to a state of nature; but not one of them
has got there. Some of them have not hesitated to ascribe to man, in such a
state, the idea of just and unjust, without troubling themselves to show that
he must be possessed of such an idea, or that it could be of any use to him.
Others have spoken of the natural right of every man to keep what belongs
to him, without explaining what they meant by belongs. Others again,
beginning by giving the strong authority over the weak, proceeded directly
to the birth of government, without regard to the time that must have
elapsed before the meaning of the words authority and government could
have existed among men. Every one of them, in short, constantly dwelling
on wants, avidity, oppression, desires and pride, has transferred to the state
of nature ideas which were acquired in society; so that, in speaking of the
savage, they described the social man. It has not even entered into the heads
of most of our writers to doubt whether the state of nature ever existed; but
it is clear from the Holy Scriptures that the first man, having received his
understanding and commandments immediately from God, was not himself
in such a state; and that, if we give such credit to the writings of Moses as
every Christian philosopher ought to give, we must deny that, even before
the deluge, men were ever in the pure state of nature; unless, indeed, they
fell back into it from some very extraordinary circumstance; a paradox

which it would be very embarrassing to defend, and quite impossible to
prove.
Let us begin then by laying facts aside, as they do not affect the question.
The investigations we may enter into, in treating this subject, must not be
considered as historical truths, but only as mere conditional and
hypothetical reasonings, rather calculated to explain the nature of things,
than to ascertain their actual origin; just like the hypotheses which our
physicists daily form respecting the formation of the world. Religion
commands us to believe that, God Himself having taken men out of a state
of nature immediately after the creation, they are unequal only because it is
His will they should be so: but it does not forbid us to form conjectures
based solely on the nature of man, and the beings around him, concerning
what might have become of the human race, if it had been left to itself. This
then is the question asked me, and that which I propose to discuss in the
following discourse. As my subject interests mankind in general, I shall
endeavour to make use of a style adapted to all nations, or rather, forgetting
time and place, to attend only to men to whom I am speaking. I shall
suppose myself in the Lyceum of Athens, repeating the lessons of my
masters, with Plato and Xenocrates for judges, and the whole human race
for audience.
O man, of whatever country you are, and whatever your opinions may be,
behold your history, such as I have thought to read it, not in books written
by your fellow-creatures, who are liars, but in nature, which never lies. All
that comes from her will be true; nor will you meet with anything false,
unless I have involuntarily put in something of my own. The times of which
I am going to speak are very remote: how much are you changed from what
you once were! It is so to speak, the life of your species which I am going
to write, after the qualities which you have received, which your education
and habits may have depraved, but cannot have entirely destroyed. There is,
I feel, an age at which the individual man would wish to stop; you are about
to inquire about the age at which you would have liked your whole species
to stand still. Discontented with your present state, for reasons which
threaten your unfortunate descendants with still greater discontent, you will
perhaps wish it were in your power to go back; and this feeling should be a
panegyric on your first ancestors, a criticism of your contemporaries, and a
terror to the unfortunates who will come after you.

THE FIRST PART
Important as it may be, in order to judge rightly of the natural state of man,
to consider him from his origin, and to examine him, as it were, in the
embryo of his species; I shall not follow his organisation through its
successive developments, nor shall I stay to inquire what his animal system
must have been at the beginning, in order to become at length what it
actually is. I shall not ask whether his long nails were at first, as Aristotle
supposes, only crooked talons; whether his whole body, like that of a bear,
was not covered with hair; or whether the fact that he walked upon all fours,
with his looks directed toward the earth, confined to a horizon of a few
paces, did not at once point out the nature and limits of his ideas. On this
subject I could form none but vague and almost imaginary conjectures.
Comparative anatomy has as yet made too little progress, and the
observations of naturalists are too uncertain, to afford an adequate basis for
any solid reasoning. So that, without having recourse to the supernatural
information given us on this head, or paying any regard to the changes
which must have taken place in the internal, as well as the external,
conformation of man, as he applied his limbs to new uses, and fed himself
on new kinds of food, I shall suppose his conformation to have been at all
times what it appears to us at this day; that he always walked on two legs,
made use of his hands as we do, directed his looks over all nature, and
measured with his eyes the vast expanse of Heaven.
If we strip this being, thus constituted, of all the supernatural gifts he may
have received, and all the artificial faculties he can have acquired only by a
long process; if we consider him, in a word, just as he must have come from
the hands of nature, we behold in him an animal weaker than some, and less
agile than others; but, taking him all round, the most advantageously
organised of any. I see him satisfying his hunger at the first oak, and slaking
his thirst at the first brook; finding his bed at the foot of the tree which
afforded him a repast; and, with that, all his wants supplied.
While the earth was left to its natural fertility and covered with immense
forests, whose trees were never mutilated by the axe, it would present on
every side both sustenance and shelter for every species of animal. Men

dispersed up and down among the rest, would observe and imitate their
industry, and thus attain even to the instinct of the beasts, with the
advantage that, whereas every species of brutes was confined to one
particular instinct, man, who perhaps has not any one peculiar to himself,
would appropriate them all, and live upon most of those different foods,
which other animals shared among themselves; and thus would find his
subsistence much more easily than any of the rest.
Accustomed from their infancy to the inclemencies of the weather and the
rigour of the seasons, inured to fatigue, and forced, naked and unarmed, to
defend themselves and their prey from other ferocious animals, or to escape
them by flight, men would acquire a robust and almost unalterable
constitution. The children, bringing with them into the world the excellent
constitution of their parents, and fortifying it by the very exercises which
first produced it, would thus acquire all the vigour of which the human
frame is capable. Nature in this case treats them exactly as Sparta treated
the children of her citizens: those who come well formed into the world she
renders strong and robust, and all the rest she destroys; differing in this
respect from our modern communities, in which the State, by making
children a burden to their parents, kills them indiscriminately before they
are born.
The body of a savage man being the only instrument he understands, he
uses it for various purposes, of which ours, for want of practice, are
incapable: for our industry deprives us of that force and agility, which
necessity obliges him to acquire. If he had had an axe, would he have been
able with his naked arm to break so large a branch from a tree? If he had
had a sling, would he have been able to throw a stone with so great
velocity? If he had had a ladder, would he have been so nimble in climbing
a tree? If he had had a horse, would he have been himself so swift of foot?
Give civilised man time to gather all his machines about him, and he will no
doubt easily beat the savage; but if you would see a still more unequal
contest, set them together naked and unarmed, and you will soon see the
advantage of having all our forces constantly at our disposal, of being
always prepared for every event, and of carrying one's self, as it were,
perpetually whole and entire about one.
Hobbes contends that man is naturally intrepid, and is intent only upon
attacking and fighting. Another illustrious philosopher holds the opposite,

and Cumberland and Puffendorf also affirm that nothing is more timid and
fearful than man in the state of nature; that he is always in a tremble, and
ready to fly at the least noise or the slightest movement. This may be true of
things he does not know; and I do not doubt his being terrified by every
novelty that presents itself, when he neither knows the physical good or evil
he may expect from it, nor can make a comparison between his own
strength and the dangers he is about to encounter. Such circumstances,
however, rarely occur in a state of nature, in which all things proceed in a
uniform manner, and the face of the earth is not subject to those sudden and
continual changes which arise from the passions and caprices of bodies of
men living together. But savage man, living dispersed among other animals
and finding himself betimes in a situation to measure his strength with
theirs, soon comes to compare himself with them; and, perceiving that he
surpasses them more in adroitness than they surpass him in strength, learns
to be no longer afraid of them. Set a bear, or a wolf, against a robust, agile,
and resolute savage, as they all are, armed with stones and a good cudgel,
and you will see that the danger will be at least on both sides, and that, after
a few trials of this kind, wild beasts, which are not fond of attacking each
other, will not be at all ready to attack man, whom they will have found to
be as wild and ferocious as themselves. With regard to such animals as have
really more strength than man has adroitness, he is in the same situation as
all weaker animals, which notwithstanding are still able to subsist; except
indeed that he has the advantage that, being equally swift of foot, and
finding an almost certain place of refuge in every tree, he is at liberty to
take or leave it at every encounter, and thus to fight or fly, as he chooses.
Add to this that it does not appear that any animal naturally makes war on
man, except in case of self-defence or excessive hunger, or betrays any of
those violent antipathies, which seem to indicate that one species is
intended by nature for the food of another.
This is doubtless why negroes and savages are so little afraid of the wild
beasts they may meet in the woods. The Caraibs of Venezuela among others
live in this respect in absolute security and without the smallest
inconvenience. Though they are almost naked, Francis Correal tells us, they
expose themselves freely in the woods, armed only with bows and arrows;
but no one has ever heard of one of them being devoured by wild beasts.

But man has other enemies more formidable, against which he is not
provided with such means of defence: these are the natural infirmities of
infancy, old age, and illness of every kind, melancholy proofs of our
weakness, of which the two first are common to all animals, and the last
belongs chiefly to man in a state of society. With regard to infancy, it is
observable that the mother, carrying her child always with her, can nurse it
with much greater ease than the females of many other animals, which are
forced to be perpetually going and coming, with great fatigue, one way to
find subsistence, and another to suckle or feed their young. It is true that if
the woman happens to perish, the infant is in great danger of perishing with
her; but this risk is common to many other species of animals, whose young
take a long time before they are able to provide for themselves. And if our
infancy is longer than theirs, our lives are longer in proportion; so that all
things are in this respect fairly equal; though there are other rules to be
considered regarding the duration of the first period of life, and the number
of young, which do not affect the present subject. In old age, when men are
less active and perspire little, the need for food diminishes with the ability
to provide it. As the savage state also protects them from gout and
rheumatism, and old age is, of all ills, that which human aid can least
alleviate, they cease to be, without others perceiving that they are no more,
and almost without perceiving it themselves.
With respect to sickness, I shall not repeat the vain and false declamations
which most healthy people pronounce against medicine; but I shall ask if
any solid observations have been made from which it may be justly
concluded that, in the countries where the art of medicine is most neglected,
the mean duration of man's life is less than in those where it is most
cultivated. How indeed can this be the case, if we bring on ourselves more
diseases than medicine can furnish remedies? The great inequality in
manner of living, the extreme idleness of some, and the excessive labour of
others, the easiness of exciting and gratifying our sensual appetites, the too
exquisite foods of the wealthy which overheat and fill them with
indigestion, and, on the other hand, the unwholesome food of the poor,
often, bad as it is, insufficient for their needs, which induces them, when
opportunity offers, to eat voraciously and overcharge their stomachs; all
these, together with sitting up late, and excesses of every kind, immoderate
transports of every passion, fatigue, mental exhaustion, the innumerable
pains and anxieties inseparable from every condition of life, by which the

mind of man is incessantly tormented; these are too fatal proofs that the
greater part of our ills are of our own making, and that we might have
avoided them nearly all by adhering to that simple, uniform and solitary
manner of life which nature prescribed. If she destined man to be healthy, I
venture to declare that a state of reflection is a state contrary to, nature, and
that a thinking man is a depraved animal. When we think of the good
constitution of the savages, at least of those whom we have not ruined with
our spirituous liquors, and reflect that they are troubled with hardly any
disorders, save wounds and old age, we are tempted to believe that, in
following the history of civil society, we shall be telling also that of human
sickness. Such, at least, was the opinion of Plato, who inferred from certain
remedies prescribed, or approved, by Podalirius and Machaon at the siege
of Troy, that several sicknesses which these remedies gave rise to in his
time, were not then known to mankind: and Celsus tells us that diet, which
is now so necessary, was first invented by Hippocrates.
Being subject therefore to so few causes of sickness, man, in the state of
nature, can have no need of remedies, and still less of physicians: nor is the
human race in this respect worse off than other animals, and it is easy to
learn from hunters whether they meet with many infirm animals in the
course of the chase. It is certain they frequently meet with such as carry the
marks of having been considerably wounded, with many that have had
bones or even limbs broken, yet have been healed without any Other
surgical assistance than that of time, or any other regimen than that of their
ordinary life. At the same time their cures seem not to have been less
perfect, for their not having been tortured by incisions, poisoned with drugs,
or wasted by fasting. In short, however useful medicine, properly
administered, may be among us, it is certain that, if the savage, when he is
sick and left to himself, has nothing to hope but from nature, he has, on the
other hand, nothing to fear but from his disease; which renders his situation
often preferable to our own.
We should beware, therefore, of confounding the savage man with the men
we have daily before our eyes. Nature treats all the animals left to her care
with a predilection that seems to show how jealous she is of that right. The
horse, the cat, the bull, and even the ass are generally of greater stature, and
always more robust, and have more vigour, strength and courage, when they
run wild in the forests than when bred in the stall. By becoming

domesticated, they lose half these advantages; and it seems as if all our care
to feed and treat them well serves only to deprave them. It is thus with man
also: as he becomes sociable and a slave, he grows weak, timid and servile;
his effeminate way of life totally enervates his strength and courage. To this
it may be added that there is still a greater difference between savage and
civilised man, than between wild and tame beasts: for men and brutes
having been treated alike by nature, the several conveniences in which men
indulge themselves still more than they do their beasts, are so many
additional causes of their deeper degeneracy.
It is not therefore so great a misfortune to these primitive men, nor so great
an obstacle to their preservation, that they go naked, have no dwellings and
lack all the superfluities which we think so necessary. If their skins are not
covered with hair, they have no need of such covering in warm climates;
and, in cold countries, they soon learn to appropriate the skins of the beasts
they have overcome. If they have but two legs to run with, they have two
arms to defend themselves with, and provide for their wants. Their children
are slowly and with difficulty taught to walk; but their mothers are able to
carry them with ease; advantage which other animals lack, as the mother, if
pursued, is forced either to abandon her young, or to regulate her pace by
theirs. Unless, in short, we suppose a singular and fortuitous concurrence of
circumstances of which I shall speak later, and which would be unlikely to
exist, it is plain in every state of the case, that the man who first made
himself clothes or a dwelling was furnishing himself with things not at all
necessary; for he had till then done without them, and there is no reason
why he should not have been able to put up in manhood with the same kind
of life as had been his in infancy.
Solitary, indolent, and perpetually accompanied by danger, the savage
cannot but be fond of sleep; his sleep too must be light, like that of the
animals, which think but little and may be said to slumber all the time they
do not think. Self-preservation being his chief and almost sole concern, he
must exercise most those faculties which are most concerned with attack or
defence, either for overcoming his prey, or for preventing him from
becoming the prey of other animals. On the other hand, those organs which
are perfected only by softness and sensuality will remain in a gross and
imperfect state, incompatible with any sort of delicacy; so that, his senses
being divided on this head, his touch and taste will be extremely coarse, his

sight, hearing and smell exceedingly fine and subtle. Such in general is the
animal condition, and such, according to the narratives of travellers, is that
of most savage nations. It is therefore no matter for surprise that the
Hottentots of the Cape of Good Hope distinguish ships at sea, with the
naked eye, at as great a distance as the Dutch can do with their telescopes;
or that the savages of America should trace the Spaniards, by their smell, as
well as the best dogs could have done; or that these barbarous peoples feel
no pain in going naked, or that they use large quantities of piemento with
their food, and drink the strongest European liquors like water.
Hitherto I have considered merely the physical man; let us now take a view
of him on his metaphysical and moral side.
I see nothing in any animal but an ingenious machine, to which nature hath
given senses to wind itself up, and to guard itself, to a certain degree,
against anything that might tend to disorder or destroy it. I perceive exactly
the same things in the human machine, with this difference, that in the
operations of the brute, nature is the sole agent, whereas man has some
share in his own operations, in his character as a free agent. The one
chooses and refuses by instinct, the other from an act of free-will: hence the
brute cannot deviate from the rule prescribed to it, even when it would be
advantageous for it to do so; and, on the contrary, man frequently deviates
from such rules to his own prejudice. Thus a pigeon would be starved to
death by the side of a dish of the choicest meats, and a cat on a heap of fruit
or grain; though it is certain that either might find nourishment in the foods
which it thus rejects with disdain, did it think of trying them. Hence it is
that dissolute men run into excesses which bring on fevers and death;
because the mind depraves the senses, and the will continues to speak when
nature is silent.
Every animal has ideas, since it has senses; it even combines those ideas in
a certain degree; and it is only in degree that man differs, in this respect,
from the brute. Some philosophers have even maintained that there is a
greater difference between one man and another than between some men
and some beasts. It is not, therefore, so much the understanding that
constitutes the specific difference between the man and the brute, as the
human quality of free-agency. Nature lays her commands on every animal,
and the brute obeys her voice. Man receives the same impulsion, but at the
same time knows himself at liberty to acquiesce or resist: and it is

particularly in his consciousness of this liberty that the spirituality of his
soul is displayed. For physics may explain, in some measure, the
mechanism of the senses and the formation of ideas; but in the power of
willing or rather of choosing, and in the feeling of this power, nothing is to
be found but acts which are purely spiritual and wholly inexplicable by the
laws of mechanism.
However, even if the difficulties attending all these questions should still
leave room for difference in this respect between men and brutes, there is
another very specific quality which distinguishes them, and which will
admit of no dispute. This is the faculty of self-improvement, which, by the
help of circumstances, gradually develops all the rest of our faculties, and is
inherent in the species as in the individual: whereas a brute is, at the end of
a few months, all he will ever be during his whole life, and his species, at
the end of a thousand years, exactly what it was the first year of that
thousand. Why is man alone liable to grow into a dotard? Is it not because
he returns, in this, to his primitive state; and that, while the brute, which has
acquired nothing and has therefore nothing to lose, still retains the force of
instinct, man, who loses, by age or accident, all that his perfectibility had
enabled him to gain, falls by this means lower than the brutes themselves?
It would be melancholy, were we forced to admit that this distinctive and
almost unlimited faculty is the source of all human misfortunes; that it is
this which, in time, draws man out of his original state, in which he would
have spent his days insensibly in peace and innocence; that it is this faculty,
which, successively producing in different ages his discoveries and his
errors, his vices and his virtues, makes him at length a tyrant both over
himself and over nature.[1] It would be shocking to be obliged to regard as a
benefactor the man who first suggested to the Oroonoko Indians the use of
the boards they apply to the temples of their children, which secure to them
some part at least of their imbecility and original happiness.
Savage man, left by nature solely to the direction of instinct, or rather
indemnified for what he may lack by faculties capable at first of supplying
its place, and afterwards of raising him much above it, must accordingly
begin with purely animal functions: thus seeing and feeling must be his first
condition, which would be common to him and all other animals. To will,
and not to will, to desire and to fear, must be the first, and almost the only

operations of his soul, till new circumstances occasion new developments
of his faculties.
Whatever moralists may hold, the human understanding is greatly indebted
to the passions, which, it is universally allowed, are also much indebted to
the understanding. It is by the activity of the passions that pur reason is
improved; for we desire knowledge only because we wish to enjoy; and it is
impossible to conceive any reason why a person who has neither fears nor
desires should give himself the trouble of reasoning. The passions, again,
originate in our wants, and their progress depends on that of our knowledge;
for we cannot desire or fear anything, except from the idea we have of it, or
from the simple impulse of nature. Now savage man, being destitute of
every species of intelligence, can have no passions save those of the latter
kind: his desires never go beyond his physical wants. The only goods he
recognises in the universe are food, a female, and sleep: the only evils he
fears are pain and hunger. I say pain, and not death: for no animal can know
what it is to die; the knowledge of death and its terrors being one of the first
acquisitions made by man in departing from an animal state.
It would be easy, were it necessary, to support this opinion by facts, and to
show that, in all the nations of the world, the progress of the understanding
has been exactly proportionate to the wants which the peoples had received
from nature, or been subjected to by circumstances, and in consequence to
the passions that induced them to provide for those necessities. I might
instance the arts, rising up in Egypt and expanding with the inundation of
the Nile. I might follow their progress into Greece, where they took root
afresh, grew up and towered to the skies, among the rocks and sands of
Attica, without being able to germinate on the fertile banks of the Eurotas: I
might observe that in general, the people of the North are more industrious
than those of the South, because they cannot get on so well without being
so: as if nature wanted to equalise matters by giving their understandings
the fertility she had refused to their soil.
But who does not see, without recurring to the uncertain testimony of
history, that everything seems to remove from savage man both the
temptation and the means of changing his condition? His imagination paints
no pictures; his heart makes no demands on him. His few wants are so
readily supplied, and he is so far from having the knowledge which is
needful to make him want more, that he can have neither foresight nor

curiosity. The face of nature becomes indifferent to him as it grows familiar.
He sees in it always the same order, the same successions: he has not
understanding enough to wonder at the greatest miracles; nor is it in his
mind that we can expect to find that philosophy man needs, if he is to know
how to notice for once what he sees every day. His soul, which nothing
disturbs, is wholly wrapped up in the feeling of its present existence,
without any idea of the future, however near at hand; while his projects, as
limited as his views, hardly extend to the close of day. Such, even at
present, is the extent of the native Caribean's foresight: he will
improvidently sell you his cotton-bed in the morning, and come crying in
the evening to buy it again, not having foreseen he would want it again the
next night.
The more we reflect on this subject, the greater appears the distance
between pure sensation and the most simple knowledge: it is impossible
indeed to conceive how a man, by his own powers alone, without the aid of
communication and the spur of necessity, could have bridged so great a gap.
How many ages may have elapsed before mankind were in a position to
behold any other Are than that of the heavens. What a multiplicity of
chances must have happened to teach them the commonest uses of that
element! How often must they have let it out before they acquired the art of
reproducing it? and how often may not such a secret have died with him
who had discovered it? What shall we say of agriculture, an art which
requires so much labour and foresight, which is so dependent on others that
it is plain it could only be practised in a society which had at least begun,
and which does not serve so much to draw the means of subsistence from
the earth —for these it would produce of itself—but to compel it to produce
what is most to our taste? But let us suppose that men had so multiplied that
the natural produce of the earth was no longer sufficient for their support; a
supposition, by the way, which would prove such a life to be very
advantageous for the human race; let us suppose that, without forges or
workshops, the instruments of husbandry had dropped from the sky into the
hands of savages; that they had overcome their natural aversion to continual
labour; that they had learnt so much foresight for their needs; that they had
divined how to cultivate the earth, to sow grain and plant trees; that they
had discovered the arts of grinding corn, and of setting the grape to ferment
—all being things that must have been taught them by the gods, since it is
not to be conceived how they could discover them for themselves—yet after

all this, what man among them would be so absurd as to take the trouble of
cultivating a field, which might be stripped of its crop by the first comer,
man or beast, that might take a liking to it; and how should each of them
resolve to pass his life in wearisome labour, when, the more necessary to
him the reward of his labour might be, the surer he would be of not getting
it? In a word, how could such a situation induce men to cultivate the earth,
till it was regularly parcelled out among them; that is to say, till the state of
nature had been abolished?
Were we to suppose savage man as trained in the art of thinking as
philosophers make him; were we, like them, to suppose him a very
philosopher capable of investigating the sublimest truths, and of forming,
by highly abstract chains of reasoning, maxims of reason and justice,
deduced from the love of order in general, or the known will of his Creator;
in a word, were we to suppose him as intelligent and enlightened, as he
must have been, and is in fact found to have been, dull and stupid, what
advantage Would accrue to the species, from all such metaphysics, which
could not be communicated by one to another, but must end with him who
made them? What progress could be made by mankind, while dispersed in
the woods among other animals? and how far could men improve or
mutually enlighten one another, when, having no fixed habitation, and no
need of one another's assistance, the same persons hardly met twice in their
lives, and perhaps then, without knowing one another or speaking together?
Let it be considered how many ideas we owe to the use of speech; how far
grammar exercises the understanding and facilitates its operations. Let us
reflect on the inconceivable pains and the infinite space of time that the first
invention of languages must have cost. To these reflections add what
preceded, and then judge how many thousand ages must have elapsed in the
successive development in the human mind of those operations of which it
is capable.
I shall here take the liberty for a moment, of considering the difficulties of
the origin of languages, on which subject I might content myself with a
simple repetition of the Abbé Condillac's investigations, as they fully
confirm my system, and perhaps even first suggested it. But it is plain, from
the manner in which this philosopher solves the difficulties he himself
raises, concerning the origin of arbitrary signs, that he assumes what I
question, viz. that a kind of society, must already have existed among the

first inventors of language. While I refer, therefore, to his observations on
this head, I think it right to give my own, in order to exhibit the same
difficulties in a light adapted to my subject. The first which presents itself is
to conceive how language can have become necessary; for as there was no
communication among men and no need for any, we can neither conceive
the necessity of this invention, nor the possibility of it, if it was not
somehow indispensable. I might affirm, with many others, that languages
arose in the domestic intercourse between parents and their children. But
this expedient would not obviate the difficulty, and would besides involve
the blunder made by those who, in reasoning on the state of nature, always
import into it ideas gathered in a state of society. Thus they constantly
consider families as living together under one roof, and the individuals of
each as observing among themselves a union as intimate and permanent as
that which exists among us, where so many common interests unite them:
whereas, in this primitive state, men had neither houses, nor huts, nor any
kind of property whatever; every one lived where he could, seldom for
more than a single night; the sexes united without design, as accident,
opportunity or inclination brought them together, nor had they any great
need of words to communicate their designs to each other; and they parted
with the same indifference. The mother gave suck to her children at first for
her own sake; and afterwards, when habit had made them dear, for theirs:
but as soon as they were strong enough to go in search of their own food,
they forsook her of their own accord; and, as they had hardly any other
method of not losing one another than that of remaining continually within
sight, they soon became quite incapable of recognising one another when
they happened to meet again. It is farther to be observed that the child,
having all his wants to explain, and of course more to say to his mother than
the mother could have to say to him, must have borne the brunt of the task
of invention, and the language he used would be of his own device, so that
the number of languages would be equal to that of the individuals speaking
them, and the variety would be increased by the vagabond and roving life
they led, which would not give time for any idiom to become constant. For
to say that the mother dictated to her child the words he was to use in
asking her for one thing or another, is an explanation of how languages
already formed are taught, but by no means explains how languages were
originally formed.

We will suppose, however, that this first difficulty is obviated. Let us for a
moment then take ourselves as being on this side of the vast space which
must lie between a pure state of nature and that in which languages had
become necessary, and, admitting their necessity, let us inquire how they
could first be established. Here we have a new and worse difficulty to
grapple with; for if men need speech to learn to think, they must have stood
in much greater need of the art of thinking, to be able to invent that of
speaking. And though we might conceive how the articulate sounds of the
voice came to be taken as the conventional interpreters of our ideas, it
would still remain for us to inquire what could have been the interpreters of
this convention for those ideas, which, answering to no sensible objects,
could not be indicated either by gesture or voice; so that we can hardly form
any tolerable conjectures about the origin of this art of communicating our
thoughts and establishing a correspondence between minds: an art so
sublime, that far distant as it is from its origin, philosophers still behold it at
such an immeasurable distance from perfection, that there is none rash
enough to affirm it will ever reach it, even though the revolutions time
necessarily produces were suspended in its favour, though prejudice should
be banished from our academies or condemned to silence, and those learned
societies should devote themselves uninterruptedly for whole ages to this
thorny question.
The first language of mankind, the most universal and vivid, in a word the
only language man needed, before he had occasion to exert his eloquence to
persuade assembled multitudes, was the simple cry of nature. But as this
was excited only by a sort of instinct on urgent occasions, to implore
assistance in case of danger, or relief in case of suffering, it could be of little
use in the ordinary course of life, in which more moderate feelings prevail.
When the ideas of men began to expand and multiply, and closer
communication took place among them, they strove to invent more
numerous signs and a more copious language. They multiplied the
inflections of the voice, and added gestures, which are in their own nature
more expressive, and depend less for their meaning on a prior
determination. Visible and movable objects were therefore expressed by
gestures, and audible ones by imitative sounds: but, as hardly anything can
be indicated by gestures, except objects actually present or easily described,
and visible actions; as they are not universally useful—for darkness or the
interposition of a material object destroys their efficacy—and as besides

they rather request than secure our attention; men at length bethought
themselves of substituting for them the articulate sounds of the voice,
which, without bearing the same relation to any particular ideas, are better
calculated to express them all, as conventional signs. Such an institution
could only be made by common consent, and must have been effected in a
manner not very easy for men whose gross organs had not been accustomed
to any such exercise. It is also in itself still more difficult to conceive, since
such a common agreement must have had motives, and speech seems to
have been highly necessary to establish the use of it.
It is reasonable to suppose that the words first made use of by mankind had
a much more extensive signification than those used in languages already
formed, and that ignorant as they were of the division of discourse into its
constituent parts, they at first gave every single word the sense of a whole
proposition. When they began to distinguish subject and attribute, and noun
and verb, which was itself no common effort of genius, substantives were at
first only so many proper names; the present infinitive was the only tense of
verbs; and the very idea of adjectives must have been developed with great
difficulty; for every adjective is an abstract idea, and abstractions are
painful and unnatural operations.
Every object at first received a particular name without regard to genus or
species, which these primitive originators were not in a position to
distinguish; every individual presented itself to their minds in isolation, as
they are in the picture of nature. If one oak was called A, another was called
B; for the primitive idea of two things is that they are not the same, and it
often takes a long time for what they have in common to be seen: so that,
the narrower the limits of their knowledge of things, the more copious their
dictionary must have been. The difficulty of using such a vocabulary could
not be easily removed; for, to arrange beings under common and generic
denominations, it became necessary to know their distinguishing properties:
the need arose for observation and definition, that is to say, for natural
history and metaphysics of a far more developed kind than men can at that
time have possessed.
Add to this, that general ideas cannot be introduced into the mind without
the assistance of words, nor can the understanding seize them except by
means of propositions. This is one of the reasons why animals cannot form
such ideas, or ever acquire that capacity for self-improvement which

depends on them. When a monkey goes from one nut to another, are we to
conceive that he entertains any general idea of that kind of fruit, and
compares its archetype with the two individual nuts? Assuredly he does not;
but the sight of one of these nuts recalls to his memory the sensations which
he received from the other, and his eyes, being modified after a certain
manner, give information to the palate of the modification it is about to
receive. Every general idea is purely intellectual; if the imagination meddles
with it ever so little, the idea immediately becomes particular. If you
endeavour to trace in your mind the image of a tree in general, you never
attain to your end. In spite of all you can do, you will have to see it as great
or little, bare or leafy, light or dark, and were you capable of seeing nothing
in it but what is common to all trees, it would no longer be like a tree at all.
Purely abstract beings are perceivable in the same manner, or are only
conceivable by the help of language. The definition of a triangle alone gives
you a true idea of it: the moment you imagine a triangle in your mind, it is
some particular triangle and not another, and you cannot avoid giving it
sensible lines and a coloured area. We must then make use of propositions
and of language in order to form general ideas. For no sooner does the
imagination cease to operate than the understanding proceeds only by the
help of words. If then the first inventors of speech could give names only to
ideas they already had, it follows that the first substantives could be nothing
more than proper names.
But when our new grammarians, by means of which I have no conception,
began to extend their ideas and generalise their terms, the ignorance of the
inventors must have confined this method within very narrow limits; and, as
they had at first gone too far in multiplying the names of individuals, from
ignorance of their genus and species, they made afterwards too few of
these, from not having considered beings in all their specific differences. It
would indeed have needed more knowledge and experience than they could
have, and more pains and inquiry than they would have bestowed, to carry
these distinctions to their proper length. If, even to-day, we are continually
discovering new species, which have hitherto escaped observation, let us
reflect how many of them must have escaped men who judged things
merely from their first appearance! It is superfluous to add that the
primitive classes and the most general notions must necessarily have
escaped their notice also. How, for instance, could they have understood or
thought of the words matter, spirit, substance, mode, figure, motion, when

even our philosophers, who have so long been making use of them, have
themselves the greatest difficulty in understanding them; and when, the
ideas attached to them being purely metaphysical, there are no models of
them to be found in nature?
But I stop at this point, and ask my judges to suspend their reading a while,
to consider, after the invention of physical substantives, which is the easiest
part of language to invent, that there is still a great way to go, before the
thoughts of men will have found perfect expression and constant form, such
as would answer the purposes of public speaking, and produce their effect
on society. I beg of them to consider how much time must have been spent,
and how much knowledge needed, to find out numbers, abstract terms,
aorists and all the tenses of verbs, particles, syntax, the method of
connecting propositions, the forms of reasoning, and all the logic of speech.
For myself, I am so aghast at the increasing difficulties which present
themselves, and so well convinced of the almost demonstrable impossibility
that languages should owe their original institution to merely human means,
that I leave, to any one who will undertake it, the discussion of the difficult
problem, which was most necessary, the existence of society to the
invention of language, or the invention of language to the establishment of
society. But be the origin of language and society what they may, it may be
at least inferred, from the little care which nature has taken to unite
mankind by mutual wants, and to facilitate the use of speech, that she has
contributed little to make them sociable, and has put little of her own into
all they have done to create such bonds of union. It is in fact impossible to
conceive why, in a state of nature, one man should stand more in need of
the assistance of another, than a monkey or a wolf of the assistance of
another of its kind: or, granting that he did, what motives could induce that
other to assist him; or, even then, by what means they could agree about the
conditions. I know it is incessantly repeated that man would in such a state
have been the most miserable of creatures; and indeed, if it be true, as I
think I have proved, that he must have lived many ages, before he could
have either desire or an opportunity of emerging from it, this would only be
an accusation against nature, and not against the being which she had thus
unhappily constituted. But as I understand the word miserable, it either has
no meaning at all, or else signifies only a painful privation of something, or
a state of suffering either in body or soul. I should be glad to have explained
to me, what kind of misery a free being, whose heart is at ease and whose

body is in health, can possibly suffer. I would ask also, whether a social or a
natural life is most likely to become insupportable to those who enjoy it. We
see around us hardly a creature in civil society, who does not lament his
existence: we even see many deprive themselves of as much of it as they
can, and laws human and divine together can hardly put a stop to the
disorder. I ask, if it was ever known that a savage took it into his head,
when at liberty, to complain of life or to make away with himself. Let us
therefore judge, with less vanity, on which side the real misery is found. On
the other hand, nothing could be more unhappy than savage man, dazzled
by science, tormented by his passions, and reasoning about a state different
from his own. It appears that Providence most wisely determined that the
faculties, which he potentially possessed, should develop themselves only
as occasion offered to exercise them, in order that they might not be
superfluous or perplexing to him, by appearing before their time, nor slow
and useless when the need for them arose. In instinct alone, he had all he
required for living in the state of nature; and with a developed
understanding he has only just enough to support life in society.
It appears, at first view, that men in a state of nature, having no moral
relations or determinate obligations one with another, could not be either
good nor bad, virtuous or vicious; unless we take these terms in a physical
sense, and call, in an individual, those qualities vices which may be
injurious to his preservation, and those virtues which contribute to it; in
which case, he would have to be accounted most virtuous, who put least
check on the pure impulses of nature. But without deviating from the
ordinary sense of the words, it will be proper to suspend the judgment we
might be led to form on such a state, and be on our guard against our
prejudices, till we have weighed the matter in the scales of impartiality, and
seen whether virtues or vices preponderate among civilised men; and
whether their virtues do them more good than their vices do harm; till we
have discovered, whether the progress of the sciences sufficiently
indemnifies them for the mischiefs they do one another, in proportion as
they are better informed of the good they ought to do; or whether they
would not be, on the whole, in a much happier condition if they had nothing
to fear or to hope from any one, than as they are, subjected to universal
dependence, and obliged to take everything from those who engage to give
them nothing in return.

Above all, let us not conclude, with Hobbes, that because man has no idea
of goodness, he must be naturally wicked; that he is vicious because he
does not know virtue; that he always refuses to do his fellow-creatures
services which he does not think they have a right to demand; or that by
virtue of the right he truly claims to everything he needs, he foolishly
imagines himself the sole proprietor of the whole universe. Hobbes had
seen clearly the defects of all the modern definitions of natural right: but the
consequences which he deduces from his own show that he understands it
in an equally false sense. In reasoning on the principles he lays down, he
ought to have said that the state of nature, being that in which the care for
our own preservation is the least prejudicial to that of others, was
consequently the best calculated to promote peace, and the most suitable for
mankind. He does say the exact opposite, in consequence of having
improperly admitted, as a part of savage man's care for self-preservation,
the gratification of a multitude of passions which are the work of society,
and have made laws necessary. A bad man, he says, is a robust child. But it
remains to be proved whether man in a state of nature is this robust child:
and, should we grant that he is, what would he infer? Why truly, that if this
man, when robust and strong, were dependent on others as he is when
feeble, there is no extravagance he would not be guilty of; that he would
beat his mother when she was too slow in giving him her breast; that he
would strangle one of his younger brothers, if he should be troublesome to
him, or bite the arm of another, if he put him to any inconvenience. But that
man in the state of nature is both strong and dependent involves two
contrary suppositions. Man is weak when he is dependent, and is his own
master before he comes to be strong. Hobbes did not reflect that the same
cause, which prevents a savage from making use of his reason, as our jurists
hold, prevents him also from abusing his faculties, as Hobbes himself
allows: so that it may be justly said that savages are not bad merely because
they do not know what it is to be good: for it is neither the development of
the understanding nor the restraint of law that hinders them from doing ill;
but the peacefulness of their passions, and their ignorance of vice: tanto
plus in illis proficit vitiorum ignoratio, quam in his cognitio virtutis.[2]
There is another principle which has escaped Hobbes; which, having been
bestowed on mankind, to moderate, on certain occasions, the impetuosity of
egoism, or, before its birth, the desire of self-preservation, tempers the
ardour with which he pursues his own welfare, by an innate repugnance at

seeing a fellow-creature suffer.[3] I think I need not fear contradiction in
holding man to be possessed of the only natural virtue, which could not be
denied him by the most violent detractor of human virtue. I am speaking of
compassion which is a disposition suitable to creatures so weak and subject
to so many evils as we certainly are: by so much the more universal and
useful to mankind, as it comes before any kind of reflection; and at the
same time so natural, that the very brutes themselves sometimes give
evident proofs of it. Not to mention the tenderness of mothers for their
offspring and the perils they encounter to save them from danger, it is well
known that horses show a reluctance to trample on living bodies. One
animal never passes by the dead body of another of its species: there are
even some which give their fellows a sort of burial; while the mournful
lowings of the cattle when they enter the slaughter-house show the
impressions made on them by the horrible spectacle which meets them. We
find, with pleasure, the author of the Fable of the Bees obliged to own that
man is a compassionate and sensible being, and laying aside his cold
subtlety of style, in the example he gives, to present us with the pathetic
description of a man who, from a place of confinement, is compelled to
behold a wild beast tear a child from the arms of its mother, grinding its
tender limbs with its murderous teeth, and tearing its palpitating entrails
with its claws. What horrid agitation must not the eye-witness of such a
scene experience, although he would not be personally concerned! What
anxiety would he not suffer at not being able to give any assistance to the
fainting mother and the dying infant!
Such is the pure emotion of nature, prior to all kinds of reflection! Such is
the force of natural compassion, which the greatest depravity of morals has
as yet hardly been able to destroy! for we daily find at our theatres men
affected, nay shedding tears at the sufferings of a wretch who, were he in
the tyrant's place, would probably even add to the torments of his enemies;
like the bloodthirsty Sulla, who was so sensitive to ills he had not caused, or
that Alexander of Pheros who did not dare to go and see any tragedy acted,
for fear of being seen weeping with Andromache and Priam, though he
could listen without emotion to the cries of all the citizens who were daily
strangled at his command.
Mollissima corda
Humano generi dare se natura fatetur,

Qua lacrimas dedit.
Juvenal, Satire xv, 151.[4]
Mandeville well knew that, in spite of all their morality, men would have
never been better than monsters, had not nature bestowed on them a sense
of compassion, to aid their reason: but he did not see that from this quality
alone flow all those social virtues, of which he denied man the possession.
But what is generosity, clemency or humanity but compassion applied to
the weak, to the guilty, or to mankind in general? Even benevolence and
friendship are, if we judge rightly, only the effects of compassion,
constantly set upon a particular object: for how is it different to wish that
another person may not suffer pain and uneasiness and to wish him happy?
Were it even true that pity is no more than a feeling, which puts us in the
place of the sufferer, a feeling, obscure yet lively in a savage, developed yet
feeble in civilised man; this truth would have no other consequence than to
confirm my argument. Compassion must, in fact, be the stronger, the more
the animal beholding any kind of distress identifies himself with the animal
that suffers. Now, it is plain that such identification must have been much
more perfect in a state of nature than it is in a state of reason. It is reason
that engenders self-respect, and reflection that confirms it: it is reason
which turns man's mind back upon itself, and divides him from everything
that could disturb or afflict him. It is philosophy that isolates him, and bids
him say, at sight of the misfortunes of others: "Perish if you will, I am
secure." Nothing but such general evils as threaten the whole community
can disturb the tranquil sleep of the philosopher, or tear him from his bed. A
murder may with impunity be committed under his window; he has only to
put his hands to his ears and argue a little with himself, to prevent nature,
which is shocked within him, from identifying itself with the unfortunate
sufferer. Uncivilised man has not this admirable talent; and for want of
reason and wisdom, is always foolishly ready to obey the first promptings
of humanity. It is the populace that flocks together at riots and street-brawls,
while the wise man prudently makes off. It is the mob and the marketwomen, who part the combatants, and hinder gentle-folks from cutting one
another's throats.
It is then certain that compassion is a natural feeling which, by moderating
the violence of love of self in each individual, contributes to the
preservation of the whole species. It is this compassion that hurries us

without reflection to the relief of those who are in distress: it is this which
in a state of nature supplies the place of laws, morals and virtues, with the
advantage that none are tempted to disobey its gentle voice: it is this which
will always prevent a sturdy savage from robbing a weak child or a feeble
old man of the sustenance they may have with pain and difficulty acquired,
if he sees a possibility of providing for himself by other means: it is this
which, instead of inculcating that sublime maxim of rational justice, Do to
others as you would have them do unto you, inspires all men with that other
maxim of natural goodness, much less perfect indeed, but perhaps more
useful; Do good to yourself with as little evil as possible to others. In a
word, it is rather in this natural feeling than in any subtle arguments that we
must look for the cause of that repugnance, which every man would
experience in doing evil, even independently of the maxims of education.
Although it might belong to Socrates and other minds of the like craft to
acquire virtue by reason, the human race would long since have ceased to
be, had its preservation depended only on the reasonings of the individuals
composing it.
With passions so little active, and so good a curb, men, being rather wild
than wicked, and more intent to guard themselves against the mischief that
might be done them, than to do mischief to others, were by no means
subject to very perilous dissensions. They maintained no kind of intercourse
with one another, and were consequently strangers to vanity, deference,
esteem and contempt; they had not the least idea of meum and tuum, and no
true conception of justice; they looked upon every violence to which they
were subjected, rather as an injury that might easily be repaired than as a
crime that ought to be punished; and they never thought of taking revenge,
unless perhaps mechanically and on the spot, as a dog will sometimes bite
the stone which is thrown at him. Their quarrels therefore would seldom
have very bloody consequences; for the subject of them would be merely
the question of subsistence. But I am aware of one greater danger, which
remains to be noticed.
Of the passions that stir the heart of man, there is one which makes the
sexes necessary to each other, and is extremely ardent and impetuous; a
terrible passion that braves danger, surmounts all obstacles, and in its
transports seems calculated to bring destruction on the human race which it
is really destined to preserve. What must become of men who are left to this

brutal and boundless rage, without modesty, without shame, and daily
upholding their amours at the price of their blood?
It must, in the first place, be allowed that, the more violent the passions are,
the more are laws necessary to keep them under restraint. But, setting aside
the inadequacy of laws to effect this purpose, which is evident from the
crimes and disorders to which these passions daily give rise among us, we
should do well to inquire if these evils did not spring up with the laws
themselves; for in this case, even if the laws were capable of repressing
such evils, it is the least that could be expected from them, that they should
check a mischief which would not have arisen without them.
Let us begin by distinguishing between the physical and moral ingredients
in the feeling of love. The physical part of love is that general desire which
urges the sexes to union with each other. The moral part is that which
determines and fixes this desire exclusively upon one particular object; or at
least gives it a greater degree of energy toward the object thus preferred. It
is easy to see that the moral part of love is a factitious feeling, born of social
usage, and enhanced by the women with much care and cleverness, to
establish their empire, and put in power the sex which ought to obey. This
feeling, being founded on certain ideas of beauty and merit which a savage
is not in a position to acquire, and on comparisons which he is incapable of
making, must be for him almost non-existent; for, as his mind cannot form
abstract ideas of proportion and regularity, so his heart is not susceptible of
the feelings of love and admiration, which are even insensibly produced by
the application of these ideas. He follows solely the character nature has
implanted in him, and not tastes which he could never have acquired; so
that every woman equally answers his purpose.
Men in a state of nature being confined merely to what is physical in love,
and fortunate enough to be ignorant of those excellences, which whet the
appetite while they increase the difficulty of gratifying it, must be subject to
fewer and less violent fits of passion, and consequently fall into fewer and
less violent disputes. The imagination, which causes such ravages among
us, never speaks to the heart of savages, who quietly await the impulses of
nature, yield to them involuntarily, with more pleasure than ardour, and,
their wants once satisfied, lose the desire. It is therefore incontestable that
love, as well as all other passions, must have acquired in society that
glowing impetuosity, which makes it so often fatal to mankind. And it is the

more absurd to represent savages as continually cutting one another's
throats to indulge their brutality, because this opinion is directly contrary to
experience; the Caribeans, who have as yet least of all deviated from the
state of nature, being in fact the most peaceable of people in their amours,
and the least subject to jealousy, though they live in a hot climate which
seems always to inflame the passions.
With regard to the inferences that might be drawn, in the case of several
species of animals, the males of which fill our poultry-yards with blood and
slaughter, or in spring make the forests resound with their quarrels over
their females; we must begin by excluding all those species, in which nature
has plainly established, in the comparative power of the sexes, relations
different from those which exist among us: thus we can base no conclusion
about men on the habits of fighting cocks. In those species where the
proportion is better observed, these battles must be entirely due to the
scarcity of females in comparison with males; or, what amounts to the same
thing, to the intervals during which the female constantly refuses the
advances of the male: for if each female admits the male but during two
months in the year, it is the same as if the number of females were fivesixths less. Now, neither of these two cases is applicable to the human
species, in which the number of females usually exceeds that of males, and
among whom it has never been observed, even among savages, that the
females have, like those of other animals, their stated times of passion and
indifference. Moreover, in several of these species, the individuals all take
fire at once, and there comes a fearful moment of universal passion, tumult
and disorder among them; a scene which is never beheld in the human
species, whose love is not thus seasonal. We must not then conclude from
the combats of such animals for the enjoyment of the females, that the case
would be the same with mankind in a state of nature: and, even if we drew
such a conclusion, we see that such contests do not exterminate other kinds
of animals, and we have no reason to think they would be more fatal to
ours. It is indeed clear that they would do still less mischief than is the case
in a state of society; especially in those countries in which, morals being
still held in some repute, the jealousy of lovers and the vengeance of
husbands are the daily cause of duels, murders, and even worse crimes;
where the obligation of eternal fidelity only occasions adultery, and the very
laws of honour and continence necessarily increase debauchery and lead to
the multiplication of abortions.

Let us conclude then that man in a state of nature, wandering up and down
the forests, without industry, without speech, and without home, an equal
stranger to war and to all ties, neither standing in need of his fellowcreatures nor having any desire to hurt them, and perhaps even not
distinguishing them one from another; let us conclude that, being selfsufficient and subject to so few passions, he could have no feelings or
knowledge but such as befitted his situation; that he felt only his actual
necessities, and disregarded everything he did not think himself
immediately concerned to notice, and that his understanding made no
greater progress than his vanity. If by accident he made any discovery, he
was the less able to communicate it to others, as he did not know even his
own children. Every art would necessarily perish with its inventor, where
there was no kind of education among men, and generations succeeded
generations without the least advance; when, all setting out from the same
point, centuries must have elapsed in the barbarism of the first ages; when
the race was already old, and man remained a child.
If I have expatiated at such length on this supposed primitive state, it is
because I had so many ancient errors and inveterate prejudices to eradicate,
and therefore thought it incumbent on me to dig down to their very root,
and show, by means of a true picture of the state of nature, how far even the
natural inequalities of mankind are from having that reality and influence
which modern writers suppose.
It is in fact easy to see that many of the differences which distinguish men
are merely the effect of habit and the different methods of life men adopt in
society. Thus a robust or delicate constitution, and the strength or weakness
attaching to it, are more frequently the effects of a hardy or effeminate
method of education than of the original endowment of the body. It is the
same with the powers of the mind; for education not only makes a
difference between such as are cultured and such as are not, but even
increases the differences which exist among the former, in proportion to
their respective degrees of culture: as the distance between a giant and a
dwarf on the same road increases with every step they take. If we compare
the prodigious diversity, which obtains in the education and manner of life
of the various orders of men in the state of society, with the uniformity and
simplicity of animal and savage life, in which every one lives on the same
kind of food and in exactly the same manner, and does exactly the same

things, it is easy to conceive how much less the difference between man and
man must be in a state of nature than in a state of society, and how greatly
the natural inequality of mankind must be increased by the inequalities of
social institutions.
But even if nature really affected, in the distribution of her gifts, that
partiality which is imputed to her, what advantage would the greatest of her
favourites derive from it, to the detriment of others, in a state that admits of
hardly any kind of relation between them? Where there is no love, of what
advantage is beauty? Of what use is wit to those who do not converse, or
cunning to those who have no business with others? I hear it constantly
repeated that, in such a state, the strong would oppress the weak; but what
is here meant by oppression? Some, it is said, would violently domineer
over others, who would groan under a servile submission to their caprices.
This indeed is exactly what I observe to be the case among us; but I do not
see how it can be inferred of men in a state of nature, who could not easily
be brought to conceive what we mean by dominion and servitude. One man,
it is true, might seize the fruits which another had gathered, the game he
had killed, or the cave he had chosen for shelter; but how would he ever be
able to exact obedience, and what ties of dependence could there be among
men without possessions? If, for instance, I am driven from one tree, I can
go to the next; if I am disturbed in one place, what hinders me from going
to another? Again, should I happen to meet with a man so much stronger
than myself, and at the same time so depraved, so indolent, and so
barbarous, as to compel me to provide for his sustenance while he himself
remains idle; he must take care not to have his eyes off me for a single
moment; he must bind me fast before he goes to sleep, or I shall certainly
either knock him on the head or make my escape. That is to say, he must in
such a case voluntarily expose himself to much greater trouble than he
seeks to avoid, or can give me. After all this, let him be off his guard ever
so little; let him but turn his head aside at any sudden noise, and I shall be
instantly twenty paces off, lost in the forest, and, my fetters burst asunder,
he would never see me again.
Without my expatiating thus uselessly on these details, every one must see
that as the bonds of servitude are formed merely by the mutual dependence
of men on one another and the reciprocal needs that unite them, it is
impossible to make any man a slave, unless he be first reduced to a situation

in which he cannot do without the help of others: and, since such a situation
does not exist in a state of nature, every one is there his own master, and the
law of the strongest is of no effect.
Having proved that the inequality of mankind is hardly felt, and that its
influence is next to nothing in a state of nature, I must next show its origin
and trace its progress in the successive developments of the human mind.
Having shown that human perfectibility, the social virtues, and the other
faculties which natural man potentially possessed, could never develop of
themselves, but must require the fortuitous concurrence of many foreign
causes that might never arise, and without which he would have remained
for ever in his primitive condition, I must now collect and consider the
different accidents which may have improved the human understanding
while depraving the species, and made man wicked while making him
sociable; so as to bring him and the world from that distant period to the
point at which we now behold them.
I confess that, as the events I am going to describe might have happened in
various ways, I have nothing to determine my choice but conjectures: but
such conjectures become reasons, when they are the most probable that can
be drawn from the nature of things, and the only means of discovering the
truth. The consequences, however, which I mean to deduce will not be
barely conjectural; as, on the principles just laid down, it would be
impossible to form any other theory that would not furnish the same results,
and from which I could not draw the same conclusions.
This will be a sufficient apology for my not dwelling on the manner in
which the lapse of time compensates for the little probability in the events;
on the surprising power of trivial causes, when their action is constant; on
the impossibility, on the one hand, of destroying certain hypotheses, though
on the other we cannot give them the certainty of known matters of fact; on
its being within the province of history, when two facts are given as real,
and have to be connected by a series of intermediate facts, which are
unknown or supposed to be so, to supply such facts as may connect them;
and on its being in the province of philosophy when history is silent, to
determine similar facts to serve the same end; and lastly, on the influence of
similarity, which, in the case of events, reduces the facts to a much smaller
number of different classes than is commonly imagined. It is enough for me

to offer these hints to the consideration of my judges, and to have so
arranged that the general reader has no need to consider them at all.

[1] See Appendix.
[2] Justin. Hist, ii, 2. So much more does the ignorance of vice profit the one sort than the knowledge
of virtue the other.
[3] Egoism must not be confused with self-respect: for they differ both in themselves and in their
effects. Self-respect is a natural feeling which leads every animal to look to its own preservation, and
which, guided in man by reason and modified by compassion, creates humanity and virtue. Egoism is
a purely relative and factitious feeling, which arises in the state of society, leads each individual to
make more of himself than of any other, causes all the mutual damage men inflict one on another,
and is the real source of the "sense of honour." This being understood, I maintain that, in our
primitive condition, in the true state of nature, egoism did not exist; for as each man regarded himself
as the only observer of his actions, the only being in the universe who took any interest in him, and
the sole judge of his deserts, no feeling arising from comparisons he could not be led to make could
take root in his soul; and for the same reason, he could know neither hatred nor the desire for
revenge, since these passions can spring only from a sense of injury: and as it is the contempt or the
intention to hurt, and not the harm done, which constitutes the injury, men who neither valued nor
compared themselves could do one another much violence, when it suited them, without feeling any
sense of injury. In a word, each man, regarding his fellows almost as he regarded animals of different
species, might seize the prey of a weaker or yield up his own to a stronger, and yet consider these
acts of violence as mere natural occurrences, without the slightest emotion of insolence or despite, or
any other feeling than the joy or grief of success or failure.
[4] Nature avows she gave the human race the softest hearts, who gave < them tears.

THE SECOND PART
The first man who, having enclosed a piece of ground, bethought himself of
saying This is mine, and found people simple enough to believe him, was
the real founder of civil society. From how many crimes, wars and murders,
from how many horrors and misfortunes might not any one have saved
mankind, by pulling up the stakes, or filling up the ditch, and crying to his
fellows, "Beware of listening to this impostor; you are undone if you once
forget that the fruits of the earth, belong to us all, and the earth itself to
nobody." But there is great probability that things had then already come to
such a pitch, that they could no longer continue as they were; for the idea of
property depends on many prior ideas, which could only be acquired
successively, and cannot have been formed all at once in the human mind.
Mankind must have made very considerable progress, and acquired
considerable knowledge and industry which they must also have transmitted
and increased from age to age, before they arrived at this last point of the

state of nature. Let us then go farther back and endeavour to unify under a
single point of view that slow succession of events and discoveries in the
most natural order.
Man's first feeling was that of his own existence, and his first care that of
self-preservation. The produce of the earth furnished him with all he
needed, and instinct told him how to use it. Hunger and other appetites
made him at various times experience various modes of existence; and
among these was one which urged him to propagate his species—a blind
propensity that, having nothing to do with the heart, produced a merely
animal act. The want once gratified, the two sexes knew each other no
more; and even the offspring was nothing to its mother, as soon as it could
do without her.
Such was the condition of infant man; the life of an animal limited at first to
mere sensations, and hardly profiting by the gifts nature bestowed on him,
much less capable of entertaining a thought of forcing anything from her.
But difficulties soon presented themselves, and it became necessary to learn
how to surmount them: the height of the trees, which prevented him from
gathering their fruits, the competition of other animals desirous of the same
fruits, and the ferocity of those who needed them for their own
preservation, all obliged him to apply himself to bodily exercises. He had to
be active, swift of foot, and vigorous in light. Natural weapons, stones and
sticks, were easily found: he learnt to surmount the obstacles of nature, to
contend in case of necessity with other animals, and to dispute for the
means of subsistence even with other men, or to indemnify himself for what
he was forced to give up to a stronger.
In proportion as the human race grew more numerous, men's cares
increased. The difference of soils, climates and seasons, must have
introduced some differences into their manner of living. Barren years, long
and sharp winters, scorching summers which parched the fruits of the earth,
must have demanded a new industry. On the sea-shore and the banks of
rivers, they invented the hook and line, and became fishermen and eaters of
fish. In the forests they made bows and arrows, and became huntsmen and
warriors. In cold countries they clothed themselves with the skins of the
beasts they had slain. The lightning, a volcano, or some lucky chance
acquainted them with fire, a new resource against the rigours of winter: they
next learned how to preserve this element, then how to reproduce it, and

finally how to prepare with it the flesh of animals which before they had
eaten raw.
This repeated relevance of various beings to himself, and one to another,
would naturally give rise in the human mind to the perceptions of certain
relations between them. Thus the relations which we denote by the terms,
great, small, strong, weak, swift, slow, fearful, bold, and the like, almost
insensibly compared at need, must have at length produced in him a kind of
reflection, or rather a mechanical prudence, which would indicate to him
the precautions most necessary to his security.
The new intelligence which resulted from this development increased his
superiority over other animals, by making him sensible of it. He would now
endeavour, therefore, to ensnare them, would play them a thousand tricks,
and though many of them might surpass him in swiftness or in strength,
would in time become the master of some and the scourge of others. Thus,
the first time he looked into himself, he felt the first emotion of pride; and,
at a time when he scarce knew how to distinguish the different orders of
beings, by looking upon his species as of the highest order, he prepared the
way for assuming pre-eminence as an individual.
Other men, it is true, were not then to him what they now are to us, and he
had no greater intercourse with them than with other animals; yet they were
not neglected in his observations. The conformities, which he would in time
discover between them, and between himself and his female, led him to
judge of others which were not then perceptible; and finding that they all
behaved as he himself would have done in like circumstances, he naturally
inferred that their manner of thinking and acting was altogether in
conformity with his own. This important truth, once deeply impressed on
his mind, must have induced him, from an intuitive feeling more certain and
much more rapid than any kind of reasoning, to pursue the rules of conduct,
which he had best observe towards them, for his own security and
advantage.
Taught by experience that the love of well-being is the sole motive of
human actions, he found himself in a position to distinguish the few cases,
in which mutual interest might justify him in relying upon the assistance of
his fellows; and also the still fewer cases in which a conflict of interests
might give cause to suspect them. In the former case, he joined in the same

herd with them, or at most in some kind of loose association, that laid no
restraint on its members, and lasted no longer than the transitory occasion
that formed it. In the latter case, every one sought his own private
advantage, either by open force, if he thought himself strong enough, or by
address and cunning, if he felt himself the weaker.
In this manner, men may have insensibly acquired some gross ideas of
mutual undertakings, and of the advantages of fulfilling them: that is, just
so far as their present and apparent interest was concerned: for they were
perfect strangers to foresight, and were so far from troubling themselves
about the distant future, that they hardly thought of the morrow. If a deer
was to be taken, every one saw that, in order to succeed, he must abide
faithfully by his post: but if a hare happened to come within the reach of
any one of them, it is not to be doubted that he pursued it without scruple,
and, having seized his prey, cared very little, if by so doing he caused his
companions to miss theirs.
It is easy to understand that such intercourse would not require a language
much more refined than that of rooks or monkeys, who associate together
for much the same, purpose. Inarticulate cries, plenty of gestures and some
imitative sounds, must have been for a long time the universal language;
and by the addition, in every country, of some conventional articulate
sounds (of which, as I have already intimated, the first institution is not too
easy to explain) particular languages were produced; but these were rude
and imperfect, and nearly such as now to be found among some savage
nations.
Hurried on by the rapidity of time, by the abundance of things I have to say,
and by the almost insensible progress of things in their beginnings, I pass
over in an instant a multitude of ages; for the slower the events were in their
succession, the more rapidly may they be described.
These first advances enabled men to make others with greater rapidity. In
proportion as they grew enlightened, they grew industrious. They ceased to
fall asleep under the first tree, or in the first cave that afforded them shelter;
they invented several kinds of implements of hard and sharp stones, which
they used to dig up the earth, and to cut wood; they then made huts out of
branches, and afterwards learnt to plaster them over with mud and clay.
This was the epoch of a first revolution, which established and

distinguished families, and introduced a kind of property, in itself the source
of a thousand quarrels and conflicts. As, however, the strongest were
probably the first to build themselves huts which they felt themselves able
to defend, it may be concluded that the weak found it much easier and safer
to imitate, than to attempt to dislodge them: and of those who were once
provided with huts, none could have any inducement to appropriate that of
his neighbour; not indeed so much because it did not belong to him, as
because it could be of no use, and he could not make himself master of it
without exposing himself to a desperate battle with the family which
occupied it.
The first expansions of the human heart were the effects of a novel
situation, which united husbands and wives, fathers and children, under one
roof. The habit of living together soon gave rise to the finest feelings known
to humanity, conjugal love and paternal affection. Every family became a
little society, the more united because liberty—and reciprocal attachment
were the only bonds of its union. The sexes, whose manner of life had been
hitherto the same, began now to adopt different ways of living. The women
became more sedentary, and accustomed themselves to mind the hut and
their children, while the men went abroad in search of their common
subsistence. From living a softer life, both sexes also began to lose
something of their strength and ferocity: but, if individuals became to some
extent less able to encounter wild beasts separately, they found it, on the
other hand, easier to assemble and resist in common.
The simplicity and solitude of man's life in this new condition, the paucity
of his wants, and the implements he had invented to satisfy them, left him a
great deal of leisure, which he employed to furnish himself with many
conveniences unknown to his fathers: and this was the first yoke he
inadvertently imposed on himself, and the first source of the evils he
prepared for his descendants. For, besides continuing thus to enervate both
body and mind, these conveniences lost with use almost all their power to
please, and even degenerated into real needs, till the want of them became
far more disagreeable than the possession of them had been pleasant. Men
would have been unhappy at the loss of them, though the possession did not
make them happy.
We can here see a little better how the use of speech became established,
and insensibly improved in each family, and we may form a conjecture also

concerning the manner in which various causes may have extended and
accelerated the progress of language, by making it more and more
necessary. Floods or earthquakes surrounded inhabited districts with
precipices or waters: revolutions of the globe tore off portions from the
continent, and made them islands. It is readily seen that among men thus
collected and compelled to live together, a common idiom must have arisen
much more easily than among those who still wandered through the forests
of the continent. Thus it is very possible that after their first essays in
navigation the islanders brought over the use of speech to the continent: and
it is at least very probable that communities and languages were first
established in islands, and even came to perfection there before they were
known on the mainland.
Everything now begins to change its aspect. Men, who have up to now been
roving in the woods, by taking to a more settled manner of life, come
gradually together, form separate bodies, and at length in every country
arises a distinct nation, united in character and manners, not by regulations
or laws, but by uniformity of life and food, and the common influence of
climate. Permanent neighbourhood could not fail to produce, in time, some
connection between different families. Among young people of opposite
sexes, living in neighbouring huts, the transient commerce required by
nature soon led, through mutual intercourse, to another kind not less
agreeable, and more permanent. Men began now to take the difference
between objects into account, and to make comparisons; they acquired
imperceptibly the ideas of beauty and merit, which soon gave rise to
feelings of preference. In consequence of seeing each other often, they
could not do without seeing each other constantly. A tender and pleasant
feeling insinuated itself into their souls, and the least opposition turned it
into an impetuous fury: with love arose jealousy; discord triumphed, and
human blood was sacrificed to the gentlest of all passions.
As ideas and feelings succeeded one another, and heart and head were
brought into play, men continued to lay aside their original wildness; their
private connections became every day more intimate as their limits
extended. They accustomed themselves to assemble before their huts round
a large tree; singing and dancing, the true offspring of love and leisure,
became the amusement, or rather the occupation, of men and women thus
assembled together with nothing else to do. Each one began to consider the

rest, and to wish to be considered in turn; and thus a—value came to be
attached to public esteem. Whoever sang or danced best, whoever was the
handsomest, the strongest, the most dexterous, or the most eloquent, came
to be of most consideration; and this was the first step towards inequality,
and at the same time towards vice. From these first distinctions arose on the
one side vanity and contempt and on the other shame and envy: and the
fermentation caused by these new leavens ended by producing
combinations fatal to innocence and happiness.
As soon as men began to value one another, and the idea of consideration
had got a footing in the mind, every one put in his claim to it, and it became
impossible to refuse it to any with impunity. Hence arose the first
obligations of civility even among savages; and every intended injury
became an affront; because, besides the hurt which might result from it, the
party injured was certain to find in it a contempt for his person, which was
often more insupportable than the hurt itself.
Thus, as every man punished the contempt shown him by others, in
proportion to his opinion of himself, revenge became terrible, and men
bloody and cruel. This is precisely the state reached by most of the savage
nations known to us: and it is for want of having made a proper distinction
in our ideas, and seen how very far they already are from the state of nature,
that so many writers have hastily concluded that man is naturally cruel, and
requires civil institutions to make him more mild; whereas nothing is more
gentle than man in his primitive state, as he is placed by nature at an equal
distance from the stupidity of brutes, and the fatal ingenuity of civilised
man. Equally confined by instinct and reason to the sole care of guarding
himself against the mischiefs which threaten him, he is restrained by natural
compassion from doing any injury to others, and is not led to do such a
thing even in return for injuries received. For, according to the axiom of the
wise Locke, There can be no injury, where there is no property.
But it must be remarked that the society thus formed, and the relations thus
established among men, required of them qualities different from those
which they possessed from their primitive constitution. Morality began to
appear in human actions, and every one, before the institution of law, was
the only judge and avenger of the injuries done him, so that the goodness
which was suitable in the pure state of nature was no longer proper in the
new-born state of society. Punishments had to be made more severe, as

opportunities of offending became more frequent, and the dread of
vengeance had to take the place of the rigour of the law. Thus, though men
had become less patient, and their natural compassion had already suffered
some diminution, this period of expansion of the human faculties, keeping a
just mean between the indolence of the primitive state and the petulant
activity of our egoism, must have been the happiest and most stable of
epochs. The more we reflect on it, the more we shall find that this state was
the least subject to revolutions, and altogether the very best man could
experience; so that he can have departed from it only through some fatal
accident, which, for the public good, should never have happened. The
example of savages, most of whom have been found in this state, seems to
prove that men were meant to remain in it, that it is the real youth of the
world, and that all subsequent advances have been apparently so many steps
towards the perfection of the individual, but in reality towards the
decrepitude of the species.
So long as men remained content with their rustic huts, so long as they were
satisfied with clothes made of the skins of animals and sewn together with
thorns and fish-bones, adorned themselves only with feathers and shells,
and continued to paint their bodies different colours, to improve and
beautify their bows and arrows and to make with sharp-edged stones fishing
boats or clumsy musical instruments; in a word, so long as they undertook
only what a single person could accomplish, and confined themselves to
such arts as did not require the joint labour of several hands, they lived free,
healthy, honest and happy lives, so long as their nature allowed, and as they
continued to enjoy the pleasures of mutual and independent intercourse. But
from the moment one man began to stand in need of the help of another;
from the moment it appeared advantageous to any one man to have enough
provisions for two, equality disappeared, property was introduced, work
became indispensable, and vast forests became smiling fields, which man
had to water with the sweat of his brow, and where slavery and misery were
soon seen to germinate and grow up with the crops.
Metallurgy and agriculture were the two arts which produced this great
revolution. The poets tell us it was gold and silver, but, for the philosophers,
it was iron and corn, which first civilised men, and ruined humanity. Thus
both were unknown to the savages of America, who for that reason are still
savage; the other nations also seem to have continued in a state of

barbarism while they practised only one of these arts. One of the best
reasons, perhaps, why Europe has been, if not longer, at least more
constantly and highly civilised than the rest of the world, is that it is at once
the most abundant in iron and the most fertile in corn.
It is difficult to conjecture how men first came to know and use iron; for it
is impossible to suppose they would of themselves think of digging the ore
out of the mine, and preparing it for smelting, before they knew what would
be the result. On the other hand, we have the less reason to suppose this
discovery the effect of any accidental fire, as mines are only formed in
barren places, bare of trees and plants; so that it looks as if nature had taken
pains to keep the fatal secret from us. There remains, therefore, only the
extraordinary accident of some volcano which, by ejecting metallic
substances already in fusion, suggested to the spectators the idea of
imitating the natural operation. And we must further conceive them as
possessed of uncommon courage and foresight, to undertake so laborious a
work, with so distant a prospect of drawing advantage from it; yet these
qualities are united only in minds more advanced than we can suppose
those of these first discoverers to have been.
With regard to agriculture, the principles of it were known long before they
were put in practice; and it is indeed hardly possible that men, constantly
employed in drawing their subsistence from plants and trees, should not
readily acquire a knowledge of the means made use of by nature for the
propagation of vegetables. It was in all probability very fang, however,
before their industry took that turn, either because trees, which together
with hunting and fishing afforded them food, did not require their attention;
or because they were ignorant of the use of corn, or without instruments to
cultivate it; or because they lacked foresight to future needs; or lastly,
because they were without means of preventing others from robbing them
of the fruit of their labour.
When they grew more industrious, it is natural to believe that they began,
with the help of sharp stones and pointed sticks, to cultivate a few
vegetables or roots around their huts; though it was long before they knew
how to prepare corn, or were provided with the implements necessary for
raising it in any large quantity; not to mention how essential it is, for
husbandry, to consent to immediate loss, in order to reap a future gain—a

precaution very foreign to the turn of a savage's mind; for, as I have said, he
hardly foresees in the morning what he will need at night.
The invention of the other arts must therefore have been necessary to
compel mankind to apply themselves to agriculture. No sooner were
artificers wanted to smelt and forge iron, than others were required to
maintain them; the more hands that were employed in manufactures, the
fewer were left to provide for the common subsistence, though the number
of mouths to be furnished with food remained the same: and as some
required commodities in exchange for their iron, the rest at length
discovered the method of making iron serve for the multiplication of
commodities. By this means the arts of husbandry and agriculture were
established on the one hand, and the art of working metals and multiplying
their uses on the other.
The cultivation of the earth necessarily brought about its distribution; and
property, once recognised, gave rise to the first rules of justice; for, to
secure each man his own, it had to be possible for each to have something.
Besides, as men began to look forward to the future, and all had something
to lose, every one had reason to apprehend that reprisals would follow any
injury he might do to another. This origin is so much the more natural, as it
is impossible to conceive how property can come from anything but manual
labour: for what else can a man add to things which he does not originally
create, so as to make them his own property? It is the husbandman's labour
alone that, giving him a title to the produce of the ground he has tilled,
gives him a claim also to the land itself, at least till harvest; and so, from
year to year, a constant possession which is easily transformed into
property. When the ancients, says Grotius, gave to Ceres the title of
Legislatrix, and to a festival celebrated in her honour the name of
Thesmophoria, they meant by that that the distribution of lands had
produced a new kind of right: that is to say, the right of property, which is
different from the right deducible from the law of nature.
In this state of affairs, equality might have been sustained, had the talents of
individuals been equal, and had, for example, the use of iron and the
consumption of commodities always exactly balanced each other; but, as
there was nothing to preserve this balance, it was soon disturbed; the
strongest did most work; the most skilful turned his labour to best account;
the most ingenious devised methods of diminishing his labour: the

husbandman wanted more iron, or the smith more corn, and, while both
laboured equally, the one gained a great deal by his work, while the other
could hardly support himself. Thus natural inequality unfolds itself
insensibly with that of combination, and the difference between men,
developed by their different circumstances, becomes more sensible and
permanent in its effects, and begins to have an influence, in the same
proportion, over the lot of individuals.
Matters once at this pitch, it is easy to imagine the rest. I shall not detain the
reader with a description of the successive invention of other arts, the
development of language, the trial and utilisation of talents, the inequality
of fortunes, the use and abuse of riches, and all the details connected with
them which the reader can easily supply for himself. I shall confine myself
to a glance at mankind in this new situation.
Behold then all human faculties developed, memory and imagination in full
play, egoism interested, reason active, and the mind almost at the highest
point of its perfection. Behold all the natural qualities in action, the rank
and condition of every man assigned him; not merely his share of property
and his power to serve or injure others, but also his wit, beauty, strength or
skill, merit or talents: and these being the only qualities capable of
commanding respect, it soon became necessary to possess or to affect them.
It now became the interest of men to appear what they really were not. To
be and to seem became two totally different things; and from this distinction
sprang insolent pomp and cheating trickery, with all the numerous vices that
go in their train. On the other hand, free and independent as men were
before, they were now, in consequence of a multiplicity of new wants,
brought into subjection, as it were, to all nature, and particularly to one
another; and each became in some degree a slave even in becoming the
master of other men: if rich, they stood in need of the services of others; if
poor, of their assistance; and even a middle condition did not enable them to
do without one another. Man must now, therefore, have been perpetually
employed in getting others to interest themselves in his lot, and in making
them, apparently at least, if not really, find their advantage in promoting his
own. Thus he must have been sly and artful in his behaviour to some, and
imperious and cruel to others; being under a kind of necessity to ill-use all
the persons of whom he stood in need, when he could not frighten them into
compliance, and did not judge it his interest to be useful to them. Insatiable

ambition, the thirst of raising their respective fortunes, not so much from
real want as from the desire to surpass others, inspired all men with a vile
propensity to injure one another, and with a secret jealousy, which is the
more dangerous, as it puts on the mask of benevolence, to carry its point
with greater security. In a word, there arose rivalry and competition on the
one hand, and conflicting interests on the other, together with a secret desire
on both of profiting at the expense of others. All these evils were the first
effects of property, and the inseparable attendants of growing inequality.
Before the invention of signs to represent riches, wealth could hardly
consist in anything but lands and cattle, the only real possessions men can
have. But, when inheritances so increased in number and extent as to
occupy the whole of the land, and to border on one another, one man could
aggrandise himself only at the expense of another; at the same time the
supernumeraries, who had been too weak or too indolent to make such
acquisitions, and had grown poor without sustaining any loss, because,
while they saw everything change around them, they remained still the
same, were obliged to receive their subsistence, or steal it, from the rich;
and this soon bred, according to their different characters, dominion and
slavery, or violence and rapine. The wealthy, on their part, had no sooner
begun to taste the pleasure of command, than they disdained all others, and,
using their old slaves to acquire new, thought of nothing but subduing and
enslaving their neighbours; like ravenous wolves, which, having once tasted
human flesh, despise every other food and thenceforth seek only men to
devour.
Thus, as the most powerful or the most miserable considered their might or
misery as a kind of right to the possessions of others, equivalent, in their
opinion, to that of property, the destruction of equality was attended by the
most terrible disorders. Usurpations by the rich, robbery by the poor, and
the unbridled passions of both, suppressed the cries of natural compassion
and the still feeble voice of justice, and filled men with avarice, ambition
and vice. Between the title of the strongest and that of the first occupier,
there arose perpetual conflicts, which never ended but in battles and
bloodshed. The new-born state of society thus gave rise to a horrible state
of war; men thus harassed and depraved were no longer capable of retracing
their steps or renouncing the fatal acquisitions they had made, but,

labouring by the abuse of the faculties which do them honour, merely to
their own confusion, brought themselves to the brink of ruin.
Attonitus novitate mali, divesque miserque,
Effugere optat opes; et quæ modô voverat odit.[5]
It is impossible that men should not at length have reflected on so wretched
a situation, and on the calamities that overwhelmed them. The rich, in
particular, must have felt how much they suffered by a constant state of war,
of which they bore all the expense; and in which, though all risked their
lives, they alone risked their property. Besides, however speciously they
might disguise their usurpations, they knew that they were founded on
precarious and false titles; so that, if others took from them by force what
they themselves had gained by force, they would have no reason to
complain. Even those who had been enriched by their own industry, could
hardly base their proprietorship on better claims. It was in vain to repeat, "I
built this well; I gained this spot by my industry." Who gave you your
standing, it might be answered, and what right have you to demand
payment of us for doing what we never asked you to do? Do you not know
that numbers of your fellow-creatures are starving, for want of what you
have too much of? You ought to have had the express and universal consent
of mankind, before appropriating more of the common subsistence than you
needed for your own maintenance. Destitute of valid reasons to justify and
sufficient strength to defend himself, able to crush individuals with ease,
but easily crushed himself by a troop of bandits, one against all, and
incapable, on account of mutual jealousy, of joining with his equals against
numerous enemies united by the common hope of plunder, the rich man,
thus urged by necessity, conceived at length the profoundest plan that ever
entered the mind of man: this was to employ in his favour the forces of
those who attacked him, to make allies of his adversaries, to inspire them
with different maxims, and to give them other institutions as favourable to
himself as the law of nature was unfavourable.
With this view, after having represented to his neighbours the horror of a
situation which armed every man against the rest, and made their
possessions as burdensome to them as their wants, and in which no safety
could be expected either in riches or in poverty, he readily devised plausible
arguments to make them close with his design. "Let us join," said he, "to
guard the weak from oppression, to restrain the ambitious, and secure to

every man the possession of what belongs to him: let us institute rules of
justice and peace, to which all without exception may be obliged to
conform; rules that may in some measure make amends for the caprices of
fortune, by subjecting equally the powerful and the weak to the observance
of reciprocal obligations. Let us, in a word, instead of turning our forces
against ourselves, collect them in a supreme power which may govern us by
wise laws, protect and defend all the members of the association, repulse
their common enemies, and maintain eternal harmony among us."
Far fewer words to this purpose would have been enough to impose on men
so barbarous and easily seduced; especially as they had too many disputes
among themselves to do without arbitrators, and too much ambition and
avarice to go long without masters. All ran headlong to their chains, in
hopes of securing their liberty; for they had just wit enough to perceive the
advantages of political institutions, without experience enough to enable
them to foresee the dangers. The most capable of fore-seeing the dangers
were the very persons who expected to benefit by them; and even the most
prudent judged it not inexpedient to sacrifice one part of their freedom to
ensure the rest; as a wounded man has his arm cut off to save the rest of his
body.
Such was, or may well have been, the origin of society and law, which
bound new fetters on the poor, and gave new powers to the rich; which
irretrievably destroyed natural liberty, eternally fixed the law of property
and inequality, converted clever usurpation into unalterable right, and, for
the advantage of a few ambitious individuals, subjected all mankind to
perpetual labour, slavery and wretchedness. It is easy to see how the
establishment of one community made that of all the rest necessary, and
how, in order to make head against united forces, the rest of mankind had to
unite in turn. Societies soon multiplied and spread over the face of the earth,
till hardly a corner of the world was left in which a man could escape the
yoke, and withdraw his head from beneath the sword which he saw
perpetually hanging over him by a thread. Civil right having thus become
the common rule among the members of each community, the law of nature
maintained its place only between different communities, where, under the
name of the right of nations, it was qualified by certain tacit conventions, in
order to make commerce practicable, and serve as a substitute for natural
compassion, which lost, when applied to societies, almost all the influence

it had over individuals, and survived no longer except in some great
cosmopolitan spirits, who, breaking down the imaginary barriers that
separate different peoples, follow the example of our Sovereign Creator,
and include the whole human race in their benevolence.
But bodies politic, remaining thus in a state of nature among themselves,
presently experienced the inconveniences which had obliged individuals to
forsake it; for this state became still more fatal to these great bodies than it
had been to the individuals of whom they were composed. Hence arose
national wars, battles, murders, and reprisals, which shock nature and
outrage reason; together with all those horrible prejudices which class
among the virtues the honour of shedding human blood. The most
distinguished men hence learned to consider cutting each other's throats a
duty; at length men massacred their fellow-creatures by thousands without
so much as knowing why, and committed more murders in a single day's
fighting, and more violent outrages in the sack of a single town, than were
committed in the state of nature during whole ages over the whole earth.
Such were the first effects which we can see to have followed the division
of mankind into different communities. But let us return to their institutions.
I know that some writers have given other explanations of the origin of
political societies, such as the conquest of the powerful, or the association
of the weak. It is, indeed, indifferent to my argument which of these causes
we choose. That which I have just laid down, however, appears to me the
most natural for the following reasons. First: because, in the first case, the
right of conquest, being no right, in itself, could not serve as a foundation
on which to build any other; the victor and the vanquished people still
remained with respect to each other in the state of war, unless the
vanquished, restored to the full possession of their liberty, voluntarily made
choice of the victor for their chief. For till then, whatever capitulation may
have been made being founded on violence, and therefore ipso facto void,
there could not have been on this hypothesis either a real society or body
politic, or any law other than that of the strongest. Secondly: because the
words strong and weak are, in the second case, ambiguous; for during the
interval between the establishment of a right of property, or prior
occupancy, and that of political government, the meaning of these words is
better expressed by the terms rich and poor: because, in fact, before the
institution of laws, men had no other way of reducing their equals to

submission, than by attacking their goods, or making some of their own
over to them. Thirdly: because, as the poor had nothing but their freedom to
lose, it would have been in the highest degree absurd for them to resign
voluntarily the only good they still enjoyed, without getting anything in
exchange: whereas the rich having feelings, if I may so express myself, in
every part of their possessions, it was much easier to harm them, and
therefore more necessary for them to take precautions against it; and, in
short, because it is more reasonable to suppose a thing to have been
invented by those to whom it would be of service, than by those whom it
must have harmed.
Government had, in its infancy, no regular and constant form. The want of
experience and philosophy prevented men from seeing any but present
inconveniences, and they thought of providing against others only as they
presented themselves. In spite of the endeavours of the wisest legislators,
the political state remained imperfect, because it was little more than the
work of chance; and, as it had begun ill, though time revealed its defects
and suggested remedies, the original faults were never repaired. It was
continually being patched up, when the first task should have been to get
the site cleared and all the old materials removed, as was done by Lycurgus
at Sparta, if a stable and lasting edifice was to be erected. Society consisted
at first merely of a few general conventions, which every member bound
himself to observe; and for the performance of covenants the whole body
went security to each individual. Experience only could show the weakness
of such a constitution, and how easily it might be infringed with impunity,
from the difficulty of convicting men of faults, where the public alone was
to be witness and judge: the laws could not but be eluded in many ways;
disorders and inconveniences could not but multiply continually, till it
became necessary to commit the dangerous trust of public authority to
private persons, and the care of enforcing obedience to the deliberations of
the people to the magistrate. For to say that chiefs were chosen before the
confederacy was formed, and that the administrators of the laws were there
before the laws themselves, is too absurd a supposition to consider
seriously.
It would be as unreasonable to suppose that men at first threw themselves
irretrievably and unconditionally into the arms of an absolute master, and
that the first expedient which proud and unsubdued men hit upon for their

common security was to run headlong into slavery. For what reason, in fact,
did they take to themselves superiors, if it was not in order that they might
be defended from oppression, and have protection for their lives, liberties
and properties, which are, so to speak, the constituent elements of their
being? Now, in the relations between man and man, the worst that can
happen is for one to find himself at the mercy of another, and it would have
been inconsistent with common-sense to begin by bestowing on a chief the
only things they wanted his help to preserve. What equivalent could he
offer them for so great a right? And if he had presumed to exact it under
pretext of defending them, would he not have received the answer recorded
in the fable: "What more can the enemy do to us?" It is therefore beyond
dispute, and indeed the fundamental maxim of all political right, that people
have set up chiefs to protect their liberty, and not to enslave them. If we
have a prince, said Pliny to Trajan, it is to save ourselves from having a
master.
Politicians indulge in the same sophistry about the love of liberty as
philosophers about the state of nature. They judge, by what they see, of
very different things, which they have not seen; and attribute to man a
natural propensity to servitude, because the slaves within their observation
are seen to bear the yoke with patience; they fail to reflect that it is with
liberty as with innocence and virtue; the value is known only to those who
possess them, and the taste for them is forfeited when they are forfeited
themselves. "I know the charms of your country," said Brasidas to a Satrap,
who was comparing the life at Sparta with that at Persepolis, "but you
cannot know the pleasures of mine."
An unbroken horse erects his mane, paws the ground and starts back
impetuously at the sight of the bridle; while one which is properly trained
suffers patiently even whip and spur: so savage man will not bend his neck
to the yoke to which civilised man submits without a murmur, but prefers
the most turbulent state of liberty to the most peaceful slavery. We cannot
therefore, from the servility of nations already enslaved, judge of the natural
disposition of mankind for or against slavery; we should go by the
prodigious efforts of every free people to save itself from oppression. I
know that the former are for ever holding forth in praise of the tranquillity
they enjoy in their chains, and that they call a state of wretched servitude a
state of peace: miserrimam servitutem pacem appellant.[6] But when I

observe the latter sacrificing pleasure, peace, wealth, power and life itself to
the preservation of that one treasure, which is so disdained by those who
have lost it; when I see free-born animals dash their brains out against the
bars of their cage, from an innate impatience of captivity; when I behold
numbers of naked savages, that despise European pleasures, braving
hunger, fire, the sword and death, to preserve nothing but their
independence, I feel that it is not for slaves to argue about liberty.
With regard to paternal authority, from which some writers have derived
absolute government and all society, it is enough, without going back to the
contrary arguments of Locke and Sidney, to remark that nothing on earth
can be further from the ferocious spirit of despotism than the mildness of
that authority which looks more to the advantage of him who obeys than to
that of him who commands; that, by the law of nature, the father is the
child's master no longer than his help is necessary; that from that time they
are both equal, the son being perfectly independent of the father, and owing
him only respect and not obedience. For gratitude is a duty which ought to
be paid, but not a right to be exacted: instead of saying that civil society is
derived from paternal authority, we ought to say rather that the latter derives
its principal force from the former. No individual was ever acknowledged
as the father of many, till his sons and daughters remained settled around
him. The goods of the father, of which he is really the master, are the ties
which keep his children in dependence, and he may bestow on them, if he
pleases, no share of his property, unless they merit it by constant deference
to his will. But the subjects of an arbitrary despot are so far from having the
like favour to expect from their chief, that they themselves and everything
they possess are his property, or at least are considered by him as such; so
that they are forced to receive, as a favour, the little of their own he is
pleased to leave them. When he despoils them, he does but justice, and
mercy in that he permits them to live.
By proceeding thus to test fact by right, we should discover as little reason
as truth in the voluntary establishment of tyranny. It would also be no easy
matter to prove the validity of a contract binding on only one of the parties,
where all the risk is on one side, and none on the other; so that no one could
suffer but he who bound himself. This hateful system is indeed, even in
modern times, very far from being that of wise and good monarchs, and
especially of the kings of France; as may be seen from several passages in

their edicts; particularly from the following passage in a celebrated edict
published in 1667 in the name and by order of Louis XIV.
"Let it not, therefore, be said that the Sovereign is not subject to the laws of
his State; since the contrary is a true proposition of the right of nations,
which flattery has sometimes attacked but good princes have always
defended as the tutelary divinity of their dominions. How much more
legitimate is it to say with the wise Plato, that the perfect felicity of a
kingdom consists in the obedience of subjects to their prince, and of the
prince to the laws, and in the laws being just and constantly directed to the
public good!"[7]
I shall not stay here to inquire whether, as liberty is the noblest faculty of
man, it is not degrading our very nature, reducing ourselves to the level of
the brutes, which are mere slaves of instinct, and even an affront to the
Author of our being, to renounce without reserve the most precious of all
His gifts, and to bow to the necessity of committing all the crimes He has
forbidden, merely to gratify a mad or a cruel master; or if this sublime
craftsman ought not to be less angered at seeing His workmanship entirely
destroyed than thus dishonoured. I will waive (if my opponents please) the
authority of Barbeyrac, who, following Locke, roundly declares that no man
can so far sell his liberty as to submit to an arbitrary power which may use
him as it likes. For, he adds, this would be to sell his own life, of which he is
not master. I shall ask only what right those who were not afraid thus to
debase themselves could have to subject their posterity to the same
ignominy, and to renounce for them those blessings which they do not owe
to the liberality of their progenitors, and without which life itself must be a
burden to all who are worthy of it.
Puffendorf says that we may divest ourselves of our liberty in favour of
other men, just as we transfer our property from one to another by contracts
and agreements. But this seems a very weak argument. For in the first place,
the property I alienate becomes quite foreign to me, nor can I suffer from
the abuse of it; but it very nearly concerns me that my liberty should not be
abused, and I cannot without incurring the guilt of the crimes I may be
compelled to commit, expose myself to become an instrument of crime.
Besides, the right of property being only a convention of human institution,
men may dispose of what they possess as they please: but this is not the
case with the essential gifts of nature, such as life and liberty, which every

man is permitted to enjoy, and of which it is at least doubtful whether any
have a right to divest themselves. By giving up the one, we degrade our
being; by giving up the other, we do our best to annul it; and, as no
temporal good can indemnify us for the loss of either, it would be an
offence against both reason and nature to renounce them at any price
whatsoever. But, even if we could transfer our liberty, as we do our
property, there would be a great difference with regard to the children, who
enjoy the father's substance only by the transmission of his right; whereas,
liberty being a gift which they hold from nature as being men, their parents
have no right whatever to deprive them of it. As then, to establish slavery, it
was necessary to do violence to nature, so, in order to perpetuate such a
right, nature would have to be changed. Jurists, who have gravely
determined that the child of a slave comes into the world a slave, have
decided, in other words, that a man shall come into the world not a man.
I regard it then as certain, that government did not begin with arbitrary
power, but that this is the depravation, the extreme term, of government,
and brings it back, finally, to just the law of the strongest, which it was
originally designed to remedy. Supposing, however, it had begun in this
manner, such power, being in itself illegitimate, could not have served as a
basis for the laws of society, nor, consequently, for the inequality they
instituted.
Without entering at present upon the investigations which still remain to be
made into the nature of the fundamental compact underlying all
government, I content myself with adopting the common opinion
concerning it, and regard the establishment of the political body as a real
contract between the people and the chiefs chosen by them: a contract by
which both parties bind themselves to observe the laws therein expressed,
which form the ties of their union. The people having in respect of their
social relations concentrated all their wills in one, the several articles,
concerning which this will is explained, become so many fundamental laws,
obligatory on all the members of the State without exception, and one of
these articles regulates the choice and power of the magistrates appointed to
watch over the execution of the rest. This power extends to everything
which may maintain the constitution, without going so far as to alter it. It is
accompanied by honours, in order to bring the laws and their administrators
into respect. The ministers are also distinguished by personal prerogatives,

in order to recompense them for the cares and labour which good
administration involves. The magistrate, on his side, binds himself to use
the power he is entrusted with only in conformity with the intention of his
constituents, to maintain them all in the peaceable possession of what
belongs to them, and to prefer on every occasion the public interest to his
own.
Before experience had shown, or knowledge of the human heart enabled
men to foresee, the unavoidable abuses of such a constitution, it must have
appeared so much the more excellent, as those who were charged with the
care of its preservation had themselves most interest in it; for magistracy
and the rights attaching to it being based solely on the fundamental laws,
the magistrates would cease to be legitimate as soon as these ceased to
exist; the people would no longer owe them obedience; and as not the
magistrates, but the laws, are essential to the being of a State, the members
of it would regain the right to their natural liberty.
If we reflect with ever so little attention on this subject, we shall find new
arguments to confirm this truth, and be convinced from the very nature of
the contract that it cannot be irrevocable: for, if there were no superior
power capable of ensuring the fidelity of the contracting parties, or
compelling them to perform their reciprocal engagements, the parties would
be sole judges in their own cause, and each would always have a right to
renounce the contract, as soon as he found that the other had violated its
terms, or that they no longer suited his convenience. It is upon this principle
that the right of abdication may possibly be founded. Now, if, as here, we
consider only what is human in this institution, it is certain that, if the
magistrate, who has all the power in his own hands, and appropriates to
himself all the advantages of the contract, has none the less a right to
renounce his authority, the people, who suffer for all the faults of their
chief, must have a much better right to renounce their dependence. But the
terrible and innumerable quarrels and disorders that would necessarily arise
from so dangerous a privilege, show, more than anything else, how much
human governments stood in need of a more solid basis than mere reason,
and how expedient it was for the public tranquillity that the divine will
should interpose to invest the sovereign authority with a sacred and
inviolable character, which might deprive subjects of the fatal right of
disposing of it. If the world had received no other advantages from religion,

this would be enough to impose on men the duty of adopting and cultivating
it, abuses and all, since it has been the means of saving more blood than
fanaticism has ever spilt. But let us follow the thread of our hypothesis.
The different forms of government owe their origin to the differing degrees
of inequality which existed between individuals at the time of their
institution. If there happened to be any one man among them pre-eminent in
power, virtue, riches or personal influence, he became sole magistrate, and
the State assumed the form of monarchy. If several, nearly equal in point of
eminence, stood above the rest, they were elected jointly, and formed an
aristocracy. Again, among a people who had deviated less from a state of
nature, and between whose fortune or talents there was less disproportion,
the supreme administration was retained in common, and a democracy was
formed. It was discovered in process of time which of these forms suited
men the best. Some peoples remained altogether subject to the laws; others
soon came to obey their magistrates. The citizens laboured to preserve their
liberty; the subjects, irritated at seeing others enjoying a blessing they had
lost, thought only of making slaves of their neighbours. In a word, on the
one side arose riches and conquests, and on the other happiness and I virtue.
In these different governments, all the offices were at first elective; and
when the influence of wealth was out of the question, the preference was
given to merit, which gives a natural ascendancy, and to age, which is
experienced in business and deliberate in council. The Elders of the
Hebrews, the Gerontes at Sparta, the Senate at Rome, and the very
etymology of our word Seigneur, show how old age was once held in
veneration. But the more often the choice fell upon old men, the more often
elections had to be repeated, and the more they became a nuisance;
intrigues set in, factions were formed, party feeling grew—bitter, civil wars
broke out; the lives of individuals were sacrificed to the pretended
happiness of the State; and at length men were on the point of relapsing into
their primitive anarchy. Ambitious chiefs profited by these circumstances to
perpetuate their offices in their own families: at the same time the people,
already used to dependence, ease, and the conveniences of life, and already
incapable of breaking its fetters, agreed to an increase of its slavery, in order
to secure its tranquillity. Thus magistrates, having become hereditary,
contracted the habit of considering their offices as a family estate, and
themselves as proprietors of the communities of which they were at first

only the officers, of regarding their fellow-citizens as their slaves, and
numbering them, like cattle, among their belongings, and of calling
themselves the equals of the gods and longs of kings.
If we follow the progress of inequality in these various revolutions, we shall
find that the establishment of laws and of the right of property was its first
term, the institution of magistracy the second, and the conversion of
legitimate into arbitrary power the third and last; so that the condition of
rich and poor was authorised by the first period; that of powerful and weak
by the second; and only by the third that of master and slave, which is the
last degree of inequality, and the term at which all the rest remain, when
they have got so far, till the government is either entirely dissolved by new
revolutions, or brought back again to legitimacy.
To understand this progress as necessary we must consider not so much the
motives for the establishment of the body politic, as the forms it assumes in
actuality, and the faults that necessarily attend it: for the flaws which make
social institutions necessary are the same as make the abuse of them
unavoidable. If we except Sparta, where the laws were mainly concerned
with the education of children, and where Lycurgus established such
morality as practically made laws needless—for laws as a rule, being
weaker than the passions, restrain men without altering them—it would not
be difficult to prove that every government, which scrupulously complied
with the ends for which it was instituted, and guarded carefully against
change and corruption, was set up unnecessarily. For a country, in which no
one either evaded the laws or made a bad use of magisterial power, could
require neither laws nor magistrates.
Political distinctions necessarily produce civil distinctions. The growing
equality between the chiefs and the people is soon felt by individuals, and
modified in a thousand ways according to passions, talents and
circumstances. The magistrate could not usurp any illegitimate power,
without giving distinction to the creatures with whom he must share it.
Besides, individuals only allow themselves to be oppressed so far as they
are hurried on by blind ambition, and, looking rather below than above
them, come to love authority more than independence, and submit to
slavery, that they may in turn enslave others. It is no easy matter to reduce
to obedience a man who has no ambition to command; nor would the most
adroit politician find it possible to enslave a people whose only desire was

to be independent. But inequality easily makes its way among cowardly and
ambitious minds, which are ever ready to run the risks of fortune, and
almost indifferent whether they command or obey, as it is favourable or
adverse. Thus, there must have been; a time, when the eyes of the people
were so fascinated, that their rulers had only to say to the least of men, "Be
great, you and all your posterity," to make him immediately appear great in
the eyes of every one as well as in his own. His descendants took still more
upon them, in proportion to their distance from him; the more obscure; and
uncertain the cause, the greater the effect: the greater—the number of idlers
one could count in a family, the more illustrious it was held to be.
If this were the place to go into details, I could readily explain how, even
without the intervention of government, inequality of credit and authority
became unavoidable among private persons, as soon as their union in a
single society made them compare themselves one with another, and take
into account the differences which they found out from the continual
intercourse every man had to have with his neighbours.[8] These differences
are of several kinds; but riches, nobility or rank, power and personal merit
being the principal distinctions by which men form an estimate "of each
other in society, I could prove that the harmony or conflict of these different
forces is the surest indication of the good or bad constitution of a State. I
could show that among these four kinds of inequality, personal qualities
being the origin of all the others, wealth is the one to which they are all
reduced in the end; for, as riches tend most immediately to the prosperity of
individuals, and are easiest to communicate, they are used to purchase every
other distinction. By this observation we are enabled to judge pretty exactly
how far a people has departed from its primitive constitution, and of its
progress towards the extreme term of corruption. I could explain how much
this universal desire for reputation, honours and advancement, which
inflames us all, exercises and holds up to comparison our faculties and
powers; how it excites and multiplies our passions, and, by creating
universal competition and rivalry, or rather enmity, among men, occasions
numberless failures, successes and disturbances of all kinds by making so
many aspirants run the same course. I could show that it is to this desire of
being talked about, and this unremitting rage of distinguishing ourselves,
that we owe the best and the worst things we possess, both our virtues and
our vices, our science and our errors, our conquerors and our philosophers;
that is to say, a great many bad things, and a very few good ones. In a word,

I could prove that, if we have a few rich and powerful men on the pinnacle
of fortune and grandeur, while the crowd grovels in want and obscurity, it is
because the former prize what they enjoy only in so far as others are
destitute of it; and because, without changing their condition, they would
cease to be happy the moment the people ceased to be wretched.
These details alone, however, would furnish matter for a considerable work,
in which the advantages and disadvantages of every kind of government
might be weighed, as they are related to man in the state of nature, and at
the same time all the different aspects, under which inequality has up to the
present appeared, or may appear in ages yet to come, according to the
nature of the several governments, and the alterations which time must
unavoidably occasion in them, might be demonstrated. We should then see
the multitude oppressed from within, in consequence of the very
precautions it had taken to guard against foreign tyranny. We should see
oppression continually gain ground without it being possible for the
oppressed to know where it would stop, or what legitimate means was left
them of checking its progress. We should see the rights of citizens, and the
freedom of nations slowly extinguished, and the complaints, protests and
appeals of the weak treated as seditious murmurings. We should see the
honour of defending the common cause confined by statecraft to a
mercenary part of the people. We should see taxes made necessary by such
means, and the disheartened husbandman deserting his fields even in the
midst of peace, and leaving the plough to gird on the sword. We should see
fatal and capricious codes of honour established; and the champions of their
country sooner or later becoming its enemies, and for ever holding their
daggers to the breasts of their fellow-citizens. The time would come when
they would be heard saying to the oppressor of their country—
Pectore si fratris gladium juguloque parentis
Condere me jubeas, gravidæque in viscera partu
Conjugis, invitâ peragam tamen omnia dextrâ.
Lucan. i, 376.
From great inequality of fortunes and conditions, from the vast variety of
passions and of talents, of useless and pernicious arts, of vain sciences,
would arise a multitude of prejudices equally contrary to reason, happiness
and virtue. We should see the magistrates fomenting everything that might
weaken men united in society, by promoting dissension among them;

everything that might sow in it the seeds of actual division, while it gave
society the air of harmony; everything that might inspire the different ranks
of people with mutual hatred and distrust, by setting the rights and interests
of one against those of another, and so strengthen the power which
comprehended them all.
It is from the midst of this disorder and these revolutions, that despotism,
gradually raising up its hideous head and devouring everything that
remained sound and untainted in any part of the State, would at length
trample on both the laws and the people, and establish itself on the ruins of
the republic. The times which immediately preceded this last change would
be times of trouble and calamity; but at length the monster would swallow
up everything, and the people would no longer have either chiefs or laws,
but only tyrants. From this moment there would be no question of virtue or
morality; for despotism cui ex honesto nulla est spes, wherever it prevails,
admits no other master; it no sooner speaks than probity and duty lose their
weight and blind obedience is the only virtue which slaves can still practise.
This is the last term of inequality, the extreme points that closes the circle,
and meets that from which we set out. Here all private persons return to
their first equality, because they are nothing; and, subjects having no law
but the will of their master, and their master no restraint but his passions, all
notions of good and all principles of equity again vanish. There is here a
complete return to the law of the strongest, and so to a new state of nature,
differing from that we set out from; for the one was a state of nature in its
first purity, while this is the consequence of excessive corruption. There is
so little difference between the two states in other respects, and the contract
of government is so completely dissolved by despotism, that the despot is
master only so long as he remains the strongest; as soon as he can be
expelled, he has no right to complain of violence. The popular insurrection
that ends in the death or deposition of a Sultan is as lawful an act as those
by which he disposed, the day before, of the lives and fortunes of his
subjects. As he was maintained by force alone, it is force alone that
overthrows him. Thus everything takes place according to the natural order;
and, whatever may be the result of such frequent and precipitate
revolutions, no one man has reason to complain of the injustice of another,
but only of his own ill-fortune or indiscretion.

If the reader thus discovers and retraces the lost and forgotten road, by
which man must have passed from the state of nature to the state of society;
if he carefully restores, along with the intermediate situations which I have
just described, those which want of time has compelled me to suppress, or
my imagination has failed to suggest, he cannot fail to be struck by the vast
distance which separates the two states. It is in tracing this slow succession
that he will find the solution of a number of problems of politics and
morals, which philosophers cannot settle. He will feel that, men being
different in different ages, the reason why Diogenes could not find a man
was that he sought among his contemporaries a man of an earlier period. He
will see that Cato died with Rome and liberty, because he did not fit the age
in which he lived; the greatest of men served only to astonish a world which
he would certainly have ruled, had he lived five hundred years sooner. In a
word, he will explain how the soul and the passions of men insensibly
change their very nature; why our wants and pleasures in the end seek new
objects; and why, the original man having vanished by degrees, society
offers to us only an assembly of artificial men and factitious passions,
which are the work of all these new relations, and without any real
foundation in nature. We are taught nothing on this subject, by reflection,
that is not entirely confirmed by observation. The savage and the civilised
man differ so much in the bottom of their hearts and in their inclinations,
that what constitutes the supreme happiness of one would reduce the other
to despair. The former breathes only peace and liberty; he desires only to
live and be free from labour; even the ataraxia of the Stoic falls far short of
his profound indifference to every other object. Civilised man, on the other
hand, is always moving, sweating, toiling and racking his brains to find still
more laborious occupations: he goes on in drudgery to his last moment, and
even seeks death to put himself in a position to live, or renounces life to
acquire immortality. He pays his court to men in power, whom he hates, and
to the wealthy, whom he despises; he stops at nothing to have the honour of
serving them; he is not ashamed to value himself on his own meanness and
their protection; and, proud of his slavery, he speaks with disdain of those,
who have not the honour of sharing it. What a sight would the perplexing
and envied labours of a European minister of State present to the eyes of a
Caribean! How many cruel deaths would not this indolent savage prefer to
the horrors of such a life, which is seldom even sweetened by the pleasure
of doing good! But, for him to see into the motives of all this solicitude, the

words power and reputation, would have to bear some meaning in his mind;
he would have to know that there are men who set a value on the opinion of
the rest of the world; who can be made happy and satisfied with themselves
rather on the testimony of other people than on their own. In reality, the
source, of all these differences is, that the savage lives within himself, while
social man lives constantly outside himself, and only knows how to live in
the opinion of others, so that he seems to receive the consciousness of his
own existence merely from the judgment of others concerning him. It is not
to my present purpose to insist on the indifference to good and evil which
arises from this disposition, in spite of our many fine works on morality, or
to show how, everything being reduced to appearances, there is but art and
mummery in even honour, friendship, virtue, and often vice itself, of which
we at length learn the secret of boasting; to show, in short, how, always
asking others what, we are, and never daring to ask ourselves, in the midst
of so much philosophy, humanity and civilisation, and of such sublime
codes of morality, we have nothing to show for ourselves but a frivolous
and deceitful appearance, honour without virtue, reason without wisdom,
and pleasure without happiness. It is sufficient that I have proved that this is
not by any means the original state of man, but that it is merely the spirit of
society, and the inequality which society produces, that thus transform and
alter all our natural inclinations.
I have endeavoured to trace the origin and progress of inequality, and the
institution and abuse of political societies, as far as these are capable of
being deduced from the nature of man merely by the light of reason, and
independently of those sacred dogmas which give the sanction of divine
right to sovereign authority. It follows from this survey that, as there is
hardly any inequality in the state of nature, all the inequality which now
prevails owes its strength and growth to the development of our faculties
and the advance of the human mind, and becomes at last permanent and
legitimate by the establishment of property and laws. Secondly, it follows
that moral inequality authorised by positive right alone, clashes with natural
right, whenever it is not proportionate to physical inequality; a distinction
which sufficiently determines what we ought to think of that species of
inequality which prevails in all civilised countries; since it is plainly
contrary to the law of nature, however defined, that children should
command old men, fools wise men, and that the privileged few should

gorge themselves with superfluities, while the starving multitude are in
want of the bare necessities of life.

[5] Ovid, Metamorphoses xi, 127.
Both rich and poor, shocked at their new-found ills,
Would fly from wealth, and lose what they had sought.
[6] Tacitus, Hist. iv, 17. The most wretched slavery they call peace.
[7] Of the Rights of the Most Christian Queen over various States of the Monarchy of Spain, 1667.
[8] Distributive justice would oppose this rigorous equality of the state of nature, even were it
practicable in civil society; as all the members of the State owe it their services in proportion to their
talents and abilities, they ought, on their side, to be distinguished and favoured in proportion to the
services they have actually rendered. It is in this sense we must understand that passage of Isocrates,
in which he extols the primitive Athenians, for having determined which of the two kinds of equality
was the most useful, viz. that which consists in dividing the same advantages indiscriminately among
all the citizens, or that which consists in distributing them to each according to his deserts. These able
politicians, adds the orator, banishing that unjust inequality which makes no distinction between good
and bad men, adhered inviolably to that which rewards and punishes every man according to his
deserts.
But in the first place, there never existed a society, however corrupt some may have become, where
no difference was made between the good and the bad; and with regard to morality, where no
measures can be prescribed by law exact enough to serve as a practical rule for a magistrate, it is with
great prudence that, in order not to leave the fortune or quality of the citizens to his discretion, it
prohibits him from passing judgment on persons and confines his judgment to actions. Only morals
such as those of the ancient Romans can bear censors, and such a tribunal among us would throw
everything into confusion. The difference between good and bad men is determined by public
esteem; the magistrate being strictly a judge of right alone; whereas the public is the truest judge of
morals, and is of such integrity and penetration on this head, that although it may be sometimes
deceived, it can never be corrupted. The rank of citizens ought, therefore, to be regulated, not
according to their personal merit—for this would put it in the power of the magistrate to apply the
law almost arbitrarily—but according to the actual services done to the State, which are capable of
being more exactly estimated.

APPENDIX[1]
A famous author, reckoning up the good and evil of human life, and
comparing the aggregates, finds that our pains greatly exceed our pleasures:
so that, all things considered, human life is not at all a valuable gift. This
conclusion does not surprise me; for the writer drew all his arguments from
man in civilisation. Had he gone back to the state of nature, his inquiries
would clearly have had a different result, and man would have been seen to
be subject to very few evils not of his own creation. It has indeed cost us
not a little trouble to make ourselves as wretched as we are. When we
consider, on the one hand, the immense labours of mankind, the many

sciences brought to perfection, the arts invented, the powers employed, the
deeps filled up, the mountains levelled, the rocks shattered, the rivers made
navigable, the tracts of land cleared, the lakes emptied, the marshes drained,
the enormous structures erected on land, and the teeming vessels that cover
the sea; and, on the other hand, estimate with ever so little thought, the real
advantages that have accrued from all these works to mankind, we cannot
help being amazed at the vast disproportion there is between these things,
and deploring the infatuation of man, which, to gratify his silly pride and
vain self-admiration, induces him eagerly to pursue all the miseries he is
capable of feeling, though beneficent nature had kindly placed them out of
his way.
[1] See the "faculty of self-improvement".

That men are actually wicked, a sad and continual experience of them
proves beyond doubt: but all the same, I think I've shown that man is
naturally good. What then can have depraved him to such an extent, except
the changes that have happened in his constitution, the advances he has
made, and the knowledge he has acquired? We may admire human society
as much as we please; it will be none the less true that it necessarily leads
men to hate each other in proportion as their interests clash, and to do one
another apparent services, while they are really doing every imaginable
mischief. What can be thought of a relation, in which the interest of every
individual dictates rules directly opposite to those the public reason dictates
to the community in general—in which every man finds his profit in the
misfortunes of his neighbour? There is not perhaps any man in a
comfortable position who has not greedy heirs, and perhaps even children,
secretly wishing for his death; not a ship at sea, of which the loss would not
be good news to some merchant or other; not a house, which some debtor of
bad faith would not be glad to see reduced to ashes with all the papers it
contains; not a nation which does not rejoice at the disasters that befall its
neighbours. Thus it is that we find our advantage in the misfortunes of our
fellow-creatures, and that the loss of one man almost always constitutes the
prosperity of another. But it is still more pernicious that public calamities
are the objects of the hopes and expectations of innumerable individuals.
Some desire sickness, some mortality, some war, and some famine. I have
seen men wicked enough to weep for sorrow at the prospect of a plentiful
season; and the great and fatal fire of London, which cost so many unhappy

persons their lives or their fortunes, made the fortunes of perhaps ten
thousand others. I know that Montaigne; censures Demades the Athenian
for having caused to be I punished a workman who, by selling his coffins
very dear, was a great gainer by the deaths of his fellow-citizens; but, the
reason alleged by Montaigne being that everybody ought to be punished,
my point is clearly confirmed by it. Let us penetrate, therefore, the
superficial appearances of benevolence, and survey what passes in the
inmost recesses of the heart. Let us reflect what must be the state of things,
when men are forced to caress and destroy one another at the same time;
when they are born enemies by duty, and knaves by interest. It will perhaps
be said that society is so formed that every man gains by serving the rest.
That would be all very well, if he did not gain still more by injuring them.
There is no legitimate profit so great, that it cannot be greatly exceeded by
what may be made illegitimately; we always gain more by hurting our
neighbours than by doing them good. Nothing is required but to know how
to act with impunity; and to this end the powerful employ all their strength,
and the weak all their cunning.
Savage man, when he has dined, is at peace with all nature, and the friend
of all his fellow-creatures. If a dispute arises about a meal, he rarely comes
to blows, without having first compared the difficulty of conquering his
antagonist with the trouble of finding subsistence elsewhere: and, as pride
does not come in, it all ends in a few blows; the victor eats, and the
vanquished seeks provision somewhere else, and all is at peace. The case is
quite different with man in the state of society, for whom first necessaries
have to be provided, and then superfluities; delicacies follow next, then
immense wealth, then subjects, and then slaves. He enjoys not a moments
relaxation; and what is yet stranger, the less natural and pressing his wants,
the more headstrong are his passions, and, still worse, the more he has it in
his power to gratify them; so that after a long course of prosperity, after
having swallowed up treasures and ruined multitudes, the hero ends up by
cutting every throat till he finds himself, at last, sole master of the world.
Such is in miniature the moral picture, if not of human life, at least of the
secret pretensions of the heart of civilised man.
Compare without partiality the state of the citizen with that of the savage,
and trace out, if you can, how many inlets the former has opened to pain
and death, besides those of his vices, his wants and his misfortunes. If you

reflect on the mental afflictions that prey on us, the violent passions that
waste and exhaust us, the excessive labour with which the poor are
burdened, the still more dangerous indolence to which the wealthy give
themselves up, so that the poor perish of want, and the rich of surfeit; if you
reflect but a moment on the heterogeneous mixtures and pernicious
seasonings of foods; the corrupt state in which they are frequently eaten; on
the adulteration of medicines, the wiles of those who sell them, the mistakes
of those who administer them, and the poisonous vessels in which they are
prepared; on the epidemics bred by foul air in consequence of great
numbers of men being crowded together, or those which are caused by our
delicate way of living, by our passing from our houses into the open air and
back again, by the putting on or throwing off our clothes with too little care,
and by all the precautions which sensuality has converted into necessary
habits, and the neglect of which sometimes costs us our life or health; if you
take into account the conflagrations and earthquakes, which, devouring or
overwhelming whole cities, destroy the inhabitants by thousands; in a word,
if you add together all the dangers with which these causes are always
threatening us, you will see how dearly nature makes us pay for the
contempt with which we have treated her lessons.
I shall not here repeat, what I have elsewhere said of the calamities of war;
but wish that those, who have sufficient knowledge, were willing or bold
enough to make public the details of the villainies committed in armies by
the contractors for commissariat, and hospitals: we should see plainly that
their monstrous frauds, already none too well concealed, which cripple the
finest armies in less than no time, occasion greater destruction among the
soldiers than the swords of the enemy.
The number of people who perish annually at sea, by famine, the scurvy,
pirates, fire and shipwrecks, affords matter for another shocking calculation.
We must also place to the credit of the establishment of property, and
consequently to the institution of society, assassinations, poisonings,
highway robberies, and even the punishments inflicted on the wretches
guilty of these crimes; which, though expedient to prevent greater evils, yet
by making the murder of one man cost the lives of two or more, double the
loss to the human race.
What shameful methods are sometimes practised to prevent the birth of
men, and cheat nature; either by brutal and depraved appetites which insult

her most beautiful work—appetites unknown to savages or mere animals,
which can spring only from the corrupt imagination of mankind in civilised
countries; or by secret abortions, the fitting effects of debauchery and
vitiated notions of honour; or by the exposure or murder of multitudes of
infants, who fall victims to the poverty of their parents, or the cruel shame
of their mothers; or, finally, by the mutilation of unhappy wretches, part of
whose life, with their hope of posterity, is given up to vain singing, or, still
worse, the brutal jealousy of other men: a mutilation which, in the last case,
becomes a double outrage against nature from the treatment of those who
suffer it, and from the use to which they are destined. But is it not a
thousand times more common and more dangerous for paternal rights
openly to offend against humanity? How many talents have not been
thrown away, and inclinations forced, by the unwise constraint of fathers?
How many men, who would have distinguished themselves in a fitting
estate, have died dishonoured and wretched in another for which they had
no taste! How many happy, but unequal, marriages have been broken or
disturbed, and how many chaste wives have been dishonoured, by an order
of things continually in contradiction with that of nature! How many good
and virtuous husbands and wives are reciprocally punished for having been
ill-assorted! How many young and unhappy victims of their parents' avarice
plunge into vice, or pass their melancholy days in tears, groaning in the
indissoluble bonds which their hearts repudiate and gold alone has formed!
Fortunate sometimes are those whose courage and virtue remove them from
life before inhuman violence makes them spend it in crime or in despair.
Forgive me, father and mother, whom I shall ever regret: my complaint
embitters your griefs; but would they might be an eternal and terrible
example to every one who dares, in the name of nature, to violate her most
sacred right.
If I have spoken only of those ill-starred unions which are the result of our
system, is it to be thought that those over which love and sympathy preside
are free from disadvantages? What if I should undertake to show humanity
attacked in its very source, and even in the most sacred of all ties, in which
fortune is consulted before nature, and, the disorders of society confounding
all virtue and vice, continence becomes a criminal precaution, and a refusal
to give life to a fellow-creature, an act of humanity? But, without drawing
aside the veil which hides all these horrors, let us content ourselves with
pointing out the evil which others will have to remedy.

To all this add the multiplicity of unhealthy trades, which shorten men's
lives or destroy their bodies, such as working in the mines, and the
preparing of metals and minerals, particularly lead, copper, mercury, cobalt,
and arsenic: add those other dangerous trades which are daily fatal to many
tilers, carpenters, masons and miners: put all these together and we can see,
in the establishment and perfection of societies, the reasons for that
diminution of our species, which has been noticed by many philosophers.
Luxury, which cannot be prevented among men who are tenacious of their
own convenience and of the respect paid them by others, soon completes
the evil society had begun, and, under the pretence of giving bread to the
poor, whom it should never have made such, impoverishes all the rest, and
sooner or later depopulates the State. Luxury is a remedy much worse than
the disease it sets up to cure; or rather it is in itself the greatest of all evils,
for every State, great or small: for, in order to maintain all the servants and
vagabonds it creates, it brings oppression and ruin on the citizen and the
labourer; it is like those scorching winds, which, covering the trees and
plants with devouring insects, deprive useful animals of their subsistence
and spread famine and death wherever they blow.
From society and the luxury to which it gives birth arise the liberal and
mechanical arts, commerce, letters, and all those superfluities which make
industry flourish, and enrich and ruin nations. The reason for such
destruction is plain. It is easy to see, from the very nature of agriculture,
that it must be the least lucrative of all the arts; for, its produce being the
most universally necessary, the price must be proportionate to the abilities
of the very poorest of mankind.
From the same principle may be deduced this rule, that the arts in general
are more lucrative in proportion as they are less useful; and that, in the end,
the most useful becomes the most neglected. From this we may learn what
to think of the real advantages of industry and the actual effects of its
progress.
Such are the sensible causes of all the miseries, into which opulence at
length plunges the most celebrated nations. In proportion as arts and
industry flourish, the despised husbandman, burdened with the taxes
necessary for the support of luxury, and condemned to pass his days
between labour and hunger, forsakes his native field, to seek in towns the

bread he ought to carry thither. The more our capital cities strike the vulgar
eye with admiration, the greater reason is there to lament the sight of the
abandoned countryside, the large tracts of land that lie uncultivated, the
roads crowded with unfortunate citizens turned beggars or highwaymen,
and doomed to end their wretched lives either on a dunghill or on the
gallows. Thus the State grows rich on the one hand, and feeble and
depopulated on the other; the mightiest monarchies, after having taken
immense pains to enrich and depopulate themselves, fall at last a prey to
some poor nation, which has yielded to the fatal temptation of invading
them, and then, growing opulent and weak in its turn, is itself invaded and
ruined by some other.
Let any one inform us what produced the swarms of barbarians, who
overran Europe, Asia and Africa for so many ages. Was their prodigious
increase due to their industry and arts, to the wisdom of their laws, or to the
excellence of their political system? Let the learned tell us why, instead of
multiplying to such a degree, these fierce and brutal men, without sense or
science, without education, without restraint, did not destroy each other
hourly in quarrelling over the productions of their fields and woods. Let
them tell us how these wretches could have the presumption to oppose such
clever people as we were, so well trained in military discipline, and
possessed of such excellent laws and institutions: and why, since society
has been brought to perfection in northern countries, and so much pains
taken to instruct their inhabitants in their social duties and in the art of
living happily and peaceably together, we see them no longer produce such
numberless hosts as they used once to send forth to be the plague and terror
of other nations. I fear some one may at last answer me by saying, that all
these fine things, arts, sciences and laws, were wisely invented by men, as a
salutary plague, to prevent the too great multiplication of mankind, lest the
world, which was given us for a habitation, should in time be too small for
its inhabitants.
What, then, is to be done? Must societies be totally abolished? Must meum
and tuum be annihilated, and must we return again to the forests to live
among beasts? This is a deduction in the manner of my adversaries, which I
would as soon anticipate as let them have the shame of drawing. O you,
who have never heard the voice of heaven, who think man destined only to
live this little life and die in peace; you, who can resign in the midst of

populous cities your fatal acquisitions, your restless spirits, your corrupt
hearts and endless desires; resume, since it depends entirely on yourselves,
your ancient and primitive innocence: retire to the woods, there to lose the
sight and remembrance of the crimes of your contemporaries; and be not
apprehensive of degrading your species, by renouncing its advances in
order to renounce its vices. As for men like me whose passions have
destroyed their original simplicity, who can no longer subsist on plants or
acorns, or live without laws and magistrates those who were honoured in
their first father with supernatural instructions; those who discover, in the
design of giving human actions at the start a morality which they must
otherwise have been so long in acquiring, the reason for a precept in itself
indifferent and inexplicable on every other system; those, in short, who are
persuaded that the Divine Being has called all mankind to be partakers in
the happiness and perfection of celestial intelligences, all these will
endeavour to merit the eternal prize they are to expect from the practice of
those virtues, which they make themselves follow in learning to know them.
They will respect the sacred bonds of their respective communities; they
will love theft fellow-citizens, and serve them with all their might: they will
scrupulously obey the laws, and all those who make or administer them;
they will particularly honour those wise and good princes, who find means
of preventing, curing or even palliating all these evils and abuses, by which
we are constantly threatened; they will animate the zeal of their deserving
rulers, by showing them, without flattery or fear, the importance of their
office and the severity of their duty. But they will not therefore have less
contempt for a constitution that cannot support itself without the aid of so
many splendid characters, much oftener wished for than found; and from
which, notwithstanding all their pains and solicitude, there always arise
more real calamities than even apparent advantages.

A DISCOURSE ON POLITICAL ECONOMY
The word Economy, or Œconomy, is derived from οἰκός, a house, and
νόμος, law, and meant originally only the wise and legitimate government
of the house for the common good of the whole family. The meaning of the

term was then extended to the government of that great family, the State. To
distinguish these two senses of the word, the latter is called general or
political economy, and the former domestic or particular economy. The first
only is discussed in the present discourse.
Even if there were as close an analogy as many authors maintain between
the State and the family, it would not follow that the rules of conduct proper
for one of these societies would be also proper for the other. They differ too
much in extent to be regulated in the same manner; and there will always be
a great difference between domestic government, in which a father can see
everything for himself, and civil government, where the chief sees hardly
anything save through the eyes of others. To put both on an equality in this
respect, the talents, strength, and all the faculties of the father would have to
increase in proportion to the size of his family, and the soul of a powerful
monarch would have to be, to that of an ordinary man, as the extent of his
empire is to that of a private person's estate.
But how could the government of the State be like that of the family, when
the basis on which they rest is so different? The father being physically
stronger than his children, his paternal authority, as long as they need his
protection, may be reasonably said to be established by nature. But in the
great family, all the members of which are naturally equal, the political
authority, being purely arbitrary as far as its institution is concerned, can be
founded only on conventions, and the Magistrate can have no authority over
the rest, except by virtue of the laws. The duties of a father are dictated to
him by natural feelings, and in a manner that seldom allows him to neglect
them. For rulers there is no such principle, and they are really obliged to the
people only by what they themselves have promised to do, and the people
have therefore a right to require of them. Another more important difference
is that since the children have nothing but what they receive from their
father, it is plain that all the rights of property belong to him, or emanate
from him; but quite the opposite is the case in the great family, where the
general administration is established only to secure individual property,
which is antecedent to it. The principal object of the work of the whole
house is to preserve and increase the patrimony of the father, in order that
he may be able some day to distribute it among his children without
impoverishing them; whereas the wealth of the exchequer is only a means,
often ill understood, of keeping the individuals in peace and plenty. In a

word, the little family is destined to be extinguished, and to resolve itself
some day into several families of a similar nature; but the great family,
being constituted to endure for ever in the same condition, need not, like the
small one, increase for the purpose of multiplying, but need only maintain
itself; and it can easily be proved that any increase does it more harm than
good.
In the family, it is clear, for several reasons which lie in its very nature, that
the father ought to command. In the first place, the authority ought not to be
equally divided between father and mother; the government must be single,
and in every division of opinion there must be one preponderant voice to
decide. Secondly, however lightly we may regard the disadvantages
peculiar to women, yet, as they necessarily occasion intervals of inaction,
this is a sufficient reason for excluding them from this supreme authority:
for when the balance is perfectly even, a straw is enough to turn the scale.
Besides, the husband ought to be able to superintend his wife's conduct,
because it is of importance for him to be assured that the children, whom he
is obliged to acknowledge and maintain, belong to no-one but himself.
Thirdly, children should be obedient to their father, at first of necessity, and
afterwards from gratitude: after having had their wants satisfied by him
during one half of their lives, they ought to consecrate the other half to
providing for his. Fourthly, servants owe him their services in exchange for
the provision he makes for them, though they may break off the bargain as
soon as it ceases to suit them. I say nothing here of slavery, because it is
contrary to nature, and cannot be authorised by any right or law.
There is nothing of all this in political society, in which the chief is so far
from having any natural interest in the happiness of the individuals, that it is
not uncommon for him to seek his own in their misery. If the magistracy is
hereditary, a community of men is often governed by a child. If it be
elective, innumerable inconveniences arise from such election; while in
both cases all the advantages of paternity are lost. If you have but a single
ruler, you lie at the discretion of a master who has no reason to love you:
and if you have several, you must bear at once their tyranny and their
divisions. In a word, abuses are inevitable and their consequences fatal in
every society where the public interest and the laws have no natural force,
and are perpetually attacked by personal interest and the passions of the
ruler and the members.

Although the functions of the father of a family and those of the chief
magistrate ought to make for the same object, they must do so in such
different ways, and their duty and rights are so essentially distinct, that we
cannot confound them without forming very false ideas about the
fundamental laws of society, and falling into errors which are fatal to
mankind. In fact, if the voice of nature is the best counsellor to which a
father can listen in the discharge of his duty, for the Magistrate it is a false
guide, which continually prevents him from performing his, and leads him
on sooner or later to the ruin of himself and of the State, if he is not
restrained by the most sublime virtue. The only precaution necessary for the
father of a family is to guard himself against depravity, and prevent his
natural inclinations from being corrupted; whereas it is these themselves
which corrupt the Magistrate. In order to act aright, the first has only to
consult his heart; the other becomes a traitor the moment he listens to his.
Even his own reason should be suspect to him, nor should he follow any
rule other than the public reason, which is the law. Thus nature has made a
multitude of good fathers of families; but it is doubtful whether, from the
very beginning of the world, human wisdom has made ten men capable of
governing their peers.
From all that has just been said, it follows that public economy, which is my
subject, has been rightly distinguished from private economy, and that, the
State having nothing in common with the family except the obligations
which their heads lie under of making both of them happy, the same rules of
conduct cannot apply to both. I have considered these few lines enough to
overthrow the detestable system which Sir Robert Filmer has endeavoured
to establish in his Patriarcha; a work to which two celebrated writers have
done too much honour in writing books to refute it. Moreover, this error is
of very long standing; for Aristotle himself thought proper to combat it with
arguments which may be found in the first book of his Politics.
I must here ask my readers to distinguish also between public economy,
which is my subject and which I call government, and the supreme
authority, which I call Sovereignty; a distinction which consists in the fact
that the latter has the right of legislation, and in certain cases binds the body
of the nation itself, while the former has only the right of execution, and is
binding only on individuals.

I shall take the liberty of making use of a very common, and in some
respects inaccurate, comparison, which will serve to illustrate my meaning.
The body politic, taken individually, may be considered as an organised,
living body, resembling that of man. The sovereign power represents the
head; the laws and customs are the brain, the source of the nerves and seat
of the understanding, will and senses, of which the Judges and Magistrates
are the organs: commerce, industry, and agriculture are the mouth and
stomach which prepare the common subsistence; the public income is the
blood, which a prudent economy, in performing the functions of the heart,
causes to distribute through the whole body nutriment and life: the citizens
are the body and the members, which make the machine live, move and
work; and no part of this machine can be damaged without the painful
impression being at once conveyed to the brain, if the animal is in a state of
health.
The life of both bodies is the self common
sensibility and internal correspondence of
communication ceases, where the formal
contiguous parts belong to one another only
dead, or the State is dissolved.

to the whole, the reciprocal
all the parts. Where this
unity disappears, and the
by juxtaposition, the man is

The body politic, therefore, is also a moral being possessed of a will; and
this general will, which tends always to the preservation and welfare of the
whole and of every part, and is the source of the laws, constitutes for all the
members of the State, in their relations to one another and to it, the rule of
what is just or unjust: a truth which shows, by the way, how idly some
writers have treated as theft the subtlety prescribed to children at Sparta for
obtaining their frugal repasts, as if everything ordained by the law were not
lawful.
It is important to observe that this rule of justice, though certain with regard
to all citizens, may be defective with regard to foreigners. The reason is
clear. The will of the State, though general in relation to its own members,
is no longer so in relation to other States and their members, but becomes,
for them, a particular and individual will, which has its rule of justice in the
law of nature. This, however, enters equally into the principle here laid
down; for in such a case, the great city of the world becomes the body
politic, whose general will is always the law of nature, and of which the

different States and peoples are individual members. From these
distinctions, applied to each political society and its members, are derived
the most certain and universal rules, by which we can judge whether a
government is good or bad, and in general of the morality of all human
actions.
Every political society is composed of other smaller societies of different
kinds, each of which has its interests and its rules of conduct: but those
societies which everybody perceives, because they have an external and
authorised form, are not the only ones that actually exist in the State: all
individuals who are united by a common interest compose as many others,
either transitory or permanent, whose influence is none the less real because
it is less apparent, and the proper observation of whose various relations is
the true knowledge of public morals and manners. The influence of all these
tacit or formal associations causes, by the influence of their will, as many
different modifications of the public will. The will of these particular
societies has always two relations; for the members of the association, it is a
general will; for the great society, it is a particular will; and it is often right
with regard to the first object, and wrong as to the second. An individual
may be a devout priest, a brave soldier, or a zealous senator, and yet a bad
citizen. A particular resolution may be advantageous to the smaller
community, but pernicious to the greater. It is true that particular societies
being always subordinate to the general society in preference to others, the
duty of a citizen takes precedence of that of a senator, and a man's duty of
that of a citizen: but unhappily personal interest is always found in inverse
ratio to duty, and increases in proportion as the association grows narrower,
and the engagement less sacred; which irrefragably proves that the most
general will is always the must just also, and that the voice of the people is
in fact the voice of God.
It does not follow that the public decisions are always equitable; they may
possibly, for reasons which I have given, not be so when they have to do
with foreigners. Thus it is not impossible that a Republic, though in itself
well governed, should enter upon an unjust war. Nor is it less possible for
the Council of a Democracy to pass unjust decrees, and condemn the
innocent; but this never happens unless the people is seduced by private
interests, which the credit or eloquence of some clever persons substitutes
for those of the State; in which case the general will will be one thing, and

the result of the public deliberation another. This is not contradicted by the
case of the Athenian Democracy; for Athens was in fact not a Democracy,
but a very tyrannical Aristocracy, governed by philosophers and orators.
Carefully determine what happens in every public deliberation, and it will
be seen that the general will is always for the common good; but very often
there is a secret division, a tacit confederacy, which, for particular ends,
causes the natural disposition of the assembly to be set at nought. In such a
case the body of society is really divided into other bodies, the members of
which acquire a general will, which is good and just with respect to these
new bodies, but unjust and bad with regard to the whole, from which each
is thus dismembered.
We see then how easy it is, by the help of these principles, to explain those
apparent contradictions, which are noticed in the conduct of many persons
who are scrupulously honest in some respects, and cheats and scoundrels in
others, who trample under foot the most sacred duties, and yet are faithful
to the death to engagements that are often illegitimate. Thus the most
depraved of men always pay some sort of homage to public faith; and even
robbers, who are the enemies of virtue in the great society, pay some respect
to the shadow of it in their secret caves.
In establishing the general will as the first principle of public economy, and
the fundamental rule of government, I have not thought it necessary to
inquire seriously whether the Magistrates belong to the people, or the
people to the Magistrates; or whether in public affairs the good of the State
should be taken into account, or only that of its rulers. That question indeed
has long been decided one way in theory, and another in practice; and in
general it would be ridiculous to expect that those who are in fact masters
will prefer any other interest to their own. It would not be improper,
therefore, further to distinguish public economy as popular or tyrannical.
The former is that of every State, in which there reigns between the people
and the rulers unity of interest and will: the latter will necessarily exist
wherever the government and the people have different interests, and,
consequently, opposing wills. The rules of the latter are written at length in
the archives of history, and in the satires of Macchiavelli. The rules of the
former are found only in the writings of those philosophers who venture to
proclaim the rights of humanity.

I. The first and most important rule of legitimate or popular government,
that is to say, of government whose object is the good of the people, is
therefore, as I have observed, to follow in everything the general will. But
to follow this will it is necessary to know it, and above all to distinguish it
from the particular will, beginning with one's self: this distinction is always
very difficult to make, and only the most sublime virtue can afford
sufficient illumination for it. As, in order to will, it is necessary to be free, a
difficulty no less great than the former arises—that of preserving at once the
public liberty and the authority of government. Look into the motives which
have induced men, once united by their common needs in a general society,
to unite themselves still more intimately by means of civil societies: you
will find no other motive than that of assuring the property, life and liberty
of each member by the protection of all. But can men be forced to defend
the liberty of any one among them, without trespassing on that of others?
And how can they provide for the public needs, without alienating the
individual property of those who are forced to contribute to them? With
whatever sophistry all this may be covered over, it is certain that if any
constraint can be laid on my will, I am no longer free, and that I am no
longer master of my own property, if any one else can lay a hand on it. This
difficulty, which would have seemed insurmountable, has been removed,
like the first, by the most sublime of all human institutions, or rather by a
divine inspiration, which teaches mankind to imitate here below the
unchangeable decrees of the Deity. By what inconceivable art has a means
been found of making men free by making them subject; of using in the
service of the State the properties, the persons and even the lives of all its
members, without constraining and without consulting them; of confining
their will by their own admission; of overcoming their refusal by that
consent, and forcing them to punish themselves, when they act against their
own will? How can it be that all should obey, yet nobody take upon him to
command, and that all should serve, and yet have no masters, but be the
more free, as, in apparent subjection, each loses no part of his liberty but
what might be hurtful; to that of another? These wonders are the work of
law. It is to law alone that men owe justice and liberty. It is this salutary
organ of the will of all which establishes, in civil right, the natural equality
between men. It is this celestial voice which dictates to each citizen the
precepts of public reason, and teaches him to act according to the rules of
his own judgment, and not to behave inconsistently with himself. It is with

this voice alone that political rulers should speak when they command; for
no sooner does one man, setting aside the law, claim to subject another to
his private will, than he departs from the state of civil society, and confronts
him face to face in the pure state of nature, in which obedience is prescribed
solely by necessity.
The most pressing interest of the ruler, and even his most indispensable
duty, therefore, is to watch over the observation of the laws of which he is
the minister, and on which his whole authority is founded. At the same
time, if he exacts the observance of them from others, he is the more
strongly bound to observe them himself, since he enjoys all their favour.
For his example is of such force, that even if the people were willing to
permit him to release himself from the yoke of the law, he ought to be
cautious in availing himself of so dangerous a prerogative, which others
might soon claim to usurp in their turn, and often use to his prejudice. At
bottom, as all social engagements are mutual in nature, it is impossible for
any one to set himself above the law, without renouncing its advantages; for
nobody is bound by any obligation to one who claims that he is under no
obligations to others. For this reason no exemption from the law will ever
be granted, on any ground whatsoever, in a well-regulated government.
Those citizens who have deserved well of their country ought to be
rewarded with honours, but never with privileges: for the Republic is at the
eve of its fall, when any one can think it fine not to obey the laws. If the
nobility or the soldiery should ever adopt such a maxim, all would be lost
beyond redemption.
The power of the laws depends still more on their own wisdom than on the
severity of their administrators, and the public will derives its greatest
weight from the reason which has dictated it. Hence Plato looked upon it as
a very necessary precaution to place at the head of all edicts a preamble,
setting forth their justice and utility. In fact, the first of all laws is to respect
the laws: the severity of penalties is only a vain resource, invented by little
minds in order to substitute terror for that respect which they have no means
of obtaining. It has constantly been observed that in those countries where
legal punishments are most severe, they are also most frequent; so that the
cruelty of such punishments is a proof only of the multitude of criminals,
and, punishing everything with equal severity, induces those who are guilty
to commit crimes, in order to escape being punished for their faults.

But though the government be not master of the law, it is much to be its
guarantor, and to possess a thousand means of inspiring the love of it. In
this alone the talent of reigning consists. With force in one's hands, there is
no art required to make the whole world tremble, nor indeed much to gain
men's hearts; for experience has long since taught the people to give its
rulers great credit for all the evil they abstain from doing it, and to adore
them if they do not absolutely hate it. A fool, if he be obeyed, may punish
crimes as well as another: but the true statesman is he who knows how to
prevent them: it is over the wills, even more than the actions, of his subjects
that his honourable rule is extended. If he could secure that every one
should act aright, he would no longer have anything to do; and the
masterpiece of his labours would be to be able to remain unemployed. It is
certain, at least, that the greatest talent a ruler can possess is to disguise his
power, in order to render it less odious, and to conduct the State so
peaceably as to make it seem to have no need of conductors.
I conclude, therefore, that, as the first duty of the legislator is to make the
laws conformable to the general will, the first rule of public economy is that
the administration of justice should be conformable to the laws. It will even
be enough to prevent the State from being ill governed, that the Legislator
shall have provided, as he should, for every need of place, climate, soil,
custom, neighbourhood, and all the rest of the relations peculiar to the
people he had to institute. Not but what there still remains an infinity of
details of administration and economy, which are left to the wisdom of the
government: but there are two infallible rules for its good conduct on these
occasions; one is, that the spirit of the law ought to decide in every
particular case that could not be foreseen; the other is that the general will,
the source and supplement of all laws, should be consulted wherever they
fail. But how, I shall be asked, can the general will be known in cases in
which it has not expressed itself? Must the whole nation be assembled
together at every unforeseen event? Certainly not. It ought the less to be
assembled, because it is by no means certain that its decision would be the
expression of the general will; besides, the method would be impracticable
in a great people, and is hardly ever necessary where the government is
well-intentioned: for the rulers well know that the general will is always on
the side which is most favourable to the public interest, that is to say, most
equitable; so that it is needful only to act justly, to be certain of following
the general will. When this is flouted too openly, it makes itself felt, in spite

of the formidable restraint of the public authority. I shall cite the nearest
possible examples that may be followed in such cases.
In China, it is the constant maxim of the Prince to decide against his
officers, in every dispute that arises between them and the people. If bread
be too dear in any province, the Intendant of that province is thrown into
prison. If there be an insurrection in another, the Governor is dismissed, and
every Mandarin answers with his head for all the mischief that happens in
his department. Not that these affairs do not subsequently undergo a regular
examination; but long experience has caused the judgment to be thus
anticipated. There is seldom any injustice to be repaired; in the meantime,
the Emperor, being satisfied that public outcry does not arise without cause,
always discovers, through the seditious clamours which he punishes, just
grievances to redress.
It is a great thing to preserve the rule of peace and order through all the
parts of the Republic; it is a great thing that the State should be tranquil, and
the law respected: but if nothing more is done, there will be in all this more
appearance than reality; for that government which confines itself to mere
obedience will find difficulty in getting itself obeyed. If it is good to know
how to deal with men as they are, it is much better to make them what there
is need that they should be. The most absolute authority is that which
penetrates into a man's inmost being, and concerns itself no less with his
will than with his actions. It is certain that all peoples become in the long
run what the government makes them; warriors, citizens, men, when it so
pleases; or merely populace and rabble, when it chooses to make them so.
Hence every prince who despises his subjects, dishonours himself, in
confessing that he does not know how to make them worthy of respect.
Make men, therefore, if you would command men: if you would have them
obedient to the laws, make them love the laws, and then they will need only
to know what is their duty to do it. This was the great art of ancient
governments, in those distant times when philosophers gave laws to men,
and made use of their authority only to render them wise and happy. Thence
arose the numerous sumptuary laws, the many regulations of morals, and all
the public rules of conduct which were admitted or rejected with the
greatest care. Even tyrants did not forget this important part of
administration, but took as great pains to corrupt the morals of their slaves,
as Magistrates took to correct those of their fellow-citizens. But our modern

governments, which imagine they have done everything when they have
raised money, conceive that it is unnecessary and even impossible to go a
step further.
II. The second essential rule of public economy is no less important than the
first. If you would have the general will accomplished, bring all the
particular wills into conformity with it; in other words, as virtue is nothing
more than this conformity of the particular wills with the general will,
establish the reign of virtue.
If our politicians were less blinded by their ambition, they would see how
impossible it is for any establishment whatever to act in the spirit of its
institution, unless it is guided in accordance with the law of duty; they
would feel that the greatest support of public authority lies in the hearts of
the citizens, and that nothing can take the place of morality in the
maintenance of government. It is not only upright men who know how to
administer the laws; but at bottom only good men know how to obey them.
The man who once gets the better of remorse, will not shrink before
punishments which are less severe, and less lasting, and from which there is
at least the hope of escaping: whatever precautions are taken, those who
only require impunity in order to do wrong will not fail to find means of
eluding the law, and avoiding its penalties. In this case, as all particular
interests unite against the general interest, which is no longer that of any
individual, public vices have a greater effect in enervating the laws than the
laws in the repression of such vices: so that the corruption of the people and
of their rulers will at length extend to the government, however wise it may
be. The worst of all abuses is to pay an apparent obedience to the laws, only
in order actually to break them with security. For in this case the best laws
soon become the most pernicious; and it would be a hundred times better
that they should not exist. In such a situation, it is vain to add edicts to
edicts and regulations to regulations. Everything serves only to introduce
new abuses, without correcting the old. The more laws are multiplied, the
more they are despised, and all the new officials appointed to supervise
them are only so many more people to break them, and either to share the
plunder with their predecessors, or to plunder apart on their own. The
reward of virtue soon becomes that of robbery; the vilest of men rise to the
greatest credit; the greater they are the more despicable they become; their
infamy appears even in their dignities, and their very honours dishonour

them. If they buy the influence of the leaders or the protection of women, it
is only that they may sell justice, duty, and the State in their turn: in the
meantime, the people, feeling that its vices are not the first cause of its
misfortunes, murmurs and complains that all its misfortunes come solely
from those whom it pays to protect it from such things.
It is under these circumstances that the voice of duty no longer speaks in
men's hearts, and their rulers are obliged to substitute the cry of terror, or
the lure of an apparent interest, of which they subsequently trick their
creatures. In this situation they are compelled to have recourse to all the
petty and despicable shifts which they call rules of State and mysteries of
the cabinet. All the vigour that is left in the government is used by its
members in ruining and supplanting one another, while the public business
is neglected, or is transacted only as personal interest requires and directs.
In short, the whole art of those great politicians lies in so mesmerising those
they stand in need of, that each may think he is labouring for his own
interest in working for theirs: I say theirs on the false supposition that it is
the real interest of rulers to annihilate a people in order to make it subject,
and to; ruin their own property in order to secure their possession of it.
But when the citizens love their duty, and the guardians of the public
authority sincerely apply themselves to the fostering of that love by their
own example and assiduity, every difficulty vanishes; and government
becomes so easy that it needs none of that art of darkness, whose blackness
is its only mystery. Those enterprising spirits, so dangerous and so much
admired, all those great ministers, whose glory is inseparable from the
miseries of the people, are no longer regretted: public morality supplies
what is wanting in the genius of the rulers; and the more virtue reigns, the
less need there is for talent. Even ambition is better served by duty than by
usurpation: when the people is convinced that its rulers are labouring only
for its happiness, its deference saves them the trouble of labouring to
strengthen their power: and history shows us, in a thousand cases, that the
authority of one who is beloved over those whom he loves is a hundred
times more absolute than all the tyranny of usurpers. This does not mean
that the government ought to be afraid to make use of its power, but that it
ought to make use of it only in a lawful manner. We find in history a
thousand examples of pusillanimous or ambitious rulers, who were ruined
by their slackness or their pride; not one who suffered for having been

strictly just. But we ought not to confound negligence with moderation, or
clemency with weakness. To be just, it is necessary to be severe; to permit
vice, when one has the right and the power to suppress it, is to be oneself
vicious.
It is not enough to say to the citizens, be good; they must be taught to be so;
and even example, which is in this respect the first lesson, is not the sole
means to be employed; patriotism is the most efficacious: for, as I have said
already, every man is virtuous when his particular will is in all things
conformable to the general will, and we voluntarily will what is willed by
those whom we love. It appears that the feeling of humanity evaporates and
grows feeble in embracing all mankind, and that we cannot be affected by
the calamities of Tartary or Japan, in the same manner as we are by those of
European nations. It is necessary in some degree to confine and limit our
interest and compassion in order to make it active. Now, as this sentiment
can be useful only to those with whom we have to live, it is proper that our
humanity should confine itself to our fellow-citizens, and should receive a
new force because we are in the habit of seeing them, and by reason of the
common interest which unites them. It is certain that the greatest miracles
of virtue have been produced by patriotism: this fine and lively feeling,
which gives to the force of self-love all the beauty of virtue, lends it an
energy which, without disfiguring it, makes it the most heroic of all
passions. This it is that produces so many immortal actions, the glory of
which dazzles our feeble eyes; and so many great men, whose old-world
virtues pass for fables now that patriotism is made mock of. This is not
surprising; the transports of susceptible hearts appear altogether fanciful to
any one who has never felt them; and the love of one's country, which is a
hundred times more lively and delightful than the love of a mistress, cannot
be conceived except by experiencing it. But it is easy to perceive in every
heart that is warmed by it, in all the actions it inspires, a glowing and
sublime ardour which does not attend the purest virtue, when separated
from it. Contrast Socrates even with Cato; the one was the greater
philosopher, the other more of the citizen. Athens was already ruined in the
time of Socrates, and he had no other country than the world at large. Cato
had the cause of his country always at heart; he lived for it alone, and could
not bear to outlive it. The virtue of Socrates was that of the wisest of men;
but, compared with Cæsar and Pompey, Cato seems a God among mortals.
Socrates instructed a few individuals, opposed the Sophists, and died for

truth: but Cato defended his country, its liberty and its laws, against the
conquerors of the world, and at length departed from the earth, when he had
no longer a country to serve. A worthy pupil of Socrates would be the most
virtuous of his contemporaries; but a worthy follower of Cato would be one
of the greatest. The virtue of the former would be his happiness; the latter
would seek his happiness in that of all. We should be taught by the one, and
led by the other; and this alone is enough to determine which to prefer: for
no people has ever been made into a nation of philosophers, but it is not
impossible to make a people happy.
Do we wish men to be virtuous? Then let us begin by making them love
their country: but how can they love it, if their country be nothing more to
them than to strangers, and afford them nothing but what it can refuse
nobody? It would be still worse, if they did not enjoy even the privilege of
social security, and if their lives, liberties and property lay at the mercy of
persons in power, without their being permitted, or it being possible for
them, to get relief from the laws. For in that case, being subjected to the
duties of the state of civil society, without enjoying even the common
privileges of the state of nature, and without being able to use their strength
in their own defence, they would be in the worst, condition in which
freemen could possibly find themselves, and the word country would mean
for them something merely odious and ridiculous. It must not be imagined
that a man can break or lose an arm, without the pain being conveyed to his
head: nor is it any more credible that the general will should consent that
any one member of the State, whoever he might be, should wound or
destroy another, than it is that the fingers of a man in his senses should
wilfully scratch his eyes out. The security of individuals is so intimately
connected with the public confederation that, apart from the regard that
must be paid to human weakness, that convention would in point of right be
dissolved, if in the State a single citizen who might have been relieved were
allowed to perish, or if one were wrongfully confined in prison, or if in one
case an obviously unjust sentence were given. For the fundamental
conventions being broken, it is impossible to conceive of any right or
interest that could retain the people in the social union; unless they were
restrained by force, which alone causes the dissolution of the state of civil
society.

In fact, does not the undertaking entered into by the whole body of the
nation bind it to provide for the security of the least of its members with as
much care as for that of all the rest? Is the welfare of a single citizen any
less the common cause than that of the whole State? It may be said that it is
good that one should perish for all. I am ready to admire such a saying
when it comes from the lips of a virtuous and worthy patriot, voluntarily
and dutifully sacrificing himself for the good of his country: but if we are to
understand by it, that it is lawful for the government to sacrifice an innocent
man for the good of the multitude, I look upon it as one of the most
execrable rules tyranny ever invented, the greatest falsehood that can be
advanced, the most dangerous admission that can be made, and a direct
contradiction of the fundamental laws of society. So little is it the case that
any one person ought to perish for all, that all have pledged their lives and
properties for the defence of each, in order that the weakness of individuals
may always be protected by the strength of the public, and each member by
the whole State. Suppose we take from the whole people one individual
after another, and then press the advocates of this rule to explain more
exactly what they mean by the body of the State, and we shall see that it will
at length be reduced to a small number of persons, who are not the people,
but the officers of the people, and who, having bound themselves by
personal oath to perish for the welfare of the people, would thence infer that
the people is to perish for their own.
Need we look for examples of the protection which the State owes to its
members, and the respect it owes to their persons? It is only among the
most illustrious and courageous nations that they are to be found; it is only
among free peoples that the dignity of man is realised. It is well known into
what perplexity the whole republic of Sparta was thrown, when the question
of punishing a guilty citizen arose.
In Macedon, the life of a man was a matter of such importance, that
Alexander the Great, at the height of his glory, would not have dared to put
a Macedonian criminal to death in cold blood, till the accused had appeared
to make his defence before his fellow-citizens, and had been condemned by
them. But the Romans distinguished themselves above all other peoples by
the regard which their government paid to the individual, and by its
scrupulous attention to the preservation of the inviolable rights of all the
members of the State. Nothing was so sacred among them as the life of a

citizen; and no less than an assembly of the whole people was needed to
condemn one. Not even the Senate, nor the Consuls, in all their majesty,
possessed the right; but the crime and punishment of a citizen were
regarded as a public calamity among the most powerful people in the world.
So hard indeed did it seem to shed blood for any crime whatsoever, that by
the Lex Porcia, the penalty of death was commuted into that of banishment
for all those who were willing to survive the loss of so great a country.
Everything both at Rome, and in the Roman armies, breathed that love of
fellow-citizens one for another, and that respect for the Roman name, which
raised the courage and inspired the virtue of every one who had the honour
to bear it. The cap of a citizen delivered from slavery, the civic crown of
him who had saved the life of another, were looked upon with the greatest
pleasure amid the pomp of their triumphs; and it is remarkable that among
the crowns which were bestowed in honour of splendid actions in war, the
civic crown and that of the triumphant general alone were of laurel, all the
others being merely of gold. It was thus that Rome was virtuous and
became the mistress of the world. Ambitious rulers! A herdsman governs
his dogs and cattle, and yet is only the meanest of mankind. If it be a fine
thing to command, it is when those who obey us are capable of doing us
honour. Show respect, therefore, to your fellow-citizens, and you will
render yourselves worthy of respect; show respect to liberty, and your
power will increase daily. Never exceed your rights, and they will soon
become unlimited.
Let our country then show itself the common mother of her citizens; let the
advantages they enjoy in their country endear it to them; let the government
leave them enough share in the public administration to make them feel that
they are at home; and let the laws be in their eyes only the guarantees of the
common liberty. These rights, great as they are, belong to all men: but
without seeming to attack them directly, the ill-will of rulers may in fact
easily reduce their effect to nothing. The law, which they thus abuse, serves
the powerful at once as a weapon of offence, and as a shield against the
weak; and the pretext of the public good is always the most dangerous
scourge of the people. What is most necessary, and perhaps most difficult,
in government, is rigid integrity in doing strict justice to all, and above all
in protecting the poor against the tyranny of the rich. The greatest evil has
already come about, when there are poor men to be defended, and rich men
to be restrained. It is on the middle classes alone that the whole force of the

law is exerted; they are equally powerless against the treasures of the rich
and the penury of the poor. The first mocks them, the second escapes them.
The one breaks the meshes, the other passes through them.
It is therefore one of the most important functions of government to prevent
extreme inequality of fortunes; not by taking away wealth from its
possessors, but by depriving all men of means to accumulate it; not by
building hospitals for the poor, but by securing the citizens from becoming
poor. The unequal distribution of inhabitants over the territory, when men
are crowded together in one place, while other places are depopulated; the
encouragement of the arts that minister to luxury and of purely industrial
arts at the expense of useful and laborious crafts; the sacrifice of agriculture
to commerce; the necessitation of the tax-farmer by the mal-administration
of the funds of the State; and in short, venality pushed to such an extreme
that even public esteem is reckoned at a cash value, and virtue rated at a
market price: these are the most obvious causes of opulence and of poverty,
of public interest, of mutual hatred among citizens, of indifference to the
common cause, of the corruption of the people, and of the weakening of all
the springs of government. Such are the evils, which are with difficulty
cured when they make themselves felt, but which a wise administration
ought to prevent, if it is to maintain, along with good morals, respect for the
laws, patriotism, and the influence of the general will.
But all these precautions will be inadequate, unless rulers go still more to
the root of the matter. I conclude this part of public economy where I ought
to have begun it. There can be no patriotism without liberty, no liberty
without virtue, no virtue without citizens; create citizens, and you have
everything you need; without them, you will have nothing but debased
slaves, from the rulers of the State downwards. To form citizens is not the
work of a day; and in order to have men it is necessary to educate them
when they are children. It will be said, perhaps, that whoever has men to
govern, ought not to seek, beyond their nature, a perfection of which they
are incapable; that he ought not to desire to destroy their passions; and that
the execution of such an attempt is no more desirable than it is possible. I
will agree, further, that a man without passions would certainly be a bad
citizen; but it must be agreed also that, if men are not taught not to love
some things, it is impossible to teach them to love one object more than
another—to prefer that which is truly beautiful to that which is deformed.

If, for example, they were early accustomed to regard their individuality
only in its relation to the body of the State, and to be aware, so to speak, of
their own existence merely as a part of that of the State, they might at
length come to identify themselves in some degree with this greater whole,
to feel themselves members of their country, and to love it with that
exquisite feeling which no isolated person has save for himself; to lift up
their spirits perpetually to this great object, and thus to transform into a
sublime virtue that dangerous disposition which gives rise to all our vices.
Not only does philosophy demonstrate the possibility of giving feeling
these new directions; history furnishes us with a thousand striking
examples. If they are so rare among us moderns, it is because nobody
troubles himself whether citizens exist or not, and still less does anybody
think of attending to the matter soon enough to make them. It is too late to
change our natural inclinations, when they have taken their course, and
egoism is confirmed by habit: it is too late to lead us out of ourselves when
once the human Ego, concentrated in our hearts, has acquired that
contemptible activity which absorbs all virtue and constitutes the life and
being of little minds. How can, patriotism germinate in the midst of so
many other passions which smother it? And what can remain, for fellowcitizens, of a heart already divided between avarice, a mistress, and vanity?
From the first moment of life, men ought to begin learning to deserve to
live; and, as at the instant of birth we partake of the rights of citizenship,
that instant ought to be the beginning of the exercise of our duty. If there are
laws for the age of maturity, there ought to be laws for infancy, teaching
obedience to others: and as the reason of each man is not left to be the sole
arbiter of his duties, government ought the less indiscriminately to abandon
to the intelligence and prejudices of fathers the education of their children,
as that education is of still greater importance to the State than to the
fathers: for, according to the course of nature, the death of the father often
deprives him of the final fruits of education; but his country sooner or later
perceives its effects. Families dissolve, but the State remains.
Should the public authority, by taking the place of the father, and charging
itself with that important function, acquire his rights by discharging his
duties, he would have the less cause to complain, as he would only be
changing his title, and would have in common, under the name of citizen,
the same authority over his children, as he was exercising separately under

the name of father, and would not be less obeyed when speaking in the
name of the law, than when he spoke in that of nature. Public education,
therefore, under regulations prescribed by the government, and under
magistrates established by the Sovereign, is one of the fundamental rules of
popular or legitimate government. If children are brought up in common in
the bosom of equality; if they are imbued with the laws of the State and the
precepts of the general will; if they are taught to respect these above all
things; if they are surrounded by examples and objects which constantly
remind them of the tender mother who nourishes them, of the love she bears
them, of the inestimable benefits they receive from her, and of the return
they owe her, we cannot doubt that they will learn to cherish one another
mutually as brothers, to will nothing contrary to the will of society, to
substitute the actions of men and citizens for the futile and vain babbling of
sophists, and to become in time defenders and fathers of the country of
which they will have been so long the children.
I shall say nothing of the Magistrates destined to preside over such an
education, which is certainly the most important business of the State. It is
easy to see that if such marks of public confidence were conferred on slight
grounds, if this sublime function were not, for those who have worthily
discharged all other offices, the reward of labour, the pleasant and
honourable repose of old age, and the crown of all honours, the whole
enterprise would be useless and the education void of success. For whereever the lesson is not supported by authority, and the precept by example,
all instruction is fruitless; and virtue itself loses its credit in the mouth of
one who does not practise it. But let illustrious warriors, bent under the
weight of their laurels, preach courage: let upright Magistrates, grown white
in the purple and on the bench teach justice. Such teachers as these would
thus get themselves virtuous successors, and transmit from age to age, to
generations to come, the experience and talents of rulers, the courage and
virtue of citizens, and common emulation in all to live and die for their
country.
I know of but three peoples which once practised public education, the
Cretans, the Lacedæmonians, and the ancient Persians: among all these it
was attended with the greatest success, and indeed it did wonders among
the two last. Since the world has been divided into nations too great to
admit of being well governed, this method has been no longer practicable,

and the reader will readily perceive other reasons why such a thing has
never been attempted by any modern people. It is very remarkable that the
Romans were able to dispense with it; but Rome was for five hundred years
one continued miracle which the world cannot hope to see again. The virtue
of the Romans, engendered by their horror of tyranny and the crimes of
tyrants, and by an innate patriotism, made all their houses so many schools
of citizenship; while the unlimited power of fathers over their children
made the individual authority so rigid that the father was more feared than
the Magistrate, and was in his family tribunal both censor of morals and
avenger of the laws.
Thus a careful and well-intentioned government, vigilant incessantly to
maintain or restore patriotism and morality among the people, provides
beforehand against the evils which sooner or later result from the
indifference of the citizens to the fate of the Republic, keeping within
narrow bounds that personal interest which so isolates the individual that
the State is enfeebled by his power, and has nothing to hope from his goodwill. Wherever men love their country, respect the laws, and live simply,
little remains to be done in order to make them happy; and in public
administration, where chance has less influence than in the lot of
individuals, wisdom is so nearly allied to happiness, that the two objects are
confounded.
III. It is not enough to have citizens and to protect them, it is also necessary
to consider their subsistence. Provision for the public wants is an obvious
inference from the general will, and the third essential duty of government.
This duty is not, we should feel, to fill the granaries of individuals and
thereby to grant them a dispensation from labour, but to keep plenty so
within their reach that labour is always necessary and never useless for its
acquisition. It extends also to everything regarding the management of the
exchequer, and the expenses of public administration. Having thus treated
of general economy with reference to the government of persons, we must
now consider it with reference to the administration of property.
This part presents no fewer difficulties to solve, and contradictions to
remove, than the preceding. It is certain that the right of property is the
most sacred of all the rights of citizenship, and even more important in
some respects than liberty itself; either because it more nearly affects the
preservation of life, or because, property being more easily usurped and

more difficult to defend than life, the law ought to pay a greater attention to
what is most easily taken away; or finally, because property is the true
foundation of civil society, and the real guarantee of the undertakings of
citizens: for if property were not answerable for personal actions, nothing
would be easier than to evade duties and laugh at the laws. On the other
hand, it is no less certain that the maintenance of the State and the
government involves costs and out-goings; and as every one who agrees to
the end must acquiesce in the means, it follows that the members of a
society ought to contribute from their property to its support. Besides, it is
difficult to secure the property of individuals on one side, without attacking
it on another; and it is impossible that all the regulations which govern the
order of succession, will, contracts, &c. should not lay individuals under
some constraint as to the disposition of their goods, and should not
consequently restrict the right of property.
But besides what I have said above of the agreement between the authority
of law and the liberty of the citizen, there remains to be made, with respect
to the disposition of goods, an important observation which removes many
difficulties. As Puffendorf has shown, the right of property, by its very
nature, does not extend beyond the life of the proprietor, and the moment a
man is dead his goods cease to belong to him. Thus, to prescribe the
conditions according to which he can dispose of them, is in reality less to
alter his right as it appears, than to extend it in fact.
In general, although the institution of the laws which regulate the power of
individuals in the disposition of their own goods belongs only to the
Sovereign, the spirit of these laws, which the government ought to follow in
their application, is that, from father to son, and from relation to relation,
the goods of a family should go as little out of it and be as little alienated as
possible. There is a sensible reason for this in favour of children, to whom
the right of property would be quite useless, if the father left them nothing,
and who besides, having often contributed by their labour to the acquisition
of their father's wealth, are in their own right associates with him in his
right of property. But another reason, more distant, though not less
important, is that nothing is more fatal to morality and to the Republic than
the continual shifting of rank and fortune among the citizens: such changes
are both the proof and the source of a thousand disorders, and overturn and
confound everything; for those who were brought up to one thing find

themselves destined for another; and neither those who rise nor those who
fall are able to assume the rules of conduct, or to possess themselves of the
qualifications requisite for their new condition, still less to discharge the
duties it entails. I proceed to the object of public finance.
If the people governed itself and there were no intermediary between the
administration of the State and the citizens, they would have no more to do
than to assess themselves occasionally, in proportion to the public needs
and the abilities of individuals: and as they would all keep in sight the
recovery and employment of such assessments, no fraud or abuse could slip
into the management of them; the State would never be involved in debt, or
the people over-burdened with taxes; or at least the knowledge of how the
money would be used would be a consolation For the severity of the tax.
But things cannot be carried an in this manner: on the contrary, however
small any State may be, civil societies are always too populous to be under
the immediate government of all their members. It is necessary that the
public money should go through the hands of the rulers, all of whom have,
besides the interests of the State, their own individual interests, which are
not the last to be listened to. The people, on its side, perceiving rather the
cupidity and ridiculous expenditure of its rulers than the public needs,
murmurs at seeing itself stripped of necessaries to furnish others with
superfluities; and when once these complaints have reached a certain degree
of bitterness, the most upright administration will find it impossible to
restore confidence. In such a case, voluntary contributions bring in nothing,
and forced contributions are illegitimate. This cruel alternative of letting the
State perish, or of violating the sacred right of property, which is its
support, constitutes the great difficulty of just and prudent economy.

The first step which the founder of a republic ought to take after the
establishment of laws, is to settle a sufficient fund for the maintenance of
the Magistrates and other Officials, and for other public expenses. This
fund, if it consist of money, is called œrarium or fisc, and public demesne if
it consist of lands. This, for obvious reasons, is much to be preferred.
Whoever has reflected on this matter must be of the opinion of Bodin, who
looks upon the public demesne as the most reputable and certain means of
providing for the needs of the State. It is remarkable also that Romulus, in
his division of lands, made it his first care to set apart a third for the use of
the State. I confess it is not impossible for the produce of the demesne, if it
be badly managed, to be reduced to nothing; but it is not of the essence of
public demesnes to be badly administered.
Before any use is made of this fund, it should be assigned or accepted by an
assembly of the people, or of the estates of the country, which should
determine its future use. After this solemnity, which makes such funds
inalienable, their very nature is, in a manner, changed, and the revenues
become so sacred, that it is not only the most infamous theft, but actual
treason, to misapply them or pervert them from the purpose for which they
were destined. It reflects great dishonour on Rome that the integrity of Cato
the censor was something so very remarkable, and that an Emperor, on
rewarding the talents of a singer with a few crowns, thought it necessary to
observe that the money came from his own private purse, and not from that
of the State. But if we find few Galbas, where are we to look for a Cato?
For when vice is no longer dishonourable, what chiefs will be so scrupulous
as to abstain from touching the public revenues that are left to their
discretion, and even not in time to impose on themselves, by pretending to
confound their own expensive and scandalous dissipations with the glory of
the State, and the means of extending their own authority with the means of
augmenting its power? It is particularly in this delicate part of the
administration that virtue is the only effective instrument, and that the
integrity of the Magistrate is the only real check upon his avarice. Books
and auditing of accounts, instead of exposing frauds, only conceal them; for
prudence is never so ready to conceive new precautions as knavery is to
elude them. Never mind, then, about account books and papers; place the
management of finance in honest hands: that is the only way to get it
faithfully conducted.

When public funds are once established, the rulers of the State become of
right the administrators of them: for this administration constitutes a part of
government which is always essential, though not always equally so. Its
influence increases in proportion as that of other resources is diminished;
and it may justly be said that a government has reached the last stage of
corruption, when it has ceased to have sinews other than money. Now as
every government constantly tends to become lax, this is enough to show
why no State can subsist unless its revenues constantly increase.
The first sense of the necessity of this increase is also the first sign of the
internal disorder of the State; and the prudent administrator, in his
endeavours to find means to provide for the present necessity, will neglect
nothing to find out the distant cause of the new need; just as a mariner when
he finds the water gaining on his vessel, does not neglect, while he is
working the pumps, to discover and stop the leak.
From this rule is deduced the most important rule in the administration of
finance, which is, to take more pains to guard against needs than to increase
revenues. For, whatever diligence be employed, the relief which only comes
after, and more slowly than, the evil, always leaves some injury behind.
While a remedy is being found for one evil, another is beginning to make
itself felt, and even the remedies themselves produce new difficulties: so
that at length the nation is involved in debt and the people oppressed, while
the government loses its influence and can do very little with a great deal of
money. I imagine it was owing to the recognition of this rule that such
wonders were done by ancient governments, which did more with their
parsimony than ours do with all their treasures; and perhaps from this
comes the common use of the word economy, which means rather the
prudent management of what one has than ways of getting what one has
not.
But apart from the public demesne, which is of service to the State in
proportion to the uprightness of those who govern, any one sufficiently
acquainted with the whole force of the general administration, especially
when it confines itself to legitimate methods, would be astonished at the
resources the rulers can make use of for guarding against public needs,
without trespassing on the goods of individuals. As they are masters of the
whole commerce of the State, nothing is easier for them than to direct it into
such channels as to provide for every need, without appearing to interfere.

The distribution of provisions, money, and merchandise in just proportions,
according to times and places, is the true secret of finance and the source of
wealth, provided those who administer it have foresight enough to suffer a
present apparent loss, in order really to obtain immense profits in the future.
When we see a government paying bounties, instead of receiving duties, on
the exportation of corn in time of plenty, and on its importation in time of
scarcity, we must have such facts before our eyes if we are to be persuaded
of their reality. We should hold such facts to be idle tales, if they had
happened in ancient times. Let us suppose that, in order to prevent a
scarcity in bad years, a proposal were made to establish public granaries;
would not the maintenance of so useful an institution serve in most
countries as an excuse for new taxes? At Geneva, such granaries,
established and kept up by a prudent administration, are a public resource in
bad years, and the principal revenue of the State at all times. Alit et ditat is
the inscription which stands, rightly and properly, on the front of the
building. To set forth in this place the economic system of a good
government, I have often turned my eyes to that of this Republic, rejoicing
to find in my own country an example of that wisdom and happiness which
I should be glad to see prevail in every other.
If we ask how the needs of a State grow, we shall find they generally arise,
like the wants of individuals, less from any real necessity than from the
increase of useless desires, and that expenses are often augmented only to
give a pretext for raising receipts: so that the State would sometimes gain
by not being rich, and apparent wealth is in reality more burdensome than
poverty itself would be. Rulers may indeed hope to keep the peoples in
stricter dependence, by thus giving them with one hand what they take from
them with the other; and this was in fact the policy of Joseph towards the
Egyptians: but this political sophistry is the more fatal to the State, as the
money never returns into the hands it went out of. Such principles only
enrich the idle at the expense of the industrious.
A desire for conquest is one of the most evident and dangerous causes of
this increase. This desire, occasioned often by a different species of
ambition from that which, it seems to proclaim, is not always what it
appears to be, and has not so much, for its real motive, the apparent desire
to aggrandise the Nation as a secret desire to increase the authority of the

rulers at home, by increasing the number of troops, and by the diversion
which the objects of war occasion in the minds of the citizens.
It is at least certain, that no peoples are so oppressed and wretched as
conquering nations, and that their successes only increase their misery. Did
not history inform us of the fact, reason would suffice to tell us that, the
greater a State grows, the heavier and more burdensome in proportion its
expenses become: for every province has to furnish its share to the general
expense of government, and besides has to be at the expense of its own
administration, which is as great as if it were really independent. Add to this
that great fortunes are always acquired in one place and spent in another.
Production therefore soon ceases to balance consumption, and a whole
country is impoverished merely to enrich a single town.
Another source of the increase of public wants, which depends on the
foregoing, is this. There may come a time when the citizens, no longer
looking upon themselves as interested in the common cause, will cease to
be the defenders of their country, and the Magistrates will prefer the
command of mercenaries to that of free-men; if for no other reason than
that, when the time comes, they may use them to reduce free-men to
submission. Such was the state of Rome towards the end of the Republic
and under the Emperors: for all the victories of the early Romans, like those
of Alexander, had been won by brave citizens, who were ready, at need, to
give their blood in the service of their country, but would never sell it. Only
at the siege of Veii did the practice of paying the Roman infantry begin.
Marius, in the Jugurthine war, dishonoured the legions by introducing
freedmen, vagabonds and other mercenaries. Tyrants, the enemies of the
very people it was their duty to make happy, maintained regular troops,
apparently to withstand the foreigner, but really to enslave their
countrymen. To form such troops, it was necessary to take men from the
land; the lack of their labour then diminished the amount of provisions, and
their maintenance introduced those taxes which increased prices. This first
disorder gave rise to murmurs among the people; in order to suppress them,
the number of troops had to be increased, and consequently the misery of
the people also got worse; and the growing despair led to still further
increases in the cause in order to guard against its effects. On the other
hand, the mercenaries, whose merit we may judge of by the price at which
they sold themselves, proud of their own meanness, and despising the laws

that protected them, as well as their fellows whose bread they ate, imagined
themselves more honoured in being Cæsar's satellites than in being
defenders of Rome. As they were given over to blind obedience, their
swords were always at the throats of their fellow-citizens, and they were
prepared for general butchery at the first sign. It would not be difficult to
show that this was one of the principal causes of the ruin of the Roman
Empire.
The invention of artillery and fortifications has forced the princes of
Europe, in modern times, to return to the use of regular troops, in order to
garrison their towns; but> however lawful their motives, it is to be feared
the effect may be no less fatal. There is no better reason now than formerly
for depopulating the country to form armies and garrisons, nor should the
people be oppressed to support, them; in a word, these dangerous
establishments have increased of late years with such rapidity in this part of
the world, that they evidently threaten to depopulate Europe, and sooner or
later to ruin its inhabitants.
Be this as it may, it ought to be seen that such institutions necessarily
subvert the true economic system, which draws the principal revenue of the
State from the public demesne, and leave only the troublesome resource of
subsidies and imposts; with which it remains to deal.
It should be remembered that the foundation of the social compact is
property; and its first condition, that every one should be maintained in the
peaceful possession of what belongs to him. It is true that, by the same
treaty, every one binds himself, at least tacitly, to be assessed toward the
public wants: but as this undertaking cannot prejudice the fundamental law,
and presupposes that the need is clearly recognised by all who contribute to
it, it is plain that such assessment, in order to be lawful, must be voluntary;
it must depend, not indeed on a particular will, as if it were necessary to
have the consent of each individual, and that he should give no more than
just what he pleased, but on a general will, decided by vote of a majority,
and on the basis of a proportional rating which leaves nothing arbitrary in
the imposition of the tax.
That taxes cannot be legitimately established except by the consent of the
people or its representatives, is a truth generally admitted by all
philosophers and jurists of any repute on questions of public right, not even

excepting Bodin. If any of them have laid down rules which seem to
contradict this, their particular motives for doing so may easily be seen; and
they introduce so many conditions and restrictions that the argument comes
at bottom to the same thing: for whether the people has it in its power to
refuse, or the Sovereign ought not to exact, is a matter of indifference with
regard to right; and if the point in question concerns only power, it is
useless to inquire whether it is legitimate or not. Contributions levied on the
people are two kinds; real, levied on commodities, and personal, paid by the
head. Both are called taxes or subsidies: when the people fixes the sum to
be paid, it is called subsidy; but when it grants the product of an imposition,
it is called a tax. We are told in the Spirit of the Laws that a capitation tax is
most suited to slavery, and a real tax most in accordance with liberty. This
would be incontestable, if the circumstances of every person were equal; for
otherwise nothing can be more disproportionate than such a tax; and it is in
the observations of exact proportions that the spirit of liberty consists. But if
a tax by heads were exactly proportioned to the circumstances of
individuals, as what is called the capitation tax in France might be, is would
be the most equitable and consequently the most proper for free-men.
These proportions appear at first very easy to note, because, being relative
to each man's position in the world, their incidence is always public: but
proper regard is seldom paid to all the elements that should enter into such a
calculation, even apart from deception arising from avarice, fraud and selfinterest. In the first place, we have to consider the relation of quantities,
according to which, ceteris paribus, the person who has ten times the
property of another man ought to pay ten times as much to the State.
Secondly, the relation of the use made, that is to say, the distinction between
necessaries and superfluities. He who possesses only the common
necessaries of life should pay nothing at all, while the tax on him who is in
possession of superfluities may justly be extended to everything he has over
and above mere necessaries. To this he will possibly object that, when his
rank is taken into account, what may be superfluous to a man of inferior
station is necessary for him. But this is false: for a grandee has two legs just
like a cow-herd, and, like him again, but one belly. Besides, these pretended
necessaries are really so little necessary to his rank, that if he should
renounce them on any worthy occasion, he would only be the more
honoured. The populace would be ready to adore a Minister who went to
Council on foot, because he had sold off his carriages to supply a pressing

need of the State. Lastly, to no man does the law prescribe magnificence;
and propriety is no argument against right.
A third relation, which is never taken into account, though it ought to be the
chief consideration, is the advantage that every person derives from the
social confederacy; for this provides a powerful protection for the immense
possessions of the rich, and hardly leaves the poor man in quiet possession
of the cottage he builds with his own hands. Are not all the advantages of
society for the rich and powerful? Are not all lucrative posts in their hands?
Are not all privileges and exemptions reserved for them alone? Is not the
public authority always on their side? If a man of eminence robs his
creditors, or is guilty of other knaveries, is he not always assured of
impunity? Are not the assaults, acts of violence, assassinations, and even
murders committed by the great, matters that are hushed up in a few
months, and of which nothing more is thought? But if a great man himself
is robbed or insulted, the whole police force is immediately in motion, and
woe even to innocent persons who chance to be suspected. If he has to pass
through any dangerous road, the country is up in arms to escort him. If the
axle-tree of his chaise breaks, everybody flies to his assistance. If there is a
noise at his door, he speaks but a word, and all is silent. If he is
incommoded by the crowd, he waves his hand and every one makes way. If
his coach is met on the road by a wagon, his servants are ready to beat the
driver's brains out, and fifty honest pedestrians going quietly about their
business had better be knocked on the head than an idle jackanapes be
delayed in his coach. Yet all this respect costs him not a farthing: it is the
rich man's right, and not what he buys with his wealth. How different the
case of the poor man! the more humanity owes him, the more society denies
him. Every door is shut against him, even when he has a right to its being
opened: and if ever he obtains justice, it is with much greater difficulty than
others obtain favours. If the militia is to be raised or the highway to be
mended, he is always given the preference; he always bears the burden
which his richer neighbour has influence enough to get exempted from. On
the least accident that happens to him, everybody avoids him: if his cart be
overturned in the road, so far is he from receiving any assistance, that he is
lucky if he does not get horse-whipped by the impudent lackeys of some
young Duke; in a word, all gratuitous assistance is denied to the poor when
they need it, just because they cannot pay for it. I look upon any poor man

as totally undone, if he has the misfortune to have an honest heart, a fine
daughter, and a powerful neighbour.
Another no less important fact is that the losses of the poor are much harder
to repair than those of the rich, and that the difficulty of acquisition is
always greater in proportion as there is more need for it. "Nothing comes
out of nothing," is as true of life as in physics: money is the seed of money,
and the first guinea is sometimes more difficult to acquire than the second
million. Add to this that what the poor pay is lost to them for ever, and
remains in, or returns to, the hands of the rich: and as, to those who share in
the government or to their dependents, the whole produce of the taxes must
sooner or later pass, although they pay their share, these persons have
always a sensible interest in increasing them.
The terms of the social compact between these two estates of men may be
summed up in a few words. "You have need of me, because I am rich and
you are poor. We will therefore come to an agreement. I will permit you to
have the honour of serving me, on condition that you bestow on me the
little you have left, in return for the pains I shall take to command you."
Putting all these considerations carefully together, we shall find that, in
order to levy taxes in a truly equitable and proportionate manner, the
imposition ought not to be in simple ratio to the property of the
contributors, but in compound ratio to the difference of their conditions and
the superfluity of their possessions. This very important and difficult
operation is daily made by numbers of honest clerks, who know their
arithmetic; but a Plato or a Montesquieu would not venture to undertake it
without the greatest diffidence, or without praying to Heaven for
understanding and integrity.
Another disadvantage of personal taxes is that they may be too much felt or
raised with too great severity. This, however, does not prevent them from
being frequently evaded; for it is much easier for persons to escape a tax
than for their possessions.
Of all impositions, that on land, or real taxation, has always been regarded
as most advantageous in countries where more attention is paid to what the
tax will produce, and to the certainty of recovering the product, than to
securing the least discomfort for the people. It has been even maintained
that it is necessary to burden the peasant in order to rouse him from

indolence, and that he would never work if he had no taxes to pay. But in all
countries experience confutes this ridiculous notion. In England and
Holland the farmer pays very little, and in China nothing: yet these are the
countries in which the land is best cultivated. On the other hand, in those
countries where the husbandman is taxed in proportion to the produce of his
lands, he leaves them uncultivated, or reaps just as much from them as
suffices for bare subsistence. For to him who loses the fruit of his labour, it
is some gain to do nothing. To lay a tax on industry is a very singular
expedient for banishing idleness.
Taxes on land or corn, especially when they are excessive, lead to two
results so fatal in their effect that they cannot but depopulate and ruin, in the
long run, all countries in which they are established.
The first of these arises from the defective circulation of specie; for industry
and commerce draw all the money from the country into the capitals: and as
the tax destroys the proportion there might otherwise be between the needs
of the husbandman and the price of his corn, money is always leaving and
never returning. Thus the richer the city the poorer the country. The product
of the taxes passes from the hands of the Prince or his financial officers into
those of artists and traders; and the husbandman, who receives, only the
smallest part of it, is at length exhausted by paying always the same, and
receiving constantly less. How could a human body subsist if it had veins
and no arteries, or if its arteries conveyed the blood only within four inches
of the heart? Chardin tells us that in Persia the royal dues on commodities
are paid in kind: this custom, which, Herodotus informs us, prevailed long
ago in the same country down to the time of Darius, might prevent the evil
of which I have been speaking. But unless Intendants, Directors,
Commissioners and Warehousemen in Persia are a different kind of people
from what they are elsewhere, I can hardly believe that the smallest part of
this produce ever reaches the king, or that the corn is not spoilt in every
granary, and the greater part of the warehouses not consumed by fire.
The second evil effect arises from an apparent advantage, which aggravates
the evil before it can be perceived. That is that corn is a commodity whose
price is not enhanced by taxes in the country producing it, and which, in
spite of its absolute necessity, may be diminished in quantity without the
price being increased. Hence, many people die of hunger, although corn
remains cheap, and the husbandman bears the whole charge of a tax, for

which he cannot indemnify himself by the price of his corn. It must be
observed that we ought not to reason about a land-tax in the same manner
as about duties laid on various kinds of merchandise; for the effect of such
duties is to raise the price, and they are paid by the buyers rather than the
sellers. For these duties, however heavy, are still voluntary, and are paid by
the merchant only in proportion to the quantity he buys; and as he buys only
in proportion to his sale, he himself gives the law its particular application;
but the farmer who is obliged to pay his rent at stated times, whether he
sells or not, cannot wait till he can get his own price for his commodity:
even if he is not forced to sell for mere subsistence, he must sell to pay the
taxes; so that it is frequently the heaviness of the tax that keeps the price of
corn low.
It is further to be noticed that the resources of commerce and industry are so
far from rendering the tax more supportable through abundance of money,
that they only render it more burdensome. I shall not insist on what is very
evident; i.e. that, although a greater or less quantity of money in a State may
give it the greater or less credit in the eye of the foreigner, it makes not the
least difference to the real fortune of the citizens, and does not make their
condition any more or less comfortable. But I must make these two
important remarks: first, unless a State possesses superfluous commodities,
and abundance of money results from foreign trade, only trading cities are
sensible of the abundance; while the peasant only becomes relatively
poorer. Secondly, as the price of everything is enhanced by the increase of
money, taxes also must be proportionately increased; so that the farmer will
find himself still more burdened without having more resources.
It ought to be observed that the tax on land is a real duty on the produce. It
is universally agreed, however, that nothing is so dangerous as a tax on corn
paid by the purchaser: but how comes it we do not see that it is a hundred
times worse when the duty is paid by the cultivator himself? Is not this an
attack on the substance of the State at its very source? Is it not the directest
possible method of depopulating a country, and therefore in the end ruining
it? For the worst kind of scarcity a nation can suffer from is lack of
inhabitants.
Only the real statesman can rise, in imposing taxes, above the mere
financial object: he alone can transform heavy burdens into useful
regulations, and make the people even doubtful whether such

establishments were not calculated rather for the good of the nation in
general, than merely for the raising of money.
Duties on the importation of foreign commodities, of which the natives are
fond, without the country standing in need of them; on the exportation of
those of the growth of the country which are not too plentiful, and which
foreigners cannot do without; on the productions of frivolous and all too
lucrative arts; on the importation of all pure luxuries; and in general on all
objects of luxury; will answer the two-fold end in view. It is by such taxes,
indeed, by which the poor are eased, and the burdens thrown on the rich,
that it is possible to prevent the continual increase of inequality of fortune;
the subjection of such a multitude of artisans and useless servants to the
rich, the multiplication of idle persons in our cities, and the depopulation of
the country-side.
It is important that the value of any commodity and the duties laid on it
should be so proportioned that the avarice of individuals may not be too
strongly tempted to fraud by the greatness of the possible profit. To make
smuggling difficult, those commodities should be singled out which are
hardest to conceal. All duties should be rather paid by the consumer of the
commodity taxed than by him who sells it: as the quantity of duty he would
be obliged to pay would lay him open to greater temptations, and afford him
more opportunities for fraud.
This is the constant custom in China, a country where the taxes are greater
and yet better paid than in any other part of the world. The merchant
himself there pays no duty; the buyer alone, without murmuring or sedition,
meets the whole charge; for as the necessaries of life, such as rice and corn,
are absolutely exempt from taxation, the common people is not oppressed,
and the duty falls only on those who are well-to-do. Precautions against
smuggling ought not to be dictated so much by the fear of it occurring, as
by the attention which the government should pay to securing individuals
from being seduced by illegitimate profits, which first make them bad
citizens, and afterwards soon turn them into dishonest men.
Heavy taxes should be laid on servants in livery, on equipages, rich
furniture, fine clothes, on spacious courts and gardens, on public
entertainments of all kinds, on useless professions, such as dancers, singers,
players, and in a word, on all that multiplicity of objects of luxury,

amusement and idleness, which strike the eyes of all, and can the less be
hidden, as their whole purpose is to be seen, without which they would be
useless. We need be under no apprehension of the produce of these taxes
being arbitrary, because they are laid on things not absolutely necessary.
They must know but little of mankind who imagine that, after they have
been once seduced by luxury, they can ever renounce it: they would a
hundred times sooner renounce common necessaries, and had much rather
die of hunger than of shame. The increase in their expense is only an
additional reason for supporting them, when the vanity of appearing
wealthy reaps its profit from the price of the thing and the charge of the tax.
As long as there are rich people in the world, they will be desirous of
distinguishing themselves from the poor, nor can the State devise a revenue
less burdensome or more certain than what arises from this distinction.
For the same reason, industry would have nothing to suffer from an
economic system which increased the revenue, encouraged agriculture by
relieving the husbandman, and insensibly tended to bring all fortunes nearer
to that middle condition which constitutes the genuine strength of the State.
These taxes might, I admit, bring certain fashionable articles of dress and
amusement to an untimely end; but it would be only to substitute others, by
which the artificer would gain, and the exchequer suffer no loss. In a word,
suppose the spirit of government was constantly to tax only the superfluities
of the rich, one of two things must happen: either the rich would convert
their superfluous expenses into useful ones, which would redound to the
profit of the State, and thus the imposition of taxes would have the effect of
the best sumptuary laws, the expenses of the State would necessarily
diminish with those of individuals, and the treasury would not receive so
much less as it would gain by having less to pay; or, if the rich did not
become less extravagant, the exchequer would have such resources in the
product of taxes on their expenditure as would provide for the needs of the
State. In the first case the treasury would be the richer by what it would
save, from having the less to do with its money; and in the second, it would
be enriched by the useless expenses of individuals.
We may add to all this a very important distinction in matters of political
right, to which governments, constantly tenacious of doing everything for
themselves, ought to pay great attention. It has been observed that personal
taxes and duties on the necessaries of life, as they directly trespass on the

right of property, and consequently on the true foundation of political
society, are always liable to have dangerous results, if they are not
established with the express consent of the people or its representatives. It is
not the same with articles the use of which we can deny ourselves; for as
the individual is under no absolute necessity to pay, his contribution may
count as voluntary. The particular consent of each contributor then takes the
place of the general consent of the whole people: for why should a people
oppose the imposition of a tax which falls only on those who desire to pay
it? It appears to me certain that everything, which is not proscribed by law,
or contrary to morality, and yet may be prohibited by the government, may
also be permitted on payment of a certain duty. Thus, for example, if the
government may prohibit the use of coaches, it may certainly impose a tax
on them; and this is a prudent and useful method of censuring their use
without absolutely forbidding it. In this case, the tax may be regarded as a
sort of fine, the product of which compensates for the abuse it punishes.
It may perhaps be objected that those, whom Bodin calls impostors, i.e.
those who impose or contrive the taxes, being in the class of the rich, will
be far from sparing themselves to relieve the poor. But this is quite beside
the point. If, in every nation, those to whom the Sovereign commits the
government of the people, were, from their position, its enemies, it would
not be worth while to inquire what they ought to do to make the people
happy.
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PREFACE
SUPPOSING that Truth is a woman—what then? Is there not ground for
suspecting that all philosophers, in so far as they have been dogmatists,
have failed to understand women—that the terrible seriousness and clumsy
importunity with which they have usually paid their addresses to Truth,
have been unskilled and unseemly methods for winning a woman?
Certainly she has never allowed herself to be won; and at present every kind
of dogma stands with sad and discouraged mien—IF, indeed, it stands at all!
For there are scoffers who maintain that it has fallen, that all dogma lies on
the ground—nay more, that it is at its last gasp. But to speak seriously, there
are good grounds for hoping that all dogmatizing in philosophy, whatever
solemn, whatever conclusive and decided airs it has assumed, may have
been only a noble puerilism and tyronism; and probably the time is at hand
when it will be once and again understood WHAT has actually sufficed for
the basis of such imposing and absolute philosophical edifices as the
dogmatists have hitherto reared: perhaps some popular superstition of
immemorial time (such as the soul-superstition, which, in the form of
subject- and ego-superstition, has not yet ceased doing mischief): perhaps
some play upon words, a deception on the part of grammar, or an audacious
generalization of very restricted, very personal, very human—all-toohuman facts. The philosophy of the dogmatists, it is to be hoped, was only a
promise for thousands of years afterwards, as was astrology in still earlier
times, in the service of which probably more labour, gold, acuteness, and
patience have been spent than on any actual science hitherto: we owe to it,
and to its "super-terrestrial" pretensions in Asia and Egypt, the grand style
of architecture. It seems that in order to inscribe themselves upon the heart
of humanity with everlasting claims, all great things have first to wander
about the earth as enormous and awe-inspiring caricatures: dogmatic
philosophy has been a caricature of this kind—for instance, the Vedanta
doctrine in Asia, and Platonism in Europe. Let us not be ungrateful to it,
although it must certainly be confessed that the worst, the most tiresome,
and the most dangerous of errors hitherto has been a dogmatist error—
namely, Plato's invention of Pure Spirit and the Good in Itself. But now

when it has been surmounted, when Europe, rid of this nightmare, can again
draw breath freely and at least enjoy a healthier—sleep, we, WHOSE
DUTY IS WAKEFULNESS ITSELF, are the heirs of all the strength which
the struggle against this error has fostered. It amounted to the very inversion
of truth, and the denial of the PERSPECTIVE—the fundamental condition
—of life, to speak of Spirit and the Good as Plato spoke of them; indeed
one might ask, as a physician: "How did such a malady attack that finest
product of antiquity, Plato? Had the wicked Socrates really corrupted him?
Was Socrates after all a corrupter of youths, and deserved his hemlock?"
But the struggle against Plato, or—to speak plainer, and for the "people"—
the struggle against the ecclesiastical oppression of millenniums of
Christianity (FOR CHRISTIANITY IS PLATONISM FOR THE
"PEOPLE"), produced in Europe a magnificent tension of soul, such as had
not existed anywhere previously; with such a tensely strained bow one can
now aim at the furthest goals. As a matter of fact, the European feels this
tension as a state of distress, and twice attempts have been made in grand
style to unbend the bow: once by means of Jesuitism, and the second time
by means of democratic enlightenment—which, with the aid of liberty of
the press and newspaper-reading, might, in fact, bring it about that the spirit
would not so easily find itself in "distress"! (The Germans invented
gunpowder—all credit to them! but they again made things square—they
invented printing.) But we, who are neither Jesuits, nor democrats, nor even
sufficiently Germans, we GOOD EUROPEANS, and free, VERY free
spirits—we have it still, all the distress of spirit and all the tension of its
bow! And perhaps also the arrow, the duty, and, who knows? THE GOAL
TO AIM AT....
Sils Maria Upper Engadine, JUNE, 1885.

CHAPTER I. PREJUDICES OF
PHILOSOPHERS
1. The Will to Truth, which is to tempt us to many a hazardous enterprise,
the famous Truthfulness of which all philosophers have hitherto spoken
with respect, what questions has this Will to Truth not laid before us! What
strange, perplexing, questionable questions! It is already a long story; yet it
seems as if it were hardly commenced. Is it any wonder if we at last grow
distrustful, lose patience, and turn impatiently away? That this Sphinx
teaches us at last to ask questions ourselves? WHO is it really that puts
questions to us here? WHAT really is this "Will to Truth" in us? In fact we
made a long halt at the question as to the origin of this Will—until at last
we came to an absolute standstill before a yet more fundamental question.
We inquired about the VALUE of this Will. Granted that we want the truth:
WHY NOT RATHER untruth? And uncertainty? Even ignorance? The
problem of the value of truth presented itself before us—or was it we who
presented ourselves before the problem? Which of us is the Oedipus here?
Which the Sphinx? It would seem to be a rendezvous of questions and notes
of interrogation. And could it be believed that it at last seems to us as if the
problem had never been propounded before, as if we were the first to
discern it, get a sight of it, and RISK RAISING it? For there is risk in
raising it, perhaps there is no greater risk.
2. "HOW COULD anything originate out of its opposite? For example,
truth out of error? or the Will to Truth out of the will to deception? or the
generous deed out of selfishness? or the pure sun-bright vision of the wise
man out of covetousness? Such genesis is impossible; whoever dreams of it
is a fool, nay, worse than a fool; things of the highest value must have a
different origin, an origin of THEIR own—in this transitory, seductive,
illusory, paltry world, in this turmoil of delusion and cupidity, they cannot
have their source. But rather in the lap of Being, in the intransitory, in the
concealed God, in the 'Thing-in-itself—THERE must be their source, and
nowhere else!"—This mode of reasoning discloses the typical prejudice by
which metaphysicians of all times can be recognized, this mode of
valuation is at the back of all their logical procedure; through this "belief"

of theirs, they exert themselves for their "knowledge," for something that is
in the end solemnly christened "the Truth." The fundamental belief of
metaphysicians is THE BELIEF IN ANTITHESES OF VALUES. It never
occurred even to the wariest of them to doubt here on the very threshold
(where doubt, however, was most necessary); though they had made a
solemn vow, "DE OMNIBUS DUBITANDUM." For it may be doubted,
firstly, whether antitheses exist at all; and secondly, whether the popular
valuations and antitheses of value upon which metaphysicians have set their
seal, are not perhaps merely superficial estimates, merely provisional
perspectives, besides being probably made from some corner, perhaps from
below—"frog perspectives," as it were, to borrow an expression current
among painters. In spite of all the value which may belong to the true, the
positive, and the unselfish, it might be possible that a higher and more
fundamental value for life generally should be assigned to pretence, to the
will to delusion, to selfishness, and cupidity. It might even be possible that
WHAT constitutes the value of those good and respected things, consists
precisely in their being insidiously related, knotted, and crocheted to these
evil and apparently opposed things—perhaps even in being essentially
identical with them. Perhaps! But who wishes to concern himself with such
dangerous "Perhapses"! For that investigation one must await the advent of
a new order of philosophers, such as will have other tastes and inclinations,
the reverse of those hitherto prevalent—philosophers of the dangerous
"Perhaps" in every sense of the term. And to speak in all seriousness, I see
such new philosophers beginning to appear.
3. Having kept a sharp eye on philosophers, and having read between
their lines long enough, I now say to myself that the greater part of
conscious thinking must be counted among the instinctive functions, and it
is so even in the case of philosophical thinking; one has here to learn anew,
as one learned anew about heredity and "innateness." As little as the act of
birth comes into consideration in the whole process and procedure of
heredity, just as little is "being-conscious" OPPOSED to the instinctive in
any decisive sense; the greater part of the conscious thinking of a
philosopher is secretly influenced by his instincts, and forced into definite
channels. And behind all logic and its seeming sovereignty of movement,
there are valuations, or to speak more plainly, physiological demands, for
the maintenance of a definite mode of life For example, that the certain is
worth more than the uncertain, that illusion is less valuable than "truth"

such valuations, in spite of their regulative importance for US, might
notwithstanding be only superficial valuations, special kinds of niaiserie,
such as may be necessary for the maintenance of beings such as ourselves.
Supposing, in effect, that man is not just the "measure of things."
4. The falseness of an opinion is not for us any objection to it: it is here,
perhaps, that our new language sounds most strangely. The question is, how
far an opinion is life-furthering, life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps
species-rearing, and we are fundamentally inclined to maintain that the
falsest opinions (to which the synthetic judgments a priori belong), are the
most indispensable to us, that without a recognition of logical fictions,
without a comparison of reality with the purely IMAGINED world of the
absolute and immutable, without a constant counterfeiting of the world by
means of numbers, man could not live—that the renunciation of false
opinions would be a renunciation of life, a negation of life. TO
RECOGNISE UNTRUTH AS A CONDITION OF LIFE; that is certainly
to impugn the traditional ideas of value in a dangerous manner, and a
philosophy which ventures to do so, has thereby alone placed itself beyond
good and evil.
5. That which causes philosophers to be regarded half-distrustfully and
half-mockingly, is not the oft-repeated discovery how innocent they are—
how often and easily they make mistakes and lose their way, in short, how
childish and childlike they are,—but that there is not enough honest dealing
with them, whereas they all raise a loud and virtuous outcry when the
problem of truthfulness is even hinted at in the remotest manner. They all
pose as though their real opinions had been discovered and attained through
the self-evolving of a cold, pure, divinely indifferent dialectic (in contrast to
all sorts of mystics, who, fairer and foolisher, talk of "inspiration"),
whereas, in fact, a prejudiced proposition, idea, or "suggestion," which is
generally their heart's desire abstracted and refined, is defended by them
with arguments sought out after the event. They are all advocates who do
not wish to be regarded as such, generally astute defenders, also, of their
prejudices, which they dub "truths,"—and VERY far from having the
conscience which bravely admits this to itself, very far from having the
good taste of the courage which goes so far as to let this be understood,
perhaps to warn friend or foe, or in cheerful confidence and self-ridicule.
The spectacle of the Tartuffery of old Kant, equally stiff and decent, with
which he entices us into the dialectic by-ways that lead (more correctly

mislead) to his "categorical imperative"—makes us fastidious ones smile,
we who find no small amusement in spying out the subtle tricks of old
moralists and ethical preachers. Or, still more so, the hocus-pocus in
mathematical form, by means of which Spinoza has, as it were, clad his
philosophy in mail and mask—in fact, the "love of HIS wisdom," to
translate the term fairly and squarely—in order thereby to strike terror at
once into the heart of the assailant who should dare to cast a glance on that
invincible maiden, that Pallas Athene:—how much of personal timidity and
vulnerability does this masquerade of a sickly recluse betray!
6. It has gradually become clear to me what every great philosophy up till
now has consisted of—namely, the confession of its originator, and a
species of involuntary and unconscious auto-biography; and moreover that
the moral (or immoral) purpose in every philosophy has constituted the true
vital germ out of which the entire plant has always grown. Indeed, to
understand how the abstrusest metaphysical assertions of a philosopher
have been arrived at, it is always well (and wise) to first ask oneself: "What
morality do they (or does he) aim at?" Accordingly, I do not believe that an
"impulse to knowledge" is the father of philosophy; but that another
impulse, here as elsewhere, has only made use of knowledge (and mistaken
knowledge!) as an instrument. But whoever considers the fundamental
impulses of man with a view to determining how far they may have here
acted as INSPIRING GENII (or as demons and cobolds), will find that they
have all practiced philosophy at one time or another, and that each one of
them would have been only too glad to look upon itself as the ultimate end
of existence and the legitimate LORD over all the other impulses. For every
impulse is imperious, and as SUCH, attempts to philosophize. To be sure, in
the case of scholars, in the case of really scientific men, it may be otherwise
—"better," if you will; there there may really be such a thing as an "impulse
to knowledge," some kind of small, independent clock-work, which, when
well wound up, works away industriously to that end, WITHOUT the rest
of the scholarly impulses taking any material part therein. The actual
"interests" of the scholar, therefore, are generally in quite another direction
—in the family, perhaps, or in money-making, or in politics; it is, in fact,
almost indifferent at what point of research his little machine is placed, and
whether the hopeful young worker becomes a good philologist, a mushroom
specialist, or a chemist; he is not CHARACTERISED by becoming this or
that. In the philosopher, on the contrary, there is absolutely nothing

impersonal; and above all, his morality furnishes a decided and decisive
testimony as to WHO HE IS,—that is to say, in what order the deepest
impulses of his nature stand to each other.
7. How malicious philosophers can be! I know of nothing more stinging
than the joke Epicurus took the liberty of making on Plato and the
Platonists; he called them Dionysiokolakes. In its original sense, and on the
face of it, the word signifies "Flatterers of Dionysius"—consequently,
tyrants' accessories and lick-spittles; besides this, however, it is as much as
to say, "They are all ACTORS, there is nothing genuine about them" (for
Dionysiokolax was a popular name for an actor). And the latter is really the
malignant reproach that Epicurus cast upon Plato: he was annoyed by the
grandiose manner, the mise en scene style of which Plato and his scholars
were masters—of which Epicurus was not a master! He, the old schoolteacher of Samos, who sat concealed in his little garden at Athens, and
wrote three hundred books, perhaps out of rage and ambitious envy of
Plato, who knows! Greece took a hundred years to find out who the gardengod Epicurus really was. Did she ever find out?
8. There is a point in every philosophy at which the "conviction" of the
philosopher appears on the scene; or, to put it in the words of an ancient
mystery:
Adventavit asinus, Pulcher et fortissimus.
9. You desire to LIVE "according to Nature"? Oh, you noble Stoics, what
fraud of words! Imagine to yourselves a being like Nature, boundlessly
extravagant, boundlessly indifferent, without purpose or consideration,
without pity or justice, at once fruitful and barren and uncertain: imagine to
yourselves INDIFFERENCE as a power—how COULD you live in
accordance with such indifference? To live—is not that just endeavouring to
be otherwise than this Nature? Is not living valuing, preferring, being
unjust, being limited, endeavouring to be different? And granted that your
imperative, "living according to Nature," means actually the same as "living
according to life"—how could you do DIFFERENTLY? Why should you
make a principle out of what you yourselves are, and must be? In reality,
however, it is quite otherwise with you: while you pretend to read with
rapture the canon of your law in Nature, you want something quite the
contrary, you extraordinary stage-players and self-deluders! In your pride
you wish to dictate your morals and ideals to Nature, to Nature herself, and

to incorporate them therein; you insist that it shall be Nature "according to
the Stoa," and would like everything to be made after your own image, as a
vast, eternal glorification and generalism of Stoicism! With all your love for
truth, you have forced yourselves so long, so persistently, and with such
hypnotic rigidity to see Nature FALSELY, that is to say, Stoically, that you
are no longer able to see it otherwise—and to crown all, some unfathomable
superciliousness gives you the Bedlamite hope that BECAUSE you are able
to tyrannize over yourselves—Stoicism is self-tyranny—Nature will also
allow herself to be tyrannized over: is not the Stoic a PART of Nature?...
But this is an old and everlasting story: what happened in old times with the
Stoics still happens today, as soon as ever a philosophy begins to believe in
itself. It always creates the world in its own image; it cannot do otherwise;
philosophy is this tyrannical impulse itself, the most spiritual Will to Power,
the will to "creation of the world," the will to the causa prima.
10. The eagerness and subtlety, I should even say craftiness, with which
the problem of "the real and the apparent world" is dealt with at present
throughout Europe, furnishes food for thought and attention; and he who
hears only a "Will to Truth" in the background, and nothing else, cannot
certainly boast of the sharpest ears. In rare and isolated cases, it may really
have happened that such a Will to Truth—a certain extravagant and
adventurous pluck, a metaphysician's ambition of the forlorn hope—has
participated therein: that which in the end always prefers a handful of
"certainty" to a whole cartload of beautiful possibilities; there may even be
puritanical fanatics of conscience, who prefer to put their last trust in a sure
nothing, rather than in an uncertain something. But that is Nihilism, and the
sign of a despairing, mortally wearied soul, notwithstanding the courageous
bearing such a virtue may display. It seems, however, to be otherwise with
stronger and livelier thinkers who are still eager for life. In that they side
AGAINST appearance, and speak superciliously of "perspective," in that
they rank the credibility of their own bodies about as low as the credibility
of the ocular evidence that "the earth stands still," and thus, apparently,
allowing with complacency their securest possession to escape (for what
does one at present believe in more firmly than in one's body?),—who
knows if they are not really trying to win back something which was
formerly an even securer possession, something of the old domain of the
faith of former times, perhaps the "immortal soul," perhaps "the old God,"
in short, ideas by which they could live better, that is to say, more

vigorously and more joyously, than by "modern ideas"? There is
DISTRUST of these modern ideas in this mode of looking at things, a
disbelief in all that has been constructed yesterday and today; there is
perhaps some slight admixture of satiety and scorn, which can no longer
endure the BRIC-A-BRAC of ideas of the most varied origin, such as socalled Positivism at present throws on the market; a disgust of the more
refined taste at the village-fair motleyness and patchiness of all these
reality-philosophasters, in whom there is nothing either new or true, except
this motleyness. Therein it seems to me that we should agree with those
skeptical anti-realists and knowledge-microscopists of the present day; their
instinct, which repels them from MODERN reality, is unrefuted... what do
their retrograde by-paths concern us! The main thing about them is NOT
that they wish to go "back," but that they wish to get AWAY therefrom. A
little MORE strength, swing, courage, and artistic power, and they would be
OFF—and not back!
11. It seems to me that there is everywhere an attempt at present to divert
attention from the actual influence which Kant exercised on German
philosophy, and especially to ignore prudently the value which he set upon
himself. Kant was first and foremost proud of his Table of Categories; with
it in his hand he said: "This is the most difficult thing that could ever be
undertaken on behalf of metaphysics." Let us only understand this "could
be"! He was proud of having DISCOVERED a new faculty in man, the
faculty of synthetic judgment a priori. Granting that he deceived himself in
this matter; the development and rapid flourishing of German philosophy
depended nevertheless on his pride, and on the eager rivalry of the younger
generation to discover if possible something—at all events "new
faculties"—of which to be still prouder!—But let us reflect for a moment—
it is high time to do so. "How are synthetic judgments a priori POSSIBLE?"
Kant asks himself—and what is really his answer? "BY MEANS OF A
MEANS (faculty)"—but unfortunately not in five words, but so
circumstantially, imposingly, and with such display of German profundity
and verbal flourishes, that one altogether loses sight of the comical niaiserie
allemande involved in such an answer. People were beside themselves with
delight over this new faculty, and the jubilation reached its climax when
Kant further discovered a moral faculty in man—for at that time Germans
were still moral, not yet dabbling in the "Politics of hard fact." Then came
the honeymoon of German philosophy. All the young theologians of the

Tubingen institution went immediately into the groves—all seeking for
"faculties." And what did they not find—in that innocent, rich, and still
youthful period of the German spirit, to which Romanticism, the malicious
fairy, piped and sang, when one could not yet distinguish between "finding"
and "inventing"! Above all a faculty for the "transcendental"; Schelling
christened it, intellectual intuition, and thereby gratified the most earnest
longings of the naturally pious-inclined Germans. One can do no greater
wrong to the whole of this exuberant and eccentric movement (which was
really youthfulness, notwithstanding that it disguised itself so boldly, in
hoary and senile conceptions), than to take it seriously, or even treat it with
moral indignation. Enough, however—the world grew older, and the dream
vanished. A time came when people rubbed their foreheads, and they still
rub them today. People had been dreaming, and first and foremost—old
Kant. "By means of a means (faculty)"—he had said, or at least meant to
say. But, is that—an answer? An explanation? Or is it not rather merely a
repetition of the question? How does opium induce sleep? "By means of a
means (faculty)," namely the virtus dormitiva, replies the doctor in Moliere,
Quia est in eo virtus dormitiva,
Cujus est natura sensus assoupire.

But such replies belong to the realm of comedy, and it is high time to
replace the Kantian question, "How are synthetic judgments a PRIORI
possible?" by another question, "Why is belief in such judgments
necessary?"—in effect, it is high time that we should understand that such
judgments must be believed to be true, for the sake of the preservation of
creatures like ourselves; though they still might naturally be false
judgments! Or, more plainly spoken, and roughly and readily—synthetic
judgments a priori should not "be possible" at all; we have no right to them;
in our mouths they are nothing but false judgments. Only, of course, the
belief in their truth is necessary, as plausible belief and ocular evidence
belonging to the perspective view of life. And finally, to call to mind the
enormous influence which "German philosophy"—I hope you understand
its right to inverted commas (goosefeet)?—has exercised throughout the
whole of Europe, there is no doubt that a certain VIRTUS DORMITIVA
had a share in it; thanks to German philosophy, it was a delight to the noble
idlers, the virtuous, the mystics, the artiste, the three-fourths Christians, and
the political obscurantists of all nations, to find an antidote to the still

overwhelming sensualism which overflowed from the last century into this,
in short—"sensus assoupire."...
12. As regards materialistic atomism, it is one of the best-refuted theories
that have been advanced, and in Europe there is now perhaps no one in the
learned world so unscholarly as to attach serious signification to it, except
for convenient everyday use (as an abbreviation of the means of expression)
—thanks chiefly to the Pole Boscovich: he and the Pole Copernicus have
hitherto been the greatest and most successful opponents of ocular
evidence. For while Copernicus has persuaded us to believe, contrary to all
the senses, that the earth does NOT stand fast, Boscovich has taught us to
abjure the belief in the last thing that "stood fast" of the earth—the belief in
"substance," in "matter," in the earth-residuum, and particle-atom: it is the
greatest triumph over the senses that has hitherto been gained on earth. One
must, however, go still further, and also declare war, relentless war to the
knife, against the "atomistic requirements" which still lead a dangerous
after-life in places where no one suspects them, like the more celebrated
"metaphysical requirements": one must also above all give the finishing
stroke to that other and more portentous atomism which Christianity has
taught best and longest, the SOUL-ATOMISM. Let it be permitted to
designate by this expression the belief which regards the soul as something
indestructible, eternal, indivisible, as a monad, as an atomon: this belief
ought to be expelled from science! Between ourselves, it is not at all
necessary to get rid of "the soul" thereby, and thus renounce one of the
oldest and most venerated hypotheses—as happens frequently to the
clumsiness of naturalists, who can hardly touch on the soul without
immediately losing it. But the way is open for new acceptations and
refinements of the soul-hypothesis; and such conceptions as "mortal soul,"
and "soul of subjective multiplicity," and "soul as social structure of the
instincts and passions," want henceforth to have legitimate rights in science.
In that the NEW psychologist is about to put an end to the superstitions
which have hitherto flourished with almost tropical luxuriance around the
idea of the soul, he is really, as it were, thrusting himself into a new desert
and a new distrust—it is possible that the older psychologists had a merrier
and more comfortable time of it; eventually, however, he finds that
precisely thereby he is also condemned to INVENT—and, who knows?
perhaps to DISCOVER the new.

13. Psychologists should bethink themselves before putting down the
instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic being. A
living thing seeks above all to DISCHARGE its strength—life itself is
WILL TO POWER; self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most
frequent RESULTS thereof. In short, here, as everywhere else, let us beware
of SUPERFLUOUS teleological principles!—one of which is the instinct of
self-preservation (we owe it to Spinoza's inconsistency). It is thus, in effect,
that method ordains, which must be essentially economy of principles.
14. It is perhaps just dawning on five or six minds that natural philosophy
is only a world-exposition and world-arrangement (according to us, if I may
say so!) and NOT a world-explanation; but in so far as it is based on belief
in the senses, it is regarded as more, and for a long time to come must be
regarded as more—namely, as an explanation. It has eyes and fingers of its
own, it has ocular evidence and palpableness of its own: this operates
fascinatingly, persuasively, and CONVINCINGLY upon an age with
fundamentally plebeian tastes—in fact, it follows instinctively the canon of
truth of eternal popular sensualism. What is clear, what is "explained"?
Only that which can be seen and felt—one must pursue every problem thus
far. Obversely, however, the charm of the Platonic mode of thought, which
was an ARISTOCRATIC mode, consisted precisely in RESISTANCE to
obvious sense-evidence—perhaps among men who enjoyed even stronger
and more fastidious senses than our contemporaries, but who knew how to
find a higher triumph in remaining masters of them: and this by means of
pale, cold, grey conceptional networks which they threw over the motley
whirl of the senses—the mob of the senses, as Plato said. In this
overcoming of the world, and interpreting of the world in the manner of
Plato, there was an ENJOYMENT different from that which the physicists
of today offer us—and likewise the Darwinists and anti-teleologists among
the physiological workers, with their principle of the "smallest possible
effort," and the greatest possible blunder. "Where there is nothing more to
see or to grasp, there is also nothing more for men to do"—that is certainly
an imperative different from the Platonic one, but it may notwithstanding be
the right imperative for a hardy, laborious race of machinists and bridgebuilders of the future, who have nothing but ROUGH work to perform.
15. To study physiology with a clear conscience, one must insist on the
fact that the sense-organs are not phenomena in the sense of the idealistic
philosophy; as such they certainly could not be causes! Sensualism,

therefore, at least as regulative hypothesis, if not as heuristic principle.
What? And others say even that the external world is the work of our
organs? But then our body, as a part of this external world, would be the
work of our organs! But then our organs themselves would be the work of
our organs! It seems to me that this is a complete REDUCTIO AD
ABSURDUM, if the conception CAUSA SUI is something fundamentally
absurd. Consequently, the external world is NOT the work of our organs—?
16. There are still harmless self-observers who believe that there are
"immediate certainties"; for instance, "I think," or as the superstition of
Schopenhauer puts it, "I will"; as though cognition here got hold of its
object purely and simply as "the thing in itself," without any falsification
taking place either on the part of the subject or the object. I would repeat it,
however, a hundred times, that "immediate certainty," as well as "absolute
knowledge" and the "thing in itself," involve a CONTRADICTIO IN
ADJECTO; we really ought to free ourselves from the misleading
significance of words! The people on their part may think that cognition is
knowing all about things, but the philosopher must say to himself: "When I
analyze the process that is expressed in the sentence, 'I think,' I find a whole
series of daring assertions, the argumentative proof of which would be
difficult, perhaps impossible: for instance, that it is I who think, that there
must necessarily be something that thinks, that thinking is an activity and
operation on the part of a being who is thought of as a cause, that there is an
'ego,' and finally, that it is already determined what is to be designated by
thinking—that I KNOW what thinking is. For if I had not already decided
within myself what it is, by what standard could I determine whether that
which is just happening is not perhaps 'willing' or 'feeling'? In short, the
assertion 'I think,' assumes that I COMPARE my state at the present
moment with other states of myself which I know, in order to determine
what it is; on account of this retrospective connection with further
'knowledge,' it has, at any rate, no immediate certainty for me."—In place
of the "immediate certainty" in which the people may believe in the special
case, the philosopher thus finds a series of metaphysical questions presented
to him, veritable conscience questions of the intellect, to wit: "Whence did I
get the notion of 'thinking'? Why do I believe in cause and effect? What
gives me the right to speak of an 'ego,' and even of an 'ego' as cause, and
finally of an 'ego' as cause of thought?" He who ventures to answer these
metaphysical questions at once by an appeal to a sort of INTUITIVE

perception, like the person who says, "I think, and know that this, at least, is
true, actual, and certain"—will encounter a smile and two notes of
interrogation in a philosopher nowadays. "Sir," the philosopher will perhaps
give him to understand, "it is improbable that you are not mistaken, but why
should it be the truth?"
17. With regard to the superstitions of logicians, I shall never tire of
emphasizing a small, terse fact, which is unwillingly recognized by these
credulous minds—namely, that a thought comes when "it" wishes, and not
when "I" wish; so that it is a PERVERSION of the facts of the case to say
that the subject "I" is the condition of the predicate "think." ONE thinks; but
that this "one" is precisely the famous old "ego," is, to put it mildly, only a
supposition, an assertion, and assuredly not an "immediate certainty." After
all, one has even gone too far with this "one thinks"—even the "one"
contains an INTERPRETATION of the process, and does not belong to the
process itself. One infers here according to the usual grammatical formula
—"To think is an activity; every activity requires an agency that is active;
consequently"... It was pretty much on the same lines that the older
atomism sought, besides the operating "power," the material particle
wherein it resides and out of which it operates—the atom. More rigorous
minds, however, learnt at last to get along without this "earth-residuum,"
and perhaps some day we shall accustom ourselves, even from the
logician's point of view, to get along without the little "one" (to which the
worthy old "ego" has refined itself).
18. It is certainly not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable; it is
precisely thereby that it attracts the more subtle minds. It seems that the
hundred-times-refuted theory of the "free will" owes its persistence to this
charm alone; some one is always appearing who feels himself strong
enough to refute it.
19. Philosophers are accustomed to speak of the will as though it were
the best-known thing in the world; indeed, Schopenhauer has given us to
understand that the will alone is really known to us, absolutely and
completely known, without deduction or addition. But it again and again
seems to me that in this case Schopenhauer also only did what philosophers
are in the habit of doing—he seems to have adopted a POPULAR
PREJUDICE and exaggerated it. Willing seems to me to be above all
something COMPLICATED, something that is a unity only in name—and it

is precisely in a name that popular prejudice lurks, which has got the
mastery over the inadequate precautions of philosophers in all ages. So let
us for once be more cautious, let us be "unphilosophical": let us say that in
all willing there is firstly a plurality of sensations, namely, the sensation of
the condition "AWAY FROM WHICH we go," the sensation of the
condition "TOWARDS WHICH we go," the sensation of this "FROM" and
"TOWARDS" itself, and then besides, an accompanying muscular
sensation, which, even without our putting in motion "arms and legs,"
commences its action by force of habit, directly we "will" anything.
Therefore, just as sensations (and indeed many kinds of sensations) are to
be recognized as ingredients of the will, so, in the second place, thinking is
also to be recognized; in every act of the will there is a ruling thought;—
and let us not imagine it possible to sever this thought from the "willing," as
if the will would then remain over! In the third place, the will is not only a
complex of sensation and thinking, but it is above all an EMOTION, and in
fact the emotion of the command. That which is termed "freedom of the
will" is essentially the emotion of supremacy in respect to him who must
obey: "I am free, 'he' must obey"—this consciousness is inherent in every
will; and equally so the straining of the attention, the straight look which
fixes itself exclusively on one thing, the unconditional judgment that "this
and nothing else is necessary now," the inward certainty that obedience will
be rendered—and whatever else pertains to the position of the commander.
A man who WILLS commands something within himself which renders
obedience, or which he believes renders obedience. But now let us notice
what is the strangest thing about the will,—this affair so extremely
complex, for which the people have only one name. Inasmuch as in the
given circumstances we are at the same time the commanding AND the
obeying parties, and as the obeying party we know the sensations of
constraint, impulsion, pressure, resistance, and motion, which usually
commence immediately after the act of will; inasmuch as, on the other
hand, we are accustomed to disregard this duality, and to deceive ourselves
about it by means of the synthetic term "I": a whole series of erroneous
conclusions, and consequently of false judgments about the will itself, has
become attached to the act of willing—to such a degree that he who wills
believes firmly that willing SUFFICES for action. Since in the majority of
cases there has only been exercise of will when the effect of the command
—consequently obedience, and therefore action—was to be EXPECTED,

the APPEARANCE has translated itself into the sentiment, as if there were
a NECESSITY OF EFFECT; in a word, he who wills believes with a fair
amount of certainty that will and action are somehow one; he ascribes the
success, the carrying out of the willing, to the will itself, and thereby enjoys
an increase of the sensation of power which accompanies all success.
"Freedom of Will"—that is the expression for the complex state of delight
of the person exercising volition, who commands and at the same time
identifies himself with the executor of the order—who, as such, enjoys also
the triumph over obstacles, but thinks within himself that it was really his
own will that overcame them. In this way the person exercising volition
adds the feelings of delight of his successful executive instruments, the
useful "underwills" or under-souls—indeed, our body is but a social
structure composed of many souls—to his feelings of delight as
commander. L'EFFET C'EST MOI. what happens here is what happens in
every well-constructed and happy commonwealth, namely, that the
governing class identifies itself with the successes of the commonwealth. In
all willing it is absolutely a question of commanding and obeying, on the
basis, as already said, of a social structure composed of many "souls", on
which account a philosopher should claim the right to include willing-assuch within the sphere of morals—regarded as the doctrine of the relations
of supremacy under which the phenomenon of "life" manifests itself.
20. That the separate philosophical ideas are not anything optional or
autonomously evolving, but grow up in connection and relationship with
each other, that, however suddenly and arbitrarily they seem to appear in
the history of thought, they nevertheless belong just as much to a system as
the collective members of the fauna of a Continent—is betrayed in the end
by the circumstance: how unfailingly the most diverse philosophers always
fill in again a definite fundamental scheme of POSSIBLE philosophies.
Under an invisible spell, they always revolve once more in the same orbit,
however independent of each other they may feel themselves with their
critical or systematic wills, something within them leads them, something
impels them in definite order the one after the other—to wit, the innate
methodology and relationship of their ideas. Their thinking is, in fact, far
less a discovery than a re-recognizing, a remembering, a return and a homecoming to a far-off, ancient common-household of the soul, out of which
those ideas formerly grew: philosophizing is so far a kind of atavism of the
highest order. The wonderful family resemblance of all Indian, Greek, and

German philosophizing is easily enough explained. In fact, where there is
affinity of language, owing to the common philosophy of grammar—I mean
owing to the unconscious domination and guidance of similar grammatical
functions—it cannot but be that everything is prepared at the outset for a
similar development and succession of philosophical systems, just as the
way seems barred against certain other possibilities of world-interpretation.
It is highly probable that philosophers within the domain of the Ural-Altaic
languages (where the conception of the subject is least developed) look
otherwise "into the world," and will be found on paths of thought different
from those of the Indo-Germans and Mussulmans, the spell of certain
grammatical functions is ultimately also the spell of PHYSIOLOGICAL
valuations and racial conditions.—So much by way of rejecting Locke's
superficiality with regard to the origin of ideas.
21. The CAUSA SUI is the best self-contradiction that has yet been
conceived, it is a sort of logical violation and unnaturalness; but the
extravagant pride of man has managed to entangle itself profoundly and
frightfully with this very folly. The desire for "freedom of will" in the
superlative, metaphysical sense, such as still holds sway, unfortunately, in
the minds of the half-educated, the desire to bear the entire and ultimate
responsibility for one's actions oneself, and to absolve God, the world,
ancestors, chance, and society therefrom, involves nothing less than to be
precisely this CAUSA SUI, and, with more than Munchausen daring, to
pull oneself up into existence by the hair, out of the slough of nothingness.
If any one should find out in this manner the crass stupidity of the
celebrated conception of "free will" and put it out of his head altogether, I
beg of him to carry his "enlightenment" a step further, and also put out of
his head the contrary of this monstrous conception of "free will": I mean
"non-free will," which is tantamount to a misuse of cause and effect. One
should not wrongly MATERIALISE "cause" and "effect," as the natural
philosophers do (and whoever like them naturalize in thinking at present),
according to the prevailing mechanical doltishness which makes the cause
press and push until it "effects" its end; one should use "cause" and "effect"
only as pure CONCEPTIONS, that is to say, as conventional fictions for the
purpose of designation and mutual understanding,—NOT for explanation.
In "being-in-itself" there is nothing of "casual-connection," of "necessity,"
or of "psychological non-freedom"; there the effect does NOT follow the
cause, there "law" does not obtain. It is WE alone who have devised cause,

sequence, reciprocity, relativity, constraint, number, law, freedom, motive,
and purpose; and when we interpret and intermix this symbol-world, as
"being-in-itself," with things, we act once more as we have always acted—
MYTHOLOGICALLY. The "non-free will" is mythology; in real life it is
only a question of STRONG and WEAK wills.—It is almost always a
symptom of what is lacking in himself, when a thinker, in every "causalconnection" and "psychological necessity," manifests something of
compulsion, indigence, obsequiousness, oppression, and non-freedom; it is
suspicious to have such feelings—the person betrays himself. And in
general, if I have observed correctly, the "non-freedom of the will" is
regarded as a problem from two entirely opposite standpoints, but always in
a profoundly PERSONAL manner: some will not give up their
"responsibility," their belief in THEMSELVES, the personal right to THEIR
merits, at any price (the vain races belong to this class); others on the
contrary, do not wish to be answerable for anything, or blamed for anything,
and owing to an inward self-contempt, seek to GET OUT OF THE
BUSINESS, no matter how. The latter, when they write books, are in the
habit at present of taking the side of criminals; a sort of socialistic sympathy
is their favourite disguise. And as a matter of fact, the fatalism of the weakwilled embellishes itself surprisingly when it can pose as "la religion de la
souffrance humaine"; that is ITS "good taste."
22. Let me be pardoned, as an old philologist who cannot desist from the
mischief of putting his finger on bad modes of interpretation, but "Nature's
conformity to law," of which you physicists talk so proudly, as though—
why, it exists only owing to your interpretation and bad "philology." It is no
matter of fact, no "text," but rather just a naively humanitarian adjustment
and perversion of meaning, with which you make abundant concessions to
the democratic instincts of the modern soul! "Everywhere equality before
the law—Nature is not different in that respect, nor better than we": a fine
instance of secret motive, in which the vulgar antagonism to everything
privileged and autocratic—likewise a second and more refined atheism—is
once more disguised. "Ni dieu, ni maitre"—that, also, is what you want; and
therefore "Cheers for natural law!"—is it not so? But, as has been said, that
is interpretation, not text; and somebody might come along, who, with
opposite intentions and modes of interpretation, could read out of the same
"Nature," and with regard to the same phenomena, just the tyrannically
inconsiderate and relentless enforcement of the claims of power—an

interpreter who should so place the unexceptionalness and
unconditionalness of all "Will to Power" before your eyes, that almost every
word, and the word "tyranny" itself, would eventually seem unsuitable, or
like a weakening and softening metaphor—as being too human; and who
should, nevertheless, end by asserting the same about this world as you do,
namely, that it has a "necessary" and "calculable" course, NOT, however,
because laws obtain in it, but because they are absolutely LACKING, and
every power effects its ultimate consequences every moment. Granted that
this also is only interpretation—and you will be eager enough to make this
objection?—well, so much the better.
23. All psychology hitherto has run aground on moral prejudices and
timidities, it has not dared to launch out into the depths. In so far as it is
allowable to recognize in that which has hitherto been written, evidence of
that which has hitherto been kept silent, it seems as if nobody had yet
harboured the notion of psychology as the Morphology and
DEVELOPMENT-DOCTRINE OF THE WILL TO POWER, as I conceive
of it. The power of moral prejudices has penetrated deeply into the most
intellectual world, the world apparently most indifferent and unprejudiced,
and has obviously operated in an injurious, obstructive, blinding, and
distorting manner. A proper physio-psychology has to contend with
unconscious antagonism in the heart of the investigator, it has "the heart"
against it even a doctrine of the reciprocal conditionalness of the "good"
and the "bad" impulses, causes (as refined immorality) distress and aversion
in a still strong and manly conscience—still more so, a doctrine of the
derivation of all good impulses from bad ones. If, however, a person should
regard even the emotions of hatred, envy, covetousness, and imperiousness
as life-conditioning emotions, as factors which must be present,
fundamentally and essentially, in the general economy of life (which must,
therefore, be further developed if life is to be further developed), he will
suffer from such a view of things as from sea-sickness. And yet this
hypothesis is far from being the strangest and most painful in this immense
and almost new domain of dangerous knowledge, and there are in fact a
hundred good reasons why every one should keep away from it who CAN
do so! On the other hand, if one has once drifted hither with one's bark,
well! very good! now let us set our teeth firmly! let us open our eyes and
keep our hand fast on the helm! We sail away right OVER morality, we
crush out, we destroy perhaps the remains of our own morality by daring to

make our voyage thither—but what do WE matter. Never yet did a
PROFOUNDER world of insight reveal itself to daring travelers and
adventurers, and the psychologist who thus "makes a sacrifice"—it is not
the sacrifizio dell' intelletto, on the contrary!—will at least be entitled to
demand in return that psychology shall once more be recognized as the
queen of the sciences, for whose service and equipment the other sciences
exist. For psychology is once more the path to the fundamental problems.

CHAPTER II. THE FREE SPIRIT
24. O sancta simplicitas! In what strange simplification and falsification
man lives! One can never cease wondering when once one has got eyes for
beholding this marvel! How we have made everything around us clear and
free and easy and simple! how we have been able to give our senses a
passport to everything superficial, our thoughts a godlike desire for wanton
pranks and wrong inferences!—how from the beginning, we have contrived
to retain our ignorance in order to enjoy an almost inconceivable freedom,
thoughtlessness, imprudence, heartiness, and gaiety—in order to enjoy life!
And only on this solidified, granite-like foundation of ignorance could
knowledge rear itself hitherto, the will to knowledge on the foundation of a
far more powerful will, the will to ignorance, to the uncertain, to the untrue!
Not as its opposite, but—as its refinement! It is to be hoped, indeed, that
LANGUAGE, here as elsewhere, will not get over its awkwardness, and
that it will continue to talk of opposites where there are only degrees and
many refinements of gradation; it is equally to be hoped that the incarnated
Tartuffery of morals, which now belongs to our unconquerable "flesh and
blood," will turn the words round in the mouths of us discerning ones. Here
and there we understand it, and laugh at the way in which precisely the best
knowledge seeks most to retain us in this SIMPLIFIED, thoroughly
artificial, suitably imagined, and suitably falsified world: at the way in
which, whether it will or not, it loves error, because, as living itself, it loves
life!
25. After such a cheerful commencement, a serious word would fain be
heard; it appeals to the most serious minds. Take care, ye philosophers and
friends of knowledge, and beware of martyrdom! Of suffering "for the
truth's sake"! even in your own defense! It spoils all the innocence and fine
neutrality of your conscience; it makes you headstrong against objections
and red rags; it stupefies, animalizes, and brutalizes, when in the struggle
with danger, slander, suspicion, expulsion, and even worse consequences of
enmity, ye have at last to play your last card as protectors of truth upon
earth—as though "the Truth" were such an innocent and incompetent
creature as to require protectors! and you of all people, ye knights of the

sorrowful countenance, Messrs Loafers and Cobweb-spinners of the spirit!
Finally, ye know sufficiently well that it cannot be of any consequence if
YE just carry your point; ye know that hitherto no philosopher has carried
his point, and that there might be a more laudable truthfulness in every little
interrogative mark which you place after your special words and favourite
doctrines (and occasionally after yourselves) than in all the solemn
pantomime and trumping games before accusers and law-courts! Rather go
out of the way! Flee into concealment! And have your masks and your
ruses, that ye may be mistaken for what you are, or somewhat feared! And
pray, don't forget the garden, the garden with golden trellis-work! And have
people around you who are as a garden—or as music on the waters at
eventide, when already the day becomes a memory. Choose the GOOD
solitude, the free, wanton, lightsome solitude, which also gives you the right
still to remain good in any sense whatsoever! How poisonous, how crafty,
how bad, does every long war make one, which cannot be waged openly by
means of force! How PERSONAL does a long fear make one, a long
watching of enemies, of possible enemies! These pariahs of society, these
long-pursued, badly-persecuted ones—also the compulsory recluses, the
Spinozas or Giordano Brunos—always become in the end, even under the
most intellectual masquerade, and perhaps without being themselves aware
of it, refined vengeance-seekers and poison-Brewers (just lay bare the
foundation of Spinoza's ethics and theology!), not to speak of the stupidity
of moral indignation, which is the unfailing sign in a philosopher that the
sense of philosophical humour has left him. The martyrdom of the
philosopher, his "sacrifice for the sake of truth," forces into the light
whatever of the agitator and actor lurks in him; and if one has hitherto
contemplated him only with artistic curiosity, with regard to many a
philosopher it is easy to understand the dangerous desire to see him also in
his deterioration (deteriorated into a "martyr," into a stage-and-tribunebawler). Only, that it is necessary with such a desire to be clear WHAT
spectacle one will see in any case—merely a satyric play, merely an
epilogue farce, merely the continued proof that the long, real tragedy IS AT
AN END, supposing that every philosophy has been a long tragedy in its
origin.
26. Every select man strives instinctively for a citadel and a privacy,
where he is FREE from the crowd, the many, the majority—where he may
forget "men who are the rule," as their exception;—exclusive only of the

case in which he is pushed straight to such men by a still stronger instinct,
as a discerner in the great and exceptional sense. Whoever, in intercourse
with men, does not occasionally glisten in all the green and grey colours of
distress, owing to disgust, satiety, sympathy, gloominess, and solitariness, is
assuredly not a man of elevated tastes; supposing, however, that he does not
voluntarily take all this burden and disgust upon himself, that he
persistently avoids it, and remains, as I said, quietly and proudly hidden in
his citadel, one thing is then certain: he was not made, he was not
predestined for knowledge. For as such, he would one day have to say to
himself: "The devil take my good taste! but 'the rule' is more interesting
than the exception—than myself, the exception!" And he would go DOWN,
and above all, he would go "inside." The long and serious study of the
AVERAGE man—and consequently much disguise, self-overcoming,
familiarity, and bad intercourse (all intercourse is bad intercourse except
with one's equals):—that constitutes a necessary part of the life-history of
every philosopher; perhaps the most disagreeable, odious, and
disappointing part. If he is fortunate, however, as a favourite child of
knowledge should be, he will meet with suitable auxiliaries who will
shorten and lighten his task; I mean so-called cynics, those who simply
recognize the animal, the commonplace and "the rule" in themselves, and at
the same time have so much spirituality and ticklishness as to make them
talk of themselves and their like BEFORE WITNESSES—sometimes they
wallow, even in books, as on their own dung-hill. Cynicism is the only form
in which base souls approach what is called honesty; and the higher man
must open his ears to all the coarser or finer cynicism, and congratulate
himself when the clown becomes shameless right before him, or the
scientific satyr speaks out. There are even cases where enchantment mixes
with the disgust—namely, where by a freak of nature, genius is bound to
some such indiscreet billy-goat and ape, as in the case of the Abbe Galiani,
the profoundest, acutest, and perhaps also filthiest man of his century—he
was far profounder than Voltaire, and consequently also, a good deal more
silent. It happens more frequently, as has been hinted, that a scientific head
is placed on an ape's body, a fine exceptional understanding in a base soul,
an occurrence by no means rare, especially among doctors and moral
physiologists. And whenever anyone speaks without bitterness, or rather
quite innocently, of man as a belly with two requirements, and a head with
one; whenever any one sees, seeks, and WANTS to see only hunger, sexual

instinct, and vanity as the real and only motives of human actions; in short,
when any one speaks "badly"—and not even "ill"—of man, then ought the
lover of knowledge to hearken attentively and diligently; he ought, in
general, to have an open ear wherever there is talk without indignation. For
the indignant man, and he who perpetually tears and lacerates himself with
his own teeth (or, in place of himself, the world, God, or society), may
indeed, morally speaking, stand higher than the laughing and self-satisfied
satyr, but in every other sense he is the more ordinary, more indifferent, and
less instructive case. And no one is such a LIAR as the indignant man.
27. It is difficult to be understood, especially when one thinks and lives
gangasrotogati [Footnote: Like the river Ganges: presto.] among those only
who think and live otherwise—namely, kurmagati [Footnote: Like the
tortoise: lento.], or at best "froglike," mandeikagati [Footnote: Like the
frog: staccato.] (I do everything to be "difficultly understood" myself!)—
and one should be heartily grateful for the good will to some refinement of
interpretation. As regards "the good friends," however, who are always too
easy-going, and think that as friends they have a right to ease, one does well
at the very first to grant them a play-ground and romping-place for
misunderstanding—one can thus laugh still; or get rid of them altogether,
these good friends—and laugh then also!
28. What is most difficult to render from one language into another is the
TEMPO of its style, which has its basis in the character of the race, or to
speak more physiologically, in the average TEMPO of the assimilation of
its nutriment. There are honestly meant translations, which, as involuntary
vulgarizations, are almost falsifications of the original, merely because its
lively and merry TEMPO (which overleaps and obviates all dangers in
word and expression) could not also be rendered. A German is almost
incapacitated for PRESTO in his language; consequently also, as may be
reasonably inferred, for many of the most delightful and daring NUANCES
of free, free-spirited thought. And just as the buffoon and satyr are foreign
to him in body and conscience, so Aristophanes and Petronius are
untranslatable for him. Everything ponderous, viscous, and pompously
clumsy, all long-winded and wearying species of style, are developed in
profuse variety among Germans—pardon me for stating the fact that even
Goethe's prose, in its mixture of stiffness and elegance, is no exception, as a
reflection of the "good old time" to which it belongs, and as an expression
of German taste at a time when there was still a "German taste," which was

a rococo-taste in moribus et artibus. Lessing is an exception, owing to his
histrionic nature, which understood much, and was versed in many things;
he who was not the translator of Bayle to no purpose, who took refuge
willingly in the shadow of Diderot and Voltaire, and still more willingly
among the Roman comedy-writers—Lessing loved also free-spiritism in the
TEMPO, and flight out of Germany. But how could the German language,
even in the prose of Lessing, imitate the TEMPO of Machiavelli, who in his
"Principe" makes us breathe the dry, fine air of Florence, and cannot help
presenting the most serious events in a boisterous allegrissimo, perhaps not
without a malicious artistic sense of the contrast he ventures to present—
long, heavy, difficult, dangerous thoughts, and a TEMPO of the gallop, and
of the best, wantonest humour? Finally, who would venture on a German
translation of Petronius, who, more than any great musician hitherto, was a
master of PRESTO in invention, ideas, and words? What matter in the end
about the swamps of the sick, evil world, or of the "ancient world," when
like him, one has the feet of a wind, the rush, the breath, the emancipating
scorn of a wind, which makes everything healthy, by making everything
RUN! And with regard to Aristophanes—that transfiguring, complementary
genius, for whose sake one PARDONS all Hellenism for having existed,
provided one has understood in its full profundity ALL that there requires
pardon and transfiguration; there is nothing that has caused me to meditate
more on PLATO'S secrecy and sphinx-like nature, than the happily
preserved petit fait that under the pillow of his death-bed there was found
no "Bible," nor anything Egyptian, Pythagorean, or Platonic—but a book of
Aristophanes. How could even Plato have endured life—a Greek life which
he repudiated—without an Aristophanes!
29. It is the business of the very few to be independent; it is a privilege of
the strong. And whoever attempts it, even with the best right, but without
being OBLIGED to do so, proves that he is probably not only strong, but
also daring beyond measure. He enters into a labyrinth, he multiplies a
thousandfold the dangers which life in itself already brings with it; not the
least of which is that no one can see how and where he loses his way,
becomes isolated, and is torn piecemeal by some minotaur of conscience.
Supposing such a one comes to grief, it is so far from the comprehension of
men that they neither feel it, nor sympathize with it. And he cannot any
longer go back! He cannot even go back again to the sympathy of men!

30. Our deepest insights must—and should—appear as follies, and under
certain circumstances as crimes, when they come unauthorizedly to the ears
of those who are not disposed and predestined for them. The exoteric and
the esoteric, as they were formerly distinguished by philosophers—among
the Indians, as among the Greeks, Persians, and Mussulmans, in short,
wherever people believed in gradations of rank and NOT in equality and
equal rights—are not so much in contradistinction to one another in respect
to the exoteric class, standing without, and viewing, estimating, measuring,
and judging from the outside, and not from the inside; the more essential
distinction is that the class in question views things from below upwards—
while the esoteric class views things FROM ABOVE DOWNWARDS.
There are heights of the soul from which tragedy itself no longer appears to
operate tragically; and if all the woe in the world were taken together, who
would dare to decide whether the sight of it would NECESSARILY seduce
and constrain to sympathy, and thus to a doubling of the woe?... That which
serves the higher class of men for nourishment or refreshment, must be
almost poison to an entirely different and lower order of human beings. The
virtues of the common man would perhaps mean vice and weakness in a
philosopher; it might be possible for a highly developed man, supposing
him to degenerate and go to ruin, to acquire qualities thereby alone, for the
sake of which he would have to be honoured as a saint in the lower world
into which he had sunk. There are books which have an inverse value for
the soul and the health according as the inferior soul and the lower vitality,
or the higher and more powerful, make use of them. In the former case they
are dangerous, disturbing, unsettling books, in the latter case they are
herald-calls which summon the bravest to THEIR bravery. Books for the
general reader are always ill-smelling books, the odour of paltry people
clings to them. Where the populace eat and drink, and even where they
reverence, it is accustomed to stink. One should not go into churches if one
wishes to breathe PURE air.
31. In our youthful years we still venerate and despise without the art of
NUANCE, which is the best gain of life, and we have rightly to do hard
penance for having fallen upon men and things with Yea and Nay.
Everything is so arranged that the worst of all tastes, THE TASTE FOR
THE UNCONDITIONAL, is cruelly befooled and abused, until a man
learns to introduce a little art into his sentiments, and prefers to try
conclusions with the artificial, as do the real artists of life. The angry and

reverent spirit peculiar to youth appears to allow itself no peace, until it has
suitably falsified men and things, to be able to vent its passion upon them:
youth in itself even, is something falsifying and deceptive. Later on, when
the young soul, tortured by continual disillusions, finally turns suspiciously
against itself—still ardent and savage even in its suspicion and remorse of
conscience: how it upbraids itself, how impatiently it tears itself, how it
revenges itself for its long self-blinding, as though it had been a voluntary
blindness! In this transition one punishes oneself by distrust of one's
sentiments; one tortures one's enthusiasm with doubt, one feels even the
good conscience to be a danger, as if it were the self-concealment and
lassitude of a more refined uprightness; and above all, one espouses upon
principle the cause AGAINST "youth."—A decade later, and one
comprehends that all this was also still—youth!
32. Throughout the longest period of human history—one calls it the
prehistoric period—the value or non-value of an action was inferred from
its CONSEQUENCES; the action in itself was not taken into consideration,
any more than its origin; but pretty much as in China at present, where the
distinction or disgrace of a child redounds to its parents, the retro-operating
power of success or failure was what induced men to think well or ill of an
action. Let us call this period the PRE-MORAL period of mankind; the
imperative, "Know thyself!" was then still unknown.—In the last ten
thousand years, on the other hand, on certain large portions of the earth, one
has gradually got so far, that one no longer lets the consequences of an
action, but its origin, decide with regard to its worth: a great achievement as
a whole, an important refinement of vision and of criterion, the unconscious
effect of the supremacy of aristocratic values and of the belief in "origin,"
the mark of a period which may be designated in the narrower sense as the
MORAL one: the first attempt at self-knowledge is thereby made. Instead
of the consequences, the origin—what an inversion of perspective! And
assuredly an inversion effected only after long struggle and wavering! To be
sure, an ominous new superstition, a peculiar narrowness of interpretation,
attained supremacy precisely thereby: the origin of an action was
interpreted in the most definite sense possible, as origin out of an
INTENTION; people were agreed in the belief that the value of an action
lay in the value of its intention. The intention as the sole origin and
antecedent history of an action: under the influence of this prejudice moral
praise and blame have been bestowed, and men have judged and even

philosophized almost up to the present day.—Is it not possible, however,
that the necessity may now have arisen of again making up our minds with
regard to the reversing and fundamental shifting of values, owing to a new
self-consciousness and acuteness in man—is it not possible that we may be
standing on the threshold of a period which to begin with, would be
distinguished negatively as ULTRA-MORAL: nowadays when, at least
among us immoralists, the suspicion arises that the decisive value of an
action lies precisely in that which is NOT INTENTIONAL, and that all its
intentionalness, all that is seen, sensible, or "sensed" in it, belongs to its
surface or skin—which, like every skin, betrays something, but
CONCEALS still more? In short, we believe that the intention is only a sign
or symptom, which first requires an explanation—a sign, moreover, which
has too many interpretations, and consequently hardly any meaning in itself
alone: that morality, in the sense in which it has been understood hitherto,
as intention-morality, has been a prejudice, perhaps a prematureness or
preliminariness, probably something of the same rank as astrology and
alchemy, but in any case something which must be surmounted. The
surmounting of morality, in a certain sense even the self-mounting of
morality—let that be the name for the long-secret labour which has been
reserved for the most refined, the most upright, and also the most wicked
consciences of today, as the living touchstones of the soul.
33. It cannot be helped: the sentiment of surrender, of sacrifice for one's
neighbour, and all self-renunciation-morality, must be mercilessly called to
account, and brought to judgment; just as the aesthetics of "disinterested
contemplation," under which the emasculation of art nowadays seeks
insidiously enough to create itself a good conscience. There is far too much
witchery and sugar in the sentiments "for others" and "NOT for myself," for
one not needing to be doubly distrustful here, and for one asking promptly:
"Are they not perhaps—DECEPTIONS?"—That they PLEASE—him who
has them, and him who enjoys their fruit, and also the mere spectator—that
is still no argument in their FAVOUR, but just calls for caution. Let us
therefore be cautious!
34. At whatever standpoint of philosophy one may place oneself
nowadays, seen from every position, the ERRONEOUSNESS of the world
in which we think we live is the surest and most certain thing our eyes can
light upon: we find proof after proof thereof, which would fain allure us
into surmises concerning a deceptive principle in the "nature of things." He,

however, who makes thinking itself, and consequently "the spirit,"
responsible for the falseness of the world—an honourable exit, which every
conscious or unconscious advocatus dei avails himself of—he who regards
this world, including space, time, form, and movement, as falsely
DEDUCED, would have at least good reason in the end to become
distrustful also of all thinking; has it not hitherto been playing upon us the
worst of scurvy tricks? and what guarantee would it give that it would not
continue to do what it has always been doing? In all seriousness, the
innocence of thinkers has something touching and respect-inspiring in it,
which even nowadays permits them to wait upon consciousness with the
request that it will give them HONEST answers: for example, whether it be
"real" or not, and why it keeps the outer world so resolutely at a distance,
and other questions of the same description. The belief in "immediate
certainties" is a MORAL NAIVETE which does honour to us philosophers;
but—we have now to cease being "MERELY moral" men! Apart from
morality, such belief is a folly which does little honour to us! If in middleclass life an ever-ready distrust is regarded as the sign of a "bad character,"
and consequently as an imprudence, here among us, beyond the middleclass world and its Yeas and Nays, what should prevent our being
imprudent and saying: the philosopher has at length a RIGHT to "bad
character," as the being who has hitherto been most befooled on earth—he
is now under OBLIGATION to distrustfulness, to the wickedest squinting
out of every abyss of suspicion.—Forgive me the joke of this gloomy
grimace and turn of expression; for I myself have long ago learned to think
and estimate differently with regard to deceiving and being deceived, and I
keep at least a couple of pokes in the ribs ready for the blind rage with
which philosophers struggle against being deceived. Why NOT? It is
nothing more than a moral prejudice that truth is worth more than
semblance; it is, in fact, the worst proved supposition in the world. So much
must be conceded: there could have been no life at all except upon the basis
of perspective estimates and semblances; and if, with the virtuous
enthusiasm and stupidity of many philosophers, one wished to do away
altogether with the "seeming world"—well, granted that YOU could do
that,—at least nothing of your "truth" would thereby remain! Indeed, what
is it that forces us in general to the supposition that there is an essential
opposition of "true" and "false"? Is it not enough to suppose degrees of
seemingness, and as it were lighter and darker shades and tones of

semblance—different valeurs, as the painters say? Why might not the world
WHICH CONCERNS US—be a fiction? And to any one who suggested:
"But to a fiction belongs an originator?"—might it not be bluntly replied:
WHY? May not this "belong" also belong to the fiction? Is it not at length
permitted to be a little ironical towards the subject, just as towards the
predicate and object? Might not the philosopher elevate himself above faith
in grammar? All respect to governesses, but is it not time that philosophy
should renounce governess-faith?
35. O Voltaire! O humanity! O idiocy! There is something ticklish in "the
truth," and in the SEARCH for the truth; and if man goes about it too
humanely—"il ne cherche le vrai que pour faire le bien"—I wager he finds
nothing!
36. Supposing that nothing else is "given" as real but our world of desires
and passions, that we cannot sink or rise to any other "reality" but just that
of our impulses—for thinking is only a relation of these impulses to one
another:—are we not permitted to make the attempt and to ask the question
whether this which is "given" does not SUFFICE, by means of our
counterparts, for the understanding even of the so-called mechanical (or
"material") world? I do not mean as an illusion, a "semblance," a
"representation" (in the Berkeleyan and Schopenhauerian sense), but as
possessing the same degree of reality as our emotions themselves—as a
more primitive form of the world of emotions, in which everything still lies
locked in a mighty unity, which afterwards branches off and develops itself
in organic processes (naturally also, refines and debilitates)—as a kind of
instinctive life in which all organic functions, including self-regulation,
assimilation, nutrition, secretion, and change of matter, are still
synthetically united with one another—as a PRIMARY FORM of life?—In
the end, it is not only permitted to make this attempt, it is commanded by
the conscience of LOGICAL METHOD. Not to assume several kinds of
causality, so long as the attempt to get along with a single one has not been
pushed to its furthest extent (to absurdity, if I may be allowed to say so):
that is a morality of method which one may not repudiate nowadays—it
follows "from its definition," as mathematicians say. The question is
ultimately whether we really recognize the will as OPERATING, whether
we believe in the causality of the will; if we do so—and fundamentally our
belief IN THIS is just our belief in causality itself—we MUST make the
attempt to posit hypothetically the causality of the will as the only causality.

"Will" can naturally only operate on "will"—and not on "matter" (not on
"nerves," for instance): in short, the hypothesis must be hazarded, whether
will does not operate on will wherever "effects" are recognized—and
whether all mechanical action, inasmuch as a power operates therein, is not
just the power of will, the effect of will. Granted, finally, that we succeeded
in explaining our entire instinctive life as the development and ramification
of one fundamental form of will—namely, the Will to Power, as my thesis
puts it; granted that all organic functions could be traced back to this Will to
Power, and that the solution of the problem of generation and nutrition—it
is one problem—could also be found therein: one would thus have acquired
the right to define ALL active force unequivocally as WILL TO POWER.
The world seen from within, the world defined and designated according to
its "intelligible character"—it would simply be "Will to Power," and
nothing else.
37. "What? Does not that mean in popular language: God is disproved,
but not the devil?"—On the contrary! On the contrary, my friends! And who
the devil also compels you to speak popularly!
38. As happened finally in all the enlightenment of modern times with
the French Revolution (that terrible farce, quite superfluous when judged
close at hand, into which, however, the noble and visionary spectators of all
Europe have interpreted from a distance their own indignation and
enthusiasm so long and passionately, UNTIL THE TEXT HAS
DISAPPEARED UNDER THE INTERPRETATION), so a noble posterity
might once more misunderstand the whole of the past, and perhaps only
thereby make ITS aspect endurable.—Or rather, has not this already
happened? Have not we ourselves been—that "noble posterity"? And, in so
far as we now comprehend this, is it not—thereby already past?
39. Nobody will very readily regard a doctrine as true merely because it
makes people happy or virtuous—excepting, perhaps, the amiable
"Idealists," who are enthusiastic about the good, true, and beautiful, and let
all kinds of motley, coarse, and good-natured desirabilities swim about
promiscuously in their pond. Happiness and virtue are no arguments. It is
willingly forgotten, however, even on the part of thoughtful minds, that to
make unhappy and to make bad are just as little counter-arguments. A thing
could be TRUE, although it were in the highest degree injurious and
dangerous; indeed, the fundamental constitution of existence might be such

that one succumbed by a full knowledge of it—so that the strength of a
mind might be measured by the amount of "truth" it could endure—or to
speak more plainly, by the extent to which it REQUIRED truth attenuated,
veiled, sweetened, damped, and falsified. But there is no doubt that for the
discovery of certain PORTIONS of truth the wicked and unfortunate are
more favourably situated and have a greater likelihood of success; not to
speak of the wicked who are happy—a species about whom moralists are
silent. Perhaps severity and craft are more favourable conditions for the
development of strong, independent spirits and philosophers than the gentle,
refined, yielding good-nature, and habit of taking things easily, which are
prized, and rightly prized in a learned man. Presupposing always, to begin
with, that the term "philosopher" be not confined to the philosopher who
writes books, or even introduces HIS philosophy into books!—Stendhal
furnishes a last feature of the portrait of the free-spirited philosopher, which
for the sake of German taste I will not omit to underline—for it is
OPPOSED to German taste. "Pour etre bon philosophe," says this last great
psychologist, "il faut etre sec, clair, sans illusion. Un banquier, qui a fait
fortune, a une partie du caractere requis pour faire des decouvertes en
philosophie, c'est-a-dire pour voir clair dans ce qui est."
40. Everything that is profound loves the mask: the profoundest things
have a hatred even of figure and likeness. Should not the CONTRARY only
be the right disguise for the shame of a God to go about in? A question
worth asking!—it would be strange if some mystic has not already ventured
on the same kind of thing. There are proceedings of such a delicate nature
that it is well to overwhelm them with coarseness and make them
unrecognizable; there are actions of love and of an extravagant
magnanimity after which nothing can be wiser than to take a stick and
thrash the witness soundly: one thereby obscures his recollection. Many a
one is able to obscure and abuse his own memory, in order at least to have
vengeance on this sole party in the secret: shame is inventive. They are not
the worst things of which one is most ashamed: there is not only deceit
behind a mask—there is so much goodness in craft. I could imagine that a
man with something costly and fragile to conceal, would roll through life
clumsily and rotundly like an old, green, heavily-hooped wine-cask: the
refinement of his shame requiring it to be so. A man who has depths in his
shame meets his destiny and his delicate decisions upon paths which few
ever reach, and with regard to the existence of which his nearest and most

intimate friends may be ignorant; his mortal danger conceals itself from
their eyes, and equally so his regained security. Such a hidden nature, which
instinctively employs speech for silence and concealment, and is
inexhaustible in evasion of communication, DESIRES and insists that a
mask of himself shall occupy his place in the hearts and heads of his
friends; and supposing he does not desire it, his eyes will some day be
opened to the fact that there is nevertheless a mask of him there—and that it
is well to be so. Every profound spirit needs a mask; nay, more, around
every profound spirit there continually grows a mask, owing to the
constantly false, that is to say, SUPERFICIAL interpretation of every word
he utters, every step he takes, every sign of life he manifests.
41. One must subject oneself to one's own tests that one is destined for
independence and command, and do so at the right time. One must not
avoid one's tests, although they constitute perhaps the most dangerous game
one can play, and are in the end tests made only before ourselves and before
no other judge. Not to cleave to any person, be it even the dearest—every
person is a prison and also a recess. Not to cleave to a fatherland, be it even
the most suffering and necessitous—it is even less difficult to detach one's
heart from a victorious fatherland. Not to cleave to a sympathy, be it even
for higher men, into whose peculiar torture and helplessness chance has
given us an insight. Not to cleave to a science, though it tempt one with the
most valuable discoveries, apparently specially reserved for us. Not to
cleave to one's own liberation, to the voluptuous distance and remoteness of
the bird, which always flies further aloft in order always to see more under
it—the danger of the flier. Not to cleave to our own virtues, nor become as a
whole a victim to any of our specialties, to our "hospitality" for instance,
which is the danger of dangers for highly developed and wealthy souls, who
deal prodigally, almost indifferently with themselves, and push the virtue of
liberality so far that it becomes a vice. One must know how TO
CONSERVE ONESELF—the best test of independence.
42. A new order of philosophers is appearing; I shall venture to baptize
them by a name not without danger. As far as I understand them, as far as
they allow themselves to be understood—for it is their nature to WISH to
remain something of a puzzle—these philosophers of the future might
rightly, perhaps also wrongly, claim to be designated as "tempters." This
name itself is after all only an attempt, or, if it be preferred, a temptation.

43. Will they be new friends of "truth," these coming philosophers? Very
probably, for all philosophers hitherto have loved their truths. But assuredly
they will not be dogmatists. It must be contrary to their pride, and also
contrary to their taste, that their truth should still be truth for every one—
that which has hitherto been the secret wish and ultimate purpose of all
dogmatic efforts. "My opinion is MY opinion: another person has not easily
a right to it"—such a philosopher of the future will say, perhaps. One must
renounce the bad taste of wishing to agree with many people. "Good" is no
longer good when one's neighbour takes it into his mouth. And how could
there be a "common good"! The expression contradicts itself; that which
can be common is always of small value. In the end things must be as they
are and have always been—the great things remain for the great, the
abysses for the profound, the delicacies and thrills for the refined, and, to
sum up shortly, everything rare for the rare.
44. Need I say expressly after all this that they will be free, VERY free
spirits, these philosophers of the future—as certainly also they will not be
merely free spirits, but something more, higher, greater, and fundamentally
different, which does not wish to be misunderstood and mistaken? But
while I say this, I feel under OBLIGATION almost as much to them as to
ourselves (we free spirits who are their heralds and forerunners), to sweep
away from ourselves altogether a stupid old prejudice and
misunderstanding, which, like a fog, has too long made the conception of
"free spirit" obscure. In every country of Europe, and the same in America,
there is at present something which makes an abuse of this name a very
narrow, prepossessed, enchained class of spirits, who desire almost the
opposite of what our intentions and instincts prompt—not to mention that in
respect to the NEW philosophers who are appearing, they must still more be
closed windows and bolted doors. Briefly and regrettably, they belong to
the LEVELLERS, these wrongly named "free spirits"—as glib-tongued and
scribe-fingered slaves of the democratic taste and its "modern ideas" all of
them men without solitude, without personal solitude, blunt honest fellows
to whom neither courage nor honourable conduct ought to be denied, only,
they are not free, and are ludicrously superficial, especially in their innate
partiality for seeing the cause of almost ALL human misery and failure in
the old forms in which society has hitherto existed—a notion which happily
inverts the truth entirely! What they would fain attain with all their strength,
is the universal, green-meadow happiness of the herd, together with

security, safety, comfort, and alleviation of life for every one, their two most
frequently chanted songs and doctrines are called "Equality of Rights" and
"Sympathy with All Sufferers"—and suffering itself is looked upon by them
as something which must be DONE AWAY WITH. We opposite ones,
however, who have opened our eye and conscience to the question how and
where the plant "man" has hitherto grown most vigorously, believe that this
has always taken place under the opposite conditions, that for this end the
dangerousness of his situation had to be increased enormously, his inventive
faculty and dissembling power (his "spirit") had to develop into subtlety
and daring under long oppression and compulsion, and his Will to Life had
to be increased to the unconditioned Will to Power—we believe that
severity, violence, slavery, danger in the street and in the heart, secrecy,
stoicism, tempter's art and devilry of every kind,—that everything wicked,
terrible, tyrannical, predatory, and serpentine in man, serves as well for the
elevation of the human species as its opposite—we do not even say enough
when we only say THIS MUCH, and in any case we find ourselves here,
both with our speech and our silence, at the OTHER extreme of all modern
ideology and gregarious desirability, as their antipodes perhaps? What
wonder that we "free spirits" are not exactly the most communicative
spirits? that we do not wish to betray in every respect WHAT a spirit can
free itself from, and WHERE perhaps it will then be driven? And as to the
import of the dangerous formula, "Beyond Good and Evil," with which we
at least avoid confusion, we ARE something else than "libres-penseurs,"
"liben pensatori" "free-thinkers," and whatever these honest advocates of
"modern ideas" like to call themselves. Having been at home, or at least
guests, in many realms of the spirit, having escaped again and again from
the gloomy, agreeable nooks in which preferences and prejudices, youth,
origin, the accident of men and books, or even the weariness of travel
seemed to confine us, full of malice against the seductions of dependency
which he concealed in honours, money, positions, or exaltation of the
senses, grateful even for distress and the vicissitudes of illness, because
they always free us from some rule, and its "prejudice," grateful to the God,
devil, sheep, and worm in us, inquisitive to a fault, investigators to the point
of cruelty, with unhesitating fingers for the intangible, with teeth and
stomachs for the most indigestible, ready for any business that requires
sagacity and acute senses, ready for every adventure, owing to an excess of
"free will", with anterior and posterior souls, into the ultimate intentions of

which it is difficult to pry, with foregrounds and backgrounds to the end of
which no foot may run, hidden ones under the mantles of light,
appropriators, although we resemble heirs and spendthrifts, arrangers and
collectors from morning till night, misers of our wealth and our fullcrammed drawers, economical in learning and forgetting, inventive in
scheming, sometimes proud of tables of categories, sometimes pedants,
sometimes night-owls of work even in full day, yea, if necessary, even
scarecrows—and it is necessary nowadays, that is to say, inasmuch as we
are the born, sworn, jealous friends of SOLITUDE, of our own profoundest
midnight and midday solitude—such kind of men are we, we free spirits!
And perhaps ye are also something of the same kind, ye coming ones? ye
NEW philosophers?

CHAPTER III. THE RELIGIOUS MOOD
45. The human soul and its limits, the range of man's inner experiences
hitherto attained, the heights, depths, and distances of these experiences, the
entire history of the soul UP TO THE PRESENT TIME, and its still
unexhausted possibilities: this is the preordained hunting-domain for a born
psychologist and lover of a "big hunt". But how often must he say
despairingly to himself: "A single individual! alas, only a single individual!
and this great forest, this virgin forest!" So he would like to have some
hundreds of hunting assistants, and fine trained hounds, that he could send
into the history of the human soul, to drive HIS game together. In vain:
again and again he experiences, profoundly and bitterly, how difficult it is
to find assistants and dogs for all the things that directly excite his curiosity.
The evil of sending scholars into new and dangerous hunting-domains,
where courage, sagacity, and subtlety in every sense are required, is that
they are no longer serviceable just when the "BIG hunt," and also the great
danger commences,—it is precisely then that they lose their keen eye and
nose. In order, for instance, to divine and determine what sort of history the
problem of KNOWLEDGE AND CONSCIENCE has hitherto had in the
souls of homines religiosi, a person would perhaps himself have to possess
as profound, as bruised, as immense an experience as the intellectual
conscience of Pascal; and then he would still require that wide-spread
heaven of clear, wicked spirituality, which, from above, would be able to
oversee, arrange, and effectively formulize this mass of dangerous and
painful experiences.—But who could do me this service! And who would
have time to wait for such servants!—they evidently appear too rarely, they
are so improbable at all times! Eventually one must do everything
ONESELF in order to know something; which means that one has MUCH
to do!—But a curiosity like mine is once for all the most agreeable of vices
—pardon me! I mean to say that the love of truth has its reward in heaven,
and already upon earth.
46. Faith, such as early Christianity desired, and not infrequently
achieved in the midst of a skeptical and southernly free-spirited world,
which had centuries of struggle between philosophical schools behind it and

in it, counting besides the education in tolerance which the Imperium
Romanum gave—this faith is NOT that sincere, austere slave-faith by
which perhaps a Luther or a Cromwell, or some other northern barbarian of
the spirit remained attached to his God and Christianity, it is much rather
the faith of Pascal, which resembles in a terrible manner a continuous
suicide of reason—a tough, long-lived, worm-like reason, which is not to be
slain at once and with a single blow. The Christian faith from the beginning,
is sacrifice the sacrifice of all freedom, all pride, all self-confidence of
spirit, it is at the same time subjection, self-derision, and self-mutilation.
There is cruelty and religious Phoenicianism in this faith, which is adapted
to a tender, many-sided, and very fastidious conscience, it takes for granted
that the subjection of the spirit is indescribably PAINFUL, that all the past
and all the habits of such a spirit resist the absurdissimum, in the form of
which "faith" comes to it. Modern men, with their obtuseness as regards all
Christian nomenclature, have no longer the sense for the terribly superlative
conception which was implied to an antique taste by the paradox of the
formula, "God on the Cross". Hitherto there had never and nowhere been
such boldness in inversion, nor anything at once so dreadful, questioning,
and questionable as this formula: it promised a transvaluation of all ancient
values—It was the Orient, the PROFOUND Orient, it was the Oriental
slave who thus took revenge on Rome and its noble, light-minded
toleration, on the Roman "Catholicism" of non-faith, and it was always not
the faith, but the freedom from the faith, the half-stoical and smiling
indifference to the seriousness of the faith, which made the slaves indignant
at their masters and revolt against them. "Enlightenment" causes revolt, for
the slave desires the unconditioned, he understands nothing but the
tyrannous, even in morals, he loves as he hates, without NUANCE, to the
very depths, to the point of pain, to the point of sickness—his many
HIDDEN sufferings make him revolt against the noble taste which seems to
DENY suffering. The skepticism with regard to suffering, fundamentally
only an attitude of aristocratic morality, was not the least of the causes, also,
of the last great slave-insurrection which began with the French Revolution.
47. Wherever the religious neurosis has appeared on the earth so far, we
find it connected with three dangerous prescriptions as to regimen: solitude,
fasting, and sexual abstinence—but without its being possible to determine
with certainty which is cause and which is effect, or IF any relation at all of
cause and effect exists there. This latter doubt is justified by the fact that

one of the most regular symptoms among savage as well as among civilized
peoples is the most sudden and excessive sensuality, which then with equal
suddenness transforms into penitential paroxysms, world-renunciation, and
will-renunciation, both symptoms perhaps explainable as disguised
epilepsy? But nowhere is it MORE obligatory to put aside explanations
around no other type has there grown such a mass of absurdity and
superstition, no other type seems to have been more interesting to men and
even to philosophers—perhaps it is time to become just a little indifferent
here, to learn caution, or, better still, to look AWAY, TO GO AWAY—Yet in
the background of the most recent philosophy, that of Schopenhauer, we
find almost as the problem in itself, this terrible note of interrogation of the
religious crisis and awakening. How is the negation of will POSSIBLE?
how is the saint possible?—that seems to have been the very question with
which Schopenhauer made a start and became a philosopher. And thus it
was a genuine Schopenhauerian consequence, that his most convinced
adherent (perhaps also his last, as far as Germany is concerned), namely,
Richard Wagner, should bring his own life-work to an end just here, and
should finally put that terrible and eternal type upon the stage as Kundry,
type vecu, and as it loved and lived, at the very time that the mad-doctors in
almost all European countries had an opportunity to study the type close at
hand, wherever the religious neurosis—or as I call it, "the religious
mood"—made its latest epidemical outbreak and display as the "Salvation
Army"—If it be a question, however, as to what has been so extremely
interesting to men of all sorts in all ages, and even to philosophers, in the
whole phenomenon of the saint, it is undoubtedly the appearance of the
miraculous therein—namely, the immediate SUCCESSION OF
OPPOSITES, of states of the soul regarded as morally antithetical: it was
believed here to be self-evident that a "bad man" was all at once turned into
a "saint," a good man. The hitherto existing psychology was wrecked at this
point, is it not possible it may have happened principally because
psychology had placed itself under the dominion of morals, because it
BELIEVED in oppositions of moral values, and saw, read, and
INTERPRETED these oppositions into the text and facts of the case?
What? "Miracle" only an error of interpretation? A lack of philology?
48. It seems that the Latin races are far more deeply attached to their
Catholicism than we Northerners are to Christianity generally, and that
consequently unbelief in Catholic countries means something quite different

from what it does among Protestants—namely, a sort of revolt against the
spirit of the race, while with us it is rather a return to the spirit (or nonspirit) of the race.
We Northerners undoubtedly derive our origin from barbarous races,
even as regards our talents for religion—we have POOR talents for it. One
may make an exception in the case of the Celts, who have theretofore
furnished also the best soil for Christian infection in the North: the
Christian ideal blossomed forth in France as much as ever the pale sun of
the north would allow it. How strangely pious for our taste are still these
later French skeptics, whenever there is any Celtic blood in their origin!
How Catholic, how un-German does Auguste Comte's Sociology seem to
us, with the Roman logic of its instincts! How Jesuitical, that amiable and
shrewd cicerone of Port Royal, Sainte-Beuve, in spite of all his hostility to
Jesuits! And even Ernest Renan: how inaccessible to us Northerners does
the language of such a Renan appear, in whom every instant the merest
touch of religious thrill throws his refined voluptuous and comfortably
couching soul off its balance! Let us repeat after him these fine sentences—
and what wickedness and haughtiness is immediately aroused by way of
answer in our probably less beautiful but harder souls, that is to say, in our
more German souls!—"DISONS DONC HARDIMENT QUE LA
RELIGION EST UN PRODUIT DE L'HOMME NORMAL, QUE
L'HOMME EST LE PLUS DANS LE VRAI QUANT IL EST LE PLUS
RELIGIEUX ET LE PLUS ASSURE D'UNE DESTINEE INFINIE....
C'EST QUAND IL EST BON QU'IL VEUT QUE LA VIRTU
CORRESPONDE A UN ORDER ETERNAL, C'EST QUAND IL
CONTEMPLE LES CHOSES D'UNE MANIERE DESINTERESSEE
QU'IL TROUVE LA MORT REVOLTANTE ET ABSURDE. COMMENT
NE PAS SUPPOSER QUE C'EST DANS CES MOMENTS-LA, QUE
L'HOMME VOIT LE MIEUX?"... These sentences are so extremely
ANTIPODAL to my ears and habits of thought, that in my first impulse of
rage on finding them, I wrote on the margin, "LA NIAISERIE
RELIGIEUSE PAR EXCELLENCE!"—until in my later rage I even took a
fancy to them, these sentences with their truth absolutely inverted! It is so
nice and such a distinction to have one's own antipodes!
49. That which is so astonishing in the religious life of the ancient Greeks
is the irrestrainable stream of GRATITUDE which it pours forth—it is a
very superior kind of man who takes SUCH an attitude towards nature and

life.—Later on, when the populace got the upper hand in Greece, FEAR
became rampant also in religion; and Christianity was preparing itself.
50. The passion for God: there are churlish, honest-hearted, and
importunate kinds of it, like that of Luther—the whole of Protestantism
lacks the southern DELICATEZZA. There is an Oriental exaltation of the
mind in it, like that of an undeservedly favoured or elevated slave, as in the
case of St. Augustine, for instance, who lacks in an offensive manner, all
nobility in bearing and desires. There is a feminine tenderness and
sensuality in it, which modestly and unconsciously longs for a UNIO
MYSTICA ET PHYSICA, as in the case of Madame de Guyon. In many
cases it appears, curiously enough, as the disguise of a girl's or youth's
puberty; here and there even as the hysteria of an old maid, also as her last
ambition. The Church has frequently canonized the woman in such a case.
51. The mightiest men have hitherto always bowed reverently before the
saint, as the enigma of self-subjugation and utter voluntary privation—why
did they thus bow? They divined in him—and as it were behind the
questionableness of his frail and wretched appearance—the superior force
which wished to test itself by such a subjugation; the strength of will, in
which they recognized their own strength and love of power, and knew how
to honour it: they honoured something in themselves when they honoured
the saint. In addition to this, the contemplation of the saint suggested to
them a suspicion: such an enormity of self-negation and anti-naturalness
will not have been coveted for nothing—they have said, inquiringly. There
is perhaps a reason for it, some very great danger, about which the ascetic
might wish to be more accurately informed through his secret interlocutors
and visitors? In a word, the mighty ones of the world learned to have a new
fear before him, they divined a new power, a strange, still unconquered
enemy:—it was the "Will to Power" which obliged them to halt before the
saint. They had to question him.
52. In the Jewish "Old Testament," the book of divine justice, there are
men, things, and sayings on such an immense scale, that Greek and Indian
literature has nothing to compare with it. One stands with fear and
reverence before those stupendous remains of what man was formerly, and
one has sad thoughts about old Asia and its little out-pushed peninsula
Europe, which would like, by all means, to figure before Asia as the
"Progress of Mankind." To be sure, he who is himself only a slender, tame

house-animal, and knows only the wants of a house-animal (like our
cultured people of today, including the Christians of "cultured"
Christianity), need neither be amazed nor even sad amid those ruins—the
taste for the Old Testament is a touchstone with respect to "great" and
"small": perhaps he will find that the New Testament, the book of grace,
still appeals more to his heart (there is much of the odour of the genuine,
tender, stupid beadsman and petty soul in it). To have bound up this New
Testament (a kind of ROCOCO of taste in every respect) along with the Old
Testament into one book, as the "Bible," as "The Book in Itself," is perhaps
the greatest audacity and "sin against the Spirit" which literary Europe has
upon its conscience.
53. Why Atheism nowadays? "The father" in God is thoroughly refuted;
equally so "the judge," "the rewarder." Also his "free will": he does not hear
—and even if he did, he would not know how to help. The worst is that he
seems incapable of communicating himself clearly; is he uncertain?—This
is what I have made out (by questioning and listening at a variety of
conversations) to be the cause of the decline of European theism; it appears
to me that though the religious instinct is in vigorous growth,—it rejects the
theistic satisfaction with profound distrust.
54. What does all modern philosophy mainly do? Since Descartes—and
indeed more in defiance of him than on the basis of his procedure—an
ATTENTAT has been made on the part of all philosophers on the old
conception of the soul, under the guise of a criticism of the subject and
predicate conception—that is to say, an ATTENTAT on the fundamental
presupposition of Christian doctrine. Modern philosophy, as
epistemological skepticism, is secretly or openly ANTI-CHRISTIAN,
although (for keener ears, be it said) by no means anti-religious. Formerly,
in effect, one believed in "the soul" as one believed in grammar and the
grammatical subject: one said, "I" is the condition, "think" is the predicate
and is conditioned—to think is an activity for which one MUST suppose a
subject as cause. The attempt was then made, with marvelous tenacity and
subtlety, to see if one could not get out of this net,—to see if the opposite
was not perhaps true: "think" the condition, and "I" the conditioned; "I,"
therefore, only a synthesis which has been MADE by thinking itself. KANT
really wished to prove that, starting from the subject, the subject could not
be proved—nor the object either: the possibility of an APPARENT
EXISTENCE of the subject, and therefore of "the soul," may not always

have been strange to him,—the thought which once had an immense power
on earth as the Vedanta philosophy.
55. There is a great ladder of religious cruelty, with many rounds; but
three of these are the most important. Once on a time men sacrificed human
beings to their God, and perhaps just those they loved the best—to this
category belong the firstling sacrifices of all primitive religions, and also
the sacrifice of the Emperor Tiberius in the Mithra-Grotto on the Island of
Capri, that most terrible of all Roman anachronisms. Then, during the moral
epoch of mankind, they sacrificed to their God the strongest instincts they
possessed, their "nature"; THIS festal joy shines in the cruel glances of
ascetics and "anti-natural" fanatics. Finally, what still remained to be
sacrificed? Was it not necessary in the end for men to sacrifice everything
comforting, holy, healing, all hope, all faith in hidden harmonies, in future
blessedness and justice? Was it not necessary to sacrifice God himself, and
out of cruelty to themselves to worship stone, stupidity, gravity, fate,
nothingness? To sacrifice God for nothingness—this paradoxical mystery of
the ultimate cruelty has been reserved for the rising generation; we all know
something thereof already.
56. Whoever, like myself, prompted by some enigmatical desire, has long
endeavoured to go to the bottom of the question of pessimism and free it
from the half-Christian, half-German narrowness and stupidity in which it
has finally presented itself to this century, namely, in the form of
Schopenhauer's philosophy; whoever, with an Asiatic and super-Asiatic
eye, has actually looked inside, and into the most world-renouncing of all
possible modes of thought—beyond good and evil, and no longer like
Buddha and Schopenhauer, under the dominion and delusion of morality,—
whoever has done this, has perhaps just thereby, without really desiring it,
opened his eyes to behold the opposite ideal: the ideal of the most worldapproving, exuberant, and vivacious man, who has not only learnt to
compromise and arrange with that which was and is, but wishes to have it
again AS IT WAS AND IS, for all eternity, insatiably calling out da capo,
not only to himself, but to the whole piece and play; and not only the play,
but actually to him who requires the play—and makes it necessary; because
he always requires himself anew—and makes himself necessary.—What?
And this would not be—circulus vitiosus deus?

57. The distance, and as it were the space around man, grows with the
strength of his intellectual vision and insight: his world becomes
profounder; new stars, new enigmas, and notions are ever coming into view.
Perhaps everything on which the intellectual eye has exercised its acuteness
and profundity has just been an occasion for its exercise, something of a
game, something for children and childish minds. Perhaps the most solemn
conceptions that have caused the most fighting and suffering, the
conceptions "God" and "sin," will one day seem to us of no more
importance than a child's plaything or a child's pain seems to an old man;—
and perhaps another plaything and another pain will then be necessary once
more for "the old man"—always childish enough, an eternal child!
58. Has it been observed to what extent outward idleness, or semiidleness, is necessary to a real religious life (alike for its favourite
microscopic labour of self-examination, and for its soft placidity called
"prayer," the state of perpetual readiness for the "coming of God"), I mean
the idleness with a good conscience, the idleness of olden times and of
blood, to which the aristocratic sentiment that work is DISHONOURING—
that it vulgarizes body and soul—is not quite unfamiliar? And that
consequently the modern, noisy, time-engrossing, conceited, foolishly
proud laboriousness educates and prepares for "unbelief" more than
anything else? Among these, for instance, who are at present living apart
from religion in Germany, I find "free-thinkers" of diversified species and
origin, but above all a majority of those in whom laboriousness from
generation to generation has dissolved the religious instincts; so that they no
longer know what purpose religions serve, and only note their existence in
the world with a kind of dull astonishment. They feel themselves already
fully occupied, these good people, be it by their business or by their
pleasures, not to mention the "Fatherland," and the newspapers, and their
"family duties"; it seems that they have no time whatever left for religion;
and above all, it is not obvious to them whether it is a question of a new
business or a new pleasure—for it is impossible, they say to themselves,
that people should go to church merely to spoil their tempers. They are by
no means enemies of religious customs; should certain circumstances, State
affairs perhaps, require their participation in such customs, they do what is
required, as so many things are done—with a patient and unassuming
seriousness, and without much curiosity or discomfort;—they live too much
apart and outside to feel even the necessity for a FOR or AGAINST in such

matters. Among those indifferent persons may be reckoned nowadays the
majority of German Protestants of the middle classes, especially in the great
laborious centres of trade and commerce; also the majority of laborious
scholars, and the entire University personnel (with the exception of the
theologians, whose existence and possibility there always gives
psychologists new and more subtle puzzles to solve). On the part of pious,
or merely church-going people, there is seldom any idea of HOW MUCH
good-will, one might say arbitrary will, is now necessary for a German
scholar to take the problem of religion seriously; his whole profession (and
as I have said, his whole workmanlike laboriousness, to which he is
compelled by his modern conscience) inclines him to a lofty and almost
charitable serenity as regards religion, with which is occasionally mingled a
slight disdain for the "uncleanliness" of spirit which he takes for granted
wherever any one still professes to belong to the Church. It is only with the
help of history (NOT through his own personal experience, therefore) that
the scholar succeeds in bringing himself to a respectful seriousness, and to a
certain timid deference in presence of religions; but even when his
sentiments have reached the stage of gratitude towards them, he has not
personally advanced one step nearer to that which still maintains itself as
Church or as piety; perhaps even the contrary. The practical indifference to
religious matters in the midst of which he has been born and brought up,
usually sublimates itself in his case into circumspection and cleanliness,
which shuns contact with religious men and things; and it may be just the
depth of his tolerance and humanity which prompts him to avoid the
delicate trouble which tolerance itself brings with it.—Every age has its
own divine type of naivete, for the discovery of which other ages may envy
it: and how much naivete—adorable, childlike, and boundlessly foolish
naivete is involved in this belief of the scholar in his superiority, in the good
conscience of his tolerance, in the unsuspecting, simple certainty with
which his instinct treats the religious man as a lower and less valuable type,
beyond, before, and ABOVE which he himself has developed—he, the little
arrogant dwarf and mob-man, the sedulously alert, head-and-hand drudge of
"ideas," of "modern ideas"!
59. Whoever has seen deeply into the world has doubtless divined what
wisdom there is in the fact that men are superficial. It is their preservative
instinct which teaches them to be flighty, lightsome, and false. Here and
there one finds a passionate and exaggerated adoration of "pure forms" in

philosophers as well as in artists: it is not to be doubted that whoever has
NEED of the cult of the superficial to that extent, has at one time or another
made an unlucky dive BENEATH it. Perhaps there is even an order of rank
with respect to those burnt children, the born artists who find the enjoyment
of life only in trying to FALSIFY its image (as if taking wearisome revenge
on it), one might guess to what degree life has disgusted them, by the extent
to which they wish to see its image falsified, attenuated, ultrified, and
deified,—one might reckon the homines religiosi among the artists, as their
HIGHEST rank. It is the profound, suspicious fear of an incurable
pessimism which compels whole centuries to fasten their teeth into a
religious interpretation of existence: the fear of the instinct which divines
that truth might be attained TOO soon, before man has become strong
enough, hard enough, artist enough.... Piety, the "Life in God," regarded in
this light, would appear as the most elaborate and ultimate product of the
FEAR of truth, as artist-adoration and artist-intoxication in presence of the
most logical of all falsifications, as the will to the inversion of truth, to
untruth at any price. Perhaps there has hitherto been no more effective
means of beautifying man than piety, by means of it man can become so
artful, so superficial, so iridescent, and so good, that his appearance no
longer offends.
60. To love mankind FOR GOD'S SAKE—this has so far been the
noblest and remotest sentiment to which mankind has attained. That love to
mankind, without any redeeming intention in the background, is only an
ADDITIONAL folly and brutishness, that the inclination to this love has
first to get its proportion, its delicacy, its gram of salt and sprinkling of
ambergris from a higher inclination—whoever first perceived and
"experienced" this, however his tongue may have stammered as it attempted
to express such a delicate matter, let him for all time be holy and respected,
as the man who has so far flown highest and gone astray in the finest
fashion!
61. The philosopher, as WE free spirits understand him—as the man of
the greatest responsibility, who has the conscience for the general
development of mankind,—will use religion for his disciplining and
educating work, just as he will use the contemporary political and economic
conditions. The selecting and disciplining influence—destructive, as well as
creative and fashioning—which can be exercised by means of religion is
manifold and varied, according to the sort of people placed under its spell

and protection. For those who are strong and independent, destined and
trained to command, in whom the judgment and skill of a ruling race is
incorporated, religion is an additional means for overcoming resistance in
the exercise of authority—as a bond which binds rulers and subjects in
common, betraying and surrendering to the former the conscience of the
latter, their inmost heart, which would fain escape obedience. And in the
case of the unique natures of noble origin, if by virtue of superior
spirituality they should incline to a more retired and contemplative life,
reserving to themselves only the more refined forms of government (over
chosen disciples or members of an order), religion itself may be used as a
means for obtaining peace from the noise and trouble of managing
GROSSER affairs, and for securing immunity from the UNAVOIDABLE
filth of all political agitation. The Brahmins, for instance, understood this
fact. With the help of a religious organization, they secured to themselves
the power of nominating kings for the people, while their sentiments
prompted them to keep apart and outside, as men with a higher and superregal mission. At the same time religion gives inducement and opportunity
to some of the subjects to qualify themselves for future ruling and
commanding the slowly ascending ranks and classes, in which, through
fortunate marriage customs, volitional power and delight in self-control are
on the increase. To them religion offers sufficient incentives and
temptations to aspire to higher intellectuality, and to experience the
sentiments of authoritative self-control, of silence, and of solitude.
Asceticism and Puritanism are almost indispensable means of educating and
ennobling a race which seeks to rise above its hereditary baseness and work
itself upwards to future supremacy. And finally, to ordinary men, to the
majority of the people, who exist for service and general utility, and are
only so far entitled to exist, religion gives invaluable contentedness with
their lot and condition, peace of heart, ennoblement of obedience, additional
social happiness and sympathy, with something of transfiguration and
embellishment, something of justification of all the commonplaceness, all
the meanness, all the semi-animal poverty of their souls. Religion, together
with the religious significance of life, sheds sunshine over such perpetually
harassed men, and makes even their own aspect endurable to them, it
operates upon them as the Epicurean philosophy usually operates upon
sufferers of a higher order, in a refreshing and refining manner, almost
TURNING suffering TO ACCOUNT, and in the end even hallowing and

vindicating it. There is perhaps nothing so admirable in Christianity and
Buddhism as their art of teaching even the lowest to elevate themselves by
piety to a seemingly higher order of things, and thereby to retain their
satisfaction with the actual world in which they find it difficult enough to
live—this very difficulty being necessary.
62. To be sure—to make also the bad counter-reckoning against such
religions, and to bring to light their secret dangers—the cost is always
excessive and terrible when religions do NOT operate as an educational and
disciplinary medium in the hands of the philosopher, but rule voluntarily
and PARAMOUNTLY, when they wish to be the final end, and not a means
along with other means. Among men, as among all other animals, there is a
surplus of defective, diseased, degenerating, infirm, and necessarily
suffering individuals; the successful cases, among men also, are always the
exception; and in view of the fact that man is THE ANIMAL NOT YET
PROPERLY ADAPTED TO HIS ENVIRONMENT, the rare exception. But
worse still. The higher the type a man represents, the greater is the
improbability that he will SUCCEED; the accidental, the law of irrationality
in the general constitution of mankind, manifests itself most terribly in its
destructive effect on the higher orders of men, the conditions of whose lives
are delicate, diverse, and difficult to determine. What, then, is the attitude of
the two greatest religions above-mentioned to the SURPLUS of failures in
life? They endeavour to preserve and keep alive whatever can be preserved;
in fact, as the religions FOR SUFFERERS, they take the part of these upon
principle; they are always in favour of those who suffer from life as from a
disease, and they would fain treat every other experience of life as false and
impossible. However highly we may esteem this indulgent and preservative
care (inasmuch as in applying to others, it has applied, and applies also to
the highest and usually the most suffering type of man), the hitherto
PARAMOUNT religions—to give a general appreciation of them—are
among the principal causes which have kept the type of "man" upon a lower
level—they have preserved too much THAT WHICH SHOULD HAVE
PERISHED. One has to thank them for invaluable services; and who is
sufficiently rich in gratitude not to feel poor at the contemplation of all that
the "spiritual men" of Christianity have done for Europe hitherto! But when
they had given comfort to the sufferers, courage to the oppressed and
despairing, a staff and support to the helpless, and when they had allured
from society into convents and spiritual penitentiaries the broken-hearted

and distracted: what else had they to do in order to work systematically in
that fashion, and with a good conscience, for the preservation of all the sick
and suffering, which means, in deed and in truth, to work for the
DETERIORATION OF THE EUROPEAN RACE? To REVERSE all
estimates of value—THAT is what they had to do! And to shatter the
strong, to spoil great hopes, to cast suspicion on the delight in beauty, to
break down everything autonomous, manly, conquering, and imperious—all
instincts which are natural to the highest and most successful type of
"man"—into uncertainty, distress of conscience, and self-destruction;
forsooth, to invert all love of the earthly and of supremacy over the earth,
into hatred of the earth and earthly things—THAT is the task the Church
imposed on itself, and was obliged to impose, until, according to its
standard of value, "unworldliness," "unsensuousness," and "higher man"
fused into one sentiment. If one could observe the strangely painful, equally
coarse and refined comedy of European Christianity with the derisive and
impartial eye of an Epicurean god, I should think one would never cease
marvelling and laughing; does it not actually seem that some single will has
ruled over Europe for eighteen centuries in order to make a SUBLIME
ABORTION of man? He, however, who, with opposite requirements (no
longer Epicurean) and with some divine hammer in his hand, could
approach this almost voluntary degeneration and stunting of mankind, as
exemplified in the European Christian (Pascal, for instance), would he not
have to cry aloud with rage, pity, and horror: "Oh, you bunglers,
presumptuous pitiful bunglers, what have you done! Was that a work for
your hands? How you have hacked and botched my finest stone! What have
you presumed to do!"—I should say that Christianity has hitherto been the
most portentous of presumptions. Men, not great enough, nor hard enough,
to be entitled as artists to take part in fashioning MAN; men, not
sufficiently strong and far-sighted to ALLOW, with sublime self-constraint,
the obvious law of the thousandfold failures and perishings to prevail; men,
not sufficiently noble to see the radically different grades of rank and
intervals of rank that separate man from man:—SUCH men, with their
"equality before God," have hitherto swayed the destiny of Europe; until at
last a dwarfed, almost ludicrous species has been produced, a gregarious
animal, something obliging, sickly, mediocre, the European of the present
day.

CHAPTER IV. APOPHTHEGMS AND
INTERLUDES
63. He who is a thorough teacher takes things seriously—and even
himself—only in relation to his pupils.
64. "Knowledge for its own sake"—that is the last snare laid by morality:
we are thereby completely entangled in morals once more.
65. The charm of knowledge would be small, were it not so much shame
has to be overcome on the way to it.
65A. We are most dishonourable towards our God: he is not
PERMITTED to sin.
66. The tendency of a person to allow himself to be degraded, robbed,
deceived, and exploited might be the diffidence of a God among men.
67. Love to one only is a barbarity, for it is exercised at the expense of all
others. Love to God also!
68. "I did that," says my memory. "I could not have done that," says my
pride, and remains inexorable. Eventually—the memory yields.
69. One has regarded life carelessly, if one has failed to see the hand that
—kills with leniency.
70. If a man has character, he has also his typical experience, which
always recurs.
71. THE SAGE AS ASTRONOMER.—So long as thou feelest the stars
as an "above thee," thou lackest the eye of the discerning one.
72. It is not the strength, but the duration of great sentiments that makes
great men.
73. He who attains his ideal, precisely thereby surpasses it.
73A. Many a peacock hides his tail from every eye—and calls it his
pride.
74. A man of genius is unbearable, unless he possess at least two things
besides: gratitude and purity.

75. The degree and nature of a man's sensuality extends to the highest
altitudes of his spirit.
76. Under peaceful conditions the militant man attacks himself.
77. With his principles a man seeks either to dominate, or justify, or
honour, or reproach, or conceal his habits: two men with the same
principles probably seek fundamentally different ends therewith.
78. He who despises himself, nevertheless esteems himself thereby, as a
despiser.
79. A soul which knows that it is loved, but does not itself love, betrays
its sediment: its dregs come up.
80. A thing that is explained ceases to concern us—What did the God
mean who gave the advice, "Know thyself!" Did it perhaps imply "Cease to
be concerned about thyself! become objective!"—And Socrates?—And the
"scientific man"?
81. It is terrible to die of thirst at sea. Is it necessary that you should so
salt your truth that it will no longer—quench thirst?
82. "Sympathy for all"—would be harshness and tyranny for THEE, my
good neighbour.
83. INSTINCT—When the house is on fire one forgets even the dinner—
Yes, but one recovers it from among the ashes.
84. Woman learns how to hate in proportion as she—forgets how to
charm.
85. The same emotions are in man and woman, but in different TEMPO,
on that account man and woman never cease to misunderstand each other.
86. In the background of all their personal vanity, women themselves
have still their impersonal scorn—for "woman".
87. FETTERED HEART, FREE SPIRIT—When one firmly fetters one's
heart and keeps it prisoner, one can allow one's spirit many liberties: I said
this once before But people do not believe it when I say so, unless they
know it already.
88. One begins to distrust very clever persons when they become
embarrassed.
89. Dreadful experiences raise the question whether he who experiences
them is not something dreadful also.

90. Heavy, melancholy men turn lighter, and come temporarily to their
surface, precisely by that which makes others heavy—by hatred and love.
91. So cold, so icy, that one burns one's finger at the touch of him! Every
hand that lays hold of him shrinks back!—And for that very reason many
think him red-hot.
92. Who has not, at one time or another—sacrificed himself for the sake
of his good name?
93. In affability there is no hatred of men, but precisely on that account a
great deal too much contempt of men.
94. The maturity of man—that means, to have reacquired the seriousness
that one had as a child at play.
95. To be ashamed of one's immorality is a step on the ladder at the end
of which one is ashamed also of one's morality.
96. One should part from life as Ulysses parted from Nausicaa—blessing
it rather than in love with it.
97. What? A great man? I always see merely the play-actor of his own
ideal.
98. When one trains one's conscience, it kisses one while it bites.
99. THE DISAPPOINTED ONE SPEAKS—"I listened for the echo and
I heard only praise."
100. We all feign to ourselves that we are simpler than we are, we thus
relax ourselves away from our fellows.
101. A discerning one might easily regard himself at present as the
animalization of God.
102. Discovering reciprocal love should really disenchant the lover with
regard to the beloved. "What! She is modest enough to love even you? Or
stupid enough? Or—or—-"
103. THE DANGER IN HAPPINESS.—"Everything now turns out best
for me, I now love every fate:—who would like to be my fate?"
104. Not their love of humanity, but the impotence of their love, prevents
the Christians of today—burning us.
105. The pia fraus is still more repugnant to the taste (the "piety") of the
free spirit (the "pious man of knowledge") than the impia fraus. Hence the

profound lack of judgment, in comparison with the Church, characteristic of
the type "free spirit"—as ITS non-freedom.
106. By means of music the very passions enjoy themselves.
107. A sign of strong character, when once the resolution has been taken,
to shut the ear even to the best counter-arguments. Occasionally, therefore,
a will to stupidity.
108. There is no such thing as moral phenomena, but only a moral
interpretation of phenomena.
109. The criminal is often enough not equal to his deed: he extenuates
and maligns it.
110. The advocates of a criminal are seldom artists enough to turn the
beautiful terribleness of the deed to the advantage of the doer.
111. Our vanity is most difficult to wound just when our pride has been
wounded.
112. To him who feels himself preordained to contemplation and not to
belief, all believers are too noisy and obtrusive; he guards against them.
113. "You want to prepossess him in your favour? Then you must be
embarrassed before him."
114. The immense expectation with regard to sexual love, and the
coyness in this expectation, spoils all the perspectives of women at the
outset.
115. Where there is neither love nor hatred in the game, woman's play is
mediocre.
116. The great epochs of our life are at the points when we gain courage
to rebaptize our badness as the best in us.
117. The will to overcome an emotion, is ultimately only the will of
another, or of several other, emotions.
118. There is an innocence of admiration: it is possessed by him to whom
it has not yet occurred that he himself may be admired some day.
119. Our loathing of dirt may be so great as to prevent our cleaning
ourselves—"justifying" ourselves.
120. Sensuality often forces the growth of love too much, so that its root
remains weak, and is easily torn up.

121. It is a curious thing that God learned Greek when he wished to turn
author—and that he did not learn it better.
122. To rejoice on account of praise is in many cases merely politeness of
heart—and the very opposite of vanity of spirit.
123. Even concubinage has been corrupted—by marriage.
124. He who exults at the stake, does not triumph over pain, but because
of the fact that he does not feel pain where he expected it. A parable.
125. When we have to change an opinion about any one, we charge
heavily to his account the inconvenience he thereby causes us.
126. A nation is a detour of nature to arrive at six or seven great men.—
Yes, and then to get round them.
127. In the eyes of all true women science is hostile to the sense of
shame. They feel as if one wished to peep under their skin with it—or
worse still! under their dress and finery.
128. The more abstract the truth you wish to teach, the more must you
allure the senses to it.
129. The devil has the most extensive perspectives for God; on that
account he keeps so far away from him:—the devil, in effect, as the oldest
friend of knowledge.
130. What a person IS begins to betray itself when his talent decreases,—
when he ceases to show what he CAN do. Talent is also an adornment; an
adornment is also a concealment.
131. The sexes deceive themselves about each other: the reason is that in
reality they honour and love only themselves (or their own ideal, to express
it more agreeably). Thus man wishes woman to be peaceable: but in fact
woman is ESSENTIALLY unpeaceable, like the cat, however well she may
have assumed the peaceable demeanour.
132. One is punished best for one's virtues.
133. He who cannot find the way to HIS ideal, lives more frivolously and
shamelessly than the man without an ideal.
134. From the senses originate all trustworthiness, all good conscience,
all evidence of truth.
135. Pharisaism is not a deterioration of the good man; a considerable
part of it is rather an essential condition of being good.

136. The one seeks an accoucheur for his thoughts, the other seeks some
one whom he can assist: a good conversation thus originates.
137. In intercourse with scholars and artists one readily makes mistakes
of opposite kinds: in a remarkable scholar one not infrequently finds a
mediocre man; and often, even in a mediocre artist, one finds a very
remarkable man.
138. We do the same when awake as when dreaming: we only invent and
imagine him with whom we have intercourse—and forget it immediately.
139. In revenge and in love woman is more barbarous than man.
140. ADVICE AS A RIDDLE.—"If the band is not to break, bite it first
—secure to make!"
141. The belly is the reason why man does not so readily take himself for
a God.
142. The chastest utterance I ever heard: "Dans le veritable amour c'est
l'ame qui enveloppe le corps."
143. Our vanity would like what we do best to pass precisely for what is
most difficult to us.—Concerning the origin of many systems of morals.
144. When a woman has scholarly inclinations there is generally
something wrong with her sexual nature. Barrenness itself conduces to a
certain virility of taste; man, indeed, if I may say so, is "the barren animal."
145. Comparing man and woman generally, one may say that woman
would not have the genius for adornment, if she had not the instinct for the
SECONDARY role.
146. He who fights with monsters should be careful lest he thereby
become a monster. And if thou gaze long into an abyss, the abyss will also
gaze into thee.
147. From old Florentine novels—moreover, from life: Buona femmina e
mala femmina vuol bastone.—Sacchetti, Nov. 86.
148. To seduce their neighbour to a favourable opinion, and afterwards to
believe implicitly in this opinion of their neighbour—who can do this
conjuring trick so well as women?
149. That which an age considers evil is usually an unseasonable echo of
what was formerly considered good—the atavism of an old ideal.

150. Around the hero everything becomes a tragedy; around the demigod
everything becomes a satyr-play; and around God everything becomes—
what? perhaps a "world"?
151. It is not enough to possess a talent: one must also have your
permission to possess it;—eh, my friends?
152. "Where there is the tree of knowledge, there is always Paradise": so
say the most ancient and the most modern serpents.
153. What is done out of love always takes place beyond good and evil.
154. Objection, evasion, joyous distrust, and love of irony are signs of
health; everything absolute belongs to pathology.
155. The sense of the tragic increases and declines with sensuousness.
156. Insanity in individuals is something rare—but in groups, parties,
nations, and epochs it is the rule.
157. The thought of suicide is a great consolation: by means of it one gets
successfully through many a bad night.
158. Not only our reason, but also our conscience, truckles to our
strongest impulse—the tyrant in us.
159. One MUST repay good and ill; but why just to the person who did
us good or ill?
160. One no longer loves one's knowledge sufficiently after one has
communicated it.
161. Poets act shamelessly towards their experiences: they exploit them.
162. "Our fellow-creature is not our neighbour, but our neighbour's
neighbour":—so thinks every nation.
163. Love brings to light the noble and hidden qualities of a lover—his
rare and exceptional traits: it is thus liable to be deceptive as to his normal
character.
164. Jesus said to his Jews: "The law was for servants;—love God as I
love him, as his Son! What have we Sons of God to do with morals!"
165. IN SIGHT OF EVERY PARTY.—A shepherd has always need of a
bell-wether—or he has himself to be a wether occasionally.
166. One may indeed lie with the mouth; but with the accompanying
grimace one nevertheless tells the truth.

167. To vigorous men intimacy is a matter of shame—and something
precious.
168. Christianity gave Eros poison to drink; he did not die of it, certainly,
but degenerated to Vice.
169. To talk much about oneself may also be a means of concealing
oneself.
170. In praise there is more obtrusiveness than in blame.
171. Pity has an almost ludicrous effect on a man of knowledge, like
tender hands on a Cyclops.
172. One occasionally embraces some one or other, out of love to
mankind (because one cannot embrace all); but this is what one must never
confess to the individual.
173. One does not hate as long as one disesteems, but only when one
esteems equal or superior.
174. Ye Utilitarians—ye, too, love the UTILE only as a VEHICLE for
your inclinations,—ye, too, really find the noise of its wheels insupportable!
175. One loves ultimately one's desires, not the thing desired.
176. The vanity of others is only counter to our taste when it is counter to
our vanity.
177. With regard to what "truthfulness" is, perhaps nobody has ever been
sufficiently truthful.
178. One does not believe in the follies of clever men: what a forfeiture
of the rights of man!
179. The consequences of our actions seize us by the forelock, very
indifferent to the fact that we have meanwhile "reformed."
180. There is an innocence in lying which is the sign of good faith in a
cause.
181. It is inhuman to bless when one is being cursed.
182. The familiarity of superiors embitters one, because it may not be
returned.
183. "I am affected, not because you have deceived me, but because I can
no longer believe in you."

184. There is a haughtiness of kindness which has the appearance of
wickedness.
185. "I dislike him."—Why?—"I am not a match for him."—Did any one
ever answer so?

CHAPTER V. THE NATURAL HISTORY OF
MORALS
186. The moral sentiment in Europe at present is perhaps as subtle,
belated, diverse, sensitive, and refined, as the "Science of Morals"
belonging thereto is recent, initial, awkward, and coarse-fingered:—an
interesting contrast, which sometimes becomes incarnate and obvious in the
very person of a moralist. Indeed, the expression, "Science of Morals" is, in
respect to what is designated thereby, far too presumptuous and counter to
GOOD taste,—which is always a foretaste of more modest expressions.
One ought to avow with the utmost fairness WHAT is still necessary here
for a long time, WHAT is alone proper for the present: namely, the
collection of material, the comprehensive survey and classification of an
immense domain of delicate sentiments of worth, and distinctions of worth,
which live, grow, propagate, and perish—and perhaps attempts to give a
clear idea of the recurring and more common forms of these living
crystallizations—as preparation for a THEORY OF TYPES of morality. To
be sure, people have not hitherto been so modest. All the philosophers, with
a pedantic and ridiculous seriousness, demanded of themselves something
very much higher, more pretentious, and ceremonious, when they
concerned themselves with morality as a science: they wanted to GIVE A
BASIC to morality—and every philosopher hitherto has believed that he
has given it a basis; morality itself, however, has been regarded as
something "given." How far from their awkward pride was the seemingly
insignificant problem—left in dust and decay—of a description of forms of
morality, notwithstanding that the finest hands and senses could hardly be
fine enough for it! It was precisely owing to moral philosophers' knowing
the moral facts imperfectly, in an arbitrary epitome, or an accidental
abridgement—perhaps as the morality of their environment, their position,
their church, their Zeitgeist, their climate and zone—it was precisely
because they were badly instructed with regard to nations, eras, and past
ages, and were by no means eager to know about these matters, that they
did not even come in sight of the real problems of morals—problems which
only disclose themselves by a comparison of MANY kinds of morality. In

every "Science of Morals" hitherto, strange as it may sound, the problem of
morality itself has been OMITTED: there has been no suspicion that there
was anything problematic there! That which philosophers called "giving a
basis to morality," and endeavoured to realize, has, when seen in a right
light, proved merely a learned form of good FAITH in prevailing morality, a
new means of its EXPRESSION, consequently just a matter-of-fact within
the sphere of a definite morality, yea, in its ultimate motive, a sort of denial
that it is LAWFUL for this morality to be called in question—and in any
case the reverse of the testing, analyzing, doubting, and vivisecting of this
very faith. Hear, for instance, with what innocence—almost worthy of
honour—Schopenhauer represents his own task, and draw your conclusions
concerning the scientificness of a "Science" whose latest master still talks in
the strain of children and old wives: "The principle," he says (page 136 of
the Grundprobleme der Ethik), [Footnote: Pages 54-55 of Schopenhauer's
Basis of Morality, translated by Arthur B. Bullock, M.A. (1903).] "the
axiom about the purport of which all moralists are PRACTICALLY agreed:
neminem laede, immo omnes quantum potes juva—is REALLY the
proposition which all moral teachers strive to establish, ... the REAL basis
of ethics which has been sought, like the philosopher's stone, for
centuries."—The difficulty of establishing the proposition referred to may
indeed be great—it is well known that Schopenhauer also was unsuccessful
in his efforts; and whoever has thoroughly realized how absurdly false and
sentimental this proposition is, in a world whose essence is Will to Power,
may be reminded that Schopenhauer, although a pessimist, ACTUALLY—
played the flute... daily after dinner: one may read about the matter in his
biography. A question by the way: a pessimist, a repudiator of God and of
the world, who MAKES A HALT at morality—who assents to morality, and
plays the flute to laede-neminem morals, what? Is that really—a pessimist?
187. Apart from the value of such assertions as "there is a categorical
imperative in us," one can always ask: What does such an assertion indicate
about him who makes it? There are systems of morals which are meant to
justify their author in the eyes of other people; other systems of morals are
meant to tranquilize him, and make him self-satisfied; with other systems
he wants to crucify and humble himself, with others he wishes to take
revenge, with others to conceal himself, with others to glorify himself and
gave superiority and distinction,—this system of morals helps its author to
forget, that system makes him, or something of him, forgotten, many a

moralist would like to exercise power and creative arbitrariness over
mankind, many another, perhaps, Kant especially, gives us to understand by
his morals that "what is estimable in me, is that I know how to obey—and
with you it SHALL not be otherwise than with me!" In short, systems of
morals are only a SIGN-LANGUAGE OF THE EMOTIONS.
188. In contrast to laisser-aller, every system of morals is a sort of
tyranny against "nature" and also against "reason", that is, however, no
objection, unless one should again decree by some system of morals, that
all kinds of tyranny and unreasonableness are unlawful What is essential
and invaluable in every system of morals, is that it is a long constraint. In
order to understand Stoicism, or Port Royal, or Puritanism, one should
remember the constraint under which every language has attained to
strength and freedom—the metrical constraint, the tyranny of rhyme and
rhythm. How much trouble have the poets and orators of every nation given
themselves!—not excepting some of the prose writers of today, in whose
ear dwells an inexorable conscientiousness—"for the sake of a folly," as
utilitarian bunglers say, and thereby deem themselves wise—"from
submission to arbitrary laws," as the anarchists say, and thereby fancy
themselves "free," even free-spirited. The singular fact remains, however,
that everything of the nature of freedom, elegance, boldness, dance, and
masterly certainty, which exists or has existed, whether it be in thought
itself, or in administration, or in speaking and persuading, in art just as in
conduct, has only developed by means of the tyranny of such arbitrary law,
and in all seriousness, it is not at all improbable that precisely this is
"nature" and "natural"—and not laisser-aller! Every artist knows how
different from the state of letting himself go, is his "most natural" condition,
the free arranging, locating, disposing, and constructing in the moments of
"inspiration"—and how strictly and delicately he then obeys a thousand
laws, which, by their very rigidness and precision, defy all formulation by
means of ideas (even the most stable idea has, in comparison therewith,
something floating, manifold, and ambiguous in it). The essential thing "in
heaven and in earth" is, apparently (to repeat it once more), that there
should be long OBEDIENCE in the same direction, there thereby results,
and has always resulted in the long run, something which has made life
worth living; for instance, virtue, art, music, dancing, reason, spirituality—
anything whatever that is transfiguring, refined, foolish, or divine. The long
bondage of the spirit, the distrustful constraint in the communicability of

ideas, the discipline which the thinker imposed on himself to think in
accordance with the rules of a church or a court, or conformable to
Aristotelian premises, the persistent spiritual will to interpret everything
that happened according to a Christian scheme, and in every occurrence to
rediscover and justify the Christian God:—all this violence, arbitrariness,
severity, dreadfulness, and unreasonableness, has proved itself the
disciplinary means whereby the European spirit has attained its strength, its
remorseless curiosity and subtle mobility; granted also that much
irrecoverable strength and spirit had to be stifled, suffocated, and spoilt in
the process (for here, as everywhere, "nature" shows herself as she is, in all
her extravagant and INDIFFERENT magnificence, which is shocking, but
nevertheless noble). That for centuries European thinkers only thought in
order to prove something—nowadays, on the contrary, we are suspicious of
every thinker who "wishes to prove something"—that it was always settled
beforehand what WAS TO BE the result of their strictest thinking, as it was
perhaps in the Asiatic astrology of former times, or as it is still at the
present day in the innocent, Christian-moral explanation of immediate
personal events "for the glory of God," or "for the good of the soul":—this
tyranny, this arbitrariness, this severe and magnificent stupidity, has
EDUCATED the spirit; slavery, both in the coarser and the finer sense, is
apparently an indispensable means even of spiritual education and
discipline. One may look at every system of morals in this light: it is
"nature" therein which teaches to hate the laisser-aller, the too great
freedom, and implants the need for limited horizons, for immediate duties
—it teaches the NARROWING OF PERSPECTIVES, and thus, in a certain
sense, that stupidity is a condition of life and development. "Thou must
obey some one, and for a long time; OTHERWISE thou wilt come to grief,
and lose all respect for thyself"—this seems to me to be the moral
imperative of nature, which is certainly neither "categorical," as old Kant
wished (consequently the "otherwise"), nor does it address itself to the
individual (what does nature care for the individual!), but to nations, races,
ages, and ranks; above all, however, to the animal "man" generally, to
MANKIND.
189. Industrious races find it a great hardship to be idle: it was a master
stroke of ENGLISH instinct to hallow and begloom Sunday to such an
extent that the Englishman unconsciously hankers for his week—and workday again:—as a kind of cleverly devised, cleverly intercalated FAST, such

as is also frequently found in the ancient world (although, as is appropriate
in southern nations, not precisely with respect to work). Many kinds of fasts
are necessary; and wherever powerful influences and habits prevail,
legislators have to see that intercalary days are appointed, on which such
impulses are fettered, and learn to hunger anew. Viewed from a higher
standpoint, whole generations and epochs, when they show themselves
infected with any moral fanaticism, seem like those intercalated periods of
restraint and fasting, during which an impulse learns to humble and submit
itself—at the same time also to PURIFY and SHARPEN itself; certain
philosophical sects likewise admit of a similar interpretation (for instance,
the Stoa, in the midst of Hellenic culture, with the atmosphere rank and
overcharged with Aphrodisiacal odours).—Here also is a hint for the
explanation of the paradox, why it was precisely in the most Christian
period of European history, and in general only under the pressure of
Christian sentiments, that the sexual impulse sublimated into love (amourpassion).
190. There is something in the morality of Plato which does not really
belong to Plato, but which only appears in his philosophy, one might say, in
spite of him: namely, Socratism, for which he himself was too noble. "No
one desires to injure himself, hence all evil is done unwittingly. The evil
man inflicts injury on himself; he would not do so, however, if he knew that
evil is evil. The evil man, therefore, is only evil through error; if one free
him from error one will necessarily make him—good."—This mode of
reasoning savours of the POPULACE, who perceive only the unpleasant
consequences of evil-doing, and practically judge that "it is STUPID to do
wrong"; while they accept "good" as identical with "useful and pleasant,"
without further thought. As regards every system of utilitarianism, one may
at once assume that it has the same origin, and follow the scent: one will
seldom err.—Plato did all he could to interpret something refined and noble
into the tenets of his teacher, and above all to interpret himself into them—
he, the most daring of all interpreters, who lifted the entire Socrates out of
the street, as a popular theme and song, to exhibit him in endless and
impossible modifications—namely, in all his own disguises and
multiplicities. In jest, and in Homeric language as well, what is the Platonic
Socrates, if not—[Greek words inserted here.]
191. The old theological problem of "Faith" and "Knowledge," or more
plainly, of instinct and reason—the question whether, in respect to the

valuation of things, instinct deserves more authority than rationality, which
wants to appreciate and act according to motives, according to a "Why,"
that is to say, in conformity to purpose and utility—it is always the old
moral problem that first appeared in the person of Socrates, and had divided
men's minds long before Christianity. Socrates himself, following, of
course, the taste of his talent—that of a surpassing dialectician—took first
the side of reason; and, in fact, what did he do all his life but laugh at the
awkward incapacity of the noble Athenians, who were men of instinct, like
all noble men, and could never give satisfactory answers concerning the
motives of their actions? In the end, however, though silently and secretly,
he laughed also at himself: with his finer conscience and introspection, he
found in himself the same difficulty and incapacity. "But why"—he said to
himself—"should one on that account separate oneself from the instincts!
One must set them right, and the reason ALSO—one must follow the
instincts, but at the same time persuade the reason to support them with
good arguments." This was the real FALSENESS of that great and
mysterious ironist; he brought his conscience up to the point that he was
satisfied with a kind of self-outwitting: in fact, he perceived the irrationality
in the moral judgment.—Plato, more innocent in such matters, and without
the craftiness of the plebeian, wished to prove to himself, at the expenditure
of all his strength—the greatest strength a philosopher had ever expended—
that reason and instinct lead spontaneously to one goal, to the good, to
"God"; and since Plato, all theologians and philosophers have followed the
same path—which means that in matters of morality, instinct (or as
Christians call it, "Faith," or as I call it, "the herd") has hitherto triumphed.
Unless one should make an exception in the case of Descartes, the father of
rationalism (and consequently the grandfather of the Revolution), who
recognized only the authority of reason: but reason is only a tool, and
Descartes was superficial.
192. Whoever has followed the history of a single science, finds in its
development a clue to the understanding of the oldest and commonest
processes of all "knowledge and cognizance": there, as here, the premature
hypotheses, the fictions, the good stupid will to "belief," and the lack of
distrust and patience are first developed—our senses learn late, and never
learn completely, to be subtle, reliable, and cautious organs of knowledge.
Our eyes find it easier on a given occasion to produce a picture already
often produced, than to seize upon the divergence and novelty of an

impression: the latter requires more force, more "morality." It is difficult
and painful for the ear to listen to anything new; we hear strange music
badly. When we hear another language spoken, we involuntarily attempt to
form the sounds into words with which we are more familiar and
conversant—it was thus, for example, that the Germans modified the
spoken word ARCUBALISTA into ARMBRUST (cross-bow). Our senses
are also hostile and averse to the new; and generally, even in the "simplest"
processes of sensation, the emotions DOMINATE—such as fear, love,
hatred, and the passive emotion of indolence.—As little as a reader
nowadays reads all the single words (not to speak of syllables) of a page—
he rather takes about five out of every twenty words at random, and
"guesses" the probably appropriate sense to them—just as little do we see a
tree correctly and completely in respect to its leaves, branches, colour, and
shape; we find it so much easier to fancy the chance of a tree. Even in the
midst of the most remarkable experiences, we still do just the same; we
fabricate the greater part of the experience, and can hardly be made to
contemplate any event, EXCEPT as "inventors" thereof. All this goes to
prove that from our fundamental nature and from remote ages we have been
—ACCUSTOMED TO LYING. Or, to express it more politely and
hypocritically, in short, more pleasantly—one is much more of an artist than
one is aware of.—In an animated conversation, I often see the face of the
person with whom I am speaking so clearly and sharply defined before me,
according to the thought he expresses, or which I believe to be evoked in
his mind, that the degree of distinctness far exceeds the STRENGTH of my
visual faculty—the delicacy of the play of the muscles and of the
expression of the eyes MUST therefore be imagined by me. Probably the
person put on quite a different expression, or none at all.
193. Quidquid luce fuit, tenebris agit: but also contrariwise. What we
experience in dreams, provided we experience it often, pertains at last just
as much to the general belongings of our soul as anything "actually"
experienced; by virtue thereof we are richer or poorer, we have a
requirement more or less, and finally, in broad daylight, and even in the
brightest moments of our waking life, we are ruled to some extent by the
nature of our dreams. Supposing that someone has often flown in his
dreams, and that at last, as soon as he dreams, he is conscious of the power
and art of flying as his privilege and his peculiarly enviable happiness; such
a person, who believes that on the slightest impulse, he can actualize all

sorts of curves and angles, who knows the sensation of a certain divine
levity, an "upwards" without effort or constraint, a "downwards" without
descending or lowering—without TROUBLE!—how could the man with
such dream-experiences and dream-habits fail to find "happiness"
differently coloured and defined, even in his waking hours! How could he
fail—to long DIFFERENTLY for happiness? "Flight," such as is described
by poets, must, when compared with his own "flying," be far too earthly,
muscular, violent, far too "troublesome" for him.
194. The difference among men does not manifest itself only in the
difference of their lists of desirable things—in their regarding different
good things as worth striving for, and being disagreed as to the greater or
less value, the order of rank, of the commonly recognized desirable things:
—it manifests itself much more in what they regard as actually HAVING
and POSSESSING a desirable thing. As regards a woman, for instance, the
control over her body and her sexual gratification serves as an amply
sufficient sign of ownership and possession to the more modest man;
another with a more suspicious and ambitious thirst for possession, sees the
"questionableness," the mere apparentness of such ownership, and wishes to
have finer tests in order to know especially whether the woman not only
gives herself to him, but also gives up for his sake what she has or would
like to have—only THEN does he look upon her as "possessed." A third,
however, has not even here got to the limit of his distrust and his desire for
possession: he asks himself whether the woman, when she gives up
everything for him, does not perhaps do so for a phantom of him; he wishes
first to be thoroughly, indeed, profoundly well known; in order to be loved
at all he ventures to let himself be found out. Only then does he feel the
beloved one fully in his possession, when she no longer deceives herself
about him, when she loves him just as much for the sake of his devilry and
concealed insatiability, as for his goodness, patience, and spirituality. One
man would like to possess a nation, and he finds all the higher arts of
Cagliostro and Catalina suitable for his purpose. Another, with a more
refined thirst for possession, says to himself: "One may not deceive where
one desires to possess"—he is irritated and impatient at the idea that a mask
of him should rule in the hearts of the people: "I must, therefore, MAKE
myself known, and first of all learn to know myself!" Among helpful and
charitable people, one almost always finds the awkward craftiness which
first gets up suitably him who has to be helped, as though, for instance, he

should "merit" help, seek just THEIR help, and would show himself deeply
grateful, attached, and subservient to them for all help. With these conceits,
they take control of the needy as a property, just as in general they are
charitable and helpful out of a desire for property. One finds them jealous
when they are crossed or forestalled in their charity. Parents involuntarily
make something like themselves out of their children—they call that
"education"; no mother doubts at the bottom of her heart that the child she
has borne is thereby her property, no father hesitates about his right to HIS
OWN ideas and notions of worth. Indeed, in former times fathers deemed it
right to use their discretion concerning the life or death of the newly born
(as among the ancient Germans). And like the father, so also do the teacher,
the class, the priest, and the prince still see in every new individual an
unobjectionable opportunity for a new possession. The consequence is...
195. The Jews—a people "born for slavery," as Tacitus and the whole
ancient world say of them; "the chosen people among the nations," as they
themselves say and believe—the Jews performed the miracle of the
inversion of valuations, by means of which life on earth obtained a new and
dangerous charm for a couple of millenniums. Their prophets fused into one
the expressions "rich," "godless," "wicked," "violent," "sensual," and for the
first time coined the word "world" as a term of reproach. In this inversion of
valuations (in which is also included the use of the word "poor" as
synonymous with "saint" and "friend") the significance of the Jewish people
is to be found; it is with THEM that the SLAVE-INSURRECTION IN
MORALS commences.
196. It is to be INFERRED that there are countless dark bodies near the
sun—such as we shall never see. Among ourselves, this is an allegory; and
the psychologist of morals reads the whole star-writing merely as an
allegorical and symbolic language in which much may be unexpressed.
197. The beast of prey and the man of prey (for instance, Caesar Borgia)
are fundamentally misunderstood, "nature" is misunderstood, so long as one
seeks a "morbidness" in the constitution of these healthiest of all tropical
monsters and growths, or even an innate "hell" in them—as almost all
moralists have done hitherto. Does it not seem that there is a hatred of the
virgin forest and of the tropics among moralists? And that the "tropical
man" must be discredited at all costs, whether as disease and deterioration
of mankind, or as his own hell and self-torture? And why? In favour of the

"temperate zones"? In favour of the temperate men? The "moral"? The
mediocre?—This for the chapter: "Morals as Timidity."
198. All the systems of morals which address themselves with a view to
their "happiness," as it is called—what else are they but suggestions for
behaviour adapted to the degree of DANGER from themselves in which the
individuals live; recipes for their passions, their good and bad propensities,
insofar as such have the Will to Power and would like to play the master;
small and great expediencies and elaborations, permeated with the musty
odour of old family medicines and old-wife wisdom; all of them grotesque
and absurd in their form—because they address themselves to "all," because
they generalize where generalization is not authorized; all of them speaking
unconditionally, and taking themselves unconditionally; all of them
flavoured not merely with one grain of salt, but rather endurable only, and
sometimes even seductive, when they are over-spiced and begin to smell
dangerously, especially of "the other world." That is all of little value when
estimated intellectually, and is far from being "science," much less
"wisdom"; but, repeated once more, and three times repeated, it is
expediency, expediency, expediency, mixed with stupidity, stupidity,
stupidity—whether it be the indifference and statuesque coldness towards
the heated folly of the emotions, which the Stoics advised and fostered; or
the no-more-laughing and no-more-weeping of Spinoza, the destruction of
the emotions by their analysis and vivisection, which he recommended so
naively; or the lowering of the emotions to an innocent mean at which they
may be satisfied, the Aristotelianism of morals; or even morality as the
enjoyment of the emotions in a voluntary attenuation and spiritualization by
the symbolism of art, perhaps as music, or as love of God, and of mankind
for God's sake—for in religion the passions are once more enfranchised,
provided that...; or, finally, even the complaisant and wanton surrender to
the emotions, as has been taught by Hafis and Goethe, the bold letting-go of
the reins, the spiritual and corporeal licentia morum in the exceptional cases
of wise old codgers and drunkards, with whom it "no longer has much
danger."—This also for the chapter: "Morals as Timidity."
199. Inasmuch as in all ages, as long as mankind has existed, there have
also been human herds (family alliances, communities, tribes, peoples,
states, churches), and always a great number who obey in proportion to the
small number who command—in view, therefore, of the fact that obedience
has been most practiced and fostered among mankind hitherto, one may

reasonably suppose that, generally speaking, the need thereof is now innate
in every one, as a kind of FORMAL CONSCIENCE which gives the
command "Thou shalt unconditionally do something, unconditionally
refrain from something", in short, "Thou shalt". This need tries to satisfy
itself and to fill its form with a content, according to its strength,
impatience, and eagerness, it at once seizes as an omnivorous appetite with
little selection, and accepts whatever is shouted into its ear by all sorts of
commanders—parents, teachers, laws, class prejudices, or public opinion.
The extraordinary limitation of human development, the hesitation,
protractedness, frequent retrogression, and turning thereof, is attributable to
the fact that the herd-instinct of obedience is transmitted best, and at the
cost of the art of command. If one imagine this instinct increasing to its
greatest extent, commanders and independent individuals will finally be
lacking altogether, or they will suffer inwardly from a bad conscience, and
will have to impose a deception on themselves in the first place in order to
be able to command just as if they also were only obeying. This condition
of things actually exists in Europe at present—I call it the moral hypocrisy
of the commanding class. They know no other way of protecting
themselves from their bad conscience than by playing the role of executors
of older and higher orders (of predecessors, of the constitution, of justice, of
the law, or of God himself), or they even justify themselves by maxims
from the current opinions of the herd, as "first servants of their people," or
"instruments of the public weal". On the other hand, the gregarious
European man nowadays assumes an air as if he were the only kind of man
that is allowable, he glorifies his qualities, such as public spirit, kindness,
deference, industry, temperance, modesty, indulgence, sympathy, by virtue
of which he is gentle, endurable, and useful to the herd, as the peculiarly
human virtues. In cases, however, where it is believed that the leader and
bell-wether cannot be dispensed with, attempt after attempt is made
nowadays to replace commanders by the summing together of clever
gregarious men all representative constitutions, for example, are of this
origin. In spite of all, what a blessing, what a deliverance from a weight
becoming unendurable, is the appearance of an absolute ruler for these
gregarious Europeans—of this fact the effect of the appearance of Napoleon
was the last great proof the history of the influence of Napoleon is almost
the history of the higher happiness to which the entire century has attained
in its worthiest individuals and periods.

200. The man of an age of dissolution which mixes the races with one
another, who has the inheritance of a diversified descent in his body—that
is to say, contrary, and often not only contrary, instincts and standards of
value, which struggle with one another and are seldom at peace—such a
man of late culture and broken lights, will, on an average, be a weak man.
His fundamental desire is that the war which is IN HIM should come to an
end; happiness appears to him in the character of a soothing medicine and
mode of thought (for instance, Epicurean or Christian); it is above all things
the happiness of repose, of undisturbedness, of repletion, of final unity—it
is the "Sabbath of Sabbaths," to use the expression of the holy rhetorician,
St. Augustine, who was himself such a man.—Should, however, the
contrariety and conflict in such natures operate as an ADDITIONAL
incentive and stimulus to life—and if, on the other hand, in addition to their
powerful and irreconcilable instincts, they have also inherited and
indoctrinated into them a proper mastery and subtlety for carrying on the
conflict with themselves (that is to say, the faculty of self-control and selfdeception), there then arise those marvelously incomprehensible and
inexplicable beings, those enigmatical men, predestined for conquering and
circumventing others, the finest examples of which are Alcibiades and
Caesar (with whom I should like to associate the FIRST of Europeans
according to my taste, the Hohenstaufen, Frederick the Second), and among
artists, perhaps Leonardo da Vinci. They appear precisely in the same
periods when that weaker type, with its longing for repose, comes to the
front; the two types are complementary to each other, and spring from the
same causes.
201. As long as the utility which determines moral estimates is only
gregarious utility, as long as the preservation of the community is only kept
in view, and the immoral is sought precisely and exclusively in what seems
dangerous to the maintenance of the community, there can be no "morality
of love to one's neighbour." Granted even that there is already a little
constant exercise of consideration, sympathy, fairness, gentleness, and
mutual assistance, granted that even in this condition of society all those
instincts are already active which are latterly distinguished by honourable
names as "virtues," and eventually almost coincide with the conception
"morality": in that period they do not as yet belong to the domain of moral
valuations—they are still ULTRA-MORAL. A sympathetic action, for
instance, is neither called good nor bad, moral nor immoral, in the best

period of the Romans; and should it be praised, a sort of resentful disdain is
compatible with this praise, even at the best, directly the sympathetic action
is compared with one which contributes to the welfare of the whole, to the
RES PUBLICA. After all, "love to our neighbour" is always a secondary
matter, partly conventional and arbitrarily manifested in relation to our
FEAR OF OUR NEIGHBOUR. After the fabric of society seems on the
whole established and secured against external dangers, it is this fear of our
neighbour which again creates new perspectives of moral valuation. Certain
strong and dangerous instincts, such as the love of enterprise, foolhardiness,
revengefulness, astuteness, rapacity, and love of power, which up till then
had not only to be honoured from the point of view of general utility—
under other names, of course, than those here given—but had to be fostered
and cultivated (because they were perpetually required in the common
danger against the common enemies), are now felt in their dangerousness to
be doubly strong—when the outlets for them are lacking—and are
gradually branded as immoral and given over to calumny. The contrary
instincts and inclinations now attain to moral honour, the gregarious instinct
gradually draws its conclusions. How much or how little dangerousness to
the community or to equality is contained in an opinion, a condition, an
emotion, a disposition, or an endowment—that is now the moral
perspective, here again fear is the mother of morals. It is by the loftiest and
strongest instincts, when they break out passionately and carry the
individual far above and beyond the average, and the low level of the
gregarious conscience, that the self-reliance of the community is destroyed,
its belief in itself, its backbone, as it were, breaks, consequently these very
instincts will be most branded and defamed. The lofty independent
spirituality, the will to stand alone, and even the cogent reason, are felt to be
dangers, everything that elevates the individual above the herd, and is a
source of fear to the neighbour, is henceforth called EVIL, the tolerant,
unassuming, self-adapting, self-equalizing disposition, the MEDIOCRITY
of desires, attains to moral distinction and honour. Finally, under very
peaceful circumstances, there is always less opportunity and necessity for
training the feelings to severity and rigour, and now every form of severity,
even in justice, begins to disturb the conscience, a lofty and rigorous
nobleness and self-responsibility almost offends, and awakens distrust, "the
lamb," and still more "the sheep," wins respect. There is a point of diseased
mellowness and effeminacy in the history of society, at which society itself

takes the part of him who injures it, the part of the CRIMINAL, and does
so, in fact, seriously and honestly. To punish, appears to it to be somehow
unfair—it is certain that the idea of "punishment" and "the obligation to
punish" are then painful and alarming to people. "Is it not sufficient if the
criminal be rendered HARMLESS? Why should we still punish?
Punishment itself is terrible!"—with these questions gregarious morality,
the morality of fear, draws its ultimate conclusion. If one could at all do
away with danger, the cause of fear, one would have done away with this
morality at the same time, it would no longer be necessary, it WOULD
NOT CONSIDER ITSELF any longer necessary!—Whoever examines the
conscience of the present-day European, will always elicit the same
imperative from its thousand moral folds and hidden recesses, the
imperative of the timidity of the herd "we wish that some time or other
there may be NOTHING MORE TO FEAR!" Some time or other—the will
and the way THERETO is nowadays called "progress" all over Europe.
202. Let us at once say again what we have already said a hundred times,
for people's ears nowadays are unwilling to hear such truths—OUR truths.
We know well enough how offensive it sounds when any one plainly, and
without metaphor, counts man among the animals, but it will be accounted
to us almost a CRIME, that it is precisely in respect to men of "modern
ideas" that we have constantly applied the terms "herd," "herd-instincts,"
and such like expressions. What avail is it? We cannot do otherwise, for it is
precisely here that our new insight is. We have found that in all the
principal moral judgments, Europe has become unanimous, including
likewise the countries where European influence prevails in Europe people
evidently KNOW what Socrates thought he did not know, and what the
famous serpent of old once promised to teach—they "know" today what is
good and evil. It must then sound hard and be distasteful to the ear, when
we always insist that that which here thinks it knows, that which here
glorifies itself with praise and blame, and calls itself good, is the instinct of
the herding human animal, the instinct which has come and is ever coming
more and more to the front, to preponderance and supremacy over other
instincts, according to the increasing physiological approximation and
resemblance of which it is the symptom. MORALITY IN EUROPE AT
PRESENT IS HERDING-ANIMAL MORALITY, and therefore, as we
understand the matter, only one kind of human morality, beside which,
before which, and after which many other moralities, and above all

HIGHER moralities, are or should be possible. Against such a "possibility,"
against such a "should be," however, this morality defends itself with all its
strength, it says obstinately and inexorably "I am morality itself and nothing
else is morality!" Indeed, with the help of a religion which has humoured
and flattered the sublimest desires of the herding-animal, things have
reached such a point that we always find a more visible expression of this
morality even in political and social arrangements: the DEMOCRATIC
movement is the inheritance of the Christian movement. That its TEMPO,
however, is much too slow and sleepy for the more impatient ones, for
those who are sick and distracted by the herding-instinct, is indicated by the
increasingly furious howling, and always less disguised teeth-gnashing of
the anarchist dogs, who are now roving through the highways of European
culture. Apparently in opposition to the peacefully industrious democrats
and Revolution-ideologues, and still more so to the awkward
philosophasters and fraternity-visionaries who call themselves Socialists
and want a "free society," those are really at one with them all in their
thorough and instinctive hostility to every form of society other than that of
the AUTONOMOUS herd (to the extent even of repudiating the notions
"master" and "servant"—ni dieu ni maitre, says a socialist formula); at one
in their tenacious opposition to every special claim, every special right and
privilege (this means ultimately opposition to EVERY right, for when all
are equal, no one needs "rights" any longer); at one in their distrust of
punitive justice (as though it were a violation of the weak, unfair to the
NECESSARY consequences of all former society); but equally at one in
their religion of sympathy, in their compassion for all that feels, lives, and
suffers (down to the very animals, up even to "God"—the extravagance of
"sympathy for God" belongs to a democratic age); altogether at one in the
cry and impatience of their sympathy, in their deadly hatred of suffering
generally, in their almost feminine incapacity for witnessing it or
ALLOWING it; at one in their involuntary beglooming and heart-softening,
under the spell of which Europe seems to be threatened with a new
Buddhism; at one in their belief in the morality of MUTUAL sympathy, as
though it were morality in itself, the climax, the ATTAINED climax of
mankind, the sole hope of the future, the consolation of the present, the
great discharge from all the obligations of the past; altogether at one in their
belief in the community as the DELIVERER, in the herd, and therefore in
"themselves."

203. We, who hold a different belief—we, who regard the democratic
movement, not only as a degenerating form of political organization, but as
equivalent to a degenerating, a waning type of man, as involving his
mediocrising and depreciation: where have WE to fix our hopes? In NEW
PHILOSOPHERS—there is no other alternative: in minds strong and
original enough to initiate opposite estimates of value, to transvalue and
invert "eternal valuations"; in forerunners, in men of the future, who in the
present shall fix the constraints and fasten the knots which will compel
millenniums to take NEW paths. To teach man the future of humanity as his
WILL, as depending on human will, and to make preparation for vast
hazardous enterprises and collective attempts in rearing and educating, in
order thereby to put an end to the frightful rule of folly and chance which
has hitherto gone by the name of "history" (the folly of the "greatest
number" is only its last form)—for that purpose a new type of philosopher
and commander will some time or other be needed, at the very idea of
which everything that has existed in the way of occult, terrible, and
benevolent beings might look pale and dwarfed. The image of such leaders
hovers before OUR eyes:—is it lawful for me to say it aloud, ye free
spirits? The conditions which one would partly have to create and partly
utilize for their genesis; the presumptive methods and tests by virtue of
which a soul should grow up to such an elevation and power as to feel a
CONSTRAINT to these tasks; a transvaluation of values, under the new
pressure and hammer of which a conscience should be steeled and a heart
transformed into brass, so as to bear the weight of such responsibility; and
on the other hand the necessity for such leaders, the dreadful danger that
they might be lacking, or miscarry and degenerate:—these are OUR real
anxieties and glooms, ye know it well, ye free spirits! these are the heavy
distant thoughts and storms which sweep across the heaven of OUR life.
There are few pains so grievous as to have seen, divined, or experienced
how an exceptional man has missed his way and deteriorated; but he who
has the rare eye for the universal danger of "man" himself
DETERIORATING, he who like us has recognized the extraordinary
fortuitousness which has hitherto played its game in respect to the future of
mankind—a game in which neither the hand, nor even a "finger of God" has
participated!—he who divines the fate that is hidden under the idiotic
unwariness and blind confidence of "modern ideas," and still more under
the whole of Christo-European morality—suffers from an anguish with

which no other is to be compared. He sees at a glance all that could still BE
MADE OUT OF MAN through a favourable accumulation and
augmentation of human powers and arrangements; he knows with all the
knowledge of his conviction how unexhausted man still is for the greatest
possibilities, and how often in the past the type man has stood in presence
of mysterious decisions and new paths:—he knows still better from his
painfulest recollections on what wretched obstacles promising
developments of the highest rank have hitherto usually gone to pieces,
broken down, sunk, and become contemptible. The UNIVERSAL
DEGENERACY OF MANKIND to the level of the "man of the future"—as
idealized by the socialistic fools and shallow-pates—this degeneracy and
dwarfing of man to an absolutely gregarious animal (or as they call it, to a
man of "free society"), this brutalizing of man into a pigmy with equal
rights and claims, is undoubtedly POSSIBLE! He who has thought out this
possibility to its ultimate conclusion knows ANOTHER loathing unknown
to the rest of mankind—and perhaps also a new MISSION!

CHAPTER VI. WE SCHOLARS
204. At the risk that moralizing may also reveal itself here as that which
it has always been—namely, resolutely MONTRER SES PLAIES,
according to Balzac—I would venture to protest against an improper and
injurious alteration of rank, which quite unnoticed, and as if with the best
conscience, threatens nowadays to establish itself in the relations of science
and philosophy. I mean to say that one must have the right out of one's own
EXPERIENCE—experience, as it seems to me, always implies unfortunate
experience?—to treat of such an important question of rank, so as not to
speak of colour like the blind, or AGAINST science like women and artists
("Ah! this dreadful science!" sigh their instinct and their shame, "it always
FINDS THINGS OUT!"). The declaration of independence of the scientific
man, his emancipation from philosophy, is one of the subtler after-effects of
democratic organization and disorganization: the self-glorification and selfconceitedness of the learned man is now everywhere in full bloom, and in
its best springtime—which does not mean to imply that in this case selfpraise smells sweet. Here also the instinct of the populace cries, "Freedom
from all masters!" and after science has, with the happiest results, resisted
theology, whose "hand-maid" it had been too long, it now proposes in its
wantonness and indiscretion to lay down laws for philosophy, and in its turn
to play the "master"—what am I saying! to play the PHILOSOPHER on its
own account. My memory—the memory of a scientific man, if you please!
—teems with the naivetes of insolence which I have heard about philosophy
and philosophers from young naturalists and old physicians (not to mention
the most cultured and most conceited of all learned men, the philologists
and schoolmasters, who are both the one and the other by profession). On
one occasion it was the specialist and the Jack Horner who instinctively
stood on the defensive against all synthetic tasks and capabilities; at another
time it was the industrious worker who had got a scent of OTIUM and
refined luxuriousness in the internal economy of the philosopher, and felt
himself aggrieved and belittled thereby. On another occasion it was the
colour-blindness of the utilitarian, who sees nothing in philosophy but a
series of REFUTED systems, and an extravagant expenditure which "does

nobody any good". At another time the fear of disguised mysticism and of
the boundary-adjustment of knowledge became conspicuous, at another
time the disregard of individual philosophers, which had involuntarily
extended to disregard of philosophy generally. In fine, I found most
frequently, behind the proud disdain of philosophy in young scholars, the
evil after-effect of some particular philosopher, to whom on the whole
obedience had been foresworn, without, however, the spell of his scornful
estimates of other philosophers having been got rid of—the result being a
general ill-will to all philosophy. (Such seems to me, for instance, the aftereffect of Schopenhauer on the most modern Germany: by his unintelligent
rage against Hegel, he has succeeded in severing the whole of the last
generation of Germans from its connection with German culture, which
culture, all things considered, has been an elevation and a divining
refinement of the HISTORICAL SENSE, but precisely at this point
Schopenhauer himself was poor, irreceptive, and un-German to the extent
of ingeniousness.) On the whole, speaking generally, it may just have been
the humanness, all-too-humanness of the modern philosophers themselves,
in short, their contemptibleness, which has injured most radically the
reverence for philosophy and opened the doors to the instinct of the
populace. Let it but be acknowledged to what an extent our modern world
diverges from the whole style of the world of Heraclitus, Plato,
Empedocles, and whatever else all the royal and magnificent anchorites of
the spirit were called, and with what justice an honest man of science MAY
feel himself of a better family and origin, in view of such representatives of
philosophy, who, owing to the fashion of the present day, are just as much
aloft as they are down below—in Germany, for instance, the two lions of
Berlin, the anarchist Eugen Duhring and the amalgamist Eduard von
Hartmann. It is especially the sight of those hotch-potch philosophers, who
call themselves "realists," or "positivists," which is calculated to implant a
dangerous distrust in the soul of a young and ambitious scholar those
philosophers, at the best, are themselves but scholars and specialists, that is
very evident! All of them are persons who have been vanquished and
BROUGHT BACK AGAIN under the dominion of science, who at one
time or another claimed more from themselves, without having a right to
the "more" and its responsibility—and who now, creditably, rancorously,
and vindictively, represent in word and deed, DISBELIEF in the mastertask and supremacy of philosophy After all, how could it be otherwise?

Science flourishes nowadays and has the good conscience clearly visible on
its countenance, while that to which the entire modern philosophy has
gradually sunk, the remnant of philosophy of the present day, excites
distrust and displeasure, if not scorn and pity Philosophy reduced to a
"theory of knowledge," no more in fact than a diffident science of epochs
and doctrine of forbearance a philosophy that never even gets beyond the
threshold, and rigorously DENIES itself the right to enter—that is
philosophy in its last throes, an end, an agony, something that awakens pity.
How could such a philosophy—RULE!
205. The dangers that beset the evolution of the philosopher are, in fact,
so manifold nowadays, that one might doubt whether this fruit could still
come to maturity. The extent and towering structure of the sciences have
increased enormously, and therewith also the probability that the
philosopher will grow tired even as a learner, or will attach himself
somewhere and "specialize" so that he will no longer attain to his elevation,
that is to say, to his superspection, his circumspection, and his
DESPECTION. Or he gets aloft too late, when the best of his maturity and
strength is past, or when he is impaired, coarsened, and deteriorated, so that
his view, his general estimate of things, is no longer of much importance. It
is perhaps just the refinement of his intellectual conscience that makes him
hesitate and linger on the way, he dreads the temptation to become a
dilettante, a millepede, a milleantenna, he knows too well that as a
discerner, one who has lost his self-respect no longer commands, no longer
LEADS, unless he should aspire to become a great play-actor, a
philosophical Cagliostro and spiritual rat-catcher—in short, a misleader.
This is in the last instance a question of taste, if it has not really been a
question of conscience. To double once more the philosopher's difficulties,
there is also the fact that he demands from himself a verdict, a Yea or Nay,
not concerning science, but concerning life and the worth of life—he learns
unwillingly to believe that it is his right and even his duty to obtain this
verdict, and he has to seek his way to the right and the belief only through
the most extensive (perhaps disturbing and destroying) experiences, often
hesitating, doubting, and dumbfounded. In fact, the philosopher has long
been mistaken and confused by the multitude, either with the scientific man
and ideal scholar, or with the religiously elevated, desensualized,
desecularized visionary and God-intoxicated man; and even yet when one
hears anybody praised, because he lives "wisely," or "as a philosopher," it

hardly means anything more than "prudently and apart." Wisdom: that
seems to the populace to be a kind of flight, a means and artifice for
withdrawing successfully from a bad game; but the GENUINE philosopher
—does it not seem so to US, my friends?—lives "unphilosophically" and
"unwisely," above all, IMPRUDENTLY, and feels the obligation and burden
of a hundred attempts and temptations of life—he risks HIMSELF
constantly, he plays THIS bad game.
206. In relation to the genius, that is to say, a being who either
ENGENDERS or PRODUCES—both words understood in their fullest
sense—the man of learning, the scientific average man, has always
something of the old maid about him; for, like her, he is not conversant with
the two principal functions of man. To both, of course, to the scholar and to
the old maid, one concedes respectability, as if by way of indemnification—
in these cases one emphasizes the respectability—and yet, in the
compulsion of this concession, one has the same admixture of vexation. Let
us examine more closely: what is the scientific man? Firstly, a
commonplace type of man, with commonplace virtues: that is to say, a nonruling, non-authoritative, and non-self-sufficient type of man; he possesses
industry, patient adaptableness to rank and file, equability and moderation
in capacity and requirement; he has the instinct for people like himself, and
for that which they require—for instance: the portion of independence and
green meadow without which there is no rest from labour, the claim to
honour and consideration (which first and foremost presupposes recognition
and recognisability), the sunshine of a good name, the perpetual ratification
of his value and usefulness, with which the inward DISTRUST which lies
at the bottom of the heart of all dependent men and gregarious animals, has
again and again to be overcome. The learned man, as is appropriate, has
also maladies and faults of an ignoble kind: he is full of petty envy, and has
a lynx-eye for the weak points in those natures to whose elevations he
cannot attain. He is confiding, yet only as one who lets himself go, but does
not FLOW; and precisely before the man of the great current he stands all
the colder and more reserved—his eye is then like a smooth and
irresponsive lake, which is no longer moved by rapture or sympathy. The
worst and most dangerous thing of which a scholar is capable results from
the instinct of mediocrity of his type, from the Jesuitism of mediocrity,
which labours instinctively for the destruction of the exceptional man, and
endeavours to break—or still better, to relax—every bent bow To relax, of

course, with consideration, and naturally with an indulgent hand—to
RELAX with confiding sympathy that is the real art of Jesuitism, which has
always understood how to introduce itself as the religion of sympathy.
207. However gratefully one may welcome the OBJECTIVE spirit—and
who has not been sick to death of all subjectivity and its confounded
IPSISIMOSITY!—in the end, however, one must learn caution even with
regard to one's gratitude, and put a stop to the exaggeration with which the
unselfing and depersonalizing of the spirit has recently been celebrated, as
if it were the goal in itself, as if it were salvation and glorification—as is
especially accustomed to happen in the pessimist school, which has also in
its turn good reasons for paying the highest honours to "disinterested
knowledge" The objective man, who no longer curses and scolds like the
pessimist, the IDEAL man of learning in whom the scientific instinct
blossoms forth fully after a thousand complete and partial failures, is
assuredly one of the most costly instruments that exist, but his place is in
the hand of one who is more powerful He is only an instrument, we may
say, he is a MIRROR—he is no "purpose in himself" The objective man is
in truth a mirror accustomed to prostration before everything that wants to
be known, with such desires only as knowing or "reflecting" implies—he
waits until something comes, and then expands himself sensitively, so that
even the light footsteps and gliding-past of spiritual beings may not be lost
on his surface and film Whatever "personality" he still possesses seems to
him accidental, arbitrary, or still oftener, disturbing, so much has he come to
regard himself as the passage and reflection of outside forms and events He
calls up the recollection of "himself" with an effort, and not infrequently
wrongly, he readily confounds himself with other persons, he makes
mistakes with regard to his own needs, and here only is he unrefined and
negligent Perhaps he is troubled about the health, or the pettiness and
confined atmosphere of wife and friend, or the lack of companions and
society—indeed, he sets himself to reflect on his suffering, but in vain! His
thoughts already rove away to the MORE GENERAL case, and tomorrow
he knows as little as he knew yesterday how to help himself He does not
now take himself seriously and devote time to himself he is serene, NOT
from lack of trouble, but from lack of capacity for grasping and dealing
with HIS trouble The habitual complaisance with respect to all objects and
experiences, the radiant and impartial hospitality with which he receives
everything that comes his way, his habit of inconsiderate good-nature, of

dangerous indifference as to Yea and Nay: alas! there are enough of cases in
which he has to atone for these virtues of his!—and as man generally, he
becomes far too easily the CAPUT MORTUUM of such virtues. Should
one wish love or hatred from him—I mean love and hatred as God, woman,
and animal understand them—he will do what he can, and furnish what he
can. But one must not be surprised if it should not be much—if he should
show himself just at this point to be false, fragile, questionable, and
deteriorated. His love is constrained, his hatred is artificial, and rather UN
TOUR DE FORCE, a slight ostentation and exaggeration. He is only
genuine so far as he can be objective; only in his serene totality is he still
"nature" and "natural." His mirroring and eternally self-polishing soul no
longer knows how to affirm, no longer how to deny; he does not command;
neither does he destroy. "JE NE MEPRISE PRESQUE RIEN"—he says,
with Leibniz: let us not overlook nor undervalue the PRESQUE! Neither is
he a model man; he does not go in advance of any one, nor after, either; he
places himself generally too far off to have any reason for espousing the
cause of either good or evil. If he has been so long confounded with the
PHILOSOPHER, with the Caesarian trainer and dictator of civilization, he
has had far too much honour, and what is more essential in him has been
overlooked—he is an instrument, something of a slave, though certainly the
sublimest sort of slave, but nothing in himself—PRESQUE RIEN! The
objective man is an instrument, a costly, easily injured, easily tarnished
measuring instrument and mirroring apparatus, which is to be taken care of
and respected; but he is no goal, not outgoing nor upgoing, no
complementary man in whom the REST of existence justifies itself, no
termination—and still less a commencement, an engendering, or primary
cause, nothing hardy, powerful, self-centred, that wants to be master; but
rather only a soft, inflated, delicate, movable potter's-form, that must wait
for some kind of content and frame to "shape" itself thereto—for the most
part a man without frame and content, a "selfless" man. Consequently, also,
nothing for women, IN PARENTHESI.
208. When a philosopher nowadays makes known that he is not a skeptic
—I hope that has been gathered from the foregoing description of the
objective spirit?—people all hear it impatiently; they regard him on that
account with some apprehension, they would like to ask so many, many
questions... indeed among timid hearers, of whom there are now so many,
he is henceforth said to be dangerous. With his repudiation of skepticism, it

seems to them as if they heard some evil-threatening sound in the distance,
as if a new kind of explosive were being tried somewhere, a dynamite of the
spirit, perhaps a newly discovered Russian NIHILINE, a pessimism
BONAE VOLUNTATIS, that not only denies, means denial, but—dreadful
thought! PRACTISES denial. Against this kind of "good-will"—a will to
the veritable, actual negation of life—there is, as is generally acknowledged
nowadays, no better soporific and sedative than skepticism, the mild,
pleasing, lulling poppy of skepticism; and Hamlet himself is now prescribed
by the doctors of the day as an antidote to the "spirit," and its underground
noises. "Are not our ears already full of bad sounds?" say the skeptics, as
lovers of repose, and almost as a kind of safety police; "this subterranean
Nay is terrible! Be still, ye pessimistic moles!" The skeptic, in effect, that
delicate creature, is far too easily frightened; his conscience is schooled so
as to start at every Nay, and even at that sharp, decided Yea, and feels
something like a bite thereby. Yea! and Nay!—they seem to him opposed to
morality; he loves, on the contrary, to make a festival to his virtue by a
noble aloofness, while perhaps he says with Montaigne: "What do I know?"
Or with Socrates: "I know that I know nothing." Or: "Here I do not trust
myself, no door is open to me." Or: "Even if the door were open, why
should I enter immediately?" Or: "What is the use of any hasty hypotheses?
It might quite well be in good taste to make no hypotheses at all. Are you
absolutely obliged to straighten at once what is crooked? to stuff every hole
with some kind of oakum? Is there not time enough for that? Has not the
time leisure? Oh, ye demons, can ye not at all WAIT? The uncertain also
has its charms, the Sphinx, too, is a Circe, and Circe, too, was a
philosopher."—Thus does a skeptic console himself; and in truth he needs
some consolation. For skepticism is the most spiritual expression of a
certain many-sided physiological temperament, which in ordinary language
is called nervous debility and sickliness; it arises whenever races or classes
which have been long separated, decisively and suddenly blend with one
another. In the new generation, which has inherited as it were different
standards and valuations in its blood, everything is disquiet, derangement,
doubt, and tentativeness; the best powers operate restrictively, the very
virtues prevent each other growing and becoming strong, equilibrium,
ballast, and perpendicular stability are lacking in body and soul. That,
however, which is most diseased and degenerated in such nondescripts is
the WILL; they are no longer familiar with independence of decision, or the

courageous feeling of pleasure in willing—they are doubtful of the
"freedom of the will" even in their dreams Our present-day Europe, the
scene of a senseless, precipitate attempt at a radical blending of classes, and
CONSEQUENTLY of races, is therefore skeptical in all its heights and
depths, sometimes exhibiting the mobile skepticism which springs
impatiently and wantonly from branch to branch, sometimes with gloomy
aspect, like a cloud over-charged with interrogative signs—and often sick
unto death of its will! Paralysis of will, where do we not find this cripple
sitting nowadays! And yet how bedecked oftentimes' How seductively
ornamented! There are the finest gala dresses and disguises for this disease,
and that, for instance, most of what places itself nowadays in the showcases as "objectiveness," "the scientific spirit," "L'ART POUR L'ART," and
"pure voluntary knowledge," is only decked-out skepticism and paralysis of
will—I am ready to answer for this diagnosis of the European disease—The
disease of the will is diffused unequally over Europe, it is worst and most
varied where civilization has longest prevailed, it decreases according as
"the barbarian" still—or again—asserts his claims under the loose drapery
of Western culture It is therefore in the France of today, as can be readily
disclosed and comprehended, that the will is most infirm, and France,
which has always had a masterly aptitude for converting even the
portentous crises of its spirit into something charming and seductive, now
manifests emphatically its intellectual ascendancy over Europe, by being
the school and exhibition of all the charms of skepticism The power to will
and to persist, moreover, in a resolution, is already somewhat stronger in
Germany, and again in the North of Germany it is stronger than in Central
Germany, it is considerably stronger in England, Spain, and Corsica,
associated with phlegm in the former and with hard skulls in the latter—not
to mention Italy, which is too young yet to know what it wants, and must
first show whether it can exercise will, but it is strongest and most
surprising of all in that immense middle empire where Europe as it were
flows back to Asia—namely, in Russia There the power to will has been
long stored up and accumulated, there the will—uncertain whether to be
negative or affirmative—waits threateningly to be discharged (to borrow
their pet phrase from our physicists) Perhaps not only Indian wars and
complications in Asia would be necessary to free Europe from its greatest
danger, but also internal subversion, the shattering of the empire into small
states, and above all the introduction of parliamentary imbecility, together

with the obligation of every one to read his newspaper at breakfast I do not
say this as one who desires it, in my heart I should rather prefer the contrary
—I mean such an increase in the threatening attitude of Russia, that Europe
would have to make up its mind to become equally threatening—namely,
TO ACQUIRE ONE WILL, by means of a new caste to rule over the
Continent, a persistent, dreadful will of its own, that can set its aims
thousands of years ahead; so that the long spun-out comedy of its pettystatism, and its dynastic as well as its democratic many-willed-ness, might
finally be brought to a close. The time for petty politics is past; the next
century will bring the struggle for the dominion of the world—the
COMPULSION to great politics.
209. As to how far the new warlike age on which we Europeans have
evidently entered may perhaps favour the growth of another and stronger
kind of skepticism, I should like to express myself preliminarily merely by
a parable, which the lovers of German history will already understand. That
unscrupulous enthusiast for big, handsome grenadiers (who, as King of
Prussia, brought into being a military and skeptical genius—and therewith,
in reality, the new and now triumphantly emerged type of German), the
problematic, crazy father of Frederick the Great, had on one point the very
knack and lucky grasp of the genius: he knew what was then lacking in
Germany, the want of which was a hundred times more alarming and
serious than any lack of culture and social form—his ill-will to the young
Frederick resulted from the anxiety of a profound instinct. MEN WERE
LACKING; and he suspected, to his bitterest regret, that his own son was
not man enough. There, however, he deceived himself; but who would not
have deceived himself in his place? He saw his son lapsed to atheism, to the
ESPRIT, to the pleasant frivolity of clever Frenchmen—he saw in the
background the great bloodsucker, the spider skepticism; he suspected the
incurable wretchedness of a heart no longer hard enough either for evil or
good, and of a broken will that no longer commands, is no longer ABLE to
command. Meanwhile, however, there grew up in his son that new kind of
harder and more dangerous skepticism—who knows TO WHAT EXTENT
it was encouraged just by his father's hatred and the icy melancholy of a
will condemned to solitude?—the skepticism of daring manliness, which is
closely related to the genius for war and conquest, and made its first
entrance into Germany in the person of the great Frederick. This skepticism
despises and nevertheless grasps; it undermines and takes possession; it

does not believe, but it does not thereby lose itself; it gives the spirit a
dangerous liberty, but it keeps strict guard over the heart. It is the
GERMAN form of skepticism, which, as a continued Fredericianism, risen
to the highest spirituality, has kept Europe for a considerable time under the
dominion of the German spirit and its critical and historical distrust Owing
to the insuperably strong and tough masculine character of the great
German philologists and historical critics (who, rightly estimated, were also
all of them artists of destruction and dissolution), a NEW conception of the
German spirit gradually established itself—in spite of all Romanticism in
music and philosophy—in which the leaning towards masculine skepticism
was decidedly prominent whether, for instance, as fearlessness of gaze, as
courage and sternness of the dissecting hand, or as resolute will to
dangerous voyages of discovery, to spiritualized North Pole expeditions
under barren and dangerous skies. There may be good grounds for it when
warm-blooded and superficial humanitarians cross themselves before this
spirit, CET ESPRIT FATALISTE, IRONIQUE, MEPHISTOPHELIQUE, as
Michelet calls it, not without a shudder. But if one would realize how
characteristic is this fear of the "man" in the German spirit which awakened
Europe out of its "dogmatic slumber," let us call to mind the former
conception which had to be overcome by this new one—and that it is not so
very long ago that a masculinized woman could dare, with unbridled
presumption, to recommend the Germans to the interest of Europe as gentle,
good-hearted, weak-willed, and poetical fools. Finally, let us only
understand profoundly enough Napoleon's astonishment when he saw
Goethe it reveals what had been regarded for centuries as the "German
spirit" "VOILA UN HOMME!"—that was as much as to say "But this is a
MAN! And I only expected to see a German!"
210. Supposing, then, that in the picture of the philosophers of the future,
some trait suggests the question whether they must not perhaps be skeptics
in the last-mentioned sense, something in them would only be designated
thereby—and not they themselves. With equal right they might call
themselves critics, and assuredly they will be men of experiments. By the
name with which I ventured to baptize them, I have already expressly
emphasized their attempting and their love of attempting is this because, as
critics in body and soul, they will love to make use of experiments in a new,
and perhaps wider and more dangerous sense? In their passion for
knowledge, will they have to go further in daring and painful attempts than

the sensitive and pampered taste of a democratic century can approve of?—
There is no doubt these coming ones will be least able to dispense with the
serious and not unscrupulous qualities which distinguish the critic from the
skeptic I mean the certainty as to standards of worth, the conscious
employment of a unity of method, the wary courage, the standing-alone,
and the capacity for self-responsibility, indeed, they will avow among
themselves a DELIGHT in denial and dissection, and a certain considerate
cruelty, which knows how to handle the knife surely and deftly, even when
the heart bleeds They will be STERNER (and perhaps not always towards
themselves only) than humane people may desire, they will not deal with
the "truth" in order that it may "please" them, or "elevate" and "inspire"
them—they will rather have little faith in "TRUTH" bringing with it such
revels for the feelings. They will smile, those rigorous spirits, when any one
says in their presence "That thought elevates me, why should it not be
true?" or "That work enchants me, why should it not be beautiful?" or "That
artist enlarges me, why should he not be great?" Perhaps they will not only
have a smile, but a genuine disgust for all that is thus rapturous, idealistic,
feminine, and hermaphroditic, and if any one could look into their inmost
hearts, he would not easily find therein the intention to reconcile "Christian
sentiments" with "antique taste," or even with "modern parliamentarism"
(the kind of reconciliation necessarily found even among philosophers in
our very uncertain and consequently very conciliatory century). Critical
discipline, and every habit that conduces to purity and rigour in intellectual
matters, will not only be demanded from themselves by these philosophers
of the future, they may even make a display thereof as their special
adornment—nevertheless they will not want to be called critics on that
account. It will seem to them no small indignity to philosophy to have it
decreed, as is so welcome nowadays, that "philosophy itself is criticism and
critical science—and nothing else whatever!" Though this estimate of
philosophy may enjoy the approval of all the Positivists of France and
Germany (and possibly it even flattered the heart and taste of KANT: let us
call to mind the titles of his principal works), our new philosophers will say,
notwithstanding, that critics are instruments of the philosopher, and just on
that account, as instruments, they are far from being philosophers
themselves! Even the great Chinaman of Konigsberg was only a great critic.
211. I insist upon it that people finally cease confounding philosophical
workers, and in general scientific men, with philosophers—that precisely

here one should strictly give "each his own," and not give those far too
much, these far too little. It may be necessary for the education of the real
philosopher that he himself should have once stood upon all those steps
upon which his servants, the scientific workers of philosophy, remain
standing, and MUST remain standing he himself must perhaps have been
critic, and dogmatist, and historian, and besides, poet, and collector, and
traveler, and riddle-reader, and moralist, and seer, and "free spirit," and
almost everything, in order to traverse the whole range of human values and
estimations, and that he may BE ABLE with a variety of eyes and
consciences to look from a height to any distance, from a depth up to any
height, from a nook into any expanse. But all these are only preliminary
conditions for his task; this task itself demands something else—it requires
him TO CREATE VALUES. The philosophical workers, after the excellent
pattern of Kant and Hegel, have to fix and formalize some great existing
body of valuations—that is to say, former DETERMINATIONS OF
VALUE, creations of value, which have become prevalent, and are for a
time called "truths"—whether in the domain of the LOGICAL, the
POLITICAL (moral), or the ARTISTIC. It is for these investigators to make
whatever has happened and been esteemed hitherto, conspicuous,
conceivable, intelligible, and manageable, to shorten everything long, even
"time" itself, and to SUBJUGATE the entire past: an immense and
wonderful task, in the carrying out of which all refined pride, all tenacious
will, can surely find satisfaction. THE REAL PHILOSOPHERS,
HOWEVER, ARE COMMANDERS AND LAW-GIVERS; they say: "Thus
SHALL it be!" They determine first the Whither and the Why of mankind,
and thereby set aside the previous labour of all philosophical workers, and
all subjugators of the past—they grasp at the future with a creative hand,
and whatever is and was, becomes for them thereby a means, an instrument,
and a hammer. Their "knowing" is CREATING, their creating is a lawgiving, their will to truth is—WILL TO POWER.—Are there at present
such philosophers? Have there ever been such philosophers? MUST there
not be such philosophers some day? ...
212. It is always more obvious to me that the philosopher, as a man
INDISPENSABLE for the morrow and the day after the morrow, has ever
found himself, and HAS BEEN OBLIGED to find himself, in contradiction
to the day in which he lives; his enemy has always been the ideal of his day.
Hitherto all those extraordinary furtherers of humanity whom one calls

philosophers—who rarely regarded themselves as lovers of wisdom, but
rather as disagreeable fools and dangerous interrogators—have found their
mission, their hard, involuntary, imperative mission (in the end, however,
the greatness of their mission), in being the bad conscience of their age. In
putting the vivisector's knife to the breast of the very VIRTUES OF THEIR
AGE, they have betrayed their own secret; it has been for the sake of a
NEW greatness of man, a new untrodden path to his aggrandizement. They
have always disclosed how much hypocrisy, indolence, self-indulgence, and
self-neglect, how much falsehood was concealed under the most venerated
types of contemporary morality, how much virtue was OUTLIVED, they
have always said "We must remove hence to where YOU are least at home"
In the face of a world of "modern ideas," which would like to confine every
one in a corner, in a "specialty," a philosopher, if there could be
philosophers nowadays, would be compelled to place the greatness of man,
the conception of "greatness," precisely in his comprehensiveness and
multifariousness, in his all-roundness, he would even determine worth and
rank according to the amount and variety of that which a man could bear
and take upon himself, according to the EXTENT to which a man could
stretch his responsibility Nowadays the taste and virtue of the age weaken
and attenuate the will, nothing is so adapted to the spirit of the age as
weakness of will consequently, in the ideal of the philosopher, strength of
will, sternness, and capacity for prolonged resolution, must specially be
included in the conception of "greatness", with as good a right as the
opposite doctrine, with its ideal of a silly, renouncing, humble, selfless
humanity, was suited to an opposite age—such as the sixteenth century,
which suffered from its accumulated energy of will, and from the wildest
torrents and floods of selfishness In the time of Socrates, among men only
of worn-out instincts, old conservative Athenians who let themselves go
—"for the sake of happiness," as they said, for the sake of pleasure, as their
conduct indicated—and who had continually on their lips the old pompous
words to which they had long forfeited the right by the life they led,
IRONY was perhaps necessary for greatness of soul, the wicked Socratic
assurance of the old physician and plebeian, who cut ruthlessly into his own
flesh, as into the flesh and heart of the "noble," with a look that said plainly
enough "Do not dissemble before me! here—we are equal!" At present, on
the contrary, when throughout Europe the herding-animal alone attains to
honours, and dispenses honours, when "equality of right" can too readily be

transformed into equality in wrong—I mean to say into general war against
everything rare, strange, and privileged, against the higher man, the higher
soul, the higher duty, the higher responsibility, the creative plenipotence and
lordliness—at present it belongs to the conception of "greatness" to be
noble, to wish to be apart, to be capable of being different, to stand alone, to
have to live by personal initiative, and the philosopher will betray
something of his own ideal when he asserts "He shall be the greatest who
can be the most solitary, the most concealed, the most divergent, the man
beyond good and evil, the master of his virtues, and of super-abundance of
will; precisely this shall be called GREATNESS: as diversified as can be
entire, as ample as can be full." And to ask once more the question: Is
greatness POSSIBLE—nowadays?
213. It is difficult to learn what a philosopher is, because it cannot be
taught: one must "know" it by experience—or one should have the pride
NOT to know it. The fact that at present people all talk of things of which
they CANNOT have any experience, is true more especially and
unfortunately as concerns the philosopher and philosophical matters:—the
very few know them, are permitted to know them, and all popular ideas
about them are false. Thus, for instance, the truly philosophical combination
of a bold, exuberant spirituality which runs at presto pace, and a dialectic
rigour and necessity which makes no false step, is unknown to most
thinkers and scholars from their own experience, and therefore, should any
one speak of it in their presence, it is incredible to them. They conceive of
every necessity as troublesome, as a painful compulsory obedience and
state of constraint; thinking itself is regarded by them as something slow
and hesitating, almost as a trouble, and often enough as "worthy of the
SWEAT of the noble"—but not at all as something easy and divine, closely
related to dancing and exuberance! "To think" and to take a matter
"seriously," "arduously"—that is one and the same thing to them; such only
has been their "experience."—Artists have here perhaps a finer intuition;
they who know only too well that precisely when they no longer do
anything "arbitrarily," and everything of necessity, their feeling of freedom,
of subtlety, of power, of creatively fixing, disposing, and shaping, reaches
its climax—in short, that necessity and "freedom of will" are then the same
thing with them. There is, in fine, a gradation of rank in psychical states, to
which the gradation of rank in the problems corresponds; and the highest
problems repel ruthlessly every one who ventures too near them, without

being predestined for their solution by the loftiness and power of his
spirituality. Of what use is it for nimble, everyday intellects, or clumsy,
honest mechanics and empiricists to press, in their plebeian ambition, close
to such problems, and as it were into this "holy of holies"—as so often
happens nowadays! But coarse feet must never tread upon such carpets: this
is provided for in the primary law of things; the doors remain closed to
those intruders, though they may dash and break their heads thereon. People
have always to be born to a high station, or, more definitely, they have to be
BRED for it: a person has only a right to philosophy—taking the word in its
higher significance—in virtue of his descent; the ancestors, the "blood,"
decide here also. Many generations must have prepared the way for the
coming of the philosopher; each of his virtues must have been separately
acquired, nurtured, transmitted, and embodied; not only the bold, easy,
delicate course and current of his thoughts, but above all the readiness for
great responsibilities, the majesty of ruling glance and contemning look, the
feeling of separation from the multitude with their duties and virtues, the
kindly patronage and defense of whatever is misunderstood and
calumniated, be it God or devil, the delight and practice of supreme justice,
the art of commanding, the amplitude of will, the lingering eye which rarely
admires, rarely looks up, rarely loves....

CHAPTER VII. OUR VIRTUES
214. OUR Virtues?—It is probable that we, too, have still our virtues,
although naturally they are not those sincere and massive virtues on account
of which we hold our grandfathers in esteem and also at a little distance
from us. We Europeans of the day after tomorrow, we firstlings of the
twentieth century—with all our dangerous curiosity, our multifariousness
and art of disguising, our mellow and seemingly sweetened cruelty in sense
and spirit—we shall presumably, IF we must have virtues, have those only
which have come to agreement with our most secret and heartfelt
inclinations, with our most ardent requirements: well, then, let us look for
them in our labyrinths!—where, as we know, so many things lose
themselves, so many things get quite lost! And is there anything finer than
to SEARCH for one's own virtues? Is it not almost to BELIEVE in one's
own virtues? But this "believing in one's own virtues"—is it not practically
the same as what was formerly called one's "good conscience," that long,
respectable pigtail of an idea, which our grandfathers used to hang behind
their heads, and often enough also behind their understandings? It seems,
therefore, that however little we may imagine ourselves to be old-fashioned
and grandfatherly respectable in other respects, in one thing we are
nevertheless the worthy grandchildren of our grandfathers, we last
Europeans with good consciences: we also still wear their pigtail.—Ah! if
you only knew how soon, so very soon—it will be different!
215. As in the stellar firmament there are sometimes two suns which
determine the path of one planet, and in certain cases suns of different
colours shine around a single planet, now with red light, now with green,
and then simultaneously illumine and flood it with motley colours: so we
modern men, owing to the complicated mechanism of our "firmament," are
determined by DIFFERENT moralities; our actions shine alternately in
different colours, and are seldom unequivocal—and there are often cases,
also, in which our actions are MOTLEY-COLOURED.
216. To love one's enemies? I think that has been well learnt: it takes
place thousands of times at present on a large and small scale; indeed, at
times the higher and sublimer thing takes place:—we learn to DESPISE

when we love, and precisely when we love best; all of it, however,
unconsciously, without noise, without ostentation, with the shame and
secrecy of goodness, which forbids the utterance of the pompous word and
the formula of virtue. Morality as attitude—is opposed to our taste
nowadays. This is ALSO an advance, as it was an advance in our fathers
that religion as an attitude finally became opposed to their taste, including
the enmity and Voltairean bitterness against religion (and all that formerly
belonged to freethinker-pantomime). It is the music in our conscience, the
dance in our spirit, to which Puritan litanies, moral sermons, and goodygoodness won't chime.
217. Let us be careful in dealing with those who attach great importance
to being credited with moral tact and subtlety in moral discernment! They
never forgive us if they have once made a mistake BEFORE us (or even
with REGARD to us)—they inevitably become our instinctive calumniators
and detractors, even when they still remain our "friends."—Blessed are the
forgetful: for they "get the better" even of their blunders.
218. The psychologists of France—and where else are there still
psychologists nowadays?—have never yet exhausted their bitter and
manifold enjoyment of the betise bourgeoise, just as though... in short, they
betray something thereby. Flaubert, for instance, the honest citizen of
Rouen, neither saw, heard, nor tasted anything else in the end; it was his
mode of self-torment and refined cruelty. As this is growing wearisome, I
would now recommend for a change something else for a pleasure—
namely, the unconscious astuteness with which good, fat, honest mediocrity
always behaves towards loftier spirits and the tasks they have to perform,
the subtle, barbed, Jesuitical astuteness, which is a thousand times subtler
than the taste and understanding of the middle-class in its best moments—
subtler even than the understanding of its victims:—a repeated proof that
"instinct" is the most intelligent of all kinds of intelligence which have
hitherto been discovered. In short, you psychologists, study the philosophy
of the "rule" in its struggle with the "exception": there you have a spectacle
fit for Gods and godlike malignity! Or, in plainer words, practise
vivisection on "good people," on the "homo bonae voluntatis," ON
YOURSELVES!
219. The practice of judging and condemning morally, is the favourite
revenge of the intellectually shallow on those who are less so, it is also a

kind of indemnity for their being badly endowed by nature, and finally, it is
an opportunity for acquiring spirit and BECOMING subtle—malice
spiritualises. They are glad in their inmost heart that there is a standard
according to which those who are over-endowed with intellectual goods and
privileges, are equal to them, they contend for the "equality of all before
God," and almost NEED the belief in God for this purpose. It is among
them that the most powerful antagonists of atheism are found. If any one
were to say to them "A lofty spirituality is beyond all comparison with the
honesty and respectability of a merely moral man"—it would make them
furious, I shall take care not to say so. I would rather flatter them with my
theory that lofty spirituality itself exists only as the ultimate product of
moral qualities, that it is a synthesis of all qualities attributed to the "merely
moral" man, after they have been acquired singly through long training and
practice, perhaps during a whole series of generations, that lofty spirituality
is precisely the spiritualising of justice, and the beneficent severity which
knows that it is authorized to maintain GRADATIONS OF RANK in the
world, even among things—and not only among men.
220. Now that the praise of the "disinterested person" is so popular one
must—probably not without some danger—get an idea of WHAT people
actually take an interest in, and what are the things generally which
fundamentally and profoundly concern ordinary men—including the
cultured, even the learned, and perhaps philosophers also, if appearances do
not deceive. The fact thereby becomes obvious that the greater part of what
interests and charms higher natures, and more refined and fastidious tastes,
seems absolutely "uninteresting" to the average man—if, notwithstanding,
he perceive devotion to these interests, he calls it desinteresse, and wonders
how it is possible to act "disinterestedly." There have been philosophers
who could give this popular astonishment a seductive and mystical, otherworldly expression (perhaps because they did not know the higher nature by
experience?), instead of stating the naked and candidly reasonable truth that
"disinterested" action is very interesting and "interested" action, provided
that... "And love?"—What! Even an action for love's sake shall be
"unegoistic"? But you fools—! "And the praise of the self-sacrificer?"—But
whoever has really offered sacrifice knows that he wanted and obtained
something for it—perhaps something from himself for something from
himself; that he relinquished here in order to have more there, perhaps in
general to be more, or even feel himself "more." But this is a realm of

questions and answers in which a more fastidious spirit does not like to
stay: for here truth has to stifle her yawns so much when she is obliged to
answer. And after all, truth is a woman; one must not use force with her.
221. "It sometimes happens," said a moralistic pedant and trifle-retailer,
"that I honour and respect an unselfish man: not, however, because he is
unselfish, but because I think he has a right to be useful to another man at
his own expense. In short, the question is always who HE is, and who THE
OTHER is. For instance, in a person created and destined for command,
self-denial and modest retirement, instead of being virtues, would be the
waste of virtues: so it seems to me. Every system of unegoistic morality
which takes itself unconditionally and appeals to every one, not only sins
against good taste, but is also an incentive to sins of omission, an
ADDITIONAL seduction under the mask of philanthropy—and precisely a
seduction and injury to the higher, rarer, and more privileged types of men.
Moral systems must be compelled first of all to bow before the
GRADATIONS OF RANK; their presumption must be driven home to their
conscience—until they thoroughly understand at last that it is IMMORAL
to say that 'what is right for one is proper for another.'"—So said my
moralistic pedant and bonhomme. Did he perhaps deserve to be laughed at
when he thus exhorted systems of morals to practise morality? But one
should not be too much in the right if one wishes to have the laughers on
ONE'S OWN side; a grain of wrong pertains even to good taste.
222. Wherever sympathy (fellow-suffering) is preached nowadays—and,
if I gather rightly, no other religion is any longer preached—let the
psychologist have his ears open through all the vanity, through all the noise
which is natural to these preachers (as to all preachers), he will hear a
hoarse, groaning, genuine note of SELF-CONTEMPT. It belongs to the
overshadowing and uglifying of Europe, which has been on the increase for
a century (the first symptoms of which are already specified documentarily
in a thoughtful letter of Galiani to Madame d'Epinay)—IF IT IS NOT
REALLY THE CAUSE THEREOF! The man of "modern ideas," the
conceited ape, is excessively dissatisfied with himself—this is perfectly
certain. He suffers, and his vanity wants him only "to suffer with his
fellows."
223. The hybrid European—a tolerably ugly plebeian, taken all in all—
absolutely requires a costume: he needs history as a storeroom of costumes.

To be sure, he notices that none of the costumes fit him properly—he
changes and changes. Let us look at the nineteenth century with respect to
these hasty preferences and changes in its masquerades of style, and also
with respect to its moments of desperation on account of "nothing suiting"
us. It is in vain to get ourselves up as romantic, or classical, or Christian, or
Florentine, or barocco, or "national," in moribus et artibus: it does not
"clothe us"! But the "spirit," especially the "historical spirit," profits even
by this desperation: once and again a new sample of the past or of the
foreign is tested, put on, taken off, packed up, and above all studied—we
are the first studious age in puncto of "costumes," I mean as concerns
morals, articles of belief, artistic tastes, and religions; we are prepared as no
other age has ever been for a carnival in the grand style, for the most
spiritual festival—laughter and arrogance, for the transcendental height of
supreme folly and Aristophanic ridicule of the world. Perhaps we are still
discovering the domain of our invention just here, the domain where even
we can still be original, probably as parodists of the world's history and as
God's Merry-Andrews,—perhaps, though nothing else of the present have a
future, our laughter itself may have a future!
224. The historical sense (or the capacity for divining quickly the order
of rank of the valuations according to which a people, a community, or an
individual has lived, the "divining instinct" for the relationships of these
valuations, for the relation of the authority of the valuations to the authority
of the operating forces),—this historical sense, which we Europeans claim
as our specialty, has come to us in the train of the enchanting and mad semibarbarity into which Europe has been plunged by the democratic mingling
of classes and races—it is only the nineteenth century that has recognized
this faculty as its sixth sense. Owing to this mingling, the past of every form
and mode of life, and of cultures which were formerly closely contiguous
and superimposed on one another, flows forth into us "modern souls"; our
instincts now run back in all directions, we ourselves are a kind of chaos: in
the end, as we have said, the spirit perceives its advantage therein. By
means of our semi-barbarity in body and in desire, we have secret access
everywhere, such as a noble age never had; we have access above all to the
labyrinth of imperfect civilizations, and to every form of semi-barbarity that
has at any time existed on earth; and in so far as the most considerable part
of human civilization hitherto has just been semi-barbarity, the "historical
sense" implies almost the sense and instinct for everything, the taste and

tongue for everything: whereby it immediately proves itself to be an
IGNOBLE sense. For instance, we enjoy Homer once more: it is perhaps
our happiest acquisition that we know how to appreciate Homer, whom men
of distinguished culture (as the French of the seventeenth century, like
Saint-Evremond, who reproached him for his ESPRIT VASTE, and even
Voltaire, the last echo of the century) cannot and could not so easily
appropriate—whom they scarcely permitted themselves to enjoy. The very
decided Yea and Nay of their palate, their promptly ready disgust, their
hesitating reluctance with regard to everything strange, their horror of the
bad taste even of lively curiosity, and in general the averseness of every
distinguished and self-sufficing culture to avow a new desire, a
dissatisfaction with its own condition, or an admiration of what is strange:
all this determines and disposes them unfavourably even towards the best
things of the world which are not their property or could not become their
prey—and no faculty is more unintelligible to such men than just this
historical sense, with its truckling, plebeian curiosity. The case is not
different with Shakespeare, that marvelous Spanish-Moorish-Saxon
synthesis of taste, over whom an ancient Athenian of the circle of
AEschylus would have half-killed himself with laughter or irritation: but we
—accept precisely this wild motleyness, this medley of the most delicate,
the most coarse, and the most artificial, with a secret confidence and
cordiality; we enjoy it as a refinement of art reserved expressly for us, and
allow ourselves to be as little disturbed by the repulsive fumes and the
proximity of the English populace in which Shakespeare's art and taste
lives, as perhaps on the Chiaja of Naples, where, with all our senses awake,
we go our way, enchanted and voluntarily, in spite of the drain-odour of the
lower quarters of the town. That as men of the "historical sense" we have
our virtues, is not to be disputed:—we are unpretentious, unselfish, modest,
brave, habituated to self-control and self-renunciation, very grateful, very
patient, very complaisant—but with all this we are perhaps not very
"tasteful." Let us finally confess it, that what is most difficult for us men of
the "historical sense" to grasp, feel, taste, and love, what finds us
fundamentally prejudiced and almost hostile, is precisely the perfection and
ultimate maturity in every culture and art, the essentially noble in works and
men, their moment of smooth sea and halcyon self-sufficiency, the
goldenness and coldness which all things show that have perfected
themselves. Perhaps our great virtue of the historical sense is in necessary

contrast to GOOD taste, at least to the very bad taste; and we can only
evoke in ourselves imperfectly, hesitatingly, and with compulsion the small,
short, and happy godsends and glorifications of human life as they shine
here and there: those moments and marvelous experiences when a great
power has voluntarily come to a halt before the boundless and infinite,—
when a super-abundance of refined delight has been enjoyed by a sudden
checking and petrifying, by standing firmly and planting oneself fixedly on
still trembling ground. PROPORTIONATENESS is strange to us, let us
confess it to ourselves; our itching is really the itching for the infinite, the
immeasurable. Like the rider on his forward panting horse, we let the reins
fall before the infinite, we modern men, we semi-barbarians—and are only
in OUR highest bliss when we—ARE IN MOST DANGER.
225. Whether it be hedonism, pessimism, utilitarianism, or eudaemonism,
all those modes of thinking which measure the worth of things according to
PLEASURE and PAIN, that is, according to accompanying circumstances
and secondary considerations, are plausible modes of thought and naivetes,
which every one conscious of CREATIVE powers and an artist's conscience
will look down upon with scorn, though not without sympathy. Sympathy
for you!—to be sure, that is not sympathy as you understand it: it is not
sympathy for social "distress," for "society" with its sick and misfortuned,
for the hereditarily vicious and defective who lie on the ground around us;
still less is it sympathy for the grumbling, vexed, revolutionary slaveclasses who strive after power—they call it "freedom." OUR sympathy is a
loftier and further-sighted sympathy:—we see how MAN dwarfs himself,
how YOU dwarf him! and there are moments when we view YOUR
sympathy with an indescribable anguish, when we resist it,—when we
regard your seriousness as more dangerous than any kind of levity. You
want, if possible—and there is not a more foolish "if possible"—TO DO
AWAY WITH SUFFERING; and we?—it really seems that WE would
rather have it increased and made worse than it has ever been! Well-being,
as you understand it—is certainly not a goal; it seems to us an END; a
condition which at once renders man ludicrous and contemptible—and
makes his destruction DESIRABLE! The discipline of suffering, of GREAT
suffering—know ye not that it is only THIS discipline that has produced all
the elevations of humanity hitherto? The tension of soul in misfortune
which communicates to it its energy, its shuddering in view of rack and
ruin, its inventiveness and bravery in undergoing, enduring, interpreting,

and exploiting misfortune, and whatever depth, mystery, disguise, spirit,
artifice, or greatness has been bestowed upon the soul—has it not been
bestowed through suffering, through the discipline of great suffering? In
man CREATURE and CREATOR are united: in man there is not only
matter, shred, excess, clay, mire, folly, chaos; but there is also the creator,
the sculptor, the hardness of the hammer, the divinity of the spectator, and
the seventh day—do ye understand this contrast? And that YOUR
sympathy for the "creature in man" applies to that which has to be
fashioned, bruised, forged, stretched, roasted, annealed, refined—to that
which must necessarily SUFFER, and IS MEANT to suffer? And our
sympathy—do ye not understand what our REVERSE sympathy applies to,
when it resists your sympathy as the worst of all pampering and enervation?
—So it is sympathy AGAINST sympathy!—But to repeat it once more,
there are higher problems than the problems of pleasure and pain and
sympathy; and all systems of philosophy which deal only with these are
naivetes.
226. WE IMMORALISTS.—This world with which WE are concerned,
in which we have to fear and love, this almost invisible, inaudible world of
delicate command and delicate obedience, a world of "almost" in every
respect, captious, insidious, sharp, and tender—yes, it is well protected
from clumsy spectators and familiar curiosity! We are woven into a strong
net and garment of duties, and CANNOT disengage ourselves—precisely
here, we are "men of duty," even we! Occasionally, it is true, we dance in
our "chains" and betwixt our "swords"; it is none the less true that more
often we gnash our teeth under the circumstances, and are impatient at the
secret hardship of our lot. But do what we will, fools and appearances say
of us: "These are men WITHOUT duty,"—we have always fools and
appearances against us!
227. Honesty, granting that it is the virtue of which we cannot rid
ourselves, we free spirits—well, we will labour at it with all our perversity
and love, and not tire of "perfecting" ourselves in OUR virtue, which alone
remains: may its glance some day overspread like a gilded, blue, mocking
twilight this aging civilization with its dull gloomy seriousness! And if,
nevertheless, our honesty should one day grow weary, and sigh, and stretch
its limbs, and find us too hard, and would fain have it pleasanter, easier, and
gentler, like an agreeable vice, let us remain HARD, we latest Stoics, and
let us send to its help whatever devilry we have in us:—our disgust at the

clumsy and undefined, our "NITIMUR IN VETITUM," our love of
adventure, our sharpened and fastidious curiosity, our most subtle,
disguised, intellectual Will to Power and universal conquest, which rambles
and roves avidiously around all the realms of the future—let us go with all
our "devils" to the help of our "God"! It is probable that people will
misunderstand and mistake us on that account: what does it matter! They
will say: "Their 'honesty'—that is their devilry, and nothing else!" What
does it matter! And even if they were right—have not all Gods hitherto
been such sanctified, re-baptized devils? And after all, what do we know of
ourselves? And what the spirit that leads us wants TO BE CALLED? (It is a
question of names.) And how many spirits we harbour? Our honesty, we
free spirits—let us be careful lest it become our vanity, our ornament and
ostentation, our limitation, our stupidity! Every virtue inclines to stupidity,
every stupidity to virtue; "stupid to the point of sanctity," they say in
Russia,—let us be careful lest out of pure honesty we eventually become
saints and bores! Is not life a hundred times too short for us—to bore
ourselves? One would have to believe in eternal life in order to...
228. I hope to be forgiven for discovering that all moral philosophy
hitherto has been tedious and has belonged to the soporific appliances—and
that "virtue," in my opinion, has been MORE injured by the
TEDIOUSNESS of its advocates than by anything else; at the same time,
however, I would not wish to overlook their general usefulness. It is
desirable that as few people as possible should reflect upon morals, and
consequently it is very desirable that morals should not some day become
interesting! But let us not be afraid! Things still remain today as they have
always been: I see no one in Europe who has (or DISCLOSES) an idea of
the fact that philosophizing concerning morals might be conducted in a
dangerous, captious, and ensnaring manner—that CALAMITY might be
involved therein. Observe, for example, the indefatigable, inevitable
English utilitarians: how ponderously and respectably they stalk on, stalk
along (a Homeric metaphor expresses it better) in the footsteps of Bentham,
just as he had already stalked in the footsteps of the respectable Helvetius!
(no, he was not a dangerous man, Helvetius, CE SENATEUR
POCOCURANTE, to use an expression of Galiani). No new thought,
nothing of the nature of a finer turning or better expression of an old
thought, not even a proper history of what has been previously thought on
the subject: an IMPOSSIBLE literature, taking it all in all, unless one

knows how to leaven it with some mischief. In effect, the old English vice
called CANT, which is MORAL TARTUFFISM, has insinuated itself also
into these moralists (whom one must certainly read with an eye to their
motives if one MUST read them), concealed this time under the new form
of the scientific spirit; moreover, there is not absent from them a secret
struggle with the pangs of conscience, from which a race of former Puritans
must naturally suffer, in all their scientific tinkering with morals. (Is not a
moralist the opposite of a Puritan? That is to say, as a thinker who regards
morality as questionable, as worthy of interrogation, in short, as a problem?
Is moralizing not-immoral?) In the end, they all want English morality to be
recognized as authoritative, inasmuch as mankind, or the "general utility,"
or "the happiness of the greatest number,"—no! the happiness of
ENGLAND, will be best served thereby. They would like, by all means, to
convince themselves that the striving after English happiness, I mean after
COMFORT and FASHION (and in the highest instance, a seat in
Parliament), is at the same time the true path of virtue; in fact, that in so far
as there has been virtue in the world hitherto, it has just consisted in such
striving. Not one of those ponderous, conscience-stricken herding-animals
(who undertake to advocate the cause of egoism as conducive to the general
welfare) wants to have any knowledge or inkling of the facts that the
"general welfare" is no ideal, no goal, no notion that can be at all grasped,
but is only a nostrum,—that what is fair to one MAY NOT at all be fair to
another, that the requirement of one morality for all is really a detriment to
higher men, in short, that there is a DISTINCTION OF RANK between
man and man, and consequently between morality and morality. They are
an unassuming and fundamentally mediocre species of men, these
utilitarian Englishmen, and, as already remarked, in so far as they are
tedious, one cannot think highly enough of their utility. One ought even to
ENCOURAGE them, as has been partially attempted in the following
rhymes:—

Hail, ye worthies, barrow-wheeling,
"Longer—better," aye revealing,
Stiffer aye in head and knee;
Unenraptured, never jesting,
Mediocre everlasting,
SANS GENIE ET SANS ESPRIT!

229. In these later ages, which may be proud of their humanity, there still
remains so much fear, so much SUPERSTITION of the fear, of the "cruel
wild beast," the mastering of which constitutes the very pride of these
humaner ages—that even obvious truths, as if by the agreement of
centuries, have long remained unuttered, because they have the appearance
of helping the finally slain wild beast back to life again. I perhaps risk
something when I allow such a truth to escape; let others capture it again
and give it so much "milk of pious sentiment" [FOOTNOTE: An expression
from Schiller's William Tell, Act IV, Scene 3.] to drink, that it will lie down
quiet and forgotten, in its old corner.—One ought to learn anew about
cruelty, and open one's eyes; one ought at last to learn impatience, in order
that such immodest gross errors—as, for instance, have been fostered by
ancient and modern philosophers with regard to tragedy—may no longer
wander about virtuously and boldly. Almost everything that we call "higher
culture" is based upon the spiritualising and intensifying of CRUELTY—
this is my thesis; the "wild beast" has not been slain at all, it lives, it
flourishes, it has only been—transfigured. That which constitutes the
painful delight of tragedy is cruelty; that which operates agreeably in socalled tragic sympathy, and at the basis even of everything sublime, up to
the highest and most delicate thrills of metaphysics, obtains its sweetness
solely from the intermingled ingredient of cruelty. What the Roman enjoys
in the arena, the Christian in the ecstasies of the cross, the Spaniard at the
sight of the faggot and stake, or of the bull-fight, the present-day Japanese
who presses his way to the tragedy, the workman of the Parisian suburbs
who has a homesickness for bloody revolutions, the Wagnerienne who, with
unhinged will, "undergoes" the performance of "Tristan and Isolde"—what
all these enjoy, and strive with mysterious ardour to drink in, is the philtre
of the great Circe "cruelty." Here, to be sure, we must put aside entirely the
blundering psychology of former times, which could only teach with regard
to cruelty that it originated at the sight of the suffering of OTHERS: there is
an abundant, super-abundant enjoyment even in one's own suffering, in
causing one's own suffering—and wherever man has allowed himself to be

persuaded to self-denial in the RELIGIOUS sense, or to self-mutilation, as
among the Phoenicians and ascetics, or in general, to desensualisation,
decarnalisation, and contrition, to Puritanical repentance-spasms, to
vivisection of conscience and to Pascal-like SACRIFIZIA DELL'
INTELLETO, he is secretly allured and impelled forwards by his cruelty,
by the dangerous thrill of cruelty TOWARDS HIMSELF.—Finally, let us
consider that even the seeker of knowledge operates as an artist and
glorifier of cruelty, in that he compels his spirit to perceive AGAINST its
own inclination, and often enough against the wishes of his heart:—he
forces it to say Nay, where he would like to affirm, love, and adore; indeed,
every instance of taking a thing profoundly and fundamentally, is a
violation, an intentional injuring of the fundamental will of the spirit, which
instinctively aims at appearance and superficiality,—even in every desire
for knowledge there is a drop of cruelty.
230. Perhaps what I have said here about a "fundamental will of the
spirit" may not be understood without further details; I may be allowed a
word of explanation.—That imperious something which is popularly called
"the spirit," wishes to be master internally and externally, and to feel itself
master; it has the will of a multiplicity for a simplicity, a binding, taming,
imperious, and essentially ruling will. Its requirements and capacities here,
are the same as those assigned by physiologists to everything that lives,
grows, and multiplies. The power of the spirit to appropriate foreign
elements reveals itself in a strong tendency to assimilate the new to the old,
to simplify the manifold, to overlook or repudiate the absolutely
contradictory; just as it arbitrarily re-underlines, makes prominent, and
falsifies for itself certain traits and lines in the foreign elements, in every
portion of the "outside world." Its object thereby is the incorporation of new
"experiences," the assortment of new things in the old arrangements—in
short, growth; or more properly, the FEELING of growth, the feeling of
increased power—is its object. This same will has at its service an
apparently opposed impulse of the spirit, a suddenly adopted preference of
ignorance, of arbitrary shutting out, a closing of windows, an inner denial of
this or that, a prohibition to approach, a sort of defensive attitude against
much that is knowable, a contentment with obscurity, with the shutting-in
horizon, an acceptance and approval of ignorance: as that which is all
necessary according to the degree of its appropriating power, its "digestive
power," to speak figuratively (and in fact "the spirit" resembles a stomach

more than anything else). Here also belong an occasional propensity of the
spirit to let itself be deceived (perhaps with a waggish suspicion that it is
NOT so and so, but is only allowed to pass as such), a delight in uncertainty
and ambiguity, an exulting enjoyment of arbitrary, out-of-the-way
narrowness and mystery, of the too-near, of the foreground, of the
magnified, the diminished, the misshapen, the beautified—an enjoyment of
the arbitrariness of all these manifestations of power. Finally, in this
connection, there is the not unscrupulous readiness of the spirit to deceive
other spirits and dissemble before them—the constant pressing and
straining of a creating, shaping, changeable power: the spirit enjoys therein
its craftiness and its variety of disguises, it enjoys also its feeling of security
therein—it is precisely by its Protean arts that it is best protected and
concealed!—COUNTER TO this propensity for appearance, for
simplification, for a disguise, for a cloak, in short, for an outside—for every
outside is a cloak—there operates the sublime tendency of the man of
knowledge, which takes, and INSISTS on taking things profoundly,
variously, and thoroughly; as a kind of cruelty of the intellectual conscience
and taste, which every courageous thinker will acknowledge in himself,
provided, as it ought to be, that he has sharpened and hardened his eye
sufficiently long for introspection, and is accustomed to severe discipline
and even severe words. He will say: "There is something cruel in the
tendency of my spirit": let the virtuous and amiable try to convince him that
it is not so! In fact, it would sound nicer, if, instead of our cruelty, perhaps
our "extravagant honesty" were talked about, whispered about, and glorified
—we free, VERY free spirits—and some day perhaps SUCH will actually
be our—posthumous glory! Meanwhile—for there is plenty of time until
then—we should be least inclined to deck ourselves out in such florid and
fringed moral verbiage; our whole former work has just made us sick of this
taste and its sprightly exuberance. They are beautiful, glistening, jingling,
festive words: honesty, love of truth, love of wisdom, sacrifice for
knowledge, heroism of the truthful—there is something in them that makes
one's heart swell with pride. But we anchorites and marmots have long ago
persuaded ourselves in all the secrecy of an anchorite's conscience, that this
worthy parade of verbiage also belongs to the old false adornment, frippery,
and gold-dust of unconscious human vanity, and that even under such
flattering colour and repainting, the terrible original text HOMO NATURA
must again be recognized. In effect, to translate man back again into nature;

to master the many vain and visionary interpretations and subordinate
meanings which have hitherto been scratched and daubed over the eternal
original text, HOMO NATURA; to bring it about that man shall henceforth
stand before man as he now, hardened by the discipline of science, stands
before the OTHER forms of nature, with fearless Oedipus-eyes, and
stopped Ulysses-ears, deaf to the enticements of old metaphysical birdcatchers, who have piped to him far too long: "Thou art more! thou art
higher! thou hast a different origin!"—this may be a strange and foolish
task, but that it is a TASK, who can deny! Why did we choose it, this
foolish task? Or, to put the question differently: "Why knowledge at all?"
Every one will ask us about this. And thus pressed, we, who have asked
ourselves the question a hundred times, have not found and cannot find any
better answer....
231. Learning alters us, it does what all nourishment does that does not
merely "conserve"—as the physiologist knows. But at the bottom of our
souls, quite "down below," there is certainly something unteachable, a
granite of spiritual fate, of predetermined decision and answer to
predetermined, chosen questions. In each cardinal problem there speaks an
unchangeable "I am this"; a thinker cannot learn anew about man and
woman, for instance, but can only learn fully—he can only follow to the
end what is "fixed" about them in himself. Occasionally we find certain
solutions of problems which make strong beliefs for us; perhaps they are
henceforth called "convictions." Later on—one sees in them only footsteps
to self-knowledge, guide-posts to the problem which we ourselves ARE—
or more correctly to the great stupidity which we embody, our spiritual fate,
the UNTEACHABLE in us, quite "down below."—In view of this liberal
compliment which I have just paid myself, permission will perhaps be more
readily allowed me to utter some truths about "woman as she is," provided
that it is known at the outset how literally they are merely—MY truths.
232. Woman wishes to be independent, and therefore she begins to
enlighten men about "woman as she is"—THIS is one of the worst
developments of the general UGLIFYING of Europe. For what must these
clumsy attempts of feminine scientificality and self-exposure bring to light!
Woman has so much cause for shame; in woman there is so much pedantry,
superficiality, schoolmasterliness, petty presumption, unbridledness, and
indiscretion concealed—study only woman's behaviour towards children!—
which has really been best restrained and dominated hitherto by the FEAR

of man. Alas, if ever the "eternally tedious in woman"—she has plenty of it!
—is allowed to venture forth! if she begins radically and on principle to
unlearn her wisdom and art-of charming, of playing, of frightening away
sorrow, of alleviating and taking easily; if she forgets her delicate aptitude
for agreeable desires! Female voices are already raised, which, by Saint
Aristophanes! make one afraid:—with medical explicitness it is stated in a
threatening manner what woman first and last REQUIRES from man. Is it
not in the very worst taste that woman thus sets herself up to be scientific?
Enlightenment hitherto has fortunately been men's affair, men's gift—we
remained therewith "among ourselves"; and in the end, in view of all that
women write about "woman," we may well have considerable doubt as to
whether woman really DESIRES enlightenment about herself—and CAN
desire it. If woman does not thereby seek a new ORNAMENT for herself—
I believe ornamentation belongs to the eternally feminine?—why, then, she
wishes to make herself feared: perhaps she thereby wishes to get the
mastery. But she does not want truth—what does woman care for truth?
From the very first, nothing is more foreign, more repugnant, or more
hostile to woman than truth—her great art is falsehood, her chief concern is
appearance and beauty. Let us confess it, we men: we honour and love this
very art and this very instinct in woman: we who have the hard task, and for
our recreation gladly seek the company of beings under whose hands,
glances, and delicate follies, our seriousness, our gravity, and profundity
appear almost like follies to us. Finally, I ask the question: Did a woman
herself ever acknowledge profundity in a woman's mind, or justice in a
woman's heart? And is it not true that on the whole "woman" has hitherto
been most despised by woman herself, and not at all by us?—We men
desire that woman should not continue to compromise herself by
enlightening us; just as it was man's care and the consideration for woman,
when the church decreed: mulier taceat in ecclesia. It was to the benefit of
woman when Napoleon gave the too eloquent Madame de Stael to
understand: mulier taceat in politicis!—and in my opinion, he is a true
friend of woman who calls out to women today: mulier taceat de mulierel.
233. It betrays corruption of the instincts—apart from the fact that it
betrays bad taste—when a woman refers to Madame Roland, or Madame de
Stael, or Monsieur George Sand, as though something were proved thereby
in favour of "woman as she is." Among men, these are the three comical

women as they are—nothing more!—and just the best involuntary counterarguments against feminine emancipation and autonomy.
234. Stupidity in the kitchen; woman as cook; the terrible thoughtlessness
with which the feeding of the family and the master of the house is
managed! Woman does not understand what food means, and she insists on
being cook! If woman had been a thinking creature, she should certainly, as
cook for thousands of years, have discovered the most important
physiological facts, and should likewise have got possession of the healing
art! Through bad female cooks—through the entire lack of reason in the
kitchen—the development of mankind has been longest retarded and most
interfered with: even today matters are very little better. A word to High
School girls.
235. There are turns and casts of fancy, there are sentences, little handfuls
of words, in which a whole culture, a whole society suddenly crystallises
itself. Among these is the incidental remark of Madame de Lambert to her
son: "MON AMI, NE VOUS PERMETTEZ JAMAIS QUE DES FOLIES,
QUI VOUS FERONT GRAND PLAISIR"—the motherliest and wisest
remark, by the way, that was ever addressed to a son.
236. I have no doubt that every noble woman will oppose what Dante
and Goethe believed about woman—the former when he sang, "ELLA
GUARDAVA SUSO, ED IO IN LEI," and the latter when he interpreted it,
"the eternally feminine draws us ALOFT"; for THIS is just what she
believes of the eternally masculine.
237. SEVEN APOPHTHEGMS FOR WOMEN
How the longest ennui flees, When a man comes to our knees!
Age, alas! and science staid, Furnish even weak virtue aid.
Sombre garb and silence meet: Dress for every dame—discreet.
Whom I thank when in my bliss? God!—and my good tailoress!
Young, a flower-decked cavern home; Old, a dragon thence doth roam.
Noble title, leg that's fine, Man as well: Oh, were HE mine!
Speech in brief and sense in mass—Slippery for the jenny-ass!
237A. Woman has hitherto been treated by men like birds, which, losing
their way, have come down among them from an elevation: as something

delicate, fragile, wild, strange, sweet, and animating—but as something also
which must be cooped up to prevent it flying away.
238. To be mistaken in the fundamental problem of "man and woman," to
deny here the profoundest antagonism and the necessity for an eternally
hostile tension, to dream here perhaps of equal rights, equal training, equal
claims and obligations: that is a TYPICAL sign of shallow-mindedness; and
a thinker who has proved himself shallow at this dangerous spot—shallow
in instinct!—may generally be regarded as suspicious, nay more, as
betrayed, as discovered; he will probably prove too "short" for all
fundamental questions of life, future as well as present, and will be unable
to descend into ANY of the depths. On the other hand, a man who has depth
of spirit as well as of desires, and has also the depth of benevolence which
is capable of severity and harshness, and easily confounded with them, can
only think of woman as ORIENTALS do: he must conceive of her as a
possession, as confinable property, as a being predestined for service and
accomplishing her mission therein—he must take his stand in this matter
upon the immense rationality of Asia, upon the superiority of the instinct of
Asia, as the Greeks did formerly; those best heirs and scholars of Asia—
who, as is well known, with their INCREASING culture and amplitude of
power, from Homer to the time of Pericles, became gradually STRICTER
towards woman, in short, more Oriental. HOW necessary, HOW logical,
even HOW humanely desirable this was, let us consider for ourselves!
239. The weaker sex has in no previous age been treated with so much
respect by men as at present—this belongs to the tendency and fundamental
taste of democracy, in the same way as disrespectfulness to old age—what
wonder is it that abuse should be immediately made of this respect? They
want more, they learn to make claims, the tribute of respect is at last felt to
be well-nigh galling; rivalry for rights, indeed actual strife itself, would be
preferred: in a word, woman is losing modesty. And let us immediately add
that she is also losing taste. She is unlearning to FEAR man: but the woman
who "unlearns to fear" sacrifices her most womanly instincts. That woman
should venture forward when the fear-inspiring quality in man—or more
definitely, the MAN in man—is no longer either desired or fully developed,
is reasonable enough and also intelligible enough; what is more difficult to
understand is that precisely thereby—woman deteriorates. This is what is
happening nowadays: let us not deceive ourselves about it! Wherever the
industrial spirit has triumphed over the military and aristocratic spirit,

woman strives for the economic and legal independence of a clerk: "woman
as clerkess" is inscribed on the portal of the modern society which is in
course of formation. While she thus appropriates new rights, aspires to be
"master," and inscribes "progress" of woman on her flags and banners, the
very opposite realises itself with terrible obviousness: WOMAN
RETROGRADES. Since the French Revolution the influence of woman in
Europe has DECLINED in proportion as she has increased her rights and
claims; and the "emancipation of woman," insofar as it is desired and
demanded by women themselves (and not only by masculine shallowpates), thus proves to be a remarkable symptom of the increased weakening
and deadening of the most womanly instincts. There is STUPIDITY in this
movement, an almost masculine stupidity, of which a well-reared woman—
who is always a sensible woman—might be heartily ashamed. To lose the
intuition as to the ground upon which she can most surely achieve victory;
to neglect exercise in the use of her proper weapons; to let-herself-go before
man, perhaps even "to the book," where formerly she kept herself in control
and in refined, artful humility; to neutralize with her virtuous audacity
man's faith in a VEILED, fundamentally different ideal in woman,
something eternally, necessarily feminine; to emphatically and loquaciously
dissuade man from the idea that woman must be preserved, cared for,
protected, and indulged, like some delicate, strangely wild, and often
pleasant domestic animal; the clumsy and indignant collection of everything
of the nature of servitude and bondage which the position of woman in the
hitherto existing order of society has entailed and still entails (as though
slavery were a counter-argument, and not rather a condition of every higher
culture, of every elevation of culture):—what does all this betoken, if not a
disintegration of womanly instincts, a defeminising? Certainly, there are
enough of idiotic friends and corrupters of woman among the learned asses
of the masculine sex, who advise woman to defeminize herself in this
manner, and to imitate all the stupidities from which "man" in Europe,
European "manliness," suffers,—who would like to lower woman to
"general culture," indeed even to newspaper reading and meddling with
politics. Here and there they wish even to make women into free spirits and
literary workers: as though a woman without piety would not be something
perfectly obnoxious or ludicrous to a profound and godless man;—almost
everywhere her nerves are being ruined by the most morbid and dangerous
kind of music (our latest German music), and she is daily being made more

hysterical and more incapable of fulfilling her first and last function, that of
bearing robust children. They wish to "cultivate" her in general still more,
and intend, as they say, to make the "weaker sex" STRONG by culture: as if
history did not teach in the most emphatic manner that the "cultivating" of
mankind and his weakening—that is to say, the weakening, dissipating, and
languishing of his FORCE OF WILL—have always kept pace with one
another, and that the most powerful and influential women in the world (and
lastly, the mother of Napoleon) had just to thank their force of will—and
not their schoolmasters—for their power and ascendancy over men. That
which inspires respect in woman, and often enough fear also, is her
NATURE, which is more "natural" than that of man, her genuine, carnivoralike, cunning flexibility, her tiger-claws beneath the glove, her NAIVETE in
egoism, her untrainableness and innate wildness, the incomprehensibleness,
extent, and deviation of her desires and virtues. That which, in spite of fear,
excites one's sympathy for the dangerous and beautiful cat, "woman," is that
she seems more afflicted, more vulnerable, more necessitous of love, and
more condemned to disillusionment than any other creature. Fear and
sympathy it is with these feelings that man has hitherto stood in the
presence of woman, always with one foot already in tragedy, which rends
while it delights—What? And all that is now to be at an end? And the
DISENCHANTMENT of woman is in progress? The tediousness of woman
is slowly evolving? Oh Europe! Europe! We know the horned animal which
was always most attractive to thee, from which danger is ever again
threatening thee! Thy old fable might once more become "history"—an
immense stupidity might once again overmaster thee and carry thee away!
And no God concealed beneath it—no! only an "idea," a "modern idea"!

CHAPTER VIII. PEOPLES AND COUNTRIES
240. I HEARD, once again for the first time, Richard Wagner's overture
to the Mastersinger: it is a piece of magnificent, gorgeous, heavy, latter-day
art, which has the pride to presuppose two centuries of music as still living,
in order that it may be understood:—it is an honour to Germans that such a
pride did not miscalculate! What flavours and forces, what seasons and
climes do we not find mingled in it! It impresses us at one time as ancient,
at another time as foreign, bitter, and too modern, it is as arbitrary as it is
pompously traditional, it is not infrequently roguish, still oftener rough and
coarse—it has fire and courage, and at the same time the loose, duncoloured skin of fruits which ripen too late. It flows broad and full: and
suddenly there is a moment of inexplicable hesitation, like a gap that opens
between cause and effect, an oppression that makes us dream, almost a
nightmare; but already it broadens and widens anew, the old stream of
delight—the most manifold delight,—of old and new happiness; including
ESPECIALLY the joy of the artist in himself, which he refuses to conceal,
his astonished, happy cognizance of his mastery of the expedients here
employed, the new, newly acquired, imperfectly tested expedients of art
which he apparently betrays to us. All in all, however, no beauty, no South,
nothing of the delicate southern clearness of the sky, nothing of grace, no
dance, hardly a will to logic; a certain clumsiness even, which is also
emphasized, as though the artist wished to say to us: "It is part of my
intention"; a cumbersome drapery, something arbitrarily barbaric and
ceremonious, a flirring of learned and venerable conceits and witticisms;
something German in the best and worst sense of the word, something in
the German style, manifold, formless, and inexhaustible; a certain German
potency and super-plenitude of soul, which is not afraid to hide itself under
the RAFFINEMENTS of decadence—which, perhaps, feels itself most at
ease there; a real, genuine token of the German soul, which is at the same
time young and aged, too ripe and yet still too rich in futurity. This kind of
music expresses best what I think of the Germans: they belong to the day
before yesterday and the day after tomorrow—THEY HAVE AS YET NO
TODAY.

241. We "good Europeans," we also have hours when we allow ourselves
a warm-hearted patriotism, a plunge and relapse into old loves and narrow
views—I have just given an example of it—hours of national excitement, of
patriotic anguish, and all other sorts of old-fashioned floods of sentiment.
Duller spirits may perhaps only get done with what confines its operations
in us to hours and plays itself out in hours—in a considerable time: some in
half a year, others in half a lifetime, according to the speed and strength
with which they digest and "change their material." Indeed, I could think of
sluggish, hesitating races, which even in our rapidly moving Europe, would
require half a century ere they could surmount such atavistic attacks of
patriotism and soil-attachment, and return once more to reason, that is to
say, to "good Europeanism." And while digressing on this possibility, I
happen to become an ear-witness of a conversation between two old patriots
—they were evidently both hard of hearing and consequently spoke all the
louder. "HE has as much, and knows as much, philosophy as a peasant or a
corps-student," said the one—"he is still innocent. But what does that
matter nowadays! It is the age of the masses: they lie on their belly before
everything that is massive. And so also in politicis. A statesman who rears
up for them a new Tower of Babel, some monstrosity of empire and power,
they call 'great'—what does it matter that we more prudent and conservative
ones do not meanwhile give up the old belief that it is only the great thought
that gives greatness to an action or affair. Supposing a statesman were to
bring his people into the position of being obliged henceforth to practise
'high politics,' for which they were by nature badly endowed and prepared,
so that they would have to sacrifice their old and reliable virtues, out of love
to a new and doubtful mediocrity;—supposing a statesman were to
condemn his people generally to 'practise politics,' when they have hitherto
had something better to do and think about, and when in the depths of their
souls they have been unable to free themselves from a prudent loathing of
the restlessness, emptiness, and noisy wranglings of the essentially politicspractising nations;—supposing such a statesman were to stimulate the
slumbering passions and avidities of his people, were to make a stigma out
of their former diffidence and delight in aloofness, an offence out of their
exoticism and hidden permanency, were to depreciate their most radical
proclivities, subvert their consciences, make their minds narrow, and their
tastes 'national'—what! a statesman who should do all this, which his
people would have to do penance for throughout their whole future, if they

had a future, such a statesman would be GREAT, would
he?"—"Undoubtedly!" replied the other old patriot vehemently, "otherwise
he COULD NOT have done it! It was mad perhaps to wish such a thing!
But perhaps everything great has been just as mad at its
commencement!"—"Misuse of words!" cried his interlocutor,
contradictorily—"strong! strong! Strong and mad! NOT great!"—The old
men had obviously become heated as they thus shouted their "truths" in
each other's faces, but I, in my happiness and apartness, considered how
soon a stronger one may become master of the strong, and also that there is
a compensation for the intellectual superficialising of a nation—namely, in
the deepening of another.
242. Whether we call it "civilization," or "humanising," or "progress,"
which now distinguishes the European, whether we call it simply, without
praise or blame, by the political formula the DEMOCRATIC movement in
Europe—behind all the moral and political foregrounds pointed to by such
formulas, an immense PHYSIOLOGICAL PROCESS goes on, which is
ever extending the process of the assimilation of Europeans, their increasing
detachment from the conditions under which, climatically and hereditarily,
united races originate, their increasing independence of every definite
milieu, that for centuries would fain inscribe itself with equal demands on
soul and body,—that is to say, the slow emergence of an essentially
SUPER-NATIONAL and nomadic species of man, who possesses,
physiologically speaking, a maximum of the art and power of adaptation as
his typical distinction. This process of the EVOLVING EUROPEAN,
which can be retarded in its TEMPO by great relapses, but will perhaps just
gain and grow thereby in vehemence and depth—the still-raging storm and
stress of "national sentiment" pertains to it, and also the anarchism which is
appearing at present—this process will probably arrive at results on which
its naive propagators and panegyrists, the apostles of "modern ideas," would
least care to reckon. The same new conditions under which on an average a
levelling and mediocrising of man will take place—a useful, industrious,
variously serviceable, and clever gregarious man—are in the highest degree
suitable to give rise to exceptional men of the most dangerous and attractive
qualities. For, while the capacity for adaptation, which is every day trying
changing conditions, and begins a new work with every generation, almost
with every decade, makes the POWERFULNESS of the type impossible;
while the collective impression of such future Europeans will probably be

that of numerous, talkative, weak-willed, and very handy workmen who
REQUIRE a master, a commander, as they require their daily bread; while,
therefore, the democratising of Europe will tend to the production of a type
prepared for SLAVERY in the most subtle sense of the term: the STRONG
man will necessarily in individual and exceptional cases, become stronger
and richer than he has perhaps ever been before—owing to the
unprejudicedness of his schooling, owing to the immense variety of
practice, art, and disguise. I meant to say that the democratising of Europe
is at the same time an involuntary arrangement for the rearing of
TYRANTS—taking the word in all its meanings, even in its most spiritual
sense.
243. I hear with pleasure that our sun is moving rapidly towards the
constellation Hercules: and I hope that the men on this earth will do like the
sun. And we foremost, we good Europeans!
244. There was a time when it was customary to call Germans "deep" by
way of distinction; but now that the most successful type of new
Germanism is covetous of quite other honours, and perhaps misses
"smartness" in all that has depth, it is almost opportune and patriotic to
doubt whether we did not formerly deceive ourselves with that
commendation: in short, whether German depth is not at bottom something
different and worse—and something from which, thank God, we are on the
point of successfully ridding ourselves. Let us try, then, to relearn with
regard to German depth; the only thing necessary for the purpose is a little
vivisection of the German soul.—The German soul is above all manifold,
varied in its source, aggregated and super-imposed, rather than actually
built: this is owing to its origin. A German who would embolden himself to
assert: "Two souls, alas, dwell in my breast," would make a bad guess at the
truth, or, more correctly, he would come far short of the truth about the
number of souls. As a people made up of the most extraordinary mixing and
mingling of races, perhaps even with a preponderance of the pre-Aryan
element as the "people of the centre" in every sense of the term, the
Germans are more intangible, more ample, more contradictory, more
unknown, more incalculable, more surprising, and even more terrifying
than other peoples are to themselves:—they escape DEFINITION, and are
thereby alone the despair of the French. It IS characteristic of the Germans
that the question: "What is German?" never dies out among them. Kotzebue
certainly knew his Germans well enough: "We are known," they cried

jubilantly to him—but Sand also thought he knew them. Jean Paul knew
what he was doing when he declared himself incensed at Fichte's lying but
patriotic flatteries and exaggerations,—but it is probable that Goethe
thought differently about Germans from Jean Paul, even though he
acknowledged him to be right with regard to Fichte. It is a question what
Goethe really thought about the Germans?—But about many things around
him he never spoke explicitly, and all his life he knew how to keep an astute
silence—probably he had good reason for it. It is certain that it was not the
"Wars of Independence" that made him look up more joyfully, any more
than it was the French Revolution,—the event on account of which he
RECONSTRUCTED his "Faust," and indeed the whole problem of "man,"
was the appearance of Napoleon. There are words of Goethe in which he
condemns with impatient severity, as from a foreign land, that which
Germans take a pride in, he once defined the famous German turn of mind
as "Indulgence towards its own and others' weaknesses." Was he wrong? it
is characteristic of Germans that one is seldom entirely wrong about them.
The German soul has passages and galleries in it, there are caves, hidingplaces, and dungeons therein, its disorder has much of the charm of the
mysterious, the German is well acquainted with the bypaths to chaos. And
as everything loves its symbol, so the German loves the clouds and all that
is obscure, evolving, crepuscular, damp, and shrouded, it seems to him that
everything uncertain, undeveloped, self-displacing, and growing is "deep".
The German himself does not EXIST, he is BECOMING, he is "developing
himself". "Development" is therefore the essentially German discovery and
hit in the great domain of philosophical formulas,—a ruling idea, which,
together with German beer and German music, is labouring to Germanise
all Europe. Foreigners are astonished and attracted by the riddles which the
conflicting nature at the basis of the German soul propounds to them
(riddles which Hegel systematised and Richard Wagner has in the end set to
music). "Good-natured and spiteful"—such a juxtaposition, preposterous in
the case of every other people, is unfortunately only too often justified in
Germany one has only to live for a while among Swabians to know this!
The clumsiness of the German scholar and his social distastefulness agree
alarmingly well with his physical rope-dancing and nimble boldness, of
which all the Gods have learnt to be afraid. If any one wishes to see the
"German soul" demonstrated ad oculos, let him only look at German taste,
at German arts and manners what boorish indifference to "taste"! How the

noblest and the commonest stand there in juxtaposition! How disorderly
and how rich is the whole constitution of this soul! The German DRAGS at
his soul, he drags at everything he experiences. He digests his events badly;
he never gets "done" with them; and German depth is often only a difficult,
hesitating "digestion." And just as all chronic invalids, all dyspeptics like
what is convenient, so the German loves "frankness" and "honesty"; it is so
CONVENIENT to be frank and honest!—This confidingness, this
complaisance, this showing-the-cards of German HONESTY, is probably
the most dangerous and most successful disguise which the German is up to
nowadays: it is his proper Mephistophelean art; with this he can "still
achieve much"! The German lets himself go, and thereby gazes with
faithful, blue, empty German eyes—and other countries immediately
confound him with his dressing-gown!—I meant to say that, let "German
depth" be what it will—among ourselves alone we perhaps take the liberty
to laugh at it—we shall do well to continue henceforth to honour its
appearance and good name, and not barter away too cheaply our old
reputation as a people of depth for Prussian "smartness," and Berlin wit and
sand. It is wise for a people to pose, and LET itself be regarded, as
profound, clumsy, good-natured, honest, and foolish: it might even be—
profound to do so! Finally, we should do honour to our name—we are not
called the "TIUSCHE VOLK" (deceptive people) for nothing....
245. The "good old" time is past, it sang itself out in Mozart—how happy
are WE that his ROCOCO still speaks to us, that his "good company," his
tender enthusiasm, his childish delight in the Chinese and its flourishes, his
courtesy of heart, his longing for the elegant, the amorous, the tripping, the
tearful, and his belief in the South, can still appeal to SOMETHING LEFT
in us! Ah, some time or other it will be over with it!—but who can doubt
that it will be over still sooner with the intelligence and taste for Beethoven!
For he was only the last echo of a break and transition in style, and NOT,
like Mozart, the last echo of a great European taste which had existed for
centuries. Beethoven is the intermediate event between an old mellow soul
that is constantly breaking down, and a future over-young soul that is
always COMING; there is spread over his music the twilight of eternal loss
and eternal extravagant hope,—the same light in which Europe was bathed
when it dreamed with Rousseau, when it danced round the Tree of Liberty
of the Revolution, and finally almost fell down in adoration before
Napoleon. But how rapidly does THIS very sentiment now pale, how

difficult nowadays is even the APPREHENSION of this sentiment, how
strangely does the language of Rousseau, Schiller, Shelley, and Byron
sound to our ear, in whom COLLECTIVELY the same fate of Europe was
able to SPEAK, which knew how to SING in Beethoven!—Whatever
German music came afterwards, belongs to Romanticism, that is to say, to a
movement which, historically considered, was still shorter, more fleeting,
and more superficial than that great interlude, the transition of Europe from
Rousseau to Napoleon, and to the rise of democracy. Weber—but what do
WE care nowadays for "Freischutz" and "Oberon"! Or Marschner's "Hans
Heiling" and "Vampyre"! Or even Wagner's "Tannhauser"! That is extinct,
although not yet forgotten music. This whole music of Romanticism,
besides, was not noble enough, was not musical enough, to maintain its
position anywhere but in the theatre and before the masses; from the
beginning it was second-rate music, which was little thought of by genuine
musicians. It was different with Felix Mendelssohn, that halcyon master,
who, on account of his lighter, purer, happier soul, quickly acquired
admiration, and was equally quickly forgotten: as the beautiful EPISODE of
German music. But with regard to Robert Schumann, who took things
seriously, and has been taken seriously from the first—he was the last that
founded a school,—do we not now regard it as a satisfaction, a relief, a
deliverance, that this very Romanticism of Schumann's has been
surmounted? Schumann, fleeing into the "Saxon Switzerland" of his soul,
with a half Werther-like, half Jean-Paul-like nature (assuredly not like
Beethoven! assuredly not like Byron!)—his MANFRED music is a mistake
and a misunderstanding to the extent of injustice; Schumann, with his taste,
which was fundamentally a PETTY taste (that is to say, a dangerous
propensity—doubly dangerous among Germans—for quiet lyricism and
intoxication of the feelings), going constantly apart, timidly withdrawing
and retiring, a noble weakling who revelled in nothing but anonymous joy
and sorrow, from the beginning a sort of girl and NOLI ME TANGERE—
this Schumann was already merely a GERMAN event in music, and no
longer a European event, as Beethoven had been, as in a still greater degree
Mozart had been; with Schumann German music was threatened with its
greatest danger, that of LOSING THE VOICE FOR THE SOUL OF
EUROPE and sinking into a merely national affair.
246. What a torture are books written in German to a reader who has a
THIRD ear! How indignantly he stands beside the slowly turning swamp of

sounds without tune and rhythms without dance, which Germans call a
"book"! And even the German who READS books! How lazily, how
reluctantly, how badly he reads! How many Germans know, and consider it
obligatory to know, that there is ART in every good sentence—art which
must be divined, if the sentence is to be understood! If there is a
misunderstanding about its TEMPO, for instance, the sentence itself is
misunderstood! That one must not be doubtful about the rhythmdetermining syllables, that one should feel the breaking of the too-rigid
symmetry as intentional and as a charm, that one should lend a fine and
patient ear to every STACCATO and every RUBATO, that one should
divine the sense in the sequence of the vowels and diphthongs, and how
delicately and richly they can be tinted and retinted in the order of their
arrangement—who among book-reading Germans is complaisant enough to
recognize such duties and requirements, and to listen to so much art and
intention in language? After all, one just "has no ear for it"; and so the most
marked contrasts of style are not heard, and the most delicate artistry is as it
were SQUANDERED on the deaf.—These were my thoughts when I
noticed how clumsily and unintuitively two masters in the art of prosewriting have been confounded: one, whose words drop down hesitatingly
and coldly, as from the roof of a damp cave—he counts on their dull sound
and echo; and another who manipulates his language like a flexible sword,
and from his arm down into his toes feels the dangerous bliss of the
quivering, over-sharp blade, which wishes to bite, hiss, and cut.
247. How little the German style has to do with harmony and with the
ear, is shown by the fact that precisely our good musicians themselves write
badly. The German does not read aloud, he does not read for the ear, but
only with his eyes; he has put his ears away in the drawer for the time. In
antiquity when a man read—which was seldom enough—he read something
to himself, and in a loud voice; they were surprised when any one read
silently, and sought secretly the reason of it. In a loud voice: that is to say,
with all the swellings, inflections, and variations of key and changes of
TEMPO, in which the ancient PUBLIC world took delight. The laws of the
written style were then the same as those of the spoken style; and these laws
depended partly on the surprising development and refined requirements of
the ear and larynx; partly on the strength, endurance, and power of the
ancient lungs. In the ancient sense, a period is above all a physiological
whole, inasmuch as it is comprised in one breath. Such periods as occur in

Demosthenes and Cicero, swelling twice and sinking twice, and all in one
breath, were pleasures to the men of ANTIQUITY, who knew by their own
schooling how to appreciate the virtue therein, the rareness and the
difficulty in the deliverance of such a period;—WE have really no right to
the BIG period, we modern men, who are short of breath in every sense!
Those ancients, indeed, were all of them dilettanti in speaking,
consequently connoisseurs, consequently critics—they thus brought their
orators to the highest pitch; in the same manner as in the last century, when
all Italian ladies and gentlemen knew how to sing, the virtuosoship of song
(and with it also the art of melody) reached its elevation. In Germany,
however (until quite recently when a kind of platform eloquence began
shyly and awkwardly enough to flutter its young wings), there was properly
speaking only one kind of public and APPROXIMATELY artistical
discourse—that delivered from the pulpit. The preacher was the only one in
Germany who knew the weight of a syllable or a word, in what manner a
sentence strikes, springs, rushes, flows, and comes to a close; he alone had a
conscience in his ears, often enough a bad conscience: for reasons are not
lacking why proficiency in oratory should be especially seldom attained by
a German, or almost always too late. The masterpiece of German prose is
therefore with good reason the masterpiece of its greatest preacher: the
BIBLE has hitherto been the best German book. Compared with Luther's
Bible, almost everything else is merely "literature"—something which has
not grown in Germany, and therefore has not taken and does not take root in
German hearts, as the Bible has done.
248. There are two kinds of geniuses: one which above all engenders and
seeks to engender, and another which willingly lets itself be fructified and
brings forth. And similarly, among the gifted nations, there are those on
whom the woman's problem of pregnancy has devolved, and the secret task
of forming, maturing, and perfecting—the Greeks, for instance, were a
nation of this kind, and so are the French; and others which have to fructify
and become the cause of new modes of life—like the Jews, the Romans,
and, in all modesty be it asked: like the Germans?—nations tortured and
enraptured by unknown fevers and irresistibly forced out of themselves,
amorous and longing for foreign races (for such as "let themselves be
fructified"), and withal imperious, like everything conscious of being full of
generative force, and consequently empowered "by the grace of God."

These two kinds of geniuses seek each other like man and woman; but they
also misunderstand each other—like man and woman.
249. Every nation has its own "Tartuffery," and calls that its virtue.—One
does not know—cannot know, the best that is in one.
250. What Europe owes to the Jews?—Many things, good and bad, and
above all one thing of the nature both of the best and the worst: the grand
style in morality, the fearfulness and majesty of infinite demands, of infinite
significations, the whole Romanticism and sublimity of moral
questionableness—and consequently just the most attractive, ensnaring, and
exquisite element in those iridescences and allurements to life, in the
aftersheen of which the sky of our European culture, its evening sky, now
glows—perhaps glows out. For this, we artists among the spectators and
philosophers, are—grateful to the Jews.
251. It must be taken into the bargain, if various clouds and disturbances
—in short, slight attacks of stupidity—pass over the spirit of a people that
suffers and WANTS to suffer from national nervous fever and political
ambition: for instance, among present-day Germans there is alternately the
anti-French folly, the anti-Semitic folly, the anti-Polish folly, the Christianromantic folly, the Wagnerian folly, the Teutonic folly, the Prussian folly
(just look at those poor historians, the Sybels and Treitschkes, and their
closely bandaged heads), and whatever else these little obscurations of the
German spirit and conscience may be called. May it be forgiven me that I,
too, when on a short daring sojourn on very infected ground, did not remain
wholly exempt from the disease, but like every one else, began to entertain
thoughts about matters which did not concern me—the first symptom of
political infection. About the Jews, for instance, listen to the following:—I
have never yet met a German who was favourably inclined to the Jews; and
however decided the repudiation of actual anti-Semitism may be on the part
of all prudent and political men, this prudence and policy is not perhaps
directed against the nature of the sentiment itself, but only against its
dangerous excess, and especially against the distasteful and infamous
expression of this excess of sentiment;—on this point we must not deceive
ourselves. That Germany has amply SUFFICIENT Jews, that the German
stomach, the German blood, has difficulty (and will long have difficulty) in
disposing only of this quantity of "Jew"—as the Italian, the Frenchman, and
the Englishman have done by means of a stronger digestion:—that is the

unmistakable declaration and language of a general instinct, to which one
must listen and according to which one must act. "Let no more Jews come
in! And shut the doors, especially towards the East (also towards
Austria)!"—thus commands the instinct of a people whose nature is still
feeble and uncertain, so that it could be easily wiped out, easily
extinguished, by a stronger race. The Jews, however, are beyond all doubt
the strongest, toughest, and purest race at present living in Europe, they
know how to succeed even under the worst conditions (in fact better than
under favourable ones), by means of virtues of some sort, which one would
like nowadays to label as vices—owing above all to a resolute faith which
does not need to be ashamed before "modern ideas", they alter only, WHEN
they do alter, in the same way that the Russian Empire makes its conquest
—as an empire that has plenty of time and is not of yesterday—namely,
according to the principle, "as slowly as possible"! A thinker who has the
future of Europe at heart, will, in all his perspectives concerning the future,
calculate upon the Jews, as he will calculate upon the Russians, as above all
the surest and likeliest factors in the great play and battle of forces. That
which is at present called a "nation" in Europe, and is really rather a RES
FACTA than NATA (indeed, sometimes confusingly similar to a RES
FICTA ET PICTA), is in every case something evolving, young, easily
displaced, and not yet a race, much less such a race AERE PERENNUS, as
the Jews are such "nations" should most carefully avoid all hot-headed
rivalry and hostility! It is certain that the Jews, if they desired—or if they
were driven to it, as the anti-Semites seem to wish—COULD now have the
ascendancy, nay, literally the supremacy, over Europe, that they are NOT
working and planning for that end is equally certain. Meanwhile, they rather
wish and desire, even somewhat importunely, to be insorbed and absorbed
by Europe, they long to be finally settled, authorized, and respected
somewhere, and wish to put an end to the nomadic life, to the "wandering
Jew",—and one should certainly take account of this impulse and tendency,
and MAKE ADVANCES to it (it possibly betokens a mitigation of the
Jewish instincts) for which purpose it would perhaps be useful and fair to
banish the anti-Semitic bawlers out of the country. One should make
advances with all prudence, and with selection, pretty much as the English
nobility do It stands to reason that the more powerful and strongly marked
types of new Germanism could enter into relation with the Jews with the
least hesitation, for instance, the nobleman officer from the Prussian border

it would be interesting in many ways to see whether the genius for money
and patience (and especially some intellect and intellectuality—sadly
lacking in the place referred to) could not in addition be annexed and
trained to the hereditary art of commanding and obeying—for both of
which the country in question has now a classic reputation But here it is
expedient to break off my festal discourse and my sprightly Teutonomania
for I have already reached my SERIOUS TOPIC, the "European problem,"
as I understand it, the rearing of a new ruling caste for Europe.
252. They are not a philosophical race—the English: Bacon represents an
ATTACK on the philosophical spirit generally, Hobbes, Hume, and Locke,
an abasement, and a depreciation of the idea of a "philosopher" for more
than a century. It was AGAINST Hume that Kant uprose and raised
himself; it was Locke of whom Schelling RIGHTLY said, "JE MEPRISE
LOCKE"; in the struggle against the English mechanical stultification of the
world, Hegel and Schopenhauer (along with Goethe) were of one accord;
the two hostile brother-geniuses in philosophy, who pushed in different
directions towards the opposite poles of German thought, and thereby
wronged each other as only brothers will do.—What is lacking in England,
and has always been lacking, that half-actor and rhetorician knew well
enough, the absurd muddle-head, Carlyle, who sought to conceal under
passionate grimaces what he knew about himself: namely, what was
LACKING in Carlyle—real POWER of intellect, real DEPTH of
intellectual perception, in short, philosophy. It is characteristic of such an
unphilosophical race to hold on firmly to Christianity—they NEED its
discipline for "moralizing" and humanizing. The Englishman, more gloomy,
sensual, headstrong, and brutal than the German—is for that very reason, as
the baser of the two, also the most pious: he has all the MORE NEED of
Christianity. To finer nostrils, this English Christianity itself has still a
characteristic English taint of spleen and alcoholic excess, for which, owing
to good reasons, it is used as an antidote—the finer poison to neutralize the
coarser: a finer form of poisoning is in fact a step in advance with coarsemannered people, a step towards spiritualization. The English coarseness
and rustic demureness is still most satisfactorily disguised by Christian
pantomime, and by praying and psalm-singing (or, more correctly, it is
thereby explained and differently expressed); and for the herd of drunkards
and rakes who formerly learned moral grunting under the influence of
Methodism (and more recently as the "Salvation Army"), a penitential fit

may really be the relatively highest manifestation of "humanity" to which
they can be elevated: so much may reasonably be admitted. That, however,
which offends even in the humanest Englishman is his lack of music, to
speak figuratively (and also literally): he has neither rhythm nor dance in
the movements of his soul and body; indeed, not even the desire for rhythm
and dance, for "music." Listen to him speaking; look at the most beautiful
Englishwoman WALKING—in no country on earth are there more
beautiful doves and swans; finally, listen to them singing! But I ask too
much...
253. There are truths which are best recognized by mediocre minds,
because they are best adapted for them, there are truths which only possess
charms and seductive power for mediocre spirits:—one is pushed to this
probably unpleasant conclusion, now that the influence of respectable but
mediocre Englishmen—I may mention Darwin, John Stuart Mill, and
Herbert Spencer—begins to gain the ascendancy in the middle-class region
of European taste. Indeed, who could doubt that it is a useful thing for
SUCH minds to have the ascendancy for a time? It would be an error to
consider the highly developed and independently soaring minds as specially
qualified for determining and collecting many little common facts, and
deducing conclusions from them; as exceptions, they are rather from the
first in no very favourable position towards those who are "the rules." After
all, they have more to do than merely to perceive:—in effect, they have to
BE something new, they have to SIGNIFY something new, they have to
REPRESENT new values! The gulf between knowledge and capacity is
perhaps greater, and also more mysterious, than one thinks: the capable man
in the grand style, the creator, will possibly have to be an ignorant person;
—while on the other hand, for scientific discoveries like those of Darwin, a
certain narrowness, aridity, and industrious carefulness (in short, something
English) may not be unfavourable for arriving at them.—Finally, let it not
be forgotten that the English, with their profound mediocrity, brought about
once before a general depression of European intelligence.
What is called "modern ideas," or "the ideas of the eighteenth century,"
or "French ideas"—that, consequently, against which the GERMAN mind
rose up with profound disgust—is of English origin, there is no doubt about
it. The French were only the apes and actors of these ideas, their best
soldiers, and likewise, alas! their first and profoundest VICTIMS; for owing
to the diabolical Anglomania of "modern ideas," the AME FRANCAIS has

in the end become so thin and emaciated, that at present one recalls its
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, its profound, passionate strength, its
inventive excellency, almost with disbelief. One must, however, maintain
this verdict of historical justice in a determined manner, and defend it
against present prejudices and appearances: the European NOBLESSE—of
sentiment, taste, and manners, taking the word in every high sense—is the
work and invention of FRANCE; the European ignobleness, the
plebeianism of modern ideas—is ENGLAND'S work and invention.
254. Even at present France is still the seat of the most intellectual and
refined culture of Europe, it is still the high school of taste; but one must
know how to find this "France of taste." He who belongs to it keeps himself
well concealed:—they may be a small number in whom it lives and is
embodied, besides perhaps being men who do not stand upon the strongest
legs, in part fatalists, hypochondriacs, invalids, in part persons overindulged, over-refined, such as have the AMBITION to conceal themselves.
They have all something in common: they keep their ears closed in
presence of the delirious folly and noisy spouting of the democratic
BOURGEOIS. In fact, a besotted and brutalized France at present sprawls
in the foreground—it recently celebrated a veritable orgy of bad taste, and
at the same time of self-admiration, at the funeral of Victor Hugo. There is
also something else common to them: a predilection to resist intellectual
Germanizing—and a still greater inability to do so! In this France of
intellect, which is also a France of pessimism, Schopenhauer has perhaps
become more at home, and more indigenous than he has ever been in
Germany; not to speak of Heinrich Heine, who has long ago been reincarnated in the more refined and fastidious lyrists of Paris; or of Hegel,
who at present, in the form of Taine—the FIRST of living historians—
exercises an almost tyrannical influence. As regards Richard Wagner,
however, the more French music learns to adapt itself to the actual needs of
the AME MODERNE, the more will it "Wagnerite"; one can safely predict
that beforehand,—it is already taking place sufficiently! There are,
however, three things which the French can still boast of with pride as their
heritage and possession, and as indelible tokens of their ancient intellectual
superiority in Europe, in spite of all voluntary or involuntary Germanizing
and vulgarizing of taste. FIRSTLY, the capacity for artistic emotion, for
devotion to "form," for which the expression, L'ART POUR L'ART, along
with numerous others, has been invented:—such capacity has not been

lacking in France for three centuries; and owing to its reverence for the
"small number," it has again and again made a sort of chamber music of
literature possible, which is sought for in vain elsewhere in Europe.—The
SECOND thing whereby the French can lay claim to a superiority over
Europe is their ancient, many-sided, MORALISTIC culture, owing to
which one finds on an average, even in the petty ROMANCIERS of the
newspapers and chance BOULEVARDIERS DE PARIS, a psychological
sensitiveness and curiosity, of which, for example, one has no conception
(to say nothing of the thing itself!) in Germany. The Germans lack a couple
of centuries of the moralistic work requisite thereto, which, as we have said,
France has not grudged: those who call the Germans "naive" on that
account give them commendation for a defect. (As the opposite of the
German inexperience and innocence IN VOLUPTATE PSYCHOLOGICA,
which is not too remotely associated with the tediousness of German
intercourse,—and as the most successful expression of genuine French
curiosity and inventive talent in this domain of delicate thrills, Henri Beyle
may be noted; that remarkable anticipatory and forerunning man, who, with
a Napoleonic TEMPO, traversed HIS Europe, in fact, several centuries of
the European soul, as a surveyor and discoverer thereof:—it has required
two generations to OVERTAKE him one way or other, to divine long
afterwards some of the riddles that perplexed and enraptured him—this
strange Epicurean and man of interrogation, the last great psychologist of
France).—There is yet a THIRD claim to superiority: in the French
character there is a successful half-way synthesis of the North and South,
which makes them comprehend many things, and enjoins upon them other
things, which an Englishman can never comprehend. Their temperament,
turned alternately to and from the South, in which from time to time the
Provencal and Ligurian blood froths over, preserves them from the dreadful,
northern grey-in-grey, from sunless conceptual-spectrism and from poverty
of blood—our GERMAN infirmity of taste, for the excessive prevalence of
which at the present moment, blood and iron, that is to say "high politics,"
has with great resolution been prescribed (according to a dangerous healing
art, which bids me wait and wait, but not yet hope).—There is also still in
France a pre-understanding and ready welcome for those rarer and rarely
gratified men, who are too comprehensive to find satisfaction in any kind of
fatherlandism, and know how to love the South when in the North and the
North when in the South—the born Midlanders, the "good Europeans." For

them BIZET has made music, this latest genius, who has seen a new beauty
and seduction,—who has discovered a piece of the SOUTH IN MUSIC.
255. I hold that many precautions should be taken against German music.
Suppose a person loves the South as I love it—as a great school of recovery
for the most spiritual and the most sensuous ills, as a boundless solar
profusion and effulgence which o'erspreads a sovereign existence believing
in itself—well, such a person will learn to be somewhat on his guard
against German music, because, in injuring his taste anew, it will also injure
his health anew. Such a Southerner, a Southerner not by origin but by
BELIEF, if he should dream of the future of music, must also dream of it
being freed from the influence of the North; and must have in his ears the
prelude to a deeper, mightier, and perhaps more perverse and mysterious
music, a super-German music, which does not fade, pale, and die away, as
all German music does, at the sight of the blue, wanton sea and the
Mediterranean clearness of sky—a super-European music, which holds its
own even in presence of the brown sunsets of the desert, whose soul is akin
to the palm-tree, and can be at home and can roam with big, beautiful,
lonely beasts of prey... I could imagine a music of which the rarest charm
would be that it knew nothing more of good and evil; only that here and
there perhaps some sailor's home-sickness, some golden shadows and
tender weaknesses might sweep lightly over it; an art which, from the far
distance, would see the colours of a sinking and almost incomprehensible
MORAL world fleeing towards it, and would be hospitable enough and
profound enough to receive such belated fugitives.
256. Owing to the morbid estrangement which the nationality-craze has
induced and still induces among the nations of Europe, owing also to the
short-sighted and hasty-handed politicians, who with the help of this craze,
are at present in power, and do not suspect to what extent the disintegrating
policy they pursue must necessarily be only an interlude policy—owing to
all this and much else that is altogether unmentionable at present, the most
unmistakable signs that EUROPE WISHES TO BE ONE, are now
overlooked, or arbitrarily and falsely misinterpreted. With all the more
profound and large-minded men of this century, the real general tendency of
the mysterious labour of their souls was to prepare the way for that new
SYNTHESIS, and tentatively to anticipate the European of the future; only
in their simulations, or in their weaker moments, in old age perhaps, did
they belong to the "fatherlands"—they only rested from themselves when

they became "patriots." I think of such men as Napoleon, Goethe,
Beethoven, Stendhal, Heinrich Heine, Schopenhauer: it must not be taken
amiss if I also count Richard Wagner among them, about whom one must
not let oneself be deceived by his own misunderstandings (geniuses like
him have seldom the right to understand themselves), still less, of course,
by the unseemly noise with which he is now resisted and opposed in
France: the fact remains, nevertheless, that Richard Wagner and the LATER
FRENCH ROMANTICISM of the forties, are most closely and intimately
related to one another. They are akin, fundamentally akin, in all the heights
and depths of their requirements; it is Europe, the ONE Europe, whose soul
presses urgently and longingly, outwards and upwards, in their multifarious
and boisterous art—whither? into a new light? towards a new sun? But who
would attempt to express accurately what all these masters of new modes of
speech could not express distinctly? It is certain that the same storm and
stress tormented them, that they SOUGHT in the same manner, these last
great seekers! All of them steeped in literature to their eyes and ears—the
first artists of universal literary culture—for the most part even themselves
writers, poets, intermediaries and blenders of the arts and the senses
(Wagner, as musician is reckoned among painters, as poet among
musicians, as artist generally among actors); all of them fanatics for
EXPRESSION "at any cost"—I specially mention Delacroix, the nearest
related to Wagner; all of them great discoverers in the realm of the sublime,
also of the loathsome and dreadful, still greater discoverers in effect, in
display, in the art of the show-shop; all of them talented far beyond their
genius, out and out VIRTUOSI, with mysterious accesses to all that
seduces, allures, constrains, and upsets; born enemies of logic and of the
straight line, hankering after the strange, the exotic, the monstrous, the
crooked, and the self-contradictory; as men, Tantaluses of the will, plebeian
parvenus, who knew themselves to be incapable of a noble TEMPO or of a
LENTO in life and action—think of Balzac, for instance,—unrestrained
workers, almost destroying themselves by work; antinomians and rebels in
manners, ambitious and insatiable, without equilibrium and enjoyment; all
of them finally shattering and sinking down at the Christian cross (and with
right and reason, for who of them would have been sufficiently profound
and sufficiently original for an ANTI-CHRISTIAN philosophy?);—on the
whole, a boldly daring, splendidly overbearing, high-flying, and aloft-updragging class of higher men, who had first to teach their century—and it is

the century of the MASSES—the conception "higher man."... Let the
German friends of Richard Wagner advise together as to whether there is
anything purely German in the Wagnerian art, or whether its distinction
does not consist precisely in coming from SUPER-GERMAN sources and
impulses: in which connection it may not be underrated how indispensable
Paris was to the development of his type, which the strength of his instincts
made him long to visit at the most decisive time—and how the whole style
of his proceedings, of his self-apostolate, could only perfect itself in sight of
the French socialistic original. On a more subtle comparison it will perhaps
be found, to the honour of Richard Wagner's German nature, that he has
acted in everything with more strength, daring, severity, and elevation than
a nineteenth-century Frenchman could have done—owing to the
circumstance that we Germans are as yet nearer to barbarism than the
French;—perhaps even the most remarkable creation of Richard Wagner is
not only at present, but for ever inaccessible, incomprehensible, and
inimitable to the whole latter-day Latin race: the figure of Siegfried, that
VERY FREE man, who is probably far too free, too hard, too cheerful, too
healthy, too ANTI-CATHOLIC for the taste of old and mellow civilized
nations. He may even have been a sin against Romanticism, this anti-Latin
Siegfried: well, Wagner atoned amply for this sin in his old sad days, when
—anticipating a taste which has meanwhile passed into politics—he began,
with the religious vehemence peculiar to him, to preach, at least, THE WAY
TO ROME, if not to walk therein.—That these last words may not be
misunderstood, I will call to my aid a few powerful rhymes, which will
even betray to less delicate ears what I mean—what I mean COUNTER TO
the "last Wagner" and his Parsifal music:—
—Is this our mode?—From German heart came this vexed ululating?
From German body, this self-lacerating? Is ours this priestly hand-dilation,
This incense-fuming exaltation? Is ours this faltering, falling, shambling,
This quite uncertain ding-dong-dangling? This sly nun-ogling, Ave-hourbell ringing, This wholly false enraptured heaven-o'erspringing?—Is this
our mode?—Think well!—ye still wait for admission—For what ye hear is
ROME—ROME'S FAITH BY INTUITION!

CHAPTER IX. WHAT IS NOBLE?
257. EVERY elevation of the type "man," has hitherto been the work of
an aristocratic society and so it will always be—a society believing in a
long scale of gradations of rank and differences of worth among human
beings, and requiring slavery in some form or other. Without the PATHOS
OF DISTANCE, such as grows out of the incarnated difference of classes,
out of the constant out-looking and down-looking of the ruling caste on
subordinates and instruments, and out of their equally constant practice of
obeying and commanding, of keeping down and keeping at a distance—that
other more mysterious pathos could never have arisen, the longing for an
ever new widening of distance within the soul itself, the formation of ever
higher, rarer, further, more extended, more comprehensive states, in short,
just the elevation of the type "man," the continued "self-surmounting of
man," to use a moral formula in a supermoral sense. To be sure, one must
not resign oneself to any humanitarian illusions about the history of the
origin of an aristocratic society (that is to say, of the preliminary condition
for the elevation of the type "man"): the truth is hard. Let us acknowledge
unprejudicedly how every higher civilization hitherto has ORIGINATED!
Men with a still natural nature, barbarians in every terrible sense of the
word, men of prey, still in possession of unbroken strength of will and
desire for power, threw themselves upon weaker, more moral, more
peaceful races (perhaps trading or cattle-rearing communities), or upon old
mellow civilizations in which the final vital force was flickering out in
brilliant fireworks of wit and depravity. At the commencement, the noble
caste was always the barbarian caste: their superiority did not consist first
of all in their physical, but in their psychical power—they were more
COMPLETE men (which at every point also implies the same as "more
complete beasts").
258. Corruption—as the indication that anarchy threatens to break out
among the instincts, and that the foundation of the emotions, called "life," is
convulsed—is something radically different according to the organization in
which it manifests itself. When, for instance, an aristocracy like that of
France at the beginning of the Revolution, flung away its privileges with

sublime disgust and sacrificed itself to an excess of its moral sentiments, it
was corruption:—it was really only the closing act of the corruption which
had existed for centuries, by virtue of which that aristocracy had abdicated
step by step its lordly prerogatives and lowered itself to a FUNCTION of
royalty (in the end even to its decoration and parade-dress). The essential
thing, however, in a good and healthy aristocracy is that it should not regard
itself as a function either of the kingship or the commonwealth, but as the
SIGNIFICANCE and highest justification thereof—that it should therefore
accept with a good conscience the sacrifice of a legion of individuals, who,
FOR ITS SAKE, must be suppressed and reduced to imperfect men, to
slaves and instruments. Its fundamental belief must be precisely that society
is NOT allowed to exist for its own sake, but only as a foundation and
scaffolding, by means of which a select class of beings may be able to
elevate themselves to their higher duties, and in general to a higher
EXISTENCE: like those sun-seeking climbing plants in Java—they are
called Sipo Matador,—which encircle an oak so long and so often with their
arms, until at last, high above it, but supported by it, they can unfold their
tops in the open light, and exhibit their happiness.
259. To refrain mutually from injury, from violence, from exploitation,
and put one's will on a par with that of others: this may result in a certain
rough sense in good conduct among individuals when the necessary
conditions are given (namely, the actual similarity of the individuals in
amount of force and degree of worth, and their co-relation within one
organization). As soon, however, as one wished to take this principle more
generally, and if possible even as the FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF
SOCIETY, it would immediately disclose what it really is—namely, a Will
to the DENIAL of life, a principle of dissolution and decay. Here one must
think profoundly to the very basis and resist all sentimental weakness: life
itself is ESSENTIALLY appropriation, injury, conquest of the strange and
weak, suppression, severity, obtrusion of peculiar forms, incorporation, and
at the least, putting it mildest, exploitation;—but why should one for ever
use precisely these words on which for ages a disparaging purpose has been
stamped? Even the organization within which, as was previously supposed,
the individuals treat each other as equal—it takes place in every healthy
aristocracy—must itself, if it be a living and not a dying organization, do all
that towards other bodies, which the individuals within it refrain from doing
to each other it will have to be the incarnated Will to Power, it will

endeavour to grow, to gain ground, attract to itself and acquire ascendancy
—not owing to any morality or immorality, but because it LIVES, and
because life IS precisely Will to Power. On no point, however, is the
ordinary consciousness of Europeans more unwilling to be corrected than
on this matter, people now rave everywhere, even under the guise of
science, about coming conditions of society in which "the exploiting
character" is to be absent—that sounds to my ears as if they promised to
invent a mode of life which should refrain from all organic functions.
"Exploitation" does not belong to a depraved, or imperfect and primitive
society it belongs to the nature of the living being as a primary organic
function, it is a consequence of the intrinsic Will to Power, which is
precisely the Will to Life—Granting that as a theory this is a novelty—as a
reality it is the FUNDAMENTAL FACT of all history let us be so far
honest towards ourselves!
260. In a tour through the many finer and coarser moralities which have
hitherto prevailed or still prevail on the earth, I found certain traits recurring
regularly together, and connected with one another, until finally two
primary types revealed themselves to me, and a radical distinction was
brought to light. There is MASTER-MORALITY and SLAVEMORALITY,—I would at once add, however, that in all higher and mixed
civilizations, there are also attempts at the reconciliation of the two
moralities, but one finds still oftener the confusion and mutual
misunderstanding of them, indeed sometimes their close juxtaposition—
even in the same man, within one soul. The distinctions of moral values
have either originated in a ruling caste, pleasantly conscious of being
different from the ruled—or among the ruled class, the slaves and
dependents of all sorts. In the first case, when it is the rulers who determine
the conception "good," it is the exalted, proud disposition which is regarded
as the distinguishing feature, and that which determines the order of rank.
The noble type of man separates from himself the beings in whom the
opposite of this exalted, proud disposition displays itself he despises them.
Let it at once be noted that in this first kind of morality the antithesis
"good" and "bad" means practically the same as "noble" and "despicable",
—the antithesis "good" and "EVIL" is of a different origin. The cowardly,
the timid, the insignificant, and those thinking merely of narrow utility are
despised; moreover, also, the distrustful, with their constrained glances, the
self-abasing, the dog-like kind of men who let themselves be abused, the

mendicant flatterers, and above all the liars:—it is a fundamental belief of
all aristocrats that the common people are untruthful. "We truthful ones"—
the nobility in ancient Greece called themselves. It is obvious that
everywhere the designations of moral value were at first applied to MEN;
and were only derivatively and at a later period applied to ACTIONS; it is a
gross mistake, therefore, when historians of morals start with questions like,
"Why have sympathetic actions been praised?" The noble type of man
regards HIMSELF as a determiner of values; he does not require to be
approved of; he passes the judgment: "What is injurious to me is injurious
in itself;" he knows that it is he himself only who confers honour on things;
he is a CREATOR OF VALUES. He honours whatever he recognizes in
himself: such morality equals self-glorification. In the foreground there is
the feeling of plenitude, of power, which seeks to overflow, the happiness of
high tension, the consciousness of a wealth which would fain give and
bestow:—the noble man also helps the unfortunate, but not—or scarcely—
out of pity, but rather from an impulse generated by the super-abundance of
power. The noble man honours in himself the powerful one, him also who
has power over himself, who knows how to speak and how to keep silence,
who takes pleasure in subjecting himself to severity and hardness, and has
reverence for all that is severe and hard. "Wotan placed a hard heart in my
breast," says an old Scandinavian Saga: it is thus rightly expressed from the
soul of a proud Viking. Such a type of man is even proud of not being made
for sympathy; the hero of the Saga therefore adds warningly: "He who has
not a hard heart when young, will never have one." The noble and brave
who think thus are the furthest removed from the morality which sees
precisely in sympathy, or in acting for the good of others, or in
DESINTERESSEMENT, the characteristic of the moral; faith in oneself,
pride in oneself, a radical enmity and irony towards "selflessness," belong
as definitely to noble morality, as do a careless scorn and precaution in
presence of sympathy and the "warm heart."—It is the powerful who
KNOW how to honour, it is their art, their domain for invention. The
profound reverence for age and for tradition—all law rests on this double
reverence,—the belief and prejudice in favour of ancestors and
unfavourable to newcomers, is typical in the morality of the powerful; and
if, reversely, men of "modern ideas" believe almost instinctively in
"progress" and the "future," and are more and more lacking in respect for
old age, the ignoble origin of these "ideas" has complacently betrayed itself

thereby. A morality of the ruling class, however, is more especially foreign
and irritating to present-day taste in the sternness of its principle that one
has duties only to one's equals; that one may act towards beings of a lower
rank, towards all that is foreign, just as seems good to one, or "as the heart
desires," and in any case "beyond good and evil": it is here that sympathy
and similar sentiments can have a place. The ability and obligation to
exercise prolonged gratitude and prolonged revenge—both only within the
circle of equals,—artfulness in retaliation, RAFFINEMENT of the idea in
friendship, a certain necessity to have enemies (as outlets for the emotions
of envy, quarrelsomeness, arrogance—in fact, in order to be a good
FRIEND): all these are typical characteristics of the noble morality, which,
as has been pointed out, is not the morality of "modern ideas," and is
therefore at present difficult to realize, and also to unearth and disclose.—It
is otherwise with the second type of morality, SLAVE-MORALITY.
Supposing that the abused, the oppressed, the suffering, the unemancipated,
the weary, and those uncertain of themselves should moralize, what will be
the common element in their moral estimates? Probably a pessimistic
suspicion with regard to the entire situation of man will find expression,
perhaps a condemnation of man, together with his situation. The slave has
an unfavourable eye for the virtues of the powerful; he has a skepticism and
distrust, a REFINEMENT of distrust of everything "good" that is there
honoured—he would fain persuade himself that the very happiness there is
not genuine. On the other hand, THOSE qualities which serve to alleviate
the existence of sufferers are brought into prominence and flooded with
light; it is here that sympathy, the kind, helping hand, the warm heart,
patience, diligence, humility, and friendliness attain to honour; for here
these are the most useful qualities, and almost the only means of supporting
the burden of existence. Slave-morality is essentially the morality of utility.
Here is the seat of the origin of the famous antithesis "good" and "evil":—
power and dangerousness are assumed to reside in the evil, a certain
dreadfulness, subtlety, and strength, which do not admit of being despised.
According to slave-morality, therefore, the "evil" man arouses fear;
according to master-morality, it is precisely the "good" man who arouses
fear and seeks to arouse it, while the bad man is regarded as the despicable
being. The contrast attains its maximum when, in accordance with the
logical consequences of slave-morality, a shade of depreciation—it may be
slight and well-intentioned—at last attaches itself to the "good" man of this

morality; because, according to the servile mode of thought, the good man
must in any case be the SAFE man: he is good-natured, easily deceived,
perhaps a little stupid, un bonhomme. Everywhere that slave-morality gains
the ascendancy, language shows a tendency to approximate the
significations of the words "good" and "stupid."—A last fundamental
difference: the desire for FREEDOM, the instinct for happiness and the
refinements of the feeling of liberty belong as necessarily to slave-morals
and morality, as artifice and enthusiasm in reverence and devotion are the
regular symptoms of an aristocratic mode of thinking and estimating.—
Hence we can understand without further detail why love AS A PASSION
—it is our European specialty—must absolutely be of noble origin; as is
well known, its invention is due to the Provencal poet-cavaliers, those
brilliant, ingenious men of the "gai saber," to whom Europe owes so much,
and almost owes itself.
261. Vanity is one of the things which are perhaps most difficult for a
noble man to understand: he will be tempted to deny it, where another kind
of man thinks he sees it self-evidently. The problem for him is to represent
to his mind beings who seek to arouse a good opinion of themselves which
they themselves do not possess—and consequently also do not "deserve,"—
and who yet BELIEVE in this good opinion afterwards. This seems to him
on the one hand such bad taste and so self-disrespectful, and on the other
hand so grotesquely unreasonable, that he would like to consider vanity an
exception, and is doubtful about it in most cases when it is spoken of. He
will say, for instance: "I may be mistaken about my value, and on the other
hand may nevertheless demand that my value should be acknowledged by
others precisely as I rate it:—that, however, is not vanity (but self-conceit,
or, in most cases, that which is called 'humility,' and also 'modesty')." Or he
will even say: "For many reasons I can delight in the good opinion of
others, perhaps because I love and honour them, and rejoice in all their joys,
perhaps also because their good opinion endorses and strengthens my belief
in my own good opinion, perhaps because the good opinion of others, even
in cases where I do not share it, is useful to me, or gives promise of
usefulness:—all this, however, is not vanity." The man of noble character
must first bring it home forcibly to his mind, especially with the aid of
history, that, from time immemorial, in all social strata in any way
dependent, the ordinary man WAS only that which he PASSED FOR:—not
being at all accustomed to fix values, he did not assign even to himself any

other value than that which his master assigned to him (it is the peculiar
RIGHT OF MASTERS to create values). It may be looked upon as the
result of an extraordinary atavism, that the ordinary man, even at present, is
still always WAITING for an opinion about himself, and then instinctively
submitting himself to it; yet by no means only to a "good" opinion, but also
to a bad and unjust one (think, for instance, of the greater part of the selfappreciations and self-depreciations which believing women learn from
their confessors, and which in general the believing Christian learns from
his Church). In fact, conformably to the slow rise of the democratic social
order (and its cause, the blending of the blood of masters and slaves), the
originally noble and rare impulse of the masters to assign a value to
themselves and to "think well" of themselves, will now be more and more
encouraged and extended; but it has at all times an older, ampler, and more
radically ingrained propensity opposed to it—and in the phenomenon of
"vanity" this older propensity overmasters the younger. The vain person
rejoices over EVERY good opinion which he hears about himself (quite
apart from the point of view of its usefulness, and equally regardless of its
truth or falsehood), just as he suffers from every bad opinion: for he
subjects himself to both, he feels himself subjected to both, by that oldest
instinct of subjection which breaks forth in him.—It is "the slave" in the
vain man's blood, the remains of the slave's craftiness—and how much of
the "slave" is still left in woman, for instance!—which seeks to SEDUCE to
good opinions of itself; it is the slave, too, who immediately afterwards falls
prostrate himself before these opinions, as though he had not called them
forth.—And to repeat it again: vanity is an atavism.
262. A SPECIES originates, and a type becomes established and strong
in the long struggle with essentially constant UNFAVOURABLE
conditions. On the other hand, it is known by the experience of breeders
that species which receive super-abundant nourishment, and in general a
surplus of protection and care, immediately tend in the most marked way to
develop variations, and are fertile in prodigies and monstrosities (also in
monstrous vices). Now look at an aristocratic commonwealth, say an
ancient Greek polis, or Venice, as a voluntary or involuntary contrivance for
the purpose of REARING human beings; there are there men beside one
another, thrown upon their own resources, who want to make their species
prevail, chiefly because they MUST prevail, or else run the terrible danger
of being exterminated. The favour, the super-abundance, the protection are

there lacking under which variations are fostered; the species needs itself as
species, as something which, precisely by virtue of its hardness, its
uniformity, and simplicity of structure, can in general prevail and make
itself permanent in constant struggle with its neighbours, or with rebellious
or rebellion-threatening vassals. The most varied experience teaches it what
are the qualities to which it principally owes the fact that it still exists, in
spite of all Gods and men, and has hitherto been victorious: these qualities
it calls virtues, and these virtues alone it develops to maturity. It does so
with severity, indeed it desires severity; every aristocratic morality is
intolerant in the education of youth, in the control of women, in the
marriage customs, in the relations of old and young, in the penal laws
(which have an eye only for the degenerating): it counts intolerance itself
among the virtues, under the name of "justice." A type with few, but very
marked features, a species of severe, warlike, wisely silent, reserved, and
reticent men (and as such, with the most delicate sensibility for the charm
and nuances of society) is thus established, unaffected by the vicissitudes of
generations; the constant struggle with uniform UNFAVOURABLE
conditions is, as already remarked, the cause of a type becoming stable and
hard. Finally, however, a happy state of things results, the enormous tension
is relaxed; there are perhaps no more enemies among the neighbouring
peoples, and the means of life, even of the enjoyment of life, are present in
superabundance. With one stroke the bond and constraint of the old
discipline severs: it is no longer regarded as necessary, as a condition of
existence—if it would continue, it can only do so as a form of LUXURY, as
an archaizing TASTE. Variations, whether they be deviations (into the
higher, finer, and rarer), or deteriorations and monstrosities, appear
suddenly on the scene in the greatest exuberance and splendour; the
individual dares to be individual and detach himself. At this turning-point
of history there manifest themselves, side by side, and often mixed and
entangled together, a magnificent, manifold, virgin-forest-like up-growth
and up-striving, a kind of TROPICAL TEMPO in the rivalry of growth, and
an extraordinary decay and self-destruction, owing to the savagely opposing
and seemingly exploding egoisms, which strive with one another "for sun
and light," and can no longer assign any limit, restraint, or forbearance for
themselves by means of the hitherto existing morality. It was this morality
itself which piled up the strength so enormously, which bent the bow in so
threatening a manner:—it is now "out of date," it is getting "out of date."

The dangerous and disquieting point has been reached when the greater,
more manifold, more comprehensive life IS LIVED BEYOND the old
morality; the "individual" stands out, and is obliged to have recourse to his
own law-giving, his own arts and artifices for self-preservation, selfelevation, and self-deliverance. Nothing but new "Whys," nothing but new
"Hows," no common formulas any longer, misunderstanding and disregard
in league with each other, decay, deterioration, and the loftiest desires
frightfully entangled, the genius of the race overflowing from all the
cornucopias of good and bad, a portentous simultaneousness of Spring and
Autumn, full of new charms and mysteries peculiar to the fresh, still
inexhausted, still unwearied corruption. Danger is again present, the mother
of morality, great danger; this time shifted into the individual, into the
neighbour and friend, into the street, into their own child, into their own
heart, into all the most personal and secret recesses of their desires and
volitions. What will the moral philosophers who appear at this time have to
preach? They discover, these sharp onlookers and loafers, that the end is
quickly approaching, that everything around them decays and produces
decay, that nothing will endure until the day after tomorrow, except one
species of man, the incurably MEDIOCRE. The mediocre alone have a
prospect of continuing and propagating themselves—they will be the men
of the future, the sole survivors; "be like them! become mediocre!" is now
the only morality which has still a significance, which still obtains a
hearing.—But it is difficult to preach this morality of mediocrity! it can
never avow what it is and what it desires! it has to talk of moderation and
dignity and duty and brotherly love—it will have difficulty IN
CONCEALING ITS IRONY!
263. There is an INSTINCT FOR RANK, which more than anything else
is already the sign of a HIGH rank; there is a DELIGHT in the NUANCES
of reverence which leads one to infer noble origin and habits. The
refinement, goodness, and loftiness of a soul are put to a perilous test when
something passes by that is of the highest rank, but is not yet protected by
the awe of authority from obtrusive touches and incivilities: something that
goes its way like a living touchstone, undistinguished, undiscovered, and
tentative, perhaps voluntarily veiled and disguised. He whose task and
practice it is to investigate souls, will avail himself of many varieties of this
very art to determine the ultimate value of a soul, the unalterable, innate
order of rank to which it belongs: he will test it by its INSTINCT FOR

REVERENCE. DIFFERENCE ENGENDRE HAINE: the vulgarity of
many a nature spurts up suddenly like dirty water, when any holy vessel,
any jewel from closed shrines, any book bearing the marks of great destiny,
is brought before it; while on the other hand, there is an involuntary silence,
a hesitation of the eye, a cessation of all gestures, by which it is indicated
that a soul FEELS the nearness of what is worthiest of respect. The way in
which, on the whole, the reverence for the BIBLE has hitherto been
maintained in Europe, is perhaps the best example of discipline and
refinement of manners which Europe owes to Christianity: books of such
profoundness and supreme significance require for their protection an
external tyranny of authority, in order to acquire the PERIOD of thousands
of years which is necessary to exhaust and unriddle them. Much has been
achieved when the sentiment has been at last instilled into the masses (the
shallow-pates and the boobies of every kind) that they are not allowed to
touch everything, that there are holy experiences before which they must
take off their shoes and keep away the unclean hand—it is almost their
highest advance towards humanity. On the contrary, in the so-called
cultured classes, the believers in "modern ideas," nothing is perhaps so
repulsive as their lack of shame, the easy insolence of eye and hand with
which they touch, taste, and finger everything; and it is possible that even
yet there is more RELATIVE nobility of taste, and more tact for reverence
among the people, among the lower classes of the people, especially among
peasants, than among the newspaper-reading DEMIMONDE of intellect,
the cultured class.
264. It cannot be effaced from a man's soul what his ancestors have
preferably and most constantly done: whether they were perhaps diligent
economizers attached to a desk and a cash-box, modest and citizen-like in
their desires, modest also in their virtues; or whether they were accustomed
to commanding from morning till night, fond of rude pleasures and
probably of still ruder duties and responsibilities; or whether, finally, at one
time or another, they have sacrificed old privileges of birth and possession,
in order to live wholly for their faith—for their "God,"—as men of an
inexorable and sensitive conscience, which blushes at every compromise. It
is quite impossible for a man NOT to have the qualities and predilections of
his parents and ancestors in his constitution, whatever appearances may
suggest to the contrary. This is the problem of race. Granted that one knows
something of the parents, it is admissible to draw a conclusion about the

child: any kind of offensive incontinence, any kind of sordid envy, or of
clumsy self-vaunting—the three things which together have constituted the
genuine plebeian type in all times—such must pass over to the child, as
surely as bad blood; and with the help of the best education and culture one
will only succeed in DECEIVING with regard to such heredity.—And what
else does education and culture try to do nowadays! In our very democratic,
or rather, very plebeian age, "education" and "culture" MUST be essentially
the art of deceiving—deceiving with regard to origin, with regard to the
inherited plebeianism in body and soul. An educator who nowadays
preached truthfulness above everything else, and called out constantly to his
pupils: "Be true! Be natural! Show yourselves as you are!"—even such a
virtuous and sincere ass would learn in a short time to have recourse to the
FURCA of Horace, NATURAM EXPELLERE: with what results?
"Plebeianism" USQUE RECURRET. [FOOTNOTE: Horace's "Epistles," I.
x. 24.]
265. At the risk of displeasing innocent ears, I submit that egoism
belongs to the essence of a noble soul, I mean the unalterable belief that to a
being such as "we," other beings must naturally be in subjection, and have
to sacrifice themselves. The noble soul accepts the fact of his egoism
without question, and also without consciousness of harshness, constraint,
or arbitrariness therein, but rather as something that may have its basis in
the primary law of things:—if he sought a designation for it he would say:
"It is justice itself." He acknowledges under certain circumstances, which
made him hesitate at first, that there are other equally privileged ones; as
soon as he has settled this question of rank, he moves among those equals
and equally privileged ones with the same assurance, as regards modesty
and delicate respect, which he enjoys in intercourse with himself—in
accordance with an innate heavenly mechanism which all the stars
understand. It is an ADDITIONAL instance of his egoism, this artfulness
and self-limitation in intercourse with his equals—every star is a similar
egoist; he honours HIMSELF in them, and in the rights which he concedes
to them, he has no doubt that the exchange of honours and rights, as the
ESSENCE of all intercourse, belongs also to the natural condition of things.
The noble soul gives as he takes, prompted by the passionate and sensitive
instinct of requital, which is at the root of his nature. The notion of "favour"
has, INTER PARES, neither significance nor good repute; there may be a
sublime way of letting gifts as it were light upon one from above, and of

drinking them thirstily like dew-drops; but for those arts and displays the
noble soul has no aptitude. His egoism hinders him here: in general, he
looks "aloft" unwillingly—he looks either FORWARD, horizontally and
deliberately, or downwards—HE KNOWS THAT HE IS ON A HEIGHT.
266. "One can only truly esteem him who does not LOOK OUT FOR
himself."—Goethe to Rath Schlosser.
267. The Chinese have a proverb which mothers even teach their
children: "SIAO-SIN" ("MAKE THY HEART SMALL"). This is the
essentially fundamental tendency in latter-day civilizations. I have no doubt
that an ancient Greek, also, would first of all remark the self-dwarfing in us
Europeans of today—in this respect alone we should immediately be
"distasteful" to him.
268. What, after all, is ignobleness?—Words are vocal symbols for ideas;
ideas, however, are more or less definite mental symbols for frequently
returning and concurring sensations, for groups of sensations. It is not
sufficient to use the same words in order to understand one another: we
must also employ the same words for the same kind of internal experiences,
we must in the end have experiences IN COMMON. On this account the
people of one nation understand one another better than those belonging to
different nations, even when they use the same language; or rather, when
people have lived long together under similar conditions (of climate, soil,
danger, requirement, toil) there ORIGINATES therefrom an entity that
"understands itself"—namely, a nation. In all souls a like number of
frequently recurring experiences have gained the upper hand over those
occurring more rarely: about these matters people understand one another
rapidly and always more rapidly—the history of language is the history of a
process of abbreviation; on the basis of this quick comprehension people
always unite closer and closer. The greater the danger, the greater is the
need of agreeing quickly and readily about what is necessary; not to
misunderstand one another in danger—that is what cannot at all be
dispensed with in intercourse. Also in all loves and friendships one has the
experience that nothing of the kind continues when the discovery has been
made that in using the same words, one of the two parties has feelings,
thoughts, intuitions, wishes, or fears different from those of the other. (The
fear of the "eternal misunderstanding": that is the good genius which so
often keeps persons of different sexes from too hasty attachments, to which

sense and heart prompt them—and NOT some Schopenhauerian "genius of
the species"!) Whichever groups of sensations within a soul awaken most
readily, begin to speak, and give the word of command—these decide as to
the general order of rank of its values, and determine ultimately its list of
desirable things. A man's estimates of value betray something of the
STRUCTURE of his soul, and wherein it sees its conditions of life, its
intrinsic needs. Supposing now that necessity has from all time drawn
together only such men as could express similar requirements and similar
experiences by similar symbols, it results on the whole that the easy
COMMUNICABILITY of need, which implies ultimately the undergoing
only of average and COMMON experiences, must have been the most
potent of all the forces which have hitherto operated upon mankind. The
more similar, the more ordinary people, have always had and are still
having the advantage; the more select, more refined, more unique, and
difficultly comprehensible, are liable to stand alone; they succumb to
accidents in their isolation, and seldom propagate themselves. One must
appeal to immense opposing forces, in order to thwart this natural, all-toonatural PROGRESSUS IN SIMILE, the evolution of man to the similar, the
ordinary, the average, the gregarious—to the IGNOBLE—!
269. The more a psychologist—a born, an unavoidable psychologist and
soul-diviner—turns his attention to the more select cases and individuals,
the greater is his danger of being suffocated by sympathy: he NEEDS
sternness and cheerfulness more than any other man. For the corruption, the
ruination of higher men, of the more unusually constituted souls, is in fact,
the rule: it is dreadful to have such a rule always before one's eyes. The
manifold torment of the psychologist who has discovered this ruination,
who discovers once, and then discovers ALMOST repeatedly throughout all
history, this universal inner "desperateness" of higher men, this eternal "too
late!" in every sense—may perhaps one day be the cause of his turning with
bitterness against his own lot, and of his making an attempt at selfdestruction—of his "going to ruin" himself. One may perceive in almost
every psychologist a tell-tale inclination for delightful intercourse with
commonplace and well-ordered men; the fact is thereby disclosed that he
always requires healing, that he needs a sort of flight and forgetfulness,
away from what his insight and incisiveness—from what his "business"—
has laid upon his conscience. The fear of his memory is peculiar to him. He
is easily silenced by the judgment of others; he hears with unmoved

countenance how people honour, admire, love, and glorify, where he has
PERCEIVED—or he even conceals his silence by expressly assenting to
some plausible opinion. Perhaps the paradox of his situation becomes so
dreadful that, precisely where he has learnt GREAT SYMPATHY, together
with great CONTEMPT, the multitude, the educated, and the visionaries,
have on their part learnt great reverence—reverence for "great men" and
marvelous animals, for the sake of whom one blesses and honours the
fatherland, the earth, the dignity of mankind, and one's own self, to whom
one points the young, and in view of whom one educates them. And who
knows but in all great instances hitherto just the same happened: that the
multitude worshipped a God, and that the "God" was only a poor sacrificial
animal! SUCCESS has always been the greatest liar—and the "work" itself
is a success; the great statesman, the conqueror, the discoverer, are
disguised in their creations until they are unrecognizable; the "work" of the
artist, of the philosopher, only invents him who has created it, is REPUTED
to have created it; the "great men," as they are reverenced, are poor little
fictions composed afterwards; in the world of historical values spurious
coinage PREVAILS. Those great poets, for example, such as Byron,
Musset, Poe, Leopardi, Kleist, Gogol (I do not venture to mention much
greater names, but I have them in my mind), as they now appear, and were
perhaps obliged to be: men of the moment, enthusiastic, sensuous, and
childish, light-minded and impulsive in their trust and distrust; with souls in
which usually some flaw has to be concealed; often taking revenge with
their works for an internal defilement, often seeking forgetfulness in their
soaring from a too true memory, often lost in the mud and almost in love
with it, until they become like the Will-o'-the-Wisps around the swamps,
and PRETEND TO BE stars—the people then call them idealists,—often
struggling with protracted disgust, with an ever-reappearing phantom of
disbelief, which makes them cold, and obliges them to languish for
GLORIA and devour "faith as it is" out of the hands of intoxicated
adulators:—what a TORMENT these great artists are and the so-called
higher men in general, to him who has once found them out! It is thus
conceivable that it is just from woman—who is clairvoyant in the world of
suffering, and also unfortunately eager to help and save to an extent far
beyond her powers—that THEY have learnt so readily those outbreaks of
boundless devoted SYMPATHY, which the multitude, above all the reverent
multitude, do not understand, and overwhelm with prying and self-

gratifying interpretations. This sympathizing invariably deceives itself as to
its power; woman would like to believe that love can do EVERYTHING—
it is the SUPERSTITION peculiar to her. Alas, he who knows the heart
finds out how poor, helpless, pretentious, and blundering even the best and
deepest love is—he finds that it rather DESTROYS than saves!—It is
possible that under the holy fable and travesty of the life of Jesus there is
hidden one of the most painful cases of the martyrdom of KNOWLEDGE
ABOUT LOVE: the martyrdom of the most innocent and most craving
heart, that never had enough of any human love, that DEMANDED love,
that demanded inexorably and frantically to be loved and nothing else, with
terrible outbursts against those who refused him their love; the story of a
poor soul insatiated and insatiable in love, that had to invent hell to send
thither those who WOULD NOT love him—and that at last, enlightened
about human love, had to invent a God who is entire love, entire
CAPACITY for love—who takes pity on human love, because it is so
paltry, so ignorant! He who has such sentiments, he who has such
KNOWLEDGE about love—SEEKS for death!—But why should one deal
with such painful matters? Provided, of course, that one is not obliged to do
so.
270. The intellectual haughtiness and loathing of every man who has
suffered deeply—it almost determines the order of rank HOW deeply men
can suffer—the chilling certainty, with which he is thoroughly imbued and
coloured, that by virtue of his suffering he KNOWS MORE than the
shrewdest and wisest can ever know, that he has been familiar with, and "at
home" in, many distant, dreadful worlds of which "YOU know nothing"!—
this silent intellectual haughtiness of the sufferer, this pride of the elect of
knowledge, of the "initiated," of the almost sacrificed, finds all forms of
disguise necessary to protect itself from contact with officious and
sympathizing hands, and in general from all that is not its equal in suffering.
Profound suffering makes noble: it separates.—One of the most refined
forms of disguise is Epicurism, along with a certain ostentatious boldness of
taste, which takes suffering lightly, and puts itself on the defensive against
all that is sorrowful and profound. They are "gay men" who make use of
gaiety, because they are misunderstood on account of it—they WISH to be
misunderstood. There are "scientific minds" who make use of science,
because it gives a gay appearance, and because scientificness leads to the
conclusion that a person is superficial—they WISH to mislead to a false

conclusion. There are free insolent minds which would fain conceal and
deny that they are broken, proud, incurable hearts (the cynicism of Hamlet
—the case of Galiani); and occasionally folly itself is the mask of an
unfortunate OVER-ASSURED knowledge.—From which it follows that it
is the part of a more refined humanity to have reverence "for the mask," and
not to make use of psychology and curiosity in the wrong place.
271. That which separates two men most profoundly is a different sense
and grade of purity. What does it matter about all their honesty and
reciprocal usefulness, what does it matter about all their mutual good-will:
the fact still remains—they "cannot smell each other!" The highest instinct
for purity places him who is affected with it in the most extraordinary and
dangerous isolation, as a saint: for it is just holiness—the highest
spiritualization of the instinct in question. Any kind of cognizance of an
indescribable excess in the joy of the bath, any kind of ardour or thirst
which perpetually impels the soul out of night into the morning, and out of
gloom, out of "affliction" into clearness, brightness, depth, and refinement:
—just as much as such a tendency DISTINGUISHES—it is a noble
tendency—it also SEPARATES.—The pity of the saint is pity for the
FILTH of the human, all-too-human. And there are grades and heights
where pity itself is regarded by him as impurity, as filth.
272. Signs of nobility: never to think of lowering our duties to the rank of
duties for everybody; to be unwilling to renounce or to share our
responsibilities; to count our prerogatives, and the exercise of them, among
our DUTIES.
273. A man who strives after great things, looks upon every one whom
he encounters on his way either as a means of advance, or a delay and
hindrance—or as a temporary resting-place. His peculiar lofty BOUNTY to
his fellow-men is only possible when he attains his elevation and
dominates. Impatience, and the consciousness of being always condemned
to comedy up to that time—for even strife is a comedy, and conceals the
end, as every means does—spoil all intercourse for him; this kind of man is
acquainted with solitude, and what is most poisonous in it.
274. THE PROBLEM OF THOSE WHO WAIT.—Happy chances are
necessary, and many incalculable elements, in order that a higher man in
whom the solution of a problem is dormant, may yet take action, or "break
forth," as one might say—at the right moment. On an average it DOES

NOT happen; and in all corners of the earth there are waiting ones sitting
who hardly know to what extent they are waiting, and still less that they
wait in vain. Occasionally, too, the waking call comes too late—the chance
which gives "permission" to take action—when their best youth, and
strength for action have been used up in sitting still; and how many a one,
just as he "sprang up," has found with horror that his limbs are benumbed
and his spirits are now too heavy! "It is too late," he has said to himself—
and has become self-distrustful and henceforth for ever useless.—In the
domain of genius, may not the "Raphael without hands" (taking the
expression in its widest sense) perhaps not be the exception, but the rule?—
Perhaps genius is by no means so rare: but rather the five hundred HANDS
which it requires in order to tyrannize over the [GREEK INSERTED
HERE], "the right time"—in order to take chance by the forelock!
275. He who does not WISH to see the height of a man, looks all the
more sharply at what is low in him, and in the foreground—and thereby
betrays himself.
276. In all kinds of injury and loss the lower and coarser soul is better off
than the nobler soul: the dangers of the latter must be greater, the
probability that it will come to grief and perish is in fact immense,
considering the multiplicity of the conditions of its existence.—In a lizard a
finger grows again which has been lost; not so in man.—
277. It is too bad! Always the old story! When a man has finished
building his house, he finds that he has learnt unawares something which he
OUGHT absolutely to have known before he—began to build. The eternal,
fatal "Too late!" The melancholia of everything COMPLETED—!
278.—Wanderer, who art thou? I see thee follow thy path without scorn,
without love, with unfathomable eyes, wet and sad as a plummet which has
returned to the light insatiated out of every depth—what did it seek down
there?—with a bosom that never sighs, with lips that conceal their loathing,
with a hand which only slowly grasps: who art thou? what hast thou done?
Rest thee here: this place has hospitality for every one—refresh thyself!
And whoever thou art, what is it that now pleases thee? What will serve to
refresh thee? Only name it, whatever I have I offer thee! "To refresh me? To
refresh me? Oh, thou prying one, what sayest thou! But give me, I pray thee
—-" What? what? Speak out! "Another mask! A second mask!"

279. Men of profound sadness betray themselves when they are happy:
they have a mode of seizing upon happiness as though they would choke
and strangle it, out of jealousy—ah, they know only too well that it will flee
from them!
280. "Bad! Bad! What? Does he not—go back?" Yes! But you
misunderstand him when you complain about it. He goes back like every
one who is about to make a great spring.
281.—"Will people believe it of me? But I insist that they believe it of
me: I have always thought very unsatisfactorily of myself and about myself,
only in very rare cases, only compulsorily, always without delight in 'the
subject,' ready to digress from 'myself,' and always without faith in the
result, owing to an unconquerable distrust of the POSSIBILITY of selfknowledge, which has led me so far as to feel a CONTRADICTIO IN
ADJECTO even in the idea of 'direct knowledge' which theorists allow
themselves:—this matter of fact is almost the most certain thing I know
about myself. There must be a sort of repugnance in me to BELIEVE
anything definite about myself.—Is there perhaps some enigma therein?
Probably; but fortunately nothing for my own teeth.—Perhaps it betrays the
species to which I belong?—but not to myself, as is sufficiently agreeable
to me."
282.—"But what has happened to you?"—"I do not know," he said,
hesitatingly; "perhaps the Harpies have flown over my table."—It
sometimes happens nowadays that a gentle, sober, retiring man becomes
suddenly mad, breaks the plates, upsets the table, shrieks, raves, and shocks
everybody—and finally withdraws, ashamed, and raging at himself—
whither? for what purpose? To famish apart? To suffocate with his
memories?—To him who has the desires of a lofty and dainty soul, and only
seldom finds his table laid and his food prepared, the danger will always be
great—nowadays, however, it is extraordinarily so. Thrown into the midst
of a noisy and plebeian age, with which he does not like to eat out of the
same dish, he may readily perish of hunger and thirst—or, should he
nevertheless finally "fall to," of sudden nausea.—We have probably all sat
at tables to which we did not belong; and precisely the most spiritual of us,
who are most difficult to nourish, know the dangerous DYSPEPSIA which
originates from a sudden insight and disillusionment about our food and our
messmates—the AFTER-DINNER NAUSEA.

283. If one wishes to praise at all, it is a delicate and at the same time a
noble self-control, to praise only where one DOES NOT agree—otherwise
in fact one would praise oneself, which is contrary to good taste:—a selfcontrol, to be sure, which offers excellent opportunity and provocation to
constant MISUNDERSTANDING. To be able to allow oneself this
veritable luxury of taste and morality, one must not live among intellectual
imbeciles, but rather among men whose misunderstandings and mistakes
amuse by their refinement—or one will have to pay dearly for it!—"He
praises me, THEREFORE he acknowledges me to be right"—this asinine
method of inference spoils half of the life of us recluses, for it brings the
asses into our neighbourhood and friendship.
284. To live in a vast and proud tranquility; always beyond... To have, or
not to have, one's emotions, one's For and Against, according to choice; to
lower oneself to them for hours; to SEAT oneself on them as upon horses,
and often as upon asses:—for one must know how to make use of their
stupidity as well as of their fire. To conserve one's three hundred
foregrounds; also one's black spectacles: for there are circumstances when
nobody must look into our eyes, still less into our "motives." And to choose
for company that roguish and cheerful vice, politeness. And to remain
master of one's four virtues, courage, insight, sympathy, and solitude. For
solitude is a virtue with us, as a sublime bent and bias to purity, which
divines that in the contact of man and man—"in society"—it must be
unavoidably impure. All society makes one somehow, somewhere, or
sometime—"commonplace."
285. The greatest events and thoughts—the greatest thoughts, however,
are the greatest events—are longest in being comprehended: the generations
which are contemporary with them do not EXPERIENCE such events—
they live past them. Something happens there as in the realm of stars. The
light of the furthest stars is longest in reaching man; and before it has
arrived man DENIES—that there are stars there. "How many centuries does
a mind require to be understood?"—that is also a standard, one also makes a
gradation of rank and an etiquette therewith, such as is necessary for mind
and for star.
286. "Here is the prospect free, the mind exalted." [FOOTNOTE:
Goethe's "Faust," Part II, Act V. The words of Dr. Marianus.]—But there is

a reverse kind of man, who is also upon a height, and has also a free
prospect—but looks DOWNWARDS.
287. What is noble? What does the word "noble" still mean for us
nowadays? How does the noble man betray himself, how is he recognized
under this heavy overcast sky of the commencing plebeianism, by which
everything is rendered opaque and leaden?—It is not his actions which
establish his claim—actions are always ambiguous, always inscrutable;
neither is it his "works." One finds nowadays among artists and scholars
plenty of those who betray by their works that a profound longing for
nobleness impels them; but this very NEED of nobleness is radically
different from the needs of the noble soul itself, and is in fact the eloquent
and dangerous sign of the lack thereof. It is not the works, but the BELIEF
which is here decisive and determines the order of rank—to employ once
more an old religious formula with a new and deeper meaning—it is some
fundamental certainty which a noble soul has about itself, something which
is not to be sought, is not to be found, and perhaps, also, is not to be lost.—
THE NOBLE SOUL HAS REVERENCE FOR ITSELF.—
288. There are men who are unavoidably intellectual, let them turn and
twist themselves as they will, and hold their hands before their treacherous
eyes—as though the hand were not a betrayer; it always comes out at last
that they have something which they hide—namely, intellect. One of the
subtlest means of deceiving, at least as long as possible, and of successfully
representing oneself to be stupider than one really is—which in everyday
life is often as desirable as an umbrella,—is called ENTHUSIASM,
including what belongs to it, for instance, virtue. For as Galiani said, who
was obliged to know it: VERTU EST ENTHOUSIASME.
289. In the writings of a recluse one always hears something of the echo
of the wilderness, something of the murmuring tones and timid vigilance of
solitude; in his strongest words, even in his cry itself, there sounds a new
and more dangerous kind of silence, of concealment. He who has sat day
and night, from year's end to year's end, alone with his soul in familiar
discord and discourse, he who has become a cave-bear, or a treasure-seeker,
or a treasure-guardian and dragon in his cave—it may be a labyrinth, but
can also be a gold-mine—his ideas themselves eventually acquire a
twilight-colour of their own, and an odour, as much of the depth as of the
mould, something uncommunicative and repulsive, which blows chilly

upon every passer-by. The recluse does not believe that a philosopher—
supposing that a philosopher has always in the first place been a recluse—
ever expressed his actual and ultimate opinions in books: are not books
written precisely to hide what is in us?—indeed, he will doubt whether a
philosopher CAN have "ultimate and actual" opinions at all; whether behind
every cave in him there is not, and must necessarily be, a still deeper cave:
an ampler, stranger, richer world beyond the surface, an abyss behind every
bottom, beneath every "foundation." Every philosophy is a foreground
philosophy—this is a recluse's verdict: "There is something arbitrary in the
fact that the PHILOSOPHER came to a stand here, took a retrospect, and
looked around; that he HERE laid his spade aside and did not dig any
deeper—there is also something suspicious in it." Every philosophy also
CONCEALS a philosophy; every opinion is also a LURKING-PLACE,
every word is also a MASK.
290. Every deep thinker is more afraid of being understood than of being
misunderstood. The latter perhaps wounds his vanity; but the former
wounds his heart, his sympathy, which always says: "Ah, why would you
also have as hard a time of it as I have?"
291. Man, a COMPLEX, mendacious, artful, and inscrutable animal,
uncanny to the other animals by his artifice and sagacity, rather than by his
strength, has invented the good conscience in order finally to enjoy his soul
as something SIMPLE; and the whole of morality is a long, audacious
falsification, by virtue of which generally enjoyment at the sight of the soul
becomes possible. From this point of view there is perhaps much more in
the conception of "art" than is generally believed.
292. A philosopher: that is a man who constantly experiences, sees,
hears, suspects, hopes, and dreams extraordinary things; who is struck by
his own thoughts as if they came from the outside, from above and below,
as a species of events and lightning-flashes PECULIAR TO HIM; who is
perhaps himself a storm pregnant with new lightnings; a portentous man,
around whom there is always rumbling and mumbling and gaping and
something uncanny going on. A philosopher: alas, a being who often runs
away from himself, is often afraid of himself—but whose curiosity always
makes him "come to himself" again.
293. A man who says: "I like that, I take it for my own, and mean to
guard and protect it from every one"; a man who can conduct a case, carry

out a resolution, remain true to an opinion, keep hold of a woman, punish
and overthrow insolence; a man who has his indignation and his sword, and
to whom the weak, the suffering, the oppressed, and even the animals
willingly submit and naturally belong; in short, a man who is a MASTER
by nature—when such a man has sympathy, well! THAT sympathy has
value! But of what account is the sympathy of those who suffer! Or of those
even who preach sympathy! There is nowadays, throughout almost the
whole of Europe, a sickly irritability and sensitiveness towards pain, and
also a repulsive irrestrainableness in complaining, an effeminizing, which,
with the aid of religion and philosophical nonsense, seeks to deck itself out
as something superior—there is a regular cult of suffering. The
UNMANLINESS of that which is called "sympathy" by such groups of
visionaries, is always, I believe, the first thing that strikes the eye.—One
must resolutely and radically taboo this latest form of bad taste; and finally
I wish people to put the good amulet, "GAI SABER" ("gay science," in
ordinary language), on heart and neck, as a protection against it.
294. THE OLYMPIAN VICE.—Despite the philosopher who, as a
genuine Englishman, tried to bring laughter into bad repute in all thinking
minds—"Laughing is a bad infirmity of human nature, which every
thinking mind will strive to overcome" (Hobbes),—I would even allow
myself to rank philosophers according to the quality of their laughing—up
to those who are capable of GOLDEN laughter. And supposing that Gods
also philosophize, which I am strongly inclined to believe, owing to many
reasons—I have no doubt that they also know how to laugh thereby in an
overman-like and new fashion—and at the expense of all serious things!
Gods are fond of ridicule: it seems that they cannot refrain from laughter
even in holy matters.
295. The genius of the heart, as that great mysterious one possesses it, the
tempter-god and born rat-catcher of consciences, whose voice can descend
into the nether-world of every soul, who neither speaks a word nor casts a
glance in which there may not be some motive or touch of allurement, to
whose perfection it pertains that he knows how to appear,—not as he is, but
in a guise which acts as an ADDITIONAL constraint on his followers to
press ever closer to him, to follow him more cordially and thoroughly;—the
genius of the heart, which imposes silence and attention on everything loud
and self-conceited, which smoothes rough souls and makes them taste a
new longing—to lie placid as a mirror, that the deep heavens may be

reflected in them;—the genius of the heart, which teaches the clumsy and
too hasty hand to hesitate, and to grasp more delicately; which scents the
hidden and forgotten treasure, the drop of goodness and sweet spirituality
under thick dark ice, and is a divining-rod for every grain of gold, long
buried and imprisoned in mud and sand; the genius of the heart, from
contact with which every one goes away richer; not favoured or surprised,
not as though gratified and oppressed by the good things of others; but
richer in himself, newer than before, broken up, blown upon, and sounded
by a thawing wind; more uncertain, perhaps, more delicate, more fragile,
more bruised, but full of hopes which as yet lack names, full of a new will
and current, full of a new ill-will and counter-current... but what am I doing,
my friends? Of whom am I talking to you? Have I forgotten myself so far
that I have not even told you his name? Unless it be that you have already
divined of your own accord who this questionable God and spirit is, that
wishes to be PRAISED in such a manner? For, as it happens to every one
who from childhood onward has always been on his legs, and in foreign
lands, I have also encountered on my path many strange and dangerous
spirits; above all, however, and again and again, the one of whom I have
just spoken: in fact, no less a personage than the God DIONYSUS, the great
equivocator and tempter, to whom, as you know, I once offered in all
secrecy and reverence my first-fruits—the last, as it seems to me, who has
offered a SACRIFICE to him, for I have found no one who could
understand what I was then doing. In the meantime, however, I have learned
much, far too much, about the philosophy of this God, and, as I said, from
mouth to mouth—I, the last disciple and initiate of the God Dionysus: and
perhaps I might at last begin to give you, my friends, as far as I am allowed,
a little taste of this philosophy? In a hushed voice, as is but seemly: for it
has to do with much that is secret, new, strange, wonderful, and uncanny.
The very fact that Dionysus is a philosopher, and that therefore Gods also
philosophize, seems to me a novelty which is not unensnaring, and might
perhaps arouse suspicion precisely among philosophers;—among you, my
friends, there is less to be said against it, except that it comes too late and
not at the right time; for, as it has been disclosed to me, you are loth
nowadays to believe in God and gods. It may happen, too, that in the
frankness of my story I must go further than is agreeable to the strict usages
of your ears? Certainly the God in question went further, very much further,
in such dialogues, and was always many paces ahead of me... Indeed, if it

were allowed, I should have to give him, according to human usage, fine
ceremonious tides of lustre and merit, I should have to extol his courage as
investigator and discoverer, his fearless honesty, truthfulness, and love of
wisdom. But such a God does not know what to do with all that respectable
trumpery and pomp. "Keep that," he would say, "for thyself and those like
thee, and whoever else require it! I—have no reason to cover my
nakedness!" One suspects that this kind of divinity and philosopher perhaps
lacks shame?—He once said: "Under certain circumstances I love
mankind"—and referred thereby to Ariadne, who was present; "in my
opinion man is an agreeable, brave, inventive animal, that has not his equal
upon earth, he makes his way even through all labyrinths. I like man, and
often think how I can still further advance him, and make him stronger,
more evil, and more profound."—"Stronger, more evil, and more
profound?" I asked in horror. "Yes," he said again, "stronger, more evil, and
more profound; also more beautiful"—and thereby the tempter-god smiled
with his halcyon smile, as though he had just paid some charming
compliment. One here sees at once that it is not only shame that this
divinity lacks;—and in general there are good grounds for supposing that in
some things the Gods could all of them come to us men for instruction. We
men are—more human.—
296. Alas! what are you, after all, my written and painted thoughts! Not
long ago you were so variegated, young and malicious, so full of thorns and
secret spices, that you made me sneeze and laugh—and now? You have
already doffed your novelty, and some of you, I fear, are ready to become
truths, so immortal do they look, so pathetically honest, so tedious! And
was it ever otherwise? What then do we write and paint, we mandarins with
Chinese brush, we immortalisers of things which LEND themselves to
writing, what are we alone capable of painting? Alas, only that which is just
about to fade and begins to lose its odour! Alas, only exhausted and
departing storms and belated yellow sentiments! Alas, only birds strayed
and fatigued by flight, which now let themselves be captured with the hand
—with OUR hand! We immortalize what cannot live and fly much longer,
things only which are exhausted and mellow! And it is only for your
AFTERNOON, you, my written and painted thoughts, for which alone I
have colours, many colours, perhaps, many variegated softenings, and fifty
yellows and browns and greens and reds;—but nobody will divine thereby

how ye looked in your morning, you sudden sparks and marvels of my
solitude, you, my old, beloved—EVIL thoughts!

FROM THE HEIGHTS
By F W Nietzsche
Translated by L. A. Magnus
1.
MIDDAY of Life! Oh, season of delight!
My summer's park!
Uneaseful joy to look, to lurk, to hark—
I peer for friends, am ready day and night,—
Where linger ye, my friends? The time is right!
2.
Is not the glacier's grey today for you
Rose-garlanded?
The brooklet seeks you, wind, cloud, with longing thread
And thrust themselves yet higher to the blue,
To spy for you from farthest eagle's view.
3.
My table was spread out for you on high—
Who dwelleth so
Star-near, so near the grisly pit below?—
My realm—what realm hath wider boundary?
My honey—who hath sipped its fragrancy?
4.
Friends, ye are there! Woe me,—yet I am not
He whom ye seek?
Ye stare and stop—better your wrath could speak!
I am not I? Hand, gait, face, changed? And what
I am, to you my friends, now am I not?
5.
Am I an other? Strange am I to Me?
Yet from Me sprung?
A wrestler, by himself too oft self-wrung?
Hindering too oft my own self's potency,
Wounded and hampered by self-victory?
6.
I sought where-so the wind blows keenest. There
I learned to dwell
Where no man dwells, on lonesome ice-lorn fell,
And unlearned Man and God and curse and prayer?

Became a ghost haunting the glaciers bare?
7.
Ye, my old friends! Look! Ye turn pale, filled o'er
With love and fear!
Go! Yet not in wrath. Ye could ne'er live here.
Here in the farthest realm of ice and scaur,
A huntsman must one be, like chamois soar.
8.
An evil huntsman was I? See how taut
My bow was bent!
Strongest was he by whom such bolt were sent—
Woe now! That arrow is with peril fraught,
Perilous as none.—Have yon safe home ye sought!
9.
Ye go! Thou didst endure enough, oh, heart;—
Strong was thy hope;
Unto new friends thy portals widely ope,
Let old ones be. Bid memory depart!
Wast thou young then, now—better young thou art!
10.
What linked us once together, one hope's tie—
(Who now doth con
Those lines, now fading, Love once wrote thereon?)—
Is like a parchment, which the hand is shy
To touch—like crackling leaves, all seared, all dry.
11.
Oh! Friends no more! They are—what name for those?—
Friends' phantom-flight
Knocking at my heart's window-pane at night,
Gazing on me, that speaks "We were" and goes,—
Oh, withered words, once fragrant as the rose!
12.
Pinings of youth that might not understand!
For which I pined,
Which I deemed changed with me, kin of my kind:
But they grew old, and thus were doomed and banned:
None but new kith are native of my land!
13.
Midday of life! My second youth's delight!
My summer's park!
Unrestful joy to long, to lurk, to hark!
I peer for friends!—am ready day and night,
For my new friends. Come! Come! The time is right!
14.
This song is done,—the sweet sad cry of rue

Sang out its end;
A wizard wrought it, he the timely friend,
The midday-friend,—no, do not ask me who;
At midday 'twas, when one became as two.
15.
We keep our Feast of Feasts, sure of our bourne,
Our aims self-same:
The Guest of Guests, friend Zarathustra, came!
The world now laughs, the grisly veil was torn,
And Light and Dark were one that wedding-morn.
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